Category Archives: Russia Network Forces

Chinese Military Simulation Technology—— Knocking on the door of Russian “war design”

中國軍事模擬技術—敲開俄羅斯「戰爭設計」之門

中國軍網 國防部網 // 2018年8月24日 星期五

現代英語:

Recently, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the establishment of the “Era Military Innovation Technology Park”, which focuses on scientific research, testing and simulation of advanced weapons, military and special equipment. Coincidentally, the US military is also stepping up the development of the “Soldiers Build Intelligence System Military Training Support” project, hoping to better assist officers and soldiers in conducting military intelligence training by providing equipment, simulators and simulation modeling services. The frequently mentioned military simulation technology has attracted attention from all parties. With the rapid development of cloud computing, big data, artificial intelligence and other technologies, military simulation technology has made significant progress in equipment construction, military exercises, combat training and logistics support. At present, major military powers have recognized the huge application prospects of simulation technology in the military field and regard it as an “advanced intelligence contest” in modern warfare.

The “virtual battlefield” can also deploy troops

Once upon a time, we all “learned about war from war”. The emergence of military simulation technology has allowed us to learn about future wars from the “virtual battlefield”.

Simulation technology mainly relies on computer and other equipment platforms, and uses mathematical models to conduct scientific research, analysis, evaluation and decision-making on issues that need to be studied. Military simulation systems are simulation systems built specifically for military applications. They can conduct quantitative analysis of combat elements such as land, sea, air, space, electricity, and the Internet, the performance of weapons and equipment, and combat operations, and then accurately simulate the battlefield environment, present relevant battlefield situations, and achieve effectiveness evaluation of the combat system and command decision-making assistance.

At present, military simulation systems have become an effective means of studying future wars, designing weapons and equipment, and supporting the evaluation of tactics, and they run through the entire process of weapons and equipment development and testing. In recent years, military simulation technology has been increasingly regarded as a multiplier for improving combat effectiveness and one of the key technologies for national defense security and troop construction and development.

The United States has always listed modeling and simulation as an important key defense technology. As early as 1992, the United States announced the “Defense Modeling and Simulation Initiative” and established a special Defense Modeling and Simulation Office. The United States also specifically listed the “integrated simulation environment” as one of the seven driving technologies to maintain the US military advantage. At the same time, European countries attach great importance to the development of military simulation technology, and strive to continuously improve simulation methods in the process of developing a new generation of weapon systems, thereby improving the comprehensive effectiveness of weapon equipment construction and development.

In fact, military simulation technology has allowed people to fully learn about future wars in experiments. Before the outbreak of the Gulf War, the US Department of Defense used military simulation technology to analyze and determine the direct consequences of Iraq igniting all oil wells in Kuwait, which had a profound impact on the US military’s formulation of the Gulf War combat plan. In the integrated ballistic missile defense system project carried out by the US military, modeling and simulation methods are specifically used to conduct a preliminary assessment of the ballistic missile defense system. At the end of 2017, the US Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency invested 12.8 million US dollars specifically for the construction of virtual simulation space battlefields. The US Army also spent 57 million US dollars to develop the Army Infantry Training System – this immersive military virtual simulation training system can provide soldiers with a more realistic battlefield combat simulation environment.

A brainstorming session to plan operations

From artillery simulation, aircraft simulation, missile simulation to today’s various types of weapon system equipment simulation and combat simulation, while simulation technology continues to meet the needs of military applications, it is also rapidly developing in the direction of virtualization, networking, intelligence, collaboration and universalization. In order to continuously improve military simulation calculation methods and improve simulation technology, people are constantly launching a “brainstorming” to plan operations.

Mathematical modeling algorithm. Mathematical model is the basis of simulation. To carry out simulation, we must first build a mathematical model of the object to be simulated. At the same time, the correctness and accuracy of the mathematical model directly affect the credibility of the simulation calculation results. In recent years, the rapid development of artificial intelligence technology has provided new ideas for mathematical modeling. Introducing artificial intelligence to build mathematical models can not only effectively improve the realism, reliability and accuracy of simulation models, but also further improve the efficiency of modeling and simulation.

Virtual reality technology. With virtual reality technology, people can interact with objects in a virtual simulation environment through related equipment, thereby creating an effect of “immersion” in the real environment. The augmented reality technology that has emerged in recent years has further increased the user’s perception of the virtual simulation system, and can superimpose virtual objects, scenes, and information generated by the military simulation system onto the real scene. The U.S. Army is currently relying on virtual reality and augmented reality technologies to develop the future overall training environment to achieve seamless, mixed immersive combat training.

Network grid technology. The realization of military simulation is inseparable from the strong support of computers, local area networks, software engineering and other technologies. The distributed interactive simulation that integrates simulation equipment or systems of different types in different locations into a whole provides a more realistic application environment for military simulation. In recent years, grid technology that can realize the rapid transmission of various types of information and resource sharing has become a research hotspot for military simulation. The US Department of Defense has begun to use the “Global Information Grid” plan to establish a military grid that communicates various information elements on the battlefield and realizes the dynamic sharing and collaborative application of various military network resources.

Winning the war before it starts

The future information warfare is an integrated war that is carried out simultaneously in multiple dimensions such as land, sea, air, space, electricity, and the Internet. Not only is the battle structure complex and the weapons and equipment diverse, but it also places higher demands on the combatants and the use of tactics. Only by building a “virtual battlefield” for future wars with the help of military simulation technology and realizing the scientific coordination of factors such as the scale of war, the course of war, war investment, the number of combatants and weapons and equipment, the targets of attack and the intensity of attack, can we be sure of victory before the war begins.

In the field of combat experiments, the U.S. military has fully reduced the losses caused by improper combat plans and action plans through a large number of computer simulation evaluations and iterative optimizations. The Russian military’s combat regulations and tactics are also “optimal battlefield solutions” obtained through scientific deduction and simulation calculation using mathematical models. Through military simulation analysis and evaluation, battlefield commanders and fighters can quickly understand the trend of war simulations and carry out effective responses according to various changes in the “virtual battlefield”, thereby effectively improving the effectiveness of combat experiments.

In the field of military training, individual soldier training can be carried out through an immersive virtual simulation training environment, which can be as close to the battlefield environment as possible and effectively improve the training effect. In recent years, the US Army has specially opened a “simulated immersion” training course in the “Advanced Course for Officers”. Through the implementation of virtual simulation military training, the organization and implementation of training are not restricted by time and weather conditions. The distributed training simulation system can even enable trainees in different locations to participate in the training together. By modeling and simulating the specific battlefield environment, tactical background and enemy forces, the military training system can also provide trainees with a more realistic battlefield perception.

In the field of equipment demonstration, the technical support of simulation systems is required throughout the life cycle of weapons and equipment development. At present, the United States has extensively adopted simulation technology in new weapon system development projects to fully support the development and testing, live-fire evaluation and combat testing of weapons and equipment. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency has further explored effective measures to deal with incoming missile threats through missile threat target modeling and simulation. The U.S. Navy simulates the operation of ship systems and crew members through mission analysis simulation software, and obtains simulation results for determining and optimizing the number of crew members. In the future, military simulation technology may become a new technological highland for the world’s major military powers to compete.

現代國語:

日前,俄羅斯國防部宣布組成“時代軍事創新科技園區”,重點進行先進武器、軍事和特殊裝備的科學研究、試驗以及模擬模擬。無獨有偶,美軍也在加緊研發「士兵建構情報系統軍隊訓練保障」項目,希望透過提供設備、模擬器與模擬建模等服務,更好地輔助官兵進行軍事情報訓練。這其中常提及的軍用模擬技術,引起各方注意。伴隨著雲端運算、大數據、人工智慧等技術的快速發展,軍事模擬技術在裝備建設、軍事演習、作戰訓練與後勤支援等領域相繼取得重大進展。目前,各軍事大國紛紛體認到模擬技術在軍事領域的巨大應用前景,將其視為現代戰爭的「超前智慧較量」。

「虛擬戰場」也能排兵布陣

曾幾何時,我們都是「從戰爭中學習戰爭」。軍用模擬技術的出現,開始讓我們從「虛擬戰場」學習未來戰爭。

模擬技術主要藉助電腦等設備平台,利用數學模型對需要研究的問題進行科學的研究、分析、評估與決策。軍用模擬系統是專門針對軍事應用建構的模擬模擬系統,可對陸、海、空、天、電、網等作戰元素、武器裝備性能以及作戰行動進行量化分析,進而精確模擬戰場環境、呈現相關戰場態勢,實現作戰體系的效能評估與指揮決策輔助。

目前,軍用模擬系統已成為研究未來戰爭、設計武器裝備、支撐戰法評估的有效手段,並貫穿武器裝備研發、試驗的整個過程。近年來,軍用模擬技術越來越被視為提升作戰效能的倍增器,是國防安全與部隊建設發展的關鍵技術之一。

美國一直將建模與模擬列為重要的國防關鍵技術。早在1992年,美國就宣布了“國防建模與模擬倡議”,並專門成立國防建模與模擬辦公室。美國也專門將「綜合模擬環境」列為保持美國軍事優勢的七大推動技術之一。同時,歐洲各國高度重視軍用模擬技術發展,力求在新一代武器系統研發過程中不斷完善模擬方法,進而提升武器裝備建設發展的綜合效能。

