探索中國軍事智慧戰爭實踐的演變
現代英語：
Recent local wars and military conflicts around the world demonstrate that modern warfare is gradually evolving towards an information-based and intelligent form. Faced with a new wave of military revolution, in order to fully explore the evolutionary laws of intelligent warfare, it is necessary to further clarify the fundamental support for the evolution of warfare practices, fully assess the technological advantages of warfare practices, and accurately identify the key challenges and difficulties in promoting the current evolution of warfare practices.
The evolution of intelligent warfare practices requires a foundation of social practice as its support.
As an important component of social activities, military activities are closely related to social activities. Similarly, as a specific form of military activity, war practice cannot be examined in isolation from the larger system of social practice.
The level of development of productive forces determines the height of practical evolution. Warfare is a part of human social practice and is always adapted to the level of social production. How humans conduct material production activities often determines how they organize war; the ways humans wage war reflect their modes of production. Engels proposed that the victory of violence is based on the production of weapons, and the production of weapons is based on the entire production process. Therefore, along with the development of productive forces, the means of warfare also continuously evolve. Just as it is impossible to find a weapon of the information age in the era of cold weapons, it is difficult to use typical weapons of the cold weapon era on the battlefield of the information age. Even daggers produced in the information age are different from those of the cold weapon era; from the alloy composition ratio to the forging technology, they embody the technological level of the information age and belong to the weapon of the information age.
Changes in the system of production relations influence the outcome of practical evolution. As a special form of social practice, the development and changes in war practice closely revolve around the direction and speed of social practice evolution. That is to say, behind every transformation in war practice, a similar social transformation is simultaneously underway, and it can only succeed when accompanied by a systemic transformation of the entire production relations. Marx succinctly pointed out that in all social forms, a certain form of production determines the position and influence of all other productions, and therefore its relations also determine the position and influence of all other relations. This is a universal light that obscures all other colors and alters their characteristics. War practice concepts that are too far ahead of their time often fail to succeed due to a lack of hardware and software support that matches the development of contemporary social practice. For example, the concept of joint operations was difficult to emerge in the era of cold weapons; even if military theorists foresaw this idea, it could not be applied in practice. Modern joint operations practice is actually a microcosm of large-scale socialized joint production in the military. Therefore, war design should return to social practice itself, seeking inspiration and reflection from it. Ignoring the overall development level of production relations and prematurely designing war scenarios for the intelligent era may make the scenarios and objectives appear science fiction, gamified, and fictional.
The effectiveness of intelligent warfare practices in achieving victory requires further testing in actual combat.
The evolution of warfare practices always aims to enhance operational superiority and the effectiveness of victory; however, this does not mean that the evolutionary process will naturally lead to this goal. Sometimes, in the early stages of changes in warfare practices, the effectiveness of victory is not obvious, and it is necessary to continuously evaluate the effectiveness of various combat methods during the development process.
First-mover advantage does not guarantee victory on the battlefield. Undoubtedly, whoever masters the latest winning mechanisms of warfare first will gain the initiative on the battlefield through tactical and technological superiority, but this first-mover advantage does not necessarily lead to final victory. While first-mover advantage certainly has a significant impact on winning a war, the history of warfare shows that tactical and technological advantages can be offset by mistakes or disadvantages in other areas. In World War II, the German army, which was the first to master the winning mechanisms of mechanized warfare, gained an advantage in the initial engagements on the Western Front in Europe and the Eastern Front in the Eastern Front. However, this initial advantage was quickly squandered due to strategic errors and overall inferior strength.
First-mover advantage is unlikely to constitute an absolute overwhelming advantage. In the era of globalization, human social practices are closely interconnected, and technological innovations from one country or region are quickly spilled over and spread. Therefore, the technological and tactical advantages in the era of intelligent warfare are often short-term and localized, making it difficult for any country or region to establish a long-term, all-encompassing, monopolistic lead. Currently, the rapid development of network communication technology has brought humanity closer together than ever before. Similarly, in the practice of intelligent warfare, various advanced reconnaissance methods will continuously penetrate the fortifications of both sides in combat. Sometimes, after the emergence of a new weapon, a countermeasure weapon or means will be invented or created very quickly.
