A brief analysis of cognitive domain combat styles in the era of intelligence
As modern warfare accelerates towards intelligence, the bottom physical domain, the middle information domain and the top cognitive domain are characterized by multi-domain linkage. Cognitive domain operations are gradually becoming the focus of the war arena. The main purpose of cognitive domain operations is to seize brain control and lay a solid foundation for seizing land, sea, air, space, and network power. Accurately grasping and fully utilizing the main modes of cognitive domain operations is an inevitable requirement to seize opportunities and gain the initiative in future wars.
1. Cognitive electronic warfare – the “tentacles” of cognitive warfare
Cognitive electronic warfare is the product of the combination of electronic warfare and artificial intelligence technology. It is the main combat style for fighting for electromagnetic control and is also a model of the integration of tactics and technology. The United States is the first country to carry out cognitive electronic warfare research. Its Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Army, Navy and Air Force have carried out projects including adaptive radar countermeasures and adaptive electronic warfare behavioral learning. Implementing cognitive electronic warfare requires focusing on three aspects.
One is cognitive electronic reconnaissance. It mainly uses electronic means to quickly, accurately and comprehensively obtain battlefield data, promptly discover threat signals, identify target characteristic signals, establish and dynamically update signal databases, and provide necessary information for commanders to judge situations, make decisions, and evaluate effectiveness. support.
The second is cognitive electronic modeling. Mainly in view of the characteristics of various types, large power and large number of electromagnetic radiation sources in the battlefield and surrounding areas, the frequency, bandwidth, waveform characteristics, protection mode, arrival direction and other information of the radiation source are distinguished between dynamic and static categories, and a unified system is established. The information describes the model architecture, thereby providing the basis for electromagnetic perception.
The third is cognitive electronic interference. Mainly in view of the complex and diverse characteristics of battlefield electronic warfare equipment and strong anti-interference capabilities, it combines active interference with passive interference, suppression interference and deception interference, and flexibly implements adaptive interference pattern decision-making, adaptive interference waveform optimization and adaptive interference. Interference resource scheduling to ensure interference quality and efficiency.
2. Cognitive intelligence warfare—the “bloodline” of cognitive warfare
The International Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers once proposed the concept of “cognitive information science”; some domestic scholars define cognitive information science as the study of people’s cognitive structures, processes and characteristics in all aspects of information production and utilization from a psychological perspective field or discipline. The concept of “cognitive intelligence warfare” is proposed here, which is consistent with cognitive logic and the nature of intelligence, and can borrow concepts and principles from cognitive intelligence science. Depending on the motivation for obtaining and using intelligence, three strategies can be used to implement cognitive intelligence warfare.
The first is to obtain and utilize intelligence based on individual cognition. It mainly uses the cognition of combat subjects as an intermediary for intelligence coordination, adheres to battlefield user-driven rather than combat system-driven, and is based on “meaning construction theory” and “knowledge abnormality hypothesis” to improve the cognitive structure of intelligence service subjects and realize subject cognition. Positive interaction between knowledge and intelligence services.
The second is to obtain and utilize intelligence based on group cognition. It mainly focuses on the common cognitive structure formed by factors such as the battlefield environment and social background of the user group, and makes full use of advanced analysis methods such as situation analysis, domain analysis, and value analysis to strive to improve the pertinence and applicability of group intelligence services. sex.
The third is to obtain and utilize intelligence based on brain-body cognition. It mainly understands the cognitive structure and cognitive activities of the human brain as computing logic and computing activities, makes full use of machine intelligent cognition and intelligent computing capabilities, strives to improve the human-machine integration environment on the battlefield, and smoothes the information link from intelligence to cognition. Implement programmed and large-scale intelligence services.
3. Cognitive algorithm warfare—the “brain” of cognitive warfare
In 2017, the U.S. Department of Defense officially proposed “algorithmic warfare” for the first time in a memorandum and clearly established an “algorithmic warfare cross-functional team.” Algorithmic warfare, like cognitive warfare, runs through the entire process of all fields of warfare, embodying the core requirements of intelligent warfare. The concept of “cognitive algorithmic warfare” is proposed here based on the similarities and intrinsic connections between cognitive warfare and algorithmic warfare. It can be said that there is algorithm in cognition, and cognition in algorithm. There are three main paths to implement cognitive algorithmic warfare.
The first is to clarify the fog of war. Military theorist Clausewitz pointed out, “War is a field full of uncertainty, and three-quarters of the situations on which war is based are as if hidden in fog.” Cognitive algorithm warfare is to calculate deterministic factors in this uncertain field, clarify the fog of the battlefield as much as possible, accurately identify information “bombs”, and strictly prevent falling into information “traps”.
The second is to clear up the blind spots of intelligence. The source of inspiration for artificial intelligence often comes from biological intelligence, especially human intelligence. Artificial intelligence is inseparable from human intelligence. Cognitive algorithm warfare is to make full use of the latest achievements in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience to promote the military application of artificial intelligence and improve the intelligence level of the cognitive domain.
The third is to accelerate human-machine integration. Although machine computing power can surpass human brain power, machine algorithms cannot surpass human “ideas” after all. Artificial intelligence and human intelligence each have their own advantages. Cognitive algorithm warfare is to closely integrate machine algorithms in the information domain with human “ideas” in the cognitive domain, and continuously improve the level of warfare in the physical domain.
4. Cognitive political warfare—the “soul” of cognitive warfare
Political war is the opposite of military war. Mao Zedong once vividly pointed out that “war is bloody politics” and “politics is bloodless war.” Since political warfare usually directly affects the cognitive domain, cognitive political warfare can be said to be the inherent meaning of political warfare and should not be understood as a new concept. There are three forms of cognitive political warfare in the era of intelligence.
One is psychological attack and defense. The main purpose is to use intelligent and precise means to “read the mind” and “control the mind” to improve the quality and effectiveness of psychological attack and defense. On the offensive side, we mainly use psychological propaganda, will disintegration, emotional influence, mental induction and other tactics; on the defensive side, we mainly adopt measures such as psychological education and training, psychological counseling and regulation, and psychological diagnosis and treatment.
The second is the competition for public opinion. The main purpose is to use new media and new technologies to enhance the popularity, flow and influence of public opinion propaganda. In terms of offense, the focus is on taking the lead, being the first to take advantage of the situation, concentrating on building momentum and forming a strong force, attacking key points, and making key breakthroughs; in terms of defense, the focus is on making the best use of the situation, combining prevention with counter-attacks, and seeking advantages and avoiding disadvantages.
The third is the legal struggle. The main thing is to participate in legislation, accurately interpret the law, actively protect the law, stand up for the law, be tit-for-tat, and get to the point. On the offensive side, we mainly use legal deterrence, legal strikes, legal restraints, legal sanctions and other tactics; on the defensive side, we mainly strengthen the research on international law, especially the law of war, and legal protection of law-related actions to prevent others from being manipulated.
Cognition-centered warfare: operational concepts for dealing with complex wars
Complexity science is one of the frontier fields of contemporary scientific development. It is a new tool for understanding, understanding, and exploring the phenomena, laws, and mechanisms of war. As the form of war evolves from information war to intelligent war, the complexity of war shows an exponential growth trend, and it becomes increasingly difficult to seize control of information. The key to combat is to put the enemy into a “decision-making dilemma” so that it can even Even with information superiority, it cannot make correct decisions, thus losing its combat advantage. The focus of operations will change from “information-centered” to “cognition-centered”, and the winning mechanism will change from “information winning” to “cognitive winning”.
“Three changes” reveal the driving forces behind the increasing complexity of war
War is a field full of possibilities, and change is the basic characteristic that runs through it. President Xi stressed that we must pay close attention to changes in technology, war, and opponents. Changes in science and technology are the foundation, changes in war are the subject, and changes in opponents are the key. Changes in science and technology lead to changes in war, and changes in war prompt changes in opponents. The “three changes” have promoted the evolution of war forms, the expansion of war fields, the transformation of war goals, and the expansion of war influence, revealing the driving forces behind the growth of war complexity.
Technological changes have subverted the basis for winning wars. Science and technology are the core combat effectiveness and the most active and revolutionary factor in military development. Throughout the history of the world’s military development, every major scientific and technological innovation has started a new military revolution, and every military revolution has pushed military development into a new era. Scientific and technological innovation has become a huge engine to improve the military’s combat effectiveness. . At present, a new round of scientific and technological revolution and military revolution are accelerating. The degree of informatization of modern warfare is constantly increasing, and the characteristics of intelligence are becoming increasingly apparent. The role of driving the military revolution is becoming more and more prominent. The rapid development of some cutting-edge technologies may fundamentally change the face of war and war. According to the rules, the military game between great powers is more embodied in technological subversion and counter-subversion, raids and counter-raids, offsets and counter-offsets.
The U.S. Navy’s “Nemesis” project includes reconnaissance, decoy, jamming and other systems. The decoy system covers air, surface and underwater. Under the scheduling and control of the distributed artificial intelligence engine, it can complement each other, coordinate deception, and truly create a A “ghost aircraft carrier formation” completely subverted traditional electronic deception methods and raised information deception to an unprecedented level. It can be said that science and technology has never had such a profound impact on the overall situation of national security and military strategy as it does today. It has profoundly intervened in, supported, and dominated the evolution of war forms and the innovation of combat styles, and has even subverted the mechanism of winning wars.
The U.S. Navy’s “Nemesis” project is based on networked collaborative electronic warfare
Concept, integrating different systems and utilizing unmanned distributed Clusters of electronic warfare platforms enable large-scale collaborative electronic warfare
The changes in war highlight the complexity of war.
Modern warfare is undergoing profound changes, showing unprecedented diversity and complexity. This super complexity stems from many reasons: first, various advanced technologies or weapons are constantly emerging, bringing many uncertainties; second, the battlefield covers land, sea, air, space, network, electricity and cognitive and other multiple third, multiple combat objects, combat styles, combat areas, and combat methods are cross-correlated and combined to form a complex “hybrid war”; fourth, artificial intelligence algorithms build a large number of combat elements into a complex logic, and use human Machine speed beyond the reach of thinking prompts the combination, deconstruction, and recombination of various elements. In the Ukraine crisis in 2022, on the surface it is a confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, but in essence it is a “hybrid war” between the United States and Western countries and Russia; the Russian and Ukrainian armies extensively use military and civilian drones to expand The “unmanned +” application model shows the prototype of future unmanned intelligent operations; with the support of U.S. NATO air and space situational intelligence, the Ukrainian army frequently uses low-cost unmanned equipment to carry out raids on important Russian weapons platforms, highlighting its new qualities Combat forces have asymmetric attack advantages against large weapons and equipment in traditional combat systems. Changes in technology will eventually lead to changes in war. The impact of a single element on war will become weaker and weaker. The joint combat system composed of multiple elements will have a complex impact on war. War is non-linear, uncertain, chaotic and open. Complex characteristics such as adaptability and confrontation will increase exponentially, which will make it more difficult for people to judge the progress and outcome of the war.
Changes in opponents accelerate the growth of war complexity.
Changes in war prompt changes in opponents. Currently, we are experiencing major changes unseen in a century. Major military powers are actively making strategic adjustments and promoting a new round of military reforms, which exhibit the following characteristics: first, the trend of joint, miniaturized, and autonomous institutional establishments has become more obvious; second, The first is that weapons and equipment are showing a development trend of digitization, precision, stealth, unmanned, and intelligence; the third is that the combat form is moving towards the “four nons” (non-contact, non-linear, asymmetric and irregular) and the “three nos” (Invisible, silent, unmanned) combat; fourth, the military command form is developing in the direction of flattening, automation, networking, and seamlessness. The United States regards China as its main strategic opponent and strives to suppress and contain China. It has vigorously strengthened the innovation of operational concepts and has successively proposed new operational concepts such as “hybrid warfare”, “multi-domain warfare” and “mosaic warfare”, claiming that it will fight to defeat its opponents. A high-end war in which “technology cannot be understood, strikes are difficult to predict, and speed cannot keep up.” The core of the US military’s “mosaic warfare” is unmanned, low-cost, fast, lethal, flexible and reconfigurable. It is based on distributed situational awareness, with the help of intelligent auxiliary decision-making tools and the concept of building blocks and jigsaw puzzles to adaptively formulate mission planning. , dynamically reorganize combat forces, decompose the functions of the combat platform into a larger number of single-function nodes, and build a combat system with a large number of functional nodes. Replace the “kill chain” with a “kill network”. Several nodes will fail or be missing, and the combat system can be adaptively reorganized.
The increasing complexity of war drives the transformation of the winning mechanism of war
With the rapid development of national defense science and technology, the upgrading of weapons and equipment, and the rapid evolution of war forms, modern warfare has shown exponential and explosive complex changes. These changes may seem dazzling, but there are rules to follow behind them. The fundamental thing is that the winning mechanism of war has changed. Only by thoroughly understanding the winning mechanism of modern war can we accurately recognize changes, respond scientifically, be good at seeking change, and firmly grasp the initiative in future wars.
The form of war has changed from cold weapon warfare to intelligent warfare.
The shape of war is a holistic understanding of war. So far, human war has generally gone through four historical stages: cold weapon war, hot weapon war, mechanized war, and information war, and is moving towards intelligent warfare. The history of cognitive warfare is almost as old as the history of human warfare. In the era of cold weapon war, hot weapon war, and mechanized war, cognitive warfare appears more in the form of public opinion warfare and psychological warfare. As mankind enters the information age, the development of cyberspace technology has greatly expanded the space for cognitive warfare, enriched the technical means of cognitive warfare, and greatly enhanced the permeability, timeliness, and deterrence of cognitive warfare. The status and role of Zhizhan have been unprecedentedly improved. In the future, the form of war will enter intelligent warfare, and a large number of intelligent weapon systems and platforms will be equipped with the military and put into combat. Cognitive warfare can not only interfere with and deceive the cognition of enemy personnel, but also attack the cognition of smart equipment through algorithm deception methods such as “adversarial input” and “data poisoning”. Its application scenarios and scope will be further expanded. , the status and role will be further improved.
The purpose of war has changed from conquering by force to conquering by spirit.
