Tag Archives: Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare

#Chinese Military Joint Oprations, #cross-domain collaborative operations, #cyber #warfare, #Information Support Force, #informatization, #intelligent warfare, #intellligentization, #中國 #太空 #戰爭, #中國太空軍, Chinese Military Intelligentization, Intelligent Warfare, Joint Domain, Single Domain

Understand Chinese Military Single-Domain & Multi-Domain Joint Operations

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了解中國軍事單域和多域聯合作戰

現代英語：

Joint operations are the basic form of combat in modern warfare. They emphasize the strength of more than two services and arms and other participating forces, and jointly implement operations in multi-domain space under unified command. “Single domain” and “multidomain” interdependence and interaction in joint operations are a pair of important military categories. Grasping the relationship between single domain and multi-domain is the core content and key to solving the “internal interface” problem in the construction and application of joint combat forces. The relationship between the two should be viewed dialectically and correctly handled, and the winning mechanism of joint operations should be continuously enriched to promote joint operations. Really achieve cross-domain integration, energy gathering and efficiency improvement.

“Single domain” is the constituent element and development basis of “multi-domain”

Joint operations emphasize the formation of advantageous multi-domains based on advantageous single domains, and place higher demands on the coupling relationship between each single domain that makes up the multi-domain. The development of a single domain can provide a solid foundation for the development of multiple domains and create prerequisites for achieving cross-domain integration.

In terms of historical process, single domain to multi-domain is the process of domain expansion. Throughout human history, the wars of each era have applied the techniques of their own era, imprinted the imprint of their own era, and developed with the time and space of the war. War in the agricultural era, with cold weapons as the main military equipment, battlefield fighting is mainly limited to land and offshore waters. It is a lower-level “full contact” war, and the combat domain is relatively single, making early operations “loose” Joint characteristics.

Entering the industrial era, with the invention and use of steam engines and internal combustion engines, air combat weapons represented by combat aircraft appeared on the battlefield. The combat space broke through the limitations of land and sea areas, forming a three-dimensional battlefield between land, sea and air. The war turned “semi-contact”, making joint operations take on “cooperative” joint characteristics. Entering the information age, the combat space breaks through the three-dimensional geographical space and forms a multi-domain integration of land, sea, air, space, electricity, network, and cognitive fields, making joint operations present multi-domain “integrated” characteristics. With the development of single domain to multi-domain, single-domain control rights such as land control, sea control, air control, heaven control, and information control have continued to appear, and the subsequent importance of single-domain control has continued to increase, promoting the connotation of multi-domain control. Expanding and changing, the competition for comprehensive control has become the first priority in the confrontation between ourselves and the enemy.

In terms of development form, single domain to multi-domain is a process of clustering into a network. Restricted by technical conditions and other constraints, combat activities before the information age, whether in terms of battlefield time, battlefield space, or the deployment and use of combat forces, have clear sections between single domains and clear levels of action at all levels, showing a strong Sequential and progressive, showing a single-domain chain development form.

Entering the information age, under the full “adhesion” of the network system, the multi-domain force formation develops from “combination” to “convergence”, forming an elastic structure with spatial dispersion and deployment, time coordination, and multi-dimensional energy release. According to the battlefield situation and changes in the situation, combat activities use the network information system as a “link” to connect the “links” of the combat single domain into a “network” shape, forming the focus of similar strong points and complementary advantages, and realizing each single domain “shape and spirit gathering” and “gathering fingers into fists”, The transition from single-domain chain to multi-domain network was achieved.

In terms of performance index, single domain to multi-domain is a process of energy aggregation and efficiency. Both opposing sides in the war tried to exert their overall combat power in order to achieve combat victory. However, due to the clear boundaries and loose connections of each single domain in the past, improving the overall combat power can only be achieved through the linearity “superposition” of each combat domain. With the development of information technology and intelligent technology, especially the widespread application of information systems in the military, the network information system realizes the command and control of each single domain force and can seamlessly link each combat domain. Each combat force maximizes The advantages of spatial multidimensionality and power diversity have been realized, and the strength and strength of each single domain and each level have been realized The high degree of integration, multi-dimensional cohesion, overall linkage and integrated energy release in terms of means and actions has achieved the effect of complementary advantages, synergy and cohesion, which is conducive to achieving a comprehensive advantage or local overwhelming advantage over the enemy.

“Multi-domain” is the direction-dominant and powerful dominance of “single-domain”

The essence of the winning mechanism of joint operations lies in cross-domain integration to achieve excellence and efficiency, which requires that single domain and multi-domain must be functionally “unified in the same direction”. “Multi-domain” stipulates the status and role of each single domain in combat. Each single domain must start from the overall functional needs of joint operations, focus on providing the ultimate contribution rate to the combat system, and achieve synchronous cross-domain maneuvering, cross-domain coordination, and cross-domain strike, to achieve system advantages in overall confrontation. Currently, the multi-domain dominates and dominates the single-domain in the direction of forming a resultant force with the system mainly from the following aspects.

Transition of multidomain operational requirements to hybrid war threats. At present, conventional threats are expanding and unconventional threats are becoming new and present threats, with the boundaries between regular and irregular battlefields tending to be blurred, between combatants and non-combatants and between physical and virtual dimensions. Joint operations are still the basic form of operations, but specific combat styles show a trend towards combining multiple styles. Various threats from traditional or non-traditional, formal or informal, high-intensity or low-intensity exist on land, sea, air, space, electricity, network, cognition and other multi-domains. These threats add a new dimension to the concept of war. Therefore, it is necessary not only to do a good job in the fight against a single threat, but also to develop the ability to integrate into multi-domain operations to deal with hybrid warfare.

The focus of multi-domain operations shifts to the network information system. Several informatization local wars that have broken out in recent years have shown that no war, no alliance, no alliance, no victory, the network information system that condenses various single-domain combat elements has become the focus of operations, and the combat command information system that gathers the combat power of the network information system has become the main basis for military operations “nerve center” and has become the key point for opponents to attack. The degree of integration of command and information systems is getting higher and higher, and the command systems of each single domain must converge and move closer to the overall command system, so as to achieve system integration of various services and combat units and deep coupling of various combat elements. In line with this, the information domain, the cognitive domain, and the electromagnetic domain, as emerging fields of warfare, have increased in their core status and importance, and have increasingly become the core operational domains for opposing sides to compete for control, becoming capable of causing enemy “blind, incapacitated, and mentally retarded” key operational domains. Therefore, each single domain must strengthen its ability to organically integrate into the network information system within the framework of a unified standard system and achieve interconnection and interoperability between each single domain, so as to ensure that it provides basic support in multi-domain precision warfare and thus wins overall advantages.

Transformation of multi-domain combat forces into joint combat units. Integrated joint operations have the characteristics of platform operations, system support and tactical operations, and strategic support. Strategic-level planning, campaign-level command, and tactical-level operations will become the norm in future wars. Large-scale corps operations may become increasingly rare and will be replaced by joint battles more often on multi-domain battlefields. The joint combat unit will bring together various single-domain combat forces and cover various combat elements. The level of the joint is reflected in the tactical level, presenting an independent combat capability that includes early warning and reconnaissance, information support, combat command, multi-domain attack and defense, combat support and other elements. Joint tactical unit form. Each “single-domain combat force” has a closer coupling relationship, and its own characteristics and advantages will become more prominent.

Accelerate the expansion of “single-domain advantages” to “multi-domain advantages”

For the dialectical unity of a single domain and a multi-domain, we must not only see the unity of a multi-domain, but also respect the independence of a single domain; we must neither completely oppose the two, nor erase the connection between them. In view of the actual situation of combat opponents, combat environment, own strength, etc., and taking into account various political, economic, technological, cultural and other factors, we should accelerate the expansion of “single-domain advantage” to “multi-domain advantage”, so as to form an information advantage, decision-making advantage and operational advantage against the enemy.

First, we must consolidate and expand the advantages of single domain.“ Metcalfe’s law ” tells us that increasing a network entity is capable of producing nonlinear exponential convergence of the combat power of the system. Multi-domain operations are deeply integrated system operations. As the basic element of multi-domain existence, the strength of each single domain’s construction will definitely affect the effectiveness of multi-domain integration. The essence of forming a multi-domain advantage is to deeply aggregate the advantages of each single domain. It is necessary to continuously strengthen the construction of single domain capabilities to form a single domain advantage and limit the opponent’s strength advantage to the limit. In fact, consolidating and expanding the advantages of single domains is not only to enhance single domain performance, but also to serve the purpose of multi-domain convergence. Single-domain construction requires strengthening top-level design, formulating standards and specifications, and striving to overcome conflicts caused by different combat construction concepts formed by the unique combat styles and combat culture of different services. At the same time, it is necessary to coordinate all military construction resources and focus on the development of multi-domain combat weapon platforms to meet the overall needs of joint operations, rather than just the needs of each single domain itself.

Second, we must promote the achievement of cross-domain synergy. Cross-domain synergy emphasizes breaking the boundaries between services and arms and integrating combat forces across services, arms and institutions. Based on the network information system, the combat forces in each domain are distributed in a wide area, and the multiple domains are linked as a whole to complement each other’s advantages and increase efficiency, and quickly gather energy step by step, promoting the expansion of single-domain advantages into multi-domain integration advantages and system advantages, and forming a concentrated energy strike against important enemy targets. In “joint operations”, combat forces in various fields must not only have the ability to independently perform a variety of combat missions, but also need to use their own cross-domain perception, target recognition and strike capabilities to support or even directly participate in other combat domain operations.

3. “Flexible mobile combat application is required!”. The winning mechanism of joint operations lies in the rapid and continuous integration of multi-domain combat forces to form multiple advantages and immediate advantages in specific time windows, forcing the enemy into passivity, disadvantage and dilemma. For the use of single-domain and multi-domain forces, such as the use of fingers and fists, whether it is “pointing points with hands” or “clenching fingers into fists”, or even the mutual transformation and use in combat, we must adhere to seeking truth from facts and comprehensively consider the efficiency of combat effects. Scientifically make decisions based on factors such as efficiency and contribution to the victory of war, and effectively use troops according to circumstances, location, and situation. If the single-domain combat force can solve the problem well, it is no longer necessary to use multi-domain combat forces, thereby improving operational effectiveness.

現代國語：

聯合作戰是現代戰爭的基本作戰形式，強調兩個以上軍兵種力量及其他參戰力量，在統一指揮下於多域空間共同實施作戰。聯合作戰中的「單域」與「多域」相互依存、相互作用，是一對重要的軍事範疇。掌握單域與多域的關係，是解決聯合作戰力量建設與運用之「內接口」問題的核心內容與關鍵所在，應辯證看待並正確處理二者關係，不斷豐富聯合作戰制勝機理，推動聯合作戰真正實現跨域融合、聚能增效。

「單域」是「多域」的構成要素與發展基礎

聯合作戰強調以優勢單域為基礎構成優勢多域，對組成多域的各單域之間的耦合關係提出了更高要求。單域的發展才能為多域的發展提供堅實的基礎，為實現跨域融合創造前提條件。

從歷史進程來看，單域到多域是領域拓展的過程。縱觀人類歷史，每個時代的戰爭都運用所在時代的技術，印刻著所在時代的烙印，並隨著戰爭時間和空間的發展而發展。農業時代的戰爭，以冷兵器為主要軍事裝備，戰場廝殺主要局限在陸域及近海海域，屬於較低級的「全接觸式」戰爭，作戰域較為單一，使得早期的作戰呈現出「鬆散性」聯合特徵。

進入工業時代，隨著蒸汽機和內燃機的發明與使用，以作戰飛機為代表的空戰武器出現在戰場，作戰空間突破陸域和海域的局限，形成陸海空三維立體戰場，戰爭轉向“半接觸式”，使得聯合作戰呈現出“協同性”聯合特徵。進入資訊時代，作戰空間突破三維地理空間，形成陸、海、空、天、電、網、認知領域等多域一體，使得聯合作戰呈現多域「一體化」聯合特徵。伴隨著單域向多域發展，制陸權、制海權、制空權、製天權、制資訊權等單域制權不斷出現，且後續單域制權的重要性不斷提升，推動著多域制權內涵的拓展變化，對綜合製權的爭奪成為敵我對抗的首要。

從發展形態來看，單域到多域是聚鏈成網的過程。受技術條件等製約，資訊時代之前的作戰活動，不論是在戰場時間、戰場空間，還是在作戰力量布勢運用等方面，各單域間條塊分明，各級行動層次分明，表現出強烈的順序性和漸進性，呈現出單域鏈條式發展形態。

進入資訊時代，在網路系統的充分“粘合”下，多域力量編成由“組合”發展為“融合”，形成空間分散部署、時間協調一致、能量釋放多維一體的彈性結構。根據戰場態勢和情況變化，作戰活動以網路資訊體系為“紐帶”，將作戰單域的“形散神聚”聯結成“網絡”狀，形成同類強點聚焦、優勢互補，實現了各單域“形散神聚”和“聚指成拳”，實現了由單域鏈條式向多域網絡式的轉變。

從效能指數來看，單域到多域是聚能增效的過程。戰爭敵對雙方都力圖發揮整體作戰威力以求得作戰勝利，但由於以往各單域邊界清晰、聯繫較為鬆散，提高整體戰力只能透過各作戰域的線性「疊加」來實現。隨著資訊化技術和智慧化技術的發展，特別是資訊系統在軍事上的廣泛應用，網路資訊體系實現了對各單域力量的指揮調控，並能無縫連結各作戰域，各作戰力量最大限度地發揮空間多維性和力量多元性優勢，實現了各單域各層級在力量、手段和行動等方面的高度融合、多維聚力、整體聯動和集成釋能，達成了優勢互補、協同一致、內聚融合的效果，有利於實現對敵全面優勢或局部壓倒性優勢。

「多域」是「單域」的方向主導與強力支配

聯合作戰制勝機理本質在於跨域融合實現聚優增效，要求單域與多域在功能上必須「同向統一」。多域規定了各單域在作戰中的地位與作用，各單域必須從聯合作戰整體功能需要出發，著眼為作戰體系提供極限貢獻率，實現同步跨域機動、跨域協同、跨域打擊，達成整體對抗中的體系優勢。目前，多域主要從以下方面主導並支配單域朝向與體系形成合力的方向發展。

多域作戰需求轉變為混合戰爭威脅。目前，常規性威脅不斷拓展，非常規威脅成為新的現實威脅，正規戰場與非正規戰場之間的界線趨於模糊，戰鬥人員與非戰鬥人員之間的界線趨於模糊，物理維度與虛擬維度之間的界線趨於模糊。聯合作戰仍是基本作戰形式，但具體的作戰樣式呈現出向多種樣式結合方向發展的趨勢，來自於傳統或非傳統、正規或非正規、高強度或低強度的各種威脅存在於陸、海、空、天、電、網、認知等多域中。這些威脅為戰爭概念增添了新的內涵。因此，既要做好針對某單一威脅的鬥爭，更要發展出具有融入多域作戰應對混合戰爭的能力。

多域作戰重心轉移到網路資訊體系。近年來爆發的幾場資訊化局部戰爭表明，無戰不聯、無聯不勝，凝聚各單域作戰要素的網路資訊體系成為作戰重心，匯聚網路資訊體系戰力的作戰指揮資訊系統，成為軍隊作戰主要依託的“神經中樞”，成為對手打擊的要害。指揮資訊系統的一體化程度越來越高，各單域的指揮系統必然要向整體指揮體系匯聚和靠攏，從而實現各軍種、各作戰單位的系統集成以及各作戰要素的深度耦合。與之相適應，資訊域、認知域、電磁域作為戰爭的新興領域，其核心地位和重要性不斷增強，日益成為敵對雙方爭奪制權的核心作戰域，成為能夠致敵「眼盲、失能、智障」的關鍵作戰域。所以，各單域必須在統一的標準體系框架內，加強自身有機融入網路資訊體系的能力，達成各單域間的互聯互通互通，才能確保在多域精確戰中提供基礎支撐，進而贏得整體優勢。

多域作戰力量轉型為聯合作戰單元。一體化聯合作戰具有平台作戰、體系支撐與戰術行動、戰略保障的特點，戰略級規劃、戰役級指揮、戰術級行動將成為未來戰爭的常態。大規模兵團作戰可能愈發少見，代之的將是聯合戰鬥更多地出現在多域戰場。聯合戰鬥單元將匯集各單域作戰力量，涵蓋各作戰要素，聯合的層級體現在戰術級，呈現出一個包括預警偵察、資訊保障、作戰指揮、多域攻防、作戰保障等多要素的可獨立作戰的聯合戰術單元形態。各單域作戰力量耦合關係更加緊密，自身特色優勢將更加突出。

加速推動「單域優勢」向「多域優勢」拓展

單域與多域辯證統一，我們既要看到多域的統一性，又要尊重單域的獨立性；既不能把二者完全地對立起來，又不可抹殺它們之間的聯繫。應針對作戰對手、作戰環境、自身實力等實際情況，綜合考慮政治、經濟、技術、文化等各種因素，加速推動「單域優勢」向「多域優勢」拓展，形成對敵的資訊優勢、決策優勢與行動優勢。

一要鞏固拓展單域優勢。 「梅特卡夫定律」告訴我們，增加網路實體能夠產生對體系戰鬥力的非線性指數聚能。多域作戰是深度融合的體係作戰，各單域作為多域存在的基礎要素，其建設的強度必將影響多域融合的效能。形成多域優勢實質是深度聚合各單域優勢，必須不斷加強單域能力建構形成單域優勢，限制對手力量優勢極限發揮。事實上，鞏固和拓展單域優勢不僅是為了增強單域效能，更是為了實現多域融合而服務。單域建設要加強頂層設計，制定標準規範，努力克服因不同軍種特有作戰樣式與戰鬥文化形成的不同作戰建設理念而帶來的矛盾衝突。同時，要統籌好各項軍隊建設資源，注重研發多域作戰武器平台，滿足聯合作戰整體需求，而非僅是各單域自身需要。

二要促進實現跨域協同。跨域協同強調打破軍兵種間界限，進行跨軍種、跨兵種、跨建制的作戰力量融合。基於網路資訊體系，各域作戰力量廣域分佈，多域整體連動，優勢互補增效，快速逐級聚能，推動將單域優勢擴展為多域融合優勢和體系優勢，形成對敵重要目標的聚能打擊。在聯合作戰中各域作戰力量不僅要具備獨立遂行多種作戰任務的能力，更需要利用自身的跨域感知、目標識別和打擊能力，能夠支援甚至直接參與其他作戰域行動。

三要靈活機動作戰運用。聯合作戰的致勝機制在於透過多域作戰力量快速且持續地整合，在特定時間窗口形成多重優勢和即時優勢，迫敵陷入被動、劣勢和困境。對於單域和多域力量的運用，猶如指頭與拳頭的使用，究竟是“指針點穴”還是“攥指成拳”，甚至是作戰中相互轉化運用，都需堅持實事求是，綜合考慮作戰效果效率效益，以及對戰爭制勝的貢獻率等因素科學決斷，切實做到因情用兵、因地用兵。如果單域作戰力量能很好解決問題，就不必再使用多域作戰力量，進而提升作戰效益。

王榮輝　 鄧仕峰

中國軍網 國防部網 2022年1月20日 星期四

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-01/20/content_307852888.htm

#Artificial #Intelligence, #Information Support Force, #informatization, #intelligent warfare, #intellligentization, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Artificial Intelligence, Chinese Military Informatization, Chinese Military Intelligentization, Information Support Force, Intelligent Warfare

China Advancing Digital Intelligence of Defence Mobilization – Informatization to Intelligentization

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中國推進國防動員數位化智能化－從資訊化走向智慧化

現代英語：

With the accelerated evolution of the new round of scientific and technological revolution, military revolution and industrial revolution, the form of war has made great strides towards intelligence, and the field of national defense mobilization has undergone profound changes. In-depth analysis of the new characteristics of national defense mobilization in the intelligent era, exploration of intelligent national defense mobilization methods, and promotion of digital intelligence of national defense mobilization are urgent practical issues facing national defense mobilization work.

Digital intelligence technology is widely used in social production and life, and the target areas, means, training exercises, etc. of national defense mobilization have also undergone profound changes, showing many new characteristics. First, the targets of national defense mobilization have expanded from traditional fields to emerging areas of intelligence. Currently, the world’s major military powers have stepped up efforts to tap and utilize the country’s smart resources. The U.S. military has launched a flagship project for the application of artificial intelligence technology “Project Mavin”, and many U.S. private technology companies such as Parantil and Amazon have participated in research and development. It is worth noting that as the role of digital intelligence technology in seizing and maintaining multi-domain competitive advantages becomes increasingly prominent, the global battle for artificial intelligence talents is intensifying, and defense mobilization is focusing on advantageous universities and key institutions engaged in artificial intelligence research. The second is the in-depth transformation of defense mobilization methods from multi-chain decentralization to intelligent dynamic matching. Through the use of intelligent means such as large models, the docking of national defense mobilization potential will be automatically matched according to professional mobilization algorithm rules. The efficiency of the transformation of national defense mobilization potential will be greatly improved. The docking of supply and demand will be changed from “offline to online”, and the transportation of mobilization materials will be handed over. It will be quickly transported to the front through intelligent dispatch, which can be achieved “direct access from the factory to the battlefield”. Under the integration of the “intelligent charging platform”, the mobilization and command method that integrates network, information and intelligence, and integrates air, space and earth allows “command chain” and “mobilization chain” to be accurately connected, agile and efficient, and can achieve plan generation “one-click” and test evaluation “Modelization”, command control “visualization”, comprehensive management “platformization”. Third, defense mobilization training has developed in depth from simple and inefficient to digital and intellectual empowerment. By using augmented reality and virtual reality technologies to construct a practical simulation confrontation environment, it can not only enhance the sense of technology, interactivity, and fun of teaching and training, but also help enhance the practicality of training, allowing trainees to “immersive” Improve training effectiveness and speed up training progress. For example, foreign military forces use interactive virtual courses in the metaverse to help soldiers master equipment maintenance and repair skills, and use augmented reality equipment to assist in the repair of some equipment. At the same time, the training and evaluation system constructed using digital twin technology will minimize the factors of human interference, squeeze the training water, provide real and objective evaluation conclusions for the training level of trainees, and promote military training from empirical management to scientific management.

To promote the digital intelligence of national defense mobilization, we must aim to win future wars, adhere to innovation-driven and technological victory, and gather superior resources in all aspects. 1. “We must focus on gathering excellence in wisdom and building new areas and new quality forces!”. Find out the high-end digital intelligence potential of national defense mobilization, tap out high-end talents, high-tech and other new resources in new fields and new fields hidden in the public and enterprises, deepen cooperation with artificial intelligence specialized new enterprises and related scientific research institutes and universities, and update them in a timely manner Potential catalog opens up new space for high-end potential support. Focusing on the expansion of support and support objects into multi-dimensional battlefields, focusing on the joint combat system “to make up for weaknesses” and multi-dimensional space “to make up for blindness”, relying on digital and intellectual potential resources to build a strong new domain and new quality defense mobilization team to provide strong support for the joint combat system. Second, we must focus on digital intelligence empowerment and improve efficient institutional mechanisms. Improve the military demand reporting and docking mechanism, unify the military demand indicator system, build a “clearly” demand reporting catalog list for both military and civilian parties, and consolidate the data foundation for collaboration and linkage. Improve the potential information system to realize functions such as intelligent matching of demand and potential, real-time statistics of stock and consumption, and form a close collaboration model between supply and demand that is data-driven, accurately matched, and trusted to interact. Third, we must focus on intellectual and brain assistance and build a strong command and coordination platform. Open up data barriers between systems to achieve information sharing, data interaction, and intelligent office. Accelerate the construction of a national defense mobilization command platform that integrates and connects combat command systems, connects grassroots defense mobilization units, and horizontally connects different types of mobilization units, using “big data + big model + cloud platform” technology to establish a relationship between “command chain” and “implementation chain” A human-machine collaborative decision-making model that presents situations, handles needs, assists planning, and regulates actions Improving the quality and effectiveness of defence mobilization command. Fourth, we must focus on outsmarting the future and accelerating technological innovation and transformation. Improve the mechanism to support joint military-civilian scientific and technological innovation, expand participation channels for local scientific and technological enterprises, universities and institutes, and achieve two-way promotion and efficient integration of new quality productivity and new quality combat effectiveness. Improve the agile response and rapid transformation mechanism of advanced technology, accelerate the development of new combat capabilities, and enhance the victory contribution rate of digital intelligence in national defense mobilization.

現代國語：

吳子穆

隨著新一輪科技革命、軍事革命和產業革命的加速演進，戰爭形態朝向智慧化闊步邁進，國防動員領域發生深刻變化。深入研究智慧化時代防衛動員的新特點，探討智慧化國防動員辦法，推進國防動員數智化，是國防動員工作面臨的緊迫現實課題。

數智技術在社會生產生活中廣泛應用，國防動員的對象領域、手段方法、訓練演練等也隨之發生深刻改變，呈現諸多新的特點。一是國防動員對象由傳統領域向智慧新興領域深入擴展。當前，世界主要軍事強國均加強了對國家智慧資源的挖掘利用。美軍啟動了人工智慧技術應用旗艦項目“梅文計畫”，帕蘭蒂爾、亞馬遜等多家美國民間科技企業參與研發。值得注意的是，隨著數智技術對奪取並維持多域競爭優勢的作用愈發凸顯，全球人工智慧人才爭奪戰愈演愈烈，國防動員正在向優勢高校和從事人工智慧研究的重點院所聚焦。二是國防動員手段由多鏈分散向智慧動態匹配深入轉變。通過大模型等智慧化手段的運用，國防動員潛力對接將按專業的動員算法規則進行自動匹配，國防動員潛力轉化的效率將大大提升，供需對接將由“線下轉為線上”，動員物資運輸交接將通過智能化派單方式快速運抵前方，可實現“工廠直達戰場”。在智慧化指控平台整合下，網信智融合、空天地一體的動員指揮手段，讓「指揮鏈」與「動員鏈」精準銜接、敏捷高效，能夠實現預案生成「一鍵化」、試驗評估「模型化」、指揮控制「可視化」、綜合管理「平台化」。第三是國防動員訓練由簡單低效向數智孿生賦能深入發展。透過運用增強現實與虛擬現實技術，構設實戰化的模擬對抗環境，既能提升教學組訓的科技感、互動性、趣味性，也有助於增強訓練實戰性，讓參訓人員在「沉浸式」訓練中提高訓練成效，加快訓練進度。例如，外軍運用元宇宙中的互動式虛擬課程幫助士兵掌握裝備維護和修理技能，借助增強現實設備協助完成一些裝備的維修工作。同時，運用數字孿生技術所構設的訓練評鑑系統，將最大限度減少人為乾擾的因素，擠壓訓練水分，為參訓人員的訓練水準提供真實客觀的評估結論，推動軍事訓練由經驗式管理走向科學化管理。

推動防衛動員數智化，必須瞄準打贏未來戰爭，堅持創新驅動、科技制勝，凝聚各方面優勢資源。一要著眼向智聚優，建強新域新質力量。摸清國防動員高端數智潛力，把蘊藏在民眾與企業中的高端人才、高新科技等新域新質資源挖掘出來，深化與人工智慧專精特新企業及相關科研院所、高校的合作，及時更新潛力目錄，為高端潛力援戰開拓新空間。著眼支援保障對象向多維戰場拓展，聚焦為聯戰體系“補弱”、多維空間“補盲”，依托數智潛力資源編優建強新域新質國防動員隊伍，為聯合作戰體系提供有力支撐。二要著眼數智賦能，健全高效制度機制。健全軍事需求提報對接機制，統一軍事需求指標體系，構建軍地雙方都「看得明白」的需求提報目錄清單，夯實協同聯動的數據基礎。完善潛力資訊系統，實現需求與潛力智慧匹配、存量與消耗實時統計等功能，形成數據驅動、精準匹配、可信互動的供需兩端密切協作模式。三要著眼智腦輔助，建強指揮協調平台。打通系統之間的數據壁壘，實現資訊共享、數據互動、智慧辦公。加速建立上融聯合作戰指揮體系、下接基層國防動員單位、橫向貫通不同類型動員單位的國防動員指揮平台，運用「大數據+大模型+雲平台」技術，在「指揮鏈」與「落實鏈」之間建立態勢呈現、需求處理、輔助規劃、調控行動的人機協同決策模式，提升國防指揮質效。四要著眼智勝未來，加速科技創新與轉化。完善支持軍地聯合科技創新體制機制，拓展地方科技企業、大學院所參與管道，實現新質生產力與新質戰鬥力的雙向拉動、高效融合。健全先進技術敏捷響應與快速轉化機制，加速發展新質戰鬥力，提升國防動員數智化的勝戰貢獻率。

中國軍網 國防網
2025年3月20日 星期四

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index888.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-03-20&paperNumber=07&articleid=951582

#Artificial #Intelligence, #Chinese Military Joint Oprations, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Use of Cognitive Confrontation within the Combat Domain, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare

Chinese Military Deciphering Cognitive Warfare Codes Capability Based on Operational Decision Chains

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中國軍隊基於作戰決策鏈破解認知戰密碼的能力

現代英語：

Cognition is the basis for operational decisions and operations. Cognitive warfare is a confrontation activity carried out in the cognitive domain. The purpose is to attack the enemy’s knowledge system, social consciousness, people’s morale, etc., disrupt its judgment and decision-making, and cause it to lose its decision-making advantage and action advantage. To deepen the research on cognitive warfare and decipher the cognitive warfare code, the key is to embed the combat decision-making chain and explore how to influence and interfere with the cognitive activities of the enemy’s decision-making chain, causing the enemy to form false observations, wrong judgments and poor decisions, so as to fully control Cognitive initiative.

