Chinese Military Analysis of Cyber Space Deterrence – Important Strategic Points // 淺析網絡空間威懾的特徵、類型和運用要點

Chinese Analysis of Cyber Space Deterrence – Important Strategic Points


Chinese People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Sciences Yuan Yi

January 04, 2016    

Editor’s note: When both opposing parties have the ability to ensure intrusion and damage to the other party’s network, they can bring about two-way network containment, making the two parties obliged to comply with the game rules that do not attack each other’s network under certain conditions, forming an invisible safety valve. Even international conventions or conventions that do not attack each other’s networks will be formed. The cyberspace has thus become a strategic area that can produce a huge deterrent effect. After the deterrence of cyberspace followed by nuclear deterrence, it began to enter the strategic vision of big country politicians and military strategists. Studying the characteristics, types, and points of use of cyberspace deterrence must be taken into consideration and necessary action by the Internet powers and the cyber force.

With the increasing dependence of human society on cyberspace, cyberspace has become the “second type of living space” for human production and life and the “fifth-dimensional combat space” for military confrontation. Countries around the world have fiercely competed for the dominant rights, control rights, and discourse power of cyberspace. The competition in the cyberspace has reached the level of human survival, national destiny, and success or failure of military struggles. Thinking about cyberspace deterrence capacity building has great practical and theoretical value.

First, analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of cyberspace deterrence

Cyberspace deterrence refers to the actions and actions taken in the cyberspace to demonstrate and control enemy cyberspace, and to control the enemy’s physical space through cross-domain cyberspace, so as to achieve the goal of destroying enemy forces, stopping the enemy, blocking the enemy, and preventing deterrence. A form of strategic deterrence for the enemy’s purpose. Compared with the physical space, the “virtual and real duality” of network space and the uniqueness of network warfare compared with traditional combat styles have determined that the advantages and disadvantages of cyberspace deterrence are very obvious.

(A) The advantages of cyberspace deterrence

The advantages of cyberspace deterrence are mainly reflected in the following: First, the deterrence approach has become more civilized and humane. Compared with nuclear, chemical, and chemical weapons based on physical, biological, and chemical killing mechanisms, the direct killing and destructive effects of cyber warfare weapons are much smaller than the former. Normally, they will not cause permanent damage and pollution to the natural environment, nor will they cause large numbers of people. Casualties and humanitarian disasters. Second, deterrence costs are inefficient. The network warfare weapons are dominated by viruses, Trojans and other software. The costs are relatively low, and the technical threshold is low. The destructive effects are rather alarming. The network defense points are multi-faceted, and they are hard to prevent. To increase the level of network security by one level, the input cost will increase exponentially. The contrast between the low cost of cyber offense and the high cost of cyber defense makes the offensive and defensive performance of the network a feature of “spirit shield”, and the cyber warfare weapon is thus called “the atomic bomb of the poor country”. The third is that deterrence methods are diverse and practical. The variety of cyber warfare weapons and the multiple goals of cyber attacks have determined that there are diversified cyberspace deterrent methods to choose from. The effects of cyberattacks are recoverable to a certain extent. As long as the application is properly implemented, the risk of causing war and escalating the war is relatively small. In a sense, the deterrence value of nuclear weapons is far greater than the value of actual combat, and cyber warfare weapons are both practical values ​​and deterrence values. Fourth, the use of repeatability and deterrence is strong. Once the “nuclear threshold” crosses, a full-scale nuclear war will erupt, and the two sides at the nuclear balance will fall into a state of mutual destruction. The easy implementation of nuclear deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence against non-nuclear countries, will also be condemned by international public opinion. These factors are all The use of nuclear deterrence is greatly limited. The deterrence of software and hardware and the controllable characteristics of cyberspace deter- mine the flexibility and control of deterrence in light of the changes and needs of the military struggle. It can be used in advance, used throughout, and used repeatedly. It has strong flexibility.

(B) Defects in cyberspace deterrence

The deterrence of cyberspace is mainly reflected in: First, the credibility of the deterrence effect has not been fully verified. The credibility of nuclear deterrence has been verified in actual combat. However, as of now, the real network war has not really exploded. People’s astonishing destructive power over cyber warfare is more of a speculation and worry. The real power of cyber warfare can only be convincing after being tested by actual combat. Second, the reliability of deterrence measures is not very high. Network warfare is a dynamic process of continuous offensive and defensive interaction between the two sides of the enemy and me. The characteristics of network confrontation and technicality determine that the network warfare attack has greater uncertainty and may not achieve the desired operational objectives, which will greatly reduce the effectiveness of deterrence. . For example, when the enemy performs cyberspace deterrence, if the enemy takes various effective defense measures in a timely manner, it will increase the difficulty of its own cyber attack and reduce the damage, and even lead to the failure of the attack. Third, the controllability of deterrence scope needs further improvement. As one of the important weapons of cyber warfare, viral weapons have strong dissemination, poor controllability, and a wide range of influence. It is difficult to launch targeted and targeted attacks on enemy computers and networks. If it can’t control its effective scope, it will spread to third-party neutral countries and even make itself a victim. As a result, the use of virus weapons suffers from the use of “imposed rats.” The fourth is the selective limitation of deterrence objects. Nuclear deterrence is clear and effective for any country, and the effectiveness of cyberspace deterrence has a lot to do with the level of informatization of enemy countries. Cyberspace deterrence is extremely effective for countries with a high degree of informatization, and for those underdeveloped countries with weak information infrastructure and weak network dependence, it is difficult for them to exert results, or even completely ineffective. Fifth, the organization of deterrence is relatively complicated. All nuclear powers in the world implement centralized and unified management of strategic nuclear forces. Command and control powers are highly centralized. When organizations implement nuclear deterrence operations, they can accurately control each combat unit, and the organization is well-executed. The implementation of the deterrence of cyberspace involves many forces such as investigation, control, defense, and control. It has many personnel and large scales and is scattered among different departments and units in the military and the military. It is very complicated to organize and it is difficult to form a synergy.

Second, the main types of cyberspace deterrence

The cyberspace deterrence includes four types: cyberspace technology test deterrence, cyberspace equipment demonstration deterrence, cyberspace operational deterrence deterrence, and cyberspace operational deterrence. Among them, the first three are demonstrative deterrence, and the latter is actual deterrence.

(A) Cyberspace Technology Test Deterrence

The cyberspace technology test deterrence is a field in the field of cyber warfare. It constantly conducts preliminary exploratory experiments on new concepts of warfare, new experiments on the effectiveness of attack mechanisms and tactics, and practical experiments on the weaponization of new technologies. The outside world is disclosed to demonstrate its strong strength in the basic research of information technology and its enormous potential for transforming it into a cyber warfare capability to achieve deterrence. At present, network offensive and defensive technology is still developing rapidly. A breakthrough in a key technology will often have a significant impact on cyberspace security and operations, and even lead to revolutionary changes. Whoever preempts the strategic commanding heights of the network offensive and defensive technology, who will be able to achieve a clear advantage in the future of network warfare.

(B) Cyberspace Equipment Demonstration

The demonstration of cyberspace equipment deterrence is the development of network warfare equipment development planning, technology development, target testing, stereotyped production and other development stages. According to the needs of the appropriate disclosure of network warfare equipment models, performance, characteristics, parameters and development schedule, etc. Reach the purpose of deterring opponents. There are two main ways: one is through public disclosure in official media such as national defense white papers, diplomatic bulletins, and newspapers, periodicals, and large-scale websites; and the other is through online social media or other unofficial. The channel has deliberately leaked equipment-related information and implemented hidden deterrence. The cyber space equipment demonstrates deterrence. On the one hand, it can invent new cyber-warfare equipment with new mechanisms and new concepts and render its unique combat capabilities. On the other hand, it can deliberately exaggerate the operational effectiveness of existing cyber warfare equipment. There are facts in the virtual reality, there is something in the real, and the implementation of fuzzy policies, so that the other party can not understand their true situation and strength, resulting in fear and jealousy. For example, the U.S. military’s “Shuute” on-board network power system has been put into practical use several times and poses a serious threat to the air defense systems of its hostile countries. However, its basic principles, working mechanisms, and combat technical indicators have not been publicly disclosed. It has not been completely mastered by other countries and has remained in a state of secrecy. It is difficult to distinguish between reality and reality and has played a very good deterrent effect.

(3) Deterrence in cyberspace operations exercises

The deterrence of cyberspace operations exercises is to conduct drills in cyberspace through virtual or virtual methods, and use various media channels to show potential war opponents their own cyber warfighting capabilities, strengths and determinations in order to achieve deterrence. Cyberspace operations can be divided into two kinds: actual drills and virtual exercises. The former is usually carried out nationwide or in alliance with allies, and is generally based on the joint exercise of military space and space defense operations. In recent years, the United States and its allies have held “Network Storm” series of cyber warfare exercises and “Shriver” series of space-network space exercises, which have demonstrated the mobilization strength, overall defense level, and the implementation of cyber warfare. Determination. The latter is usually held at the national large-scale network integrated shooting range, and is generally based on the offensive actions of the military professional cyber warfare forces.

(D) Deterrence in cyberspace operations

The deterrence of cyberspace operations is the actual deterrence of attacking specific opponents by deterring opponents with certain attacks. There are two opportunities for its use: First, when one’s own side is aware that the enemy is about to wage a war on one’s own side, one’s own choice of the key cyber targets of the enemy’s key defenses will be targeted to combat them, and preventive and deterrent deterrence will be implemented; When the Party initiates a tentative cyber attack on its own side and implements cyberspace deterrence, it must immediately conduct effective retaliatory and disciplinary deterrence. There are many types of cyber warfare operations that have deterrent effects. For example, infiltrate the enemy’s telecommunications network, send a large number of anti-war messages to the enemy’s citizens, and attack the enemy’s power grid, resulting in a short-term blackout of major cities in the enemy’s power; attacking the enemy’s broadcast television networks and inserting their own broadcasts during prime time. Special video programs; etc.

Third, the use of cyberspace deterrence points

The general requirements for the use of cyberspace deterrence are: combination of wartime and warfare, with strength, actual display capability, and determination, strive to demonstrate deterrence with small battles, ensure deterrence with strikes, and achieve deterrence with a small price. Specifically, the following points should be achieved.

(A) Combination of peacetime and long-term preparation

“Frozen feet, not a cold day.” Successful implementation of cyberspace deterrence requires a combination of peacetime and warfare, and we must fully and carefully prepare for peacetime. The first is to conduct comprehensive and thorough network reconnaissance. Requires the combination of spying, reconnaissance and technical reconnaissance, wireless reconnaissance, and cable reconnaissance. Conduct long-term and continuous network reconnaissance of enemy network targets, gradually understand the basic conditions of the enemy’s network, draw a picture of its network topology, and in particular analyze and find all kinds of soft enemies. Hardware system vulnerabilities. The second is to conduct a large number of effective strategic presets. Using hacking methods, secretive infiltrate all types of networks through the use of system vulnerabilities or password cracking, leaving the back door, setting up a springboard machine, and laying down logic bombs and Trojans to set a breakthrough for launching cyber attacks in the future. The third is to conduct pre-prepared cyber defenses. When deterring cyberspace deterrence against the enemy, one must adjust the deployment of network defenses in advance, make the enemy’s pre-designed attack path, anticipate the use of system loopholes, and plan to implement an attack plan that is difficult to implement, or the effect of implementation is greatly reduced to minimize the enemy’s Losses caused by cyber retaliation.

(B) careful decision-making, control strength

Sun Tzu said: “The Lord must not anger and raise a teacher. Cyberspace deterrence is a strategic game behavior between countries, especially with deterrence and sensitivity. It must be rational, beneficial, and tangible. It must not be abused because of the low threshold of deterrence. Otherwise, its effect may be counter-productive. . Cyberspace deterrence has a high requirement for combat intensity control. On the one hand, if the intensity is too small, the enemy’s government and people will not have fear and will not achieve the deterrent effect they deserve. The other party may also use the same methods to implement anti-deterrence, eventually leading to confrontational escalation and deterring one’s own deterrence. On the other hand, if it is too strong, it will cause huge economic losses and casualties to the enemy countries. This will cause the condemnation of the international community and the hatred of the enemy governments and people. It may trigger the enemy’s use of conventional forces to carry out large-scale revenge. Nuclear countries may even Nuclear power may be used. This will not only stop the war but will also play a role in warfare.