事實上,軍用模擬技術已經讓人們在實驗中充分學習了未來戰爭。在海灣戰爭爆發前,美國國防部就藉助軍用模擬技術,分析研判伊拉克點燃科威特境內全部油井的直接後果,對美軍制定海灣戰爭作戰方案產生了深遠影響。在美軍進行的一體化彈道飛彈防禦系統專案中,就專門採用建模模擬方法​​對彈道飛彈防禦系統進行預先評估。 2017年底,美國國防部高級研究計畫局投資1,280萬美元,專門用於虛擬模擬太空戰場建設。美國陸軍也耗資5,700萬美元研發陸軍步兵訓練系統-這款沉浸式軍事虛擬模擬訓練系統,能為士兵提供更真實的戰場作戰模擬環境。

掀起策劃作戰的“腦力激盪”

從火砲仿真、飛行器仿真、飛彈仿真到現今的各式武器系統裝備仿真以及作戰仿真,仿真技術在不斷滿足軍事應用需求的同時,自身也朝向虛擬化、網路化、智慧化、協同化與普適化方向迅速發展。為不斷完善軍用模擬計算方法、改進模擬技術手段,人們正不斷掀起謀劃作戰的「腦力激盪」。

數學建模演算法。數學模型是進行模擬的基礎,要進行模擬模擬,必須先建構被模擬物件的數學模型。同時,數學模型的正確與否以及精確度高低直接影響模擬計算結果的可信度。近年來,人工智慧技術的快速發展,為數學建模提供了新思路。引進人工智慧建構數學模型,不僅能有效改善模擬模型的逼真性、可靠性與精確性,也進一步提升了建模與模擬的效率。

虛擬實境技術。採用虛擬實境技術,人們可透過相關設備與虛擬模擬環境中的物件進行交互,進而產生「沉浸」於真實環境的效果。近年來興起的擴增實境技術,進一步增加了使用者對虛擬模擬系統的感知程度,能將軍用模擬系統產生的虛擬物件、場景和資訊疊加到真實場景中。美國陸軍目前就依賴虛擬實境和擴增實境技術開發未來整體訓練環境,實現無縫、混合的沉浸式作戰訓練。

網路網格技術。軍用仿真的實現離不開電腦、區域網路、軟體工程等技術的強大支撐,將分散於不同地點、不同類型的仿真設備或系統集成為一個整體的分散式交互仿真,為軍用仿真提供了更逼真的應用環境。近年來,可實現各類資訊快速傳輸和資源共享的網格技術成為軍用模擬的研究熱點。美國國防部已開始借助「全球資訊網格」計劃,建立起溝通戰場各類資訊要素的軍事網格,實現各類軍事網路資源的動態共享與協同應用。

在戰爭開始前穩操勝券

未來的資訊化戰爭是陸、海、空、天、電、網等多維空間同時展開的一體化戰爭,不僅戰役結構複雜、武器裝備多樣,對參戰人員和戰術運用也提出了更高要求。借助軍事模擬技術建構未來戰爭的“虛擬戰場”,實現對戰爭規模、戰爭進程、戰爭投入、作戰人員與武器裝備數量、打擊目標與打擊強度等要素的科學統籌,才能在戰爭開始之前穩操勝券。

在作戰實驗領域,美軍透過大量的電腦模擬評估和迭代優化,充分減少了因作戰方案和行動計畫不當而造成的損失。俄軍的作戰條令和戰法也都是運用數學模型進行科學推導、模擬計算得出的「戰場最優解」。透過軍用模擬分析與評估,戰場指戰員可以快速了解戰爭推演趨勢,在「虛擬戰場」中根據各種情況變化開展有效應對,進而有力提升作戰試驗效果。

在軍事訓練領域,透過沉浸式虛擬模擬訓練環境實施單兵訓練,能最大限度地貼近戰場環境,並有力提升訓練效果。近年來,美國陸軍已經在“軍官高級教程”中專門開設了“模擬沉浸”訓練課程。透過進行虛擬模擬軍事訓練,訓練的組織與實施不受時間和氣象條件限制,分散式訓練模擬系統甚至能使不同地點的參訓人員共同參與訓練。透過對具體戰場環境、戰術背景和敵方兵力進行建模和仿真,軍事訓練系統也能為訓練人員提供更逼真的戰場感知。

在裝備論證領域,武器裝備研發的全生命週期都需要模擬系統的技術支援。目前,美國在新型武器系統研發專案中大量採用模擬技術,全面支援武器裝備的開發測試、實彈評估測試和作戰測試。美國飛彈防禦局透過飛彈威脅目標建模與仿真,進一步探索出應對來襲飛彈威脅的有效措施。美國海軍則透過任務分析仿真軟體,對船艦系統和艦員的操作進行仿真,得出確定和優化艦員數量的仿真結果。未來,軍用模擬技術或將成為世界各軍事大國角逐的科技新高地。

製圖:陳 晨

中國原創軍事資源:https://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-08/24/content_214234888.htm

Chinese Military in-depth Analysis of the Latest “Cognitive Warfare” Case in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

中國軍方深入解析俄烏衝突最新「認知戰」案例

2023-10-07 09:00 來源: 述策

現代英語:

It is said that on September 22, the Ukrainian Air Force used the “Storm Shadow” cruise missile to attack the Black Sea Fleet Command in Sevastopol. Since then, the life and death of Admiral Victor Sokolov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, has been a topic of concern to the outside world. After a few days of undercurrents, on September 25, the Ukrainian Special Operations Command (SOF) announced that they had successfully “killed” Admiral Sokolov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and dozens of officers below him. Even Admiral Romanchuk, commander of the Russian Zaporizhia Cluster, was injured by the Ukrainian army.

Unexpectedly, Ukraine’s news was “slapped in the face” less than a day after it was released-on September 26, the Russian Ministry of Defense held a meeting of the National Defense Committee. Senior leaders of the Ministry of Defense, commanders of various military regions, and commanders of various military services attended the meeting in person or via video. At the meeting, Admiral Sokolov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, who was declared “killed” by Ukrainian officers, appeared. After the news was released, the Ukrainian side was extremely embarrassed and had to announce that they wanted to collect more information. But then someone claimed that Admiral Sokolov, who attended the meeting, was “just a photo” and not a real person.

Nevertheless, the battle between the Russian and Ukrainian armies over the life and death of General Sokolov can be seen as a classic case of cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict. It is worthwhile for us to analyze this case specifically, and it is even more worthwhile for us to “talk about” this case and talk about the battle between the Russian and Ukrainian armies in the field of cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict.

  1. Is the “beheading” of General Sokolov not an isolated case?

It is not the first time that the Ukrainian propaganda department has fallen into the trap of “beheading” Russian generals. For example, in mid-June this year, the Ukrainian army spread rumors that the Vice President of Chechnya, Lieutenant General of the Chechen National Guard, and Kadyrov Jr.’s right-hand man, Drimkhanov, was “killed” by the Ukrainian army’s HIMARS rocket launcher.

From the perspective of the implementation process of the entire cognitive warfare, whether it was the “beheading” of Drimkhanov in June or the “beheading” of General Sokolov this time, the whole process was similar:

The first step: The Ukrainian propaganda department deliberately “created topics”. The so-called “creating topics” can be regarded as a “primer” in cognitive warfare, which serves to trigger heated public discussion. This kind of “primer” is often not necessarily released by the official, but may be released by some semi-official channels or channels with close ties to the official. For example, the fact that Lieutenant General Drimkhanov was “killed” by the Ukrainian army’s “HIMARS” rocket launcher was first said to have been released from a telegram group of the Ukrainian armed forces, and the statement was ambiguous. The earliest source of the news that Admiral Sokolov was “beheaded” this time was traced back to a telegram group in Russia. The news in this telegram group is mixed, some of which are of low credibility, but some are surprisingly accurate. In a sense, releasing the “primer” of cognitive warfare through these groups is even more likely to arouse public attention and discussion than official news.

The second step can be regarded as “reinforcement” of public opinion. The first step of cognitive warfare, namely “primer information”, often lacks details for a complete news, but it doesn’t matter. Judging from the efficiency and characteristics of information dissemination in the current society, a “lead information” that lacks details but is easy to arouse everyone’s interest, but has information barriers due to some factors, will naturally be “supplemented with details” during the dissemination process. This is true whether Admiral Sokolov was “shot dead” or Drimkhanov was “beheaded”. Information lacks details, but it is very important “Breaking News” for the media. At the same time, due to military secrets, it is impossible to cross the information barrier to obtain more information in time. Therefore, this will inevitably lead the media to a result – public opinion “reinforcement”, and everyone will do it together, and in the process of word of mouth, a lead information will be constantly detailed and “real”. For example, in the process of dissemination, Drimkhanov was “beheaded”, and the “time” and “place” of his beheading were supplemented one after another (even due to different dissemination channels, these time and place elements are also different), sometimes appearing in Kremenaya and sometimes in Gorlovka. The same is true for Admiral Sokolov’s “killing”. During the process of information dissemination, people have come up with a whole set of details such as “The Black Sea Fleet held a regular meeting on Friday, and the Ukrainian army seized the opportunity to launch a strike”, “Two missiles hit the headquarters office, and the other missile launched a supplementary strike when the rescuers went in to rescue people”. It is precisely in this “decentralized” word of mouth that the “fact” that these two senior generals were “beheaded” has been continuously strengthened, and the lack of information sources is even more conducive to the cognitive shaping of ordinary information recipients.