Seeing is false, changing the facts

Observation is the starting point of cognition. No matter what kind of war, when facing any opponent, the first step is observation. The observation here is a broad concept and is about all activities to obtain all relevant information about the hostile party. Just as people perceive external things through sensory organs, observation relies on the battlefield perception system to obtain relevant data and information from the battlefield environment according to the needs of the subject, providing “ source material ” for judgment and decision-making. Observation uses intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance and other activities to obtain as much factual information and materials from all aspects of the enemy as possible and convert them into text, images, audio, video and sensor signals.

The history of war at home and abroad in ancient and modern times shows that the essence of command is the endless pursuit of certainty, including the status and intentions of enemy troops, various factors affecting the combat environment such as weather and terrain, as well as the status and actions of one’s own troops. Therefore, efficient command consists in clarifying each element and then coordinating it as a whole to achieve the best combat effect. Human judgment and decision-making are easily disturbed by information uncertainty. In the observation stage, the key to cognitive warfare is to make the enemy unable to clearly observe, incompletely observe, and distort the information of their own combat elements, and lack real information or accurate understanding, thereby weakening the enemy’s decision-making on combat at the source. The pursuit of certainty.

Measures for observing cognitive warfare, in addition to common information warfare methods, such as disguise, interference, deception, silence, etc., should also pay attention to the following aspects: First, create complex situations. War is inherently full of complexity. By creating complexity, it increases the fog and resistance on the battlefield, making it impossible for the enemy to observe the real specific situation. For example, by creating various events and operations in multi-dimensional combat areas such as land, sea, air, sky, and network, and making irregular changes, it can effectively increase the difficulty of enemy observation. The second is to interfere with observation and cognition. Observation is not aimless. It is carried out based on a certain cognition. Cognition determines what information needs to be observed, what kind of reconnaissance activities need to be carried out, etc. For example, during observation activities, by interfering with operations, the enemy’s attention in observation activities is affected, causing it to lose the ability to focus on essential issues and key issues, thereby making it unable to obtain key information. The third is to shape the factual narrative. Shaping factual narratives is to reformulate, combine, arrange, and reconstruct facts according to the needs of cognitive warfare. These facts are either created out of nothing, highlight certain details in the facts, or are difficult to verify and test, making their observation materials Mixed with fictional facts, the observed facts are far from objective facts. The fourth is to protect specific knowledge. Knowledge protection is an important aspect of cognitive warfare. The main contents include: commander’s decision-making style, combat theory reasoning process, premises and assumptions, key tactical ideas and combat principles, key decision-making procedures, mechanisms and methods, information analysis methods, especially some algorithms, passwords, etc.

Targeting the judgment, misleading the judgment

On the battlefield, simple observation and data collection do not make much sense. Only by analyzing these data “ by looking at the essence of the phenomenon, and then drawing various judgments, will we promote the formation of operational decisions. For example, during the Battle of Moscow in World War II, the Soviet Union had a lot of and messy information about the Japanese Kwantung Army. Finally, after careful analysis, it was concluded that “ the Soviet Union could be considered safe in the Far East, and the threat from Japan had been ruled out ” After the judgment, it was decided to transfer troops from the Far East to Moscow to participate in the Battle of Moscow. Judgment is the corresponding conclusion reached by analyzing and reasoning the observation results, which mainly includes: first, factual judgment, usually expressed in descriptive language, such as the current situation, enemy battlefield deployment, battlefield posture, etc.; second, value and relationship judgment, usually Expressed in evaluative language, such as threat assessment, correlation analysis, trend prediction, etc.

Judgment cognitive warfare is actually a game surrounding judgment. Normally, judgments arise on the basis of a judgment, without which there would be no conclusion of judgment. Whether a person has high blood pressure or diabetes is often based on some medical indicators, and these indicators are the criteria. The premises and assumptions of reasoning are actually based on judgments. “ Persian cat story ” circulated in World War I. Judging from the location of the command post from a Persian cat, it contains a series of judgments: there is no village around, and it cannot be a cat raised by ordinary civilians; the sound of artillery on the battlefield is rumbling, and it cannot be It is a wild cat that is cautious and avoids people; Persian cats are a valuable breed, and the position of cat owners is not low; cats appear at fixed times every day, and the command post should be near cats. Therefore, interfering with judgment is to target the judgment to design and produce information products so that the facts obtained do not match the judgment, or to minimize the leakage of information related to the judgment, so that the enemy cannot judge or make wrong judgments.

The main contents of the interference criterion are: First, the interference is based on experience. Based on enemy experience, create “ virtual facts ” to make errors in judgment. For example, in the Battle of Maling, Sun Bin halved the stove to lure Pang Juan, which is a typical example. Because according to experience, the number of stoves is directly proportional to the number of troops. Halving the number of stoves every day means that the number of people is decreasing. The possibility of reduction is that the soldiers have suffered greater casualties, which leads to the judgment of weakening combat power. The second is to interfere with the judgment based on the knowledge system. Such knowledge includes the enemy’s common sense, concepts, principles and some assumptions. For example, in the Fourth Middle East War that broke out in October 1973, Israel’s initial defeat was a misjudgment of the war situation. It believed that as long as its air force was still in an advantageous position, the other side would never dare to attack. However, Egypt began to adopt new military technology and used mobile surface-to-air missiles to support an air defense network, partially offsetting Israel’s air superiority. The third is to interfere with judgments based on universal culture. That is, design corresponding information and actions based on the enemy’s cultural characteristics so that they can be misjudged due to cultural differences. According to foreign information, during the Cold War, the United States studied the root causes of “ Soviet behavior, so it started from culture and behavior to induce the Soviet Union to make strategic misjudgments. The fourth is to interfere with methodological-based judgments. Generalizations, analogies, etc. are the basic methods of judgment. Cognitive interference based on methodology makes it difficult for the other party to understand facts and cannot be compared with known facts; complicating the causal relationship and confusing factual cause and effect, psychological cause and effect, conditional cause and effect, social cause and effect, etc., making it impossible to implement causal judgment; reducing possible signs and phenomena, making it impossible to see through the essence and make accurate judgments.

Focus on the process and influence decision-making

Operational decision-making is based on combat purposes and intentions. After observation and judgment, various factors are combined to derive the optimal solution to the problem. War or conflict behavior has game, competition and confrontation attributes, so decision-making is a game. Decisions address key issues such as whether to do it, how to do it, what purpose to achieve, or the state of termination. In information-based local wars, action-centeredness gradually replaces planning-centeredness, requiring an increase from data center warfare, information center warfare, and knowledge center warfare to decision-making center warfare. Combat decision-making has become one of the main areas of competition between the enemy and ourselves.

Decision-making cognitive warfare is to target enemy cognition and interfere with the decision-making process to affect the quality and efficiency of decision-making. Decision-making is affected by the knowledge structure of the decision-maker himself. If cognition is paranoid or the knowledge reserve is outdated, even if the judgment is correct, good decisions will still not be made. The decision-making process includes the application and change process of knowledge structure, which mainly involves procedural knowledge and conceptual principled knowledge. The former includes decision-making procedures and methods, decision-making mechanisms and evaluation methods, etc., while the latter includes understanding of battlefield posture, winning mechanism, combat concepts, combat rules, and weapons and equipment performance. Therefore, cognitive attacks on the decision-making process will greatly affect its decision-making speed and quality.

The main ways to influence cognitive warfare in decision-making are: First, squeezing the cognitive decision-making space. When watching tennis matches, commentary on non-forced errors and forced mistakes are often heard, with forced mistakes being those caused by putting pressure on the opponent. Interfering with the cognitive decision-making environment is to put pressure on the enemy’s cognitive decisions, thereby squeezing the cognitive space and weakening cognition to force the enemy to make mistakes in decision-making. For example, through virtual and real decision-making activities and actions, the opponent is trapped in decision-making difficulties, which increases the probability of low-level decision-making. The second is to attack rational cognition. Including: First, interfering with the understanding of threats and opportunities. Many examples of failures in military history are caused by misjudgment of threats and opportunities on the battlefield. Whether you despise the enemy or overestimate the enemy, you will form decision-making expectations that are different from objective reality, leading to adverse action results. Second, attack combat theory and doctrine. For example, by proposing the theory of mutual restraint, deliberately exaggerating the loopholes in the enemy’s doctrine, and amplifying the adverse effects of the enemy’s combat operations, the enemy can arouse doubts about its own theory and doctrine. Third, for procedural knowledge. Including decision-making mechanisms, procedures and methods, plan evaluation and combat evaluation methods, auxiliary decision-making systems, algorithms, thinking, etc. Attacking the weaknesses present will also cause decision-making errors. The third is to interfere with irrational factors. The use of irrational factors often creates decision-making traps, such as groupthink traps, conceit traps, etc., which have a significant impact on decision-making. The strategic deception successfully implemented by the Allied forces many times during World War II was to use the enemy’s ambiguous and misleading analysis to increase the probability that the wrong decision would win.

現代國語：

來源：中國軍網-解放軍報 作者：吳中和 朱小寧 責任編輯：王韻
2022-09-13 06:48:xx
吳中和 朱小寧

引言

認知是作戰決策與行動的基礎。認知戰是在認知域進行的對抗活動，目的是攻擊敵知識體系、社會意識、民心士氣等，打亂其判斷與決策，使其失去決策優勢與行動優勢。深化認知戰研究，破譯認知戰密碼，關鍵是嵌入作戰決策鏈，探究如何影響和乾擾敵決策鏈的認知活動，致敵形成不真實的觀察、錯誤的判斷和糟糕的決策，從而充分掌控認知主動權。

眼見為虛，改變事實

觀察是認知的起點。無論何種戰爭，面對任何對手，首先要做的第一步就是為觀察。這裡的觀察是一個廣義概念，是關於獲得敵對方所有相關資訊的一切活動。正如人類透過感覺器官感知外界事物一樣，觀察依托戰場感知系統，根據主體需要從戰場環境中獲得相關數據與訊息，為判斷和決策提供「原始材料」。觀察通過情報、偵察、監視等活動，盡可能多地獲取敵對方各方面的事實信息與材料，並將其轉化為文本、圖像、音頻、視頻和傳感器信號等。

古今中外的戰爭史表明，指揮的本質是對確定性的無盡追求，包括敵軍部隊狀態和意圖，天候、地形等影響作戰環境的種種因素，以及己方部隊的狀態和行動。因而，高效率的指揮在於廓清每個要素，然後將其整體協調起來行動，以達成最佳作戰效果。而人的判斷決策，很容易受資訊的不確定性幹擾。在觀察階段，認知戰的關鍵就在於，使敵人對己方各種作戰要素觀察不清、觀察不全、觀察的信息失真混亂，缺乏真實信息或準確理解，從而從源頭上削弱敵方對作戰決策確定性的追求。

觀察認知戰的措施，除了通常的資訊戰方法，如偽裝、幹擾、欺騙、靜默等，還應注意以下方面：一是製造復雜局面。戰爭本來就充滿複雜性，通過製造複雜性，增加戰場的迷霧和阻力，使敵人無法觀察到真實具體情況。如，透過在陸、海、空、天、網絡等多維作戰域製造各種事件與行動，並作無規則變動，可有效增加敵方觀察的難度。二是乾擾觀察認知。觀察不是毫無目的的，是基於某種認知進行的，認知決定需要觀察哪些資訊、採取何種偵察活動等。如，在觀察活動中，透過幹擾行動，影響敵方觀察活動的注意力，使其失去聚焦本質問題、關鍵問題的觀察能力，進而使其始終無法獲得關鍵資訊。三是塑造事實敘事。塑造事實敘事，就是根據認知戰需要，重新表述、組合、編排、再建構事實，這些事實要麼是無中生有，要麼是突出事實中的某些細節、要麼是難以查實和檢驗等，使其觀察材料中混雜於虛構事實，觀察的事實與客觀事實相距甚遠。四是保護特定知識。知識保護是認知戰的重要面向。主要內容有：指揮員決策風格，作戰理論推理過程、前提與假設，關鍵戰術思想與作戰原則，關鍵決策程序、機制與方法，資訊分析方法特別是一些演算法、密碼等。

瞄準判據，誤導判斷

戰場上，簡單的觀察和資料收集並沒有太多意義，只有對這些數據進行「透過現像看本質」地分析，進而得出各種判斷，才會推動形成作戰決策。如第二次世界大戰莫斯科保衛戰中，蘇聯有關日本關東軍的資訊多而雜亂，最後經過縝密分析，得出「蘇聯在遠東地區可以認為是安全的，來自日本方面的威脅已排除」的判斷後，才決定將遠東方面的部隊調往莫斯科，參加莫斯科保衛戰。判斷是對觀察結果進行分析推理而得出的相應結論，主要包括：一是事實判斷，通常用描述性語言表達，如當前形勢、敵方的戰場部署、戰場態勢等；二是價值和關系判斷，通常用評價性語言表達，如威脅評估、關聯分析、趨勢預測等。

判斷認知戰，實際上是圍繞判據展開的一種博弈。通常情況下，判斷是基於判據產生的，沒有判據，就不會有判斷結論。一個人是否患有高血壓、糖尿病，往往基於一些醫學指標，這些指標就是判據。推理的前提與假設，實際上也是基於判據。一戰中流傳的“波斯貓的故事”，從一隻波斯貓判斷出指揮所位置，就包含著一系列判據：周圍沒有村莊，不可能是普通平民養的貓；戰場上炮聲隆隆，不可能是謹慎避人的野貓；波斯貓是名貴品種，養貓的人職位不低；貓每天固定時間出現，指揮家應該就在貓出沒在貓出沒。因此，幹擾判斷就是瞄準判據進行資訊產品設計與生產，使其獲得的事實與判據不匹配，或盡量減少自己與判據相關資訊的洩漏，從而使敵方無法判斷或做出錯誤的判斷。

幹擾判據的主要內容有：一是乾擾以經驗為基礎的判據。根據敵方經驗，製造“虛擬事實”，使其判斷失誤。如馬陵之戰中孫臏日減半灶以誘龐涓，就是典型的例子。因為根據經驗，灶與軍隊人數成正比，日減半灶說明人數在減少，減少的可能性是士兵傷亡較大，從而得出戰力減弱的判斷。二是乾擾以知識體係為基礎的判據。此類知識，包括敵方的常識、概念、原則及一些假設等。如1973年10月爆發的第四次中東戰爭，以色列最初的失利在於對戰局的誤判，認為只要自己的空軍仍處於優勢地位，對方就絕對不敢進攻。但是，埃及開始採用新的軍事技術，運用移動式地空飛彈撐起一張空中防禦網，部分抵銷了以色列的空中優勢。三是乾擾以普遍文化為基礎的判據。即根據敵方文化特徵，設計相應資訊與行動，使其因文化差異而產生誤判。據國外資料介紹，冷戰時期美國曾研究了“蘇聯行為的根源”，因此從文化與行為上入手做文章，誘使蘇聯產生戰略誤判。四是乾擾以方法論為基礎的判據。概括、類比等是判斷的基本方法。針對方法論的認知幹擾，就是使對方難以了解事實，無法與已知事實類比；將因果關系復雜化，把事實因果、心理因果、條件因果、社會因果等混淆起來，無法實施因果判斷；減少可能的徵兆和現象，使其無法看透本質，無從進行準確判斷。

著眼過程，影響決策

作戰決策，是針對作戰目的和企圖，經過觀察和判斷，將各種因素綜合起來，推導出解決問題的最優方案。戰爭或沖突行為，具有博弈、競爭和對抗屬性，因而決策即是​​博弈。決策解決的是乾不干、怎麼幹，達到什麼目的或終止狀態等關鍵問題。在資訊化局部戰爭中，以行動為中心逐步取代以計畫為中心，要求從資料中心戰、資訊中心戰、知識中心戰上升為決策中心戰，作戰決策更成為敵我雙方競逐的主要領域之一。

決策認知戰，就是瞄準決策過程中敵方認知進行攻擊幹擾，以影響決策品質與效率。決策受到決策者本身知識結構的影響，如果認知發生偏執或知識儲備過時，即使判斷正確了，仍然得不出好的決策。決策過程包含了知識結構的運用與變化過程，主要涉及程序性知識和概念原理性知識，前者包括決策程序與方法、決策機制與評估方法等，後者包括對戰場態勢、制勝機理、作戰概念、作戰法則、武器裝備表現的認識等。因而，對決策過程中的認知攻擊，將大大影響其決策速度與品質。

影響決策認知戰的主要途徑有：一是擠壓認知決策空間。觀看網球比賽時，經常聽到非逼迫性失誤和逼迫性失誤的解說，逼迫性失誤是指由於給對手造成壓力引起的失誤。幹擾認知決策環境，就是給敵方認知決策壓力，從而擠壓認知空間，削弱認知力，以逼迫敵人決策出現失誤。如，透過虛實相間的決策活動與行動，讓對手陷入決策困境，致其增加出現低水準決策的機率。二是攻擊理性認知。包括：其一，幹擾對威脅與機會的認知。軍事史上許多失敗的戰例，都是誤判戰場上的威脅與機會所引起的。無論輕視敵人，或高估敵人，都會形成與客觀實際不一樣的決策預期，導致不利的行動結果。其二，攻擊作戰理論與條令。如透過提出相剋的理論、刻意渲染敵條令的漏洞、放大敵方作戰行動的不利效果等，引起敵方對自身理論與條令的懷疑。其三，針對程序性知識。包括決策的機制、程序與方法，方案評估與作戰評估方法，輔助決策系統、演算法、思維等，攻擊其中的弱點，也會造成決策失誤。第三是乾擾非理性因素。對非理性因素加以利用，往往會造成決策陷阱，如群思陷阱、自負陷阱等，對決策有重大影響。二戰中盟軍曾多次成功實施的戰略欺騙，就是利用了敵方模稜兩可和誤導性迷惑分析，讓錯誤的決策勝出的機率增大。

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.81.cn/xxqj_207719/xxjt/pl_207751/10184370888.html?big=fan

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Chinese Military Research on Conceptual System-based Superior Warfare – How to Fight in Information Warfare System Operations? Analysis of Nine Typical Combat Styles

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中國軍事體系優勢作戰概念研究－資訊化作戰體系如何作戰？九種典型作戰風格分析

現代英語：

System “Gathering Excellent War” It is “systematic warfare in information warfare. It does not necessarily refer to a certain combat style, but is composed of multiple combat styles and tactics” “combination boxing”, or combat style group . Emphasizes that, depending on the combat mission, combat opponent and the changing battlefield situation, any appropriate means and style of combat can be used flexibly to form combat advantages as long as it is conducive to forming comparative advantages and achieving system victory. In the specific implementation process of “system-based superior warfare”, these specific combat styles and operational tactics can not only be organized and implemented separately as part of joint all-domain operations, but also emphasize fighting “combination boxing”, using multiple strategies simultaneously, and winning as a whole. 


       In order to better understand its core connotation, this article lists Nine typical combat styles including overall deterrence warfare, electromagnetic disturbance warfare, network penetration warfare, and cognitive control disturbance warfare And analyze .

       System “Juyouzhan” ――combination boxing that flexibly uses multiple combat styles“
        1. Overall deterrence war: Emphasis on multi-domain joint deterrence; Three elements should be present in the implementation of an overall deterrent war ; Strong overall strength is central to achieving effective deterrence
        2. Electromagnetic Disturbance Warfare : The key to competing for information advantage; On the combined means approach, information empowerment is achieved through “connection + sharing” ; Crack down on effective tactics for unmanned cluster operations
       3. Cyber-sabotage: Soft “kill” is the main focus, combining soft and hard, focusing on breaking the net and reducing energy failure
       4. Cognitive scrambling: Control the cognitive power of situational awareness and compete for information advantage; control the decision-making power of command and compete for decision-making advantage; control “brain” power and seize the advantage of brain control
       5. Agile mobile warfare: High-efficiency and rapid decision-making; high-efficiency formation of a favorable combat situation; high-efficiency and instant gathering of combat forces; agile mobile warfare is an innovative development of traditional mobile warfare
       6. Swarm autonomous warfare: It is conducive to forming a system advantage to suppress the enemy; it is conducive to enhancing the combat effect; it is conducive to falling into the enemy’s combat dilemma
       7. Point-and-kill War: Achieving an efficient cost ratio for operations; targeting key nodes is an important option; large-scale system support is a basic condition; it is inseparable from precise intelligence support
       8. Supply-breaking: The supply guarantee chain has a huge impact on the overall combat situation; the center of gravity of the attack is a key node in cutting off the enemy’s supply guarantee chain; the focus is on choosing the right time and making full use of tactics
       9. System “paralysis battle:” The objectives of the operation are to make the enemy combat system run out of order; to strike the key nodes of the combat system with heavy blows; and to carry out soft strikes against the enemy combat system

        For learning reference only, welcome to communicate and correct! Article views do not represent the position of this body
       The concept of combat was first proposed as a new combat style. Innovative combat styles are a core element in the development of combat concepts. It can be said that system-gathering battle is a general term for a series of specific tactics. The following nine typical combat styles constitute the tactical system of system-gathering and superior warfare. They are: One is Overall deterrence warfare, actively organize static power display and deterrence actions in system excellence battles, and strive to defeat others without fighting or small battles; Two is Electromagnetic disturbance warfare uses various combat methods and action styles such as electronic detection, attack and defense to disrupt, prevent and destroy the enemy’s electromagnetic capabilities, actively compete for the advantages of the electromagnetic spectrum, seize the right to control information, and then win the initiative in combat; Three is In cyber attack warfare, various means such as soft strikes and hard destruction are used to defeat the enemy’s command network, intelligence network, communication network, logistics supply network, and disrupt the enemy’s command and support; Four is Cognitively Controlled Disturbance. Form a controlling advantage in the cognitive space through information attacks, public opinion attacks, and brain attacks; Five is Agile mobile warfare. Quickly adjust the deployment of troops and weapons, quickly gather capabilities on the battlefield, and seize combat opportunities; Six is Swarm autonomous warfare. Extensively use unmanned combat methods such as “bee swarms”, “wolf swarms”, and “fish swarms” to independently organize actions and distributed attacks to achieve joint human-machine victory; Seven is Pointkill. Accurately obtain intelligence, carry out multi-domain precision strikes, strive to shake the overall situation with one point, and maximize combat benefits; Eight is Supply-breaking. Organize an elite force to attack enemy logistics supplies and equipment supply supply chains, supply lines and supply bases, defeat the enemy and lose supplies and withdraw from the battle; Nine is System “paralysis battle”. A variety of means, such as breaking the net, exercising, and hitting nodes, are used to interfere with, delay, destroy, or even paralyze the effective operation of the enemy’s combat system and weaken its functions.


       1. Overall deterrence
       Overall deterrence warfare refers to actively organizing static power display and deterrence actions in the system’s battle for excellence, and striving to defeat others without fighting or small battles. Sun Tzu said: “Subduing one’s troops without fighting is a good thing.” Deterrence and war are the two main forms of military activity. And “deterrence” is mainly the act of showing determination and will to potential opponents by showing strength or threatening to use strong strength to deter opponents from action. It can be said that the overall deterrence war in the system-based battle of excellence is an important means or tactic to achieve the goal of “stopping” human troops without fighting. Clausewitz emphasized that the first rule of strategy is to be as strong as possible, first in general, and then in key locations. Modern warfare is system-to-system confrontation. The overall deterrence war under informationized local warfare requires not only traditional deterrence methods and capabilities on land, sea, air and space, but also new deterrence methods and capabilities such as space deterrence, electromagnetic deterrence, and network deterrence. It also requires an overall deterrence that shows the overall strength of the country. Especially with the rapid development of advanced technologies such as information technology, the technological revolution, industrial revolution, and military revolution have accelerated their integration, and strategic competitiveness, social productivity, and military combat effectiveness have become more closely coupled. Winning the information war is to a greater extent a contest between the will of the country and the overall strength of the country. To contain the war, we must first act as a deterrent to our opponents in terms of overall strength.


       1.1 Emphasis on multi-domain joint deterrence
       Means of deterrence typically include both nuclear and conventional deterrence. In the “system-based battle for excellence”, the overall deterrence war is implemented, aiming to comprehensively use conventional deterrence methods across the land, sea, air and space power grids to achieve the purpose of deterrence. Especially with the application of information network technology and space and directed energy technology in the military, space, networks, electromagnetic weapons, etc. have become new means of deterrence. Space deterrence, It mainly uses equipment such as rapid response electromagnetic orbit weapons, space-to-ground networked anti-navigation and positioning service systems, large elliptical orbit laser weapons, and high-power microwave weapons to threaten and attack the opponent’s space targets and form a deterrent against enemy space information “interference blocking”. Cyber deterrence mainly uses cyberspace situational awareness and attack equipment to threaten and attack the opponent’s military network and other critical information infrastructure to achieve deterrence against the enemy. Electromagnetic deterrence mainly uses electromagnetic spectrum combat systems to threaten and attack enemy detection, navigation, communications and other information weapons and equipment systems to achieve deafening and blinding deterrence against the enemy.

1.2 The implementation of overall deterrence should have three major elements
       Implementing an overall deterrent war and achieving the desired effect of deterrence usually requires three main elements: One is strength. The deterrent must have the reliable ability or strength to frighten and fear the opponent; the second is determination and will. The deterrent party must dare to use this capability when necessary; third, to transmit information clearly. The deterring party must make the ability to act and the determination clearly known to the other party accurately and effectively.


       Historically, the criteria for judging deterrent strength have varied in three main ways: First, the active military force; second, the combined national strength or war potential; and third, the total number of main battle weapons and equipment. For quite a long period of history, the number of troops was deterrence, and the strength of military strength depended directly on the size of the active military, the amount of vital weapons and equipment, and non-material factors such as the morale of the army’s training organization. After the twentieth century, with the expansion of the scale of warfare, deterrence power has become less limited to the strength of the military and the quantity of vital weapons and equipment, but is determined by the nation’s war potential, which includes economic power, scientific and technological power, energy resources, and even population size, among others. The overall deterrence war in the system’s “gathering and excellence war”, the formation of its deterrence strength is mainly based on the network information system, as well as the joint global deterrence capability formed under the integration of the system.


       1.3 Strong overall strength is the core of achieving effective deterrence
       The development of information technology and its widespread penetration and application in the military sector provide favourable conditions for building overall strength and achieving overall deterrence. System “Juyouzhan” is supported by the network information system, making full use of the permeability and connectivity of information technology, not only integrating various combat forces, combat elements, and combat units into an organic whole, realizing the military system combat advantages, but also integrating Various fields related to war and national mobilization, such as national politics, economy, diplomacy, finance, transportation, and energy, are connected and integrated into the national war mobilization system Gather all forces and resources to form an overall synergy, realize the emergence effect of system capabilities, show the overall strength advantage, and form a powerful invisible deterrent of united efforts and sharing the same hatred Create a situation that makes the enemy “powerful but unable to act ”“able to act but ineffective”, and play a role in containing and winning the war.
       In the “overall deterrence war”, the scope of national war mobilization will be wider, not limited to a certain direction or region, but throughout the country and even the relevant regions of the world; mobilization time will be faster, and using networks and information systems, mobilization and action information can be quickly transmitted to everyone and every node at the first time; action coordination and synergy will be more consistent, and all forces distributed in various regions can be based on the same situation Under the same order, the operation is unified at almost the same time, which greatly improves the efficiency of operational synergy; resources are more fully utilized, and various war resources based on the Internet can quickly realize the conversion between peacetime and wartime, military-civilian conversion, and achieve integrated front and rear guarantees and precise guarantees.


       2. Electromagnetic Disturbance Warfare
       Electromagnetic disturbance warfare refers to the flexible use of electronic detection, attack and defense and other combat methods and action styles to disrupt, prevent and destroy the enemy’s electromagnetic capabilities, actively compete for the advantages of the electromagnetic spectrum, seize information control rights, and then win operational initiative.


       2.1 The key to competing for information advantage Informatization local warfare is highly dependent on the electromagnetic spectrum, the Control and counter-control of electromagnetic space have become the focus of competition for information rights. Organize and carry out electromagnetic obstruction warfare, mainly to destroy the enemy’s electromagnetic spectrum and protect one’s own side from destruction. The electromagnetic spectrum is the main carrier for transmitting information. The use of electromagnetic means to disrupt the enemy’s electromagnetic spectrum will effectively reduce the enemy’s information combat capabilities and enable our own side to ensure the rapid and effective flow of information in the scenario of ownership of information rights, driving command flow, action flow, and material flow through information flow, energy flow, and then have the dominance and initiative in combat.