(III) Unified command and careful organization

The implementation of the deterrence of cyberspace requires centralized command, unified planning, and good coordination. The first is meticulous organization of strength. Uniformly organize the four forces of military investigation, attack, defense, and control, and actively coordinate the strength of the cyber warfare forces of all parties to form a joint force. In particular, it is necessary to organize and coordinate the strength of civil non-professional cyber warfare, especially patriotic hacking, so that there can be no phenomenon of “blindness” so as to avoid triggering friction, escalating fire, causing an escalation of cyber warfare, or prematurely exposing attack intentions and giving people a handle. , leading to uncontrollable situations or failure of operations. The second is to select the target. Should choose a wide range of influence, easy to produce a clear deterrent effect of the goal. For example, broadcast television channels with the highest ratings, portals with a large number of visitors, and wireless communication networks with numerous users. It is not possible to choose attacks that are irrelevant, insignificant, and indifferent to the target. They can easily be mistaken for cybersecurity incidents created by ordinary hackers and do not achieve the desired deterrent effect. In addition, we must also consider the constraints of international law and war laws. We must not choose targets that are easy to cause humanitarian disasters. We should try our best not to select the network goals of railways, aviation, finance, and medical departments so as not to arouse condemnation and resentment from the international community and the people of the other side. The third is the precise control of the process. Prior to the deterrent strikes in cyberspace, it is necessary to publicize the momentum through extensive public opinion, issue warnings to the enemy countries, and declare the justice of their actions to the world in order to gain the understanding and support of international public opinion. In order to highlight the deterrent effect, one can highly announce the target of the enemy’s network to be attacked, break through the enemy’s layered network defenses, and implement a resolute and effective cyber attack. If necessary, the network attack effect can be resumed regularly to show its superiority. The cyber attack technology and means make the enemy’s decision makers and the public have a sense of frustration that is hard to defend and difficult to parry, thus forming a strong shock effect.

(4) Combining actual situation with actual situation, focusing on strategy

The grandson said that “it is not possible to show and not to use it,” and it is used to deter online space. Its main points are summarized as “showing without propaganda, advocating without showing.” “Indicating nothing” means that it is difficult to track and locate using cyber attacks and conduct cyber attacks on specific targets. However, it is not done for others to announce that they are doing their own thing. It not only demonstrates their own capabilities, but also makes the enemy’s suspicion of doing their own thing. However, there is no evidence and it cannot be pursued. “Proclaiming but not showing” is the publicity or inadvertent disclosure of the type, performance, and characteristics of the advanced cyber warfare equipment developed or fabricated by the company, deliberately exaggerating its combat effectiveness, falsifying facts, and integrating facts and facts, so that the enemy can’t understand its true strength. , resulting in a deterrent effect. The cyber warfare operations have the characteristics of difficulty in tracking and traceability and complexity in forensics. The initiating party can either admit or deny it, or push the responsibility to civil hacker organizations. (Source: China Information Security).

Original Communist Mandarin Chinese:






網絡空間威懾的優點,主要體現在:一是威懾方式更趨文明和人道。與基於物理、生物、化學殺傷機理的核生化武器相比,網絡戰武器的直接殺傷和破壞效應要遠小於前者,通常不會對自然環境造成永久性破壞和污染,也不會造成大量的人員傷亡,並引發人道主義災難。二是威懾成本低效費比高。網絡戰武器以病毒、木馬等軟件為主,成本相對低廉,技術門檻較低,而造成的破壞效果卻相當驚人。網絡防禦點多面廣,防不勝防,要網絡安全程度每提高一個等級,投入成本會呈指數級增加。網絡進攻的低成本與網絡防禦的高成本對比鮮明,使得網絡攻防呈現“矛尖盾薄”的特點,網絡戰武器因而被稱為“窮國的原子彈”。三是威懾手段多樣實用性強。網絡戰武器多種多樣,網絡攻擊目標多元,決定了有多樣化的網絡空間威懾手段可供選擇。網絡攻擊效果在一定程度上是可恢復的,只要運用實施得當,引發戰爭和促使戰爭升級的風險相對較小。從某種意義上講,核武器的威懾價值遠大於實戰價值,而網絡戰武器則是實戰價值與威懾價值兼具。四是威懾運用可重複靈活性強。 “核門檻”一旦跨過就會爆發全面核戰爭,處於核均勢的雙方將陷入相互摧毀狀態,輕易實施核威懾特別是對無核國家進行核威懾,還會招致國際輿論的譴責,這些因素都極大地限制了核威懾手段的使用。而網絡空間威懾軟硬結合、威力可控的特點,決定了其可根據軍事鬥爭形勢的變化和需要,適時調控威懾強度,先期使用、全程使用、反複使用,具有很強的靈活性。






















孫子所說的“能而示之不能,用而示之不用”,運用到網絡空間威懾,其要點概括起來就是“示而不宣、宣而不示”。 “示而不宣”,就是利用網絡攻擊難以追踪定位這一點,對特定目標實施網絡攻擊,但不對外宣布是己方所為,既展示了己方能力,又使得敵方雖然懷疑是己方所為,但沒有證據,無法追究。 “宣而不示”,就是公開宣傳或不經意透露己方研製或虛構的先進網絡戰裝備的型號、性能、特點,刻意誇大其作戰效能,虛虛實實,虛實結合,使敵摸不清己方真實實力,從而產生威懾效果。網絡戰行動具有追踪溯源困難、取證複雜的特點,發起方既可以承認,也可以矢口否認,或把責任推給民間黑客組織。 (來源:中國信息安全)

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Chinese Military Electromagnetic Spectrum Technology Determines the Future Development of Defeating the US at War

Chinese Military Electromagnetic Spectrum Technology Determines the Future Development of Defeating the US at War

For a long time, in order to solve the A2/AD dilemma and achieve a new offset strategy, the U.S. has launched combat operations such as open space/air-sea warfare, cyber-centric warfare, distributed killing, multi-domain warfare, and mixed warfare. With new ideas, we constantly seek military advantages such as missile offensive and defense, cyber-electromagnetics, and multi-domain space. Today, the electromagnetic spectrum war has become the new darling of leading a new round of military theory and technological innovation. Researching and analyzing the status quo and characteristics of the development of the US military’s electromagnetic spectrum combat has important practical significance for our military’s success in defeating the enemy in the information battlefield.

1  Development of Electromagnetic Spectrum Warfare

In 1956, Admiral Sergei Gorschkov, the former Soviet naval commander, pointed out: “Who controls the electromagnetic spectrum, who will win the next war.” Sixty years later, the electromagnetic spectrum has become one of the key battlefields of modern warfare. In order to compete for the advantages of the electromagnetic spectrum in the battlefield, the US military conducted in-depth explorations from combat theory to equipment technology and developed rapidly.

1.1 Evolution of theory

Electromagnetic spectrum control has a long history. In the early 1970s, Thomas H, chairman of the US Senate Association. Moorer said that the winner of World War III will be a party that can highly control and manage the electromagnetic spectrum. The United States “Old Ravens” Association first proposed the use of electromagnetic control (EMC) as the fourth component of the concept of electronic warfare. In 2009, Strategic Command launched the early concept of electromagnetic spectrum warfare (EMSW), and added tasks such as electromagnetic spectrum management (EMSM), electromagnetic spectrum control (EMSC), and electromagnetic battle control (EMBC) on the basis of electronic warfare [1]. In 2012, the Strategic Command established the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center (JEMSCC) to achieve full integration of electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum management, and each of the units also established corresponding organizational coordination agencies and detachments [2]. In the same year, the US Navy proposed the concept of Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare (EMMW) [3], and in March 2015 released the “21st Century Maritime Force Cooperation Strategy,” which outlines the goals, components, technology projects, and implementation paths of the electromagnetic maneuver warfare [4]. In December 2015, Terry Halvorsen, chief information officer of the US Department of Defense, pointed out that the electromagnetic spectrum is expected to be considered as the sixth battlefield following land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace [5]; in the same month, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Defining Electromagnetic Waves: Regaining U.S. Dominance in the Electromagnetic Spectrum Field[6] The report proposes the concept of “low-zero-power” electromagnetic spectrum warfare, expounding concept ideas, trend features, capabilities and technical requirements and current obstacles, and presenting views, concepts, Procurement, technical, verification, etc. At the end of November 2016, the 53rd International Conference of the “Old Ravens” Association of the United States took the theme “Global Vision of Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations” as the theme to demonstrate the new concepts and technical achievements of electronic warfare, spectrum sensing and conflict resolution, and explored the electromagnetic spectrum operational environment. Policy regulations, equipment procurement, joint training and combat capabilities, etc. [7]. In January 2017, the new Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter signed the first “Electronic Warfare Strategy” document, officially establishing the electromagnetic spectrum as an independent operational domain and elaborating on how to conduct operations [8].

1.2 Policies and Orders

Strategic policies and military doctrines reflect the development of the US military’s combat theory. From 2006 to 2014, the US Department of Defense updated the “Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy” to focus on advancing strategic objectives such as development of spectrum equipment, flexibility of spectrum operations, spectrum management, and improvement of policy response capabilities [9]; Strategic Command released in August 2010. Winning the 21st Century Economic and Security Advantage: Strategic Framework for Electromagnetic Spectrum Control, building an electromagnetic spectrum control system architecture from multiple perspectives including objectives, requirements, strategic development, etc. [10]; the Joint Venture Association has promulgated JP6-01 “Joint” in March 2012. “Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Action” joint publication [11], signed in December 2012 CJCSM3320.01C “Chairman’s Handbook of Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations in Electromagnetic Operation Environment” [12], issued CJCSI3320.01D “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum” in January 2013 Operational Instructions [13] and CJCSM 3320.04 “Electronic Warfare Supporting Combined Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations” Manual [14]. In March 2015, the “Electromagnetic Spectrum Operational Joint Concept” document [15] was signed, which systematically stated that the Joint Forces launched electromagnetic spectrum combat operations. Strategic vision, organizational structure and functions, command and management relationships, plan formulation and operational implementation, operational integration and action synergy, and gradually Tactical, technical, and program (TTP) refinement of control, interference cancellation, spectrum management, and electronic warfare reprogramming, etc.; US Army released TRADOC P525-7-16, “The US Army’s Future Modular Force Conceptual Capability in December 2007 Plan 2015-2024 – Electromagnetic Spectrum Operation Manual [16]. Field regulations FM6-02.70 “Army Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations” [17] were issued in May 2010. Field Manual FM3-38 “Network Electromagnetic Actions” was issued in January 2014. [18] Published in December 2015, ATP6-02. 70 “Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Combat Operations Skills” [19], updated in February 2016 AR525-15 “Network Reconfiguration of Electromagnetic Action Software” provisions [20], US Air Force updated 2017 AFI10-703 “electronic warfare integrated reprogramming” instructions [21] Define the concept of electromagnetic spectrum operations under the guidance of joint directives, and elaborate on issues such as organization and responsibilities, operational architecture, plan development and coordination control, task list and decision process, action team and management tools, and DOTMLPF, and promote electromagnetics. The integration of spectrum operations, electronic warfare, and cyberspace warfare. In addition, Kevin D, head of the United States Joint Force Development Department. In October 2016, Scott signed the JDN3-16 “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operation” bulletin[22], standardized terminology and operational framework standards, and made a procedural description of the functional roles, organization, planning, operational implementation, and evaluation. It was awarded the Joint Spectrum Interference Cancellation Program CJCSM3320.02D signed in January and March 2013 by the Joint Committee, CJCSI3320.02F Joint Spectrum Interference Cancellation, and CJCSI3320.02E-1 Joint Spectrum Interference in February 2014. The three major regulations [23][24][25] to eliminate the confidentiality of the program were the important operational support and became the latest guidance for the US military’s electromagnetic spectrum warfare.

