中國的戰爭暴力從殲滅戰轉向對敵方的征服戰

現代英語：Military Academy

Editor’s Note: In today’s world, war looms large, with open and covert conflicts erupting one after another, revealing new connotations of war. The theory of war discusses the superstructure of violence, taking conflict as its object of study, exploring the roots, purposes, forms, and methods of political, military, economic, and social conflicts; the theory of violence studies the means and behavioral basis of war, taking confrontation as its object of study, exploring the nature, forms, laws, and violence of weapons and their use in confrontation. The theory of war is supported by the theory of violence, and the theory of violence is guided by the theory of war; the two complement each other, driving the evolution of the art of war. On July 24th of this year, this journal published Professor Lin Dong’s article “Comprehensive War Changes the Form of Conflict,” proposing a new theory of war. Here, this journal has invited Professor Lin Dong to write another article, “War Violence: From Annihilating the Enemy to Dominating the Enemy,” elaborating on the new theory of violence corresponding to the new theory of war, for our readers.

War is the highest form of violence, and violence is its most essential characteristic. As humanity entered the 21st century, driven by both technological advancements and pressing needs, war and violence entered a more advanced stage—the era of dominant violence.

1. The inevitability of the shift in war violence from annihilating the enemy to dominating the enemy

In the 21st century, information and intelligent technologies are reshaping the space and means of violence in warfare, triggering a differentiation in the application of violence. While novice war players are still reveling in the ever-evolving violence of conquering cities and territories, skilled war players have already devised new forms of violence that allow them to manipulate the enemy without firing a single shot. Once the opponent falls into the trap of being controlled, no matter how many battles they win, it will all be in vain, ultimately returning them to square one, or even leading to utter ruin.

The purpose of dominating violence is to enable oneself to strike the enemy and render their strikes ineffective. The ultimate goal of victory, pursued by both sides in war throughout history—to subdue the enemy without being subdued—is characterized by the asymmetry of violent confrontation. Information and intelligent technologies have solved the complexities of controllable and coordinated warfare, making war no longer like it was during World War II, where “the war machine, once started, was difficult to stop.” Violence has become a political tool that can be manipulated and used with ease. Especially under informationized and intelligent conditions, the controllability and deprivation of violence in war provide the conditions for dominating violence. The side possessing advanced technology can dominate the battlefield and control the course of war through non-contact warfare, achieving its war objectives by deterring, dismantling, and dismantling the enemy’s tools of violence. Thus, violent confrontation manifests as the deprivation or restraint of the opponent’s violence, allowing oneself to successfully evade enemy attacks.

The essence of dominating violence lies in the shift from annihilating the enemy to dominating the enemy, a shift determined by the emphasis on economic objectives in modern warfare. Engels pointed out, “Violence is merely a means; on the contrary, economic interests are the ends. The ends are far more ‘fundamental’ than the means used to achieve them.” Fundamentally, modern warfare pursues social values ​​and economic interests, leading to the expansion of war violence from direct to indirect violence. Simply put, victory can be achieved without physically destroying the enemy. Firstly, it involves the precise use and control of violence. The controllability of violence is developing towards precision, which is not only a political necessity to reduce collateral damage but also an economic necessity to lower the cost of war. It is also a requirement for quickly controlling the battlefield, effectively dominating the enemy, and seizing victory—a distinctive feature of modern warfare. Secondly, it has evolved from inflicting violence to deterring violence. Traditional violent confrontation emphasizes victory through battlefield combat, while dominating violence seeks to deter and dismantle the effectiveness of enemy violence. By displaying force and refusing the enemy’s use of force, it instills fear of war or renders the war machine inoperable, thereby achieving war objectives with minimal use of violence. Currently, the US military’s concepts of deterrence warfare and decapitation strikes are based on this idea. Thirdly, bloodless violence is comparable to bloody violence. The greatest advantage of bloodless violence is that it not only significantly reduces the cost of using violence but also increases the asymmetry of its use, leading to unexpected changes in the course of battle.