       2.2 The basic focus is to implement electromagnetic disturbance warfare in the battle to deactivate the enemy’s combat system. It is mainly aimed at the enemy’s dependence on electromagnetic space. At the same time, in order to ensure its own effective use of electromagnetic space, it organizes various electronic reconnaissance and interference, attack, defense and support forces to attack enemy communication networks, radar networks, computer networks and command centers, communication hubs, radar stations, etc Computer network nodes, global navigation and positioning systems, space link systems such as the “Heaven and Earth Integrated Internet”, and various other frequency-using weapons and equipment carry out interference and attacks, block and destroy their communication and data transmission, and destroy the enemy’s combat system. “Connection” and “sharing” structural center of gravity provide support for seizing information control and electromagnetic control from the root, thereby weakening the enemy’s command and control capabilities Deactivating and disabling the enemy’s entire combat system.


       2.3 Crack effective tactics for unmanned cluster operations
     “Unmanned autonomous group operations such as swarms ”“wolves ”“fishes” are important features of information-based local warfare with intelligent characteristics. The various unmanned autonomous clusters are large in number, diverse in type, and complex in characteristics, and each individual can complement each other and play a role in replacing each other. It will be very difficult to intercept and damage the entire unmanned cluster. However, from a technical point of view, for unmanned combat clusters to achieve effective synergy, each individual must share and interact with each other. Once the communication coordination between unmanned clusters is interfered with, it will be impossible to share battlefield posture and information, and will not be able to coordinate actions with each other, making it difficult to achieve the combat effectiveness it deserves. This gives the other party an opportunity to implement interception of communications and electromagnetic interference. Therefore, the implementation of electromagnetic spectrum warfare, interference and attacks on the information and communication networks of unmanned clusters, and the destruction of their information sharing and interaction will make it impossible for each individual in the unmanned cluster to achieve effective synergy and thus lose its operational capabilities.


       3. Cyber-sabotage
       Cyber-blowout, It refers to military confrontation operations that comprehensively use technologies such as networks and computers and other effective means to control information and information networks. It is a major combat style of cyberspace operations and competition for network control. Its main combat operations are both soft-kill and hard-destroy, focusing on soft and combining soft and hard. Among them, soft kill is mainly a cyber attack, that is, it comprehensively uses blocking attacks, virus attacks and other means to block and attack enemy information networks, command systems, weapon platforms, etc., making it difficult for enemy networks, command information systems, etc. to operate effectively or even paralyze; hard destruction mainly uses precision fire strikes, high-energy microwaves, electromagnetic pulses, and anti-radiation attacks to paralyze and destroy enemy information network physical facilities Destroy enemy combat and weapons and equipment entities.
       The important thing is to “break the net and reduce energy failure”. Organizing a cyber attack in a “system-based battle of excellence” is to target the weaknesses of the combat opponent’s military information network, use the advantages of the system to organize various cyber attack forces, and conduct combat command networks, reconnaissance intelligence networks, communication networks and even logistics throughout the entire operation. Supply networks, etc., continue to carry out soft killing and hard destruction operations to destroy the enemy’s network system The overall function of the enemy’s combat system is reduced or even disabled. It mainly targets core targets such as the enemy’s basic information network, intelligence network, command network, and support network, and implements a series of combat operations such as network-to-electronics coordinated attacks, deception and confusion, link blocking, and takeover control, so that the enemy’s intelligent combat network system becomes incapacitated and ineffective, achieving a critical victory that paralyzes the enemy system.


      4. Cognitively Controlled Disturbance Warfare
      Cognitive interference control war refers to interfering with, destroying or controlling the enemy’s thinking and cognition through information attacks, public opinion attacks, and brain attacks in the system optimization war, so that the enemy cannot make correct judgments and decisions, thereby controlling the enemy in cognitive space. form a controlling advantage.
      Cognitive domains, That is, “human thinking space and consciousness space are areas that have a critical impact on combat decision-making and judgment”. The development of information technology, especially artificial intelligence technology, and its widespread application in the military field have expanded the battle of war from physical space and information space to cognitive space, making cognitive space a completely new combat domain. With the development of information and intelligent technology and its widespread and in-depth application in the military field, the Human-machine intelligence tends to converge This has made the status of cognition in intelligent warfare more prominent, and the cognitive field has gradually become an important battlefield. The right to control cognition has become a key element of future battlefield control. Fighting for cognitive control has become an important combat style for winning information-based local warfare operations with intelligent characteristics.


       4.1 Control the cognitive rights of situational awareness and compete for information advantages
       In the system’s “excellence battle”, information flow drives the flow of matter and energy, and information advantage determines decision-making advantage. Rapid and accurate knowledge of intelligence information and battlefield situations has an important impact on seizing command and decision-making advantages. Therefore, when organizing and implementing system-based battle gathering, we must make full use of intelligent technology and big data technology to conduct comprehensive analysis and judgment on massive intelligence information data, mine and extract the required intelligence information, and achieve more accurate and faster understanding of battlefield situations and combat environments. Cognition ensures that the enemy is discovered first and the enemy is recognized first from the source. While removing one’s own side “the fog of war”, create “the fog” for the opponent. Therefore, in order to compete for cognitive rights, we must not only control and process information before the enemy, but also take measures such as online public opinion attacks and high virtual reality chaos to actively create and spread false information, disrupt and disrupt the perception and cognition of hostile battlefield situations, maximize confusion and increase uncertainty, interfere with the opponent’s combat decisions, and delay its combat operations.


       4.2 Control and command decision-making power and compete for decision-making advantages
       Decision strengths determine action strengths. Quick decision-making by the commander is the key to shortening “the command cycle” and achieving quick wins. The organizational system focuses on excellent combat, and the success or failure of combat operations depends largely on the speed of the commander’s decision-making. It is necessary to “use intelligent auxiliary decision-making systems, select the best combat plans, scientifically and rationally allocate combat resources, and maximize combat effectiveness; use ubiquitous intelligent networks to access required combat nodes and combat platforms at any time to build and form an integrated combat system.” Achieve decentralized deployment of power, information, and capabilities, cross-domain linkage, form advantages at locations and times required for operations, gather energy to release energy, and gather advantages to win; Implementation “core attack”, Errors or deviations in the enemy’s command decisions are caused by hacking into the other party “chip”, tampering with its programs, and command and decision system algorithms.


       4.3 Control “brain” power and seize the advantage of brain control
       Cognitive interference control warfare in the system’s “gathering excellence war” emphasizes “attacking the heart and seizing the will”, that is, using network warfare, electromagnetic warfare and other methods to control the enemy’s human brain and consciousness cognition as well as the control system of the unmanned autonomous platform “attacking the heart Cognitive control warfare to control the brain and seize ambitions” Replace “destroy” with “control”, To achieve the goal of stopping and winning the war at the minimum cost. Attacking the heart and controlling the brain is different from traditional strategic deterrence. It places more emphasis on active attack. It is an active attack operation that mainly uses advanced information combat technology, brain control technology, etc. to attack the enemy’s decision-making leader, as well as intelligent unmanned autonomous combat platforms, auxiliary decision-making systems, etc., carry out controlled “brain” attacks, directly control and disrupt the opponent “brain”, influence and control the enemy’s decision-making, or disable it Enable stealth control of enemy combat operations. For example, “Targeting human cognitive thinking, using brain reading and brain control technology, and using mental guidance and control methods to directly carry out “inject ”“invasive” attacks on the brains of enemy personnel, interfering with, controlling or destroying the cognitive system of enemy commanders.”, deeply control it from the perspective of consciousness, thinking and psychology, seize “control intellectual power”, disrupt the enemy’s decision-making, destroy the enemy’s morale, and force the enemy to disarm.


      5. Agile Mobile Warfare
      Agile mobile warfare refers to the efficient decision-making, efficient adjustment of troop deployment and high-efficiency real-time gathering of combat forces in systematic battle, efficient gathering of capabilities on the existing battlefield, and seizing combat opportunities. Agility is the ability to respond quickly and timely to changes in the battlefield environment. It has the characteristics of responsiveness, robustness, flexibility, elasticity, innovation and adaptability.

Table 1 Connotation of the concept of agile warfare


      5.1 Efficient and fast decision-making
      To implement agile and mobile warfare, we must first make efficient and rapid decisions to win operational opportunities. Therefore, it is necessary to comprehensively use various means of reconnaissance, detection, perception and surveillance to obtain battlefield posture and target information in a timely manner, especially characteristic information, activity trajectories and real-time position information of time-sensitive targets, so as to ensure precise intelligence support for rapid decision-making. Efficient decision-making is also reflected in the speed of intelligence processing. It takes less time to screen effective intelligence information, formulate action plans at a faster speed according to changes in circumstances, and seize the initiative and seize the opportunity with one step ahead. High-efficiency decision-making focuses on shortening the decision-making cycle, taking the target time window as the central point, and integrating decision-making command with combat units and weapon platforms, rapid response, and overall linkage to improve combat efficiency.


      5.2 High efficiency forms a favorable combat situation
      It is necessary to “keep abreast of changes in the battlefield situation at any time, rely on the support of information networks, and achieve dynamic reorganization of combat forces and integration during movement through cross-domain, cross-dimensional, and diversified three-dimensional maneuvers. Combat resources flow efficiently throughout the region and gather during movement to achieve mobility and excellence.”, forming a favorable battlefield situation. Agile mobile warfare relies on data fusion processing, intelligent assisted decision-making and other means to quickly form combat plans, quickly project combat forces at a high frequency according to the case, organize troops to quickly form favorable combat deployments, and realize enemy discovery, enemy decision-making, and enemy fire, first enemy assessment, change the balance of power in the shortest time and fastest speed, form combat advantages, and improve the efficiency of combat operations.


      5.3 Efficient and instant gathering of combat power
      To organize agile mobile warfare, the key is to select the right combat force within a limited time, coordinate the entire battle situation, and form an overall synergy to ensure a fatal blow. Therefore, in response to changes in battlefield posture, especially target situations, it is necessary to draw up groups to form a joint mobile combat system formed by multi-domain combat forces, gather combat forces in real time, deploy quickly and mobilely to a favorable battlefield, and carry out real-time strikes against the enemy. For deep space, deep sea, etc. to become a new combat space, an intelligent unmanned autonomous combat platform can be organized Rapid mobility is deployed to lurk near key targets or important passages that are difficult for humans to reach due to physiological limitations, and ambush operations are carried out on standby, creating new cross-domain checks and balances.


      5.4 Agile mobile warfare is an innovative development of traditional mobile warfare
      In the history of both ancient and modern warfare at home and abroad, there have been numerous examples of successful battles that relied on rapid covert maneuvers to achieve combat objectives. However, the combat process of information-based local warfare has been greatly compressed, the combat rhythm has accelerated rapidly, and fighter aircraft are fleeting. It has put forward higher requirements for fast mobile capture fighters. It is difficult to meet the requirements of joint operations and all-area operations under information conditions alone “fast pace, high speed”. requirements, so agile mobility must be implemented.


       6. Unmanned cluster autonomous warfare
       Unmanned cluster autonomous warfare refers to the widespread use of unmanned combat methods such as “bees”“ wolves ”“fishes” in system optimization warfare to independently organize actions and distributed attacks to achieve joint human-machine victory. With unmanned autonomous equipment becoming the main combat force on the battlefield, defeating the enemy with unmanned autonomous equipment clusters and numerical superiority has become an important combat style in information warfare.


       6.1 It is conducive to forming a system advantage to suppress the enemy
       Unmanned cluster independent warfare gives full play to the special advantages of unmanned combat weapons such as all-weather, unlimited, difficult to defend, and low consumption, and builds and forms large-scale unmanned combat clusters or formations such as unmanned “bee swarms”“ wolves ”“fish swarms”, and organizes independently, mutual coordination, can implement close-range and full-coverage reconnaissance, or act as bait to interfere or deceive, or cooperate with main battle weapons to implement distributed coordinated attacks Enable overall mobility and joint control of the enemy.


       6.2 Conducive to enhancing combat effectiveness
       In “unmanned cluster autonomous operations”, different combat units within the unmanned cluster organization are responsible for different functions and different tasks, including those responsible for reconnaissance, those carrying out electromagnetic interference and fire strikes, and those playing “decoy” roles. Clusters transmit and share battlefield information through inter-group networks, perform their respective duties according to the division of labor, and collaborate in real-time, independently, and dynamically according to battlefield changes. They not only give full play to their advantages in quantity and scale, but also use information networks and intelligent integration technology to achieve integration effects, using cluster advantages to consume enemy defense detection, tracking and interception capabilities, rapidly saturating and paralyzing the enemy’s defense system.


       6.3 Conducive to getting into enemy combat difficulties
       Unmanned cluster autonomous warfare uses a large number of autonomous unmanned combat platforms with different functions to form an unmanned combat cluster integrating reconnaissance and detection, electronic interference, cyber attacks, and fire strikes. It can carry out multi-directional and multi-directional operations against the same target or target group. Multiple, continuous attacks will make it difficult for the enemy to make effective counterattacks.


       7. Pointkill Battle
       “Precise point-killing warfare” refers to accurately obtaining intelligence in system-based battles, implementing multi-domain precision strikes, striving to shake the overall situation with one point, and maximizing combat benefits. Informationized local warfare is an overall confrontation between systems. Implementing precise point-killing warfare and precise strikes on important nodes and key links of the enemy’s combat system will destroy the enemy’s combat system and reduce enemy combat capabilities, which will achieve twice the result with half the effort. Combat effect.


      7.1 Achieve efficient combat cost ratio
      Achieving maximum combat effectiveness at the minimum cost is a goal pursued by both sides of the war. With the widespread application of information technology in the military field and the advent of information warfare, precision-guided weapons, intelligent kinetic energy weapons, integrated surveillance and attack drones, and laser weapons are widely equipped with troops; through the use of big data, artificial intelligence and other technologies, it has become possible to accurately calculate the required troops and weapons. These all provide material and technical conditions for achieving precision point kill warfare, achieving operational objectives at a lesser cost, and achieving operationally efficient fee ratios.


       7.2 Targeting key nodes is an important option
       The key to precise point-killing battles is to hit the key points and nodes. If you don’t hit, it will be enough. If you hit, it will be painful. If you hit, you will win. If you hit a point, you will break the enemy’s system and shake the overall situation. The target of the strike is not limited to the enemy’s dispersed deployment of ships and aircraft, but should also be targeted at local, dynamic, time-sensitive targets or independent targets such as enemy command centers, important hubs, and even major generals and commanders, in pursuit of deterrence, shock and enemy-breaking system effects. It will also be an effective countermeasure to use precision strike fire to carry out “point-kill” strikes in response to the distributed tactic of decomposing expensive large-scale equipment functions into a large number of small platforms and implementing decentralized deployment of forces.


       7.3 Large-scale system support is the basic condition
       The implementation of precise point-kill warfare cannot be separated from the support of a large-scale system. Focusing on achieving combat goals, the required troops and weapons are transferred from each operational domain that is dispersed and deployed. With the support of the network information system, they are dynamically integrated to form a precision strike system to achieve overall linkage and system energy gathering. Through reasonable and sufficient firepower, the target is concentrated. Strike to achieve precise use of troops and precise release of energy. To implement precise point-and-kill operations to be precise, all links within the entire combat system need to be closely connected without any mistakes. The U.S. military’s killing of bin Laden in 2011 can be said to be a typical strategic precision killing operation supported by the strategic system.


       7.4 It is inseparable from precise intelligence support
       In precision point kill warfare, precise intelligence support is always the key to achieving operational goals. Therefore, before the war, various means should be used to collect various enemy intelligence information, especially accurate analysis and judgment of enemy targets. During combat operations, various sensors and intelligence reconnaissance methods should be used to accurately grasp enemy target changes and dynamic target situations in a timely manner, so as to provide powerful and effective intelligence support for the implementation of precise point-kill warfare. The U.S. military’s targeted killing operation against Soleimani was a typical precise point-killing battle supported by an efficient intelligence system.


       8. Supply-breaking
       Supply chain-breaking warfare refers to organizing elite forces in a system-gathering battle to attack the enemy’s logistics supplies and equipment supply supply chain, supply lines and supply bases, defeat the enemy and lose supplies and withdraw from the battle. In response to weaknesses such as the enemy’s long logistics supply line and large equipment support stalls, the organization of elite forces to build “chain-breaking warfare” combat systems, and to carry out sustained, precise and devastating strikes against enemy logistics supplies and equipment supply chains, supply lines and supply bases, will make it unsustainable due to the loss of supplies and will have to withdraw from the battle.


       8.1 The supply guarantee chain has a huge impact on the overall combat situation
       Logistics equipment support is an important basis for operations. The constant supply of logistical supplies and weapons and equipment ultimately determines the size of an army’s combat troops, whether they can fight, in what season, where they can fight, how far they can leave their rear bases, how long they can fight, how fast they can maneuver, and so on. In information warfare, the consumption of battlefield materials has increased exponentially. Not only has the dependence on logistics equipment support for operations not decreased, but it has become larger and larger. Moreover, the requirements for the specialization of support have also become higher and higher In particular, modern combat equipment is available in a wide variety of models and specifications, with huge volumes of mixed transport, more dispersed troop deployment and very high requirements for transport capacity, which makes bases, communication lines and transport more important than ever. The stable and efficient operation of the supply guarantee chain and continuous and uninterrupted supply guarantee are the key to operational victory and have a huge impact on the overall operational situation.


       8.2 The center of gravity of the attack is a key node in cutting off the enemy’s supply guarantee chain
       The operational center of gravity of supply chain-breaking warfare is a key link in attacking the enemy’s supply support chain, and its continuous support capability is lost through chain-breaking. Therefore, the organization of supply chain-breaking warfare should mainly target enemy ground railway and road transport lines, maritime supply convoys, military requisitioned merchant ships and combat support ships, large and medium-sized air transport aircraft, and rear supply bases. For example, striking the enemy’s maritime supply support chain and cutting off the enemy’s fuel, ammunition, fresh water, and food supplies will make the enemy aircraft carrier battle group lose its ability to continue fighting, which in turn will even affect the outcome of a battle.


       8.3 The key is to choose the right time and make full use of tactics
       It is crucial to organize the implementation of supply chain-breaking warfare and to choose a favorable time to strike. The timing of strikes in supply chain-breaking warfare should be organized and implemented when the enemy’s supply maneuvers are selected, so as to surprise and attack unprepared concealed tactics, carry out sudden strikes on enemy supply vehicles, ships and transport aircraft, and terminate their supply operations. Specific tactics usually include covert ambush warfare, organizing capable forces to ambush the routes and routes that enemy transportation must pass through, waiting for opportunities to carry out covert surprise attacks; stealth surprise warfare, using submarines, stealth fighters, etc. to covertly move forward to carry out attacks on enemy transportation targets, and win by surprise; long-range precision warfare, using long-range conventional surface-to-surface missile forces to attack enemy supply bases and airports Long-range precision strikes are carried out at the departure points of supplies such as docks.


       9. System “paralysis battle”
       System destruction and paralysis war refers to the comprehensive use of various means such as breaking the network, breaking the chain, and defeating nodes in the system optimization war to interfere with, delay, destroy, or even paralyze the effective operation of the enemy’s combat system and weaken the functions of the enemy’s combat system. The essence of system destruction and paralysis warfare is to weaken the correlation and structural power between the elements of the enemy’s combat system, degrade the functions of the system, and fail to play a role in doubling capabilities.


       9.1 The combat goal is to disorderly operate the enemy’s combat system
       In information warfare, the combat systems of both warring parties have their own internal order, and this order is the key to maintaining and supporting the operation of the combat system. The side that can maintain and navigate the internal order of the combat system will gain an advantage and, conversely, a disadvantage. Therefore, the goal of “disrupting the enemy’s winning mechanism and causing the enemy’s combat system to become disordered” should be established in system destruction and paralysis warfare. This requires that the system be fully utilized in the battle of paralysis Information technology in particular intelligent algorithms The “powerful enabling effect” can quickly adjust and reconstruct one’s own combat system, quickly generate and release powerful combat power, and implement agile and precise strikes on the enemy’s combat system, causing the enemy’s combat system to lose normal operating order and become disordered. The system functions are destroyed and the overall combat capabilities are significantly reduced.


       9.2 A key node in the heavy strike combat system
       Systematic confrontation is a major feature of information warfare. System is an important foundation and support for system confrontation, and is also the key to effectively exerting combat effectiveness by integrating various combat forces, weapon platforms and weapon systems on the battlefield. Whether the system can be kept robust and run smoothly has a decisive influence on the achievement of war and campaign victories. In the battle to destroy and paralyze the system, the key is to focus on the enemy’s integrated combat system of land, sea, air and space power grids, breaking the network, breaking the chain, and attacking nodes. By attacking key node targets, the operating mechanism of the enemy’s combat system will be out of order, and it may even be severely damaged or destroyed. Paralysis. Therefore, the basic direction of system destruction and paralysis warfare is to select key units, key nodes, and key elements of the enemy’s combat system to carry out strikes, attack one point, destroy one part, and paralyze the whole, so as to achieve the goal of defeating the enemy.


       9.3 Implement soft strikes against the enemy’s combat system
       When organizing and implementing system breaking and hard destruction, it simultaneously organizes soft-kill combat operations such as electronic warfare, cyber warfare, psychological warfare, and public opinion warfare, and carries out soft strikes on the information domain and cognitive domain of the enemy’s combat system. Electronic warfare uses the power of electronic warfare to carry out strong electromagnetic interference against the enemy, causing its information to malfunction and fall into the fog of war; cyber warfare uses the power of cyber attack to attack the enemy’s network information system, causing the enemy’s command and communication system and computer network to be severely damaged, causing its command to malfunction and fall into information islands or even war islands; psychological warfare and public opinion warfare, using psychological warfare and public opinion warfare methods It carries out psychological strikes and public opinion guidance against the enemy, severely damaging his will to fight and inducing his cognitive disorientation. Organizing “people’s livelihood wars” to attack the opponent’s major national economy and people’s livelihood facilities can also play a role in the enemy’s combat system “drawing fuel from the bottom of the cauldron”. In the 1999 Kosovo War, the US military did not attack the Yugoslav army, but attacked its war potential target system, causing the Yugoslav soldiers and civilians to lose their will to fight and lead to defeat. 

現代國語：

體系聚優戰是資訊化戰爭中的體係作戰，其不限定特指某一種作戰樣式，而是由多種作戰樣式和戰法組成的“組合拳”，或作戰樣式群。強調根據作戰任務、作戰對手和戰場情勢變化，只要有利於形成相對優勢、達成體系製勝，可以靈活運用任何適宜的作戰手段和样式，形成作戰優勢。在體系聚優戰具體實施過程中，這些具體作戰樣式和行動戰法既可以作為聯合全局作戰的一部分單獨組織實施，更強調打“組合拳”，多策並舉，整體制勝。
為更能理解其核心內涵，本文列舉了整體威懾戰、電磁擾阻戰、網路破擊戰、認知控擾戰等九大典型作戰樣式，並進行分析。

體系聚優戰――靈活運用多種作戰樣式的「組合拳」作者：學術plus高級觀察員 東週
本文主要內容及關鍵字
1.整體威懾戰：強調多域聯合威懾；實施整體威懾戰應具備三大要素；強大整體實力是實現有效威懾的核心
2.電磁擾阻戰：爭奪資訊優勢的關鍵；在組合手段方法上，透過「連結+共享」實現資訊賦能；破解無人集群作戰的有效戰法
3.網路破擊戰：軟殺傷為主，軟硬結合，重在破網降能失效
4.認知控擾：控制態勢感知認知權，爭奪資訊優勢；控制指揮決策權，爭奪決策優勢；控制「腦」權，奪取腦控優勢
5.敏捷機動戰：高效率快速決策；高效率形成有利作戰態勢；高效率即時聚合作戰力量；敏捷機動戰是對傳統機動作戰的創新發展
6.蜂群自主戰：有利於形成體系優勢壓制敵方；有利於增強作戰效果；有利於陷敵於作戰困境
7.精確點殺戰：實現作戰的高效費比；打關鍵節點目標是重要選項；大範圍體系支撐是基本條件；離不開精確情報保障
8.補給斷鍊戰：供應保障鏈對作戰全局影響巨大；打擊重心是斷敵供應保障鏈的關鍵節點；重在選準時機活用戰法
9.體系毀癱戰：作戰目標是使敵作戰體系運作失序；重拳打擊作戰體系的關鍵節點；對敵作戰體系實施軟打擊

僅供學習參考，歡迎交流指正！文章觀點不代表本機構立場
作戰概念首先是作為一種新的作戰樣式提出。創新作戰樣式是作戰概念開發的核心內容。可以說，體系聚優戰是一系列具體戰法的總稱。以下九大典型作戰樣式構成了體系聚優戰的戰法體系。分別為：一是整體威懾戰，在體系聚優戰中積極組織靜態威力展示和威懾行動，力爭不戰或小戰而屈人之兵；二是電磁擾阻戰，運用電子偵攻防等多種作戰手段和行動樣式，擾亂、阻止、破壞敵電磁能力的發揮，積極爭奪電磁頻譜優勢，奪取制資訊權，進而贏得作戰主動；三是網路破擊戰，運用軟打擊和硬摧毀等多種手段，破敵指揮網、情報網、通信網、後勤補給網，亂敵指揮保障；四是認知控擾。透過資訊攻擊、輿論攻擊、腦攻擊，在認知空間形成控制優勢；五是敏捷機動戰。快速調整兵力兵器部署，在即設戰場快速聚集能力，搶奪作戰先機；六是蜂群自主戰。廣泛運用「蜂群」、「狼群」、「魚群」等無人作戰手段，自主組織行動、分散式攻擊，實現人機聯合製勝；七是精確點殺戰。精準獲取情報，實施多域精確打擊，力爭打一點撼全局，實現作戰效益最大化；八是補給斷鏈戰。組織精銳力量，打敵後勤物資裝備供應補給鏈、補給線和補給基地，破敵失去補給而退出戰鬥；九是體系毀癱戰。綜合採取破網、鍛鍊、打節點等多種手段，幹擾、遲滯、破壞甚至癱瘓敵作戰體係有效運轉，削弱敵作戰系統功能。
1.整體威懾戰
整體威懾戰是指在體系聚優戰中積極組織靜態威力展示和威懾行動，力爭不戰或小戰而屈人之兵。孫子曰：「不戰而屈人之兵，善之善者也。」威懾和戰爭是軍事活動的兩種主要形式。而威懾，主要是透過展現力量或威脅使用強大實力，向潛在對手錶明決心意志，以嚇阻對手行動的行為。可以說，體系聚優戰中的整體威懾戰是實現不戰而「止」人之兵的重要手段或戰法。克勞塞維茨強調，策略的第一條規則是盡可能強大，首先是整體的強大，然後是在關鍵部位的強大。現代戰爭是體系與體系的對抗。資訊化局部戰爭下的整體威懾戰，不僅要有陸海空天傳統威懾手段和能力，也需要太空威懾、電磁威懾、網路威懾等新型威懾手段和能力，更需要有顯示國家整體實力的整體威懾。特別是隨著資訊科技等先進科技的快速發展，科技革命、產業革命、軍事革命加速融合,戰略競爭力、社會生產力和軍隊戰鬥力耦合關聯更加緊密，打贏資訊化戰爭更大程度上是國家意志和國家整體實力的較量。若要遏止戰爭，首先要從整體實力上對對手形成嚇阻。
1.1 強調多域聯合威懾
威懾手段通常包括核威懾和常規威懾。在體系聚優戰中，實施整體威懾戰，旨在綜合運用陸海空天電網全域常規威懾手段，以達成威懾目的。特別是隨著資訊網路技術及太空、定向能技術在軍事上的應用，太空、網路、電磁武器等成為新型威懾手段。太空威懾，主要以快速回應電磁軌道武器、天地網路化反導航定位服務系統、大橢圓軌道雷射武器、高功率微波武器等裝備，威脅攻擊對手空間目標，形成對敵空間訊息「幹擾阻斷」威懾。網路威懾，主要是以網路空間態勢感知和攻擊裝備，威脅攻擊對手軍事網路及其它關鍵資訊基礎設施，實現對敵威懾。電磁威懾，主要以電磁頻譜作戰系統，威脅攻擊敵探測、導航、通訊等資訊化武器裝備系統，實現對敵致聾致盲威懾。 1.2 實施整體嚇阻戰應具備三大要素
實施整體威懾戰並達成嚇阻預期效果，通常必須具備三大要素：一是實力。威嚇方必須具備令對手感到忌憚畏懼的可靠能力或力量；二是決心意志。威懾方在必要時必須敢於使用這種能力；三是明確傳遞訊息。威懾方必須將行動能力與決心準確、有效地讓對方清楚知道。
從歷史上看，判斷威懾實力的標準主要有三個面向變化：一是現役軍事力量；二是綜合國力或戰爭潛力；三是主戰武器裝備總數。在相當長一段歷史時期內，軍隊數量就是威懾，軍事實力的強弱直接取決於現役軍隊的規模、重要武器裝備的數量，以及軍隊訓練組織士氣等非物質因素。二十世紀後，隨著戰爭規模的擴大，威懾實力已不再僅限於軍隊兵力和重要武器裝備的數量，而是由國家戰爭潛力所決定，其中包括經濟實力、科技實力、能源資源，甚至人口數量，等等。體系聚優戰中的整體威懾戰，其威懾實力的形成主要基於網路資訊體系，以及在該體系融合整合下形成的聯合全局威懾能力。
1.3 強大整體實力是實現有效威懾的核心綜合分析研判，挖掘提取所需情報訊息，實現對戰場態勢、作戰環境的更精準、更快速認知，從源頭確保先敵發現、先敵認知。在消除己方「戰爭迷霧」的同時，也要為對手製造「迷霧」。因此，爭奪認知權，不僅要先敵掌握、先敵處理信息，還要採取網絡輿論攻擊、高度虛擬現實亂真等措施，積極製造、散佈虛假信息，破壞、擾亂敵對戰場態勢的感知、認知，最大限度地製造混亂、增加不確定性，幹擾對手的作戰決策，遲滯其作戰行動。
4.2 控制指揮決策權，爭奪決策優勢
決策優勢決定行動優勢。指揮者的快速決策是縮短「指揮週期」、實現快速勝利的關鍵。組織體系聚優戰，作戰行動成敗很大程度取決於指揮的決策速度。要利用智慧輔助決策系統，優選最佳作戰方案，科學合理調配作戰體系，實現力量、資訊、能力分散部署、跨域聯動，在作戰所需地點、時間形成優勢，集子聚釋能、聚變勝負實施、跨域聯動，在作戰所需地點、時間形成優勢，集子聚釋能、聚變勝負實施法實作「攻芯」，透過反義程式定義、原則性反制勝；
4.3 控制「腦」權，奪取腦控優勢
體系聚優戰中的認知控擾戰，強調“攻心奪志”，即利用網絡戰、電磁戰等方式，對敵方人腦和意識認知以及無人自主平台的控制系統實施“攻心控腦奪志”的認知控制戰，以“控制”取代“摧毀”，以最小代價實現止戰、勝戰之目的。攻心控腦與傳統的謀略威懾不同，其更強調主動攻擊，是一種主動攻擊行動，主要運用先進信息作戰技術、控腦技術等，對敵決策首腦，以及智能化無人自主作戰平台、輔助決策系統等，實施控“腦”攻擊，直接控制、擾亂對手“大腦”，影響、控制敵對決策，或使其失能，實現隱形敵作戰。如以人的認知思維為目標，利用讀腦、腦控技術，運用心智導控手段，直接對敵方人員大腦實施“注入”“侵入”式攻擊，幹擾、控製或破壞敵指揮人員認知體系，從意識、思維和心理上對其深度控制，奪取“制智權”，以亂敵決策、破敵士氣，迫敵繳械。
5.敏捷機動戰
敏捷機動戰，指在體系聚優戰中高效率決策、高效率調整兵力兵器部署和高效率即時聚合作戰力量，在既設戰場高效率聚集能力，搶奪作戰先機。敏捷是一種快速及時應對戰場環境變化的能力，具有響應性、穩健性、柔性、彈性、創新性和適應性等特徵。
表1 敏捷作戰概念內涵