1.3 Equipment and Technology

Military technology leads and supports advanced operational concepts. To transform the concept of electromagnetic spectrum warfare from concept to capability, the U.S. military is striving to develop technological innovation and equipment development, and to develop new systems featuring networking, dexterity, multifunction, miniaturization, and adaptability.

On the spectrum management and control system[19][26], the US Department of Defense has developed and deployed the Allied Nations Joint Spectrum Management Planning Tool (CJSMPT) and the Global Electromagnetic Spectrum Information System (GEMSIS) since 2005, followed by the Spectrum XXI and the Modified Spectrum XXIO, Spectrum. Perception Management and Planning System (SSC-SSMPS), Spectrum Situational Sensing System (S2AS), Maritime Electromagnetic Spectrum Operational Action Project (AESOP), Joint Automatic Communication Electronic Action Instruction System (JACS), Host Country Global Online Spectrum Database, etc., with real-time spectrum Measurement and online analysis, spectrum planning and deduction and frequency allocation, electromagnetic interference analysis and conflict elimination, electromagnetic warfare environment modeling simulation, electromagnetic situation sharing and frequency efficiency evaluation, spectrum resource access and database functions and capabilities.

In combat equipment and technology projects [3][26][27], in 2011, the DARPA began to initiate behavioral learning adaptive electronic warfare (BLADE), adaptive radar confrontation (ARC), extreme radio frequency spectrum CommEx, Active Electronic Scan Array (AESA) technology, Near Zero-Power Radio Frequency and Sensor Operation (N-ZERO), under the conditions of the project, through the development of new technologies such as real-time evaluation of countermeasures, autonomous generation of measures, immediate feedback of effects, etc. Unknown waveform and behavioral electromagnetic spectrum threats Real-time tactical confrontation new capabilities; In 2010, the Air Force launched a Cognitive Jammer and HiPERDAC project based on Networked Software Defined Architecture (SDA) and passive RF PRIDE, SWEATER, and CHAMP (Eliminate High-Power Microwave Advanced Missiles) to develop active and passive target threat automatic recognition, real-time assessment and adaptive confrontation technologies and capabilities The US Navy conducts a maritime electronic warfare improvement (SEWIP-Block I/II/III) SLQ-32 shipboard electronic warfare system and ship signalling Equipment (SSEE), electromagnetic command and control (EMC2), integrated mast (InTop) shipborne antenna, next-generation jamming machine (NGJ) and other projects to improve real-time threat assessment and situational awareness, mission program modeling simulation, automatic distribution of electromagnetic spectrum , Combat Operations Analysis and other capabilities; the US Army launched the Electronic Warfare Planning and Management Tool (EWPMT) and Multi-Functional Electronic Warfare (MFEW), Defensive Electronic Assault (DEA) and Silencer Electronics scheduled for September 2016 Warfare and other systems enhance the electronic support for the perception of radio signals and the ability to send electronic signals that interfere with or deceive signals. Earlier this year, the Strategic Command Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC) initiated research on new technologies that provide improved electromagnetic battle management capabilities for electromagnetic spectrum situational awareness and command and control, and plans to implement real-time strategy-based spectrum control and advanced electromagnetic battle sequences (EOB) within five years. ) Characterization and action plan modeling, simulation, analysis, and other capabilities and achieve 7-8 level of technology maturity [28]. Driven by cognitive EW and artificial intelligence technologies, DARPA launched the Radio Frequency Machine Learning System (RFMLS) and Spectrum Joint Challenge Program on August 11, 2017 to develop automatic identification and characterization of target signals from a large number of complex spectrum signals. New technology [29].

2  Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Theory

The electromagnetic spectrum warfare is the latest theory of information warfare of the US military in the 21st century. As research and understanding continue to deepen, the U.S. military will gradually place new strategic ideas as tactics and tactical measures. In order to unify the battlefield electromagnetic spectrum utilization and control actions, the U.S. military issued a series of directives, regulations, regulations, and other documents to publish a summary of the JDN3-16 “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operation” regulations, and standardized the operational concept, mission category, organization, and combat planning and implementation. Evaluation and so on.

2.1 Basic concepts

Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) is the conceptual starting point for the US military’s electromagnetic spectrum warfare theory. It is based on electronic warfare and spectrum management and is based on joint electromagnetic spectrum operations. The goal is to achieve electromagnetic spectrum advantages in electromagnetic operating environment (EMOE), involving spectrum management operations, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO) and joint electromagnetic spectrum. Management actions and other concepts. According to the US military regulations JP1-02 “Defense Ministry Military Terms Glossary” [30], JP6-01 “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Action”, JDN3-16 “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations” and ATP6-02.70 “Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Combat Operations Skills” , United electromagnetic spectrum operations are coordinated military operations carried out by two or more units for use, attacks, protection and management of operational electromagnetic environment. The electromagnetic spectrum management action refers to the interaction between the spectrum management, frequency allocation, host country coordination, policy compliance, and conflict resolution in the entire phase of military operations to jointly promote the planning, management, and implementation of operations within the electromagnetic operations environment. The relationship between various concepts and categories is shown in Figure 1.

Fig. 1 Diagram of related concepts of electromagnetic spectrum operations [19]

2.2 Task Domain Positioning

The U.S. military believes that the joint electromagnetic spectrum combat mission domain is composed of four-dimensional missions of electromagnetic spectrum utilization, management, attack, and protection. Among them, missions include signal intelligence gathering, distribution, and electronic warfare support. Management tasks include electromagnetic spectrum management and electromagnetic battle management. Missions have electronic attacks and navigation warfare, protection tasks have electronic protection and joint spectrum interference cancellation. The operational concept aims to operationally integrate the electromagnetic spectrum operations of the joint forces in the electromagnetic operating environment, establish key priorities, organize action coordination, and eliminate conflicts. Through the full integration of electromagnetic maneuvering schemes, strength and action to strengthen coordination and unification, the electromagnetic spectrum of the battlefield is realized. control. It plays a key role in the formation of joint operational capability in all operational areas, and has a profound impact on the joint forces’ command and control, intelligence, firepower strikes, adjustment and mobility, protection, and maintenance of operational capabilities.

2.3 Organizational Framework

The organization of the joint electromagnetic spectrum operations is responsible for the formulation and publication of policy directives and operational guidelines for commanders and commanders, and for combat planning, operational implementation, coordination of operations, and operational evaluation. The person in charge of electromagnetic spectrum control assigned by the Joint Force Commander shall assume the overall responsibility for the joint electromagnetic spectrum operations. The Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Unit (JEMSOC) is the chief staff of the Joint Force, and the person in charge of electromagnetic spectrum control assigns a supervisor to direct the command. Each service set up an electromagnetic spectrum operations division, each of which administers an electromagnetic spectrum operational unit, and assumes the functions of integrated network operations, electronic warfare, and spectrum management operations. They are the Army’s electronic warfare officer’s network of electromagnetic action units and the Navy’s maritime operations. The operational center electromagnetic spectrum operational unit, the Air Force air operations center electronic warfare coordination unit, the Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration Command’s cyberspace and electronic warfare coordination unit, and the Multinational Force Joint Staff Operations Department’s contracted electronic warfare coordination unit. The Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operational Organization of the Joint Force is shown in Figure 2. The joint electromagnetic spectrum combat unit architecture is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 2 Electromagnetic Spectrum Operational Organization

Figure 3 Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Unit Architecture

2.4 Combat Planning Process

Joint electromagnetic spectrum combat planning is jointly completed by all levels of joint electromagnetic spectrum combat units. During task analysis, the combat plan development team develops a staff assessment plan to determine the electromagnetic spectrum support degree in the formulation and analysis of the action plan as a strategic basis for achieving the advantages of the electromagnetic spectrum; after the action plan is selected, joint electromagnetics are developed. The spectrum operations appendix describes mission tasks, priorities, policy strategies, process steps, and implementation procedures for the entire operational phase, establishing coordination measures, specific procedures, and engagement rules for the use of electromagnetic battle management and control systems in the joint operations domain; The Ministry submits its own electromagnetic spectrum operations plan and integrates it into this appendix. During the planning and implementation of the plan, the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Unit strengthens the electromagnetic spectrum operations plans of each division and participates in the development of various divisions, establishment of priorities, establishment of operational integration and operational coordination, and the creation of an electromagnetic spectrum control plan. Then, the updated electromagnetic spectrum control plan is adjusted to start the joint electromagnetic spectrum combat implementation cycle to generate an electromagnetic spectrum control sequence that guides the use of the electromagnetic spectrum of the joint force. The combat planning process is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4 Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Combat Plan Development Process

2.5 Operational methods

The joint electromagnetic spectrum operations implementation process is a continuous cycle of planning, implementation and evaluation. The united electromagnetic spectrum combat unit completes the formulation of the electromagnetic spectrum control plan and the electromagnetic spectrum control sequence, and establishes the combat cycle for combat operations. After the approval of the person in charge of electromagnetic spectrum control, it publishes and organizes the implementation to each branch’s combat unit and unit. The electromagnetic spectrum combat unit fully participates in the key combat flow of the joint force and adjusts the update plan and sequence in time according to the user needs of the subunits and the electromagnetic spectrum of the battlefield during the operation period to ensure that each electromagnetic spectrum control sequence is effectively generated and efficiently Released and executed. The basic processes are: Formulation and release of control plans, update of control plans for each division, preparation of operational plans, generation and distribution of control sequences, execution and adjustment of operational implementation plans and control sequences, and monitoring and guidance of operational processes. The operational implementation cycle is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5 Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operational Implementation Cycle

3  Electromagnetic Spectrum Combat Development Characteristics

New military capabilities cannot be separated from the new system. As an operational concept that responds to new military challenges in the era of information networks, big data, and artificial intelligence, electromagnetic spectrum warfare has become a new direction for the development of the combat effectiveness of the US military. In order to deepen understanding and be efficient and practical, the U.S. military has pushed the new concept to the battlefield from many dimensions, including the development of policy directives, organization and force adjustment, equipment systems and new technology research and development.

3.1 Reinforce basic concepts and theoretical understanding based on policy directives, promote operational concepts and implement operations

Thought leads action. The U.S. military is good at innovative operational concepts and the concept of electromagnetic spectrum warfare is no exception. The first is to focus on clarifying the concept core and uniting the concept. During the early years of the development of the electromagnetic spectrum warfare, new concepts for the new combat domain were always being demonstrated. The military led high-level forums such as the “Old Ravens” and other professional military and military forums to analyze the related theories involved in the concept, exchange technology development and application methods, and promote deeper understanding. At the same time, in the strategic documents and top-level regulations, the relevant old and new policies were gradually sorted out. The links and distinctions between concepts, and the analysis of their categories and task areas, are increasingly contributing to the clear definition of concepts and the formation of theoretical systems. The second is to use operations on the battlefield, and refine the rules step by step. The U.S. military has always attached importance to the concept of combat to the implementation of warfare and technical measures. It took only about three years from the conception of the electromagnetic spectrum to the entry directives and from the joint directive to the arms and military operational manuals and the TTP. The US Army even established a concept blueprint for the use of battlefields before the Joint Staff. Joint operational and operational guidance for systemic operations at the level of the joint level to the unit level.

3.2 Establish an efficient and integrated force structure based on intrinsic power, and strive to use the full cycle of coordination and order in the battlefield

The troops are the carrier of operations. The U.S. military attaches great importance to the optimization and integration of new concept combat forces and existing capabilities. The first is to focus on the overall planning of the capability system. The trajectory of the capabilities of the US military’s electromagnetic spectrum warfare and cyberspace operations is similar. From the Joint Staff Headquarters, the Joint Forces Command to the military arms, set up combat seats and corresponding implementation teams, and establish a full-flow operation mechanism for operational planning, accusation, implementation, and evaluation to form an efficient and smooth capability integration system. The second is to emphasize the coordination and integration of existing institutions and new forces. Through the clarification of the responsibilities and interrelationships of institutions and forces involved in new capabilities in a timely manner, action-oriented operational procedures and implementation procedures are formulated, and even the relevant regulatory templates for coordination activities are promoted to facilitate the whole-system action coordination of electromagnetic spectrum operations and other mission domains. Orderly. The third is relying on actual drills to verify their capabilities in a timely manner. Based on the new concepts of combat and capability goals, the practice of offensive and defensive battles in the field of electromagnetic spectrum is rapidly promoted, and corrections are made during operational trials. The U.S. Army formed an independent electromagnetic spectrum warfare unit of the 1st battlefield network warfare group from February to May last year and plans to participate in an exercise organized by a regional battle commander at the end of the year [31]; the U.S. Air Force is in the “battle shield” exercise. In response to the “Spectrum Interference Elimination Project”, radar EW system evaluation [5] was implemented.