After several days of fermentation, the cognitive war has come to the third step – “the final word”. The Ukrainian official did not “finally decide” the “beheading” of Drimkhanov. Kadyrov Jr. couldn’t sit still first, and soon released a video of himself and Drimkhanov sitting together for a meal and picnic, and even took out his mobile phone on the spot to show the shooting time, “slapping his face”. Admiral Sokolov was “finally decided” by large departments such as the Ukrainian Special Operations Command and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. According to the process of cognitive warfare, this kind of official media “final word” should play the role of completing the cognitive shaping process in the field of cognitive warfare, that is, completing a complete logical closed loop from releasing “primers” to “speculation reinforcement” by the outside world, and finally “stamping and confirming” by the official. However, the Russian army took the initiative and performed a “slap in the face on the spot”, which not only made all the information dissemination of the Ukrainian army in front of it useless, but also made Ukraine’s two key units, the Special Operations Command and even the Ministry of Defense, become clowns.

  1. Cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, is the Ukrainian army coming in full force?

Many people may be puzzled by the Ukrainian army’s cognitive warfare propaganda department’s personal participation in the rumor that Chechen Vice President Delimkhanov or General Sokolov was “killed” by the Ukrainian army: If the Russian side responds quickly, pulls these senior generals out to show their faces, and self-confirms that “I am still alive”, then won’t the rumors of the Ukrainian cognitive warfare be self-defeating?

It seems reasonable, but the Russian army did not clarify it once it was rumored. Why? Because things are not that simple.

First, from a tactical perspective, if the Russian army arranges for generals to come out and refute rumors every time the Ukrainian army creates a rumor about a senior general, the most direct consequence is that it will cause unnecessary interference and trouble to the daily combat command of senior generals. In combat operations, the time of senior officers above the rank of general is very precious, the daily workload is extremely high, and the brainpower is extremely consumed. It is impossible for them to have so much time to appear and refute rumors endlessly. If the Russian army refutes a rumor every time the Ukrainian army creates a rumor, then these senior generals will have nothing to do in their daily lives and just shoot videos to refute rumors every day.

Second, for information that enters the cognitive shaping cycle, in some cases, “refutation” is not only useless, but will further create more rumors. For example, regarding the “beheading” of General Sokolov, although the Russian army has arranged to refute the rumor, some Ukrainian groups are still “picking on it”, believing that General Sokolov did not move in front of the camera and that the time and place of General Sokolov’s interview could not be seen, so it was just “information countermeasures” arranged by the Russian side. Even for some Russian generals who were “officially announced” and “beheaded” by Ukraine last year but then appeared on certain occasions, such as Major General Gerasimov, Chief of Staff of the 41st Army, there are still Ukrainian supporters who claim that “this person is dead”. The only reason is that this person did not show up again after showing up!

Therefore, in the field of cognitive warfare, many things are not as simple as we think.

Having said that, at the strategic level, there is indeed a big gap between the Russian army and the Ukrainian army in the field of cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict. The Ukrainian army is very good at creating topics, and it is flexible and mobile and pays attention to participation.

In terms of creating topics, Ukraine takes the initiative to create topics almost every time in cognitive warfare, from the Mariupol Theater incident at the beginning, to the Bucha incident later, to the chemical explosion in Rubezhnoy, and the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant incident and the explosion of the New Kakhovka Hydropower Station Dam. Almost every time, Ukraine “takes the lead”. Russia is in a state of passive response, and as a result, Ukraine continues to create topics and continuously attacks, which puts it in a disadvantageous position.

In terms of mobility and flexibility, the Ukrainian army is very familiar with the characteristics of modern media communication. For example, in the cognitive warfare against the “beheading” of Admiral Sokolov, the Ukrainian army took advantage of the characteristics of modern media’s fast communication speed and decentralized communication mode, released the “primer” in a semi-official form, and let netizens “reinforce” it (in fact, it is the self-growth of information), and finally the more authoritative official media came out to “finalize the final word”.

In terms of “focusing on participation”, the Ukrainian army is better at creating a sense of participation of ordinary netizens in specific topics. For example, after the Bucha incident and the Battle of Mariupol, Ukraine immediately launched a set of websites called “The Executioner’s Book”. Anyone can log in to these websites or network plug-ins at will and register the so-called “Russian army’s atrocities” or Russian army movements. The United States immediately responded and opened the “Observation Post” project belonging to the US State Department in response to the “Executioner’s Book” project, which is used to record the “atrocities” of the Russian army in the conflict. These public topics are set up quite cleverly, making the outside world feel that they are highly involved, while the specific content is true and false, which is different from the false information indoctrination of traditional information warfare. In the cognitive warfare of the Ukrainian army, these highly involved projects once made the entire network trend one-sided.

Compared with the propaganda and operation of the Ukrainian army in the field of cognitive warfare, the Russian army is far behind in the field of cognitive warfare. For example, in response to Ukraine’s formation of a combat mode that emphasizes mass participation and mass experience in the cognitive field, Russia is still using the old method – announcing ambiguous combat conditions in the form of daily combat reports, with only Major General Konashenko “acting as an emotionless reading machine” in front of the camera. As a result, most combat observers do not take his combat reports seriously. Another example is the tactics of Ukraine frequently setting topics and carrying out cognitive shaping in steps, and Russia can only defend itself. Every time Ukraine creates topics, Russia responds passively, and then Ukraine continues to create new topics based on Russia’s response, leaving Russia in a state of exhaustion. From this perspective, the Russian army’s cognitive warfare against the Ukrainian side’s “beheading” of Admiral Sokolov, and the sudden arrangement of the rumor-busting “face-slapping”, is just a tactical “flash of inspiration”, and the effect does not seem to be very good. It has not completely changed the basic power comparison between the Russian and Ukrainian armies in the field of cognitive warfare. Ukraine’s “cognitive warfare advantage” over Russia will continue.

  1. How do we deal with cognitive warfare in the new combat form?

In terms of definition, “cognitive warfare” can be traced back to the concept of “network-centric warfare” proposed by the US military in military reform at the beginning of this century. After years of development, by 2017, related discussions began to frequently appear in the speeches of senior NATO generals. For example, on August 14, 2017, Stewart, director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, clearly put forward the assertion that “the fifth-generation war is cognitive warfare” at the 2017 Defense Intelligence Information System Annual Conference. On September 17, 2017, Goldfein, then Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, also clearly put forward the concept of “cognitive warfare” at the annual meeting of the US Air Force Association. Soon, NATO comprehensively developed this novel operational concept. In March 2020, NATO released the concept book “Operation 2040”, which clearly stated that “information and cognitive warfare” will play an important role in future operations. In June, NATO appointed François du Creuse, former French colonel and head of the NATO Innovation Center, to study cognitive warfare, and produced a detailed report on “Cognitive Warfare” in January 2021. In June 2021, NATO held a scientific conference on cognitive warfare and released a special report on “Cognitive Warfare: Cognition Dominates the Future”, thus forming a more systematic and complete cognitive warfare theory.

Compared with traditional information warfare and propaganda warfare, the biggest feature of cognitive warfare is that it is based on the working principle of the human brain, that is, the process of acquiring, perceiving, understanding, processing, inferring, evaluating, judging, calculating, and making decisions on external information. In short, cognitive warfare is superior in terms of operational characteristics. It is not a unilateral indoctrination, but a good use of people’s cognitive process to “reshape” everyone’s worldview, values, ideology, and even cognitive and understanding processes in an all-round way, so as to fully rebuild the individual’s interpretation and response to information and interfere with the individual’s ideology and value orientation. The final result is not only to use various false information to disrupt the opponent, but more importantly to reshape the opponent’s social psychology, thereby affecting the opponent’s strategic decision-making, “defeating the enemy without fighting.” This determines that cognitive warfare is a new generation of propaganda warfare and information warfare. Compared with the traditional information warfare that focuses on the tactical level, the role of cognitive warfare can be further improved to the strategic level, which may affect the direction or outcome of the war.

So, facing a new type of combat form such as cognitive warfare, referring to the current situation in which Russia has been at a disadvantage in the field of cognitive warfare with Ukraine in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict, how should we respond to future cognitive warfare?

From a strategic perspective, we should realize that in the field of cognitive warfare, pure passive response is the most unreliable and inefficient form of combat. For example, Russia’s passive response to Ukraine’s agenda setting is equivalent to passively being beaten. Of course, compared with firepower warfare or mobile warfare, cognitive warfare is a thorough “open conspiracy” without too much feint and deception. It mainly relies on the ideological superiority and media skills of the West, and relies on the legal rights of the Western media in the field of the “fourth power”. Since we are temporarily at a disadvantage in the field of media compared with Western countries, it is actually a relatively difficult thing to implement cognitive confrontation with them in the whole system and at all levels. Therefore, even if we also adopt the strategy of strategic offensive in cognitive warfare, its implementation effect may not be as good as that of the other party. One way may be to firmly grasp our basic plate strategically and form a “you fight yours, I fight mine” pattern.