The dominant principle governing violence has shifted from the traditional greater use of violence to the optimal use of violence, leading to a decrease in the brutality of war. Since the end of the Cold War, casualties in modern warfare have decreased dramatically. From the Gulf War to the Iraq War, the total number of deaths on both sides dropped from less than 100,000 to less than 20,000, while the Vietnam War saw nearly 1.7 million deaths. However, the driving force behind this sharp decline in war casualties is not a decrease in the lethality of war, but rather strategic needs, primarily economic needs, as the economy has always been the root of war. Taking the Iraq War as an example, the United States sought oil resources; therefore, its purpose in launching the war was to establish an Iraq that aligned with American interests. “Destroying” Iraq or plunging it into chaos would only exacerbate the destructive nature of the war, increase the cost of post-war reconstruction, and amplify hostility, making post-war stability maintenance more difficult. Simultaneously, the overall decline in the brutality of war is also attributed to the progress in the world’s moral views on war since World War II, resulting in restrictions on the use of violence in war, with media playing a role in public opinion oversight. Thus, the violence of war was precisely used and released after precise planning and design. Unprecedented high-intensity military strikes could be carried out under the principle of minimizing (sufficient) collateral damage and not causing large-scale casualties. Instead of causing mass casualties among the enemy, the strikes quickly rendered the enemy unable to resist, which is equivalent to turning surgical strikes into minimally invasive surgery to reduce the aftereffects of war.

2. Dominating the enemy’s thinking is becoming the direct course of war.

Dominating the enemy evolved from deterring the enemy, but it is not a new concept. From Sun Tzu’s “the best strategy is to subdue the enemy by their plans” to the tactics of “leading the enemy by the nose,” there is a wealth of ideas about domination. However, in the past, due to a lack of weapons and technology, dominating the enemy was indirect. Today, the informatization and intelligentization of weapons are transforming the idea of ​​dominating the enemy into a direct approach to warfare.

Lethal violence plays a dominant role in military force, exhibiting a dual-track pattern of bloodshed and non-bloodshed in manned combat spaces, moving from physically eliminating the enemy to dominating them physiologically and psychologically. From cold weapons to firearms, all are physical violence that injures the body, belonging to the category of bloodshed violence. After carpet bombing reached its peak, it was constrained by the laws of war, shifting towards precision strikes to reduce unnecessary casualties. At the same time, demonstrating force remains an effective political tool; nuclear deterrence acts as a strategic stabilizer, and precision strikes enhance the effectiveness of conventional deterrence. However, precision violence is not “merciful violence,” and battlefield pressure is greater than ever before.

During World War I, biological and chemical weapons emerged, with bacteriological and chemical warfare entering the battlefield, causing massive casualties and ecological damage, and were banned by the Hague Convention. However, since the beginning of the 21st century, hegemonic powers have continued to pursue biological and chemical warfare, and terrorism has used these weapons as the best tool of violence against humanity. Therefore, some scholars consider the 21st century the century of biological warfare. With technological advancements, the controllability of the lethality of biological agents has greatly increased. In 2002, Russia used biogas for the first time in the anti-terrorism battlefield during a hostage crisis, marking the entry of non-lethal weapons into conventional warfare. With the rapid development of non-lethal weapons, the focus has shifted from gunpowder-based killings to controlling and destroying biological (physiological) systems, thereby disabling combat effectiveness. In particular, non-lethal weapons are more cost-effective compared to lethal weapons such as aircraft, warships, and tanks. With simplified manufacturing techniques, olfactory weapons, rubber bullets, traps, biological reagents, stun grenades, and laser blinding weapons have been deployed, driving lethal violence towards a soft-kill approach. Modern deterrence warfare and effects-based operations demonstrate that making the enemy afraid to use weapons or unable to use weapons on the battlefield can lead to easier victories. During the Iraq War, the United States successfully used deterrence warfare to intimidate and deceive Saddam Hussein, preventing him from using the Scud missiles that posed a threat to U.S. forces.