3.3 Promote the pre-research of the new concept equipment system with the support of scientific and technological strength, transform the high technology into the advantage of combat effectiveness

Strong army must have weapon. High-tech equipment is an important way to give birth to newcomer warfare capabilities. The first is to excavate new battlefield changes and assess new demands. The US Department of Defense’s “Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy” in 2014 pointed out that it is necessary to quantify spectrum requirements and develop the equipment and technologies needed for the electromagnetic environment to enhance real-time spectrum operation and electromagnetic spectrum system real-time identification, prediction and interference cancellation capabilities [9]. From the bottom up to the top, the U.S. military has established a demand collection and integration mechanism for the deployment and deployment of equipment systems and applications. It collects and sorts regularly and conducts special investigations and demonstrations with the aid of the government audit department, Rand Corporation, and a special panel of institutes. The analysis results can be Directly providing decision support for the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Staff Association, it forms an unobstructed demand management evaluation system, and injects activators for the development of electromagnetic spectrum warfare equipment and the development of new combat capabilities. The second is to pay attention to the integration of pre-research technology to equipment system applications. The U.S. military equipment system development will be based on national defense information architecture standards. It will have system processes and capabilities such as simulation modeling, pre-research, technology integration, and application verification. It will focus on the simultaneous improvement of existing models and the development of new research and development of smart technology and equipment systems. “Determining Electromagnetic Waves” pointed out that the important features of the electromagnetic spectrum warfare in the new phase are passive sensor applications and the use of “low-zero-power” capabilities to counteract the enemy’s anti-electromagnetic confrontation, and intelligent technologies and equipment are the future dominant [6]. The pre-research and integration of electromagnetic spectrum warfare technology and equipment will also be able to achieve a more optimal way to upgrade military capabilities to technological capabilities, integrate cutting-edge technologies with mature methods, and integrate specialized systems into integrated platforms, thus achieving a seamless leap in combat effectiveness.


Original Mandarin Chinese:

电磁频谱技术决定未来战争赢家 美军发展现状需警惕


長期以來,為破解反進入/區域拒止(A2 / AD)困局,達成新的抵消戰略,美軍先後推出空地/空海一體戰,網絡中心戰,分佈式殺傷,多域戰和混合戰爭等作戰新思想,不斷謀求導彈攻防,網絡電磁和多域空間等軍事優勢。如今,電磁頻譜戰成為引領新一輪軍事理論和技術創新的新寵。研究和剖析美軍電磁頻譜作戰發展現狀與特點,對於我軍在信息戰場禦敵制勝具有重要現實意義。


1956年,前蘇聯海軍司令Sergei Gorschkov上將指出:“誰控制了電磁頻譜,誰將贏得下一場戰爭”。六十年後,電磁頻譜成為現代戰爭的關鍵作戰域之一。為爭奪戰場電磁頻譜優勢,美軍從作戰理論到裝備技術進行深入探索,發展迅猛。


電磁頻譜控制由來已久。上世紀70年代初,美參聯會主席Thomas H. Moorer稱,第三次世界大戰的勝利者將是能高度控制和管理電磁頻譜的一方。美國“老鴇鴉”協會最早提出將電磁控制(EMC)作為電子戰概念的第四組成部分。2009年,戰略司令部推出電磁頻譜戰(EMSW)早期概念,在電子戰基礎上增加電磁頻譜管理(EMSM),電磁頻譜控制(EMSC),電磁戰鬥控制(EMBC)等任務內容[1]。2012年,戰略司令部建立聯合電磁頻譜控制中心(JEMSCC),旨在實現電子戰和電磁頻譜管理全面集成,各部隊也分別建立相應的組織協調機構和分隊[2]。美海軍同年提出電磁機動戰(EMMW)概念[3],並在2015年3月發布“21世紀海上力量合作戰略”,概要闡述了電磁機動戰目標,構成,技術項目和實現路徑[4]。2015年12月,美國防部首席信息官TerryHalvorsen指出,電磁頻譜有望被視作繼,海,空,天,賽博空間之後第六作戰域[5];同月,戰略與預算評估中心在“決勝電磁波:重拾美國電磁頻譜領域主宰地位”[6]報告中提出“低 – 零功率“電磁頻譜戰概念,闡述了概念思想,趨勢特點,能力和技術需求及當前障礙並提出視圖,概念,採辦,技術,驗證等方面建議。2016年11月底,美國”老鴇鴉“協會第53屆國際研討會以“電磁頻譜作戰全球視野”為主題,展示電子戰,頻譜感知與衝突消除的新概念與技術成果,探討電磁頻譜作戰環境,政策條令,裝備採辦,聯合訓練與作戰能力等[ 7]。2017年1月新任國防部長Ashton Carter簽署首部“電子戰戰略”文件,正式確立電磁頻譜為獨立作戰域並闡述如何實施作戰[8]。


戰略政策與軍事條令集中體現美軍作戰理論發展。美國防部2006年至2014年多版更新“電磁頻譜戰略”,聚焦推進頻譜裝備發展,頻譜行動靈活性,頻譜管理和政策響應能力提升等戰略目標[ 9];戰略司令部2010年8月發布“贏得21世紀經濟與安全優勢:電磁頻譜控制戰略框架”,從目標,需求,戰略開發等多角度構建電磁頻譜控制體系架構[10];參聯會先後於2012年3月頒布JP6-01“聯合電磁頻譜管理行動”聯合出版物[11],2012年12月簽頒CJCSM3320.01C“電磁作戰環境中聯合電磁頻譜管理行動”主席手冊[12], 2013年1月簽發CJCSI3320.01D“聯合電磁頻譜作戰”指示[13]和CJCSM3320.04“電子戰支援聯合電磁頻譜作戰”手冊[14],2015年3月簽署“電磁頻譜作戰聯合概念”文件[ 15,系統闡明聯合部隊開展電磁頻譜作戰行動的戰略願景,組織機構與職能,指揮與管理關係,計劃制定與作實施,作戰集成與行動協同等內容,並逐步向電磁控制,干擾消除,頻譜管理和電子戰重編程等操作層的戰術,技術與程序(TTP)細化;美陸軍於2007年12月發布TRADOC P525-7-16“美陸軍未來模塊化部隊概念能力計劃2015-2024–電磁頻譜作戰”手冊[16],2010年5月頒布野戰條令FM6-02.70“陸軍電磁頻譜作戰”[17],2014年1月頒布野戰手冊FM3-38“網絡電磁行動”[18],2015年12月發布出版物ATP6-02.70“電磁頻譜管理作戰行動技能”[19],2016年2月更新AR525-15“網絡電磁行動軟件重編程“規定[20],美空軍2017年更新AFI10-703”電子戰集成重編程“指示[21],在聯合條令指導下界定電磁頻譜作戰概念範疇,深度闡述機構與職責,作戰架構,計劃制定與協調控制,任務清單與決策流程,行動分隊與管理工具及DOTMLPF等問題,並促進電磁頻譜作戰,電子戰與網絡空間戰的融合。此外,美聯合部隊開發部主管Kevin D. Scott於2016年10月簽署JDN3-16“聯合電磁頻譜作戰”條令紀要[22],規範了術語和作戰框架標準,對職能角色,組織機構,計劃制定,作戰實施和評估作了程序性描述,它以參聯會2013年1月和3月簽頒的CJCSM3320.02D“聯合頻譜干擾消除程序”,CJCSI3320.02F“聯合頻譜干擾消除”和2014年2月的CJCSI3320.02E-1“聯合頻譜干擾消除程序保密增本”三大條令[23] [24] [25]為重要操作支撐,成為美軍電磁頻譜戰最新指導。



在頻譜管控系統上[19] [26],美國防部自2005年開發部署同盟國聯合頻譜管理規劃工具(CJSMPT)與全球電磁頻譜信息系統(GEMSIS),隨後的頻譜XXI與改進型頻譜XXIO,頻譜感知管理與規劃系統(SSC-SSMPS),頻譜態勢感知系統(S2AS),海上電磁頻譜作戰行動項目(伊索),聯合自動通信電子行動指令系統(JACS),東道國全球在線頻譜數據庫等,具備實時頻譜測量與在線分析,頻譜籌劃推演與頻率分配,電磁干擾分析與衝突消除,電磁作戰環境建模仿真,電磁態勢共享與用頻效能評估,頻譜資源接入與數據庫等功能與能力。

在作戰裝備與技術項目上[3] [26] [27],2011年,預先研究計劃局(DARPA)開始啟動行為學習自適應電子戰(刀片),自適應雷達對抗(ARC),極端射頻頻譜條件下通信(CommEx),主動電子掃描陣列(AESA)技術,近零功耗射頻和傳感器運行(N-ZERO)等項目,通過對抗行為實時評估,措施自主生成,效果即時反饋等新技術開發針對未知波形和行為的電磁頻譜威脅實時戰術對抗新能力; 2010年,空軍啟動基於網絡化軟件定義架構(SDA)的認知干擾機與大功率高效射頻數模轉換器(HiPERDAC)項目以及無源射頻識別環境(PRIDE),頻譜戰評估技術工程研究(衫),反電子高功率微波先進導彈(CHAMP)等項目,發展有源和無源目標威脅自動感知識別,實時評估和自適應對抗技術與能力;美海軍開展海上電子戰改進(SEWIP-塊1 / II / III)SLQ-32艦載電子戰系統,艦船信號探裝備(SSEE),電磁指揮與控制(EMC2),集成桅杆(InTop)艦載天線,下一代干擾機(NGJ)等項目,提升實時威脅評估與態勢感知,任務方案建模仿真,電磁頻譜自動分配,作戰行動分析等能力;美陸軍啟動計劃在2016年9月投入使用的電子戰規劃與管理工具(EWPMT)和多功能電子戰(MFEW),防禦性電子攻擊(DEA)和“消音器”電子戰等系統,增強射頻信號感知的電子支援和發送干擾或欺騙信號的電子攻擊能力。今年初,戰略司令部聯合電子戰中心(JEWC)啟動面向電磁頻譜態勢感知與指揮控制提供改進電磁戰鬥管理能力的新技術研究,計劃5年內實現基於策略的實時頻譜管控,先進電磁戰鬥序列(EOB)表徵和行動方案建模仿真分析等能力並達到7-8級技術成熟度[28]。在認知電子戰和人工智能技術推動下,DARPA在2017年8月11日又啟動了射頻機器學習系統(RFM LS)和頻譜聯合挑戰項目,開發從大量複雜頻譜信號中自動區分和表徵目標信號的新技術[29]。




電磁頻譜作戰(EMSO)是美軍電磁頻譜戰理論的概念基點。它以電子戰和頻譜管理為基礎,以聯合電磁頻譜作戰為實現方式,目標是在電磁作戰環境(EMOE)中達成電磁頻譜優勢,涉及頻譜管理行動,聯合電磁頻譜作戰(JEMSO)和聯合電磁頻譜管理行動等概念。根據美軍條令JP1-02“國防部軍事術語詞典”[30],JP6-01“聯合電磁頻譜管理行動”,JDN3 -16“聯合電磁頻譜作戰”和ATP6-02.70“電磁頻譜管理作戰行動技能”界定,聯合電磁頻譜作戰是由兩個或兩個以上部隊開展的用於利用,攻擊,防護和管理電磁作戰環境的協同軍事行動。電磁頻譜管理行動是指在軍事行動全階段共同促成計劃,管理和實施電磁作戰環境內作戰行動的頻譜管理,頻率分配,東道國協調,政策遵循,衝突消除等相互聯繫的功能。各概念間關係與範疇如圖1。





