In the field of tactics, we should fully learn from the experience and lessons of both sides in cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Judging from the cognitive warfare strategy implemented by the Ukrainian army, in areas such as topic shaping, it mainly exploits the loopholes of information asymmetry. Then, our possible response strategy is to disclose some information in a timely manner and change the original concept that “military operations must be kept confidential and not disclosed to the outside world.” In fact, public information itself is a process of cognitive shaping. Both sides can carry out a lot of cognitive warfare confrontation around the timing, content, and timing of information disclosure. For example, in the field of setting topics, we can “take the initiative” and first seek the ability to set topics and carry out cognitive shaping in countries such as the Belt and Road, BRICS or Shanghai Cooperation Organization countries, at least to ensure that the people of our country and some friendly countries can offset the influence of the Western cognitive warfare. For another example, in response to the “cognitive warfare” implemented by the other party against different groups in multiple dimensions and levels, or the rumors created step by step, we can make extensive use of the influence of KOL (Key Opinion Leader) and the platform to form a “cognition against cognition” combat pattern.

In short, cognitive warfare, as a new combat style that has been studied by NATO for many years, appeared in large numbers in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict and played a certain role, deserves further research to ensure that it is invincible in future military operations.

This articleThe article on cognitive warfare is just an appetizer, and there will be a main course later. This studio took about a year to complete the “Research on Cognitive Warfare in the United States and Other Western Countries”, which has a text of more than 40,000 words (excluding more than 7,000 words of notes), which is much richer and more in-depth. The report will be officially launched and introduced the day after tomorrow, so stay tuned.

現代國語:

據稱,9月22日烏克蘭空軍使用「風暴陰影」巡航飛彈襲擊塞瓦斯托波爾黑海艦隊司令部。此後,關於黑海艦隊司令維克托.索科洛夫上將的生死一直是外界關注的議題。經過幾天暗流湧動後,9月25日,烏克蘭特戰司令部(SOF)對外宣布,他們成功「擊斃」黑海艦隊司令索科洛夫上將及以下數十名軍官,甚至俄軍札波羅熱集群司令羅曼丘克上將也被烏軍擊傷。

沒想到,烏克蘭的消息剛放出來不到一天就慘遭「打臉」——9月26日,俄羅斯國防部召開國防委員會會議,國防部高級領導人、各軍區司令、各軍兵種司令等以現場出席或視訊連線的方式參會,會上赫然出現了被烏軍官宣「擊斃」的黑海艦隊司令索科洛夫上將。消息放出後,烏方極為尷尬,只好宣布他們要收集更多資訊。但隨後又有人宣稱說參會的索科洛夫上將“只是照片”,不是真人。

儘管如此,從這次俄烏兩軍圍繞索科洛夫上將的生死問題展開的鬥法,可以被看做是俄烏軍事衝突中關於認知戰的一個經典案例,既值得我們就這一案例進行專門剖析,更值得我們從這個案例中“說開去”,談一談俄烏軍事衝突中俄烏兩軍在認知戰領域展開的較量。

一、索科洛夫上將“被斬首”,並非孤例?

關於「斬首」俄軍將領,烏克蘭宣傳部門栽進坑裡已經不是第一次了。例如今年6月中,烏克蘭軍隊造謠稱車臣副總統、車臣國民近衛軍中將、小卡德羅夫左膀右臂德里姆哈諾夫被烏軍海馬火箭砲「擊斃」。

從整個認知戰的實施過程看,無論是6月那次德里姆哈諾夫被“斬首”,還是這次索科洛夫上將被“斬首”,整個過程大同小異:

第一步:烏克蘭宣傳部門有意「製造議題」。所謂“製造議題”,在認知戰中可以被視為一個“引子”,作用是引發輿論熱議。這種「引子」往往不一定由官方放出,可能是由一些半官方的管道或與官方關係比較緊密的管道放出。例如德里姆哈諾夫中將被烏軍的「海馬」火箭炮「打死」一事,最早據說是從烏克蘭武裝部隊的一個電報群組裡放出來的,而且說法模稜兩可。這次索科洛夫上將被“斬首”,最早的消息來源經過追溯則是俄羅斯的某個電報群組。這種電報群組的消息魚龍混雜,有些消息則可信度很低,但有些消息卻出奇準確。將認知戰的「引子」透過這些群組放出,某種意義上說甚至比官方消息更容易引發輿論關注和討論。

第二步可以被視為輿論的「補強」。認知戰的第一步即「引子資訊」對一個完整的新聞來說往往缺乏細節,但不要緊。從當前社會訊息傳播的效率和特徵來看,一個缺乏細節、但容易引起大家興趣、卻又因某種因素出現信息壁壘的“引子信息”,在傳播過程中,大家自然會對其進行“細節補充」。無論是索科洛夫上將被“擊斃”還是德里姆哈諾夫被“斬首”,都是如此。資訊缺乏細節,但對傳媒來說偏偏又是非常重要的「Breaking News」(突發新聞),同時基於軍事機密的因素,想穿越資訊壁壘及時獲取更多的資訊也不可能。因此,這必然會使傳媒導向一個結果——輿論“補強”,而且是大家一起上,在口耳相傳的過程中不斷把一個引子信息細節化、“真實”化。例如德里姆哈諾夫被「斬首」在傳播過程中,先後彌補上了他被斬首的「時間」、「地點」(甚至由於傳播管道不同,這些時間和地點要素也各不相同),時而出現在克雷緬納亞,時而出現在戈爾洛夫卡。索科洛夫上將被「擊斃」同樣如此,訊息在傳播過程中,被先後腦補出一整套「黑海艦隊週五開例會,烏軍抓住機會實施打擊」、「兩發飛彈一發擊中了司令部辦公室,另一發飛彈在救援人員進去救人的時候實施了補充打擊」這種細節。正是在這種「去中心化」的口耳相傳,這兩名高級將領被「斬首」的「事實」被不斷強化,消息來源的缺失甚至更有利對普通信息受眾進行認知塑造。

經過數天發酵之後,認知戰來到第三步-「一錘定音」。德里姆哈諾夫被“斬首”一事並沒有輪到烏克蘭官方“一錘定音”,小卡德羅夫先坐不住了,很快放出了自己和德里姆哈諾夫坐在一起吃飯野餐的視頻,甚至當場拿出手機展示拍攝時間,進行「打臉」。索科洛夫上將則是烏軍特戰司令部、烏克蘭國防部這樣的大部門出面完成「一錘定音」。按照認知戰的過程,這種官方媒體“一錘定音”應該起到在認知戰領域完成認知塑造過程的作用,也就是完成一個從放出“引子”,到外界“猜測補強”,最後官方「蓋章確認」的完整邏輯閉環。但俄軍居然後發製人,表演了一出“當場打臉”,不僅讓烏軍前面的所有信息傳播都變成了無用功,還讓烏克蘭的兩個要害單位特戰司令部甚至國防部變成了小丑。

二、俄烏衝突中的認知戰,烏軍來勢洶洶?

對於烏軍認知戰宣傳部門親自上陣、造謠車臣副總統德里姆哈諾夫或索科洛夫上將被烏軍“擊斃”,很多人可能大惑不解:如果俄羅斯方面迅速反應,把這些高級將領拉出來亮個相,自我確認一下“我還活著”,那麼烏方認知戰的謠言不就不攻自破了嗎?

看似有理,但俄軍並沒有被造謠一次就照上面的辦法澄清一次。為什麼?因為事情沒有那麼簡單。

其一,從戰術角度來說,如果烏軍每製造一個關於高級將領的謠言,俄軍就安排將領出面闢謠,最直接的後果就是對高級將領的日常作戰指揮造成不必要的干擾和麻煩。在作戰行動中,將官以上的高級軍官時間非常寶貴,每天工作量極高,對腦力消耗極大,根本不可能有那麼多時間沒完沒了地現身闢謠。如果烏軍每造一個謠俄軍就闢一個謠,那這些高級將領平時啥也別幹了,就天天拍視頻闢謠吧。

其二,對於進入認知塑造循環的訊息來說,某些情況下,「闢謠」不僅沒用,還會進一步製造出更多謠言。例如索科洛夫上將被“斬首”一事,儘管俄軍已經安排了闢謠,但一些烏克蘭群組依然在“挑刺死磕”,認為索科洛夫上將在鏡頭前沒有動,索科洛夫上將在受訪時看不出時間和地點,因此只是俄方安排的「資訊反制」。甚至對一些去年曾經被烏克蘭方面「官方宣布」「斬首」、但隨後又在某些場合露面的俄軍將官,比如第41集團軍參謀長格拉西莫夫少將,目前依然有烏克蘭支持者宣稱“此人已死”,唯一的原因就是這人在露面之後居然沒有再度露面!