5.1 高效率快速決策
實施敏捷機動戰，首先要高效率快速決策，贏得作戰先機。因此，要綜合運用各種偵察探測感知與監視手段，及時獲取戰場態勢和目標信息，特別是時敏目標的特徵信息、活動軌跡以及實時位置信息，確保為快速決策提供精準情報支持。高效率決策也體現在情報處理速度上，要用更少的時間甄別有效情報訊息，根據情況變化，以更快的速度製定行動方案，快敵一步佔據主動，奪取先機。高效率決策重在縮短決策週期，要以目標時間窗口為中心點，決策指揮與作戰單元、武器平台一體協同、快速反應、整體連動，提高作戰效率。
5.2 高效率形成有利作戰態勢
要隨時掌握戰場態勢變化，依靠資訊網支撐，透過跨域、跨維、多樣化立體機動，達成作戰力量動態重組、動中融合，作戰資源全局高效流動、動中聚集，實現機動聚優，形成有利戰場態勢。敏捷機動戰依賴資料融合處理、智慧化輔助決策等手段，快速形成作戰方案，依案高頻率快速投送作戰力量，組織部隊快速形成有利作戰部署，實現先敵發現、先敵決策、先敵開火、先敵評估，以最短時間、最快速度改變力量對比，形成作戰優勢，提高作戰行動效率。
5.3 高效率即時聚合作戰力量
組織敏捷機動戰，關鍵在於有限時間內選準作戰力量，協調整個戰局，形成整體合力，確保一擊致命。因此，要針對戰場態勢特別是目標情況變化，抽組形成由多域作戰力量形成的聯合機動作戰系統，即時聚合作戰力量，快速機動部署至有利戰場，對敵實施即時打擊。針對深空、深海等成為新的作戰空間，可組織智慧化無人自主作戰平台，快速機動部署至人類因生理所限而難以到達的重點目標或重要通道附近潛伏，待機實施伏擊作戰，形成新的跨域制衡優勢。
5.4 敏捷機動戰是對傳統機動作戰的創新發展
古今中外戰爭史上，靠著快速隱密機動達成作戰目的的成功戰例比比皆是。但資訊化局部戰爭作戰進程大幅壓縮，作戰節奏極速加快，戰機稍縱即逝，對快速機動捕捉戰機提出更高要求，僅靠「快節奏、高速度」已難以滿足資訊化條件下聯合作戰、全局作戰的要求，因而必須實施敏捷機動。
6.無人集群自主戰
無人集群自主戰，指在體系聚優戰中廣泛運用「蜂群」「狼群」「魚群」等無人作戰手段，自主組織行動、分散式攻擊，實現人機聯合製勝。隨著無人自主裝備成為戰場上的主要作戰力量，以無人自主裝備集群和數量優勢戰勝敵人，已成為資訊化戰爭中的重要作戰風格。
6.1 有利於形成體系優勢壓制敵方
無人群聚自主戰充分發揮無人作戰兵器全天候、無極限、難防禦、低消耗等特殊優勢，建構組成無人「蜂群」「狼群」「魚群」等大規模無人作戰集群或編隊，自主組織、相互協同，可實施近距離、全覆蓋偵察，或充當誘敵實施幹擾、欺騙，或配合主戰兵器實施分佈式協同攻擊，實現整體分散式協同攻擊者。
6.2 有利於增強作戰效果
在無人群聚自主作戰中，無人群集編成內的不同作戰單元分別擔負不同功能、不同任務，既有負責偵察的，也有實施電磁幹擾、火力打擊的，還有扮演「誘餌」角色的。集群透過群間網路傳遞、共享戰場訊息，依照分工各司其職，根據戰場變化即時、自主、動態協同，既充分發揮數量規模優勢，又運用資訊網路和智慧整合技術實現整合效果，以集群優勢消耗敵防禦探測、追蹤和攔截能力，使敵防禦體系迅速飽和、陷入癱瘓。
6.3 有利於陷敵於作戰困境
無人集群自主戰以大量不同功能的自主無人作戰平台混合編組，形成集偵察探測、電子乾擾、網路攻擊、火力打擊於一體的無人作戰集群，對同一目標或目標群實施多方向、多波次、持續不斷的攻擊，將使敵難以作出有效反擊。
7.精確點殺戰
精確點殺戰，是指在體系聚優戰中精準獲取情報，實施多域精確打擊，力爭打一點撼全局，實現作戰效益最大化。資訊化局部戰爭是體系與體系之間的整體對抗，實施精確點殺戰，對敵方作戰體系重要節點與關鍵環節實施精確打擊，破壞敵作戰體系，降維敵作戰能力，將形成事半功倍的作戰效果。
7.1 實現作戰的高效費比
以最小代價實現最大作戰效益是作戰雙方都在追求的目標。隨著資訊科技在軍事領域的廣泛應用及資訊化戰爭來臨，精確導引武器、智慧化動能武器、察打一體無人機以及雷射武器等廣泛裝備部隊；透過運用大數據、人工智慧等技術，精確計算所需兵力兵器已成為可能。這些都為實現精確點殺戰，以較小代價達成作戰目標，實現作戰高效費比，提供了物質和技術條件。
7.2 打關鍵節點目標是重要選項
精確點殺戰重在打關鍵、打節點，不打則已，打則必痛、打則必勝，打一點破敵體系、撼動全局。打擊的目標不僅限於敵分散部署的艦機等，還應針對敵指揮中心、重要樞紐，甚至主要將領、指揮等局部、動態、時敏目標或獨立目標實施打擊，追求威懾震撼和破敵體系效果。針對將昂貴的大型裝備功能分解到大量小型平台、實施兵力分散部署這一分佈式戰術，運用精確打擊火力對其進行「點殺」式打擊，也將是一個有效對策。
7.3 大範圍體系支撐是基本條件
實施精確點殺戰，離不開大範圍體系支撐。圍繞著實現作戰目標，從分散部署的各作戰域抽調所需兵力兵器，在網路資訊體系支撐下，動態融合形成精確打擊體系，實現整體連動、體系聚能，透過合理夠用的火力集中對目標實施打擊，達成精確用兵、精確釋能。實施精確點殺戰要做到精確，需要整個作戰體系內各環節緊密銜接，不能有絲毫差錯。 2011年美軍擊斃賓拉登作戰行動，可以說是戰略體系支撐下的一次典型的戰略精確點殺作戰行動。
7.4 離不開精確情報保障
在精確點殺戰中，精確情報保障始終是達成作戰目標的關鍵。因此，戰前應動用各種手段蒐集敵方各種情報資料信息，特別要對敵方目標作出精準分析研判。作戰行動中，應動用各種感測器和情報偵察手段，適時精準掌握敵方目標變化及動態目標狀況，為實施精確點殺戰提供有力有效的情報保障。美軍對蘇萊曼尼的定點清除行動，就是一場典型的以高效情報體系支撐的精確點殺戰。
8.補給斷鍊戰
補給斷鏈戰，是指在體系聚優戰中組織精銳力量，打敵後勤物資和裝備供應補給鏈、補給線和補給基地，破敵失去補給而退出戰鬥。針對敵後勤補給線長、裝備保障攤子大等弱點，組織精銳力量建構「斷鍊戰」作戰體系，對敵後勤物資和裝備供應補給鏈、補給線和補給基地等，實施持續、精確、毀滅性打擊，將使其因失去補給而難以為繼，不得不退出戰鬥。
8.1 供應保障鏈對作戰全局影響巨大
後勤裝備保障是作戰的重要基礎。後勤物資和武器裝備持續不斷的供應補給，最後決定一支軍隊作戰部隊的規模、能否作戰、在什麼季節作戰、在哪裡作戰、能離開後方基地多遠、能作戰多長時間、機動的速度多快，等等。在資訊化戰爭中，戰場物資消耗呈指數級上升，作戰對後勤裝備保障的依賴程度不僅沒有減小，反而越來越大，而且保障的專業化程度要求也越來越高，特別是現代化作戰裝備器材型號規格紛繁多樣，混裝運輸體積巨大，部隊部署更加分散，對運力也提出非常高的要求，這使線路、通信和運輸比以往任何時候都更加重要。供應保障鏈的穩定高效運作和持續不間斷的供應保障，是作戰制勝的關鍵，對作戰全局產生巨大影響。
8.2 打擊重心是斷敵供應保障鏈的關鍵節點
補給斷鍊戰的作戰重心是打擊敵方供應保障鏈的關鍵環節，透過斷鍊使其喪失持續保障能力。因此，組織補給斷鍊戰應主要以敵方地面鐵路公路運輸線、海上補給船隊、軍事徵用的商船和戰鬥支援艦，空中大中型運輸機，以及後方補給基地等作為打擊目標。例如打擊敵方海上供應保障鏈，斷敵燃料、彈藥、淡水、食物補給，將使敵航母戰鬥群失去持續作戰能力，進而影響一場戰役的勝負。
8.3 重在選準時機活用戰法
組織實施補給斷鍊戰，選擇有利打擊時機至關重要。補給斷鍊戰的打擊時機，應選擇敵補給機動時組織實施，以出其不意攻其不備的隱蔽戰法，對敵補給車輛、艦船和運輸機實施突然打擊，終止其補給行動。具體戰法通常有隱蔽伏擊戰，組織精幹力量埋伏在敵運輸工具必經路線和航線上，伺機實施隱密性突然打擊；隱形奇襲戰，使用潛艦、隱形戰機等隱蔽前出，對敵運輸目標實施打擊，以奇制勝；遠程精確補給
9.體系毀癱戰
體系毀癱戰，指在體系聚優戰中，綜合採取破網、斷鍊、打節點等多種手段，幹擾、遲滯、破壞甚至癱瘓敵作戰體係有效運轉，削弱敵作戰體系功能。體系毀癱戰的本質，是透過削弱敵作戰體係要素間的關聯性與結構力，使體系功能退化，無法發揮能力倍增作用。
9.1 作戰目標是使敵作戰體系運作失序
在資訊化戰爭中，交戰雙方作戰體係都有其內在秩序，而這種秩序是維繫和支撐作戰體系運作的關鍵所在。能夠維護和駕馭作戰體系內在秩序的一方將獲得優勢，反之則處於劣勢。因此，體系毀癱戰應確立亂敵制勝機制、致敵作戰體系失序此目標。這就要求在體系毀癱戰中要充分利用資訊科技特別是智慧演算法的強大賦能作用，對己方作戰體系進行快速調整和重構，迅即生成並釋放強大的作戰威力，對敵方作戰體系實施敏捷精準打擊，使敵作戰體系失去正常的運作秩序，在失序中使體系功能遭到破壞，整體作戰精準打擊，使敵作戰體系失去正常的運作秩序，在失序中使體系功能遭到破壞，整體作戰能力顯著下降。
9.2 重拳打擊作戰體系的關鍵節點
體系對抗是資訊化戰爭的一個主要特徵。體係是體系對抗的重要基礎與支撐，也是戰場上各種作戰部隊、武器平台和
資訊科技的發展及在軍事領域的廣泛滲透和應用，為建構整體實力、實現整體威懾提供了有利條件。體系聚優戰以網路資訊體系為支撐，充分利用資訊科技的滲透性和聯通性，不僅把各種作戰力量、作戰要素、作戰單元融合為一個有機整體，實現軍事上的體係作戰優勢，而且把國家政治、經濟、外交、金融、交通、能源等與戰爭和國家動員相關的各領域，都連接、匯入國家戰爭動員體系，凝聚各方面力量和資源形成整體合力，實現體系能力的湧現效應，從整體上顯示綜合實力優勢，形成眾志成城、同仇敵愾的強大無形威懾，塑造使敵「有力量但不能行動」「能行動但沒有效果」的態勢，起到遏制和打贏戰爭的作用。
在整體威懾戰中，國家戰爭動員的範圍將更加廣泛，不僅限於某一方向、區域，而是遍及全國各地，乃至世界有關地區；動員時間更加迅速，利用網絡和信息系統，動員和行動信息可在第一時間迅速傳達到每個人、每個節點；行動協調和協同更加一致，分佈在各域各地的各方力量可以基於同一態勢、根據同一命令幾乎在同一時間統一行動，極大提高行動協同效率；資源利用更加充分，基於網絡的各種戰爭資源，可以快速實現平戰轉換、軍民轉換，實現前方後方一體化保障、精確保障。
2.電磁擾阻戰
電磁擾動戰，指靈活運用電子偵攻防等多種作戰手段和行動樣式，擾亂、阻止、破壞敵電磁能力的發揮，積極爭奪電磁頻譜優勢，奪取制信息權，進而贏得作戰主動。
2.1 爭奪資訊優勢的關鍵資訊化局部戰爭高度依賴電磁頻譜，對電磁空間的控制與反控製成為爭奪制資訊權的焦點。組織實施電磁阻擾戰，主要是破壞敵方電磁頻譜，保護己方不受破壞。電磁頻譜是傳遞訊息的主要載體。使用電磁手段對敵方電磁頻譜實施阻擾破壞，將有效降低敵資訊作戰能力，並使己方在擁有製資訊權的場景下，保障資訊的快速有效流動，透過資訊流驅動指揮流、行動流、物質流、能量流，進而擁有作戰的主導權、主動權。
2.2基本著眼導航定位系統、天地一體互聯網等空間鏈路系統，及其他各種用頻武器裝備，實施幹擾、攻擊，阻斷、破壞其通信聯絡及資料傳輸，破壞敵作戰體系的「連結」與「共享」結構重心，從根源為奪取制資訊權、制電磁權提供支撐，進而削弱整個作戰控制能力，使敵軍系統失能、失效。
2.3 破解無人集群作戰的有效戰法
「蜂群」「狼群」「魚群」等無人自主集群作戰，是具有智慧化特徵的資訊化局部戰爭的重要特徵。各種無人自主集群數量龐大、類型多樣、特徵複雜，且每個個體都可以互補位置、互相替代發揮作用，攔截毀傷整個無人集群將十分困難。但從技術角度分析，無人作戰集群為實現有效協同，每個個體之間必須進行資訊共享與互動。無人集群間通訊協同一旦受到干擾，將無法分享戰場態勢與訊息，無法相互協同行動，也就很難發揮應有作戰效能。這就給對方實施通訊攔截與電磁幹擾提供了機會。因此，實施電磁頻譜戰，對無人集群的資訊通訊網路實施幹擾、攻擊，破壞其資訊共享與交互，將使無人集群中每個個體無法實現有效協同，從而失去作戰能力。
3.網路破擊戰
網路破擊戰，指綜合運用網路和電腦等技術以及其他有效手段，圍繞著資訊、資訊網路的控制權而進行的軍事對抗行動，是網路空間作戰、爭奪制網權的主要作戰樣式。其主要作戰行動既有軟殺傷也有硬摧毀，以軟為主、軟硬結合。其中，軟殺傷主要是網路攻擊，即綜合利用阻塞攻擊、病毒攻擊等手段，對敵資訊網路、指揮系統、武器平台等進行阻滯與攻擊，使敵網路、指揮資訊系統等難以有效運作甚至癱瘓；硬摧毀主要是利用精確火力打擊、高能量微波、電磁脈衝以及反輻射攻擊等手段，癱毀敵資訊資訊網路和物理設施，摧毀敵人實體武器。
重在破網降能失效。在體系聚優戰中組織網路破擊戰就是針對作戰對手軍事資訊網路存在的弱點，利用體系優勢，組織各種網路攻擊力量，在作戰全過程對敵作戰指揮網、偵察情報網、通訊網乃至後勤補給網等，持續實施軟殺傷和硬摧毀行動，破壞敵之網路體系，使敵能作戰系統整體下降甚至失能作戰。主要對敵基礎資訊網、情報網、指揮網、保障網等核心目標，實施網電協同攻擊、欺騙迷惘、連結阻塞、接管控制等一系列作戰行動，使敵智能化作戰網路體系失能失效，達成癱敵體系的關鍵性勝利。
4.認知控擾戰
認知控擾戰，是指在體系聚優戰中透過資訊攻擊、輿論攻擊、腦攻擊，幹擾、破壞或控制敵對思維認知，使敵不能做出正確判斷、決策，從而在認知空間對敵形成控制優勢。
認知域，即人的思考空間、意識空間，是對作戰決策、判斷等具有關鍵性影響的領域。資訊科技特別是人工智慧技術的發展及在軍事領域的廣泛應用，使戰爭的較量從物理空間、資訊空間擴大到認知空間，使認知空間成為一個全新的作戰域。隨著資訊化、智慧化技術發展並在軍事領域廣泛深入應用，人機智慧趨於融合，使認知在智慧化戰爭作戰中的地位更加凸顯，認知領域逐漸成為重要的戰場。制認知權成為未來戰場控制權的關鍵要素。爭奪認知控制權成為具有智慧化特徵的資訊化局部戰爭作戰制勝的重要作戰樣式。
4.1 控制態勢感知認知權，爭奪資訊優勢
體系聚優戰中，資訊流驅動物質流、能量流，資訊優勢決定決策優勢。對情報資訊與戰場態勢的快速、準確認知，對奪取指揮決策優勢有重要影響。因此，組織實施體系聚優戰，要充分利用智慧技術、大數據技術，對海量情報資訊資料進行武器系統聯為一體，有效發揮作戰效能的關鍵。體系能否保持健壯、順暢運轉，對取得戰爭和戰役勝利具有決定性影響。體系毀癱戰中，關鍵在於著眼敵方陸海空天電網整合作戰體系，破網、斷鍊、打節點，透過打關鍵節點目標，使敵方作戰體系運作機理失序，甚至遭到重創或毀癱。因此，體系毀癱戰的基本指向是選敵作戰體系的關鍵單元、關鍵節點、關鍵要素實施打擊，擊其一點、毀其一片、癱其整體，達成克敵制勝的目的。
9.3 對敵作戰體系實施軟性打擊
組織實施體系破擊戰硬摧毀時，同步組織電子戰、網路戰、心理戰、輿論戰等軟殺傷作戰行動，對敵作戰體系的資訊域、認知域實施軟打擊。電子戰，使用電子戰力量對敵實施強電磁幹擾，使其信息失靈，陷入戰爭迷霧之中；網絡戰，使用網絡進攻力量對敵網絡信息體系實施攻擊，使敵指揮通信系統和計算機網絡受到嚴重破壞，使其指揮失靈，陷入信息孤島乃至戰爭孤島；心理戰和作戰論戰，使用心理戰、輿論手段，對敵對認知，打擊其戰爭論戰，使用心理戰、輿論手段，對敵對心理打擊行為論組織民生戰，打擊對手的重大國計民生設施，同樣可以對敵作戰體係起到「釜底抽薪」作用。 1999年科索沃戰爭中，美軍沒有打擊南聯盟軍隊，而是打擊其戰爭潛力目標體系，使南聯盟軍民失去戰鬥意志走向失敗。

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.81it.com/2022/0901/13716888.html

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Future Proofing China’s National Defense & Military An Important Aspect of Chinese-style Modernization

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面向未來的中國國防和軍隊是中國式現代化的重要面向

現代英語：

Soldiers are a major event for the country. In the great journey of “building a powerful country and rejuvenating the nation, and against the background of the accelerated evolution of major changes unseen in the world in a century, building and consolidating national defense and a strong people’s army are directly related to the future and destiny of the country and the nation”. The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China pointed out that “national defense and military modernization are important components of Chinese-style modernization”, which fully reflects the great importance that the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core attaches to national defense and military construction, and provides guidance for national defense and military modernization on the new journey. Modernization points out the direction.

　　The modernization of the national defense and military is the security guarantee and strategic support for Chinese-style modernization

　　”If you fall behind, you will be beaten. Only when the army is strong can the country be safe”. Without a strong army, there can be no strong state. After the Opium War in 1840, modern China was repeatedly defeated in its battles with Western powers. The vast country gradually became a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, with the country humiliated, the people in trouble, and civilization in dust. History has inspired us that the Chinese nation’s emergence from suffering and the liberation of the Chinese people depend on a heroic people’s army; to comprehensively promote the great cause of building a powerful country and national rejuvenation with Chinese-style modernization, we must place national defense and military modernization as a barrier to national security, plan and deploy in strategic positions based on career development, and accelerate the construction and consolidation of national defense and a strong people’s army.

　　The modernization of the national defense and military is closely linked and internally unified with Chinese-style modernization. Without the modernization of national defense and the military, there would be no Chinese-style modernization. Comrade Mao Zedong once profoundly pointed out “the original requirements for building socialism were industrial modernization, agricultural modernization, scientific and cultural modernization, and now we must add national defense modernization”; Comrade Deng Xiaoping also emphasized “four modernizations, one of which is national defense modernization”, these all reflect the great importance our party attaches to national defense and military construction.

　　Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Xi has always adhered to the integrated operation of strengthening the country and the military, put national defense and military modernization in the chess game of Chinese-style modernization, and opened up the road to strengthening the military with Chinese characteristics, forming a new strategy for national defense and military modernization by 2027, 2035, and the middle of this century, a new “three-step” strategy for national defense and military modernization that connects near, medium and long-term goals Created a new situation in the cause of strengthening the military. Guided by the party’s goal of strengthening the military in the new era, we will comprehensively implement the strategy of reforming and strengthening the military, promote the reform of the leadership and command system, the reform of scale structure and force organization, and the reform of military policies and systems. Our military’s organizational structure will achieve historic changes, and the force system will achieve revolutionary changes. Reshaping, the basic framework of the socialist military policy system with Chinese characteristics has been constructed and formed. Our military system has been completely new, its structure has been completely new, its pattern has been completely new, and its appearance has been completely new It has laid a solid foundation for the modernization of national defence and the army.

　　Military means, as a means of guaranteeing the realization of great dreams, can only stop a war if it can be fought. The current and future periods are critical periods for comprehensively promoting the great cause of building a powerful country and rejuvenating the nation through Chinese-style modernization, and will inevitably encounter various risks, challenges and even turbulent waves. We must comprehensively modernize our national defense and military, build the People’s Army into a world-class military, effectively guarantee Chinese-style modernization, and safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests.

　　 Comprehensive and accurate grasp of the scientific connotation of national defense and military modernization

　　Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Xi has issued a series of important expositions around “Chinese-style modernization”, summarizing the Chinese characteristics, essential requirements and major principles for the formation of Chinese-style modernization, building a theoretical system for Chinese-style modernization, and promoting the new era and new journey. Chinese-style modernization provides scientific guidance and also carries out strategic design and scientific deployment for national defense and military modernization.

　　The most fundamental thing about modernizing the national defense and military is to uphold the absolute leadership of the party over the military. The leadership of the Party is the fundamental guarantee of Chinese-style modernization, which determines the fundamental nature of Chinese-style modernization, and it must also determine the fundamental nature of national defense and military modernization. To promote the modernization of national defense and the military on the new journey, we must fully implement a series of fundamental principles and systems for the party to lead the people’s army, comprehensively and thoroughly implement the chairman’s responsibility system of the Military Commission, and effectively unify thoughts and actions into the decisions and arrangements of the Party Central Committee and President Xi; Adhere to the party’s management of cadres and talents, and highlight political standards and combat capabilities Ensure that the barrel of the gun is always in the hands of those who are loyal and reliable to the party; improve the comprehensive and strict governance of the party system, enhance the political and organizational functions of party organizations at all levels, and integrate the party’s leadership throughout the entire process of continuing to deepen national defense and military reforms in all aspects.

　　To modernize national defense and the military is to modernize military doctrine, military organization, military personnel, and weapons and equipment. This reflects the inherent requirements for the construction of military forces resulting from changes in the concept of victory in modern warfare, elements of victory and methods of victory, and clarifies the main signs of the basic realization of national defence and military modernization. To realize the modernization of military theory is to keep pace with the times, innovate war and strategic guidance, and form a military theoretical system that is contemporary, leading, and unique; to realize the modernization of organizational form is to deepen the reform of national defense and the military, and the military force structure layout is scientific and reasonable, strategic deterrence capabilities are consolidated and improved, new areas and new quality combat forces continue to grow, and elite operations, system support, and joint victory have become the basic application models; To realize the modernization of military personnel is to deeply implement the strategy of strengthening the military with talents in the new era, promote the comprehensive transformation and upgrading of military personnel’s capabilities, structural layout, and development management, and forge high-quality, professional new military talents with both ability and political integrity; to realize the modernization of weapons and equipment, It is necessary to focus on strengthening national defense scientific and technological innovation and accelerating the development of strategic, cutting-edge and disruptive technologies Accelerate the upgrading of weapons and equipment and the development of intelligent weapons and equipment.

　　For the modernization of national defence and the military, we must adhere to the integrated development of mechanization, informatization and intelligence. The military conflicts and local wars that have taken place in recent years have shown that new qualitative combat capabilities generated based on intelligent combat systems are increasingly becoming core military capabilities. Based on mechanization, dominated by informatization, and oriented by intelligence, the three superimpose, penetrate, and support each other, jointly giving rise to new forms of warfare and methods of warfare. Only by accelerating the integrated development of mechanization, informatization and intelligence and keeping up with the new military revolutionary trends in the world can we seize the opportunity and take the initiative in seizing the commanding heights of the military struggle.

　　The modernization of national defence and the army is a guarantee of security for insisting on the path of peaceful development. Since ancient times, soldiers have not been warlike. Chinese-style modernization is modernization on the path of peaceful development. Building a consolidated national defense and a strong military commensurate with international status and national security and development interests is a strategic task of China’s socialist modernization drive and an insistence on taking the path of peaceful development. Safety guarantee is an inevitable choice for summarizing historical experience. China has always pursued a defensive defence policy and adhered to the strategic idea of active defence, and no matter how far it develops, China will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion. To promote the modernization of national defense and the military on the “new journey”, we must faithfully implement the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind, resolutely oppose all forms of hegemony and bullying, and contribute China’s strength to building a beautiful world of lasting peace and universal security.

　　 Advancing the modernization of national defence and the military at a new historical starting point

　　The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China included “continuous deepening of national defense and military reforms into the overall plan for further comprehensive deepening of reforms, and made a series of major strategic arrangements for improving the leadership and management system and mechanism of the people’s army, deepening the reform of the joint operations system, and deepening cross-military and civilian reforms”. On the new journey, we must deeply understand and grasp the themes, major principles, major measures, and fundamental guarantees for further comprehensively deepening reforms, resolutely implement the new “three-step” strategy for national defense and military modernization, and accelerate the modernization of military theory, military organizational form, and military personnel. Modernize and modernize weapons and equipment, and lead the modernization of national defense and the military to move forward with better strategies, higher efficiency, and faster speed.