強軍必需利器。高新技術裝備是催生新生作戰能力的重要途徑。一是善於發掘戰場新變化並評估新需求。美國防部2014年“電磁頻譜戰略”指出,要量化頻譜需求,發展電磁環境所需裝備和技術,增強實時頻譜操作和電磁頻譜系統實時識別,預測及干擾消除等能力[9]。美軍由底至頂建立了面向裝備系統研建與作戰部署應用的需求採集與集成機構,在定期蒐集梳理的同時借助政府審計署,蘭德公司和院所專題小組進行專項調研論證,分析結果可直接為國防部和參聯會提供決策支持,形成了暢通有力的需求管理評估體系,為研建電磁頻譜戰裝備和開發新型戰鬥力注入激活劑。二是注重預研技術向裝備系統集成應用。美軍裝備系統研建都會基於國防信息體系結構標準展開,具備仿真建模,預先研究,技術集成,應用驗證等系統流程和完善能力,注重同步進行原有型號改進和新研智能技術裝備系統開發“決勝電磁波”指出,新階段電磁頻譜戰重要特徵是無源傳感器應用和採用“低 – 零功率”。能力對敵進行反電磁對抗,智能化技術和裝備是未來主導[6]。電磁頻譜戰技術裝備預研與集成也將能夠以更優方式實現軍事問題向技術能力升級,前沿技術與成熟方法互融,專用系統向綜合平台集成,進而完成戰鬥力優勢無縫躍升。

Original Source:

Analysis on the Establishment of the Joint Operation Command System by the PLA 中國軍方聯合作戰指揮中心解放軍建構聯合作戰指揮體制評析國防

Analysis on the Establishment of the Joint Operation Command System by the PLA


1 六、解放軍建構聯合作戰指揮體制評析 國防大學政治系馬振坤教授 ■ 習近平在去(2015)年 11 月下旬召開中央軍委改革工作會議, 強調要組建戰區聯合作戰指揮機構和健全軍委聯合作戰指揮 機制,以強化軍隊聯合作戰能力。

■ 改革重點在建立一套能夠上下銜接、起承轉合之聯合作戰指 揮中樞機制,在中央軍委層級是將現有總參謀部改組成為直 屬中央軍委之聯合參謀部,對上能讓軍委主席有效行使最高 軍令指揮權;對下則能夠銜接整合各戰區聯合作戰指揮系統。

■ 解放軍在理順組織結構及權力運作模式後,將在組織編制、 軍種功能、武器裝備以及作戰指揮各個面向趨向成熟,可望 提升其作戰能力。

(一)前言 中共於去(2015)年 11 月下旬召開中央軍委改革工作會議,正式 揭開軍隊組織變革之序幕。中央軍委深化國防和軍隊改革領導小組組 長習近平在會中發表重要講話,直指解放軍「必須在 2020 年前在領 導管理體制、聯合作戰指揮體制改革上取得突破性進展、在優化規模 結構、完善政策制度、推動軍民融合發展等方面改革上取得重要成 果,努力構建能夠打贏信息化戰爭、有效履行使命任務的中國特色現 代軍事力量體系,完善中國特色社會主義軍事制度」。

(二)解放軍作戰指揮體系的變革 在習近平揭櫫的軍隊改革具體內容上,他強調要組建戰區聯合作 戰指揮機構和健全軍委聯合作戰指揮機制。透過中央軍委組織職能調 整之頂層設計,習近平要建構「軍委→戰區→部隊」的作戰指揮體系 以強化軍隊聯合作戰能力。 解放軍原本並無聯合作戰指揮體制,其既有之作戰指揮體制係以 從事境內地面持久作戰為主之設計,具體表徵有二,一是解放軍並無 2 陸軍司令部,但海空軍及二炮部隊則自其組建時即成立軍種司令部; 二是中共將全中國大陸劃為七大軍區,作戰時以軍區為基礎轉換為戰 區,採取誘敵深入之戰略遂行地面持久消耗戰。 解放軍僅有海空二炮司令部卻無陸軍司令部並非獨特設計,而是 歷史發展的結果。中共自 1927 年創立紅軍成為其首支武裝力量,至 1949 年組建海軍和空軍之前,其軍隊皆以地面部隊為主,在國共內 戰期間,為方便作戰指揮,堅持以黨領軍以及強化後勤保障,中共在 軍事領導上,採取總部形式作為其軍隊領導管理和作戰指揮機構。而 中共在建政後仍然延續此總參謀部、總政治部、總後勤部之架構,作 為其軍隊領導體制,即便陸續組建海空軍及二炮部隊,並未改變此架 構,反而是將新組建的軍兵種納入此架構中,成為支援地面部隊作戰 的輔助性軍兵種。 因此中共傳統的四大總部領導機制,係以陸軍為主、海空軍及二 炮部隊為輔、適合從事傳統單一軍種地面作戰的軍隊領導機制。此機 制無法適應現代戰爭係屬遠程投射、立體攻防、不同軍兵種聯合作戰 之特性,共軍內部早有變更之議。尤其近年來中共與周邊國家在陸地 領土主權爭議逐漸經由雙邊協商談判獲得解決、陸地邊界之緊張情勢 明顯降低之際,在東海及南海之島礁領土主權及海域劃界爭端卻日形 嚴重。而對應此等緊張情勢者,是海空二炮等軍兵種而非陸軍,爭端 發生之東海、南海區域,亦非南京、廣州軍區戰備任務指向之處。 若依中央軍委賦予兩大軍區之任務,南京軍區是「主管江蘇、安 徽、浙江、江西、福建、上海五省一市軍事事務的大軍區,主要作戰 使命是保衛南京、上海、杭州、福州等東南沿海發達的特大城市和工 業區的安全」。依此內容視之,南京軍區主要作戰範圍並不包括東海 及釣魚臺。再依共軍廣州軍區之主要任務內容視之,該軍區是解放軍 「主管廣東、廣西、湖北、湖南、海南五省區軍事事務的大軍區,戰 時使命為保衛中國南部,尤其防止越南和東海沿海的攻擊,防衛廣 州、深圳等特大城市。此外,當需要時也負責增援香港和澳門」。同 樣地,廣州軍區防務亦不包括南海諸島礁。 3 除大軍區主要戰略方向係向陸而非向海,大軍區指揮職位的設計 上也是以陸軍為主,七大軍區司令員均由陸軍將領出任,各軍區海空 軍司令員在編制上僅為大軍區之副司令員,故軍區海空軍主要作戰任 務係以支援軍區地面部隊作戰為主,而非遂行境外海空域獨立作戰。 但依據中共公布之「2015 中國的軍事戰略報告書」,共軍要「加 快轉變戰鬥力生成模式,運用信息系統把各種作戰力量、作戰單元、 作戰要素融合集成為整體作戰能力,逐步構建作戰要素無縫鏈接、作 戰平台自主協同的一體化聯合作戰體系」,另要「按照權威、精幹、 靈便、高效的要求,建立健全軍委聯合作戰指揮機構和戰區聯合作戰 指揮體制」。顯見中共領導階層深知既有中央軍委與各總部、軍種司 令部間職能區分,以及大軍區制度等,皆無法因應未來戰爭聯合作戰 型態之需求,因而藉由中央軍委組織調整的時機,對於軍隊領導管理 體制和聯合作戰指揮體制進行一體化設計。 (三)現行聯合作戰指揮機構的組建 依據「意見」,為適應一體化聯合作戰指揮要求,應「建立健全 軍委、戰區兩級聯合作戰指揮體制,構建平戰一體、常態運行、專司 主營、精幹高效的戰略戰役指揮體系」,且要「重新調整劃設戰區」。 在軍隊作戰指揮體系上,則要「按照聯合作戰、聯合指揮的要求,調 整規範軍委聯指、各軍種、戰區聯指和戰區軍種的作戰指揮職能」, 部隊訓練則要求必須「與聯合作戰指揮體制相適應,完善聯合訓練體 制」。 在具體組建聯合作戰指揮機構方面,在中央軍委層級是將現有總 參謀部改組成為直屬中央軍委之聯合參謀部,此新成立之「聯參」只 負責中央軍委之聯合作戰指揮事宜,與過去的「總參」總攬對軍隊的 作戰指揮權和領導管理權有很大的差異。更重要者,新的聯合參謀長 不再擁有過去總參謀長對軍隊之最高軍令權,此最高軍令權在中央軍 委職能調整之後,已回歸到中央軍委主席之手,以落實軍委主席負責 制之精神。此聯合參謀部只是一個直屬中央軍委常態存在之作戰指揮 4 機構,故聯合參謀長不論在平時或戰時,都扮演軍委主席在行使軍隊 作戰指揮最高軍令權之幕僚長,而不再是過去總參謀長名為幕僚長, 實際上卻擁有等同陸軍司令員之權力。 將總參謀部改編成為聯合參謀部在具體實踐上確實可行,因為目 前總參謀部除陸軍出身之總參謀長、副總參謀長外,海、空、二炮皆 有擔任副總參謀長,其實已具備聯合作戰指揮機制之雛型。此海空二 炮擔任副總參謀長之將領在原本制度運作下,即是未來接任海空二炮 司令員之必然人選,其在副總參謀長任內,可獲得與其它軍種副總參 謀長溝通協調之經驗,並可在此過程中了解其它軍種之特性以及在執 行作戰任務時必須考量之諸種條件。當此將領擔任軍種司令員後,在 落實中央軍委「一體化聯合作戰」政策要求下,自當能夠與其它軍種 溝通協調,降低軍種本位主義色彩。 海空二炮將領出任總參副總參謀長始於江澤民在 2004 年將中央 軍委主席職務交棒給胡錦濤時,同步將海空二炮司令員納入中央軍委 成員起。原本海空二炮司令員之級別等同大軍區正職,僅同陸軍之大 軍區司令員。江澤民將其納入中央軍委後,海空二炮司令員級別提 升,但是在司令員以下各階則無變動,尤其各大軍區空軍司令員以及 瀕海大軍區海軍司令員,在級別上仍屬大軍區副職,編制上為軍區副 司令員。為求幹部梯隊之完整性和連續性,並且符合不同軍兵種聯合 作戰之時代發展趨勢,乃在總參謀部原本由陸軍壟斷之副總參謀長職 務,分由陸、海、空軍和二炮之將領分別擔任,以連接海空二炮軍兵 種高階將領在成為軍兵種司令員之前最後階段職務歷練。 除副總參謀長層級外,總參謀部所屬各部例如情報部、作戰部 等,亦早已納入海空二炮各軍兵種幹部擔任高階參謀,各自負擔與本 身軍兵種相關之情報、作戰等參謀業務。換言之,總參謀部在過去十 年來即是以滿足不同軍兵種聯合作戰之需求作為主要發展方向,且實 際上已發展出成熟的聯合作戰指揮參謀機制。因此將總參謀部調整為 聯合參謀部,就實質運作面而言,並非是全盤的改變,反而是將實質 上已初步具備的聯合作戰機制加以制度化與正名化。 5 因此將總參謀部調整為聯合參謀部之重點並不在總參謀長、副總 參謀長等領導層級職務由不同軍種將領擔任,亦不是整合不同軍種作 戰參謀業務,而是建立一套能夠上下銜接、起承轉合之聯合作戰指揮 中樞機制。對上能夠落實中央軍委主席負責制之精神,讓中央軍委主 席得以透過聯合參謀部之機制,有效行使最高軍令指揮權;對下則能 夠銜接整合各戰區聯合作戰指揮系統,讓一體化聯合作戰指揮體制成 為一個「有機的整體」,在作戰指揮上不會出現「斷鏈」甚至「無鏈 結」的情況。 建立聯合作戰指揮機制在大軍區層級,即是取消現有的七大軍 區,另成立東西南北四大戰略方向之戰區,以及保障北京安全之中部 戰區。傳統上,大軍區是中共軍隊體制上的主要建制,自毛澤東時期 強調誘敵深入境內決戰的戰略思維下,大軍區制度即扮演最重要之分 區屯兵固守防衛角色。事實上,大軍區是真正掌握軍隊、集軍隊之軍 令軍政權於一身的體制,舉凡軍隊之建設、教育訓練、乃至作戰指揮 權,皆由大軍區司令員掌握。另外中共政權在國防動員體制和軍地制 度,也都依托在大軍區體制之下,與維護內部安全秩序相關之武警部 隊之建制與指揮,也都在大軍區管轄範圍內。 由於大軍區制度是以屯兵和境內決戰為前提,在體制運作上自然 以陸軍為主,海空軍及二炮僅扮演支援陸軍作戰的角色。隨著中共軍 事現代化成果日顯,海空二炮遠距投射力量不斷強化,共軍向海方向 的活動範圍不斷擴張,軍事戰略思維已改採邊境和境外作戰,不再以 誘敵深入境內決戰為主。而境外作戰自然以能夠從事遠距投射之海空 軍和二炮作戰力量為主,陸軍反而僅能扮演預備隊之角色。因此將以 陸軍為主之大軍區體制改為以不同軍兵種遂行聯合作戰為主之戰區 指揮體制,方能整合不同軍兵種之作戰力量,即時且有效發揮海空二 炮遠距投射火力之優勢。 另外,將大軍區改為戰區,亦可消除原本大軍區司令員壟斷軍隊 領導及指揮權,形同分地割據之軍閥的現象。戰區將僅負責聯合作戰 指揮,戰區司令員僅擁有對其戰區之聯合作戰指揮權,並不擁有對軍 隊之領導管理權。軍隊領導管理權由各軍種司令部掌握,如此可以將 6 軍令權和軍政權在戰區層級完全切割,就不會再出現軍區司令員形同 地方軍閥的權力膨脹問題。