The advantage of intelligent technology does not necessarily guarantee the optimal combat situation. Currently, the level of intelligence in warfare has not yet become the decisive factor in determining victory or defeat. Intelligent warfare is still in its nascent stage; the mechanisms of victory require in-depth research, many pieces of equipment need further development and verification, and various experimental pre-war practices need further testing and improvement. In contrast, informationized warfare is relatively mature; various weapons and equipment, along with supporting operational and tactical methods, have become relatively stable, and informationized warfare methods still have significant application potential. Therefore, in the evolution of warfare, while continuously innovating intelligent warfare methods, it is essential to fully develop the operational potential of informationized warfare.
The development and transformation of intelligent warfare practices require the combined efforts of humans and technology.
There are many factors that drive the evolution of intelligent practices. It is necessary to clarify the development support and evaluate the effectiveness of operational methods, comprehensively analyze various contradictions, grasp the key points, distinguish the essentials, and highlight the leading role of people.
Technological change is the most dynamic factor. Science and technology are core combat capabilities. As the most revolutionary factor in the development of warfare, every major technological innovation has a profound impact on the form of warfare. Engels once pointed out that once technological progress can be used for military purposes and has been used for military purposes, it immediately, almost forcibly, and often against the will of commanders, causes changes or even revolutions in the way of warfare. However, equating the intelligent military revolution with the high-tech revolution, and thus overemphasizing intelligent technology and pursuing the development of various intelligent weapons, undoubtedly fails to grasp the evolutionary essence of intelligent warfare. While technology plays an important role, it is not the only decisive factor; culture, politics, and people themselves also play a role. In his book *The History of World Wars*, British historian Jeremy Black repeatedly reminds readers not to fall into the trap of technological determinism and not to simply attribute all major changes in military history to technological innovation.
Institutional innovation is the key challenge. To fully leverage the combat effectiveness of equipment in the evolution of intelligent warfare, it is necessary to integrate all combat elements into a unified system, combining ideology, combat methods, organizational structure, education and training with military technology. The renowned military theorist Dupuy, in his book *The Evolution of Weapons and War*, argued that no matter how much the lethality of weapons increases, the compatibility and unity of new weapons with military tactics and organization is far more important than the invention and adoption of new weapons. The advantages of equipment can only create optimal combat power when integrated into a scientific organizational structure. Historically, Britain was the first country to possess aircraft carriers and tanks, but it was not the country that successfully led the revolution in mechanized warfare. In the transformation of warfare practice, the easiest thing to achieve is the upgrading of weaponry and equipment, but comprehensive innovation in warfare practice requires holistic innovation at the institutional level to create an overall effect. An army that only upgrades equipment without institutional reform will find it difficult to form a sustained and effective combat capability, and will not be able to truly lead a revolution in warfare practice.
The integration of people and weapons is key. People are the main actors in warfare. In the era of intelligent warfare, the decisive role of people in warfare remains unchanged; they are still the driving force behind the evolution of warfare. From the perspective of the two major categories of people and weapons, military technology belongs more to the “weapons” aspect, while other elements in warfare, such as military strategy, organizational structure, tactics, and combat methods, belong more to the “people” aspect. The more advanced the high-tech equipment, the more people are needed to master and utilize it. The era of intelligent warfare requires greater attention to the importance of wisdom and strategy, and greater reliance on people with intelligent-era concepts and thinking for command and design. Therefore, promoting the evolution of warfare requires focusing on people as the decisive element, fully integrating “people” and “weapons,” vigorously developing joint education in the context of intelligent warfare, and concentrating on cultivating scientific and technological personnel and command personnel who meet the requirements of intelligent warfare.