Intelligent warfare is shifting from force-intensive to weapon-intensive battlefields. Higher-dimensional spaces such as cyberspace, outer space, and electromagnetic spectrum are replacing land, sea, and air as the dominant operational spaces. These spaces are nearly unmanned, and with massive political, economic, and military critical infrastructure such as oil pipelines, storage facilities, and transportation hubs becoming the focus of attack, weapons of mass destruction are breaking free from the constraints of manned battlefields and turning towards destroying weapon systems and combat platforms. This shift from lethal violence to destructive violence has led to an unlimited increase in war violence. From the Gulf War to the Iraq War, the US military used cluster bombs and depleted uranium munitions to strike Iraqi military and political infrastructure and armored convoys, breaking the nuclear threshold to some extent and opening a new direction for the development of weapons of mass destruction. From the US military’s use of graphite bombs to attack urban power systems in the Kosovo War to the damage and paralysis of Iranian nuclear facilities by a virus attack, electromagnetic pulse weapons, space weapons, and cyber weapons have demonstrated enormous power. Although destructive weapons are strictly controlled and do not directly target humans, they aim to destroy operational systems, infrastructure, and even the enemy’s survival environment, thereby forcing the enemy to submit. What warrants particular attention is that nuclear strikes, restricted by the laws of war, are moving away from cities and civilians, and even densely populated manned battlefields, but are shifting towards sparsely populated unmanned battlefields, such as space, the deep sea, and isolated islands.

With the development of informatization and intelligentization, the information and cognitive domains have become new battlegrounds for penetrating the economy and society. Information tools and cognitive tools have naturally become new tools of violence, mainly manifested in the forms of cyber violence, economic violence, and cultural violence, which have emerged rapidly and forcibly altered the judgments, positions, and decisions of adversaries at the strategic and social levels. Cyber ​​warfare involves artificially creating false data or tampering with big data to induce adversaries to make incorrect judgments and decisions; economic violence has evolved into economic sanctions, financial warfare, and technological decoupling warfare, attacking adversaries’ stock markets and banking systems, disrupting adversaries’ supply chains through legal and coercive commercial means, and hindering adversaries’ development and innovation; cultural violence leverages digital networks to push traditional public opinion warfare into public diplomacy and global media warfare, thereby influencing the positions of the international community and the global public.

In short, in the era of dominant violence, the violence of war has shifted, expanding from lethal violence to destructive and coercive violence.

3. Just wars and unjust wars follow different paths of dominant violence.

In the 21st century, the violent nature of war has not changed; violence remains the primary act of war, and without violence, there can be no war. In the era of cold weapons, violence manifested as the clash of swords; in the era of firearms, it evolved into the smoke of gunpowder; and in the nuclear age, the violence of war has expanded infinitely. To this day, humanity as a whole still lives in a relatively peaceful era of insecurity under the threat of nuclear weapons.

Marx’s assertion that “violence is the midwife of every old society that gives birth to a new one” remains a tenet of just war. However, advancements in warfare and the globalization of warfare have elevated the structural transformation of violence in just war from a natural process to a conscious one. First, we must not allow the pursuit of efficiency in war to obscure our historical perspective, recognizing that only just war can achieve complete victory. Wars are always categorized as just or unjust, and informationized and intelligent warfare is no exception. Second, modern warfare practice has provided both tactical and technical lessons for promoting the development of just war theory and negative examples for political and strategic critique. A profound realization is that the US military’s promotion of low-casualty, low-cost warfare efficiency has given the world a strong impression of swift military victories. However, the US spent trillions of dollars on post-war reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq, yet still could not avoid the eventual withdrawal. Such lessons are ancient, and modern warfare continues to repeat them. The secret it reveals is that the pursuit of efficiency in informationized and intelligent warfare has not changed the fundamental principle that only just war can win peace. The U.S. military achieved military dominance through its superior combat power and, to some extent, economic dominance from before the start of the war until the end of the major combat operations. However, without just political leadership, its rapid victories based on information superiority were still short-lived, unsustainable, and politically unsuccessful military victories. Therefore, developing informationized and intelligent warfare along a just path is both determined by the political nature of the just side and a prerequisite for the just side to win.