(四)結語 習近平在此次中共中央軍委組織調整中,展現對軍隊完全的領導 權威。誠然外界多認為習近平通過這次軍改刻意打亂軍中既有的權力 結構,清洗原本在軍隊裡根深蒂固的江澤民派系將領,全面掌握軍 權。但是平心而論,從中央軍委公布的「意見」對中央軍委層級、軍 種司令部層級、以及戰區層級的組織調整內容看來,這次的變動若能 落實,的確可以讓解放軍的組織架構及權力運作機制脫胎換骨。解放 軍在理順組織結構及權力運作模式後,將在組織編制、軍種功能、武 器裝備以及作戰指揮各個面向趨向成熟,符合現代化軍隊的標準,而 這也將讓解放軍的作戰能力在可預見的未來呈現出跳躍式之進步。


English Translation

Analysis on the Establishment of the Joint Operation Command System by the PLA

China National Defense University

■ Xi Jinping held a meeting to reform the Central Military Commission in late November (2015).

Emphasizing the need to establish a joint combat command organization in the theater and a joint combat command of a sound military commission

Mechanism to strengthen the joint combat capabilities of the military.

■ The focus of the reform is to establish a set of joint operations that can be linked up and down.

The central mechanism, at the Central Military Commission level, is to reorganize the existing general staff into straight the Joint Chief of Staff of the Central Military Commission is able to effectively exercise the highest authority for the chairman of the Central Military Commission Military command structure; to the next can be integrated with all theater joint warfare command systems.

■ After the People’s Liberation Army clarifies its organizational structure and power operation mode, it will organize

The military services, weapons and equipment, as well as operational commanders, tend to be mature.

Improve its combat capabilities.

(I). Introduction

The Chinese Communist Party held a meeting to reform the Central Military Commission in late November (2015).

Reveal the prelude to the reform of the military organization. The Central Military Commission Deepens the Leading Group for National Defense and Army Reform

President Xi Jinping delivered an important speech at the conference, pointing to the People’s Liberation Army “must be in the lead by 2020

Led to breakthroughs in the reform of the management system and joint operations command system, and the optimization of scale major achievements have been made in reforming the structure, improving policies and systems, and promoting the integration of military and civilian development.

As a result, efforts will be made to build Chinese characteristics that can win informatized warfare and effectively fulfill its mission.

On behalf of the military strength system, improve the socialist military system with Chinese characteristics.”

(II) The reform of the PLA command system

In Xi Jinping’s disclosure of the specific contents of the military reform, he emphasized the need to establish a joint cooperation.

The joint command and command mechanism of the war command organization and the sound military commission. Through the Central Military Commission organizational functions

With the entire top-level design, Xi Jinping must build a combat command system of “military committee, theater, and troops”.

In order to strengthen the joint combat capabilities of the military.

The People’s Liberation Army originally did not have a joint operational command system. Its existing operational command system was engaged in the design of long-term operations on the ground in the Mainland, and there are two specific characterizations. One is that the PLA did not the Army Command, but the Hainan Air Force and the Second Artillery Corps established the Service Command since its establishment;

Second, the Chinese Communist Party has designated the entire Chinese mainland as the seven major military regions and converted to combat based on the military region.

District, adopting a strategy to lure the enemy into a long-lasting war of attrition.

The People’s Liberation Army’s only air and sea artillery headquarters but no army headquarters are not uniquely designed, but the result of historical development. The Chinese Communists founded the Red Army as its first armed force since 1927.

Prior to the formation of the Navy and the Air Force in 1949, its troops were mainly based on ground forces within the KMT.

During the war, in order to facilitate combat operations, adhere to the leadership of the party and strengthen logistics support, the Chinese Communist Party

In terms of military leadership, it takes the form of headquarters as its military leadership management and operational command organization. And after the establishment of the government, the Chinese Communist Party continued the structure of the General Staff Headquarters, the General Political Department, and the General Logistics Department.

For its military leadership system, even if the navy, air force, and second artillery units were successively formed, they did not change this plane.

Instead, the newly-formed military units are included in this structure and become support for ground forces operations.

Combines & Auxiliary arms.

Therefore, the four traditional leadership mechanisms of the Chinese Communist Party are based on the Army, the Hainan Air Force and the Second Supplementary to the artillery force, it is suitable for the army leadership mechanism for traditional single-army ground operations. This machine system cannot adapt to modern warfare, long-range projection, three-dimensional offensive and defensive, joint operations of different types of arms

The characteristics of the Communist Army have long been changed. In particular, the CCP and its neighboring countries have been on land in recent years.

Territorial sovereignty disputes are gradually resolved through bilateral negotiation and tension on the land boundary.

At a time of marked decline, disputes over the territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation of the islands and reefs in the East China Sea and the South China Sea were observed.

serious. The counterparts to these tense situations are the Hainan Second Artillery Corps and not the Army.

The East China Sea and South China Sea areas that occurred were also not directed by the combat readiness tasks of the Nanjing and Guangzhou military regions.

If the tasks assigned to the two military regions are assigned by the Central Military Commission, the Nanjing Military Region is “supervising Jiangsu and An.

Military areas of the five provinces and one city of Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Fujian and Shanghai

The mission is to defend the developed mega cities and workers in the southeast coasts of Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou and Fuzhou.

Industry Zone Security”. According to this content, the main battle area of ​​the Nanjing Military Region does not include the East China Sea.

Diaoyutai. According to the main tasks of the Communist Army of the Guangzhou Military Region, the military region is the People’s Liberation Army.

“In charge of military affairs in the five provinces and regions of Guangdong, Guangxi, Hubei, Hunan and Hainan

Mission to defend southern China, in particular to prevent attacks on the coasts of Vietnam and the East China Sea.

State, Shenzhen and other megacities. In addition, it is also responsible for the reinforcement of Hong Kong and Macao when necessary.” with

In the sample plot, the defense of the Guangzhou Military Region does not include the South China Sea Islands.

In addition to the major strategic directions of the military region, the design of command posts in the large military region is directed toward the land instead of to the sea.

The Army is also the main force, and the commanders of the seven military regions are all served by army generals.

The military commander is only the deputy commander of the military area in the preparation, so the main combat operations of the Hainan Air Force in the military region

The Department is mainly to support the ground forces of the military region, instead of independently operating in the offshore airspace.

However, according to the “2015 China Military Strategy Report” announced by the Chinese Communist Party, the Communists must “add

Rapidly change the combat power generation mode and use information systems to put various combat forces and units of combat

Combine operational elements into integrated combat capabilities, and gradually build combat elements to make seamless links.

The integrated joint combat system where the platform is autonomously coordinated with each other” must also be “according to authority, capable, and effortlessly and efficiently required to establish and improve joint operations of the Central Military Commission and joint operations in the theater

Command system.” It is evident that the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party is fully aware of the existence of both the Central Military Commission and headquarters and the Military Services Division.

The division of functions among different ministries, and the military area system, etc., cannot meet the requirements of future warfare joint operations.

The demand of the type, and therefore the time for the adjustment of the Central Military Commission, for the leadership of the military

The system and the joint operational command system are designed in an integrated manner.

(3) Establishment of the current joint operations command organization

According to “opinions,” it is necessary to “establish and improve the

The two-level joint combat command system of the Central Military Commission and the theater establishes an integrated peacetime operation, normal operation, and

Main, lean and effective strategic battle command system, and “re-adjust the planning of the theater.”

In the military operational command system, it is necessary to “adjust the requirements of joint operations and joint efforts to standardize the operational command functions of the Central Military Commission, the Military Services, the Joint League Forces, and the regional military services.”

The training of troops requires that “it must be adapted to the joint combat command system and improve the joint training body system”.

In the specific formation of a joint combat command organization, at the Central Military Commission level will be the existing total the Staff Department was reorganized into a joint staff department directly under the Central Military Commission. This newly established “joint participation” is only

Responsible for the Joint Combat Command of the Central Military Commission, and the “Gan Sen General” of the past there is a big difference between operational command and leadership. More importantly, the new Joint Chief of Staff

No longer has the highest military commander of the general staff in the past. The highest military authority is in the Central Army.

After the adjustment of the committee’s functions, it has returned to the chairman of the Central Military Commission to implement the responsibility of the chairman of the Central Military Commission.

The spirit of the system. This Joint Staff is just a direct command of the Central Military Commission.

Institutions, so the chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both in peacetime and in wartime, plays the role of the chairman of the Central Military Commission in the exercise of the military.

The commander of the highest military command of the combat commander is no longer the chief of general staff of the past.

In fact, it has the same power as the army commander.

The restructuring of the General Staff Headquarters into the Joint Staff Department is indeed feasible in the specific practice because in addition to the chief of the general staff and deputy chief of the general staff of the former general staff of the former general staff, the sea, air, and the second gun are all

As the deputy chief of the general staff, in fact, he already has the prototype of joint operations command mechanism. This sea and air two the commander of the deputy chief of the general staff of the cannon, under the operation of the original system, is to take over the sea and air artillery.

The commander is an inevitably elected candidate who can be obtained as a deputy chief of the general staff and can be used as a deputy general secretary of other services.

Communicate the experience of communication and coordination, and understand the characteristics and the conditions that must be considered when performing combat missions. After this general served as commander of the military,

Implementing the Central Military Commission’s “integrated joint operations” policy requires that it be able to cooperate with other service communicate and coordinate, reducing the service-oriented nature.

The Hainan Second Artillery general served as deputy chief of general staff of the General Staff and began with Jiang Zemin in 2004.

When the chairman of the Central Military Commission delivered the post to Hu Jintao, he simultaneously incorporated the commander of the Hainan Second Artillery into the Central Military Commission.

Members from. The level of the original commander of the Haikong Second Artillery was equal to that of the Great Military Region, which was only equal to that of the Army.

Commander of the Military District. After Jiang Zemin incorporated it in the Central Military Commission, the commander of the Second Air and Sea Artillery ranks but there are no changes in the order of the commander, especially the commanders of the air forces of the major military regions.

The naval commander of the Bohai Sea Military Area Command is still a deputy chief of the military region at the rank, and the military commander is assigned to the military region.

Commander. In order to achieve the integrity and continuity of the cadre echelon, and to meet the requirements of different military units

The trend of development in the era of warfare is that of the deputy chief of the general staff who was originally monopolized by the Army in the General Staff Department.

The service is divided into the positions of generals of land, sea, air force, and second artillery to connect the Hainan Second Artillery Corps.

The high-ranking generals took the final stage of career training before becoming military commanders.