The winning mechanism of modern war has undergone great changes compared with the past. The violence of war has been curbed, and the purpose of combat has changed from the original siege of cities and territories and annihilation of the enemy’s effective forces to making the opponent obey one’s will. The means of combat have shifted from military conquest to focusing more on psychological and spiritual conquest, which has made cognitive warfare increasingly prominent in its status and role in modern warfare. In recent years, “hybrid warfare” has become a major means of great power competition. More and more countries have begun to focus on using new fields and new means to achieve political, military, and economic goals that are difficult to achieve with traditional warfare. “Hybrid war” is a mixture of war subjects such as states, non-state actors and individuals, a mixture of conventional warfare, unconventional warfare and other war styles, a mixture of military operations such as combat, stability maintenance and reconstruction, and a mixture of political, military and economic The mixture of multiple fields such as military and people’s livelihood is a mixture of multiple combat goals such as defeating the enemy and winning the hearts and minds of the people. This is highly consistent with cognitive warfare. The operational field of “hybrid warfare” has expanded from the military field to politics, economy, culture, people’s livelihood and other fields; the combat methods have expanded from firepower warfare and troop warfare to diplomatic warfare, economic warfare, cyber warfare, psychological warfare, public opinion warfare and other directions. This is highly consistent with cognitive warfare. Its core essence is to “make profit out of chaos”, its main purpose is to win people’s hearts, and its combat guidance is to win by cleverness.
The winning domain of war changes from the physical domain and information domain to the cognitive domain.
Modern war occurs in three fields: physics, information and cognition at the same time. The physical domain and information domain are separated from the material domain, and the cognitive domain is separated from the spiritual domain. The physical domain is a traditional war domain, consisting of combat platforms and military facilities, which provides the material basis for information warfare. The information domain is a newly emerging war field, that is, the space for information generation, transmission and sharing, and is the focus of information warfare competition. Cognitive domain is the scope and field involved in human cognitive activities. It is not only the space for human feeling, perception, memory and thinking activities, but also the space for knowledge generation, exchange, association, storage and application. It is also the space for perception, judgment and decision-making in combat activities. and spaces of command and control. The cognitive domain exists in the field of consciousness of combatants and affects their judgment and decision-making. It is a rising field of warfare. With the development of technologies such as network information and artificial intelligence, the scope of the cognitive domain has greatly expanded, and is expanding from the field of human consciousness to the field of modern cognitive tools and artificial intelligence. The development of military technology has expanded the scope of the cognitive domain, providing more advanced, faster, and more effective material and technical means for cognitive warfare, greatly enhancing the permeability, timeliness, and deterrence of cognitive warfare, and fundamentally It has changed cognitive warfare, making the cognitive domain a new winning field that transcends the physical domain and information domain, and has become the ultimate domain for great power games and military confrontations.
The mechanism for winning wars changes from information victory to cognitive victory.
War confrontation is ultimately a game and confrontation of cognition. If you have the right to control cognition, you will have the initiative in war to a large extent. If you lose the right to control cognition, you will be passive in the war. The situation of being beaten. Obtaining higher and stronger control rights is the key to defeating powerful enemies. Finding ways to control cognitive power and then seize comprehensive battlefield control, so as to achieve maximum victory at the minimum cost, is an important mechanism and inherent law of modern warfare, especially cognitive warfare. In recent years, the U.S. military has successively proposed new concepts of future warfare represented by “decision-centered warfare” and “mosaic warfare”, intending to use complexity as a weapon to create multiple dilemmas for opponents, requiring it to ensure its own tactical “selective advantage”. At the same time, by creating highly complex decision-making influences on the enemy and interfering with its decision-making capabilities, it can achieve a subversive advantage over the enemy in the cognitive domain. In the primary and intermediate stages of information warfare, the key to combat is to seize network control and information control, which runs through the progressive model of “network advantage → information advantage → decision-making advantage → combat advantage”. After information warfare enters an advanced stage, it becomes more and more difficult to seize control of information. The key to combat is to make the enemy fall into a “decision-making dilemma” so that even if it has information superiority, it cannot make correct decisions, thereby losing its combat advantage and having recognition. Only by knowing the advantages can you have the combat advantage. In future wars, cognitive advantage will be the most important strategic advantage, and cognitive confrontation will be the most important form of confrontation. It can be said that “without cognition, there is no war.”
Coping with complex wars has given rise to the concept of cognitive-centered warfare
In order to cope with the exponential growth trend of the complexity characteristics of modern warfare, we must use the theories and methods of complexity science to change the concept of platform-centered warfare where firepower is supreme and killing is king, and establish a cognitive-centered combat thinking. Cognition-centered warfare refers to taking the cognitive domain as the winning area, taking the cognitive advantage as the operational goal, and focusing on interfering with cognitive means, suppressing cognitive channels, affecting cognitive production, and conducting cognitive operations on enemy personnel and intelligent equipment. Interference, suppression, deception and inducement are a new operational concept that obtains combat advantages by seizing and maintaining cognitive advantages. Its main winning mechanisms are as follows.
Use cyber deterrence to destroy the enemy’s will to fight.
Targeting at the enemy’s political, economic, military, diplomatic, and cultural contradictions and weaknesses, disseminate deterrent information through cyberspace, or publish military parades, large-scale military exercises, new weapons and equipment research and development and other information through the Internet , causing great fear and shock to the opponent’s cognition and psychology, and deterring the enemy is not conducive to the implementation of my actions. Comprehensive use of network and electricity attack methods to carry out point strikes and warning attacks against the enemy’s important network and electricity targets and key core nodes, destroying the enemy’s system combat capabilities, affecting the normal performance of the enemy’s weapons and equipment, and providing psychological deterrence to the enemy. The US military’s “gray zone operations” theory relies on its own technological advantages and mainly takes actions such as cyber and electronic countermeasures to respond to the opponent’s “gray zone provocation” and deter the opponent from giving up “confrontation” or escalating the conflict, putting it in a dilemma.
Use information deception to induce the enemy to make wrong judgments.
Aiming at the enemy’s reconnaissance equipment, intelligence agencies and command systems, conceal one’s military intentions, military operations and military objectives through cyber attacks, electronic deception and other means, and transmit to the enemy errors and information about one’s own False information on combat intentions, troop configurations, combat capabilities, combat plans, and battlefield situations, or use the enemy’s command information system to send false orders and information to induce the enemy to make wrong judgments and disrupt the enemy’s combat command. Implement new attacks such as “adversarial input” and “data poisoning” against artificial intelligence algorithms, allowing them to obtain preset conclusions through deep learning training, or causing them to fall into local optimal solutions and ignore the global optimal. Use technologies such as computer imaging, video synthesis, virtual reality, and artificial intelligence to synthesize sounds, videos, images, text information, etc., or use “deep fake” technology to generate false information that is difficult to distinguish between true and false and transmit it through the Internet Spread in large quantities to confuse and deceive opponents and influence their decisions and actions.
Use information suppression to block the enemy’s cognitive means.
Aim at the enemy’s important network targets, as well as core routers, switches, gateways, key servers, etc., and use “soft” and “hard” attack methods to destroy their network nodes. Based on the networking characteristics of wireless links such as the enemy’s command and control network, communication transmission network, weapon hinge network, and early warning detection network, comprehensively use technologies and means such as electronic jamming, GPS spoofing attacks, command link takeover, and data hijacking control to suppress them. Data communication, blocking its communication links and interfering with its combat command. Implement cyber-paralysis attacks on enemy command and control, military communications, early warning detection, aerospace information and other military networks, destroying core networks that affect their operations and weakening their combat capabilities.
Create a favorable public opinion environment through public opinion propaganda.
Cooperate with the country’s political, military, and diplomatic struggles, vigorously promote one’s own justice in the war, and stimulate the enthusiasm of all people to fully support the war. With the help of new media platforms such as instant messaging tools, online forums, podcasts, Twitter, and WeChat, we can systematically disseminate information that targets the enemy’s weaknesses. After gaining widespread attention and consensus, we can then promptly report information, create new hot spots, and repeatedly build momentum. Enhance the influence and form a resonance effect to expand the effect. Propaganda “sets the tone” by cleverly setting agendas, building public opinion through powerful media, setting off a “spiral of silence”, controlling and guiding public opinion, and changing people’s opinions and behaviors.
Use psychological attacks to undermine the morale of enemy soldiers and civilians.
Widely disseminate processed and processed information through the Internet, promote one’s own justice, demonstrate one’s strength, will and determination, vilify the enemy politically and morally, and internally Gather the thoughts and will of the military and civilians, strive for the legal and moral commanding heights externally, and spiritually “soften” and “weaken” the enemy. Use a variety of network communication methods and technical means to send various deceptive, disruptive, inductive, and deterrent messages to the enemy’s military and civilians in a targeted manner to attack the enemy’s psychological defense line, promote an ineffective confrontation mentality, and then lose the combat capability. . Through the Internet, we can create, guide, plan, build, and expand momentum to create a “momentum” that is beneficial to ourselves but not beneficial to the enemy, causing a psychological impact on the other party’s people, thereby affecting or changing their psychological state, and implementing effective psychological attacks.
Watch legal and moral support through legal struggle.
Use legal weapons to curb the enemy’s possible or future illegal acts, declare the legality of our actions, affirm our power of military counterattack, declare our determination to pursue war responsibilities, and give To intimidate the enemy. By exposing the illegality of the enemy’s provocative behavior, criticizing the legal basis for the enemy’s combat operations, and condemning the enemy’s illegal behavior, it causes the enemy’s strategic defeat and our own strategic gain. Use legal means to restrict the enemy’s possible actions, limit the possible interference of third parties, and block other parties from interfering with our own actions. Formulate the laws and regulations necessary for our operations to provide legal protection for our operations or take legal remedial measures to reduce the possible negative impacts of our operations and ensure that combat operations are carried out in accordance with the law.
In the era of intelligence, intelligent algorithms, as the underlying logic and implementation means for information generation, distribution, dissemination, and reception, determine the form and presentation of information. In future wars, the expansion of the application boundaries of intelligent algorithms and the development of application scenarios will promote the update and iteration of cognitive domain combat tactics. Clarifying the mechanism and implementation path of intelligent algorithms and cognitive confrontation is of great significance for innovating cognitive domain combat tactics with the help of intelligent algorithms. .
The mechanism of how intelligent algorithms influence cognitive confrontation
Intelligent algorithms can formulate optimal information recommendation strategies through comprehensive analysis and calculation of users’ personal identity, psychological characteristics, behavioral habits, interests and preferences, etc., and then use specific information to affect target cognition, and ultimately affect their real-life behavior.
Draw a portrait of your target users. The essence of user portraits is to label users to form a specific identity. Tags are similar to “pixels” in digital portraits. The more comprehensive the data is obtained, the more precise the tag description will be, and the more realistic the reflection of user behavior characteristics will be. Foreign militaries believe that in cognitive domain operations, technical means such as web crawlers and log mining are widely used to obtain basic information data, financial data, communication data, etc. of target objects. On this basis, intelligent algorithms are used to deeply mine these data, and the interests, hobbies, behavioral habits, and interpersonal relationships of the target object can be systematically analyzed, and then their value orientation can be determined. Afterwards, by constructing multi-dimensional label vectors, clustering similar individuals, and analyzing group characteristics with similar characteristics, a group target portrait can be formed, which can be used as the basis and starting point for cognitive shaping.
Achieve personalized information customization. Adopting “divide and conquer” for different individuals and groups is the advantage of intelligent algorithms, and it is also the proper meaning of cognitive shaping. Relying on social media platforms and search engines to carry out personalized push for specific objects can greatly improve the acceptance of the target objects and avoid idling and internal consumption of information during the dissemination process. In this process, the “information cocoon” effect will further narrow the target object’s perception range, leaving it in a relatively closed information environment for a long time, thus actively accepting one-sided information. At the same time, homogeneous information will further strengthen the shaping effect. Under the combined effect of convergence psychology and group pressure, the target object may gradually lose basic logic and value judgment capabilities, thus subtly forming the cognition carefully set by the initiator. .
Demonstrate specific real-life behaviors. Cognition is the premise of behavior, and behavior reacts on cognition. Intelligent algorithms can constrain and induce real-life behavior by directional shaping of the stance and value tendencies of specific objects on political, military operations, social and other issues. The foreign military believes that by disseminating special ideas to the public, it can lead to social disorder and loss of control. For key individuals, through strategies such as controlling the brain, attacking the heart, and seizing the will, they will make mistakes in their judgment of the country’s strategic direction, doubt the war decision-making, and be negative and pessimistic about the direction of the war, thus producing the effect of “conquering the enemy without fighting.” Practice has proven that the reshaping of target cognitive orientation highlights specific real-life behaviors, and dynamic changes in real-life behaviors trigger real-time adjustments to user portraits, which in turn drives the adjustment and update of recommendation strategies, forming a complete closed feedback loop.
Intelligent algorithms influence the implementation path of cognitive confrontation
Intelligent algorithms have the characteristics of encapsulation and transplantation, data sharing, fast calculation, autonomous learning, etc., and there is a natural fit between them and cognitive confrontation.
Promote the coupling of confrontational forms of peace and war. The dissemination of information across time boundaries leads to conflicts in cognitive space at all times, and the time scale may vary from seconds to decades. In peacetime, the most important characteristics of cognitive confrontation tactics are concealment and long-term nature, while in wartime they are suppressive and urgent. Intelligent algorithms can further promote the coupling of peace and war in the form of cognitive confrontation through information sharing, situation updating and strategy inheritance. Based on peacetime information and wartime intelligence, comprehensive analysis and judgment of the enemy’s situation, our situation, and the battlefield environment can be automatically calculated to draw conclusions on the strengths, weaknesses, key points, and difficulties of the confrontation; based on mathematical modeling and machine learning, combined with Cognitive confrontation results and real-time battlefield situation in peacetime, and after comprehensive evaluation, optimal tactics and plans can be proposed.
Promote the combination of explicit and implicit means of confrontation. Cognitive domain operations are filled with massive and complex information in various formats and with varying strengths and weaknesses, which not only brings challenges to one’s own identification and processing, but also provides convenient conditions for confusing the opponent. Only through cognitive fusion can a comprehensive, timely and accurate judgment of the situation be formed, and then the advantages of global perception be transformed into decision-making and action advantages. Comprehensive multi-channel information for intelligent analysis and comparison, comprehensive research and judgment, can identify erroneous information, filter useless information, screen false information, and provide information support for commanders’ decision-making. For example, explicit means can be used for cognitive deterrence and will disintegration, implicit means can be used for cognitive deception and cognitive induction, and explicit and implicit means can be used for cognitive confusion.