　　Strengthening the Party’s theoretical and scientific leadership in military guidance. Our party insists on combining the basic principles of Marxism with the practice of building the people’s army, absorbing the essence of China’s excellent traditional military culture, and constantly exploring new realms in the development of contemporary Chinese Marxist military theory and military practice. As an important part of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military has achieved a new leap forward in the Sinicization and modernization of Marxist military theory. It is the fundamental guiding ideology of our party building and military governance in the new era. We must unremittingly arm our minds with Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, further firmly establish the guiding position of Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military in national defense and military construction, and build and consolidate national defense and a strong people’s army under the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military. Take new and greater steps on the road to strengthening the military with Chinese characteristics.

　　Efforts should be made to make the main responsibility and business of war preparation more solid and effective. The People’s Army is an armed group that performs the party’s political tasks. It must be both politically strong and capable. In the final analysis, this ability can win wars. To accelerate the modernization of national defense and the military, we must firmly grasp the fundamental direction of winning wars, establish the only fundamental standard of combat effectiveness, focus all our energy on fighting wars, and work hard on fighting wars. Conscientiously implement the military strategic policy for the new era, operate war preparation and cessation, deterrence and actual combat, war operations and the use of military forces in peacetime as a whole, innovate strategies, tactics and tactics, effectively shape the situation, manage crises, contain wars, and win wars. Adhere to the principle of “training troops as they fight, and comprehensively improve the actual combat level of military training and the ability to perform missions and tasks”.

　　Promote high-quality development of national defense and military construction through “reform and innovation”. Reform is a key move that will determine the growth of our army and its future. On the new journey, we must put innovation at the core of the overall military construction and development, transform development concepts, innovate development models, enhance development momentum, and promote the transformation of national defense and military modernization from quantitative growth to qualitative improvement. Focus on integrating national defense and military construction into the national economic and social development system on a wider scale, at a higher level, and to a deeper extent, continuously improve the quality and efficiency of national defense and military modernization, promote the simultaneous improvement of national defense strength and economic strength, and consolidate and improve the integration National strategic system and capabilities, and constantly write a new chapter of strengthening the country and the military.

現代國語：

時間：2024年11月15日 08:20 來源：解放軍報
兵者，國之大事。在強國建設、民族復興偉大征程中，在世界百年未有之大變局加速演進的背景下，建構鞏固國防和強大人民軍隊直接關係國家和民族的前途命運。黨的二十屆三中全會指出，“國防和軍隊現代化是中國式現代化的重要組成部分”，充分體現了以習近平同志為核心的黨中央對國防和軍隊建設的高度重視，為新征程上國防和軍隊現代化建設指明了方向。

國防與軍隊現代化是中國式現代化的安全保障與戰略支撐

落後就要挨打，軍強才能國安。沒有一支強大的軍隊，就不可能有強大的國家。 1840年鴉片戰爭以後，近代中國在與西方列強的較量中屢屢戰敗，泱泱大國逐步淪為半殖民地半封建社會，國家蒙辱、人民蒙難、文明蒙塵。歷史啟示我們，中華民族走出苦難、中國人民實現解放，有賴於一支英雄的人民軍隊；以中國式現代化全面推進強國建設、民族復興偉業，必須把國防和軍隊現代化擺在國家安全之屏障、事業發展之依託的戰略位置來策劃和部署，加快建設鞏固國防和強大人民軍隊。

國防與軍隊現代化與中國式現代化緊密聯繫、內在統一。沒有國防和軍隊的現代化，就沒有中國式現代化。毛澤東同誌曾深刻指出“建設社會主義，原來要求是工業現代化，農業現代化，科學文化現代化，現在要加上國防現代化”；鄧小平同志也曾強調“四個現代化，其中就有一個國防現代化”，這些都體現了我們黨對國防和軍隊建設的高度重視。

黨的十八大以來，習主席始終堅持強國強軍一體運籌，把國防和軍隊現代化放在中國式現代化大棋局中謀劃推進，開闢出中國特色強軍之路，形成了到2027年、2035年、本世紀中葉，近、中、遠目標梯次行動」，開創三步和現代化軍階的國防和軍事戰略。以黨在新時代的強軍目標為引領，全面實施改革強軍戰略，推進領導指揮體制改革、規模結構和力量編成改革、軍事政策制度改革，我軍組織架構實現歷史性變革，力量體系實現革命性重塑，中國特色社會主義軍事政策制度體系基本框架構建形成，我軍體制一新、結構一新、一新、一現代化新格局新化，為國防和軍事基礎一化。

軍事手段作為實現偉大夢想的保底手段，能戰方能止戰。當前和今後一個時期，是以中國式現代化全面推進強國建設、民族復興偉業的關鍵時期，必然會遇到各種風險挑戰甚至驚濤駭浪。我們必須全面推動國防和軍隊現代化，把人民軍隊建設成為世界一流軍隊，有力保障中國式現代化建設，保障國家主權、安全、發展利益。

全面準確掌握國防與軍隊現代化的科學內涵

黨的十八大以來，習主席圍繞中國式現代化發表一系列重要論述，概括形成中國式現代化的中國特色、本質要求和重大原則，構建起中國式現代化的理論體系，為新時代新征程推進中國式現代化提供了科學指引，也為國防和軍隊現代化進行了戰略設計和科學部署。

國防與軍事現代化，最根本的是堅持黨對軍隊絕對領導。黨的領導是中國式現代化的根本保證，決定了中國式現代化的根本性質，也必然決定了國防和軍隊現代化的根本性質。新征程上推動國防和軍隊現代化，必須全面貫徹黨領導人民軍隊的一系列根本原則和製度，全面深入貫徹軍委主席負責制，切實把思想和行動統一到黨中央、習主席決策部署上來；堅持黨管幹部、黨管人才，突顯政治標準和打仗能力，確保槍桿子始終掌握在對黨忠誠可靠的人手中；健全全面從嚴治黨體系，增強各級黨組織政治功能和組織功能，把黨的領導貫穿持續深化國防和軍事改革各方面全過程。

國防與軍隊現代化，就是要實現軍事理論、軍隊組織形態、軍事人員、武器裝備的現代化。這反映了現代戰爭制勝觀念、制勝要素、制勝方式變化對軍事力量建設的內在要求，明確了基本實現國防和軍隊現代化的主要標誌。實現軍事理論現代化，就是要與時俱進創新戰爭和戰略指導，形成具有時代性、引領性、獨特性的軍事理論體系；實現組織形態現代化，就是要深化國防和軍事改革，軍隊力量結構佈局科學合理，戰略威懾能力鞏固提高，新域新質作戰力量不斷壯大，精製作戰、體系支撐、聯合戰略威懾成為基本運作模式；實現軍事人員現代化，就是要深入實施新時代人才強軍戰略，推動軍事人員能力素質、結構佈局、開發管理全面轉型升級，鍛造德才兼備的高素質、專業化新型軍事人才；實現武器裝備現代化，就是要聚力加強國防科技創新，加速戰略性、前沿性、顛覆性技術發展，加速武器裝備升級和智能化武器裝備升級。

國防與軍隊現代化，必須堅持機械化資訊化智慧化融合發展。近年來發生的軍事衝突和局部戰爭表明，基於智慧化作戰體系所產生的新質作戰能力越來越成為核心軍事能力。以機械化為基礎，以資訊化為主導，以智慧化為方向，三者相互疊加、相互滲透、相互支撐，共同催生新的戰爭形態和作戰方式。只有加速機械化資訊化智慧化融合發展，跟上世界新軍事革命潮流，才能在搶佔軍事鬥爭制高點中占得先機、贏得主動。

國防與軍隊現代化，是堅持走和平發展道路的安全保障。自古知兵非好戰。中國式現代化是走和平發展道路的現代化，建立同國際地位相稱、同國家安全和發展利益相適應的鞏固國防和強大軍隊，是中國社會主義現代化建設的戰略任務，是堅持走和平發展道路的安全保障，是總結歷史經驗的必然選擇。中國始終奉行防禦性國防政策，堅持積極防禦戰略思想，無論發展到什麼程度，中國永遠不稱霸、永遠不搞擴張。在新征程上推動國防和軍隊現代化，必須忠實踐行人類命運共同體理念，堅決反對一切形式的霸權霸道欺凌，為建設持久和平、普遍安全的美好世界貢獻中國力量。

在新的歷史起點上推進國防和軍隊現代化

黨的二十屆三中全會將持續深化國防和軍事改革納入進一步全面深化改革的大盤子，對完善人民軍隊領導管理體制機制、深化聯合作戰體系改革、深化跨軍地改革作出一系列重大戰略部署。新旅程上，要深刻領會和把握進一步全面深化改革的主題、重大原則、重大舉措、根本保證，堅決貫徹國防和軍隊現代化新「三步走」戰略，加快軍事理論現代化、軍隊組織形態現代化、軍事人員現代化、武器裝備現代化，引領國防和軍事現代化以更優策略、更高效益、更快速度向前推進。

強化黨的軍事指導理論科學領導。我們黨堅持把馬克思主義基本原理同人民軍隊建設實踐結合，汲取中華優秀傳統軍事文化精華，不斷拓拓當代中國馬克思主義軍事理論和軍事實踐發展新境界。習近平強軍思想作為習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想的重要組成部分，實現了馬克思主義軍事理論中國化時代化的新飛躍，是新時代我們黨建軍治軍強軍的根本指導思想。我們必須堅持不懈用習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想武裝頭腦，進一步牢固確立習近平強軍思想在國防和軍隊建設中的指導地位，在習近平強軍思想引領下建設鞏固國防和強大人民軍隊，在中國特色強軍之路上邁出新的更大步伐。

著力把備戰打仗的主責主業抓得更加紮實有效。人民軍隊是執行黨的政治任務的武裝集團，既要政治過硬，也要本領高強，這個本領說到底就是能打勝仗。加快推進國防和軍隊現代化，必須緊緊扭住能打勝仗的根本指向，樹牢戰鬥力這個唯一的根本的標準，全部精力向打仗聚焦，全部工作向打仗用勁。認真貫徹新時代軍事戰略方針，把備戰與止戰、威懾與實戰、戰爭行動與和平時期軍事力量運用作為一個整體加以運籌，創新戰略戰術與戰法打法，有效塑造態勢、管控危機、遏制戰爭、打贏戰爭。堅持仗怎麼打兵就怎麼練，全面提升部隊軍事訓練實戰化水準和履行使命任務的能力。

以改革創新推動國防和軍隊建設高品質發展。改革是決定我軍發展壯大、制勝未來的關鍵一招。新征程上，要把創新擺在軍隊建設發展全局的核心位置，轉變發展理念、創新發展模式、增強發展動能，推動國防和軍隊現代化由量的成長轉向質的提升。著力在更廣範圍、更高層次、更深程度上將國防和軍隊建設融入國家經濟社會發展體系之中，不斷提高國防和軍隊現代化質量效益，促進國防實力和經濟實力同步提升，鞏固提高一體化國家戰略體系和能力，不斷書寫強國強軍新篇章。

中國原創軍事資源：https://www.mva.gov.cn/sy/zt/zt1/xxgcddsjdjs/qwjd/202411/t20241120_453942888.html

Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Future Wars, Chinese Military Intelligentization, Chinese Military Use of Cognitive Confrontation within the Combat Domain, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare, Dissipative Warfare, 以認知為中心的戰爭：應對複雜戰爭的作戰概念, 認知域戰, 認知戰

[Chinese National Defense] Establishing Correct Awareness to Contain China and Conduct Cognitive Warfare Operations

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[中國國防]建立正確的意識，以遏制中國並進行認知戰爭行動

現代英語：

As the world continued to actively combat the COVID-19 pandemic, the British newspaper The Guardian reported in late May 2021 that Fazze, a public relations and marketing agency with close ties to Russian officials, was accused of providing funding to influential YouTubers, bloggers, and other opinion leaders in France, Germany, and other European countries to spread false information claiming that vaccines like Pfizer (BNT) and AstraZeneca (AZ) had caused hundreds of deaths. The false information also criticized the EU vaccine procurement system for harming public health in European countries, with the goal of sowing public distrust of Western vaccines and shifting public acceptance toward Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine. This is the most significant example of “perception warfare” in recent international history.

 In fact, human society has always adhered to the principle of “conquering the enemy without fighting” as the guiding principle for optimal military operations. While traditional warfare still primarily takes place in physical space, victory requires the physical capture of cities and territories, as well as the destruction of enemy forces. However, as humanity’s understanding of the nature of war deepens, the use of information technology has become a new trend in warfare, enabling the achievement of traditional combat effectiveness without the need for physical engagement. Given the increasing attention paid to “information warfare” and “hybrid warfare,” this article discusses the closely related concept of “cognitive warfare,” exploring the emerging threats facing our country and our national defense response strategy.

 Whether it’s what the US calls “hybrid warfare” or what Russia calls “information warfare,” the implications are quite similar: centered on the cognitive realm, the use of information to influence and manipulate targets, encompassing both peacetime public opinion and wartime decision-making. The rise of Nazi Germany after World War I was arguably the first modern regime to master the use of information to shape perceptions within its own country and even abroad. Its successful use of propaganda and lies, delivered through various communication technologies, was highly successful. Principles such as “repetition is power” and “negative information is more easily accepted and remembered than positive information” would later profoundly influence authoritarian governments, including Russia.

 Using information capabilities to subvert national regimes

 At the beginning of the 21st century, Russia began to pay attention to the situation where international discourse power was completely controlled by Western countries. It successively put forward theories such as “Information Warfare Theory” and “Sixth Generation Warfare Theory”, arguing that the sixth generation of warfare is a non-contact war that uses precision weapons and information warfare to traverse the battlefield. The purpose of war is no longer a devastating global war, but to achieve effects that cannot be achieved through traditional warfare by exploiting the enemy’s information capabilities to exploit its weaknesses, including changing social and cultural orientations and values, and thus subverting national regimes.

 In 2005, Russia established the international news channel “Russia Today.” Initially focused on soft power propaganda, it shifted its focus after the 2008 Georgian War to attacking negative aspects of Western society and fostering conspiracy theories. The 2014 Ukraine crisis became a training ground for Russian information warfare forces. Using electronic jamming and cyber theft, they intercepted Ukrainian communications, inferring subsequent Ukrainian actions and releasing damaging information at critical moments. They also targeted sensitive issues in eastern Ukraine, including the status of ethnic Russians and economic downturn, distributing a large amount of carefully selected, targeted information to resonate with the public, influencing their perceptions and behavior and gaining control of media opinion. In terms of “cognitive warfare,” Russia’s approach has been successful, and has become a model for the Chinese Communist Party.

 Manipulating “brain control” to control the public

 In 2014, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) proposed the cognitive operational concept of “brain control,” building on its past “three warfares” of psychological warfare, legal warfare, and public opinion warfare, as well as Russia’s theoretical framework of “information warfare.” It states that a nation’s cognitive space is composed of the superposition of countless individuals, and that “brain control” uses national languages, propaganda media, and cultural products as weapons to comprehensively infiltrate and control the cognition, emotions, and consciousness of the general public and national elites, ultimately distorting, disintegrating, and reshaping their national spirit, values, ideology, history, and culture, thereby achieving the strategic goal of winning without fighting.

 Therefore, the CCP’s “cognitive operations” fall under the broad category of psychological warfare. In the era of information globalization, it integrates information warfare, psychological warfare, and public opinion warfare, becoming the core of the CCP’s overall strategy. Since the 2016 military reform, it has been led by the newly formed “Strategic Support Force” and implemented at all political and military levels. On the one hand, the PLA has adopted American operational thinking in the field of “cognitive operations,” using units such as the 311 Base, the National University of Defense Technology, and the Academy of Military Sciences to develop tactics such as “psychological operations,” “ideological operations,” “consciousness manipulation,” and “strategic communication” to strengthen the “cognitive operations” capabilities jointly constructed by military-civilian integration and joint combat systems. On the other hand, it uses professional personnel to operate media platforms, shape the public opinion environment, and introduce “cognitive operations” into the actual combat application stage.

 The CCP’s recent “cognitive warfare” offensive against Taiwan reveals its methods and tactics. First, the CCP primarily uses the internet to collect personal data from Taiwanese citizens, using big data databases to categorize information by target group, based on political leanings, age, occupation, and other factors. Second, it leverages intelligence gathering to launch targeted cognitive attacks on specific social media platforms, influencing the psychology of the targeted groups, particularly by releasing disinformation to weaken and distract Taiwanese society. Third, it employs online virtual organizations to set up fake social media accounts, infiltrate online communities, and disguise themselves as whistleblowers, deliberately spreading fabricated information to create confusion. Cybertroopers then massively repost and discuss this information, manipulating audience perceptions and creating a cycle of disrupting information retention, manipulating cognitive psychology, and altering thinking patterns.

 Identify fake news and fight back together

 At this stage, the CCP’s campaign for “brain control” over Taiwan aims to influence Taiwanese society’s cognition, distorting public opinion, devaluing democratic values, intensifying opposition, disrupting political conditions, and undermining public trust in the government. The following preventive measures can be taken within the national defense system:

 1. Strengthening educational functions

 Through national defense education in schools, institutions, and society, we will raise the public’s awareness of the threat posed by the CCP’s “cognitive warfare” and their ability to identify false information, and cultivate the habit of rationality, verification, and calmness.

 2. Follow the constraints

 Although there are currently no internationally accepted legal rules that can clearly define the extent to which cognitive warfare constitutes an act of war, making it even more difficult to hold people accountable, media platforms can still strengthen the review of their own reporting content in accordance with existing regulations, and the public can also refrain from spreading suspicious information and following the trend of tennis melee, so as to facilitate the establishment of information verification measures and mechanisms.

 3. Combining Military and Civilian Strength

 Incorporate information and communication-related institutions and industries into the national defense mobilization mechanism, coordinate in peacetime the review, analysis, and disposal of fake news, strengthen talent training and research cooperation, and enhance the capabilities of professional units of the government and the national army; in wartime, cooperate with the overall national actions and carry out countermeasures.

 Currently, Taiwan already has the National Security Bureau’s National Security Operations Center responsible for responding to controversial information from hostile foreign forces. There’s also the non-profit Taiwan Fact-Checking Center. Facing the challenges of cognitive warfare, we must continue to integrate various sectors, strive for international intelligence exchange and experience sharing, optimize the media environment, collaborate across multiple channels, and instantly identify the authenticity and source of information, jointly building our offensive capacity to respond to cognitive warfare.

 Conclusion

 In reality, all countries around the world face threats related to cognitive warfare and information-based psychological warfare. However, democratic and free societies are by no means vulnerable to cognitive warfare attacks and must instead rely on diverse strategies and methods to protect them. We aim to establish a more comprehensive and substantive framework, build a powerful counterforce, and enhance the quality and discernment of our citizens, thereby gaining immunity from the CCP’s cognitive warfare campaign to seize control of our minds.

(The author is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Tamkang University)

現代國語：

在全球持續積極對抗新冠疫情之際，英國《衛報》2021年5月下旬報道，與俄羅斯官員關係密切的公關和營銷機構Fazze被指控向法國、德國和其他歐洲國家頗具影響力的YouTube用戶、博主和其他意見領袖提供資金，用於傳播虛假信息，聲稱輝瑞（BNTAZ）和阿斯特利康（BNTAZ）和阿斯特疫苗已導致數百人死亡。這些假訊息也批評歐盟疫苗採購體系損害了歐洲國家的公共衛生，目的是挑起大眾對西方疫苗的不信任，並促使大眾接受俄羅斯的Sputnik V疫苗。這是近代國際史上最顯著的「感知戰」案例。

事實上，人類社會自古以來，均以「不戰而屈人之兵」作為最佳軍事行動指導原則，儘管傳統戰爭主要仍在物理空間進行，需透過實際攻城掠地、消滅敵有生力量，才能獲得勝利。然隨人類對戰爭本質認知深化，利用資訊科技，於不需實體短兵相接的情況下，卻能達到傳統戰爭效果，已成為新型態戰爭趨勢。鑑於「資訊戰」、「混合戰」日益受重視，謹就與其密切相關的「認知作戰」概念進行論述，並探討我國所面臨的新型威脅及全民國防因應策略。

無論是美國所稱的「混合戰」，或俄國所說的「資訊戰」，其實指涉意涵很相似，即以認知領域為核心，利用訊息影響、操控對象目標涵蓋承平時期輿論及戰時決策的認知功能。一戰後，逐漸興起的納粹德國，可謂當代首個擅長運用資訊形塑本國，甚至外國民眾認知的政權，其透過各種傳播技術的政治宣傳與謊言包裝，相當成功；而所謂「重複是一種力量」、「負面訊息總是比正面訊息，更容易讓人接受和印象深刻」等實踐原則，日後更深刻影響專制極權政府與現在的俄羅斯。

藉資訊能力 顛覆國家政權

俄國於進入21世紀初，開始注意國際話語權遭西方國家完全掌控的情形，陸續提出「資訊戰理論」、「第6代戰爭理論」等論述，主張第6代戰爭是以精確武器及資訊戰，縱橫戰場的非接觸式戰爭，戰爭目的不再是毀滅性的全球大戰，而是藉利用敵方弱點的資訊能力，達成傳統戰爭無法實現的效果，包括改變社會文化取向、價值觀，進而顛覆國家政權等。

2005年，俄國成立國際新聞頻道「Russia Today」，起初主要是軟實力宣傳，2008年「喬治亞戰爭」後，轉為攻擊西方社會負面問題與製造陰謀論；2014年「烏克蘭危機」，成為俄軍資訊戰部隊的練兵場，透過電子干擾、網路竊密等手段，截收烏國對外通聯訊息，依此推判烏方後續舉動，並選擇在關鍵時機，釋放對烏國政府不利消息；另選定烏東地區敏感議題，包括俄裔民族地位、經濟不振等，投放大量經篩選的特定資訊，引發民眾共鳴，從而影響烏東人民認知與行為，取得媒體輿論主動權。就「認知作戰」言，俄國作法是成功的，更成為中共的效法對象。

操弄「制腦權」 控制社會大眾

中共2014年於過去心理戰、法律戰、輿論戰等「三戰」基礎，以及俄國「資訊戰」理論架構上，提出「制腦權」認知操作概念，指國家認知空間係由無數個體疊加而成，「制腦」是以民族語言、宣傳媒體、文化產品為武器，全面滲透、控制社會大眾與國家精英之認知、情感與意識，最終扭曲、瓦解、重塑其民族精神、價值觀念、意識形態、歷史文化等，達致不戰而勝的戰略目標。

是以，中共「認知作戰」屬於廣義心理戰範疇，是資訊全球化時代，融合資訊戰、心理戰及輿論戰的戰法，成為中共整體戰略主軸，並自2016年「軍改」後，由新組建的「戰略支援部隊」操盤，在各政略、軍事層次開展執行。一方面，共軍擷取美國在「認知作戰」領域的操作思維，以311基地、國防科技大學、軍事科學院等單位研提「心理作戰」、「思想作戰」、「意識操縱」、「戰略傳播」等戰法，以加強軍民融合及聯戰體系共同建構的「認知作戰」能力；另一方面，則以專業人員操作媒體平臺，形塑輿論環境，將「認知作戰」導入實戰運用階段。

從近年中共對臺進行的「認知作戰」攻勢，可拆解其途徑與手段。首先，中共主要係以網路蒐集國人個資，透過大數據資料庫，劃分政治傾向、年齡、職業等不同目標族群資訊；其次，配合情報偵蒐，針對個別社群媒體展開認知精準打擊，影響目標群眾心理，尤其釋放假訊息，以削弱、分散臺灣社會注意力；再次，則運用網路虛擬組織設置社群媒體假帳號，打入網路族群，偽裝成揭密者、吹哨者，刻意傳散變造資訊，製造混亂，再由網軍大量轉傳、討論，操弄受眾認知，進入阻斷資訊記憶、操縱認知心理、改變思考模式的運作循環。

識別假訊息 全民齊反制

基於現階段，中共對臺「制腦權」作戰，影響臺灣社會認知的目的，在於扭曲輿論、貶低民主價值、激化對立、擾亂政情、減損民眾對政府信任等，於全民國防體系可採取的防制辦法包括：

一、強化教育功能

分別透過全民國防之學校教育、機關教育、社會教育途徑，提高公眾對中共「認知作戰」威脅的認識，與對假訊息識別能力，養成理性、查證、冷靜習慣。

二、遵循約束規範

儘管目前尚無國際通用的法律規則，可明確定義何種程度的認知作戰已構成戰爭行為，更難以究責；然各媒體平臺仍可按既有規範，對自身報導內容加強審查，民眾也可做到不傳播可疑訊息、不跟風網壇混戰，俾利訊息查證措施與機制建立。

三、結合軍民力量

將資訊與傳播相關機構、產業，納入全民防衛動員機制，平時協調因應假訊息審查、分析、處置，加強人才培訓、研究合作，提升政府、國軍專業單位能力；戰時則配合國家整體作為，執行反制任務。

目前我國已有國安局「國家安全作業中心」執行對境外敵對勢力爭議訊息應處有關工作，民間亦有非營利組織成立的「臺灣事實查核中心」。面對「認知作戰」挑戰，仍應持續整合各界力量，爭取國際情報交流與經驗共享，優化媒體環境，多管道合作，即時辨識訊息真偽與來源，共同建設應處「認知作戰」攻勢能量。

結語

事實上，世界各國都同樣面臨「認知作戰」、「資訊心理戰」等相關威脅，然民主自由的社會環境，絕非易受「認知作戰」攻擊的溫床，更需仰賴多元策略與方式守護。期以更完善周全的實質架構，建構強而有力的反制力量，並提升我國公民素質及識別能力，於中共奪取「制腦權」的認知作戰中，獲得免疫。

（作者為淡江大學戰略研究所博士）

中國原創軍事資源：https://www.ydn.com.tw/news/newsInsidePage?chapterID=1431550

#認知戰, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Use of Cognitive Confrontation within the Combat Domain, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare

China’s Weaponized Communication in International Public Opinion Warfare: Scenarios and Risk Responses

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中國在國際公眾輿論戰爭中的武器交流：場景和風險回應

現代英語：

【Abstract】 In the international public opinion war, weaponized communication has penetrated into military, economic, diplomatic and other fields, bringing imagination and practice “everything can be weaponized”. Weaponized communication manipulates public perception through technology, platforms, and policies, reflecting the complex interaction of power distribution and cultural games. Driven by globalization and digitalization, cognitive manipulation, social fragmentation, emotional polarization, digital surveillance, and information colonization have become new means of influencing national stability, which not only exacerbates competition between information-powerful and weak countries, but also provides information-weak countries with the opportunity to achieve reversal through flexible strategies and technological innovation. Under the global asymmetric communication landscape, how to find a point of convergence and balance between technological innovation and ethical responsibility, strategic goals and social balance will be key elements that will influence the future international public opinion landscape.

【Keywords】 Public opinion warfare; weaponized communication; information manipulation; asymmetric communication; information security

If “propaganda is a rational recognition of the modern world” [1], then weaponized communication is a rational application of modern technological means. In the “public opinion war”, each participating subject achieves strategic goals through different communication methods, making them superficially reasonable and concealed. Unlike traditional military conflicts, modern warfare involves not only physical confrontation, but also competition in several fields, including information, economics, psychology, and technology. With the advancement of technology and globalization, the shape of war has changed profoundly, and traditional physical confrontations have gradually shifted to multi-dimensional and multi-field integrated warfare. In this process, weaponized communication, as a modern form of warfare, becomes an invisible means of violence that affects the psychology, emotions and behavior of the opposing enemy or target audience by controlling, guiding and manipulating public opinion, thereby achieving political, military or strategic ends.》 “On War” believes that war is an act of violence that makes the enemy unable to resist and subservient to our will. [ 2] In modern warfare, the realization of this goal not only relies on the confrontation of military forces, but also requires support from non-traditional fields such as information, networks, and psychological warfare. Sixth Generation Warfare heralds a further shift in the shape of warfare, emphasizing the application of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data, and unmanned systems, as well as comprehensive games in the fields of information, networks, psychology, and cognition. The “frontline” of modern warfare has expanded to include social media, economic sanctions, and cyberattacks, requiring participants to have stronger information control and public opinion guidance capabilities.

At present, the spread of weaponization has penetrated into the military, economic, diplomatic and other fields, bringing with it the apprehension that “everything can be weaponized”. In the sociology of war, communication is seen as an extended tool of power, with information warfare penetrating deeply and accompanying traditional warfare. Weaponized communication is precisely under the framework of information control, by shaping public perceptions and emotions, consolidating or weakening the power of states, regimes or non-state actors. This process not only occurs in wartime, but also affects power relations within and outside the state in non-combatant states. In international political communication, information manipulation has become a key tool in the great power game, as countries try to influence global public opinion and international decision-making by spreading disinformation and launching cyberattacks. Public opinion warfare is not only a means of information dissemination, but also involves the adjustment of power games and diplomatic relations between countries, directly affecting the governance structure and power pattern of the international community. Based on this, this paper will delve into the conceptual evolution of weaponized communication, analyze the social mentality behind it, elaborate on the specific technical means and the risks they entail, and propose multidimensional strategies to deal with them at the national level.