In addition to the rank of deputy chief of the general staff, all departments under the general staff department such as the intelligence department and the warfare department

And so on, they have long been included in the cadres of the sea, air, and the Second Artillery, serving as high-level staff, and their respective burdens.

Armed Forces related intelligence, operations and other staff officers. In other words, the General Staff in the past ten years and in recent years, it is to meet the needs of joint operations of different types of arms as the main direction of development.

At the same time, a mature joint combat command staff mechanism has been developed. So it must  adjust the General Staff to The Joint Staff, in terms of substantive operations, is not a complete change, but instead it will

The joint warfare mechanism that has been initially established has been institutionalized and renamed.

Therefore, the focus of adjusting the General Staff Department to the Joint Staff Department is not the chief of the general staff and vice president.

Chiefs of Staff such as the Chief of Staff are served by generals of different services and are not integrated into different military services.

Instead of consulting staff, establish a set of joint operations command that can be linked up and down, inherited from each other the central mechanism. In order to implement the spirit of the responsibility system of the chairman of the Central Military Commission, the Central Military Commission should be

Can effectively exercise the highest military command authority through the mechanism of the Joint Staff Headquarters; enough to integrate and integrate the joint operations command systems of all theaters and make the integrated joint operations commander

As an “organic whole,” there will be no “broken chain” or even “no chain” in combat command Results”.

The establishment of a joint combat command mechanism at the rank of the military region is to cancel the existing seven major military units.

District, the establishment of a four-strategic direction of the East, West, South and North, and the security of Beijing Theater. Traditionally, the large military area is the main organizational system of the Chinese Communist Army, since Mao Zedong’s time under the strategic thinking of emphasizing the lure of the enemy’s deep defensive battles in the country, the major military region system plays the most important role.

District soldiers stick to the defensive role. In fact, the military area is the army that truly controls the army and sets up the army.

The system of the military regime, which includes the construction of the army, education and training, and even combat command

The power is controlled by the commander of the military area. In addition, the Chinese Communist regime’s national defense mobilization system and military and land system

Degree, also relying on the system of the great military region, and related to the maintenance of the internal security order of the armed police department

The formation and command of the team are also within the jurisdiction of the military area.

Since the military region’s system is based on the premise of setting up troops and a decisive battle in the country, it is natural to operate the system.

Mainly based on the Army, the Hainan Air Force and the Second Artillery only played the role of supporting the Army. With the Chinese Communists the achievements of modernization have become increasingly apparent.

The scope of activities has continued to expand, and military strategic thinking has shifted to border and foreign operations.

Luring the enemy into the depths of the domestic decisive battle. However, it is natural for overseas operations to be able to engage in distant projections.

The Army and the Second Artillery are the main combat forces, but the Army can only play the role of reserve force. So will the army-based major military zone system was changed to a combat zone based on joint operations between different types of military units.

The command system can only integrate the combat forces of different military units, and immediately and efficiently this weapons combination has the advantage of projecting firepower from a distance.

In addition, changing the military area into a theater can also eliminate the original military commander’s monopoly of the military.

Leadership and command rights are similar to the phenomenon of the warlords split by land. The theater will only be responsible for joint operations commanding, the commander of the theater has only joint warfighting command over the theater and does not possess military command.

The leadership of the team. The leadership of the army is controlled by the various service commands so that the military commander and the military regime are completely cut at the theater level, and military commanders will no longer appear.

The issue of the expansion of power of local warlords.

(4) Conclusion

Xi Jinping demonstrated complete leadership over the army during the restructuring of the Central Military Commission of the CPC authority. It is true that the outside world thinks that Xi Jinping deliberately disrupted the existing power in the military through this military reform.

Structure, cleansing Jiang Zemin faction generals deeply rooted in the army and fully grasping the military right. But in all fairness, the “opinions” announced by the Central Military Commission of the Central Military Commission ranks and forces.

The level of organizational adjustment at the command level and the theater level suggests that if this change can implementation can indeed make the PLA’s organizational structure and power operation mechanism reborn.

People’s Liberation Army

After the military has straightened out the organizational structure and power operation mode, it will organize the organization, military services, and military operations.

Equipment and combat operations are oriented toward maturity and meet the standards of modern military forces.

This will also allow the PLA’s combat capabilities to show a leap forward in the foreseeable future.


Chairman Xi inspects the CMC’s joint operations command center and has aroused strong reaction in the entire army and the armed police force

Comprehensively improve the ability to prepare for fighting in the new era and provide strategic support for the realization of the Chinese dream

“To realize the party’s goal of strengthening the army in the new era and building the people’s army into a world-class army, we must grasp the key to fighting wars and defeating warlords. We have a major step forward in preparation for war.” On the 3rd, Chairman Xi Jinping inspected the Central Military Commission. The Operation Command Center led a group of CMC members to study the construction of the CMC Central Committee, and talked with the officers and men of the relevant task forces stationed at the Frontier Defense and Coastal Defence, inspected the Djibouti Security Base through the video, listened to the report of the PLA’s military preparation for war preparations, and delivered an important speech. It caused strong repercussions in the entire army and the armed police forces.

The officers and men all said that this inspection fully embodies President Xi’s high attention to the issue of military preparations for fighting warfare. This shows that the new military committee has implemented the spirit of the party’s Nineteenth Congress and promoted the work of the entire military to fight and win. A clear-cut attitude. They said that we must conscientiously study and implement the spirit of the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, adhere to the guidance of the military ideology of Xi Jinping, implement the military strategy under the new situation, strengthen the mission, strengthen reforms and innovations, intensify work implementation, and comprehensively improve preparations for fighting in the new era. The ability to provide strategic support for the realization of the “two hundred years” goal and the Chinese dream of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Tighten the string of war preparations and strengthen war preparations.

On the morning of the 3rd, the coldness hit people outside the window, but the joint military command center of the Central Military Commission was warm and strong. President Xi once went to the Central Building of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of the Central Military Commission, and led a group of people in the Central Military Commission to study the construction of the Central Committee of the Central Military Commission.


“When Xi Chairman made an inspection, he delivered an important speech and profoundly clarified the strategic significance and practical requirements for comprehensively improving the ability to prepare for fighting in the new era.” Zhou Shangping, deputy director of the Joint Operations Department of the Central Military Commission of the Central Military Commission who inspected the entire process, said, “This is the leader of the party. The commander of our army piloted the People’s Army to implement the party’s strong military objectives in the new era, to build a world-class army, and to send political mobilization and epoch orders to the entire army.”

The military is preparing to fight. The fundamental focus of the people’s army in carrying out missions in the new era is combat effectiveness.

The officers and men of the various theaters, services, and agencies of the Central Military Commission said in their discussions that the officers and men of the entire army must only tighten the war preparedness string, strengthen war preparations for war preparations, and always focus on preparing for battles and continuously improve their ability to win. Situation, control crisis, curb war and win war.

“If you want peace, then you have to prepare for war.” The party’s 19th representative Wang Jinlong served as an instructor. A certain army brigade in the central theater “does a great deal”. In the war years, he played in the name of He Huwei. In the new era, the company has a long history. The brigade is responsible for the mission of the brigade for emergency combat readiness. It always maintains a state of readiness for action on the string. He believes that the state is uneasy and that it will be dangerous to forget. Things in the world are always the same. If you are not ready, the enemy will come. You are ready. The enemy does not dare to come. The dialectic of war and peace tells us that if we can fight, we will not be able to fight unless we are ready to fight.

“We must engrave the word ‘war’ in our hearts and continue to strengthen our sense of responsibility for ‘ready to go on the battlefield’. We will deeply engrave our duty to prepare for war and become a conscious action,” said Cui Jiabin, a brigade commander of the Army Aviation Corps. Once something can be quickly responded, resolutely fulfill the tasks entrusted by the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission and President Xi, and resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests.

Pay close attention to actual combat military training and improve the ability to win

Socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era, and national defense and army building have also entered a new era.

The officers and men believe that the new era requires that the military must have new capabilities, but to have new capabilities, it is necessary to take substantive training.

“When Xi inspected the Central Committee of the Central Military Commission, Xi pointed out that we must focus on deepening military training in actual combat, stick to how to train soldiers on how to train, and what to do if we need to fight, and inspire the enthusiasm, initiative, and creativity of the officers and men. The military has risen vigorously in the military training upsurge,” said Liu Rui, the 19th Party Congress representative and head of the Air Force’s aviation regiment. “I’m most impressed by this. The military is only holding on to actual combat military training and improving their ability to win. Only in this way can we shoulder the mission of the mission of the new era given by the party and the people.”

Liu Rui is the first air force of the Air Force to modify the H-6K air force and is an important force in the air force’s long-range offensive operations. At this time after the closing of the 19th National Party Congress, he not only preached the spirit of the Nineteenth Party Congress, but also spent all his time on the training ground. A few days ago, he organized and implemented the largest cross-regional mobile combat training in the team’s history. From dawn to late at night, from combat to ultra-low altitude, from land to sea, all the way to the road, across multiple strange areas. And several airports, lasting more than 9 hours, with a range of nearly 5,000 kilometers…

A synthetic brigade of “Huangcailing Mountain” of the 74th Army Group of the Southern Theater Army is currently training hard soldiers to welcome the coming year-end assessment of the group army. Instructor Chen Yuwen believes that President Xi inspects the Central Military Commission’s Central Committee, sets the baton ready for warfare from the level of the Central Military Commission, and pays close attention to actual combat military training from the level of the chairman of the Central Military Commission. Grassroots officers and soldiers have no reason not to do a good job. We must unify our thoughts and actions to the important instructions of President Xi to prepare for war, and strive to forge an elite force that can be called, come to war, and win in battle.

Adhere to problem-oriented and make preparations for work

The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is by no means an easy task. It can be achieved by banging and playing drums. The ambitious goal of building a world-class army is also facing severe challenges.

Li Keliang, political commissar of a central information and communications brigade in the Central Theater, believes that we must strictly follow the requirements of Chairman Xi’s important directives, stick to the problem-oriented approach, grasp the end, and promote implementation of the preparations for combating one practical problem. It is necessary to establish a strict responsibility system, strengthen supervision and accountability, and grasp first-level, first-level and first-level levels, and stringently prepare for war preparations.

“The battlefield is a real contest, and the fight is a hard-fought duel.” The party’s 19th representative and Navy carrier-based fighter pilot Cao Jianjian created 419 days after serious injuries and only after 70 days of go-around, the F-15 fighters succeeded in their operations. The ship’s miracle, “In the past few years, the entire army took the training winds to test the wind and declared war on the “peace and evil” in military training. During the exercises, they dared to expose problems and dare to dissect themselves. They introduced a series of hard measures and effective. Promote the building of the combat effectiveness of the troops.”

After seriously studying Xi’s speech, a brigade commander of the 80th Armed Forces believed that we must follow the example of President Xi’s entrustment to strengthen the sense of crisis, awareness of crisis, and awareness of snoring. We must focus all our efforts on fighting and focus on each other’s work. We must make preparations as soon as possible. Snoring ability to engage in.

Experts and scholars of the Academy of Military Sciences, National Defense University, and National University of Defense Technology, according to the future situation and task, believe that we must use the important instructions given by President Xi’s visit to the joint operations command center of the Central Military Commission as guidelines, and focus on innovating wars and combat planning, closely following the evolution of war formations and combat methods. , Adhering to the combat missions, operational opponents, and operational environment, Daxing’s research on warfare issues.

President Xi’s strong mission, clear preparations for fighting, and inspiring the majority of officers and soldiers of the entire army and armed police forces. The officers and men said that we must firmly establish the only basic standard of combat effectiveness. All our thoughts must be focused and focused on. All tasks should be used to fight hard, and we must successfully accomplish the mission of the new era entrusted by the party and the people!