所以,在認知戰領域,很多事沒有想的那麼簡單。

話又說回來,在戰略層面上,俄軍在俄烏軍事衝突的認知戰領域相比烏軍確實存在較大差距。烏軍非常善於製造議題,而且機動靈活,注重參與。

製造議題方面,幾乎每次認知戰都是烏克蘭主動製造議題,從一開始的馬裡烏波爾大劇院事件,到後來的布查事件,再到魯別日諾耶的化學物質爆炸事件,還有後來的札波羅熱核電廠事件和新卡霍夫卡水力發電廠大壩爆破事件,幾乎每次都是烏克蘭「先聲奪人」。俄羅斯則處於被動應對的狀態,結果被烏克蘭繼續製造議題連續攻訐,處於不利地位。

機動彈性方面,烏軍對現代傳媒的傳播特徵非常熟稔,例如對索科洛夫上將被「斬首」展開的認知戰,烏軍利用了現代傳媒傳播速度快、傳播模式去中心化的特點,以半官方形式放出“引子”,放任網民對其進行“補強”(事實上就是信息的自生長),最後再由比較權威的官方媒體下場“一錘定音”。

「注重參與」方面,烏軍更善於營造普通網民對特定議題的參與感。例如布查事件和馬裡烏波爾戰役之後,烏克蘭方面立即上線了一套名叫「劊子手之書」的網站,任何人都可以隨意登陸這些網站或者網絡插件,在裡面登記所謂的「俄羅斯軍隊的暴行」或俄軍動向。美國立即回應,針對「劊子手之書」項目,開通了屬於美國國務院的「觀察站」項目,從而用於記錄俄軍在衝突中的「暴行」。這些公共議題設定相當巧妙,令外界群眾感受到的參與度極高,而在具體內容上則真真假假,不同於傳統資訊戰的假訊息灌輸。在烏克蘭軍隊的認知戰中,這些參與度極高的計畫一度讓整個網路風向呈現一面倒的趨勢。

和烏軍在認知戰領域的宣傳和操作相比,俄軍在認知戰領域差太遠。例如針對烏克蘭方面在認知領域塑造極為強調群眾參與、群眾體驗的作戰模式,俄羅斯方面依然在沿用著老辦法——以每日戰情通報的形式對外公佈模棱兩可的戰況,只有一個科納申科少將在鏡頭前“當一個沒有感情的讀稿機器”,結果絕大多數戰況觀察者都不太把他的戰況通報當回事。又如對烏克蘭方面頻繁設置議題、依照步驟進行認知塑造的戰法,俄羅斯方面更是只有招架之功。每次都是烏克蘭製造議題,俄羅斯方面被動應對,然後烏克蘭方面根據俄羅斯的應對情況繼續製造新的議題,使俄羅斯處於疲於奔命的狀態。從這個角度來看,俄軍此次針對索科洛夫上將被“斬首”的烏方認知戰塑造,突然安排闢謠“打臉”,只是戰術上“靈光乍現”而已,而且效果似乎也沒多好,也沒有徹底改變目前俄烏兩軍在認知戰領域的基本力量對比,烏克蘭對俄羅斯的「認知戰優勢」還會持續下去。

三、新型作戰形式認知戰,我們如何因應?

從定義上來說,「認知戰」最早可追溯到本世紀初美軍在軍事改革中提出的「網路中心戰」概念,經過多年的發展,到2017年,相關論述開始頻頻見於北約高級將領的言論集中,譬如2017年8月14日,美國國防情報局局長史都華在國防情報資訊系統2017年會上就明確提出了「第五代戰爭是認知戰」這一論點。到了2017年9月17日,時任美國空軍參謀長戈德費恩在美國空軍協會年會上同樣明確地提出了「認知戰」這個概念。很快,北約就對這個新穎的作戰概念進行了全面發展。 2020年3月,北約發布《作戰2040》概念書,明確提出「資訊與認知戰」將在未來作戰中扮演重要角色。 6月,北約又指派前法軍上校、北約創新中心負責人弗朗索瓦.杜.克魯澤專題研究認知戰,並在2021年1月拿出了《認知戰》的詳細報告書。 2021年6月,北約召開了認知戰科學會議,並發布了《認知戰:認知主導未來》專題報告,從而形成了較有系統、完整的認知戰作戰理論。

相較於傳統的資訊戰和宣傳戰,認知戰的最大特徵是基於人的大腦運作原理,也就是對外在資訊的獲取、感知、理解、加工、推論、評估、判斷、計算、決策的過程。總之,認知戰在作戰特質上可謂更勝一籌,不是進行單方面灌輸,而是要善於利用人們的認知過程,對每個人的世界觀、價值觀、意識形態,甚至認知、理解過程進行全方位“重塑”,從而全面重建個人對訊息的解讀和反應,干涉個人的意識形態和價值取向,最終的結果不僅是要利用各種假訊息擾亂對手,更重要的是重塑對手的社會心理,從而對對手的戰略決策產生影響,「不戰而屈人之兵」。這決定了認知戰是新一代的宣傳戰和資訊戰,相對於傳統的專注於戰術層面上的資訊戰,認知戰的角色可以進一步提高到戰略層面上,可能會影響戰爭的走向或結局。

那麼,面對認知戰這樣一種新型的作戰形式,參考俄烏軍事衝突中俄羅斯在和烏克蘭的認知戰領域長期處於下風的現狀,我們對未來的認知戰究竟該如何應對呢?

從戰略角度來看,我們應當認識到,在認知戰領域,單純的被動應對是最不可靠、效率最低的作戰形式,如俄羅斯在烏克蘭的議題設定面前被動應對等於被動挨打。當然,認知戰相比於火力戰戰或機動戰,是徹底的“陽謀”,並沒有太多佯動和詭詐,依託的主要是西方的意識形態優勢地位和傳媒功力,靠的是西方媒體「第四權」領域的法權。由於我方相比西方國家在傳媒領域暫時處於下風,要在全系統、全層面上與其實施認知對抗作戰其實是一件相對困難的事情。因此,即使我們在認知戰上同樣採取戰略進攻的策略,其實施效果可能也不如對手。辦法之一或許是從策略上牢牢把握住我們的基本盤,形成「你打你的,我打我的」格局。

而在戰術領域,要充分借鏡俄烏衝突中雙方在認知作戰上的經驗教訓。從烏克蘭軍隊實施的認知戰策略來看,在議題塑造等領域,主要鑽了資訊不對稱的空子。那麼,我方可能的因應策略是及時公開部分訊息,要改變原有的「軍事行動必須保密、不要對外界公開」的觀念。事實上,公開資訊本身就是認知塑造的過程,雙方圍繞著資訊公開的時機、內容、時序上,可以展開大量的認知戰對抗。如在設置議題領域,我方可以“先發製人”,先求得在諸如一帶一路沿線國家、金磚國家或上海合作組織國家內設置議題、展開認知塑造的能力,起碼確保本國群眾和一些友好國家能夠對沖西方認知戰領域的影響。再如,針對對方在多維度、多層次上針對不同人群實施的「認知戰」或步步為營塑造出的謠言,我方可廣泛利用KOL(Key Opinion Leader,即意見領袖)及平台的影響力,形成以「認知對認知」的作戰模式。

總之,認知戰作為一種被北約研究多年、在俄烏軍事衝突中大量出現且起到一定作用的新型作戰樣式,值得進一步進行研究,以確保在未來的軍事行動中立於不敗之地。

這篇關於認知戰的文章只是“開胃菜”,隨後還有“正餐硬菜”——本工作室歷時約一年完成了《美國等西方國家的認知作戰研究》,正文4萬多字(不含註7千多字),要豐富和深入得多。該報告將於後天正式推出並進行介紹,敬請關注。

中國原創軍事資源:https://www.163.com/dy/article/IGEFT5CB0515NAKC888.html

Russian military officers explain cognitive warfare: It is important to train all people to be loyal to their duties and defend the motherland

俄軍官解釋認知戰:重要的是訓練所有人忠於職責、保衛祖國。

現代英語:

Many Russian military officers interpret cognitive warfare

■ Hou Bing, researcher at Womin Hi-Tech Ward Research Institute (excerpted translation)

The 8th issue of Russia’s “Military Thought” in 2021 published an article titled “Cognitive Warfare – Trends in Modern Warfare” by three active colonels of the Russian army, Marichev, Lobanov, and Tarasov. The summary is as follows:

1. Concept, status, role, characteristics and other aspects of “cognitive warfare”

“Cognition” is a synonym for the term “spiritual, psychological” and is “a certain way of thinking, the sum of the spiritual habits and mindset of an individual or a social group, or the entire population.”

Cognitive warfare is one of the latest trends in modern warfare. The content of the concept of “cognition” covers people’s moral and psychological values, psychological and behavioral realities, adaptation and educational characteristics, and attitudes towards religion and culture.

Cognitive warfare is the primary means to achieve the goals of military conflict. Transforming the consciousness of broad social groups and imposing foreign worldviews and positions have become the main trends in winning in modern wars. General Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, attaches great importance to this trend: “In modern conflicts, the focus of the struggle is increasingly shifting to a combination of political, economic, information and other measures based on military power.”

The status and role of cognitive warfare first depend on the use of necessary and sufficient military force at each stage of confrontation to destroy the opponent’s economic and information potential in advance in modern warfare to achieve military and political goals. Attempts to seize and hold enemy territory have been replaced by new intentions: to control a country’s critical infrastructure through surveillance regimes (often established in parallel to the existing government)—in Venezuela, Ukraine, and many others. The country is like that. Under modern conditions, information technology is widely used and closely integrated with other non-military means, becoming an efficient tool to establish and control residents’ protest potential. By creating instability in the country and undermining residents’ perceptions. All destructive forces are actively used for this purpose, including the “fifth column” and other non-state organizations. Characterized by the subsequent implementation of military measures in a covert form, through indirect, asymmetric actions “by the hands of others” (such as what happened in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria).