Promote global integration of confrontation space. The cognitive confrontation space not only covers the physical domain space including land, sea, air, space, etc., but also covers the information domain space and cognitive domain space such as electromagnetic and network. Cognitive confrontation is a global fusion confrontation. Battlefield data is generated extremely quickly and in huge volumes, which places extremely high requirements on computing speed and capabilities. Relying on traditional manual calculations and computer-aided calculations can no longer meet the needs of battlefield space fusion. Semi-automatic or even automated fusion calculations must be achieved with the help of the high efficiency, strong computing power and high accuracy of intelligent algorithms. Relying on intelligent algorithms, vertical integration from cognitive perception to cognitive analysis to cognitive decision-making can be achieved; horizontally, multi-dimensional situation, power, decision-making, and scheduling across the physical domain, information domain, and cognitive domain can be achieved. Domain fusion.
Value offense and defense is an important way to carry out cognitive domain operations from a strategic level. Usually, value offense and defense involves interfering with people’s thinking, beliefs, values, etc., in order to achieve the purpose of disintegrating the enemy’s consensus, destroying the enemy’s will, and then gaining comprehensive control of the battlefield. . Accurately grasping the characteristics, mechanisms, and methods of value attack and defense is crucial to gaining operational advantages in the cognitive domain in the future.
Characteristics of the cognitive domain of value attack and defense
Value attack and defense refers to the intervention and influence on relatively stable cognitive results by inducing deep logical thinking and value judgment changes in individuals or groups, in order to reconstruct people’s will, thinking, psychology, emotion and other cognitive abilities. Value offense and defense mainly have the following characteristics:
Soft confrontation. Traditional war mainly relies on violent means to weaken and disintegrate the enemy’s military capabilities, and usually has a strong war intensity. Cognitive domain operations will no longer be limited to hard confrontations such as siege of cities and territories, but will focus more on penetration and counter-infiltration, attack and counter-attack, control and counter-control around value positions. By competing for dominance in cognitive domain confrontations, the physical domain will be further stimulated. and information domain combat effectiveness, thereby seizing the initiative on the battlefield and even achieving the effect of defeating others without fighting. In practice, value offense and defense often focus on the cultural traditions, values and social psychology of a country or nation, and ultimately achieve the purpose of destroying the enemy’s will, cognitive manipulation, and mental control.
Full dimensional release. Modern warfare increasingly exhibits overall, multi-domain, and all-time characteristics. Cognitive domain operations aim to affect battlefield effects by intervening in people’s consciousness. The relative stability of consciousness determines that people’s worldview, beliefs and other values are generally relatively stable. Therefore, value attack and defense require long-term, uninterrupted, holographic Proceed in all dimensions. From a time point of view, value offense and defense blurs the boundaries between peacetime and war, and is always in war, at any time, continuously accumulating and gradually releasing combat effectiveness; from a space point of view, value offense and defense blurs the boundaries between front and rear of operations, and creates a full range of physical and intangible space. Directional expansion; from a field perspective, value offense and defense blurs the boundaries between military and non-military. It not only occurs in the military field, but also exists in political, economic, diplomatic, cultural and other fields, showing the characteristics of full coverage.
Technology empowers. Cognitive domain operations are a technology-intensive and complex system engineering. The penetration of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, brain science, and quantum computing into the entire process is triggering iterative upgrades and profound changes in cognitive domain operations. Intelligent tools have fundamentally enhanced the ability of combatants in the cognitive domain to manipulate and intervene in the opponent’s thinking. As a new means and new style of combat power, human-machine hybridization will change the subject of future wars. Independent confrontation and cloud-brain victory may become the mainstream offensive and defensive model. . In recent years, NATO has launched cognitive electronic warfare equipment aimed at changing the opponent’s value perception and behavior through information offense and defense. The development of science and technology has also triggered a cognitive revolution. The rapid spread of information has further accelerated the differences in public value cognition. Cognitive islands have intensified the value gap between different subjects. The changes in social structure brought about by intelligence have profoundly changed the political and cultural landscape. . Starting from this point, in future cognitive domain operations, holding the “nose” of technological innovation and mastering key core technologies will be crucial to seizing the initiative on the battlefield.
The mechanism of cognitive domain of value attack and defense
Value offense and defense is a high-level confrontation in the cognitive domain, and its target is people’s deep cognition. Consciousness is the reflection of social existence in the brain. Regulation of social existence, guidance of public consciousness and changes in the function of the human brain can strengthen or reverse human consciousness. If you want to defeat your opponent in an offensive and defensive confrontation, you must follow the laws of thinking and cognition and grasp the winning mechanism of value offense and defense.
Shock value “protection zone”. Occupying the commanding heights of values is the logical starting point for carrying out value offense and defense. Social consciousness is often composed of relatively stable core values and peripheral auxiliary theories. Various theories such as economics, politics, religion, culture, etc. can be constructed and adapted to protect core values from external impacts, and therefore also bear the burden of external impact. The impact of other values challenges. From the perspective of foreign military forces, value offense and defense means to continuously impact the “protective zone” of the opponent’s ideology through cultural penetration, religious conflict, strategic communication and other means, in conjunction with actions in the physical and information domains. This often requires grasping the values, political attitudes, religious beliefs, etc. that affect the opponent’s cognition. By disrupting their social group psychology, inducing value confusion, shaking the will to fight, destroying cultural identity, and even changing and disintegrating their original cognitive system, Thereby instilling or implanting new values that are beneficial to oneself in order to achieve the purpose of combat.
Ignite the “tipping point” of conflict. Cognitive domain warfare involves history, culture, political systems, national emotions, religious beliefs and other categories, and the subjects of the war have also expanded from simple military personnel to ordinary people. Stimulating cognitive conflicts among ordinary people by hyping up topic disputes and public events will become an important means of cognitive domain warfare. In recent local conflicts, it is not uncommon for warring parties to use purposeful narratives to ignite national emotions, trigger political crises, and then affect the war situation. In future wars, some countries will use hot-button and sensitive events to ignite public opinion, and rely on network technology to gather, attract, mobilize, precisely manipulate and induce and shape ordinary people, thereby promoting general conflicts to escalate into battles over beliefs, systems, and values. Become the norm.
Controlling cognitive “fracture surfaces.” As an existence at the conceptual level, cognitive space is superimposed by the subjective cognitive space of all combat individuals. It is a collection of differentiated, different and even conflicting values. However, ideology has a “suturing” function. Through cognitive shaping and discourse construction, it can effectively “sew” broken cognitions together, condense scattered values, and form a relatively stable cognitive system. After World War II, France conducted an effective cognitive “suturing” of the trauma of defeat. It used a set of independent narrative logic to explain how the war provided “new opportunities” for France, which greatly condensed the French people’s political identification with the government. When fighting for value positions in cognitive domain operations, we should pay attention to the cognitive fractures within the enemy, find the cognitive connection points between the enemy and ourselves, and conduct cognitive “stitching” to unite the forces of all parties to the maximum extent and isolate and disintegrate the enemy.
The main means of the cognitive domain of value attack and defense
Value offense and defense expand cognitive confrontation from the public opinion and psychological levels to the thinking space, and from the military field to the overall domain, thereby achieving a blow to the enemy’s deep political identity. At present, the world’s military powers are strengthening their strategic preparations, aiming at profound changes in target subjects and tactics and means, transforming their operational thinking, and actively taking the initiative in cognitive domain operations.
Aiming for deep destruction. Cognitive domain operations directly affect human brain cognition. Compared with physical domain operations, it is easier to achieve deep strategic intentions. In particular, once the “high-order cognition” of people’s language level, thinking level and cultural level is broken through, it will help to strategically reverse the battlefield situation and achieve the political purpose of the war. Based on this, cognitive domain operations often start before the war, by intervening in the opponent’s internal affairs and diplomacy, shaking the ideological and value foundations of the opponent; during war, they focus on affecting the enemy’s war decision-making, campaign command, and battle implementation value judgments, attacking or weakening them. The decision-making ability and resistance will of combatants, etc. All hostile parties are trying to “maintain their own world while increasing the destructive pressure on their opponents” to achieve the goal of achieving decision-making advantages through competing for cognitive advantages, and then gaining operational advantages.
Centered on ordinary individuals. In the future, the subjects of cognitive domain operations will no longer be limited to military personnel. Broadly speaking, individuals who can exchange and disseminate information may become combatants. Compared with elites in the social field, ordinary people are more likely to accept and spread multiple values, and their cognitive space is more likely to be manipulated. At present, online media is becoming the main channel for information exchange and dissemination in the social field. Through targeted information guidance and information delivery, the purpose of cognitive shaping is achieved. Foreign military practice has proven that by shaping the cognition of ordinary individuals, it can cause progressive penetration and cognitive interference from bottom to top, causing the ideological concepts between ordinary people and social decision-makers to deviate, making it impossible to achieve key actions. effective consensus.
In the form of protracted warfare. Unlike military struggles in the physical domain that directly attack and destroy “hard” targets, the potential target of cognitive domain operations is human cognition. Value attack and defense are directed at changing the concepts, beliefs, will, emotions, etc. of the combatants, which often requires subtlety and step-by-step operations. Effective cognitive attacks are generally launched during the preparation stage of combat and run throughout the war. By collecting the opponent’s cognitive situation, decision-making habits, thinking patterns, etc., actions such as creating a situation and changing the atmosphere are carried out in a targeted manner. Therefore, cognitive domain operations need to strengthen the overall design, pay special attention to coordinating multi-party forces, and strengthen pre-preparation in multiple positions such as public opinion field creation and diplomacy, so as to form an overall operational synergy.
(Author’s unit: Military Political Work Research Institute, Academy of Military Sciences)
With the development of global informatization and the advancement of computer science, linguistics and neuroscience, the human cognitive space composed of spiritual and psychological activities such as human emotions, will, beliefs and values is evolving into a new battlefield for military competition. In order to achieve the effect of defeating others without fighting. As early as July 2001, the “Network Centric Warfare” demonstration report submitted to Congress by the U.S. Department of Defense pointed out that in addition to the five-dimensional war space of land, sea, air, space, and electricity, future wars will also have a sixth-dimensional war space. ——Cognitive space.
Cognitive domain battles intensify
Since the birth of human warfare, the strategy of subduing the enemy without fighting has been highly praised by military strategists at home and abroad in ancient and modern times. Whether it is the “empty city strategy” or “embarrassment on all sides”, they are classic examples of cognitive domain warfare in Chinese history. Sun Tzu said: “He who subdues the enemy’s army without fighting is a good man.” During the American Civil War, a northern army was surrounded by a southern army. At the critical moment, the northern army commander asked for negotiations. The southern army commander said nothing. He just led the northern army commander to his artillery position and counted the number of cannons. When the number reached 150, the northern army commander Surrender.
With the advancement of science and technology and the development of human society, under the interaction of informatization and globalization, various information carried by emerging media, national languages, cultural products, etc. are used as weapons to penetrate, influence and shape hostility. The battle in the cognitive domain, which is oriented toward the cognition, emotion, and consciousness of the national leadership, military, elites, and the general public, and ultimately achieves the purpose of controlling a country’s ideology, values, national spirit, cultural traditions, and historical beliefs, is becoming more and more intense. In particular, the rapid development of multidisciplinary technologies such as brain science and technology, information technology, biotechnology, and materials technology has provided more direct means to influence the opponent’s cognition and achieve “conquering the enemy without fighting.”
Currently, brain science is developing rapidly. Using computer technology, linguistics and neuroscience, etc., brain imaging technology can reveal the advanced cognitive functions and neural information processing methods of the human brain, thereby obtaining the rules of psychological activities such as the feeling, perception, attention, thinking, memory and subconsciousness of human individuals. It has become possible, which has laid a solid technical foundation for human beings to compete in the cognitive space.
Brain reading technology can read human thoughts and consciousness. The human brain is made up of hundreds of billions of neurons. When neurons interact, a chemical reaction occurs that releases a measurable electrical impulse. With the help of advanced brain imaging technology, people can read these electrical pulses, conduct quantitative analysis of brain activity, and ultimately achieve the purpose of analyzing and reading the thinking activities of the human brain. According to reports, the smart headband invented by Australian scientists can monitor the current transmission status of tens of billions of neurons in the human brain, and then understand the real-time psychological state of the monitored person, including attention, engagement, excitement and stress levels. wait.
Brain stimulation technology can enhance specific functions of the human brain. Since the birth of human beings, we have mainly relied on natural evolution to improve our capabilities. However, with the development and progress of brain science and technology, brain stimulation technology can provide a more direct and rapid method for humans to improve their abilities. Scientific research has found that human cognitive ability is closely related to specific areas of the brain, and specific stimulation of these areas can help improve or enhance brain function. For example, the implementation of non-invasive brain stimulation technology can significantly improve people’s sleep and enhance attention, memory, alertness and decision-making.
Brain control technology can control people’s thinking consciousness. Brain science research shows that after the human brain generates action awareness and before executing the action, the electrical pulse activity of the nervous system will change accordingly, and people’s thoughts can be controlled through external interference. The “Neuroscience: Conflict and Security” report released by the Royal Society in 2012 believed that cognitive neuroscience (including brain science) has the potential for weaponization and can develop new weapons that directly act on the nervous system (mainly the brain). Moreover, the idea of mind-controlled combat has always been a focus of the Pentagon. As early as 2004, the U.S. Department of Defense began to invest heavily in research on “thought-controlled robots” in six laboratories including the Neural Engineering Center at Duke University. The Washington Post Military Weekly disclosed that the U.S. military used brain-control weapons during the Iraq War.
Cognitive domain has huge operational advantages
“Attack on the heart is first, siege the city second; war on the heart is first, followed by military warfare.” At present, information-based weapons and equipment are becoming more and more expensive, and the price has doubled; the battlefield space is multi-dimensional, and combat consumption has skyrocketed; the lethality of weapons has increased dramatically. The political influence is increasing day by day, and waging war is no longer the first choice to achieve political, military, economic and other purposes. With the increasing number of methods and means of cognitive space operations and the high cost-efficiency ratio of operations, cognitive confrontation has become increasingly prominent in the national security strategic game and has become a new battlefield for military competition. Whether it is the “color revolutions” in the Middle East, West Asia, North Africa and other regions, or the war in Syria, the confrontation between the two sides in the cognitive space is intensifying.