1. From weaponization of communication to weaponization of communication: conceptual evolution and metaphor

Weapons have been symbols and tools of war throughout human history, and war is the most extreme and violent form of conflict in human society. Thus, “weaponized” refers to the use of certain tools for confrontation, manipulation or destruction in warfare, emphasizing the way in which these tools are used.“ Weaponization ”(weaponize) translated as“ makes it possible to use something to attack an individual or group of people”. In 1957, the term “weaponization” was proposed as a military term, and Werner von Braun, leader of the V-2 ballistic missile team, stated that his main work was “weaponizing the military’s ballistic missile technology‘ [3].

“Weaponization ”first appeared in the space field, during the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the two major powers tried to compete for dominance in outer space.“ Weaponization of space ”refers to the process of using space for the development, deployment or use of military weapons systems, including satellites, anti-satellite weapons and missile defense systems, etc., with the purpose of conducting strategic, tactical or defensive operations. From 1959 to 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union proposed a series of initiatives to ban the use of outer space for military purposes, especially the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space orbit. In 2018, then-U.S. President Trump signed Space Policy Directive-3, launching the construction of the “Space Force” and treating space as an important combat area on the same level as land, air, and ocean. In 2019, the “Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Strengthening Contemporary Global Strategic Stability” proposed “prohibiting the placement of any type of weapons in outer space” [4].

In addition to weaponization in the space sector, there is also a trend towards weaponization in the military, economic and diplomatic fields.“ Military weaponization” is the use of resources (such as drones, nuclear weapons, etc.) for military purposes, the deployment of weapons systems, or the development of military capabilities. During the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022, a report from the Royal United Services Institute showed that Ukraine lost approximately 10,000 drones every month due to the impact of Russian jamming stations. [ 5] “weaponization” also often appears in expressions such as “financial war ”“diplomatic battlefield”. In the economic sphere, weaponization usually refers to the use of shared resources or mechanisms in the global financial system by countries or organizations; diplomatic weaponization is manifested in countries pursuing their own interests and exerting pressure on other countries through economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and manipulation of public opinion. Over time, the concept of “weaponization” has gradually expanded into the political, social, cultural and other fields, especially in the information field, and since the 2016 United States presidential election, manipulation of public opinion has become a universal tool in political struggles. David Petraeus, a former director of the CIA in the United States, once said at a National Institute for Strategic Studies conference that the time has come for “the weaponization of everything”.[ 6]

As a metaphor, “weaponization” not only refers to the use of actual physical tools, but also symbolizes the transformation of adversarial and aggressive behavior, emphasizing how the concept of “weapons” permeates daily life, cultural production, and political strategies, showing how social actors use various tools to achieve strategic goals. Nowadays, many areas that should remain neutral, such as the media, law and government agencies, are often described as “weaponized” to criticize their excessive politicization and improper use, highlighting their illegality and negative impact on society. Influence. Through this metaphor, one unconsciously contrasts the current political environment with an idealized and seemingly more moderate past, making one think that the political climate of the past was more rational and civilized, while the present appears too extreme and oppositional.[ 7] Therefore, the essence of “weaponization” is the process of political mediation, which is the use of various means and channels by political forces to influence or control areas that should remain neutral, making them political purposes and tools of political struggle.

In the field of information, the weaponization of communication is a long-standing and strategic means. During World War I and II, propaganda and public opinion warfare were widely used in various countries, and means of communication were used as a psychological tactic. Weaponized communication is the embodiment of the weaponization of communication in the modern information society. It uses algorithms and big data analysis to accurately control the speed and scope of information dissemination, and then controls public opinion and emotions. It reflects the combination of technology, platforms and strategies, making Political forces can more accurately and efficiently control the public perception and public opinion environment. As the ontology of public opinion, information is “weaponized” and used to influence social cognition and group behavior, and the concept of “war” has changed accordingly, no longer just traditional military confrontation, but also includes psychological warfare and cognitive warfare through information dissemination and public opinion manipulation. This shift has led to a range of new terms such as unrestricted warfare, new generation warfare, asymmetric warfare, and irregular warfare. Almost all of these terms are borrowed from “warfare” (warfare) to emphasize diverse conflicts in the information field, and information becomes the core content of “weaponization”.

Although there is some view that the term “war” does not apply to situations where hostilities are not formally declared [8], weaponized communication extends the concept of “war” by weakening the traditional political attributes of war and treating overt or covert forces and forms in various fields in general terms. as an act of communication. It is important to note that in English terms “weaponization” there are two formulations: one is “weaponized noun ”noun“, which means that something has been ”weaponized“ with a weapon function or purpose, and the other is ”weaponization of noun, which refers to the process of converting something into a weapon or having the nature of a weapon. In the academic sphere, Chinese translations differ, although weaponized communication and weaponization of communication are not yet strictly distinguished.“ Weaponized communication ”which focuses more on the means of communication or the message itself“ being weaponized” in order to achieve a certain strategic goal, and “weaponization of communication”, which emphasizes the process of communication itself as a transformation process of weapons. When discussing specific technical means, most academic papers adopt weaponized or weaponizing as a prefix to modify specific means of dissemination.

This article focuses on specific communication strategies in the international public opinion war, focusing on describing the weaponization phenomenon that has occurred, so unified use “weaponized communication” is a method of using communication means, technical tools and information platforms to accurately control information flow, public cognition and emotional response, a strategic communication method to achieve specific military, political or social purposes. Weaponized communication is also not a simple state of war or wartime, but a continuous communication phenomenon. It reflects the interaction and game between various subjects and is the flow of information sharing and meaning space.

2. Application scenarios and implementation strategies of weaponized communication

If at the end of the 1990s, weaponization in the information field was still a “dead topic”, and countries were mainly chasing upgrading competitions for physical weapons such as missiles and drones, then entering the 21st century, cyber wars have truly entered the public eye, and deeply embedded in people’s daily lives, through social media and smart devices, the public will inevitably be involved in the war of public opinion and unconsciously become participants or communication nodes. With the spread of technology, weaponized means gradually expanded from state-led instruments of war to socialized and politicized areas, and control over individuals and society shifted from explicit state apparatus to more covert conceptual manipulation. The exposure of Project Prism (PRISM) has raised strong global concerns about privacy breaches, highlighting the potential for states to use advanced technology for surveillance and control, seen as a new type of weaponization. Since Trump was elected President of the United States in 2016, the large-scale application of information weapons such as social robots has become a common phenomenon in the global political game. Information warfare ——including electronic warfare, computer network warfare, psychological warfare, and military deception—— is widely used to manipulate the flow of information and influence the landscape of public opinion. Not only do these methods work in military wars and political elections, but they also gradually permeate cultural conflicts, social movements and transnational games, perpetuating the traditional logic of information warfare. Nowadays, weaponized communication, as a socio-political tool, profoundly affects the ecology of public opinion, international relations and the daily lives of individuals.

(1) Information manipulation warfare in the military field

Information flow can directly influence the direction of military conflicts, shaping public and military perceptions and decisions, which in turn affects morale, strategic judgment, and social stability. In modern warfare, information is no longer a mere aid, and the field of information has become a central battleground. By manipulating the flow of information, the enemy’s situation assessment may be misled, the will to fight is weakened, and the trust and support of the people are shaken, which in turn affects the decision-making process and continuity of the war.

The Gulf War is regarded as the beginning of modern information warfare. In this war, the United States carried out systematic strikes against Iraq through high-tech means ——including electronic warfare, air strikes, and information operations——. The U.S. military used satellites and AWACS early warning aircraft to monitor the battlefield situation in real time, and induced the Iraqi army to surrender from a psychological level by airdropping leaflets and radio stations to convey to Iraqi soldiers the advantages of the U.S. military and its preferential treatment policy after surrender. The war marked the key place of information control in military conflicts, demonstrating the potential of information warfare in modern warfare. In the 21st century, cyberwarfare has become an important part of information warfare. Cyberwarfare involves not only the dissemination and manipulation of information, but also control over enemy social functions through attacks on critical infrastructure. In 2007, Estonia suffered a large-scale DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service Attack) attack, demonstrating a trend towards the fusion of information manipulation and cyberattacks. In the WannaCry ransomware incident in 2017, attackers used a Windows system vulnerability (EternalBlue) to encrypt the files of approximately 200,000 computers in 150 countries around the world and demanded a ransom, seriously affecting the British National Health Service (NHS) and causing the interruption of emergency services. and hospital system paralysis, further revealing the threat of cyber warfare to critical infrastructure. In addition, in long-term conflicts, infrastructure control is widely used to undermine the strategic capabilities of adversaries to compete for public information space due to its ability to directly determine the speed, scope, and direction of information dissemination. Israel has effectively weakened Palestinian communications capabilities by restricting the use of radio spectrum, controlling Internet bandwidth and disrupting communications facilities. At the same time, Israel also restricts the development of the Palestinian telecommunications market through economic sanctions and legal frameworks, suppresses Palestinian competitiveness in the flow of information, and consolidates its own strategic advantage in the conflict [9] in order to maintain the unequal flow of information.

Social media provides an immediate and extensive channel for information manipulation, allowing it to cross borders and influence global public sentiment and political situations, as well as shifting the focus of war from mere physical destruction to manipulation of public opinion. During the Russo-Ukrainian War, deepfake technology was used as a visual weapon, which significantly interfered with public perception and public opinion about the war. On March 15, 2022, a fake video of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was circulated on Twitter, in which he “called” Ukrainian soldiers to lay down their weapons, triggering public confusion for a short period of time. Similarly, fake videos of Russian President Vladimir Putin have been used to confuse the public. Although the videos were promptly annotated “Stay informed” by the platform (pending instructions on understanding the situation), they still caused obvious interference to public emotions and perceptions within a short period of time. These events highlight the critical role of social media in modern information warfare, where state and non-state actors can exert interference in military conflicts through disinformation, emotional manipulation, and other means.

The complexity of information manipulation warfare is also reflected in its dual nature ——both a tool for attack and a means of defense. In the military sphere, states ensure national security, protect critical infrastructure, maintain military secrets, and in some cases influence adversary combat effectiveness versus decision-making by defending against and countering cyberattacks. In 2015 and 2017, Russian hackers launched large-scale cyber attacks against Ukraine (such as BlackEnergy and NotPetya). Ukraine successfully resisted some attacks and took countermeasures by quickly upgrading its cyber defense systems, avoiding larger-scale infrastructure paralysis. In addition, units such as the NATO Center of Excellence for Strategic Communications and the British 77th Brigade focus on researching public opinion shaping in peacetime [10], using strategic communications, psychological warfare, and social media monitoring to expand strategic control in the information field and strengthen defense and public opinion shaping capabilities, further increasing the strategic height of information warfare.

Today, information manipulation warfare is a key link in modern military conflicts. Through the high degree of integration of information technology and psychological manipulation, it not only changes the rules of traditional warfare, but also profoundly affects public perception and the global security landscape. By taking control of critical infrastructure and social media platforms, countries, multinational corporations or other actors can gain strategic advantages in the global information ecosystem by restricting the flow of information and manipulating communication paths.

(2) Public opinion intervention in political elections

Political elections are the most direct field of competition for power in democratic politics, and the dissemination of information has an important influence on voter decision-making in the process. By calculating propaganda and other means, external forces or political groups are able to manipulate the sentiments of voters and mislead the public, thereby influencing the results of elections, destabilizing politics or weakening the democratic process, and elections are thus the most effective application scenario for weaponized communication.

In recent years, global political elections have shown a trend towards polarization, with large ideological differences between groups with different political affiliations. Polarization leads the public to selectively accept information that is consistent with their own views, while excluding other information, and this “echo chamber effect” intensifies the public’s one-sided perception of positions, giving greater scope for public opinion intervention. And the rise of information dissemination technology, especially computational propaganda, has enabled external forces to more accurately manipulate public opinion and influence voter decision-making. Computational Propaganda refers to the use of computing technology, algorithms and automated systems to control the flow of information to disseminate political information, interfere with election results and influence public opinion. Its core characteristics are algorithm-driven accuracy and the scale of automated communication. By breaking through The limitations of traditional manual communication have significantly enhanced the effect of public opinion manipulation. In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the Trump team analyzed Facebook user data through Cambridge Analytica and pushed customized political advertisements to voters, accurately affecting voters’ voting intentions [11]. This incident was seen as a classic case of computational propaganda interfering in elections, and also provided an operational template for other politicians, driving the widespread use of computational propaganda worldwide. In the 2017 French presidential election, candidate Emmanuel Macron’s team was hacked, and internal emails were stolen and made public, claiming that Macron had secret accounts overseas and was involved in tax evasion in an attempt to discredit his image. During the 2018 Brazilian presidential election, the team of candidate Jair Bolsonaro used WhatsApp groups to spread inflammatory political content, targeting and pushing a large number of images, videos and inflammatory messages to influence voter sentiment. According to statistics, from 2017 to 2019, the number of countries using computing for propaganda worldwide increased from 28 to 70, and in 2020 this number rose to 81. This suggests that computational propaganda is redefining the rules of public opinion in global elections through technical means and communication strategies.

Computational propaganda is also an important tool for state actors in the war of public opinion intervention. In 2011, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) launched Operation “Voice of Ernest” in the Middle East to distort conversations on Arabic-language social media by establishing and managing multiple false identities (sockpuppets). Russia also frequently uses computational propaganda to intervene, operating about 200,000 social media accounts in Canada, using far-right and far-left movements to spread pro-Russian rhetoric, create false social hot spots, and try to undermine Canada’s support for Ukraine [12]. As an important part of computing propaganda, social robots create the heat of public opinion through automation and scale, increase the exposure of information on social platforms through specific tags, and control the priority of issues. During the 2016 U.S. election, Russia used social robots to post content supporting Putin and attacking the opposition, covering up the opposition’s voice through information overload, and strengthening the pro-Putin public opinion atmosphere. [ 13] During the 2017 Gulf crisis, Saudi Arabia and Egypt used Twitter bots to create anti-Qatar hashtags#AlJazeeraInsultsKingSalman, which made it a hot topic and fictionalized the peak of anti-Qatar sentiment, which in turn affected global public opinion attitudes towards Qatar. [ 14] Deepfake technology further improves the accuracy and concealment of computing propaganda. In 2024, a fake video of U.S. President Joe Biden went viral on X (formerly Twitter), showing him using offensive language in the Oval Office, sparking controversy in public opinion and influencing voter sentiment. According to a survey by cybersecurity firm McAfee, 63% of respondents had watched a political deepfake video within two months, and nearly half said the content influenced their voting decisions.[ 15]

Globally, computing propaganda has infiltrated public opinion wars in various countries, affecting social stability and national security. The Israel Defense Forces waged a public opinion war against Palestine through digital weapons, Turkey cultivated “a patriotic troll army” to manipulate public opinion at home and abroad, and the Mexican government used botnets to influence public opinion. Computational propaganda is changing the landscape of global political communication as an important means of modern public opinion intervention warfare. With the development of technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, computing propaganda may also interfere with electoral processes through more covert and efficient means, or even directly threaten the core operating logic of democratic institutions.

(3) Symbolic identity war in the cultural field

Weaponized communication attempts to influence the public’s thoughts, emotions, and behaviors by manipulating information, symbols, and values, which in turn shapes or changes society’s collective cognition and cultural identity. This mode of communication consists not only in the transmission of information, but also in promoting the transmission and identification of a specific ideological or political idea through a specific narrative framework, cultural symbols and emotional resonance. Through the manipulation of cultural symbols, social emotions and collective memory, weaponized communication interferes with social structure and cultural identity in the cultural field, becoming a core means of symbolic identity warfare.

Memes, as a cultural symbol that combines visual elements and concise words, stimulate the emotional response of the audience in a humorous, satirical or provocative way, affecting their political attitudes and behaviors. Pepe the Frog began as a harmless comic book character that was repurposed and weaponized by far-right groups to spread hate speech, gradually evolving into a racist and anti-immigrant symbol. Memes transform complex political sentiments into easy-to-spread visual symbols that quickly stir up public distrust and anger over policy, seen as “weaponized iconoclastic weaponization” (Iconoclastic Weaponization). This process, by manipulating cultural symbols in order to achieve the purpose of political or social struggle [16], aggravates the public’s division of society and politics. For example, during Brexit, memes bearing the words “Take Back Control” Take Back Control spread rapidly, reinforcing nationalist sentiments.

In addition to the manufacture of cultural symbols, the screening and shielding of symbols are equally capable of shaping or deepening a certain cultural identity or political stance. Censorship has been an important means for power to control information since ancient times, and as early as the ancient Greek and Roman periods, governments censored public speeches and literary works to maintain social order and power stability. Entering the digital age, the rise of the Internet and social media has driven the modernization of censorship, and platform censorship has gradually replaced traditional censorship methods as a core tool for contemporary information control and public opinion guidance. Algorithm review detects sensitive topics, keywords, and user behavior data through artificial intelligence, automatically deletes or blocks content deemed “violations”, and the review team of social media manually screens user-generated content to ensure its compliance with platform policies and laws and regulations. The role of platform censorship is not only to limit the dissemination of certain content, but also to guide public opinion and shape the public perception framework through push, deletion and blocking. Although mainstream social platforms control the spread of information through strict content moderation mechanisms, some edge platforms such as Gab, Gettr, Bitchute, and others have become hotbeds of extreme speech and malicious information due to the lack of effective censorship. These platforms do not place sufficient restrictions on content publishing, allowing extreme views and disinformation to spread wantonly. For example, Gab has been repeatedly criticized for its extremist content and is accused of promoting violence and hatred. In the “echo chamber”, users can only access information that is consistent with their own views. This information environment further strengthens extreme ideas and leads to increased antagonism among social groups.[ 17]

Language, as a carrier and tool for information dissemination, can profoundly influence group behavior and cultural identity through emotional manipulation, symbolic politics, and social mobilization. The weaponization of language focuses on how language forms and cultural contexts affect the way information is received, emphasizing how language can be used to manipulate, guide or change people’s cognition and behavior. This involves not only the use of specific lexical and rhetorical devices, but also the construction of specific social meanings and cultural frameworks through linguistic representations. As another important tool of symbolic identity warfare, language shapes the narrative framework “of antagonism between the enemy and the enemy”. The Great Translation Movement spread the nationalist rhetoric of Chinese netizens to international social media platforms through selective translation, triggering negative perceptions of China. This language manipulation amplifies controversial content through emotional expression and deepens the cultural bias of the international community.

The deep logic of the weaponization of language lies in emotional and inflammatory forms of language. Western countries often justify acts of intervention by using the labels of justice such as “human rights” and “democracy”, legitimizing political or military action. White supremacists reshape ideologies using vague labels such as “alt-right”, transforming traditional “white supremacist” with strongly negative connotations into a more neutral concept, reducing the vocabulary’s social resistance, broadening the base of its supporters with a broad “umbrella” identity. Through the infiltration of secular discourse, hate politics and extreme speech are justified, gradually creating a political normality. Language is truly weaponized after the public routineizes this politics.[ 18] In Nigeria, hate-mongering content spreads through racial, religious and regional topics, profoundly deteriorating social relations. [ 19] Linguistic ambiguity and reasonable denial strategies have also become powerful tools for communicators to circumvent their responsibilities and spread complex social and political issues in simplified narratives. Through negative labeling and emotional discourse, Trump’s America First policy deliberately puts forward views that are opposed to mainstream opinions by opposing globalization, questioning climate change science, and criticizing traditional allies, stimulating public distrust of globalization, reshaping the cultural identity of national interests first. [ 20]

III Risks and challenges of weaponized dissemination: legitimacy and destructiveness

Although weaponized communication poses a great risk to the international public opinion landscape, it may be given some legitimacy by certain countries or groups through legal, political or moral frameworks in specific situations. For example, after the “9/11” incident, the United States passed the Patriot Act to expand the surveillance authority of intelligence agencies and implement extensive information control in the name of “anti-terrorism”. This “legitimacy” is often criticized as undermining civil liberties and eroding the core values of democratic society.

In the international political game, weaponized transmission is more often seen as a means of “Gray Zone” (Gray Zone). Confrontations between countries are no longer limited to economic sanctions or diplomatic pressure, but are waged through non-traditional means such as information manipulation and social media intervention. Some States use “the protection of national interests” as a pretext to disseminate false information, arguing that their actions are compliant and, although they may be controversial under international law, are often justified as necessary means “to counter external threats”. In some countries where the regulation of information lacks a strict legal framework, interference in elections is often tolerated or even seen as a “justified” political exercise. At the cultural level, certain countries attempt to shape their own cultural influence on a global scale by disseminating specific cultural symbols and ideologies. Western countries often promote the spread of their values in the name of “cultural sharing” and “communication of civilizations”, but in actual operations, they weaken the identity of other cultures by manipulating cultural symbols and narrative frameworks, leading to global cultural ecology. imbalance. The legal framework also provides support, to a certain extent, for the justification of weaponized dissemination. In the name of “counter-terrorism” and “against extremism”, some countries restrict the dissemination of so-called “harmful information” through information censorship, content filtering and other means. However, this justification often pushes moral boundaries, leading to information blockades and suppression of speech. Information governance on the grounds of “national security”, although internally recognized to a certain extent, provides space for the proliferation of weaponized communications.

Compared to legitimacy, the spread of weaponization is particularly devastating. At present, weaponized communication has become an important tool for power structures to manipulate public opinion. It not only distorts the content of information, but also profoundly affects public perception, social emotions, and international relations through privacy violations, emotional mobilization, and cultural penetration.

(1) Information distortion and cognitive manipulation

Distortion of information means that information is deliberately or unintentionally distorted during dissemination, resulting in significant differences between what the public receives and the original information. On social media, the spread of disinformation and misleading content is rampant, and generated content from artificial intelligence models (such as GPT) may be exacerbated by bias in training data. Gender, race, or social bias may be reflected in automatically generated text, amplifying the risk of information distortion. The fast-spreading nature of social media also makes it difficult for traditional fact-checking mechanisms to keep up with the spread of disinformation. Disinformation often dominates public opinion in a short period of time, and cross-platform dissemination and anonymity complicate clarification and correction. The asymmetries in communication undermine the authority of traditional news organizations, and the public’s preference for trusting instantly updated social platform information over in-depth coverage by traditional news organizations further diminishes the role of news organizations in resisting disinformation.

In addition to the distortion of the information itself, weaponized communication makes profound use of the psychological mechanisms of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance refers to the psychological discomfort that occurs when an individual is exposed to information that conflicts with their pre-existing beliefs or attitudes. By creating cognitive dissonance, communicators shake the established attitudes of their target audience and even induce them to accept new ideologies. In political elections, targeted dissemination of negative information often forces voters to re-examine their political positions or even change their voting tendencies. Weaponized communication further intensifies the formation of “information cocoon houses” through selective exposure, allowing audiences to tend to access information consistent with their own beliefs, ignoring or rejecting opposing views. This not only reinforces the cognitive biases of individuals, but also allows disinformation to spread rapidly within the group, making it difficult to be broken by external facts and rational voices, and ultimately forming a highly homogeneous ecology of public opinion.

(2) Privacy leakage and digital monitoring

In recent years, the abuse of deepfakes has exacerbated the problem of privacy violations. In 2019, the “ZAO” face-changing software was removed from the shelves due to default user consent to portrait rights, revealing the risk of overcollection of biometric data. Photos uploaded by users that have been processed through deep learning can either generate an accurate face-changing video or become a source of privacy leaks. What’s more, techniques such as deepfakes are abused for gender-based violence, the faces of multiple European and American actresses are illegally planted with fake sex videos and widely distributed, and although the platforms remove this content in some cases, the popularity of open-source programs makes it easy for malicious users to copy and share forged content. In addition, when users use social media, they tend to authorize the platform by default to access their devices’ photos, cameras, microphones and other app permissions. Through these rights, the platform not only collects a large amount of personal data, but also analyzes users’ behavioral characteristics, interest preferences, and social relationships through algorithms, allowing it to accurately deliver ads, recommend content, and even implement information manipulation. This large-scale data acquisition drives global discussion of privacy protections. In Europe, the General Data Protection Regulation attempts to strengthen the protection of individuals’ right to privacy through strict regulations on data collection and use. However, due to “implicit consent” or complex user agreements, platforms often bypass regulations that make the data-processing process less transparent, making it difficult for regular users to understand what the data is actually used for. Section 230 of the U.S. Communications Decency Act provides that online platforms are not legally responsible for user-generated content, a provision that has fueled the development of content moderation on platforms but has also left them with little incentive to respond to privacy infringements. Platforms, motivated by commercial interests, often lag behind in dealing with disinformation and privacy issues, leading to ongoing shelving of audit responsibilities.

In terms of digital surveillance, social platforms work with governments to make user data a core resource “of surveillance capitalism”. The National Security Agency (NSA) implements mass surveillance through phone records, Internet communications, and social media data, and works with large enterprises such as Google and Facebook to obtain users’ online behavioral data for intelligence gathering and behavioral analysis worldwide. The abuse of transnational surveillance technologies is what pushes privacy violations to an international level. Pegasus spyware developed by the Israeli cybersecurity company NSO, which compromises target devices through “zero-click attacks”, can steal private information and communication records in real time. In 2018, in the case of the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the Saudi government monitored its communications through Pegasus, revealing the profound threat this technology poses to individual privacy and international politics.

(3) Emotional polarization and social division

Emotions play a key role in influencing individual cognition and decision-making. Weaponized communication influences rational judgment by inciting feelings of fear, anger, sympathy, etc., and pushes the public to react irrationally, driven by emotions. War, violence and nationalism often become the main content of emotional mobilization. Through carefully designed topics, communicators implant elements such as patriotism and religious beliefs into information dissemination, quickly arousing public emotional resonance. The widespread adoption of digital technologies, particularly the combination of artificial intelligence and social media platforms, further amplifies the risk of emotional polarization. The rapid spread of disinformation and extreme speech on the platform comes not only from the sharing behavior of ordinary users, but is also driven by algorithms. Platforms tend to prioritize the push of emotional and highly interactive content, which often contains inflammatory language and extreme views, thus exacerbating the spread of hate speech and extreme views.

Social media hashtags and algorithmic recommendations play a key role in emotional polarization. After the Charlie Hebdo incident, the #StopIslam hashtag became a communication tool for hate speech, with the help of which users posted messages of hatred and violent tendencies. During the 2020 presidential election in the United States, extreme political rhetoric and misinformation on social platforms were also amplified in a bitter partisan struggle. Through precise emotional manipulation, weaponized communication not only tears apart public dialogue, but also greatly affects the democratic process of society. Another particular extremist mobilization tactic is “Weaponized Autism”, where far-right groups use the technical expertise of autistic individuals to implement emotional manipulation. These groups recruit technically competent but socially challenged individuals, transforming them into enforcers of information warfare by giving them a false sense of belonging. These individuals, guided by extremist groups, are used to spread hate speech, carry out cyberattacks and promote extremism. This phenomenon reveals not only the deep-seated mechanisms of emotional manipulation, but also how technology can be exploited by extremist groups to serve the larger political and social agenda.[ 21]

(4) Information colonization and cultural penetration

“Weaponized Interdependence” theory Weaponized Interdependence Theory reveals how states use key nodes in political, economic, and information networks to exert pressure on other states. [ 22] Especially in the field of information, developed countries further consolidate their cultural and political advantages by controlling the implementation of information flows “information colonization”. Digital platforms became the vehicles of this colonial process, the countries of the Global South were highly dependent on Western-dominated technology platforms and social networks for information dissemination, and in sub-Saharan Africa, Facebook has become synonymous with “the Internet”. This dependence not only generates huge advertising revenues for Western businesses, but also has a profound impact on indigenous African cultures and values through algorithmic recommendations, especially in terms of gender, family, and religious beliefs, making cultural penetration the norm.

Digital inequality is another manifestation of information colonization. The dominance of developed countries in digital technology and information resources has increasingly marginalized countries of the South in the economic, educational and cultural fields. Palestine’s inability to effectively integrate into the global digital economy due to inadequate infrastructure and technological blockade both limits local economic development and further weakens its voice in global information dissemination. Through technological blockades and economic sanctions, the world’s major economies and information powers restrict other countries’ access to key technological and innovation resources, which not only hinders the development of science and technology in target countries, but also exacerbates the rupture of the global technology and innovation ecosystem. Since withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear Deal in 2018, U.S. economic sanctions on Iran have blocked its development in the semiconductor and 5G sectors, and the asymmetry between technology and innovation has widened the gap in the global technology ecosystem, putting many countries at a disadvantage in information competition.

IV Reflection and discussion: the battle for the right to speak in the asymmetric communication landscape

In the competitive landscape of “Asymmetric Communication”, strong parties often dominate public opinion through channels such as mainstream media and international news organizations, while weak parties need to use innovative communication technologies and means to make up for their disadvantages and compete for the right to speak. At the heart of this communication landscape lies Information Geopolitics, the idea that the contest of power between states depends not only on geographical location, military power, or economic resources, but also on control over information, data, and technology. The game between the great powers is no longer limited to the control of physical space, but extends to the competition for public opinion space. These “information landscapes” involve the right to speak, information circulation and media influence in the global communication ecosystem. In this process, the country continuously creates landscapes to influence international public opinion and shape the global cognitive framework, thereby achieving its strategic goals. The strategy of asymmetric communication is not only related to the transmission of information content, but more importantly, how to bridge the gap between resources and capabilities with the help of various communication technologies, platforms and means. The core of information communication is no longer limited to the content itself, but revolves around the right to speak. The competition unfolds. With the rise of information warfare and cognitive warfare, whoever has the information will have a head start in global competition.