Just wars differ from unjust wars, which are frequently waged for hegemonic gain. Just wars are typically acts of self-defense, driven by necessity, aiming to deter further and larger conflicts through a single act of violence, thus serving an educational purpose against violence. In 1958, the People’s Liberation Army’s shelling of Kinmen, evolving from all-weather attacks aimed at eliminating enemy manpower to shelling every other day, then to shelling without targeting individuals, and finally to notifying the enemy before shelling, represents a transformation from lethal violence to destructive violence, and finally to coercive violence. This served the war’s objectives of deterring, educating, and uniting the enemy, fully demonstrating the wisdom and courage of just wars. The view of violence in just wars can be summarized by “one central principle and two basic points”—the central principle is using just violence to curb unjust violence. This is fundamentally different from the pursuit of maximizing violence and the inhumane tendencies of unjust wars. One fundamental point is the development of self-defense violence, advocating the development of weapons to destroy weapons. Dominating the enemy requires emphasizing the development of violence capable of stopping violence itself, expanding military force in a direction where lethality and destructiveness are controllable, moving from lethal to non-lethal, and from environmentally destructive to environmentally minimal. Another fundamental point is the forceful, justified, and restrained use of force, not seeking to maximize its use, but rather selecting the methods of its application to dominate the enemy, and defining the laws of force in its specific application.

A just war advocates using lethal and destructive violence supplemented by coercive violence, moving from focusing on destroying the enemy’s tools of violence to deterring and preventing the enemy from using them, demonstrating a higher level of dominance over violence. Fundamentally, a just war is about defending one’s own territory and maritime borders, and highly values ​​the need for post-war environmental and social governance. It should be recognized that the US military dropped large quantities of depleted uranium, thermobaric, and graphite bombs in cities in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and established virus laboratories in other countries, causing long-term damage to urban environments and people’s livelihoods; its invisible destruction is enormous. Unjust wars, under the guise of reducing “bloodshed politics,” expand from inflicting external wounds to inflicting irreparable internal damage, abusing non-lethal violence, such as using audio weapons beyond reasonable limits, rupturing eardrums and causing hearing loss—more cruel than gunpowder-based killings, bringing terror rather than deterrence. Compared to the destructive and lethal nature of unjust wars, the violent structure of a just war is centered on coercion. First, we must strive to deter the enemy from launching its war machine, based on large-scale military declarations and pressure, demonstrating invincible strength and the determination to not withdraw until the objective is achieved. This will advance the deterrence strategy to a new level of dominance, showcasing the effectiveness of war preparations and deterring the enemy from taking desperate measures. Second, we must use limited lethal and destructive violence to prevent the enemy from operating its war machine, forcing it to abandon violent resistance. This method of depriving or hindering the enemy from using weapons is far less costly than destroying their weapons, more effective than destroying their troops and equipment, and more suitable for just wars. Third, we must use coercive violence as the main force, based on a protracted approach, and win an overwhelming strategic posture through flexible economic warfare, cyber warfare, and cognitive warfare.

Looking to the future, only just wars can bring about progress in the civilization of warfare. This is because the progress of the civilization of warfare depends on the warring parties’ understanding and choice of violence. History has proven that the dominant role of absolute violence in unjust wars is temporary and unreliable. While it provides conditions for the inevitable victory of just wars, the excessive abuse of violence simultaneously creates asymmetrical pressure on the just warring parties to exercise restraint. Therefore, just wars need to combine violence and non-violence to exert a dominant role, giving new support to the “inevitable victory of just wars” in the era of intelligent globalization. Just wars employ relative violence to achieve victory, aiming to create conditions for a political solution through limited but long-term military and economic control. This involves mobilizing the people of both sides and the international community to prevent the enemy from using the war machine, winning through containment, and containing through victory. It seeks to use violence efficiently and at low cost, achieving political victory with minimal casualties, minimal damage, and minimal cost.