Under uncertain conditions, it is necessary to effectively attack unknown enemies and be good at offsetting the advantages of “high-tech enemies”. Adversaries often use non-force methods to influence the perception of the Russian people. In cognitive warfare, non-military tools are often more effective than military tools. The spiritual and psychological value system formed in history has been destroyed, the “time connection” has been interrupted, and cognition as a means of realizing national self-awareness and world view (recorded in the categories and styles of national language) has changed. Cognitive warfare achieves a unique combination of the following methods – intimidation, blackmail, coercion and comprehensive pressure. It becomes more aggressive and has the characteristics of a “hybrid threat”, often determining and ensuring the achievement of political goals and strategic results.

In the foreseeable future, cognitive warfare will inevitably take on new characteristics and become one of the important trends in geopolitical confrontation. The radical use of new information technologies around the world has become an effective means of shaping the desired reality.

2. The basic purpose to be achieved by cognitive warfare

The entire history of civilization is a history of cognitive warfare. Under modern conditions, under the background of the vigorous development of information technology, it is very common to change personal cognition and cultural identity and destroy the national and historical values ​​of the country and society.

Currently, information and communication technology is used maliciously in cognitive warfare to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. The destructive effect is very significant and has changed the cognition of the entire nation. This information slowly “erodes” the cognition of individuals and the nation as a whole from the inside. The realms of cognition, national self-awareness, and national and cultural identity become battlefields. This direction first denigrates and then eliminates traditional national values, causing the public consciousness to become insensitive to external information invasion, and even regard these actions as progressive movements.

Therefore, in modern warfare, cognitive warfare must achieve the following basic goals:

① Let the residents lose their ability to understand the country and its strategic position and role, and then become indifferent to the fate of the country and nation, and switch to the decadent lifestyle required by the opponent;

② Destroy residents’ traditional self-identity mechanism, divide people into different “participation and support groups” through social networks and media, and replace others with new “fake” identities;

③ Let the public form “lazy thinking”, no longer be critical of the information provided, and adopt measures to fool the people;

④Instill new, carefully designed values ​​and social and personal behavioral norms into social consciousness, making them possible behavioral patterns. Destroy people’s innate cultural and historical memories, leading to social psychological confusion and “mental disorder”, making them extremely vulnerable to the external influence of “political craftsmen”, “guardians” and the creators of “controllable chaos” and “color revolutions” control;

⑤ Create ambiguity in the information space of people’s consciousness, causing them to lose the ability to think deeply about events and form stable personal cognition.

Comprehensive information influence measures are adopted to affect residents’ cognition to create good conditions for achieving military objectives. Therefore, the development of confrontation in the cognitive field is mainly reflected in the deepening of technical level and psychological (cognitive) influence, aiming to change the consciousness (cognition) of the rival residents.

With the emergence of modern information and communication technology, the above ideas have become increasingly popular and can influence a large number of audiences in a short period of time without making large economic investments. At this time, because information and communication technology is “out of reach” and it is very difficult to identify the source of attacks, the enemy may carry out operations “under the banner of others”, and there are a wide range of subjects who maliciously use technology – state and non-state subjects, and even individuals. For hackers, assessing damage and taking countermeasures is easier said than done. All of this adds to uncertainty and instability.

3. Main methods of cognitive warfare

At present, cognitive warfare mainly adopts the following methods:

① Deliberately concealing key situation information in different areas of social life;

② According to the principle of “water drops into the sea”, valuable information is drowned in a large amount of “information garbage”;

③ Substitute the concept or distort its meaning;

④ Direct attention to insignificant events;

⑤The concept commonly used in media space is used, but its meaning has undergone a qualitative change;

⑥ Providing negative news to the public is more likely to be accepted than positive news;

⑦ Discuss events that have no real social value and maliciously use social research results to form a distorted understanding of the social situation;

⑧ Prohibit certain types of information and do not allow broad social discussions on key issues of some political institutions;

⑨ Spread rumors openly and deceive people at home and abroad.

4. Geopolitical cognitive warfare

The geopolitical program to conduct cognitive warfare is protracted and may last for decades or centuries. Destroying ancient relics, including written records, mainly “erases” the historical memory of the nation, and then any other history can be written on a “blank sheet” to establish the required self-identity. It proves that cognitive warfare has reached a global scale, and “archaeological warfare” is an important part of it, aiming to specifically destroy human material memory.

When the “famous” US military occupied Baghdad in 2003, they behaved like a group of barbarians. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces reporter was stunned by the scene in front of him: US officers and soldiers ransacked the museum and used stretchers to transport piles of gold products from the building. Of course, this atrocity committed by an ally was unlikely to be reported in the press, so it could only be spread by word of mouth, but the photos are damning evidence. The radical “Islamic State” destroyed mosques and museums in Syria. The Afghan “Taliban” blew up the ancient Bamiyan Buddhas in the process of “exterminating Buddhas.” Malian radicals completely destroyed 16 tombs and more than 4,000 ancient books and documents.

In modern armed conflicts, Christian churches and holy places often suffer disasters, which are too numerous to mention. According to confirmation from the Russian “Pravda” electronic magazine: “Compared with other outstanding events, the destruction of world historical and cultural monuments has become commonplace today.”

5. Russia’s response

①The cognitive war launched by the West against Russia. Distorting the history of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War has become an integral part of the global cognitive war. The Western world is increasingly adopting radical policies in an attempt to deprive Russia of its status as a great nation and deny its outstanding contribution to the progress and development of mankind. The examples of waging cognitive war against the Russian people are obvious: the United States, European countries, and especially Ukraine are provoking hatred against Russia. The main purpose is not only to set up obstacles for Russia to return to its status as a world power, but also to launch an anti-Russian “hot war” in the near future. “Lay the foundation.

②Russia’s response. The commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War should be an important information opportunity for us to enhance our awareness. Relive the numerous examples of heroism of the Soviet soldiers, the perseverance of the entire population, their willingness to sacrifice everything for the front line, the suffering experienced on the home front, and vigorously promote the post-war years and the great achievements of the Soviet people – the restoration of economic potential, the reclamation of wild lands, Taking the lead in exploring space… In the new history, there are many examples showing the high cognitive level of various Russian peoples. In short, they have become an important factor in consolidating traditional spiritual and moral values. Without them, it is impossible to defeat the enemy in any crisis situation. Establish a system to curb the use of information weapons and stop global information warfare. Improve legislation and technical guarantees for national independence in the information space.

Seize the information advantage over the enemy and create good conditions for the Russian army to efficiently carry out its mission. Carrying out patriotism education and cultivating all Russian people to be loyal to their duties and defend the motherland play a crucial role in gaining advantages in the cognitive field.

現代國語:

多位俄軍軍官解讀認知戰

■沃民高科沃德研究院研究員 侯兵(摘譯)

俄羅斯《軍事思想》2021年第8期發表了馬里切夫、洛巴諾夫、塔拉索夫三位俄軍現役上校題為《認知戰-現代戰爭的趨勢》的文章,摘要如下:

一、「認知戰」概念、地位與角色、特徵及其他

「認知」是「精神、心理」一詞的同義詞,是「一定的思維方式,個人或社會群體、全民精神習慣、思維定勢的總和」。

認知戰是現代戰爭的最新趨勢之一。 「認知」概念的內容涵蓋人們的道德心理價值觀,心理、行為現實,適應、教育特點,對待宗教、文化的態度。

認知戰是達成軍事沖突目標的主要手段。改造廣泛社會群體的意識,強加異國的世界觀立場,成為現代戰爭中獲勝的主要趨勢。俄聯邦武裝力量總參謀長格拉西莫夫大將十分重視這一趨勢:“現代沖突中,鬥爭的重心越來越轉向,基於軍事力量,綜合採取政治、經濟、信息和其他措施。”

認知戰的地位、角色首先取決於,在現代戰爭中,在對抗各階段使用必要、足夠的軍事力量預先破壞對方的經濟、資訊潛力,達成軍政目的。奪佔、扼守敵方領土的企圖已經被新的意圖取而代之:透過監控下的政權(經常在現政府之外平行建立這一政權)控制國家的關鍵基礎設施——在委內瑞拉、烏克蘭和其他多個國家正是如此。現代條件下廣泛運用資訊技術,並與其他非軍事手段緊密結合,成為建立、操控居民抗議潛力的高效工具。藉由製造國內局勢不穩,破壞居民的認知。為此積極動用所有破壞力量,包括「第五縱隊」和其他非國家組織。特點是隨後以隱蔽的形式、採取「借他人之手」的間接、非對稱行動實現軍事措施(例如在伊拉克、阿富汗、利比亞和敘利亞發生的事情)。

不確定的條件下需要有效率地打擊不明之敵,要擅於抵銷「高科技敵人」的優勢,對手常常使用非武力方式影響俄羅斯人民的認知。在認知戰中,與軍事工具相比,非軍事工具往往更有效率。歷史上形成的精神心理價值觀體系遭到破壞,「時間聯繫」中斷,認知作為實現民族自我意識、世界觀(記錄在民族語言範疇、樣式之中)的手段發生了變化。認知戰實現了下列方式的獨特結合——恐嚇、訛詐、強迫和綜合施壓,變得更具侵略性,具備了「混合威脅」的特徵,經常決定並保證達成政治目的和戰略成果。