現代國語：
探究智能化戰爭實踐演進規律
■沈文科 宋騰淵 岳明峰
引言
近年來的世界局部戰爭和軍事沖突表明，現代戰爭實踐正逐步向信息化智能化形態演變。面對新一輪軍事革命浪潮，為充分探究智能化戰爭實踐演進規律，需要進一步釐清戰爭實踐演進的基礎支撐，充分評估戰爭實踐的技術優勢，找准推動當前戰爭實踐演進的重難點。
智能化戰爭實踐的演進需要社會實踐基礎作為支撐
作為社會活動的一個重要組成部分，軍事活動與社會活動有著十分密切的關系。同樣，作為軍事活動的一種具體形式，戰爭實踐也不能離開社會實踐的大系統去孤立地考察。
生產力發展水平決定實踐演進的高度。戰爭實踐是人類社會實踐的一部分，始終與社會生產水平相適應。人類怎樣進行物質生產活動，往往就怎樣組織戰爭，人類從事戰爭的方式，反映了它們的生產方式。恩格斯提出，暴力的勝利是以武器生產為基礎的，而武器的生產又是以整個生產為基礎的。因此，伴隨生產力的發展，戰爭實踐手段也在不斷發展。正如在冷兵器時代無法尋覓到一件信息化時代武器一樣，在信息化時代的戰場上也難以運用典型的冷兵器時代的武器。即使是信息化時代生產的匕首，也已然不同於冷兵器時代的匕首，從合金成分比例到鍛造成型技術，它本身蘊含了信息化時代的工藝水平，屬於信息化時代的武器。
生產關系系統變化影響實踐演進的結果。作為一種特殊形式的社會實踐，戰爭實踐發展變化緊緊圍繞社會實踐演進方向和速度展開。也就是說，一場戰爭實踐變革背後，也在同步進行著相似的社會變革實踐，而且需要伴隨整個生產關系的系統變革完成才能取得成功。馬克思精辟地指出，在一切社會形式中都有一種一定的生產決定其他一切生產的地位和影響，因而它的關系也決定其他一切關系的地位和影響，這是一種普照的光，它掩蓋了一切其他色彩，改變著它們的特點。過於超越時代的戰爭實踐設想，往往會因缺少符合同時代社會實踐發展所匹配的軟硬件支撐而難以成功。比如聯合作戰概念很難在冷兵器時代出現，即便有軍事理論家先驗地預想到這種理念，也無法在實踐中運用。而現代聯合作戰實踐實際上正是社會化聯合大生產在軍事上的縮影。因此，設計戰爭應當回歸社會實踐本身，從中尋找靈感和鏡像。若忽視生產關系的整體發展水平，超前設計智能化時代戰爭場景，將可能使場景目標變得科幻化、游戲化和虛構化。
智能化戰爭實踐的制勝效果需要戰爭的進一步檢驗
戰爭實踐演進的目標總是瞄准提高作戰優勢和制勝效果展開，然而這並不意味著演進過程會自然指向這一目標。有時候在戰爭實踐變革初期，其制勝效果並不明顯，需要在發展的過程中持續評估各種作戰手段的效果。
先發優勢不等於戰場上的必勝之勢。毫無疑問，誰先掌握了最新戰爭制勝機理，誰就能夠憑借技戰術優勢掌握戰場主動權，但這種先發優勢並不會必然導致戰爭最終勝利。先發優勢的確對贏得戰爭有巨大影響，但戰爭實踐發展史表明，技戰術先發優勢會被其他方面的失誤或劣勢抵消。在第二次世界大戰中，率先掌握了機械化戰爭制勝機理的德軍，盡管在西線歐洲戰場以及東線蘇德戰場的最初較量中獲得了優勢，然而這種初始優勢很快因其戰略上的失誤以及總體實力上的劣勢而被消耗殆盡。
先發優勢難以構成絕對的壓倒態勢。全球化時代，人類社會實踐緊密相連，一個國家或地區的技術創新很快會被外溢傳播，所以智能化時代的技戰術優勢往往是短期局域性的，一個國家或一個地區很難形成長期全域性的壟斷式領先。當前，網絡通信技術迅速發展，讓人類空前地彼此接近。同樣，在智能化戰爭實踐中，各類先進偵察手段將不斷洞穿作戰雙方的保密堡壘，有時一種新型武器出現以後，其制衡性武器或手段很快會被發明創造出來。