(Author: Lin Dong, Professor at the National Defense University)

現代國語：

【講武堂】

編者按：當今世界，戰爭風雲籠罩，明戰暗戰此起彼伏，蘊藏戰爭新內涵。戰爭論講暴力之上層建筑，以沖突為研究對象，探究政治軍事經濟社會沖突的根源、目的、形態和方式﹔暴力論則研究戰爭之手段與行為基礎，以對抗為研究對象，探究武器和運用武器進行對抗的性質、形式、法則和暴烈程度。戰爭論以暴力論為支撐，暴力論則以戰爭論為指導，二者相輔相成，推動戰爭藝術的演化。今年7月24日，本刊發表了林東教授的文章《綜合戰爭改變沖突形態》提出了一種新戰爭論，這裡，本刊再請林東教授撰寫《戰爭暴力從消滅敵人走向支配敵人》一文，闡述與新戰爭論相對應的新暴力論，以饗讀者。

戰爭是暴力的最高形式，暴力是戰爭的最本質特征。人類進入21世紀，在技術推動和需求牽引雙雙作用之下，戰爭暴力進入了一個高級階段——支配暴力時代。

1、戰爭暴力從消滅敵人向支配敵人轉變的必然性

21世紀，信息化智能化技術正在刷新戰爭暴力的空間和手段，觸發暴力應用層次分化。當初級戰爭玩家還陶醉於攻城克地的暴力日新月異之中，高明的戰爭玩家已經布局不費一兵一卒而調動敵人於股掌之中的全新暴力，而對手一旦掉入受支配的陷阱，無論打贏多少場戰役戰斗，都是做無用功，終回原點，甚至萬劫不復。

支配暴力目的是使自己能打擊敵人，並使敵人的打擊失靈。歷來戰爭雙方所追求的至高戰勝境界——致人而不致於人，其最大特點就是暴力對抗的不對等性。信息和智能技術解決了戰爭手段可控與協調等復雜性問題，使戰爭不再像二戰時期那樣“戰爭機器一經啟動就難以停止”，暴力手段成了可以駕馭並游刃有余的政治工具。尤其是在信息化智能化條件下，戰爭暴力的可控性、可剝奪性為支配暴力提供了條件，掌握高技術的一方通過實施非接觸作戰主宰戰場和主導戰爭進程，通過威懾、瓦解和解除敵人的暴力工具來達到戰爭目的，從而使暴力對抗呈現為剝奪或掣肘對手的暴力，並使自己成功避開敵人的打擊。

支配暴力本質是從消滅敵人向支配敵人轉移，是現代戰爭凸顯經濟目的所決定的。恩格斯指出：“暴力僅僅是手段，相反地，經濟利益是目的。目的比用來達到目的的手段要‘基礎性’得多。”從根本上講，現代戰爭追求社會價值和經濟利益，導致戰爭暴力從直接暴力向間接暴力拓展。簡單地說，不需要從肉體上毀滅敵人而贏得勝利，一是精確使用和控制暴力。暴力的可控性向精確化方向發展，這不僅是減少附帶損傷的政治需要，也是降低戰爭成本的經濟需要，還是快速控制戰局，有效支配敵人，奪取戰爭勝利的效益需求，這已成為現代戰爭發展的鮮明特點。二是從施與暴力發展到遏制暴力。傳統的暴力對抗強調通過戰場搏斗來取勝，而支配暴力則追求威懾、拆解敵人暴力的效力，通過顯示武力和拒止敵人使用武力的方式，使敵人畏懼戰爭或無法運作戰爭機器，從而以最少量地施與暴力，來達到戰爭目的。目前看，美軍發明的震懾戰、斬首戰都是基於這樣的觀念產生的。三是不流血的暴力與流血的暴力相媲美。不流血的暴力的最大優勢是不僅能大幅度減輕暴力運用的成本，而且能提高暴力運用的非對稱性，使戰局發生奇變。