(1) Technology catching up under the advantage of latecomers

Traditional large countries or strong communicators control the dominance of global public opinion, and by contrast, weak countries often lack communication channels to compete with these large countries. The theory of latecomer advantage advocates that latecomer countries can rapidly rise and circumvent inefficient and outdated links in early technological innovation by leaping forward and bypassing traditional technological paths and introducing existing advanced technologies and knowledge. In the context of weaponized communication, this theory provides information-weak countries with a path to break through the barriers of communication in large countries through emerging technologies, helping them to catch up at the technical level. Traditional media are often constrained by resources, influence and censorship mechanisms, with slow dissemination of information, limited coverage and vulnerability to manipulation by specific countries or groups. The rise of digital media has brought about a fundamental change in the landscape of information dissemination, enabling disadvantaged countries, with the help of globalized Internet platforms, to directly target international audiences without having to rely on traditional news organizations and mainstream media. Through emerging technologies, disadvantaged countries can not only transmit information more precisely, but also rapidly expand their influence in international public opinion through targeted communication and emotional guidance. Later-developing countries can use advanced technologies (such as big data, artificial intelligence, 5G networks, etc.) to achieve precise information dissemination and create efficient communication channels. Taking “big data analysis” as an example, latecomer countries can gain an in-depth understanding of audience needs and public opinion trends, quickly identify the pulse of global public opinion, implement targeted communication, and quickly expand international influence. AI technology not only predicts the direction of public opinion development, but also optimizes communication strategies in real time. The popularization of 5G networks has greatly improved the speed and coverage of information dissemination, allowing latecomer countries to break through the limitations of traditional communication models in a low-cost and efficient manner and form unique communication advantages.

Through transnational cooperation, late-developing countries can integrate more communication resources and expand the breadth and depth of communication. For example, Argentina has established “Latin American News Network” with other Latin American countries to push Latin American countries to speak with a single voice in international public opinion and counter the single narrative of Western media through news content sharing. In Africa, South Africa has partnered with Huawei to promote the “Smart South Africa” project to build a modern information infrastructure and promote digital transformation and efficiency improvements in public services. Governments of late-developing countries should invest more in technological research and development and innovation, and encourage the development of local enterprises and talent. At the same time, attention should be paid to the export of culture and the construction of the media industry, so as to enhance the country’s voice in the international information space through globalized cooperation and decentralized communication models. Governments can fund digital cultural creations, support the growth of local social media platforms, and integrate more communication resources through an international cooperation framework.

(2) Construction of barriers in information countermeasures

Unlike a full-scale conflict that may be triggered by military action, or the risks that economic sanctions may pose, weaponized dissemination is able to achieve strategic objectives without triggering full-scale war, and it is extremely attractive based on cost and strategic considerations. Because weaponized communication is characterized by low cost and high returns, an increasing number of State and non-State actors have chosen to manipulate information in order to reach strategic objectives. The spread of this means of dissemination makes countries face even more complex and variable threats in the face of attacks involving information from outside and inside. With the increasing intensity of information warfare, mere traditional military defense can no longer meet the needs of modern warfare. Instead, building a robust information defense system becomes a key strategy for the country to maintain political stability, safeguard social identity, and enhance international competitiveness. Therefore, how to effectively deal with external interference in information and manipulation of public opinion, as well as counter-information, has become an urgent issue for all countries to address. A complete cybersecurity infrastructure is key to maintaining national security against the manipulation or tampering of sensitive information from outside. Take, for example, the European Union’s push to strengthen cybersecurity in member states through its “Digital Single Market” strategy, which requires internet companies to be more aggressive in dealing with disinformation and external interference. The EU’s cybersecurity directives also provide for member states to establish emergency response mechanisms to protect critical information infrastructure from cyberattacks. In addition, the EU has established cooperation with social platform companies, such as Facebook, Twitter and Google, to combat the spread of fake news by providing anti-disinformation tools and data analysis technologies. Artificial intelligence, big data, and automation technologies are becoming important tools for information defense, used to monitor information propagation paths in real time, identify potential disinformation, and resist public opinion manipulation. In the field of cybersecurity, big data analysis helps decision makers identify and warn against malicious attacks, and optimize countermeasures. The application of these technologies will not only enhance information defence capabilities at the domestic level, but also enhance national initiative and competitiveness in the international information space.

Counter-mechanisms are another important component of the information defence system, especially under pressure from international public opinion, where real-time monitoring of the spread of external information and timely correction of disinformation become key to safeguarding the initiative of public opinion. Since the 2014 Crimean crisis, Ukraine has built a rather large-scale cyber defense system through cooperation with NATO and the United States. Ukraine’s National Cyber Security Service has set up “information countermeasures teams” to counter cyberthreats, using social media and news release platforms to refute false Russian reports in real time, a tactic that has significantly boosted Ukraine’s reputation and trust in international public opinion.

(3) Agenda setting in public opinion guidance

In the global competitive landscape of informatization and digitalization, public opinion guidance involves not only the content of information dissemination, but more importantly, how to set the agenda and focus on hot topics of global concern. The agenda-setting theory suggests that whoever can take control of the topics of information circulation can guide the direction of public opinion. Agenda setting influences public attention and evaluation of events by controlling the scope and focus of discussion of topics, and the rise of social media provides a breakthrough for information-disadvantaged countries to compete for dominance in information dissemination through multi-platform linkage. In the case of Ukraine, for example, during the Russo-Ukrainian War, it disseminated the actual war situation through social media, not only publishing the actual combat situation, but also incorporating the emotional demands of the people, and using the tragic narrative of civilian encounters and urban destruction to inspire sympathy and attention from the international community. While resisting interference from external information, the State also needs to proactively disseminate positive narratives and tell cultural stories that can resonate with the international community. The story should correspond to the emotional needs of international public opinion, while at the same time showing the uniqueness of the country and strengthening the link with the international community. Taking my country’s “One Belt, One Road” co-construction as an example, in the “One Belt, One Road” co-construction country, my country has invested in and constructed a large number of infrastructure projects. These projects not only helped improve local economic basic conditions, but also demonstrated China’s globalization process. Responsibility provides a window for cultural cooperation and exchange activities, showing the rich history and culture of the Chinese nation to the world It has demonstrated the inclusiveness and responsibility of Chinese culture to the international community.

However, because countries of the Global South often face constraints in terms of resources, technology and international communication platforms, and have difficulty in competing directly with developed countries, they rely on more flexible and innovative means of communication to participate in the setting of the global agenda. For example, Brazil is under negative public opinion pressure from the Western media when it comes to dealing with issues of environmental protection and climate change, especially the deforestation of the Amazon forest. To this end, the Brazilian government actively creates the country’s image in the field of environmental protection by using social media to publish recent data and success stories about Amazon protection. At the same time, Brazil has strengthened its voice on climate issues by engaging with other developing countries in global climate change negotiations and promoting South-South cooperation. Large international events, humanitarian activities and the production of cultural products, among others, are also effective ways of telling national stories. International sports events such as the World Cup and the Olympic Games are not only a display platform for sports competitions, but also an exhibition venue for national image and cultural soft power. By hosting or actively participating in these global events, the country can show its strength, value and cultural charm to the world, promoting a positive public opinion agenda.

“War is nothing more than the continuation of politics through another means”[23]. This classic Clausewitz assertion is modernized in the context of weaponized communication. Weaponized communication breaks through the physical boundaries of traditional warfare and becomes a modern strategic means of integrating information warfare, cognitive warfare, and psychological warfare. It manipulates the flow of information and public perception in a non-violent form, so that State and non-State actors can achieve political goals without relying on direct military action, reflecting a highly strategic and targeted nature. By manipulating information, emotions and values, weaponized communication can achieve strategic goals while avoiding all-out war, and in global competition and conflict, it has become an important means of political suppression by powerful countries against weak ones.

The core of weaponized communication lies in weakening the enemy’s decision-making and operational capabilities through information manipulation, but its complexity makes the communication effect difficult to fully predict. Although information-powerful countries suppress information-weak countries through technological advantages and communication channels, the effectiveness of communication is uncertain. Especially in the context of the globalization of social media and digital platforms, the boundaries and effects of information flow are becoming increasingly difficult to control. This complexity offers the weak countries the opportunity to break through the hegemony of discourse and promote the reverse game of information dissemination. Weak countries can use these platforms to launch confrontations, challenge the information manipulation of powerful countries, and take their place in global public opinion. The asymmetric game reflects the dynamic balance of international public opinion, whereby communication is no longer one-way control, but more complex interaction and dialogue, giving the weak the possibility of influencing public opinion. The current international public opinion landscape is still dominated by the one-way suppression of information-weak countries by information-powerful countries, but this situation is not unbreakable. Information warfare has a high degree of asymmetry, and information-weak countries can counter it step by step with technological innovation, flexible strategies and transnational cooperation. By exerting “asymmetric advantages”, weak countries are not only able to influence global public opinion, but also to enhance their voice with the help of joint action and information-sharing. Transnational cooperation and the establishment of regional alliances provide the weak countries with a powerful tool to counter the powerful, enabling them to form a synergy in international public opinion and challenge the dominance of the information powers. Under the “war framework”, countries can flexibly adjust their strategies and proactively shape the information dissemination pattern, rather than passively accepting information manipulation by powerful countries.

Sociology of war emphasizes the role of social structure, cultural identity, and group behavior in warfare. Weaponized communication is not only a continuation of military or political behavior, but also profoundly affects the psychosocial, group emotions, and cultural identity. Powerful countries use information dissemination to shape other countries’ perceptions and attitudes in order to achieve their own strategic goals. However, from a sociological perspective, weaponized transmission is not a one-way suppression, but rather the product of complex social interactions and cultural responses. In this process, the information-weak countries are not completely vulnerable, but, on the contrary, they can counter external manipulation with “soft power” with the help of cultural communication, social mobilization and dynamic confrontation of global public opinion, shaping a new collective identity and demonstrating the legitimacy of “weak weapons”.

(Fund Project: Research results of the National Social Science Fund Major Project to Study and Interpret the Spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China “Research on Promoting the Integrated Management of News Publicity and Online Public Opinion” (Project No.: 24ZDA084))

現代國語：

作者：

郭小安 康如诗来源：

　 发布时间：

2025-05-06

【摘要】在國際輿論戰中，武器化傳播已滲透軍事、經濟、外交等領域，帶來“一切皆可武器化”的想像與實踐。武器化傳播通過技術、平台和政策操控公眾認知，體現了權力分配與文化博弈的複雜互動。在全球化和數字化的推動下，認知操控、社會分裂、情感極化、數字監控、信息殖民已成為影響國家穩定的新型手段，這不僅加劇了信息強國與弱國間的競爭，也為信息弱國提供了通過靈活策略和技術創新實現逆轉的機會。在全球非對稱傳播格局下，如何在技術創新與倫理責任、戰略目標與社會平衡間找到契合點和平衡點，將是影響未來國際輿論格局的關鍵要素。

【關鍵詞】輿論戰；武器化傳播；信息操縱；非對稱傳播；信息安全

如果說“宣傳是對現代世界的理性認可”[1]，那麼武器化傳播則是對現代技術手段的理性應用。在輿論戰中，各參與主體通過不同傳播手段實現戰略目標，做到表面合理且隱蔽。與傳統軍事衝突不同，現代戰爭不僅涉及物理對抗，還涵蓋信息、經濟、心理及技術等多個領域的競爭。隨著技術進步和全球化的推動，戰爭形態發生深刻變化，傳統的物理對抗逐漸轉向多維度、多領域的綜合作戰。在這一過程中，武器化傳播作為一種現代戰爭形式，成為通過控制、引導和操縱輿論，影響敵對方或目標受眾的心理、情感與行為，進而實現政治、軍事或戰略目的的隱形暴力手段。 《戰爭論》認為，戰爭是讓敵人無力抵抗，且屈從於我們意志的一種暴力行為。 [2]在現代戰爭中，這一目標的實現不僅依賴於軍事力量的對抗，更需要信息、網絡與心理戰等非傳統領域的支持。第六代戰爭（Sixth Generation Warfare）預示戰爭形態的進一步轉變，強調人工智能、大數據、無人系統等新興技術的應用，以及信息、網絡、心理和認知領域的全面博弈。現代戰爭的“前線”已擴展到社交媒體、經濟制裁和網絡攻擊等層面，要求參與者俱備更強的信息控制與輿論引導能力。

當前，武器化傳播已滲透到軍事、經濟、外交等領域，帶來“一切皆可武器化”的憂慮。在戰爭社會學中，傳播被視為權力的延伸工具，信息戰爭深刻滲透並伴隨傳統戰爭。武器化傳播正是在信息控制的框架下，通過塑造公眾認知與情感，鞏固或削弱國家、政權或非國家行為者的權力。這一過程不僅發生在戰時，也在非戰斗狀態下影響著國家內外的權力關係。在國際政治傳播中，信息操控已成為大國博弈的關鍵工具，各國通過傳播虛假信息、發動網絡攻擊等手段，試圖影響全球輿論和國際決策。輿論戰不僅是信息傳播的手段，更涉及國家間權力博弈與外交關係的調整，直接影響國際社會的治理結構與權力格局。基於此，本文將深入探討武器化傳播的概念流變，分析其背後的社會心態，闡述具體的技術手段及所帶來的風險，並從國家層面提出多維應對策略。

一、從傳播武器化到武器化傳播：概念流變及隱喻

武器在人類歷史上一直是戰爭的象徵和工具，戰爭則是人類社會中最極端、暴力的衝突形式。因此，“被武器化”是指將某些工具用於戰爭中的對抗、操控或破壞，強調這些工具的使用方式。 “武器化”（weaponize）譯為“使得使用某些東西攻擊個人或團體成為可能”。 1957年，“武器化”一詞作為軍事術語被提出，V-2彈道導彈團隊的領導者沃納·馮·布勞恩表示，他的主要工作是“將軍方的彈道導彈技術‘武器化’”[3]。

“武器化”最早出現在太空領域，時值美蘇軍備競賽時期，兩個大國力圖爭奪外太空主導權。 “太空武器化”是指將太空用於發展、部署或使用軍事武器系統的過程，包括衛星、反衛星武器和導彈防禦系統等，目的是進行戰略、戰術或防禦性行動。 1959年至1962年，美蘇提出了一系列倡議，禁止將外太空用於軍事目的，尤其是禁止在外層空間軌道部署大規模毀滅性武器。 2018年，當時的美國總統特朗普簽署了《空間政策指令-3》，啟動“太空軍”建設，將太空視為與陸地、空中、海洋同等的重要作戰領域。 2019年，《中華人民共和國和俄羅斯聯邦關於加強當代全球戰略穩定的聯合聲明》中倡議“禁止在外空放置任何類型武器”[4]。

除太空領域的武器化外，軍事、經濟、外交等領域也顯現武器化趨勢。 “軍事武器化”是將資源（如無人機、核武器等）用於軍事目的、部署武器系統或發展軍事能力。 2022年俄烏戰爭期間，英國皇家聯合軍種研究所的報告顯示，烏克蘭每月因俄羅斯干擾站的影響，損失約10000架無人機。 [5]“武器化”也常出現在“金融戰爭”“外交戰場”等表述中。在經濟領域，武器化通常指國家或組織對全球金融系統中的共享資源或機制的利用；外交武器化則表現為國家通過經濟制裁、外交孤立、輿論操控等手段，追求自身利益並對他國施加壓力。隨著時間的推移，“武器化”概念逐漸擴展到政治、社會、文化等領域，尤其在信息領域，自2016年美國總統大選以來，輿論操縱已成為政治鬥爭的普遍工具。美國前中央情報局局長戴維·彼得雷烏斯曾在國家戰略研究所會議上表示，“萬物武器化”（the weaponization of everything）的時代已經來臨。 [6]

作為一種隱喻，“武器化”不僅指實際物理工具的使用，還像徵著對抗性和攻擊性行為的轉化，強調“武器”這一概念如何滲透至日常生活、文化生產和政治策略中，展現社會行動者如何利用各種工具達成戰略目的。時下，許多本應保持中立的領域，如媒體、法律和政府機構，常被描述為“武器化”，用以批判它們的過度政治化和被不正當利用，突出其非法性及對社會的負面影響。通過這一隱喻，人們無意識地將當前的政治環境與理想化的、看似更溫和的過去進行對比，使人們認為過去的政治氛圍更加理性和文明，而現今則顯得過於極端和對立。 [7]因此，“武器化”的實質是政治中介化的過程，是政治力量通過各種手段和渠道，影響或控製本應保持中立的領域，使其成為政治目的和政治鬥爭的工具。

在信息領域，傳播武器化是長期存在的一種戰略手段。第一、二次世界大戰期間，各國就廣泛使用了宣傳和輿論戰，傳播手段被作為一種心理戰術使用。武器化傳播是傳播武器化在現代信息社會中的體現，其利用算法和大數據分析精準地控制信息的傳播速度和範圍，進而操控輿論和情感，反映了技術、平台和策略的結合，使得政治力量可以更加精準和高效地操控公眾認知與輿論環境。信息作為輿論的本體，被“武器化”並用於影響社會認知和群體行為，“戰爭”的概念也隨之變化，不再只是傳統的軍事對抗，還包括通過信息傳播和輿論操控實現的心理戰和認知戰。這種轉變促生了一系列新術語，例如無限制戰爭（unrestricted warfare）、新一代戰爭（new generation warfare）、非對稱戰爭（asymmetric warfare）和非常規戰爭（irregular warfare）等。這些術語幾乎都藉用“戰爭”（warfare）強調信息領域中的多樣化衝突，信息成為被“武器化”的核心內容。

儘管有部分觀點認為“戰爭”一詞不適用於未正式宣布敵對行動的情況[8]，但武器化傳播通過弱化戰爭的傳統政治屬性，將各領域的公開或隱蔽的力量和形式籠統地視作傳播行為，從而擴展了“戰爭”這一概念的外延。值得注意的是，在英文術語中“武器化”有兩種表述方式：一種是“weaponized noun（名詞）”，即表示某物已經“被武器化”，具備武器功能或用途；另一種是“weaponization of noun”，指將某物轉化為武器或具有武器性質的過程。在學術領域，儘管weaponized communication和weaponization of communication尚未嚴格區分，但中文翻譯有所區別。 “武器化傳播”更側重於傳播手段或信息本身“被武器化”，以實現某種戰略目標；“傳播武器化”則強調傳播過程本身作為武器的轉化過程。在討論具體技術手段時，多數學術論文采用weaponed或weaponizing作為前綴，以修飾具體的傳播手段。

本文重點討論的是國際輿論戰中的具體傳播策略，著重描述已經發生的武器化現象，故統一使用“武器化傳播”，其是一種利用傳播手段、技術工具和信息平台，通過精確操控信息流動、公眾認知與情感反應，達到特定軍事、政治或社會目的的策略性傳播方式。武器化傳播也並非單純的戰爭或戰時狀態，而是一種持續的傳播現象，它反映了各主體間的互動與博弈，是信息共享和意義空間的流動。

二、武器化傳播的應用場景及實施策略

如果說20世紀90年代末，信息領域的武器化仍是一個“死話題”，各國主要追逐導彈、無人機等實體武器的升級競賽，那麼步入21世紀，網絡戰爭則真正衝進了公眾視野，並深刻嵌入人們的日常生活，經由社交媒體和智能設備，公眾不可避免地捲入輿論戰爭，不自覺地成為參與者或傳播節點。隨著技術的普及，武器化手段逐漸從國家主導的戰爭工具擴展到社會化和政治化領域，對個人和社會的控制從顯性的國家機器轉向更隱蔽的觀念操控。棱鏡計劃（PRISM）的曝光引發了全球對隱私洩露的強烈擔憂，凸顯了國家利用先進技術進行監視和控制的潛力，這被視為一種新型的武器化。自2016年特朗普當選美國總統以來，社交機器人等信息武器的大規模應用，成為全球政治博弈中的常見現象。信息作戰——包括電子戰、計算機網絡作戰、心理戰和軍事欺騙——被廣泛用於操控信息流動，影響輿論格局。這些手段不僅在軍事戰爭和政治選舉中發揮作用，還逐漸滲透到文化衝突、社會運動及跨國博弈之中，傳統的信息作戰邏輯得以延續。如今，武器化傳播作為一種社會政治工具，深刻影響著輿論生態、國際關係以及個人的日常生活。

（一）軍事領域的信息操縱戰

信息流能夠直接影響軍事衝突的走向，塑造公眾和軍隊的認知與決策，進而影響士氣、戰略判斷和社會穩定。在現代戰爭中，信息不再是單純的輔助工具，信息領域已成為核心戰場。通過操控信息流向，敵方的形勢評估可能被誤導，戰鬥意志被削弱，民眾的信任與支持被動搖，進而影響戰爭的決策過程與持續性。

海灣戰爭（Gulf War）被視為現代信息戰的開端。在這場戰爭中，美國通過高科技手段——包括電子戰、空中打擊和信息操作——實施了對伊拉克的系統性打擊。美軍利用衛星和AWACS預警機實時監控戰場態勢，通過空投傳單和廣播電台向伊拉克士兵傳遞美軍優勢及投降後的優待政策，從心理層面誘使伊軍投降。這場戰爭標誌著信息控制在軍事衝突中的關鍵地位，展示了信息戰在現代戰爭中的潛力。進入21世紀，網絡戰成為信息戰的重要組成部分。網絡戰不僅涉及信息的傳播和操控，還包括通過攻擊關鍵基礎設施實現對敵方社會功能的控制。 2007年愛沙尼亞遭遇大規模DDoS（Distributed Denial of Service Attack）攻擊，展示了信息操縱與網絡攻擊融合的趨勢。 2017年在WannaCry勒索軟件事件中，攻擊者利用Windows系統漏洞（EternalBlue）加密全球150個國家約20萬台計算機文件，要求支付贖金，嚴重影響英國國家健康服務體系（NHS），導致急診服務中斷和醫院系統癱瘓，進一步揭示了網絡戰對關鍵基礎設施的威脅。此外，在長期衝突中，基礎設施控制因能夠直接決定信息傳播的速度、範圍和方向，被廣泛用於削弱對手的戰略能力，爭奪公共信息空間。以色列通過限制無線電頻譜使用、控制互聯網帶寬和破壞通信設施，有效削弱了巴勒斯坦的通信能力。同時，以色列還通過經濟制裁和法律框架限制巴勒斯坦電信市場的發展，壓制巴勒斯坦在信息流動中的競爭力，鞏固自身在衝突中的戰略優勢[9]，以維持信息的不平等流動。

社交媒體為信息操縱提供了即時、廣泛的信息傳播渠道，使其能夠跨越國界，影響全球公眾情緒和政治局勢，也使戰爭焦點從單純的物理破壞轉向輿論操控。俄烏戰爭期間，深度偽造技術作為視覺武器，對公眾認知和戰爭輿論產生了顯著干擾。 2022年3月15日，烏克蘭總統澤連斯基的偽造視頻在Twitter上傳播，視頻中他“呼籲”烏克蘭士兵放下武器，引發了短時間內的輿論混亂。同樣，俄羅斯總統普京的偽造視頻也被用以混淆視聽。儘管這些視頻被平台迅速標註“Stay informed”（等待了解情況）的說明，但其在短時間內仍然對公眾情緒和認知造成明顯干擾。這些事件凸顯了社交媒體在現代信息戰中的關鍵作用，國家和非國家行為體可以通過虛假信息、情感操控等手段對軍事衝突施加干擾。

信息操縱戰的複雜性還體現在其雙重特性上——既是攻擊工具，也是防禦的手段。在軍事領域，各國通過防禦和反擊網絡攻擊來確保國家安全、保護關鍵基礎設施、維護軍事機密，並在某些情況下影響對手的戰鬥力與決策。 2015年和2017年，俄羅斯黑客發起了針對烏克蘭的大規模網絡攻擊（如BlackEnergy和NotPetya），烏克蘭通過迅速升級網絡防禦系統，成功抵禦部分攻擊並採取反制措施，避免了更大規模的基礎設施癱瘓。此外，北約戰略傳播卓越中心和英國第77旅等單位專注研究和平時期的輿論塑造[10]，利用戰略傳播、心理戰和社交媒體監控等手段，擴大信息領域的戰略控制，並強化了防禦與輿論塑造能力，進一步提高了信息戰的戰略高度。

如今，信息操縱戰已經成為現代軍事衝突中的關鍵環節。通過信息技術與心理操控的高度結合，它不僅改變了傳統戰爭的規則，也深刻影響著公眾認知和全球安全格局。國家、跨國公司或其他行為體通過掌控關鍵基礎設施和社交媒體平台，限制信息流動、操控傳播路徑，從而在全球信息生態中獲得戰略優勢。

（二）政治選舉的輿論干預戰

政治選舉是民主政治中最直接的權力競爭場域，信息傳播在此過程中對選民決策具有重要影響。通過計算宣傳等手段，外部勢力或政治團體能夠操縱選民情緒、誤導公眾認知，從而左右選舉結果、破壞政治穩定或削弱民主進程，選舉因此成為武器化傳播最具效果的應用場景。

近年來，全球政治選舉呈現極化趨勢，持不同政治立場的群體之間存在巨大的意識形態差異。極化導致公眾選擇性接受與自身觀點一致的信息，同時排斥其他信息，這種“回音室效應”加劇了公眾對立場的片面認知，為輿論干預提供了更大的空間。而信息傳播技術，尤其是計算宣傳的興起，使外部勢力能夠更加精準地操控輿論和影響選民決策。計算宣傳（Computational Propaganda）指利用計算技術、算法和自動化系統操控信息流動，以傳播政治信息、干預選舉結果和影響輿論，其核心特徵在於算法驅動的精準性和自動化傳播的規模化，通過突破傳統人工傳播的限制，顯著增強了輿論操控的效果。 2016年美國總統選舉中，特朗普團隊通過劍橋分析公司分析Facebook用戶數據，為選民定向推送定制化的政治廣告，精準影響了選民的投票意向[11]。這一事件被視為計算宣傳干預選舉的典型案例，也為其他政客提供了操作模板，推動了計算宣傳在全球範圍內的廣泛應用。 2017年法國總統選舉中，候選人埃馬紐埃爾·馬克龍（Emmanuel Macron）團隊遭遇黑客攻擊，內部郵件被竊取並公開，內容稱馬克龍在海外擁有秘密賬戶並涉及逃稅，企圖抹黑其形象。 2018年巴西總統選舉期間，候選人雅伊爾·博索納羅（Jair Bolsonaro）團隊利用WhatsApp群組傳播煽動性政治內容，定向推送大量圖像、視頻和煽動性消息以影響選民情緒。據統計，自2017年至2019年，全球採用計算宣傳的國家由28個增加至70個，2020年這一數量上升至81個。這表明，計算宣傳正通過技術手段和傳播策略，重新定義全球選舉中的輿論規則。

計算宣傳也是國家行為者在輿論干預戰中的重要工具。 2011年，美國國防高級研究計劃局（DARPA）在中東地區開展“歐內斯特之聲”行動，通過建立和管理多個虛假身份（sockpuppets），扭曲阿拉伯語社交媒體的對話。俄羅斯也頻繁利用計算宣傳實施干預，在加拿大操作約20萬個社交媒體賬戶，借助極右翼和極左翼運動散佈親俄言論，製造虛假的社會熱點，試圖破壞加拿大對烏克蘭的支持[12]。作為計算宣傳的重要組成部分，社交機器人通過自動化和規模化手段製造輿論熱度，藉由特定標籤在社交平台上增加信息的曝光率，操控議題的優先級。 2016年美國大選期間，俄羅斯利用社交機器人發布支持普京和攻擊反對派的內容，通過信息過載（information overload）掩蓋反對派聲音，強化親普京的輿論氛圍。 [13]2017年海灣危機期間，沙特阿拉伯和埃及通過Twitter機器人製造反卡塔爾標籤#AlJazeeraInsultsKingSalman的熱度，使其成為熱門話題，虛構了反卡塔爾情緒的高峰，進而影響了全球範圍內對卡塔爾的輿論態度。 [14]深度偽造技術則進一步提升了計算宣傳的精準性與隱蔽性。 2024年，美國總統喬·拜登的偽造視頻在X（原Twitter）上迅速傳播，視頻顯示其在橢圓形辦公室使用攻擊性語言，引發輿論爭議並影響選民情緒。據網絡安全公司McAfee調查，63%的受訪者在兩個月內觀看過政治深度偽造視頻，近半數表示這些內容影響了他們的投票決定。 [15]

在全球範圍內，計算宣傳已滲透各國輿論戰中，影響著社會穩定與國家安全。以色列國防軍通過數字武器對巴勒斯坦展開輿論戰，土耳其培養了“愛國巨魔軍隊”操控國內外輿論，墨西哥政府利用殭屍網絡影響輿論。作為現代輿論干預戰的重要手段，計算宣傳正在改變全球政治傳播的格局。隨著人工智能、量子計算等技術的發展，計算宣傳還可能通過更隱蔽和高效的方式乾預選舉流程，甚至直接威脅民主制度的核心運行邏輯。