智能化優勢未必造成最佳作戰局勢。從當前來看，戰爭實踐的智能化含量尚未成為影響戰爭勝負的決定因素。目前，智能化戰爭實踐尚處於不成熟的萌芽期，戰爭制勝機理有待深入研究，許多裝備有待進一步開發驗證，各類試驗性的戰爭預實踐有待進一步檢驗和完善。相較而言，信息化戰爭實踐已相對成熟，各類武器裝備以及配套的戰役戰術手段已趨於穩定，信息化作戰方式仍有很大應用空間。因此在戰爭實踐演進中，要在不斷創新智能化戰爭實踐手段的同時，充分開發信息化戰爭實踐的作戰潛能。
智能化戰爭實踐的發展變革需要人與技術綜合推動
推動智能化實踐演進的因素有很多，需要在釐清發展支撐、評估作戰方式成效的前提下，綜合分析各類矛盾，抓住關鍵、區分要點，突出人的主導作用。
技術變革是最活躍因素。科技是核心戰斗力。作為戰爭實踐發展中最具革命性的因素，每一次重大科技創新都會對戰爭形態產生深遠影響。恩格斯曾指出，一旦技術上的進步可以用於軍事目的並且已經用於軍事目的，它們便立刻幾乎強制地，而且往往是違反指揮官的意志而引起作戰方式上的改變甚至變革。但是，將智能化軍事革命等同於高新技術革命，以至於過於注重對智能化技術的強調，過於追求各類智能化武器的研發，無疑是沒能正確把握智能化戰爭實踐的演進本質。技術雖然發揮重要作用，但並非起決定性的唯一因素，文化、政治以及人本身都在發揮作用。英國歷史學家傑裡米·布萊克在《世界戰爭史》一書中不斷提醒讀者，不要掉進技術決定論的陷阱，不能簡單地把軍事史上所有重大變革都歸因於技術革新。
制度化創新是難點。為充分發揮好智能化戰爭演進中的裝備作戰效能，需要將所有作戰要素凝聚為一個體系，將思想理論、作戰方式、編制體制、教育訓練等與軍事技術融為一體。著名軍事理論家杜普伊在《武器和戰爭的演變》一書中提出，無論兵器的殺傷力有多大提高，新兵器跟軍事戰術和編制的兼容統一，要比新兵器的發明和采用重要得多。裝備的優勢只有融入科學的組織形態，才能創造出最佳戰斗力。從歷史實踐看，英國是第一個擁有航空母艦和坦克的國家，但並不是成功引領機械化戰爭革命的國家。戰爭實踐變革中，最容易實現的是武器裝備的更新換代，但戰爭實踐全面創新需要在制度層面進行整體創新，形成總體效應。只有裝備更新而無制度變革的軍隊，是難以形成持久有效戰斗力的，也無法真正引領戰爭實踐革命。
人與武器結合是關鍵。人是戰爭實踐的主體。在智能化戰爭時代，人對戰爭實踐的決定性作用絲毫沒有改變，仍是推動戰爭實踐演進的主導。從人與武器這兩大范疇看，軍事技術更多屬於“武器”這一方面，而戰爭實踐中的其他要素，如軍事謀略、編制體制、組織結構、戰略戰術、作戰方式等則更多地屬於“人”這一方面。高新技術裝備越先進，越需要有人去掌握運用，智能化戰爭時代需要更多關注智慧和謀略的重要性，需要更多依靠具備智能化時代觀念和思維的人去指揮和設計。因此，推動戰爭實踐演進要聚焦人這一決定性要素，把“人”和“武器”充分結合起來，大力發展智能化戰爭背景下的聯合教育，聚力培養符合智能化戰爭要求的科技人才、指揮人才。
中國原創軍事資源：http://www.81.cn/
來源：中國軍網-解放軍報 作者：沈文科 宋騰淵 岳明峰 責任編輯：王一亙
2025-03-13