支配暴力的法則從傳統更多地使用暴力變為最佳使用暴力，從而導致戰爭暴烈性有所下降。冷戰結束以來，現代化戰爭造成的傷亡驟然減少了。從海灣戰爭到伊拉克戰爭，戰爭雙方死亡總數從不到10萬人下降到不足2萬人，而越南戰爭死亡總數則是近170萬人。但導致戰爭傷亡銳減的動因並不是戰爭殺傷力在減小，而是戰略上的需要，首先是經濟上的需要，經濟歷來是戰爭的本源。以伊拉克戰爭為例，美國要獲得的是石油資源，因此它發起戰爭的目的是建立符合美國利益的伊拉克，“打爛”伊拉克或者伊拉克陷入混亂隻能加劇戰爭的破壞程度，增加戰后重建的成本，並擴大敵對情緒增加戰后維穩的困難。同時，戰爭暴烈性的總體下降還歸因於二戰以來世界人民在戰爭道義觀上的進步，產生了對戰爭暴力使用的限制，其中媒體傳播起到了輿論監督作用。由此，戰爭暴力在精確規劃和計劃之后被精確地使用了、被精確地釋放了，前所未有的高強度軍事打擊，能夠在最少（足夠）並不導致大面積附帶損傷的原則下進行，不再使敵人大量死去，而是使敵人快速失去抵抗意志和抵抗能力，相當於外科手術式打擊轉向微創手術，以減小戰爭后遺症。

2、支配敵人的思想正在變成直接的戰爭路線

支配敵人是從威懾敵人發展而來的，但並非新概念。從孫子的“上兵伐謀”到“牽著敵人鼻子走”的戰略戰術，都蘊含著豐富的支配思想，但過去缺乏武器和技術條件，支配敵人的方式是間接的。而今，武器的信息化智能化，正在把支配敵人的思想變成直接的戰爭路線。

殺傷性暴力發揮武力支配作用，在有人作戰空間呈現流血和不流血雙軌模式，從肉體上消滅敵人邁向從生理和心理上支配敵人。從冷兵器到火器，都是物理暴力殺傷肌體，屬於流血的暴力，當地毯式轟炸發展到頂峰后受到戰爭法制約，轉向精確殺傷，減少不必要的殺傷。同時，顯示武力仍是有效的政治工具，核威懾起著戰略穩定器作用，精確殺傷提升常規威懾效力。但精確暴力並非“仁慈的暴力”，戰場壓力超過以往任何時期。

在第一次世界大戰期間，生化武器興起，細菌戰、毒氣戰進入戰場，導致大規模傷亡並破壞生態環境，被《海牙公約》禁止。但進入21世紀以來，霸權主義仍在謀求生化戰爭，而恐怖主義更是把生化武器作為反人類的最佳暴力工具，因此，21世紀被一些學者認為是生物戰的世紀。隨著科技的進步，生物戰劑殺傷力可控性大大增強，2002年俄羅斯在處置人質危機事件中首次將生物氣體用於反恐戰場，標志著非致命性武器走進了常規戰爭。隨著非致命性武器大發展，從火藥殺傷肌體邁向控制、破壞生物（生理）系統，從而使戰斗力失能。尤其是非致命性武器的造價與飛機、軍艦、坦克等致命性武器相比具有高性價比，隨著制造技術簡易化，嗅覺武器、橡皮子彈、捕捉器、生物試劑、眩暈彈、激光致盲武器列裝，它們帶動殺傷性暴力朝著軟殺傷方向發展。現代震懾戰和基於效果作戰實踐表明，戰場上使敵人不敢使用武器和使用不了武器，可以贏得更容易。伊拉克戰爭期間，美國成功地運用震懾戰來恫嚇和欺騙薩達姆，使其一直未能啟用對美軍有威脅的飛毛腿導彈。