The combat effectiveness is high. From the perspective of counter-weapons, cognitive space combat weapons are mainly information, with various means of dissemination. Especially with the rapid development of new media such as the Internet and social media, as well as the networking of human society, its dissemination scope is getting wider and wider, and its influence is increasing. getting bigger. Anywhere information can spread can become a battlefield in cognitive wars. Compared with the current physical domain operations, the unit price of advanced fighters, missiles and other weapons and equipment can easily reach tens of millions or even hundreds of millions of dollars. The cost of war is huge. However, cognitive space operations can be used without firing a single shot. The enemy loses his will to fight. In the Gulf War, the U.S.-led coalition spent 60 billion U.S. dollars, and finally had to ask Japan and other allies to finance the war; in the Afghanistan War, the U.S. spent more than 3 trillion U.S. dollars but failed to defeat the Taliban, and was eventually forced to withdraw. In the early days of the Iraq War, the U.S. military carried out cognitive operations, causing the Iraqi National Guard to suddenly “disappear” without firing a single shot. The U.S.-British coalition captured Baghdad in less than a month. With the extensive application of science and technology such as biology, medicine, environment, and information communication in the cognitive field, the ways to control cognitive systems such as people’s will, thinking, psychology, and emotions have become more diverse and flexible, and the implementation of cognitive operations has become easier. It is easy to implement and can be implemented individually or jointly at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to achieve a high operational cost-effectiveness ratio.
Fully implemented in all dimensions. Since cognitive information is not limited by operational dimensions, space, and time, it can be used in various operational dimensions, spaces, and times, making cognitive space operations a basic combat situation that is all-dimensional, all-domain, and all-time. From a spatial point of view, cognitive space operations blur the boundaries between front and rear operations, showing the characteristics of all-round and all-weather expansion of tangible and invisible spaces; from a time point of view, cognitive space operations blur the boundaries between wartime and peacetime, transforming In peacetime, it is used in wartime, and it continues after the war, throughout the entire process of the war, showing the characteristics of “war at all times”; from a field perspective, cognitive space operations blur the boundaries between military and non-military operations, and are not only widespread It is used in the military field, and penetrates into various fields such as politics, economy, diplomacy, religion, etc., showing the characteristics of full coverage; from the perspective of combat objects, cognitive space operations blur the boundaries between military personnel and civilians, and have the ability to comprehensively implement military and civilian Characteristics of impact.
The lethality is huge. Cognitive advantage is both soft power and hard power. It is the smart power that best combines soft and hard power. Cognitive advantages usually include perceptual advantages, knowledge advantages, psychological advantages and decision-making advantages. Perceptual advantages can help the military improve the lethality of weapon platforms. U.S. Air Force combat tests show that after a combat aircraft gains a perception advantage, its lethality can be increased by 2.5 times. However, if the aircraft is at a disadvantage in perception, it will be in a state of information confusion to a large extent, and will not only become “blind” or “deaf”, They may also become “idiots” who act blindly and “idiots” who are deceived by the enemy’s false information. In the future, intelligent warfare will, to some extent, be a contest of knowledge. Knowledge has become an important military element. Only by forming a knowledge advantage can we fully utilize the performance of high-tech weapons and equipment and achieve the best combination of people and weapons. Decision-making advantage is the core of cognitive space advantage and the key to winning future wars. Establishing and protecting one’s own decision-making advantages, and attacking and weakening the enemy’s decision-making advantages will be the focus of future war confrontations. Only by gaining a decision-making advantage can we form a full-spectrum advantage and ultimately win the war.
Give full play to the advantages of non-military power. Future wars are hybrid wars, involving not only the military field, but also many non-military fields. Due to restrictions such as the laws of war, military power cannot be used in non-military fields, but cognitive space operations can exert its unique advantages to achieve war goals. For example, during the Second Lebanon War, the Lebanese military made full use of the power of the media to publicize a large number of civilian casualties to win the support of international public opinion; internally, it used pictures of destroyed Israeli military equipment to publicize the results of the war, which not only forced the Israeli military to compress as much as possible The duration of the operation resulted in its inability to achieve its operational objectives, and it also received support from Arab countries, thus gaining strategic initiative. As cognitive space becomes a new battlefield space, non-military forces are likely to become the main force in cognitive space operations, and combat operations will become more and more frequent. According to statistics, in recent local wars, the ratio of non-military forces to military combat forces has reached 4:1, with non-military forces engaged in cognitive operations accounting for the vast majority.
Cognitive domain combat methods are diverse
In essence, cognitive domain operations start from the spiritual level of war, taking people’s will, beliefs, thinking, psychology, etc. as the objects of combat, triggering cognitive imbalances by attacking the opponent’s perceptual system, and attacking their value system to promote combat. The target is emotionally disturbed and attacks its belief system, causing the target’s will to collapse, thereby achieving the combat goal. According to the cognitive space combat mechanism, its combat methods mainly include the following.
Destroy the will to fight. To dismantle the will to war is to declare to hostile countries the determination to fight and the will to use force by displaying powerful new weapons and equipment, new combat forces, mobilizing and deploying troops, and large-scale military exercises, so as to intimidate and deter the enemy’s military and civilians. The opponent retreats or surrenders, abandoning war operations. As for the timing of use, it is mainly used before war, aiming to defeat the enemy without fighting, and can also be used during combat. At the operational level, operations to disrupt the will to fight are mainly used at the strategic and operational levels, reflecting the will and determination of a country or group to safeguard interests. In peacetime, it usually manifests itself in the form of revelations in the cognitive field, exercises in the military field, blockades in the diplomatic field, sanctions in the economic field, etc.; in times of war, it usually manifests itself in the use of battlefield information advantages to show the enemy the results of the battle and directly express the will to fight. and determination to achieve cognitive enhancement of combat effectiveness. For example, pictures of the precise destruction of important targets in war are transmitted to enemy soldiers and civilians in the form of images or videos, which enhances the memory of the combat effects in the enemy’s cognitive field, creates a psychological shadow on the enemy, and makes them lose their will to fight.
Attack the idea of faith. Attacking beliefs and concepts refers to using various means to guide enemy soldiers and civilians to abandon or form certain beliefs and concepts, so as to disintegrate the spiritual pillars of enemy soldiers and civilians, change their attitude towards war, and then force the enemy to give up resistance. The main means of attacking beliefs and concepts include: vilifying the enemy’s political or spiritual leaders, destroying the values of the enemy’s military and civilians, and inducing young people to change their “three views.” For example, in the Iraq war and the Libyan war, the US military vilified Saddam Hussein and Gaddafi were typical examples. Another example is to use the Internet, social media and other channels to attack the beliefs of the enemy’s military and civilians, induce cognitive confusion among the enemy’s military and civilians, change their concepts, and thereby destroy the enemy’s public opinion foundation for war.
Public opinion attacks psychology. The psychology of public opinion attack refers to the use of various cognitive operations, such as creating a combat situation and atmosphere, to strongly stimulate the normal psychological state of enemy soldiers and civilians, thereby affecting combat judgment, decision-making, and actions. Public opinion attack psychological operations are not about eliminating the impact, but about controlling and minimizing the impact on one’s own military and civilians, and maximizing the impact on the enemy’s military and civilians. The U.S. military predicts through analysis of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that the proportion of attrition due to psychological problems will reach 10% to 25% in future operations. In recent local wars, the US military has always used psychological warfare as a “multiplier” of combat effectiveness and a “reducer” of combat costs. It must be used in every battle and every battle. Israel’s “Debka Files” website disclosed that in order to isolate Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the US military called senior Syrian military officials and said bluntly: “General, we have used the global positioning system to determine your position, and then sent snipers Hand. What do you want to do now? If I were you, I would definitely think twice about who I should be loyal to.”
The battlefield conceals truth and reveals lies. Concealing truth and showing falsehood refers to concealing the true battlefield situation and combat intentions through various actions, creating and displaying illusions, inducing the enemy to make wrong decisions, and achieving the purpose of controlling the war situation. For example, in ancient times, “hanging sheep beats drums”, “thatched boats borrow arrows”, and “empty city strategy” all infiltrated the idea of concealing the truth and revealing the false. In future wars, both combatants will usually use false information in the information acquisition process to induce confusion in the enemy’s situation; use saturated information blocking in the information processing process to induce the enemy to make inaccurate analysis and judgment; use viruses in the information feedback process , Trojan horse attack means to make the enemy’s command decision-making errors.
●Cognitive domain operations focus on full-dimensional attacks, including both “peacetime” cognitive penetration and “wartime” cognitive coercion.
●Wartime cognitive domain operations revolve around the achievement of military objectives, and are implemented in conjunction with military operations to support each other.
●In cognitive domain operations, as the sound of gunfire dissipates, the horn of a new round of cognitive domain operations may sound again, and there must be no slacking off.
Cognitive domain warfare is a confrontation at the level of conscious thinking. Through selective processing and transmission of information, it affects judgment, changes concepts, and competes for people’s hearts, thereby guiding the real situation to develop in a direction that is beneficial to oneself. From the perspective of cognitive shaping, cognitive domain operations focus on full-dimensional attacks, including both “peacetime” cognitive penetration and “wartime” cognitive coercion. Therefore, cognitive domain operations have no clear boundaries between peace and war; at the same time, according to the needs of political or military purposes, its targets can be individuals, organizations or even countries. Therefore, cognitive domain operations should establish the concepts of peacetime and wartime integration, military-civilian integration, cross-domain integration, and joint victory, and sort out basic tasks accordingly.
Focus on ideological layout tasks
Ideology is “an ideological system that systematically and consciously reflects the socio-economic formation and political system.” Ideology determines the rational foundation of cognition and has distinct camp characteristics. Although ideology covers all aspects of social life, in confrontations between countries or political groups, the struggle around belief guidance, attitude struggle, and concept assimilation is particularly fierce, and has become a focus of cognitive domain operations.
Shape and guide political cognition and seize control of belief and establishment. Confrontation between countries or political groups is not only a confrontation of national strength, but also a confrontation of national aspirations. The confrontation of political beliefs bears the brunt. Shaping and guiding political cognition aims to condense or destroy political consensus, strengthen or shake political beliefs, and expand or dissolve political camps. In cognitive domain operations, through cognitive guidance on the legitimacy of the ruling party, the rationality of political ideas and systems, and the health of the political ecology, we cultivate recognition, denial, and support of political positions, beliefs, practices, etc. Or hatred and other emotions, laying out a political cognitive layout that is beneficial to oneself and detrimental to the enemy. Political cognition is related to the survival foundation of a country or organization and is the primary focus of cognitive domain operations.
Shape and guide war cognition and seize the right to lead war attitudes. A country can be without war, but it cannot be without a sense of war. War cognition is the basis for the formation and development of the will, concepts, psychology, and thinking of individuals, organizations, and countries in the war cycle. Through cognitive guidance on the essence, nature, legal concepts, etc. of war, we build a war cognitive thinking system, guide the evaluation direction of the rationality, justice, and legality of war, promote the formation of support or opposition attitudes towards possible wars, and regulate The rise and fall of willingness to assume war obligations is a key issue in cognitive guidance of war. War cognition affects war attitudes, and the struggle for its control is a task that must be paid attention to in cognitive domain operations.
Shape and guide value cognition and seize control of emotions and will. Values influence people’s judgment of beauty and ugliness, right and wrong, and social behavior orientation. In terms of identifying things and judging right and wrong, human emotions always tend to support claims with similar values. Value cognition permeates every corner of life. Through the dissemination of ethical concepts, standards of beauty, ugliness, good and evil, literary and artistic opinions, etc., competition for the right to guide values, the right to guide life patterns, and the right to judge traditional inheritance is frequent and fierce. . In real life, different values often interpenetrate and entangle with each other. The essence of shaping and guiding value cognition is to strive for social and emotional recognition, which is a regular task in cognitive domain operations.
Pay close attention to social psychology and the task of building momentum
Social psychology provides a perceptual and experiential basis for cognition. It is formed on the basis of daily life, social activities, practical insights and other experiences. Social psychological guidance often promotes unpredictable changes in the actual situation. It is one of the usual modes of confrontation between the two sides, especially during non-military conflicts. It is also a task that must be paid attention to in cognitive domain operations.
Guide national psychology and regulate national emotions. National psychology is one of the social psychology that is most likely to cause conflicts and confrontations. Attacking national self-esteem can breed national inferiority complex and easily lead to disintegration. Improving national self-esteem can enhance national cohesion, but the expansion of national self-esteem can easily lead to the emergence of extreme racism, national chauvinism, etc.; the status, interests, and culture of different ethnic groups within the country Differences in people, customs, and lifestyles provide opportunities for people with ulterior motives to stir up ethnic antagonisms, while the same living space and cooperation process lay the foundation for eliminating prejudice and even cohesion and tolerance among ethnic groups. The result depends on the perception. Know the guide. National psychological guidance is sensitive and easy to lose control, and has a direct impact on social stability. It is a task that needs to be focused on in cognitive domain operations.
Guide group psychology and increase and eliminate oppositional consciousness. Groups generally refer to people of the same type, such as ethnicity, region, class, professional groups, even civil society groups, non-governmental organizations, etc. If groups are subjectively defined based on “convergence”, then the “differences” between groups exist objectively. This difference may be political and economic status, cultural thought, regional concept or other factors. Inducing the perception of differences and promoting the antagonism between different groups such as party opposition, regional opposition, professional opposition, rich and poor opposition, etc. will not only damage the internal unity of the country, but also accumulate and increase the dissatisfaction of all sectors of society against the political authorities, and instigate social mobilization. The turbulence and division left behind a foreshadowing. In cognitive domain operations, this kind of social psychology needs to be paid attention to.
Guide individual psychology and influence social emotions. In cognitive domain operations, individual psychological guidance is divided into two situations. One is the psychological guidance of important figures, such as sensitive professionals, public intellectuals, academic elites, successful business people, etc. The struggle for their political positions, emotional attitudes, etc. is an issue that both sides of the confrontation need to focus on. One is the use of phenomena that easily trigger individual psychological resonance. Such as public crises, major accidents, natural disasters and even some crimes and emergencies in life, intentionally inducing certain emotions may cause group polarization due to the herd effect of individuals, thus triggering changes in public opinion and even social unrest. Both of these aspects need to be paid attention to in cognitive domain operations.