Original Mandarin Chinese:


























Reference (1)

Reference (2)

信息安全技術-個人信息安全規範 – China’s “Information Security Technology Personal Information Security Specification” in Four Aspects

信息安全技術-個人信息安全規範 –

China’s “Information Security Technology Personal Information Security Specification” in Four Aspects

On December 11th, 2017, there were two kinds of mobile phone APPs, Baidu and Baidu, which were owned by Baidu. They included “listening phone”, “reading short MMS”, “reading contacts”, etc. involving consumer personal information. In the case of security related rights and refusal to rectify the situation, the Jiangsu Provincial Consumer Protection Committee initiated a consumer civil public interest litigation concerning suspected illegal access to consumer personal information and related issues by Beijing, which was held on January 2 of this year in Nanjing. The Intermediate People’s Court has formally opened the case. On January 6th, with the fermentation of Alipay’s annual billing event, the State Administration of Cybernetics Network Security Coordination Bureau interviewed relevant persons in charge of Alipay (China) Network Technology Co., Ltd. and Sesame Credit Management Co., Ltd. and pointed out that Alipay, The way in which sesame credits collect personal information does not conform to the spirit of the National Standard for Information Security Technology and Personal Information Security. It violates the promise of the Personal Information Protection Initiative that it signed shortly and should strictly follow the Cyber ​​Security Law. The following is called the “net security law” requirements, strengthen the comprehensive investigation of the platform, carry out special rectification, and take effective measures to prevent similar incidents from happening again. Since the official implementation of the “Network Security Law”, the National People’s Congress, Industry and Information Technology, Internet Information, Internet Security, and Consumers’ Association systems have launched a series of special inspections and rectifications of personal information throughout the country. At the same time, they have also strengthened punishments for violations of laws and regulations. The public’s emphasis on the protection of personal information.

  However, because of the principle, fuzziness and fragmentation of legal norms and local regulatory policies, many articles lack detailed rules for landing, which brings great confusion to many network operators’ personal information compliance work. On December 29 last year, the China National Standardization Administration officially issued the “Information Security Technology Personal Information Security Specification” (hereinafter referred to as the “Safety Code”). On January 24, the national standard full-text publication system officially announced the full text of the specification, and It will be implemented on May 1, 2018. The “Safety Code” clarifies the compliance requirements for the collection, preservation, use, and sharing of personal information in the form of national standards, and provides guidelines for network operators to formulate privacy policies and improve internal controls.

  ”Safety Regulations”

  Related legal concepts

  Based on the existing principles and provisions of the “Net Security Law”, the “Safety Regulations” specifies the specific definitions of relevant legal concepts in light of the specific issues that network operators are concerned about in practice.

  First, regarding personal sensitive information, the “Guide to the Protection of Personal Information in Information and Security Technology Public and Commercial Service Information Systems” implemented in 2013 defined personal sensitive information as personal information that would adversely affect the personal information subject after being exposed or modified. At the same time, it is recommended that the specific content of personal sensitive information in various industries be determined based on the willingness of the personal information subject to the service and their respective business characteristics. The “Safety Regulations” further emphasizes in the definition that the disclosure of personal sensitive information, illegal provision or misuse may endanger the safety of people and property, cause personal reputation, physical and mental health damage or discriminatory treatment and other serious consequences, and in Appendix B A specific example of personal sensitive information was drawn up, linking up with the data classification obligations stipulated in Article 21 of the “Network Security Law”.

  Secondly, regarding the collection of personal information, the “Safety Regulations” defines three types of “collection” as the provision of personal information subjects, automatic collection by network operators, and indirect acquisition from third parties. At the same time, exceptions are stipulated and individuals are acquired at terminals. Information not returned to the operator’s server does not belong to “collection.”

  Finally, with respect to the anonymization and de-identification of personal information, the “Safety Code” distinguishes the two. The anonymized information cannot be restored and is no longer part of personal information; de-identification processing guarantees Personal information can’t identify the main body of information without relying on additional information, but it still retains the granularity of the individual and uses pseudonyms, encryption, hash functions, etc. instead of the original personal information. In addition, on August 15 last year, the “Information Security Technology Personal Information De-identification Guide” was released for solicitation of public opinions. The contents involved the process of de-identification and technical applications. Currently, the network operators are implementing the personal information during the review stage. Marking work is worth learning from.

  Collection of personal information

  The “Safety Regulations” stipulates that the collection of personal information should comply with the requirements of legality and minimization. Among them, the requirements for authorization to obtain personal information indirectly and the explicit consent requirements for collecting personal sensitive information are worthy of attention.

  When obtaining personal information indirectly, the company as the recipient is obliged to require the provider to explain the source of the relevant personal information and confirm its legitimacy. At the same time, it should also understand the scope of the personal information subject’s authorization to the provider, including the purpose of use and the individual. Whether the information subject is authorized to consent to the transfer, sharing, public disclosure, etc. If the recipient handles personal information beyond the above-mentioned range, it shall also obtain the explicit consent of the personal information subject within a reasonable time limit. Establishing an authorization consent model for indirect collection of personal information is one of the highlights of the Personal Information Collection section of the “Safety Code”. This model reinforces the review obligation of information receivers and increases the corresponding compliance costs.

  In the collection of personal sensitive information, first of all, the “Safety Code” further requires the express consent of the personal information subject on the basis of the “Net Security Law” to be a voluntary, concrete, clear and clear wish given by the individual on the basis of full knowledge. Representation; Second, if the personal information controller collects personal sensitive information for the core business functions of its products or services, it shall explicitly inform the information subject of the core business functions it provides, the personal sensitive information it needs to collect, and the personal information subject. Three choices of rights; Finally, if personal information controllers collect personal sensitive information for other additional functions, they should clearly inform specific additional functions and the right to choose personal information, but refuse personal sensitive information required for additional functions. It does not mean that the core business functions have stopped providing.

  Sharing of personal information

  When entrusting a third party to process personal information, apart from the fact that the commissioning itself must not exceed the scope of the authorized consent of the personal information subject, the “Safety Code” also stipulates that the personal information controller should carry out personal information security impact assessment and take the responsibility of the contract. Obligation, auditing, etc. supervise the trustee and ensure accurate recording and preservation of the trustee’s handling of personal information.

  With respect to the sharing and transfer of personal information, the “Safety Code” also stipulates the obligations of the personal information controller on the security impact assessment. At the same time, the personal information controller shall notify the personal information subject of the purpose of sharing, transferring the personal information, and the type of the data receiver. In the case of personal sensitive information, the type of sensitive information, the identity of the recipient of the data, and the security capabilities should also be notified, and sharing or transfer may be made only after obtaining the explicit consent of the personal information subject. In addition, personal information controllers need to accurately record and preserve the sharing and transfer of personal information, and bear the legal responsibility for the harm caused by sharing and transferring personal information to the legitimate rights and interests of the information subject. Where changes in the controlling body occur due to mergers and acquisitions, restructuring, etc., they shall individually notify the subject of personal information.

  With regard to the cross-border transmission of personal information, the “Safety Code” requires that personal information controllers should conduct security assessments in accordance with the standards set by the Network Information Office and relevant departments. According to the “Personal Information and Important Data Outbound Security Assessment Methodology (Exposure Draft)” published in April last year, network operators should organize their own data outbound security assessment before leaving the country and be responsible for the results if they contain or accumulate 500,000. If the personal information above the person or the personal information provided by the key information infrastructure is provided to the outside, it shall also be reported to the industry supervisor or the supervisory authority for organizing the safety assessment. The Guidelines for Outbound Security Assessment of Information Security Technology Data (Draft for Solicitation of Comments) (hereinafter referred to as the “Evaluation Guide”) issued by the National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee on August 30 last year are also worthy of attention. The Assessment Guide clearly indicates the data. The use scope and exceptions of outbound security assessments are to refine the types of personal information and important data, increase the disclosure obligation of network operators for personal information, distinguish security self-assessment and assessment processes of competent authorities, and implement personal information for personal information controllers. Cross-border transmission provides a reference.

  Safety management requirements

  Since its implementation, NetEase has given network operators many security protection obligations. One of them is the development of internal security management systems and operational procedures to implement the network security protection responsibilities. Specifically, the “security regulations” include three. Aspects. First, the responsible departments and personnel should be clarified. According to the “Safety Regulations”, personal information controllers that meet certain conditions in terms of business, personnel scale, and personal information processing volume should establish full-time personal information protection managers and work agencies so that The specific implementation of personal information security work prevents personal information from being leaked, damaged or lost. Second, a personnel management and training system should be established. According to the “Safety Regulations”, personal information controllers should sign confidentiality agreements with employees engaged in personal information processing positions and conduct background checks to clarify the safety responsibilities of related positions and the occurrence of security incidents. Penalty mechanism, while conducting regular professional training and assessment, to ensure that relevant employees have the privacy policy and regulatory processes. Third, a personal information security impact assessment and audit system should be developed to assess potential risks and adverse impacts in the processing of personal information, form an assessment report for inspection by relevant parties, and establish an automated auditing system to monitor and record personal information processing activities. Handle the illegal use and abuse of personal information in the audit process in a timely manner.


  The formal issuance of the “Safety Code” ended the situation in which there were many personal information protection principles and the lack of specific measures since the implementation of the “Net Security Law.” This answer the confusion of the Internet companies, and in the appendix, it is the subject of personal information. The agreed-upon functional interface and privacy policy templates have provided a complete compliance and risk control policy for the provision of network products and services. Although the “Safety Code” number is displayed as a national recommendation, in practice, the review of the privacy policy conducted by the four departments of the Network Information Office, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and the Ministry of Public Security last year was mainly based on the “Safety Regulations” solicitation opinion draft. When the Information Office interviewed Alipay about the annual billing event, it also emphasized the validity of the “Safety Regulations.” These events all reflected the importance of the “Safety Rules” for improving the personal information protection system. The majority of network operators should make efforts to collect, save, use, and share personal information, improve internal management and privacy policy formulation to cope with the rigorous regulatory situation.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

2017年12月11日,就百度旗下“手機百度”、“百度瀏覽器”等兩款手機APP存在“監聽電話”、“讀取短彩信”、“讀取聯繫人”等涉及消費者個人信息安全的相關權限且拒不整改的情形,江蘇省消費者權益保護委員會就北京百度網訊科技有限公司涉嫌違法獲取消費者個人信息及相關問題提起消費民事公益訴訟,今年1月2日,南京市中級人民法院已正式立案。 1月6日,隨著“支付寶年度賬單事件”的發酵,國家網信辦網絡安全協調局約談了支付寶(中國)網絡技術有限公司、芝麻信用管理有限公司的有關負責人並指出,支付寶、芝麻信用收集使用個人信息的方式,不符合《信息安全技術個人信息安全規範》國家標準的精神,違背了其前不久簽署的《個人信息保護倡議》的承諾,應嚴格按照《網絡安全法》(以下稱“《網安法》”)的要求,加強對平台的全面排查,進行專項整頓,切實採取有效措施,防止類似事件再次發生。自《網安法》正式實施以來,人大、工信、網信、網安以及消協系統,在全國各地掀起了一系列個人信息專項檢查、整治行動,處罰違法違規行為的同時,也加強了社會公眾對個人信息保護的重視程度。

然而,由於法律規範及各地監管政策的原則性、模糊化及碎片化,很多條文缺乏落地的細則,這就給很多網絡運營者個人信息合規工作帶來極大的困惑。去年12月29日,中國國家標準化管理委員會正式發布《信息安全技術個人信息安全規範》(以下稱“《安全規範》”),1月24日,國家標準全文公開系統正式對外公佈規範全文,並將於2018年5月1日起實施。 《安全規範》以國家標準的形式,明確了個人信息的收集、保存、使用、共享的合規要求,為網絡運營者制定隱私政策及完善內控提供了指引。




首先,關於個人敏感信息,2013年實施的《信息安全技術公共及商用服務信息系統個人信息保護指南》將個人敏感信息定義為在遭受洩露或修改後會對個人信息主體造成不良影響的個人信息,同時建議各行業個人敏感信息的具體內容根據接受服務的個人信息主體意願和各自業務特點確定。 《安全規範》則在定義中進一步強調了個人敏感信息被洩露、非法提供或濫用可能危害人身、財產安全,致使個人名譽、身心健康受到損害或歧視性待遇等嚴重後果,並在附錄B中給出了個人敏感信息的具體示例,銜接了《網安法》第二十一條規定的數據分類義務。