在可預見的未來,認知戰將不可避免地具備新的特性,是地緣政治對抗的重要趨勢之一。在全球激進地運用新的資訊技術,成為塑造所需現實的有效手段。

二、認知戰要達成的基本目的

整個文明史就是一部認知戰的歷史。現代條件下,在資訊科技蓬勃發展的脈絡下,改變個人的認知、文化標識,破壞國家、社會的民族歷史價值觀甚囂塵上。

目前認知戰中惡意使用資訊通信技術,干涉他國內部事務,破壞效果十分顯著,改變了整個民族的認知。這些訊息緩慢、從內部「侵蝕」個人、民族整體的認知。認知、民族自我意識、民族和文化認同領域淪為戰場。這個方向上首先是詆毀,然後是消滅民族傳統的價值觀,致使大眾意識對外部的資訊侵略麻木不仁,甚至將這些行動視為進步的運動。

因此,在現代戰爭中,認知戰要達成下列基本目的:

①讓居民喪失對國家及其戰略地位、角色的理解能力,隨後對國家、民族的命運漠不關心,轉入對手所需的腐朽生活方式;

②破壞居民傳統的自我認同機制,透過社交網絡、媒體將人們劃分為不同的“參與、支持群”,以新的認同“贋品”偷梁換柱;

③讓公眾形成“惰性思維”,對提供的資訊不再持批判態度,採取愚民措施;

④向社會意識灌輸新的、處心積慮設計的價值觀和社會、個人行為規範,使之成為可能的行為模式。摧毀人們與生俱來的文化、歷史記憶,導致社會心理混亂、“神經失常”,從而極易受到“政治工藝師”、“衛士”和“可控混亂”、“顏色革命”創造者的外部控制;

⑤在人的意識訊息空間製造模糊,令其喪失對事件進行深思熟慮、形成穩定個人認知的能力。

對居民的認知採取綜合資訊影響措施,為達成軍事目的創造良好條件。因此,認知領域對抗的發展,主要體現在技術層面和心理(認知)影響的不斷深入,旨在改變競爭對手居民的意識(認知)。

隨著現代資訊通信技術的出現,上述觀點日益普及,可以在短時間內不必進行大量經濟投入就可以影響大量受眾。此時由於資訊通信技術「觸不可及」、查明攻擊來源相當困難,敵人有可能「打著別人的旗號」展開行動,惡意使用技術的主體相當廣泛——國家和非國家主體,甚至是單獨的駭客,評估損失和採取對抗措施談何容易。所有這一切都增加了不確定性、不穩定。

三、認知戰採取的主要方式

目前認知戰主要採取下列方式:

①在社會生活不同領域故意隱瞞關鍵的事態訊息;

②根據「水滴入海」原則將有價值的資訊淹沒在大量「資訊垃圾」中;

③偷換概念或扭曲其涵義;

④把注意力引向無足輕重的事件;

⑤使用媒體空間常用的概念,其涵義卻發生了質變;

⑥向公眾提供負面消息,與正面新聞相比,更容易被接受;

⑦討論不具有現實社會價值的事件,惡意利用社會研究成果,以形成對社會形勢的歪曲認識;

⑧禁止一定類型的信息,不允許就一些政權機構的關鍵問題展開廣泛的社會討論;

⑨公開散佈謠言,欺騙國內外民眾。

四、地緣政治上的認知戰

實施認知戰的地緣政治方案曠日持久,可能長達數十年、數百年。銷毀古老的遺跡,包括文字記載,主要是「擦除」民族的歷史記憶,隨後就可以在「一張白紙」上任意書寫其他任何歷史,建立所需的自我認同。證明認知戰已經具有全球規模,「考古戰」是其重要組成部分,旨在目標明確地銷毀人類的物質記憶。

2003年「赫赫有名」的美軍佔領巴格達時,表現得完全像一群野蠻人。日本自衛隊記者被眼前的一幕驚呆了:美軍官兵洗劫了博物館,使用擔架從大樓裡運出成堆的黃金製品。當然,關於盟友的這一暴行不可能見諸報端,因此只能口口相傳,但照片鐵證如山。激進的「伊斯蘭國」摧毀了敘利亞的清真寺、博物館。阿富汗「塔利班」在「滅佛」過程中炸毀了古老的巴米揚大佛。馬裡激進分子完全摧毀了16處陵寢、4000餘部古籍文獻。

現代武裝沖突中,基督教教堂、聖地經常遭受劫難,真可謂罄竹難書。據俄羅斯《真理報》電子雜志確認:“與其他突出事件相比,摧毀世界歷史、文化遺跡今天已經司空見慣。”

五、俄羅斯的應對

①西方對俄發起的認知戰。扭曲偉大衛國戰爭及整個二戰的歷史,已成為全球認知戰不可或缺的一部分。西方世界越來越頻繁地採用激進政策,企圖剝奪俄羅斯偉大民族的地位,否認其對人類進步發展的傑出貢獻。發動針對俄羅斯人民認知戰的例子顯而易見:美國、歐洲國家,尤其是烏克蘭挑起對俄羅斯的仇恨,主要目的不僅是為俄羅斯重返世界大國地位設置障礙,而且為不久的將來發動反俄“熱戰”奠定基礎。

②俄羅斯的應對。偉大衛國戰爭爆發80週年的紀念活動應成為我們加強認知的重要資訊契機。重溫蘇軍將士大量英雄主義的範例,全民的堅強不屈,甘願為前線付出一切,在後方經歷的苦難,大力宣傳戰後的歲月和蘇聯人民的偉大成就——恢復了經濟潛力,開墾蠻荒之地,率先探索太空……新的歷史中,展示俄羅斯各民族高度認知水平的例子俯拾皆是。總之,它們成為鞏固傳統精神道德價值觀的重要因素,離開它們在任何危機局勢中不可能克敵制勝。建立遏止資訊武器使用的體系,制止全球資訊戰。在資訊空間完善國家獨立的立法、技術保障。

奪取對敵資訊優勢,為俄軍高效遂行任務創造良好條件。進行愛國精神教育、培養俄羅斯全民忠於職守保衛祖國,對奪取認知領域優勢,作用舉足輕重。

中國原創軍事資源:https://www.81.cn/ll_208543/10088888.html

Russian Ministry of Defense set up information operations forces to deal with Western networks – psychological attacks // 俄國防部組建信息作戰部隊 應對西方網絡-心理攻擊

Russian Ministry of Defense set up information operations forces to deal with Western networks – psychological attacks // 俄國防部組建信息作戰部隊 應對西方網絡-心理攻擊

With the Russian and Western cyber space in the game is becoming increasingly fierce, especially in the 2018 Russian presidential election near the background, the Western countries for Russia’s network and information / psychological attacks increasing. To this end, Russia to strengthen the network and information security construction. At the end of 2016, the revision of the new edition of the Russian Federation Information Security Theory. February 27, 2017, Russian Defense Minister Shaoyou announced the formation of information operations forces, accelerate the construction of information combat forces, clear its functional mission.

First, the new theory clearly set up the purpose of information combat forces and their functions

December 6, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved the new version of “Russian Federation information security theory.” It points out that the main objectives of information security in the field of defense include the implementation of strategic containment and prevention of military conflicts caused by information technology, the improvement of the Russian armed forces information security system, the development of information confrontation forces and equipment, the forecasting, inspection and evaluation of the Russian armed forces Threats in the field of information; elimination of information / psychological effects aimed at destabilizing national history and patriotic traditions.

The formation of information combat forces is one of Russia’s important initiatives to achieve these goals. First of all, the Russian information combat forces is to contain and prevent the field of network information conflict or the main force of war. Second, the formation of information combat forces is the Russian armed forces information security system construction and the Russian new military reform an important step, will take into account the strength of construction and equipment development. Once again, the information warfare forces ensure that Russian armed forces are protected from cyber attacks and information security threats, ensuring wartime command and control and operational capability. Finally, the information warfare forces will also confront and counter the Western countries of the anti-Russian information penetration and psychological impact, to maintain the fighting morale and national stability.

Second, the troops named on the network attack and information penetration of the “two-handedly”

Russian Defense Minister Shao Yigu pointed out that the main functions of the information combatants include: centralized management of network operations; protection of Russian military networks and nodes, military command systems and communications systems from hackers; to ensure reliable access to information; Russian military capacity to expand its ability to act in cyberspace; against the Western anti-Russian information / psychological propaganda and penetration.

Russian military experts believe that the future of military struggle in the information combat objectives not only include the armed forces allegation system, the government administrative system and the financial system and other hard targets, more strategic is the soldiers and public psychology and other soft targets. An attack on the implementation of soft targets such as soldiers and people can lead to dislocation and disintegration. Information combat forces should not only have to protect their own side and attack each other hard targets and other capabilities, but also have to confront and oppose the enemy information / psychological attack and penetration. At present, countries with network dominance use different means to implement information operations against different objectives. For the use of special information weapons, such as computer viruses, information bombs, logic bombs, computer chips that are given special missions, explosive devices that generate electromagnetic pulses, UHF generators, and electronic biological weapons. And for the soldiers and the public psychological and other soft targets, create provocative or intimidating false information and spread through the information media to achieve military and political purposes.