Targeting the critical mission of wartime cognition
Cognitive domain operations begin before military operations and end after military operations. Wartime cognitive domain operations revolve around the achievement of military objectives, are implemented in conjunction with military operations and support each other, and are characterized by violent coercion. In this stage of cognitive domain operations, “offensive” and “defensive” actions are carried out simultaneously, the influence of weapons and propaganda effects are comprehensively effective, and methods such as “lure”, “attack”, “deception” and “control” are emerging one after another. This is the key to cognitive domain operations. critical stage.
Attack the mind and seize the will, force and induce cognition. Wartime cognitive attacks are mainly carried out to weaken the enemy’s will to resist and induce the enemy to make wrong decisions. Targeting the enemy’s decision-makers, front-line commanders, etc., use targeted attacks to shake the will to resist, and use information deception and interference to induce decision-making; for armed forces, mainly the military, use force to shock and deter, and comprehensively use operations such as public opinion warfare and emerging technologies. Means are used to shake their belief in participating in the war, trigger their panic, undermine their military morale, and dominate their action patterns; target the supporting forces in society, deliver tough messages through large-scale military exercises, equipment testing, publicity of weapon lethality effectiveness, etc. to attack confidence, and selectively Target strikes and dissemination of war situations can induce panic, and efforts can be made to gain understanding by publicizing one’s own humanitarian actions in the war and relevant international comments.
Build a strong line of defense and control the situation with concentration. The focus of cognitive defense in wartime is to build a strong defense line of “heart”, “will” and “intellect” to prevent the loss of fighting spirit under the stimulation of drastic changes in the situation or environment. Education and publicity are the basic approaches to cognitive defense in wartime. For the forces participating in the war, we can stimulate enthusiasm for participating in the war through mobilization and encouragement, clarify the truth by refuting rumors, establish the belief in victory by publicizing the results of the war, mobilize morale by setting examples, etc.; for the supporting forces, educate the justice, rationality, and legality of the war. Propaganda is used to establish a sense of mission, responsibility, and obligation among the people, to inspire a sense of hatred and hatred by exposing the enemy’s brutal behavior, to stimulate enthusiasm for supporting operations by publicizing the deeds of local governments participating in the war and supporting frontline operations, and so on.
Expand your camp and eliminate hidden dangers. Creating a favorable cognitive atmosphere and providing support for the expansion of one’s own camp is an important aspect that must be achieved in wartime cognitive domain operations. In particular, although the fight for international support is mainly through political, diplomatic and other activities, the widespread diffusion of one’s own positions, ideas, attitudes, etc. often leads to changes in international civil attitudes, which in turn affects decision-making at the political level. Provide support for your own camp expansion. In addition, wartime cognitive domain operations also have an important task throughout the war, which is to eliminate the adverse hidden dangers caused by various accidents in the war. Especially in the later stages of the war, as the destructive effects of war appear and spread, people’s cognitive system will be repeatedly impacted by different information. During this period, ideological guidance, social psychological shaping, and individual psychological counseling are required to work together to ensure the consolidation of the results. In cognitive domain operations, as the sound of guns dissipates, the horn of a new round of cognitive domain operations may sound again, and there must be no slacking off.
China adopts a multifaceted approach in its engagement with Europe, leveraging all instruments of national power to further its interests in the region. Diplomatically, China employs bilateral and multilateral forums to build consensus, overcome barriers, and secure support for major initiatives like One Belt One Road (OBOR). In the information domain, China disseminates targeted messaging to shape positive perceptions and counter unfavorable narratives related to its activities in Europe. The military dimension involves selective cooperation and naval access arrangements to protect China’s growing overseas investments and assets. Economically, China wields its financial clout to fund major infrastructure projects, stimulate trade linkages, and employ incentives or coercion when advantageous. Additionally, China engages in political alignment, intelligence gathering, information control, and measured military cooperation to facilitate the expansion of its influence across the European landscape. By orchestrating a synchronized strategy across these domains, China strives to achieve its overarching objectives in Europe – expanding its economic and political influence, accessing advanced technologies, reshaping global governance, and cementing its role as a major global power on the world stage.
China’s increasing focus on Europe has necessitated a comprehensive and multifaceted approach by the United States military’s European Command (EUCOM) and NATO to counter Chinese influence. Through a range of strategic initiatives, these organizations aim to safeguard European security, protect national interests, and promote democratic values while mitigating the risks posed by China’s expanding presence. By strengthening economic cooperation, addressing military expansion, leveraging soft power and public diplomacy, building multinational partnerships, fostering cooperation with global powers, investing in critical infrastructure, and promoting regional security cooperation, EUCOM and NATO can effectively counter China’s influence in Europe.
China’s focus for the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative in relation to Europe can be summarized into several key aspects:
1. Infrastructure Development: The OBOR initiative aims to enhance connectivity and infrastructure development between China and Europe, with a focus on improving transportation networks, such as railways, ports, and roads. China seeks to build a comprehensive and efficient transportation network that will facilitate trade, investment, and people-to-people exchanges between the two regions.
2. Trade and Investment Promotion: China aims to deepen economic ties and promote trade and investment between China and Europe through the OBOR initiative. By improving infrastructure connectivity, reducing trade barriers, and enhancing market access, China envisions increased bilateral trade volumes and a boost in Chinese investment in Europe, as well as European investment in China.
3. Cultural Exchanges and People-to-People Ties: Alongside economic development, OBOR emphasizes fostering cultural exchanges, understanding, and people-to-people ties between China and Europe. China aims to strengthen cooperation in areas such as education, tourism, and cultural heritage preservation to promote mutual understanding and friendship among the peoples of the two regions.
4. Regional Cooperation and Diplomacy: OBOR represents a platform for regional cooperation and diplomatic engagement. China seeks to collaborate with European countries and institutions in areas such as policy coordination, connectivity planning, and project implementation. By fostering multilateral dialogue and cooperation, China intends to create an inclusive and cooperative framework for regional development.
It is important to note that the OBOR initiative is not solely focused on Europe and encompasses a broader vision, including Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Nonetheless, Europe plays a crucial role in OBOR due to its geostrategic importance, economic potential, and historical ties with China.
The Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) philosophy is a conceptual framework used to analyze and understand the multifaceted elements of a nation’s power projection and influence. Applying the DIME philosophy to China’s efforts in the context of the One Belt One Road initiative focused on Europe.
One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative:
1. Diplomatic Dimension: China strategically employs diplomacy to reinforce OBOR’s objectives. Diplomatically, China engages in bilateral and multilateral dialogues with participating countries, promoting OBOR as a cooperative endeavor that facilitates mutual economic development, regional stability, and win-win outcomes. China seeks diplomatic support, cooperation, and consensus-building to overcome potential barriers to implementation, such as political disagreements, regulatory issues, or national security concerns.
2. Information Dimension: China recognizes the significance of managing information and narratives related to the OBOR initiative. It utilizes various channels, including media, public relations, and cultural exchanges, to disseminate positive messages about the benefits and progress of OBOR projects. China aims to shape perceptions, generate support, and counter any negative narratives that may emerge, ensuring that OBOR is viewed favorably and comprehensively understood by the international community.
3. Military Dimension: Although the primary focus of OBOR is economic and developmental in nature, the military dimension cannot be disregarded entirely. While China promotes a peaceful vision for OBOR, it acknowledges the need to safeguard its interests and protect its investments and infrastructure. China engages in military cooperation, primarily maritime security and anti-piracy efforts, to ensure the safety of critical sea routes and protect its overseas investments and personnel involved in OBOR-related projects.
4. Economic Dimension: The economic dimension is at the heart of the OBOR initiative. China leverages its economic might and financial resources to provide funding, loans, and investments in infrastructure projects along the OBOR routes. Through initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Silk Road Fund, China facilitates economic cooperation and provides financial support to partner countries. This economic dimension is central to stimulating economic growth, reducing regional disparities, creating job opportunities, and enhancing trade linkages between China and participating nations.
In essence, the DIME philosophy helps to articulate how China employs each dimension – diplomatic, information, military, and economic – to further its OBOR goals. By utilizing a comprehensive approach across these domains, China seeks to maximize its impact, build partnerships, and address challenges that may arise during implementation.
Further analysis and expanded review and application of the DIME philosophy to China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative:
5. Political Dimension: The political dimension is intertwined with the diplomatic efforts of China in promoting OBOR. China engages in political dialogue, negotiations, and diplomacy at various levels to secure support for the initiative. It seeks to align the interests and aspirations of participating countries with OBOR’s objectives, forging strategic partnerships and agreements that facilitate policy coordination and mutual benefits. China also employs economic incentives and aid packages to foster political alignment and gain influence in participating nations.
6. Information Warfare: In the information age, China recognizes the importance of information warfare as a means to shape narratives and control the flow of information related to OBOR. Through the use of social media, digital platforms, and state-controlled media outlets, China actively promotes positive stories and achievements associated with OBOR while countering unfavorable narratives. It also invests in soft power initiatives, including cultural exchanges, media cooperation, and academic partnerships, to shape perceptions and gain support for OBOR.
7. Intelligence Gathering: Intelligence plays a crucial role in implementing large-scale infrastructure projects, evaluating risks, and ensuring successful outcomes. China engages in intelligence gathering activities to assess the political, economic, and security landscape of participating countries. It analyzes potential obstacles, identifies investment opportunities, and addresses potential threats to its projects and interests along the OBOR routes. This intelligence informs decision-making, risk management, and mitigation strategies.
8. Military Cooperation and Presence: While the primary focus of OBOR is economic cooperation, China recognizes the importance of military cooperation and presence for certain aspects. China engages in military exercises, joint trainings, and exchanges with partner countries to enhance security cooperation, build trust, and safeguard its maritime interests. It also strategically establishes naval bases or access arrangements along critical sea routes as part of its broader security framework. This military dimension contributes to stability, protects China’s investments, and addresses potential security challenges to OBOR projects.
9. Economic Warfare: China’s economic dimension goes beyond funding infrastructure projects. It employs economic leverage, market access, and economic incentives to advance its OBOR agenda. China can utilize economic coercion or inducements to influence the decision-making of participating countries and create dependencies. It strategically offers trade opportunities, investments, and economic cooperation to strengthen relationships, promote integration, and expand Chinese influence in the region.
By considering these additional dimensions within the DIME philosophy, we can better understand how China applies a comprehensive approach to OBOR, incorporating political, information, intelligence, military, and economic tools to achieve its strategic objectives. The continuous assessment and adaptation across these dimensions allow China to navigate challenges, seize opportunities, and exert influence throughout the implementation of OBOR.
The following table illustrates China’s multidimensional application of the DIME framework, including additional elements like information warfare, intelligence and military cooperation, to further the strategic goals and objectives of its OBOR initiative across diplomatic, information, military and economic dimensions.
The following comprehensive table illustrates China’s application of the DIME framework to its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative:
Dimension
Key Strategies and Objectives
Diplomatic
Bilateral and multilateral engagement; Consensus building; Overcoming barriers
Further analysis and application f the DIME philosophy to the United States European Command (EUCOM) to counter China’s influence:
1. Diplomatic Dimension: The diplomatic dimension of EUCOM involves engaging with European nations through bilateral and multilateral channels to foster cooperation, build alliances, and promote shared security interests. EUCOM conducts diplomatic negotiations, strategic dialogues, and military-to-military engagements to strengthen partnerships, address regional challenges, and enhance collective defense capabilities. It aims to solidify alliances, facilitate interoperability, and foster collaboration through diplomatic initiatives and agreements.
2. Information Dimension: The information dimension is critical for EUCOM in shaping perceptions, countering misinformation, and maintaining a strategic narrative. EUCOM employs various communication strategies and media platforms to disseminate accurate and timely information about its activities, exercises, and missions in Europe. It also engages in public diplomacy to foster understanding, build trust, and counteract potential negative narratives or propaganda that may undermine U.S. interests or objectives in the region.
3. Military Dimension: The military dimension of EUCOM involves the deployment and readiness of military forces to defend U.S. and NATO interests in Europe. EUCOM maintains a robust military presence, conducts joint exercises, and provides deterrence against potential threats. It collaborates closely with NATO allies and partners to ensure collective defense and security cooperation. The military dimension also encompasses crisis response, contingency planning, and the ability to rapidly deploy forces when necessary.
4. Economic Dimension: While primarily a diplomatic and military command, the economic dimension of EUCOM is significant. Economic considerations can play a role in strengthening alliances and partnerships within Europe. EUCOM supports economic initiatives that promote stability and prosperity, encouraging increased trade, investment, and economic integration among European nations. Economic cooperation enhances regional resilience, contributes to security, and fosters long-term stability.
5. Intelligence Dimension: Intelligence is a crucial element for EUCOM’s situational awareness, threat assessment, and decision-making. EUCOM collects, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence to understand the shifting security dynamics, anticipate emerging threats, and develop effective strategies. Intelligence helps identify potential challenges, vulnerabilities, and opportunities in the European theater, informing EUCOM’s military planning, operational activities, and policy recommendations.
6. Political Dimension: The political dimension is inherent in EUCOM’s engagement with European nations, NATO, and other relevant political actors. EUCOM works closely with U.S. diplomatic representatives and policy-makers to align military objectives with broader political goals. Political engagements range from high-level strategic dialogues to local-level engagements with host nation governments or regional political entities. EUCOM’s political dimension seeks to influence decision-making, enhance cooperation, and build consensus around common security objectives.
By considering these dimensions within the DIME framework, it becomes clear that EUCOM employs a comprehensive approach to ensure regional security, enhance partnerships, and project U.S. influence in Europe. The integration of diplomatic, information, military, economic, intelligence, and political elements allows EUCOM to address multifaceted challenges, build coalitions, and support the strategic interests of the United States and its European allies.
The following table summarizes EUCOM’s application of the DIME framework across the diplomatic, information, military, economic, intelligence, and political dimensions to counter China’s influence in Europe, along with the key elements within each dimension.