智能化戰爭從兵力密集型戰場轉向武器密集型戰場，網絡、太空、電磁空間等高維度空間取代陸海空成為主導性作戰空間，這些空間近乎無人化，加上輸油管道、倉儲、交通樞紐等體積龐大的政治經濟軍事關鍵基礎設施成為打擊重心，推動大規模殺傷性武器突破有人戰場的羈絆，轉向破壞武器系統和作戰平台。殺傷性暴力轉向破壞性暴力，導致戰爭暴力仍在無限增長。從海灣戰爭到伊拉克戰爭，美軍使用集束炸彈、貧鈾彈打擊伊拉克軍政基礎設施和裝甲車隊，一定程度上打破了核門檻的禁忌，開啟了大規模殺傷性武器發展的新方向。自美軍科索沃戰爭使用石墨炸彈攻擊城市供電系統起，到伊朗核設施受到病毒攻擊而毀傷癱瘓，電磁脈沖武器、太空武器、網絡武器顯示出巨大威力。破壞性武器雖然嚴格控制，不直接針對人體，但卻力圖破壞作戰體系、基礎設施甚至是敵人的生存環境，從而迫使敵人屈服。尤需警惕的是，核打擊因戰爭法限制而遠離城市和平民，甚至兵力密集的有人戰場，但轉向人員稀少的無人戰場，太空、深海和孤立的島嶼。

隨信息化智能化發展，信息域認知域成為深入經濟社會的新戰場，信息工具和認知工具也自然成為新暴力工具，其主要以網絡暴力、經濟暴力、文化暴力等形式展現出來並異軍突起，強制性改變對手戰略層和社會層的判斷、立場和決策。網絡戰人為制造假數據或篡改大數據，誘導對手做出錯誤判斷和決策﹔經濟暴力演化出經濟制裁、金融戰、科技脫鉤戰，打擊對手股市和銀行系統，以法律和強制性商業手段中斷對手供應鏈，遲滯對手發展創新﹔文化暴力借助數字網絡推動傳統輿論戰邁向公共外交戰和全球傳媒戰，從而影響國際社會和全球公眾的立場。

總之，在支配暴力時代，戰爭的暴烈性發生了轉移，即從殺傷性暴力向破壞性暴力、強制性暴力拓展。

3、正義戰爭與非正義戰爭走不同的支配暴力路線

21世紀，戰爭的暴力本質並未改變，暴力仍是戰爭的主要行為，沒有暴力就談不上戰爭。在冷兵器時代暴力表現為刀光劍影，在火器時代發展成硝煙彌漫，到了核時代戰爭暴力走向無限擴大，至今，人類總體上仍處於核威脅下不安全的相對和平年代。

馬克思關於“暴力是每一個孕育著新社會的舊社會的助產婆”的論斷，至今仍是正義戰爭信條。但戰爭手段的進步和戰爭時空全球化的展開，使正義戰爭的暴力結構性轉變從自然過程上升到自覺過程中來。首先，不為戰爭的效益觀掩蓋戰爭的歷史觀，認清隻有正義的支配才能取得戰爭的徹底勝利。戰爭總是分正義和非正義兩類，信息化智能化戰爭也不例外。其次，現代戰爭實踐既為我們推動發展正義戰爭理論提供了戰術技術上的經驗借鑒，同時也提供了政治和戰略上批判的反面教材。一個深刻認識是，美軍宣揚的小傷亡、低成本戰爭效益觀，給世界帶來了軍事速勝的深刻印象。但美國在阿富汗、伊拉克這兩個國家花上萬億美元來搞戰后重建，還是無法避免最終撤軍走人的結局。這樣的教訓古已有之，現代戰爭又繼續重演，它揭示的奧秘是，信息化智能化戰爭的效益觀並沒有改變隻有正義戰爭才能贏得和平的規律。美軍憑借強大的戰斗力做到了軍事上的支配，從戰爭發起前到主要戰事結束期間也在一定程度做到經濟支配，但沒有正義的政治統領，其信息優勢下的快速制勝仍然是短暫的、不能維持的、政治失敗的武力勝利。因此，開辟信息化智能化戰爭在正義方向上的發展路線，既是正義方政治性質所決定，同時也是決定正義方打贏的前提條件。