Therefore, Russia will be named the “information combat forces” rather than the network combat forces fully embodies the scope of its combat both soft and hard targets.

Third, the integration of active elite forces and the recruitment of new forces simultaneously

The force will integrate the existing Russian armed forces network operations, electronic reconnaissance and electronic confrontation and other departments and functions, while absorbing the Ministry of Internal Affairs and security system of network information security and related experts, including mathematicians, programmers, engineers, cryptographers , Communications experts, electronic confrontation experts, translators and so on.

Russian military arms and institutions in 2013 has set up a “technology even”, and from college graduates in the recruitment of professionals, which is the key components of the military system / unit reserves and training professionals specializing in technology research and development and information security team. According to statistics, this force mainly includes the Air Force’s second science and technology even the space and defense forces of the third technology even under the Army’s fifth technology even, under the Military Academy of Sciences, the seventh technology even Wait. Each with 2 to 3 rows, each with about 20 people. To the air days of military science and technology, for example, the troops regularly recruit college graduates, give priority to the use of computer security, communications systems, information security, special radio systems, cryptography, electronic optoelectronic special equipment and other professionals, by the Air Force Academy of Military Academy training and education The center is responsible for training new people.

Fourth, the force commander has not yet determined, Gracimov is the most likely candidate

Russian Defense Minister Shaoyou clear, information warfare force commander will be general rank. Western countries believe that the Russian armed forces, the current chief of staff, Mr. Grazimov served as the commander of the information operations the possibility of the largest. He has proposed the Russian version of the “mixed war” concept, and received the approval of President Putin. He pointed out that “the current principle of war itself has undergone substantial changes, the realization of political and strategic objectives of the non-military means of the status of a series of events show that the effect of non-military means sometimes more than the use of weapons.” In his description of the “civil war in Ukraine” and “the spring of Arabia”, he pointed out that the information / psychological warfare could “turn a peaceful and prosperous country into a brutal armed struggle in months or even days”. March 4, 2017, Grazimov in military academy, asked the Russian Academy of Military Sciences to intensify the study of the new model of confrontation between countries and effective counter-measures. In addition, the West speculated that Gerasimov’s another reason is that he has served as the Russian armed forces network information warfare the highest commander. In 2010, the Russian Armed Forces commanded a powerful message / psychological offensive, and it was Gracimov who had recaptured the Crimea.

Five, conclusion

At present, the Russian Defense Ministry official website has not yet put information warfare troops, and the existing army, air force, navy and strategic missile soldiers, airborne soldiers of these five arms tied. The forces become separate forces or scattered in the existing five arms and key sectors are not yet known. However, the formation of information combat forces is not only a key step in the construction of Russian network information security forces, but also an important step in the reform of the Russian army in the context of the increasingly fierce network security of information security and the increasingly complex environment of security. Information operations forces will defend Russia’s cyberspace and information in the field of soft and hard targets, to achieve their own attack and defense functions, maintaining national network security and political and military security.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

隨著俄羅斯與西方在網絡空間的博弈日趨激烈,特別在2018年俄總統大選臨近的大背景下,西方國家針對俄羅斯的網絡和信息/心理攻擊日益增多。為此,俄羅斯加強網絡和信息安全建設。 2016年底,修訂頒布新版《俄羅斯聯邦信息安全學說》。 2017年2月27日,俄國防部長紹伊古宣布組建信息作戰部隊,加快推進信息作戰力量建設,明確其職能使命。

一、新版學說明確組建信息作戰部隊的目的及其職能

2016年12月6日,俄總統普京批准新版《俄羅斯聯邦信息安全學說》。其中指出,國防領域信息安全保障的主要目標包括:對利用信息技術導致的軍事衝突實施戰略遏制和預防;完善俄武裝力量信息保障體系,發展信息對抗力量和裝備;預測、檢查和評估俄武裝力量在信息領域的威脅;消除旨在動搖國家歷史觀念和愛國傳統的信息/心理影響等。

組建信息作戰部隊是俄實現上述目標的重要舉措之一。首先,俄羅斯信息作戰部隊是遏制和預防網絡信息領域衝突或戰爭的主要力量。其次,組建信息作戰部隊是俄武裝力量信息保障體系建設和俄羅斯新軍事改革的重要步驟,將兼顧力量建設和裝備發展。再次,信息作戰部隊確保俄武裝力量免受網絡攻擊和信息安全威脅,保證戰時指揮控制和作戰行動能力。最後,信息作戰部隊還將對抗和反制西方國家的反俄信息滲透和心理影響,保持士兵鬥志和國民思想穩定。

二、部隊命名體現對網絡攻擊和信息滲透的“兩手抓”

俄國防部長紹伊古指出,信息作戰部隊主要職能包括:對網絡作戰行動進行集中統一管理;保護俄羅斯軍用網絡和節點、軍事指揮系統和通信系統免受黑客攻擊;確保實現可靠的信息傳遞通道;檢驗俄軍的網絡能力,拓展其在網絡空間的行動能力;對抗西方的反俄信息/心理宣傳和滲透等。

俄軍事專家認為,未來軍事鬥爭中的信息作戰目標不僅包括武裝力量指控系統、政府行政管理系統和金融系統等硬目標,更具戰略意義的是士兵和民眾心理等軟目標。對士兵和民眾等軟目標實施的信息攻擊,可導致人心渙散和瓦解。信息作戰部隊不僅要具備保護己方和攻擊對方硬目標等能力,還要具備對抗和反制敵方信息/心理的攻擊與滲透。當前,擁有網絡主導權的國家針對不同目標運用不同手段實施信息作戰。針對硬目標使用特殊的信息武器,如計算機病毒、信息炸彈、邏輯炸彈、被賦予特殊使命的計算機芯片、能產生電磁脈衝的爆炸裝置、超高頻發生器、電子生物武器等。而針對士兵和民眾心理等軟目標,製造煽動性或恐嚇性的虛假消息並通過信息媒介傳播,以達到軍事政治目的。

因此,俄將該部隊命名為“信息作戰部隊”而非網絡作戰部隊充分體現了其作戰範圍兼顧軟硬兩類目標。

三、整合現役精銳力量和招募高校新生力量並舉

該部隊將整合現有俄羅斯武裝力量網絡作戰、電子偵察和電子對抗等部門人員和職能,同時吸收內務部和安全系統的網絡信息安全及相關專家,包括數學家、程序員、工程師、密碼學家、通信專家、電子對抗專家、翻譯人員等。

俄各軍兵種和機關在2013年先後組建“科技連”,並從高校畢業生中招募專業人才,這是軍隊系統各關鍵部門/單位儲備和培養的專門從事技術研發和信息安全保障的隊伍。據資料顯示,這支力量主要包括隸屬於空天軍的空軍第二科技連和空天防禦部隊的第三科技連、隸屬於陸軍的第五科技連、隸屬於軍事通訊科學院的第七科技連等。每個連有2~3個排,每個排約20人。以空天軍“科技連”為例,部隊定期招收高校畢業生,優先錄用計算機安全、通訊系統信息安全、特種無線電系統、密碼學、電子光電特種設備等專業人員,並由空軍軍事科學院培訓教育中心負責培養新人。

四、部隊司令尚未確定,格拉西莫夫是最大可能人選

俄國防部長紹伊古明確,信息作戰部隊司令將是大將軍銜。西方國家認為,俄武裝力量現任總參謀長格拉西莫夫大出任信息作戰部隊司令的可能性最大。他曾提出俄版“混合戰爭”概念,並得到普京總統的認同。他指出,“目前的戰爭原則本身已發生實質性改變,實現政治和戰略目標的非軍事手段的地位在上升。一系列事件表明,非軍事手段的效果有時超過了使用武器”。他在對“烏克蘭內戰”和“阿拉伯之春”等事件的描述中指出,信息/心理戰能夠將“一個祥和繁榮的國家在幾個月甚至幾天之內變成殘酷武裝鬥爭的戰場”。 2017年3月4日,格拉西莫夫在參加軍事學術會議時,要求俄軍事科學院加緊研究國家間對抗的新模式及有效反製手段。此外,西方推測格拉西莫夫的另一原因是,他此前一直擔任俄武裝力量網絡信息作戰的最高指揮官。 2014年指揮俄武裝力量發動強大信息/心理攻勢,兵不血刃收復克里米亞的正是格拉西莫夫。

五、結語

目前,俄國防部官方網站還沒有將信息作戰部隊,與現有的陸軍、空天軍、海軍和戰略導彈兵、空降兵這五大軍兵種並列放置。該部隊成為單列軍兵種亦或散佈於現有五大軍兵種和關鍵部門還未可知。但信息作戰部隊的組建不僅是俄羅斯網絡信息安全力量建設的關鍵舉措,更是在大國網絡信息安全博弈日益激烈和安全環境日益複雜的大背景下俄軍改革的重要步驟。信息作戰部隊將保衛俄羅斯網絡空間和信息領域的軟、硬目標,實現自身的攻、防職能,維護國家網絡信息安全和政治軍事安全。

 

作者:易鑫磊 來源:中國日報網

http://world.chinadaily.com.cn/2017-06/19/content_29801583.htm