Dimension
EUCOM’s Application
Key Elements
Diplomatic
Engagement through bilateral and multilateral channels
Solidify alliances and partnerships; Foster cooperation; Facilitate interoperability
Collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence
Inform decision-making; Identify threats and vulnerabilities
Political
Alignment with diplomatic and policy objectives
Influence decision-making; Build consensus; Achieve political goals
China’s Influence and Counter-Offensive Strategy in Europe apply the DIME philosophy to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the United States European Command (EUCOM) in the European theater:
NATO:
1. Diplomatic Dimension: Diplomacy is at the core of NATO’s operations. The diplomatic dimension involves robust engagement and dialogue among member nations and partner countries to ensure solidarity and consensus on key issues. NATO conducts diplomatic efforts to strengthen alliances, build partnerships, and facilitate cooperation with non-NATO actors. It aims to promote shared values, address regional challenges, and forge common approaches to security.
2. Information Dimension: The information dimension plays a vital role in shaping narratives, countering misinformation, and maintaining public support for NATO’s mission. Through strategic communications, NATO disseminates accurate information about its activities, operations, and collective defense efforts. It engages in public diplomacy to foster understanding, build trust, and counter potential disinformation campaigns that may undermine NATO’s objectives or erode public support.
3. Military Dimension: The military dimension of NATO involves the collective defense and deterrence of its member states. NATO maintains a credible military presence, conducts joint exercises, and ensures interoperability among its forces. It coordinates defense planning, crisis response, and contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. The military dimension also encompasses the NATO-led missions, such as peacekeeping and counterterrorism, which contribute to regional security.
4. Economic Dimension: The economic dimension in NATO revolves around the economic capabilities and contributions of member nations. NATO encourages defense spending and defense industry cooperation among members to ensure the development and maintenance of effective military capabilities. Economic aspects also involve strengthening resilience against hybrid threats, including cyber and economic vulnerabilities. Economic cooperation ensures the sustainability and effectiveness of NATO’s military endeavors.
EUCOM:
1. Diplomatic Dimension: EUCOM’s diplomatic dimension involves engaging with European nations through strategic dialogues, military-to-military engagements, and diplomatic negotiations. It fosters cooperation, builds partnerships, and ensures synchronized efforts with European allies. EUCOM promotes mutual trust, understanding, and consensus on key security matters, facilitating the alignment of military objectives with broader diplomatic goals in Europe.
2. Information Dimension: The information dimension within EUCOM aims at shaping perceptions, countering misinformation, and maintaining a strategic narrative. EUCOM employs various communication strategies, media platforms, and public diplomacy initiatives to ensure accurate and timely information about its activities. It enhances transparency, builds public support, and counters potential negative narratives that might undermine U.S.-European partnerships or military operations.
3. Military Dimension: As a combatant command, the military dimension of EUCOM focuses on the readiness and posture of U.S. military forces deployed in Europe. EUCOM maintains a robust military presence, conducts joint exercises, and provides deterrence against potential threats. It collaborates closely with NATO allies and partner nations to ensure collective defense and security cooperation. The military dimension also encompasses crisis response, contingency planning, and rapid deployment capabilities.
4. Economic Dimension: Though primarily a military command, the economic dimension of EUCOM recognizes the significance of economic factors for regional stability. EUCOM supports economic initiatives that promote stability, trade, investment, and economic integration among European nations. By encouraging economic cooperation, EUCOM enhances regional resilience, contributes to security, and fosters long-term stability.
5. Intelligence Dimension: Intelligence is instrumental in supporting EUCOM’s situational awareness, threat assessment, and operational planning. EUCOM collects, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence to understand the evolving security environment in Europe. Intelligence supports decision-making, ensures effective risk management, and enables timely responses to emerging challenges and potential threats.
6. Political Dimension: The political dimension of EUCOM involves close coordination with U.S. diplomatic representatives and policymakers. EUCOM aligns military objectives with broader political goals, participates in strategic dialogues, and engages with European governments and political entities. This political dimension helps shape decision-making, enhance cooperation, and build consensus on key security issues.
By applying the DIME framework to NATO and EUCOM, we can observe how these entities utilize a comprehensive approach, incorporating diplomatic, information, military, economic, intelligence, and political tools to ensure regional security, enhance partnerships, and project influence in Europe. This holistic perspective strengthens collective defense, supports efficient decision-making, and fosters cooperation among member nations and partner countries.
Here are three developed courses of action that can be considered using the DIME philosophy within NATO and EUCOM to counter China’s influence:
Course of Action 1: Enhancing Cyber Defense Capabilities
Diplomatic Dimension: Strengthen diplomatic ties and engage in information sharing on cyber threats among NATO member nations and partner countries. Foster dialogue on norms of behavior in cyberspace and establish joint initiatives to counter cyber threats collectively.
Information Dimension: Develop a comprehensive cybersecurity communication strategy to raise awareness among the public about cyber threats and promote responsible behavior. Disseminate accurate information about cyber incidents and counter potential misinformation campaigns by engaging with the media and employing digital platforms.
Military Dimension: Prioritize the allocation of resources towards cyber defense capabilities, including robust cyber training, exercises, and joint operations among NATO allies. Focus on enhancing cyber resilience and improving interoperability to allow for effective information sharing and coordinated responses in the event of a cyber attack.
Economic Dimension: Encourage investment in research and development of cybersecurity technologies, promote public-private partnerships, and establish cyber protection agreements with defense industries. Foster economic cooperation to improve the collective resilience of NATO members against cyber threats.
Course of Action 2: Counteracting Disinformation Campaigns
Diplomatic Dimension: Strengthen coordination and information-sharing mechanisms with partner countries to exchange best practices in countering disinformation campaigns. Establish joint task forces, workshops, and training programs to enhance media literacy and critical thinking skills.
Information Dimension: Develop a proactive and agile strategic communication approach to counter disinformation campaigns. Establish dedicated communication channels to promptly respond to false narratives, challenge disinformation, and provide accurate information. Collaborate with social media platforms to identify and mitigate the spread of disinformation.
Military Dimension: Leverage the strengths of military strategic communication units to counter disinformation campaigns. Utilize military channels to disseminate accurate news, engage with local communities, and build trust. Conduct joint information operations exercises with NATO allies to enhance coordination and effectiveness.
Political Dimension: Work closely with political leaders, policymakers, and civil society organizations to develop policies that address the impact of disinformation and strengthen media resilience. Promote information transparency and accountability among political entities, fostering public trust in democratic processes.
Course of Action 3: Strengthening Defense Resilience against Hybrid Threats
Diplomatic Dimension: Foster international partnerships to enhance information sharing and cooperation in countering hybrid threats. Strengthen diplomatic ties to establish mechanisms for swift responses and joint operations when faced with hybrid challenges.
Information Dimension: Develop a comprehensive strategy to raise public awareness about hybrid threats, their tactics, and potential consequences. Establish public-private partnerships to combat disinformation and promote media literacy initiatives to increase resilience against manipulation.
Military Dimension: Improve cooperation and coordination among NATO member nations’ military forces to rapidly respond to hybrid threats. Focus on training and joint exercises to enhance interoperability and develop the capability to counter hybrid tactics effectively.
Economic Dimension: Encourage investment in critical infrastructure protection, including measures to defend against cyber attacks and secure supply chains. Foster economic resilience by diversifying energy sources and reducing dependencies on single suppliers to mitigate potential economic coercion.
These courses of action demonstrate how the DIME philosophy can be applied to address specific challenges while considering the diplomatic, information, military, economic, intelligence, and political dimensions. By adopting a holistic approach, NATO and EUCOM can effectively respond to evolving security threats, ensure regional stability, and strengthen partnerships in the European theater.
The following table highlights key points from each course of action are summarized concisely under the relevant DIME dimensions. The use of bullet points helps illustrate the main action points.
Course of Action 1: Enhancing Cyber Defense
Course of Action 2: Countering Disinformation
Course of Action 3: Defense against Hybrid Threats
Diplomatic
Strengthen ties and info sharing on cyber threats Establish norms of behavior in cyberspace
Coordination and info sharing mechanisms Joint task forces and training programs
Foster international partnerships Mechanisms for joint operations
Information
Cybersecurity communication strategy Counter misinformation
Strategic communication approach Collaborate with social media
Public awareness strategy Media literacy initiatives
Military
Prioritize cyber capabilities Exercises and joint operations
Leverage military comms expertise Information operations training
Further analysis considering each course of action, expanding and elaborating on the application of the DIME philosophy within NATO and EUCOM:
Course of Action 1: Enhancing Cyber Defense Capabilities
Diplomatic Dimension: Strengthening diplomatic ties and engaging in information sharing is crucial to combat cyber threats. NATO and EUCOM can facilitate regular forums, workshops, and conferences for member nations and partner countries to exchange best practices, insights, and threat intelligence. This includes enhancing coordination among diplomatic channels to develop joint initiatives and agreements on cybersecurity norms, deterrence, and response mechanisms.
Information Dimension: Developing a comprehensive cybersecurity communication strategy is vital. NATO and EUCOM can establish dedicated cybersecurity communication units to disseminate accurate information, raise awareness of cyber threats, and promote responsible behavior in cyberspace. This includes engaging with media outlets, social media platforms, and educational institutions to counter disinformation and improve public understanding of cybersecurity issues.
Military Dimension: Prioritizing the allocation of resources towards cyber defense capabilities is crucial. NATO and EUCOM can conduct regular joint exercises and training programs to enhance cyber skills and ensure interoperability among member nations’ military forces. This includes developing shared cyber response plans, conducting threat simulations, and fostering cooperation between military and civilian cybersecurity entities.
Economic Dimension: Encouraging investment in research and development of cybersecurity technologies is essential. NATO and EUCOM can collaborate with defense industries, academia, and private sector partners to advance cybersecurity capabilities, exchange expertise, and support innovation in this field. Additionally, member nations can work together to establish cyber protection agreements and promote economic cooperation to strengthen collective cyber resilience.
Course of Action 2: Counteracting Disinformation Campaigns
Diplomatic Dimension: Strengthening coordination and information-sharing mechanisms is key. NATO and EUCOM can establish dedicated working groups and task forces that involve both member nations and partner countries. These forums would facilitate sharing best practices, early warning systems, and intelligence on disinformation campaigns. Joint initiatives should focus on building resilience, countering propaganda, and enhancing collaboration among governments, non-governmental organizations, and international bodies.
Information Dimension: Developing a proactive and agile strategic communication approach is crucial to counter disinformation. NATO and EUCOM can establish specialized communication cells that monitor and analyze disinformation trends, identify false narratives, and promptly respond with accurate information. They should work closely with social media platforms to detect and mitigate the spread of disinformation, ensuring transparent algorithms and policies.
Military Dimension: Leveraging the strengths of military strategic communication units is invaluable. NATO and EUCOM can integrate their expertise into broader information campaigns aimed at countering disinformation. Military communication channels can be utilized to disseminate accurate news, engage with local communities, and build trust. Joint exercises and information operations training with NATO allies would enhance coordination and effectiveness in countering disinformation campaigns.
Political Dimension: Collaboration with political leaders, policymakers, and civil society organizations is essential for effective response to disinformation campaigns. NATO and EUCOM should engage with these stakeholders to develop policies that address disinformation challenges, strengthen media resilience, and ensure transparency in political processes. Partnerships with civil society groups, independent media, and fact-checking organizations can foster public trust, accountability, and responsible media practices.
Course of Action 3: Strengthening Defense Resilience against Hybrid Threats
Diplomatic Dimension: Strengthening cooperation among NATO and partner nations is crucial in countering hybrid threats. Regular dialogue, joint exercises, and information-sharing mechanisms can be established to exchange insights, intelligence, and best practices. NATO and EUCOM should actively engage in diplomatic efforts to develop joint strategies, share lessons learned, and strengthen global partnerships to tackle hybrid challenges collectively.
Information Dimension: Developing a comprehensive strategy to raise public awareness about hybrid threats is essential. NATO and EUCOM can leverage their communication channels to provide accurate information, highlight potential risks, and educate the public on the nature and tactics of hybrid warfare. Engaging social media platforms and partnering with media outlets to promote media literacy initiatives would enhance public resilience against manipulation.
Military Dimension: Improved cooperation and coordination among member nations’ military forces is vital in countering hybrid threats. NATO and EUCOM should organize joint exercises, simulations, and training programs that focus on countering hybrid tactics effectively. This includes enhancing interoperability, developing rapid response capabilities, and conducting joint assessments of vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure.
Economic Dimension: Economic resilience plays a crucial role in countering hybrid threats. NATO and EUCOM should encourage member nations to invest in critical infrastructure protection measures, such as securing energy supplies, diversifying energy sources, and safeguarding supply chains. Promoting economic cooperation and reducing dependencies on single suppliers would mitigate potential economic coercion and vulnerabilities.
Intelligence Dimension: Strengthening intelligence capabilities is essential to gain situational awareness, assess threats, and support effective response to hybrid challenges. NATO and EUCOM can enhance intelligence sharing and fusion among member nations’ intelligence agencies. This includes developing joint intelligence assessments, establishing early warning systems, and bolstering collaboration between military and civilian intelligence organizations.
Political Dimension: Collaboration with political leaders and policymakers is crucial to develop policies that address the impact of hybrid threats. NATO and EUCOM should engage in regular strategic dialogues and consultations with political entities to align military objectives with broader political goals. By fostering political awareness, ensuring coordination, and promoting transparency, NATO and EUCOM can effectively respond to hybrid threats.
By further expanding and elaborating on these courses of action, NATO and EUCOM can develop comprehensive strategies that encompass the diplomatic, information, military, economic, intelligence, and political dimensions. These actions will enhance their capabilities to address specific challenges, mitigate risks, and promote stability in the European theater.
The following The table summarizes the key points along the DIME+I+P dimensions for each of the three courses of action – enhancing cyber capabilities, countering disinformation campaigns, and building defense against hybrid threats.
Course of Action
Diplomatic
Information
Military
Economic
Intelligence
Political
Enhancing Cyber Defense Capabilities
Strengthen ties for info sharing; Joint cyber initiatives
Cybersecurity communication strategy; Counter disinformation
Joint cyber exercises; Interoperability
R&D investments; Economic cooperation
Countering Disinformation Campaigns
Coordination through working groups; Early warning systems
Strategic communication cells; Social media partnerships
Integrate military comms expertise
Collaboration on policies and transparency
Strengthening Defense against Hybrid Threats
Cooperation for joint strategies; Global partnerships
Applying the diplomatic, information/intelligence and economic philosophy to China’s challenges in Europe. When applying the DIME philosophy to analyze the challenges China faces, we can focus on the following dimensions: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic.