正義戰爭與非正義戰爭牟取霸權利益而頻繁發動戰爭不同，通常是被迫採取戰爭自衛行動，並力爭通過一次性暴力的釋放來阻止更多更大的戰爭，從而達成反暴力的教育作用。1958年，中國人民解放軍炮擊金門，從消滅敵人有生力量的全天候打擊轉向隔日炮擊，再轉向不打人的炮擊，再轉向炮擊前通知敵人，就是從殺傷性暴力到破壞性暴力，再到強制性暴力的轉換過程，起到震懾敵人、教育敵人、團結敵人的戰爭目的，充分展示了正義戰爭的大智大勇。正義戰爭的暴力觀可以用“一個中心兩個基本點”來概括——以正義暴力遏制非正義暴力是中心，這與非正義戰爭追求暴力最大化及其反人類傾向有本質區別。一個基本點是發展自衛的暴力，主張發展消滅武器的武器，支配敵人更要強調發展那些能夠制止暴力的暴力，立足朝殺傷力、破壞力可控的方向拓展武力，從致命性向非致命性方向拓展，從環境破壞大向環境破壞小方向拓展。另一個基本點是有力有理有節地使用武力，不求最大化地使用武力，而是圍繞支配敵人選擇武力的運用方式，並在具體運用中界定武力法則。

正義戰爭主張以殺傷性暴力、破壞性暴力輔助強制性暴力，從重在摧毀敵人暴力工具邁向遏制和拒止敵人使用暴力工具，展示更高的支配暴力境界。從根本上講，正義戰爭是保衛自己的國土、海疆，高度重視戰后環境和社會治理需要。應看到美軍在南聯盟、阿富汗和伊拉克城市扔下了大量貧鈾彈、溫壓彈和石墨彈，在他國建立病毒實驗室，對城市環境和民生的傷害是長遠的，其隱形的破壞是巨大的。這種非正義戰爭以降低“流血的政治”為名，從制造外傷向制造不可修復的內傷拓展，濫用非致命性暴力，如音頻武器超過合理的度，震裂耳膜，導致聽覺喪失，比火藥殺傷更殘忍，帶來的不是威懾而是恐怖。相比於非正義戰爭突出破壞性和殺傷性，正義戰爭暴力結構則以強制性為中心。一是力求遏制敵人啟動戰爭機器，立足大規模的武力宣示和施壓，顯示不可戰勝的實力和不達目的不收兵的決心，將威懾戰略推進到支配戰略的新思路，把戰爭准備的實效顯示出來，懾止敵人鋌而走險﹔二是以有限殺傷性暴力、破壞性暴力釋放拒止敵人運行戰爭機器，使敵人放棄暴力抵抗，這種用剝奪或掣肘敵人使用武器的方式比摧毀敵人武器代價要小得多，比摧毀敵人兵力兵器更有效，更適用於正義戰爭。三是以強制性暴力為主體，立足持久，以富有彈性的經濟戰、網絡戰、認知戰贏得壓倒性戰略態勢。

展望未來，隻有正義戰爭才能帶來戰爭文明的進步。因為，戰爭文明是否進步取決於戰爭方對暴力的認知和選擇。歷史証明，非正義戰爭奉行絕對暴力的支配作用是暫時的、不可靠的，為正義戰爭必勝提供了條件，但同時超限濫用暴力對正義戰爭方的克制暴力構成非對稱的犧牲壓力。為此，正義戰爭有必要把暴力和非暴力綜合起來發揮支配作用，使“正義戰爭必勝”在智能化全球化時代獲得新支撐。正義戰爭施展相對暴力制勝，立足以有限但長期的軍事和經濟扼控為政治解決創造條件，發動敵我雙方的人民和國際社會，制止敵人使用戰爭機器，在遏制中打贏，在打贏中遏制，追求高效益、低代價的暴力運用，以最小傷亡、最小破壞、最小成本達成政治勝利。

（作者：林東，系國防大學教授）

中國原創軍事資源：https://military.people.com.cn/