Diplomatic Challenges:
1. Competition for Influence: China faces diplomatic challenges in managing its relationships with other major powers and regional actors. Balancing its influence against that of the United States, Japan, and regional rivals like India and Vietnam requires careful diplomacy and economic engagement.
2. Disputed Territorial Claims: China’s territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea, pose significant diplomatic challenges. Resolving these disputes while maintaining regional stability and avoiding conflicts is crucial for China’s diplomatic strategies.
3. Tensions with Neighboring Countries: China’s assertive actions, such as its border disputes with India and historical rivalries with countries like Japan and South Korea create challenges in maintaining stable diplomatic relations. Addressing these tensions while promoting cooperation is essential for China’s diplomatic efforts.
Information Challenges:
1. Information Control: China faces challenges in controlling and managing information flows within its borders, especially with the increasing influence of social media platforms. Maintaining strict censorship and managing narratives to maintain domestic stability while engaging with the global community can be a delicate balancing act.
2. Disinformation and Perception Management: China faces scrutiny regarding its state-sponsored disinformation campaigns and efforts to shape global perceptions. Countering negative narratives and addressing concerns about human rights, intellectual property, and technological advancements is a significant information challenge.
3. Media Influence: China’s state-controlled media outlets, such as Xinhua and CGTN, encounter challenges in presenting a positive image abroad while facing accusations of biased reporting and lack of press freedom. Navigating global media landscapes and countering negative perceptions is a critical information challenge for China.
Military Challenges:
1. Regional Security Dynamics: As China’s military capabilities expand, it faces challenges with regard to regional perceptions. Neighboring countries and global powers like the United States are cautious about China’s military modernization and assertiveness, creating challenges in maintaining a stable military balance and managing regional tensions.
2. Technological Advancements: China faces challenges in developing cutting-edge military technologies, such as artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and advanced weaponry. Addressing the gap between indigenous innovation and reliance on foreign technologies is crucial for China’s military modernization efforts.
3. Naval Power Projection: China’s desire to expand its maritime influence presents challenges in developing a blue-water navy capable of power projection beyond its immediate maritime borders. Overcoming technological constraints, enhancing logistical capabilities, and countering regional concerns are significant military challenges.
Economic Challenges:
1. Economic Structural Reforms: China faces the challenge of transitioning from an export-led economic model to one driven by domestic consumption, innovation, and a more sustainable growth trajectory. Rebalancing the economy while managing financial risks, addressing inequality, and reducing overcapacity requires careful economic management.
2. Trade Tensions: China confronts challenges associated with its trade disputes with major economies, particularly the United States. Navigating protectionist measures, supporting global trade rules, and striking a balance between economic growth and geopolitical influence pose significant economic challenges.
3. Resource and Energy Security: China’s rapidly growing economy faces challenges related to resource scarcity and energy security. As the largest energy consumer globally, ensuring a stable supply of resources while diversifying energy mix and promoting sustainable practices are essential for China’s economic resilience.
By addressing these challenges across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic dimensions, China can navigate its geopolitical landscape more effectively and shape its strategies accordingly. It requires careful management of relationships, enhancement of information capabilities, modernization of the military, and sustainable economic reforms to address these challenges successfully.
The following table summarizes the key challenges outlined across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic dimensions that China faces:
Dimension
Challenge
Details
Diplomatic
Competition for influence
Balancing relationships with US, Japan, India, Vietnam
Territorial disputes
Resolving South China Sea, East China Sea issues
Tensions with neighboring countries
Border disputes with India; Historical rivalries with Japan, South Korea
Information
Information control
Censorship, narrative management, balancing openness and stability
Disinformation and perception
Countering negative campaigns, managing global image
Media influence
Promoting state media amid press freedom concerns
Military
Regional security dynamics
Cautiousness about China’s military growth and assertiveness
Technological advancements
Gaps in developing advanced defense tech like AI and cyber
Naval power projection
Building blue-water navy; Logistical and tech constraints
Economic
Structural reforms
Shifting export model; Managing risks and inequality
Trade tensions
Navigating disputes with US; Supporting trade rules
Resource and energy security
Ensuring supply while diversifying sources
Further analysis expanded of the challenges China faces by applying the DIME philosophy:
Diplomatic Challenges:
1. Competition for Influence: As China’s economic and political power grows, it faces diplomatic challenges in managing its relationships with other major powers and regional actors. Balancing its influence against that of the United States, Japan, and regional rivals like India and Vietnam requires nuanced diplomacy and strategic engagement to expand its sphere of influence without triggering backlash or conflicts.
2. Disputed Territorial Claims: China’s territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea, pose significant diplomatic challenges. Resolving these disputes while maintaining regional stability and peaceful coexistence is crucial for China’s diplomatic strategies. It requires skillful negotiation, confidence-building measures, and adherence to international law to mitigate tensions and foster a cooperative environment.
3. Tensions with Neighboring Countries: China’s assertive actions, such as its border disputes with India and historical rivalries with countries like Japan and South Korea, create challenges in maintaining stable diplomatic relations. Addressing historical grievances, defusing tensions through dialogue, and fostering mutual trust and understanding are essential for maintaining peace and stability in the region.
Information Challenges:
1. Information Control: China faces challenges in controlling and managing information flows within its borders, given the increasing influence of the internet and social media platforms. Maintaining strict censorship and managing narratives to maintain domestic stability while engaging with the global community can be a delicate balancing act. China needs to explore strategies that allow for greater transparency and open communication while addressing concerns related to cybersecurity and maintaining social stability.
2. Disinformation and Perception Management: China faces scrutiny regarding its state-sponsored disinformation campaigns and efforts to shape global perceptions. Countering negative narratives and addressing concerns about human rights, intellectual property, and technological advancements is a significant information challenge. China must foster greater transparency, engage in constructive dialogue, and share accurate information to shape a more favorable global perception.
3. Media Influence: China’s state-controlled media outlets, such as Xinhua and CGTN, encounter challenges in presenting a positive image abroad while facing accusations of biased reporting and lack of press freedom. Navigating global media landscapes, building media partnerships, and fostering independent journalism can help China overcome these challenges. Enhancing the international presence of Chinese media outlets and promoting cultural exchange can also help improve China’s global media influence.
Military Challenges:
1. Regional Security Dynamics: As China’s military capabilities expand, it faces challenges with regard to regional perceptions and potential rivalries. Neighboring countries and global powers like the United States are cautious about China’s military modernization and assertiveness, creating challenges in maintaining a stable military balance and managing regional tensions. China needs to emphasize transparency, confidence-building measures, and dialogue to address concerns and foster trust among regional stakeholders.
2. Technological Advancements: China faces challenges in developing cutting-edge military technologies, such as artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and advanced weaponry. Addressing the gap between indigenous innovation and reliance on foreign technologies is crucial for China’s military modernization efforts. Encouraging research and development, fostering collaborations with global partners, and investing in education and training can help China overcome these challenges and achieve technological self-reliance.
3. Naval Power Projection: China’s desire to expand its maritime influence presents challenges in developing a blue-water navy capable of power projection beyond its immediate maritime borders. Overcoming technological constraints, enhancing logistical capabilities, and countering regional concerns are significant military challenges. Improving naval capabilities, developing overseas military bases, and ensuring maritime security collaboration with other nations are crucial for China to establish itself as a regional maritime power.
Economic Challenges:
1. Economic Structural Reforms: China faces the challenge of transitioning from an export-led economic model to one driven by domestic consumption, innovation, and a more sustainable growth trajectory. Rebalancing the economy while managing financial risks, addressing inequality, reducing overcapacity, and promoting environmental sustainability require comprehensive economic structural reforms. This involves liberalizing key sectors, fostering innovation and entrepreneurship, and strengthening social safety nets to ensure inclusive and sustainable growth.
2. Trade Tensions: China confronts challenges associated with its trade disputes with major economies, particularly the United States. Navigating protectionist measures, supporting global trade rules, and striking a balance between economic growth and geopolitical influence pose significant economic challenges. China must emphasize fair trade practices, increase market access opportunities, and strengthen multilateral trade mechanisms to resolve disputes and maintain global economic stability.
3. Resource and Energy Security: China’s rapidly growing economy faces challenges related to resource scarcity and energy security. As the world’s largest energy consumer, ensuring a stable supply of resources while diversifying the energy mix, reducing dependence on fossil fuels, and promoting sustainable practices are essential for China’s economic resilience. Investing in renewable energy infrastructure, promoting energy efficiency, and international cooperation in resource management can help China address these challenges effectively.
In summary, China’s application of the DIME philosophy reveals a range of challenges including diplomatic competitions, information control and influence, military modernization and projection, as well as economic transformations and trade tensions. Navigating these challenges requires strategic diplomacy, transparent information practices, responsible military growth, and comprehensive economic reforms. By addressing these challenges effectively, China can enhance its global standing and contribute to regional stability and prosperity.
The following table illustrates the key challenges faced by China in the realms of diplomacy, information, military, and economics.
Area
Main Challenges
Additional Details
Diplomatic
Managing relationships with major powers, territorial disputes, tensions with neighboring countries
Balancing influence against US, Japan, India etc.; Resolving South China Sea disputes; Border tensions with India; Historical rivalries with Japan and South Korea
Information
Controlling information flows, countering disinformation campaigns, expanding state-controlled media influence
Censorship and narrative control; Perception management and transparency issues; Building global presence of state media
Military
Perceptions of regional security threat, gaps in technological capabilities, projecting naval power
Regional arms race and mistrust issues; Gaps in AI, cybernetics, weapons tech; Developing blue-water navy and overseas bases
Economic
Rebalancing economic structure, trade tensions with major economies, energy security concerns
Shifting from export model; US trade war; Resource scarcity and fossil fuel dependence
United States and European allied nations should consider China’s challenges in the context of Project 863 and Project 972:
Project 863:
1. Technological Innovation: One of the key challenges for China’s Project 863, a high-technology development plan initiated in the 1980s, is achieving indigenous innovation. While China has made significant progress in areas such as telecommunications, space exploration, and biotechnology, it still faces challenges in developing cutting-edge technologies that can compete with global leaders. Overcoming technological bottlenecks, fostering an environment of innovation and entrepreneurship, and attracting top talent in scientific research and development are crucial for China to enhance its technological capabilities through Project 863.
2. Intellectual Property Rights: China faces challenges related to protecting and enforcing intellectual property rights (IPR) within the framework of Project 863. Addressing concerns about intellectual property theft, patent infringement, and trade secret violations is vital for attracting foreign direct investment, promoting collaborations with international partners, and ensuring a fair playing field for innovation. Enhancing IPR laws, strengthening enforcement mechanisms, and encouraging a culture of respect for intellectual property are essential steps for China to overcome these challenges.
3. Collaboration and Integration: China’s Project 863 strives to promote collaboration and integration between academia, industry, and government research institutions to drive technological advancements. However, achieving seamless coordination and fostering effective knowledge transfer among these sectors remains a challenge. Encouraging partnerships, providing funding incentives, streamlining bureaucratic processes, and creating platforms for open collaboration can help address these challenges, fostering a more integrated and efficient innovation ecosystem.
Project 972:
1. Food Security: China’s Project 972, an agricultural development project initiated in the late 1990s, faces challenges in ensuring food security for its massive population. With increasing urbanization, limited arable land, water scarcity, and environmental concerns, achieving self-sufficiency in food production is a significant challenge. Implementing sustainable agricultural practices, improving irrigation infrastructure, enhancing agricultural research and development, and promoting efficient resource allocation are crucial for China’s food security goals under Project 972.
2. Environmental Sustainability: Project 972 faces challenges in addressing environmental sustainability issues, particularly in the context of agricultural practices. Greenhouse gas emissions, water pollution, deforestation, and soil degradation pose significant environmental challenges that need to be tackled. Transitioning towards sustainable farming practices, promoting organic agriculture, implementing effective waste management systems, and investing in renewable energy sources are necessary steps for China to mitigate environmental impacts associated with agricultural development.
3. Rural-Urban Income Gap: Implementing Project 972 has the objective of bridging the income gap between rural and urban areas, promoting rural development, and raising living standards. However, China faces challenges in achieving equitable economic growth and opportunities across regions. Addressing disparities in infrastructure, access to education, healthcare, and social services between rural and urban areas, as well as promoting rural job creation and income generation, are essential for reducing the income gap and ensuring the success of Project 972 in promoting inclusive development.
In summary, China faces a range of challenges within the frameworks of Project 863 and Project 972. These challenges include achieving technological innovation and indigenous research capabilities, protecting intellectual property rights, fostering collaboration and integration, ensuring food security and environmental sustainability in agriculture, and bridging the income gap between rural and urban areas. By addressing these challenges effectively, China can enhance its technological capabilities, promote sustainable agricultural practices, and achieve more balanced regional development, contributing to its long-term economic growth and societal well-being.
To successfully apply the plans of Project 863 and Project 972 in conjunction with the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative in Europe, China can focus on the following strategies:
1. Technology and Innovation Exchange: China can leverage the technological advancements achieved through Project 863 to promote knowledge exchange, collaboration, and technology transfer with European countries. By fostering partnerships between Chinese and European research institutions, facilitating joint research projects, and providing incentives for technological cooperation, China can enhance its technological capabilities while benefiting from European expertise in areas such as advanced manufacturing, clean energy, and digital technologies.
2. Intellectual Property Protection and Collaboration: China can address concerns regarding intellectual property rights (IPR) by strengthening its legal framework and enforcement mechanisms. By cooperating with European countries to improve IPR protection, establishing bilateral agreements, and promoting transparency in technology transfer, China can build trust and attract European investments and partnerships under the OBOR framework. Demonstrating a commitment to IPR protection will be essential in fostering collaboration and ensuring mutually beneficial engagements.
3. Infrastructure Development and Investment: China’s OBOR initiative aims to enhance connectivity and trade between Asia, Europe, and Africa. By aligning the objectives of Project 972 with OBOR, China can contribute to Europe’s infrastructure development needs. Investment in transport, logistics, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure projects will facilitate trade, promote economic growth, and strengthen regional integration. Adhering to international best practices, ensuring transparency in tendering processes, and engaging in mutually beneficial partnerships with European countries will be crucial for China’s success in Europe under OBOR.
4. Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security Cooperation: In the context of Project 972, China can collaborate with European countries to address food security challenges. By sharing expertise and best practices in sustainable agricultural techniques, resource management, and ecological protection, China can contribute to European efforts in promoting sustainable farming practices. Strengthening agricultural research partnerships, facilitating knowledge exchange, and developing joint projects related to agri-tech and food processing will enhance cooperation and support food security objectives within the OBOR framework.
5. Green Technology and Environmental Cooperation: China’s focus on environmental sustainability aligns with European efforts to combat climate change and promote a green economy. Through Project 972, China can collaborate with European countries to develop and deploy green technologies, such as renewable energy systems, energy-efficient infrastructure, and waste management solutions. By sharing experiences and investing in joint research and development projects, China can support Europe’s environmental goals while driving sustainable growth within the OBOR framework.
6. Cultural Exchange and People-to-People Engagement: Facilitating cultural exchange, educational cooperation, and tourism promotion between China and Europe is essential for fostering mutual understanding and building stronger relationships. By encouraging student exchanges, academic collaborations, and promoting tourism and cultural events, China can enhance people-to-people connections. Such exchanges will contribute to greater mutual trust and support the successful implementation of Project 863, Project 972, and the OBOR initiative in Europe.
Overall, China’s successful application of Project 863 and Project 972 in Europe under the OBOR framework requires a combination of technological cooperation, infrastructure investment, sustainable agriculture collaboration, environmental protection, cultural exchange, and people-to-people engagement. By leveraging these strategies, China can forge productive partnerships, strengthen regional connectivity, and promote mutually beneficial development between China and European countries.
The following table focuses on condensing the main points regarding how China can leverage Project 863, Project 972, and OBOR to collaborate with Europe across areas like technology, infrastructure, agriculture, environment, and cultural exchange.
Project
Ways China Can Collaborate with Europe
Project 863
Knowledge exchange, joint research projects, incentives for tech cooperation in areas like manufacturing, energy, digital tech
Strengthen IPR protection
Improve legal frameworks, bilateral agreements, ensure transparency in tech transfers
Project 972 and OBOR
Invest in infrastructure development projects to facilitate trade and growth
Sustainable agriculture
Share expertise in sustainable farming practices, agri-tech research partnerships
Green technology
Develop and deploy renewable energy systems, waste management solutions, support Europe’s environmental goals
Cultural exchange
Student exchanges, academic collaborations, tourism promotion to build relationships
The United States and European allies should also consider additional strategies that China can and will apply towards colonizing Europe, such as the Project 863, Project 972, and the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative in Europe:
1. Technology and Innovation Exchange:
China can establish joint research and development centers, innovation parks, and technology incubators in collaboration with European countries. These platforms would facilitate the exchange of expertise and ideas, leading to the development of cutting-edge technologies. China can also encourage Chinese companies to invest in, acquire, or form partnerships with European tech start-ups and established companies to gain access to advanced technologies and market opportunities.
China’s focus on emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), 5G, and advanced manufacturing aligns with European priorities. By fostering technology partnerships, China can tap into European expertise and gain a competitive edge in these fields. Additionally, China can promote training programs and scholarships for European researchers, engineers, and entrepreneurs, encouraging their engagement in Chinese technological advancements.
2. Intellectual Property Protection and Collaboration:
China has made strides in improving its intellectual property rights (IPR) framework; however, concerns persist. As part of its efforts, China can provide clear guidelines to protect IPR, establish specialized IPR courts, and streamline the process for enforcing IPR laws. Collaborating with European countries, China can create mechanisms for monitoring and reporting IPR violations, as well as implementing effective dispute resolution mechanisms.
China can actively engage in technology collaboration, joint patent applications, and licensing agreements with European companies. By promoting joint ventures and technology transfer, built on a foundation of transparent and fair agreements, China can build trust and strengthen ties with European partners. Implementing transparent pricing mechanisms and ensuring a level playing field for foreign companies will contribute to mutual confidence, attracting more European investments.
3. Infrastructure Development and Investment:
China’s OBOR initiative seeks to improve transportation, logistics, and energy infrastructure connectivity. In Europe, China can align its infrastructure investments with regional needs and priorities. By conducting rigorous feasibility studies, consulting with local stakeholders, and adhering international standards and best practices, China can ensure the sustainability and long-term viability of infrastructure projects.
Additionally, China can explore public-private partnerships (PPPs) and co-investment models to involve European companies and investors in infrastructure projects. Collaboration with European development banks, such as the European Investment Bank, can provide financial support, expertise, and risk-sharing mechanisms. Such partnerships and investment models enable mutual benefits and foster a sense of shared ownership, leading to successful implementation of OBOR infrastructure projects in Europe.
4. Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security Cooperation:
Food security is a crucial concern globally, and China’s expertise in agricultural innovation and technology can be beneficial for Europe. China can collaborate with European countries to develop sustainable agriculture practices, exchange knowledge on crop varieties, cultivation techniques, and water resource management.
China can strengthen agricultural research cooperation, establish demonstration farms for best practices, and support joint projects in innovative farming methods such as hydroponics, vertical farming, and precision agriculture. The exchange of agricultural experts, training programs, and technology demonstrations would enhance collaborative efforts in addressing common challenges related to food security, sustainability, and climate change adaptation.
5. Green Technology and Environmental Cooperation:
China is striving to transition towards a low-carbon economy, and European countries have a wealth of experience in green technologies, renewable energy, and environmental protection. By partnering with European companies and leveraging their expertise, China can accelerate the adoption and deployment of clean energy solutions, energy-efficient technologies, and sustainable practices.
China can collaborate with European countries to set emission reduction targets, exchange best practices in renewable energy development, and establish joint research and development centers focusing on clean technologies. Furthermore, China can participate in European environmental initiatives like the European Green Deal and leverage these partnerships to enhance its own environmental sustainability goals.
6. Cultural Exchange and People-to-People Engagement:
Promoting cultural understanding and fostering people-to-people connections are essential for successful cooperation. China can support academic exchanges, scholarships, and joint research programs with European universities. Establishing Confucius Institutes and cultural centers would facilitate language learning, cultural activities, and academic programs, enhancing mutual understanding and trust.
Furthermore, China can proactively promote tourism between China and Europe by easing visa procedures, supporting marketing campaigns, and expanding direct flight routes. Encouraging cultural events, festivals, and exhibitions that highlight both Chinese and European traditions will attract tourists and foster cultural exchange.
It is worth noting that each European country has its own unique needs, priorities, and regulatory environments. Therefore, China should consider tailoring its strategies and approaches to better align with the specific requirements and expectations of different European nations. Open dialogue, flexibility, and adaptability will be key to navigating the diverse European landscape effectively.
By comprehensively applying these strategies, China can strengthen its partnerships, enhance technology and innovation capabilities, contribute to sustainable development, and foster mutual growth and prosperity between China and Europe under the framework of OBOR.
The following table focuses on condensing the key areas of potential China-Europe collaboration from the document into a concise summary, outlining the main mechanisms and initiatives for cooperation in each domain.
Area of Cooperation
Ways China Can Collaborate with Europe
Technology and Innovation
Joint R&D centers, incubators, investments in startups, training programs
Align investments with local priorities, feasibility studies, public-private partnerships
Sustainable Agriculture
Develop sustainable practices, knowledge exchange, joint research projects
Green Technology
Emission reduction targets, renewable energy collaboration, leverage European Green Deal
Cultural Exchange
Academic exchanges, scholarships, Confucius Institutes, cultural centers
The United States military’s European Command (EUCOM) and NATO have several means to counter Chinese influence in Europe:
1. Robust Defense Posture:
EUCOM and NATO maintain a strong military presence in Europe to deter potential aggression and secure the region. This includes forward-deployed forces, rotational deployments, and joint exercises with European partner nations. By demonstrating collective defense commitments, the U.S. military and NATO send a clear message that any attempts to undermine European security will be met with a strong response.
2. Strengthening Alliance Cohesion:
EUCOM and NATO place a strong emphasis on enhancing cohesion among member countries. Acting as a unified front, they work to foster a sense of shared responsibility and solidarity among allies. This involves regular consultations, coordination on defense planning, and joint decision-making processes. By maintaining a united stance, NATO and the U.S. military can effectively address challenges posed by Chinese influence in Europe.
3. Enhanced Intelligence and Information Sharing:
Maintaining situational awareness is critical to counter Chinese influence effectively. EUCOM, in coordination with intelligence agencies, utilizes intelligence-sharing mechanisms and information networks to monitor and identify potential areas of concern. Sharing intelligence on Chinese activities and intentions with NATO allies helps build a comprehensive understanding of the threat landscape, enabling proactive responses.
4. Strengthening Cybersecurity:
China’s increasing cyber capabilities pose a significant challenge. EUCOM and NATO place great emphasis on enhancing cybersecurity measures, including the protection of critical infrastructure and information systems. By promoting information sharing, conducting joint cybersecurity exercises, and developing robust defenses, they can effectively counter Chinese cyber threats and minimize vulnerabilities.
5. Countering Chinese Disinformation:
China employs various tactics, including disinformation campaigns, to shape public opinions in Europe. EUCOM and NATO actively work to counter these efforts through strategic communication, media literacy programs, and highlighting the importance of objective and accurate reporting. By enhancing public awareness and countering false narratives, they can limit the impact of Chinese disinformation campaigns.
6. Collaborative Engagement and Capacity Building:
EUCOM and NATO engage in bilateral and multilateral military cooperation and capacity-building initiatives with European partner nations. They provide training, expertise, and support to enhance the capabilities and resilience of European armed forces, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. By bolstering partner nation capabilities, they can better address Chinese influence and potential security challenges.
7. Defense Trade and Technology Partnerships:
EUCOM and NATO promote defense trade and technology partnerships among member states to ensure interoperability, shared technological advancements, and collective defense capabilities. By encouraging the exchange of defense technologies and fostering collaborative research and development, they can counterbalance China’s attempts to advance its military technologies in Europe.
8. Engaging Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific Region:
EUCOM and NATO work in close coordination with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Strengthening ties between these commands helps address shared concerns about Chinese influence and contributes to a coordinated response across both regions, increasing the resilience of the U.S. and its European allies.
It is crucial to note that countering Chinese influence requires a comprehensive approach that combines diplomatic, economic, informational, and military efforts. Ultimately, the U.S. military’s European Command and NATO, working in tandem, aim to maintain the stability, security, and resilience of Europe while effectively addressing challenges arising from China’s expanding influence.
Further additional analysis on how the United States military’s European Command (EUCOM) and NATO can counter Chinese influence in Europe includes:
9. Strengthening Economic Cooperation:
EUCOM and NATO can work alongside European countries to promote economic cooperation and investment policies that ensure transparency, fairness, and protect national interests. By encouraging market diversification, reducing dependency on Chinese investments, and fostering trade partnerships with like-minded nations, the U.S. and NATO can help European countries resist undue influence and economic coercion.
10. Addressing Chinese Military Expansion:
China’s military ambitions extend beyond its regional waters, with a growing presence in Europe through investments in ports, military logistics, and cooperation with European countries. EUCOM and NATO can closely monitor and assess these activities, urging their member nations to be vigilant about potential security risks. Joint military exercises and defense cooperation with European partners can enhance capabilities and enable a coordinated response to address any challenges arising from China’s military expansion in Europe.
11. Leveraging Soft Power and Public Diplomacy:
EUCOM and NATO can leverage soft power and public diplomacy efforts to counter Chinese influence. This involves promoting democratic values, human rights, and shared principles through cultural exchanges, educational programs, and public outreach initiatives. By highlighting the benefits of democratic systems and engaging with civil society organizations, they can foster a counter-narrative to China’s authoritarian influence and win the hearts and minds of the European public.
12. Building Multinational Partnerships:
EUCOM and NATO can strengthen partnerships with non-NATO European countries to counter Chinese influence effectively. Engaging countries like Sweden, Finland, and Ukraine, among others, in joint defense exercises, capacity-building programs, and information sharing helps broaden the collective strength against potential Chinese encroachment in Europe.
13. Strategic Cooperation with Other Global Powers:
Cooperation with other global powers, such as the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, and Canada, is crucial in countering Chinese influence. EUCOM and NATO can deepen military partnerships and information sharing with these countries, expanding joint exercises and coordination efforts. By leveraging collective resources and expertise, a united front can deter potential Chinese aggression and safeguard European security.
14. Investment in Critical Infrastructure:
EUCOM and NATO can work with European countries to ensure the security and integrity of critical infrastructure, such as telecommunications networks, ports, energy facilities, and transportation systems. Close monitoring, risk assessments, and collaboration on cybersecurity efforts can help prevent potential vulnerabilities and limit China’s ability to exploit critical infrastructure for strategic or intelligence purposes.
15. Promoting Regional Security Cooperation:
EUCOM and NATO can actively engage in supporting and promoting regional security cooperation mechanisms in Europe, such as the Three Seas Initiative or the Baltic Sea Region Defense Cooperation (B9 format). These efforts bolster unity, coordination, and interoperability among European countries, reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing the collective ability to deter and counter Chinese influence.
Overall, countering Chinese influence in Europe necessitates a comprehensive and multidimensional approach where diplomatic, economic, informational, and military measures converge. EUCOM and NATO play a crucial role in this endeavor, working together with European allies and partners to ensure a secure and resilient Europe that is prepared to address and mitigate the challenges posed by China’s expanding influence.
Here is a table which highlights these strategic options for countering China’s influence in Europe:
Strategy
Description
Robust Defense Posture
Maintain strong military presence in Europe through forward-deployed forces, rotations, and joint exercises to deter aggression
Strengthening Alliance Cohesion
Enhance unity and shared responsibility among NATO allies through consultations, coordination, and joint decision-making
Enhanced Intelligence Sharing
Improve situational awareness through intelligence-sharing networks to monitor Chinese activities
Strengthening Cybersecurity
Bolster cyber defenses, critical infrastructure protection, and interoperability through NATO
Countering Disinformation
Counter Chinese propaganda and shape public opinion through strategic communication and media literacy
Collaborative Engagement and Capacity Building
Provide training, expertise and support to European partners to enhance capabilities in areas like cybersecurity and counterintelligence
Defense Trade and Technology Partnerships
Promote defense trade and R&D partnerships for interoperability and collective defense capabilities
Indo-Pacific Coordination
Coordinate with Indo-Pacific allies to address Chinese influence across regions
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中國網絡衝突討論，信息與研究 // Chinese Cyber Conflict Discussions, Information & Research