（三）文化領域的符號認同戰

武器化傳播通過操控信息、符號和價值觀，試圖影響公眾的思想、情感和行為，進而塑造或改變社會的集體認知與文化認同。這種傳播方式不僅在於信息的傳遞，更通過特定的敘事框架、文化符號和情感共鳴，推動某種特定的意識形態或政治理念的傳播與認同。通過操縱文化符號、社會情感和集體記憶，武器化傳播在文化領域干擾社會結構與文化認同，成為符號認同戰的核心手段。

模因（Meme）作為一種集視覺元素和簡潔文字於一體的文化符號，以幽默、諷刺或挑釁的方式激發觀眾的情感反應，影響他們的政治態度和行為。佩佩模因（Pepe the Frog）起初是一個無害的漫畫角色，被極右翼群體重新利用並武器化，用以傳播仇恨言論，逐漸演變為種族主義和反移民的象徵。模因將復雜的政治情緒轉化為便於傳播的視覺符號，迅速激起公眾對政策的不信任和憤怒，被視為“武器化的偶像破壞主義”（Iconoclastic Weaponization）。這一過程通過操控文化符號，以達到政治或社會鬥爭的目的[16]，加劇了公眾對社會和政治的分裂。例如，在英國脫歐期間，帶有“Take Back Control”（奪回控制權）字樣的模因迅速傳播，強化了民族主義情緒。

除了文化符號的製造外，符號的篩选和屏蔽同樣能夠塑造或加深某種文化認同或政治立場。審查制度自古以來就是權力控制信息的重要手段，早在古希臘和古羅馬時期，政府就對公共演講和文學作品進行審查，以維持社會秩序和權力穩定。進入數字時代，互聯網和社交媒體的興起推動了審查制度的現代化，平台審查逐漸取代傳統的審查方式，成為當代信息控制和輿論引導的核心工具。算法審查通過人工智能檢測敏感話題、關鍵詞和用戶行為數據，自動刪除或屏蔽被視為“違規”的內容，社交媒體的審核團隊會對用戶生成的內容進行人工篩選，確保其符合平台政策和法律法規。平台審查的作用不僅是限制某些內容的傳播，更是通過推送、刪除和屏蔽等方式引導輿論，塑造公眾認知框架。儘管主流社交平台通過嚴格的內容審核機制控制信息傳播，但一些邊緣平台，如Gab、Gettr、Bitchute等因缺乏有效審查，成為極端言論和惡意信息的溫床。這些平台未對內容髮布做出足夠限制，極端觀點和虛假信息得以肆意擴散，例如，Gab因極端主義內容屢遭批評，被指助長暴力和仇恨。在迴聲室中，用戶只能接觸與自身觀點一致的信息，這種信息環境更強化了極端思想，導致社會群體間的對立加劇。 [17]

語言作為信息傳播的載體和工具，能夠通過情感操控、符號政治和社會動員等方式，深刻影響群體行為和文化認同。語言武器化聚焦於語言形式和文化語境如何影響信息的接收方式，強調語言如何被用來操控、引導或改變人們的認知與行為。這不僅涉及特定詞彙和修辭手法的使用，更包括通過語言表述建構特定的社會意義和文化框架。作為符號認同戰的另一重要工具，語言塑造了“敵我對立”的敘事框架。大翻譯運動（Great Translation Movement）通過選擇性翻譯中國網民的民族主義言論，將其傳播到國際社交媒體平台，引發了對中國的負面認知。這種語言操控通過情緒化表達放大了爭議性內容，加深了國際社會的文化偏見。

語言武器化的深層邏輯在於情緒化和煽動性的語言形式。西方國家常以“人權”與“民主”等正義化標籤為乾預行為辯護，合法化政治或軍事行動。白人至上主義者使用“另類右翼”等模糊標籤重塑意識形態，將傳統的帶有強烈負面含義的“白人至上主義”轉化為一個較為中立的概念，降低了該詞彙的社會抵抗力，用寬泛的“傘式”身份擴大其支持者的基礎。通過對世俗話語的滲透，仇恨政治和極端言論被正當化，逐漸形成一種政治常態。當公眾將這種政治日常化後，語言實現了真正的武器化。 [18]在尼日利亞，煽動仇恨的內容通過種族、宗教和地區話題擴散，深刻惡化了社會關係。 [19]語言的模糊性和合理否認策略也成為傳播者規避責任的有力工具，在被簡化的敘事中傳播複雜的社會和政治議題。特朗普的美國優先（America First）政策通過否定性標籤和情緒化話語，以反對全球化、質疑氣候變化科學、抨擊傳統盟友等方式，故意提出與主流意見相對立的觀點，激發公眾對全球化的不信任，重塑國家利益優先的文化認同。 [20]

三、武器化傳播的風險與挑戰：正當性與破壞性

儘管武器化傳播給國際輿論格局帶來了巨大風險，但特定情形下，其可能會被某些國家或團體通過法律、政治或道德框架賦予一定的正當性。如“9·11”事件後，美國通過《愛國法案》擴大了情報部門的監控權限，以“反恐”為名實施廣泛的信息控制，這種“正當性”常被批評為破壞公民自由，侵蝕了民主社會的核心價值。

在國際政治博弈中，武器化傳播更常被視為“灰色區域”（Gray Zone）的手段。國家間的對抗不再局限於經濟制裁或外交壓力，而是通過信息操控、社交媒體干預等非傳統方式展開。部分國家以“保護國家利益”為藉口傳播虛假信息，辯稱其行為是合規的，儘管這些行為可能在國際法上存在爭議，但往往被合理化為“反制外部威脅”的必要手段。在一些信息監管缺乏嚴格法律框架的國家，選舉的干預行為往往被容忍，甚至被視為一種“正當”的政治活動。在文化層面，某些國家通過傳播特定的文化符號和意識形態，試圖在全球範圍內塑造自身的文化影響力。西方國家常以“文化共享”和“文明傳播”為名，推動其價值觀的傳播，而在實際操作中，卻通過操控文化符號和敘事框架，削弱其他文化的認同感，導致全球文化生態的不平衡。法律框架也在一定程度上為武器化傳播的正當性提供了支持。一些國家以“反恐”和“反對極端主義”為名，通過信息審查、內容過濾等手段限制所謂“有害信息”的傳播。然而，這種正當性往往突破了道德邊界，導致信息封鎖和言論壓制。以“國家安全”為理由的信息治理，雖然在一定程度上獲得了內部認可，卻為武器化傳播的氾濫提供了空間。

相較於正當性，武器化傳播的破壞性尤為顯著。目前，武器化傳播已成為權力結構操控輿論的重要工具，其不僅扭曲了信息內容，還通過隱私侵犯、情感動員和文化滲透等方式，深刻影響了公眾認知、社會情緒以及國際關係。

（一）信息失真與認知操控

信息失真指信息在傳播過程中被故意或無意扭曲，導致公眾接收到的內容與原始信息存在顯著差異。在社交媒體上，虛假信息和誤導性內容的傳播日益猖獗，人工智能模型（如GPT）的生成內容，可能因訓練數據的偏見而加劇這一問題。性別、種族或社會偏見可能被反映在自動生成的文本中，放大信息失真的風險。社交媒體的快速傳播特性也使傳統的事實核查機制難以跟上虛假信息的擴散速度。虛假信息在短時間內往往佔據輿論主導地位，跨平台傳播和匿名性使得澄清與糾正變得更加複雜。傳播的不對稱性削弱了傳統新聞機構的權威性，公眾更傾向於相信即時更新的社交平台信息，而非傳統新聞機構的深入報導，這進一步削弱了新聞機構在抵制虛假信息中的作用。

除了信息本身的失真，武器化傳播還深刻利用了認知失調的心理機制。認知失調指個體接觸到與其已有信念或態度相衝突的信息時產生的心理不適感。傳播者通過製造認知失調，動搖目標受眾的既有態度，甚至誘導其接受新的意識形態。在政治選舉中，定向傳播負面信息常迫使選民重新審視政治立場，甚至改變投票傾向。武器化傳播通過選擇性暴露進一步加劇了“信息繭房”的形成，讓受眾傾向於接觸與自身信念一致的信息，忽視或排斥相反觀點。這不僅強化了個體的認知偏見，也讓虛假信息在群體內部快速擴散，難以被外界的事實和理性聲音打破，最終形成高度同質化的輿論生態。

（二）隱私洩露與數字監控

近年來，深度偽造技術的濫用加劇了隱私侵權問題。 2019年，“ZAO”換臉軟件因默認用戶同意肖像權而被下架，揭示了生物特徵數據的過度採集風險。用戶上傳的照片經深度學習處理後，既可能生成精確的換臉視頻，也可能成為隱私洩露的源頭。更嚴重的是，深度偽造等技術被濫用於性別暴力，多名歐美女演員的面孔被非法植入虛假性視頻並廣泛傳播，儘管平台在部分情況下會刪除這些內容，但開源程序的普及讓惡意用戶能夠輕鬆複製和分享偽造內容。此外，用戶在使用社交媒體時，往往默認授權平台訪問其設備的照片、相機、麥克風等應用權限。通過這些權限，平台不僅收集了大量個人數據，還能夠通過算法分析用戶的行為特徵、興趣偏好和社交關係，進而精準投放廣告、內容推薦甚至實施信息操控。這種大規模數據採集推動了對隱私保護的全球討論。在歐洲，《通用數據保護條例》（General Data Protection Regulation）試圖通過嚴格的數據收集和使用規定，加強個人隱私權保障。然而，由於“隱性同意”或複雜的用戶協議，平台常常繞過相關規定，使數據處理過程缺乏透明度，導致普通用戶難以了解數據的實際用途。美國《通信規範法》第230條規定，網絡平台無需為用戶生成的內容承擔法律責任，這一規定推動了平台內容審核的發展，但也使其在應對隱私侵權時缺乏動力。平台出於商業利益的考慮，往往滯後處理虛假信息和隱私問題，導致審核責任被持續擱置。

在數字監控方面，社交平台與政府的合作使用戶數據成為“監控資本主義”的核心資源。美國國家安全局（NSA）通過電話記錄、互聯網通信和社交媒體數據，實施大規模監控，並與Google、Facebook等大型企業合作，獲取用戶的在線行為數據，用於全球範圍內的情報收集和行為分析。跨國監控技術的濫用更是將隱私侵犯推向國際層面。以色列網絡安全公司NSO開發的Pegasus間諜軟件，通過“零點擊攻擊”入侵目標設備，可實時竊取私人信息和通信記錄。 2018年，沙特記者賈馬爾·卡舒吉（Jamal Khashoggi）被謀殺一案中，沙特政府通過Pegasus監聽其通信，揭示了這種技術對個體隱私和國際政治的深遠威脅。

（三）情感極化與社會分裂

情感在影響個體認知與決策中起著關鍵作用。武器化傳播通過煽動恐懼、憤怒、同情等情緒，影響理性判斷，推動公眾在情緒驅動下做出非理性反應。戰爭、暴力和民族主義常成為情感動員的主要內容，傳播者通過精心設計的議題，將愛國主義、宗教信仰等元素植入信息傳播，迅速引發公眾情感共鳴。數字技術的廣泛應用，特別是人工智能和社交媒體平台的結合，進一步放大了情感極化的風險。虛假信息與極端言論在平台上的快速傳播，不僅來自普通用戶的分享行為，更受到算法的驅動。平台傾向優先推送情緒化和互動性高的內容，這些內容常包含煽動性語言和極端觀點，從而加劇了仇恨言論和偏激觀點的傳播。

社交媒體標籤和算法推薦在情感極化中扮演著關鍵角色。在查理周刊事件後，#StopIslam標籤成為仇恨言論的傳播工具，用戶借助該標籤發布仇視和暴力傾向的信息。在美國2020年總統選舉期間，社交平台上的極端政治言論和錯誤信息也在激烈的黨派鬥爭中被放大。通過精確的情感操控，武器化傳播不僅撕裂了公共對話，還極大影響了社會的民主進程。另一種特殊的極端主義動員策略是“武器化自閉症”（Weaponized Autism），即極右翼團體利用自閉症個體的技術專長，實施情感操控。這些團體招募技術能力較強但有社交障礙的個體，通過賦予虛假的歸屬感，將其轉化為信息戰的執行者。這些個體在極端組織的指引下，被用於傳播仇恨言論、執行網絡攻擊和推動極端主義。這種現像不僅揭示了情感操控的深層機制，也表明技術如何被極端團體利用來服務於更大的政治和社會議程。 [21]

（四）信息殖民與文化滲透

“武器化相互依賴”理論（Weaponized Interdependence Theory）揭示了國家如何利用政治、經濟和信息網絡中的關鍵節點，對其他國家施加壓力。 [22]特別是在信息領域，發達國家通過控制信息流實施“信息殖民”，進一步鞏固其文化和政治優勢。數字平台成為這一殖民過程的載體，全球南方國家在信息傳播中高度依賴西方主導的技術平台和社交網絡，在撒哈拉以南非洲地區，Facebook已成為“互聯網”的代名詞。這種依賴不僅為西方企業帶來了巨大的廣告收入，還通過算法推薦對非洲本土文化和價值觀，尤其是在性別、家庭和宗教信仰等方面，產生了深遠影響，使文化滲透成為常態。

數字不平等是信息殖民的另一表現。發達國家在數字技術和信息資源上的主導地位，使南方國家在經濟、教育和文化領域日益邊緣化。巴勒斯坦因基礎設施不足和技術封鎖，難以有效融入全球數字經濟，既限制了本地經濟發展，又進一步削弱了其在全球信息傳播中的話語權。全球主要經濟體和信息強國通過技術封鎖和經濟制裁，限制他國獲取關鍵技術與創新資源，這不僅阻礙了目標國的科技發展，也加劇了全球技術與創新生態的斷裂。自2018年退出《伊朗核協議》以來，美國對伊朗的經濟制裁導致其在半導體和5G領域發展受阻，技術與創新的不對稱拉大了全球技術生態的差距，使許多國家在信息競爭中處於劣勢。

四、反思與討論：非對稱傳播格局中的話語權爭奪

在國際非對稱傳播（Asymmetric Communication）競爭格局下，強勢方常常通過主流媒體和國際新聞機構等渠道佔據輿論的主導地位，而弱勢方則需要藉助創新傳播技術和手段來彌補劣勢，爭奪話語權。這一傳播格局的核心在於信息地緣政治（Information Geopolitics），即國家之間的權力較量不僅僅取決於地理位置、軍事力量或經濟資源，更取決於對信息、數據和技術的控制。大國間的博弈已不再僅限於物理空間的控制，而擴展至輿論空間的爭奪。這些“信息景觀”涉及全球傳播生態中的話語權、信息流通和媒體影響力等，在這一過程中，國家通過不斷製造景觀，以影響國際輿論、塑造全球認知框架，進而實現其戰略目標。非對稱傳播的策略不僅關乎信息內容的傳遞，更重要的是如何借助各種傳播技術、平台和手段彌補資源與能力上的差距，信息傳播的核心不再局限於內容本身，而圍繞著話語權的爭奪展開。隨著信息戰和認知戰的興起，誰掌握了信息，誰就能在全球競爭中占得先機。

（一）後發優勢下的技術赶超

傳統的大國或強勢傳播者掌控著全球輿論的主導權，相比之下，弱勢國家往往缺乏與這些大國抗衡的傳播渠道。後發優勢理論主張後發國家能夠通過跳躍式發展，繞過傳統的技術路徑，引進現有的先進技術和知識，從而迅速崛起並規避早期技術創新中的低效和過時環節。在武器化傳播的背景下，這一理論為信息弱國提供了通過新興科技突破大國傳播壁壘的路徑，有助於其在技術層面上實現赶超。傳統媒體往往受到資源、影響力和審查機制的限制，信息傳播速度慢、覆蓋面有限，且容易受到特定國家或集團的操控。數字媒體的崛起使信息傳播的格局發生了根本性變化，弱勢國家能夠借助全球化的互聯網平台，直接面向國際受眾，而不必依賴傳統的新聞機構和主流媒體。通過新興技術，弱勢國家不僅能更精準地傳遞信息，還能通過定向傳播和情感引導，迅速擴大其在國際輿論中的影響力。後發國家可以利用先進技術（如大數據、人工智能、5G網絡等）實現精準的信息傳播，打造高效的傳播渠道。以大數據分析為例，後發國家可以深入了解受眾需求和輿情趨勢，快速識別全球輿論脈搏，實施定向傳播，快速擴大國際影響力。人工智能技術不僅能夠預測輿論發展方向，還能實時優化傳播策略。 5G網絡的普及大大提升了信息傳播的速度與覆蓋範圍，使後發國家能夠以低成本、高效率的方式突破傳統傳播模式的局限，形成獨特的傳播優勢。

通過跨國合作，後發國家可以整合更多的傳播資源，擴大傳播的廣度與深度。例如，阿根廷與拉美其他國家共同建立了“拉美新聞網絡”，通過新聞內容共享，推動拉美國家在國際輿論中發出統一的聲音，反擊西方媒體的單一敘事。在非洲，南非與華為合作推動“智慧南非”項目，建設現代化信息基礎設施，促進數字化轉型和公共服務效率的提升。後發國家政府應加大對技術研發和創新的投入，鼓勵本土企業和人才的發展。同時，還應注重文化輸出和媒體產業建設，通過全球化合作和去中心化傳播模式提升國家在國際信息空間中的話語權。政府可以資助數字文化創作，支持本地社交媒體平台的成長，並通過國際合作框架整合更多傳播資源。

（二）信息反制中的壁壘構建

與軍事行動可能引發的全面衝突，或經濟制裁可能帶來的風險不同，武器化傳播能夠在不觸發全面戰爭的情況下實現戰略目標，基於成本和戰略考量，其具有極大的吸引力。由於武器化傳播具備低成本、高回報的特點，越來越多的國家和非國家行為體選擇通過操控信息來達到戰略目標。這種傳播手段的普及，使得國家在面對來自外部和內部的信息攻擊時，面臨更加複雜和多變的威脅。隨著信息戰爭的日益激烈，單純的傳統軍事防禦已經無法滿足現代戰爭的需求。相反，構建強有力的信息防禦體系，成為國家保持政治穩定、維護社會認同和提升國際競爭力的關鍵策略。因此，如何有效應對外部信息干擾和輿論操控，並進行信息反制，已成為各國迫切需要解決的問題。完善的網絡安全基礎設施是維護國家安全的關鍵，用以防范敏感信息不被外部操控或篡改。以歐盟為例，歐盟通過“數字單一市場”戰略推動成員國加強網絡安全建設，要求互聯網公司更積極地應對虛假信息和外部干預。歐盟的網絡安全指令還規定各成員國建立應急響應機制，保護重要信息基礎設施免受網絡攻擊。此外，歐盟還與社交平台公司，如Facebook、Twitter和Google等建立合作，通過提供反虛假信息工具和數據分析技術來打擊假新聞傳播。人工智能、大數據和自動化技術正在成為信息防禦的重要工具，被用以實時監控信息傳播路徑，識別潛在的虛假信息和抵禦輿論操控。在網絡安全領域，大數據分析幫助決策者識別和預警惡意攻擊，並優化反制策略。這些技術的應用不僅能夠在國內層面增強信息防禦能力，還能提高國家在國際信息空間中的主動性和競爭力。

反制機制是信息防禦體系的另一重要組成部分，尤其是在國際輿論壓力下，實時監控外部信息傳播並及時糾正虛假信息成為維護輿論主動權的關鍵。烏克蘭自2014年克里米亞危機以來，通過與北約和美國合作，建立了頗具規模的網絡防禦體系。烏克蘭的國家網絡安全局為應對網絡威脅設立了“信息反制小組”，利用社交媒體和新聞發布平台實時駁斥俄羅斯的虛假報導，這一策略顯著提升了烏克蘭在國際輿論中的聲譽和信任度。

（三）輿論引導中的議程設置

在信息化和數字化的全球競爭格局中，輿論引導不僅涉及信息傳播內容，更關鍵的是如何設置議程並聚焦全球關注的熱點話題。議程設置理論表明，誰能掌控信息流通的議題，誰就能引導輿論的方向。議程設置通過控制話題的討論範圍和焦點，影響公眾對事件的關注與評價，社交媒體的興起為信息弱勢國提供了突破口，使其可以通過多平台聯動來爭奪信息傳播的主導權。以烏克蘭為例，其在俄烏戰爭中通過社交媒體傳播戰爭實況，不僅發布戰鬥實況，還融入民眾的情感訴求，借助平民遭遇和城市破壞的悲情敘事，激發國際社會的同情與關注。在抵禦外部信息干擾的同時，國家還需要主動傳播正面敘事，講述能夠引發國際社會共鳴的文化故事。故事應該符合國際輿論的情感需求，同時展現國家的獨特性，強化與國際社會的聯繫。以我國的“一帶一路”共建為例，在“一帶一路”共建國家，我國投資建設了大量基礎設施項目，這些項目不僅幫助改善了當地的經濟基礎條件，也展示了中國在全球化進程中的責任擔當，更為文化合作和交流活動提供了窗口，向世界展示了中華民族豐富的歷史文化，為國際社會展現了中華文化的包容性和責任感。

但由於全球南方國家往往面臨資源、技術與國際傳播平台的限制，難以直接與發達國家競爭，因此它們依賴更加靈活、創新的傳播手段來參與全球議程的設置。例如，巴西在應對環保和氣候變化議題上，尤其是亞馬遜森林的砍伐問題，面臨來自西方媒體的負面輿論壓力。為此，巴西政府利用社交媒體發布關於亞馬遜保護的最新數據和成功案例，積極塑造國家在環境保護領域的形象。同時，巴西通過與其他發展中國家合作，參與全球氣候變化談判，推動南南合作，增強了在氣候問題上的話語權。大型國際事件、人道主義活動和製作文化產品等，也是講述國家故事的有效方式。國際體育賽事如世界杯、奧運會等，不僅是體育競技的展示平台，更是國家形象和文化軟實力的展現場所，通過承辦或積極參與這些全球性事件，國家能夠向世界展示其實力、價值和文化魅力，推動積極的輿論議程。

“戰爭無非是政治通過另一種手段的延續”[23]。這一克勞塞維茨的經典論斷在武器化傳播的語境下得到了現代化的詮釋。武器化傳播突破了傳統戰爭的物理邊界，成為一種融合信息戰、認知戰和心理戰的現代戰略手段。它以非暴力的形式操控信息流向和公眾認知，使國家和非國家行為者無須依賴直接軍事行動即可實現政治目標，體現出極強的戰略性和目標性。通過操控信息、情緒和價值觀，武器化傳播能夠在避免全面戰爭的同時達成戰略目的，在全球競爭和衝突中，已成為強國對弱國進行政治壓制的重要手段。

武器化傳播的核心在於通過信息操控削弱敵方的決策力與行動能力，但其複雜性使得傳播效果難以完全預測。儘管信息強國通過技術優勢和傳播渠道壓制信息弱國，傳播效果卻充滿不確定性。尤其是在社交媒體和數字平台全球化的背景下，信息流動的邊界和效果愈加難以控制。這種複雜性為弱國提供了突破話語霸權的機會，推動信息傳播的反向博弈。弱國可以利用這些平台發起對抗，挑戰強國的信息操控，在全球輿論中佔據一席之地。非對稱性博弈反映了國際輿論的動態平衡，傳播不再是單向的控制，而是更為複雜的交互和對話，賦予弱者影響輿論的可能性。當前國際輿論格局仍以信息強國對信息弱國的單向壓制為主，但這一局面並非不可打破。信息戰爭具有高度的不對稱性，信息弱國可以憑藉技術創新、靈活策略和跨國合作逐步反制。通過發揮“非對稱優勢”，弱國不僅能夠影響全球輿論，還能藉助聯合行動和信息共享提升話語權。跨國合作與地區聯盟的建立，為弱國提供了反制強國的有力工具，使其能夠在國際輿論上形成合力，挑戰信息強國的主導地位。在戰爭框架下，各國可以靈活調整策略，主動塑造信息傳播格局，而非被動接受強國的信息操控。

戰爭社會學強調社會結構、文化認同和群體行為在戰爭中的作用。武器化傳播不僅是軍事或政治行為的延續，更深刻影響社會心理、群體情感和文化認同。強國利用信息傳播塑造他國的認知與態度，以實現自己的戰略目標。然而，從社會學視角來看，武器化傳播並非單向的壓制，而是複雜的社會互動和文化反應的產物。在這一過程中，信息弱國並非完全處於弱勢，相反，它們可以藉助文化傳播、社會動員和全球輿論的動態對抗，以“軟實力”反擊外部操控，塑造新的集體認同，展示“弱者武器”的正當性。

（基金項目：研究闡釋黨的二十屆三中全會精神國家社科基金重大專項“推進新聞宣傳和網絡輿論一體化管理研究”（項目編號：24ZDA084）的研究成果）

References:

[1] Lasswell H D Propaganda techniques in the world wars [M] Beijing: Renmin University Press, 2003

[2] Clausewitz C V. On War: Volume 1 [M] Academy of Military Sciences of the People’s Liberation Army of China, translated Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1978.

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[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Joint statement by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on strengthening contemporary global strategic stability (full text) [EB/OL].https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/1179_674909/201906/t20190606_7947892.shtml.

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[7]Mattson G. Weaponization： Metaphorical Ubiquity and the Contemporary Rejection of Politics[EB/OL].OSF（2019-01-08）[2024-12-20].osf.io/5efrw.

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[14]Jones M O. The gulf information war| propaganda， fake news， and fake trends： The weaponization of twitter bots in the gulf crisis[J]. International journal of communication13（2019）：27.

[15]Genovese D. Nearly 50% of voters said deepfakes had some influence on election decision. [EB/OL].（2024-10-30）[2024-12-20].https：//www.foxbusiness.com/politics/nearly-50-voters-said-deepfakes-had-some-influence-election-decision.

[16]Peters C， Allan S. Weaponizing memes： The journalistic mediation of visual politicization[J]. Digital Journalism， 2022， 10（02）：217-229.

[17]Gorissen S. Weathering and weaponizing the# TwitterPurge： digital content moderation and the dimensions of deplatforming[J]. Communication and Democracy， 2024， 58（01）： 1-26.

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作者簡介：郭小安，重慶大學新聞學院教授、博士生導師，重慶市哲學社會科學智能傳播與城市國際推廣重點實驗室執行主任（重慶 400044）；康如詩，重慶大學新聞學院碩士生（重慶 400044）。

中國原創軍事資源：https://www.cjwk.cn/journal/guidelinesDetails/192031322246497484888

#Artificial #Intelligence, #Information Support Force, #intelligent warfare, #intellligentization, Chinese Artificial Intelligence

What strategic risks will military artificial intelligence bring to the game between China and the United States?

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軍事人工智慧將為中美博弈帶來哪些戰略風險？

現代英語：

2023-10-24 10:21:32Source: Military High-Tech Online
In July 2023, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) released a report titled US-China Competition and Military AI: US-China Competition and Military AI, which explores how the United States can effectively manage a series of strategic risks caused by the militarization of artificial intelligence in Sino-US relations against the backdrop of intensified Sino-US competition and rapid development of artificial intelligence technology. It also conducts an in-depth analysis of the possible paths by which military artificial intelligence can intensify the strategic risks between China and the United States, the options for the United States to manage the strategic risks of military artificial intelligence, and the related measures and recommendations. The report has great reference value, so the original content is compiled as follows for readers to learn and communicate.

Five ways military AI exacerbates strategic risks between China and the United States


How will emerging military artificial intelligence exacerbate strategic risks between China and the United States? The report discusses five possible impact paths and attempts to analyze and predict this issue.

1. Reshaping the Sino-US Military Balance
The report points out that in the process of militarized application of artificial intelligence, the imbalance of military strength between the competing parties caused by the unilateral improvement of military strength is most likely to aggravate the strategic risks between China and the United States. In the short term, military artificial intelligence will still be mainly used to improve the equipment maintenance, military logistics, personnel training and decision support of the military, and play an auxiliary and beneficial role, but these “behind-the-scenes” tasks, like front-line troops and weapons, constitute the basis of military strength. In addition, some emerging military artificial intelligence systems will also improve the combat capabilities of the troops. For example, the “loyal wingman” system based on human-machine collaboration can help improve the pilot’s mission, although this improvement may be incremental rather than revolutionary, and compared with fully autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles, the “loyal wingman” has limited effect on the transformation of the air combat paradigm. But there is no doubt that the military strength of the party that takes the lead in the military application of artificial intelligence will develop rapidly, and the rise and fall of this may push the military balance between China and the United States into a new stage, causing panic and concern for the lagging party.

2. Profound impact on information acquisition and strategic decision-making
The report believes that military artificial intelligence may increase strategic risks in the decision-making and information fields in three main ways: first, compressing decision-making time. If artificial intelligence can help one party make decisions faster, the other party may make hasty decisions in order to keep up with the opponent’s actions. This time pressure may exacerbate tensions and even create a new crisis; second, inducing decision makers to make wrong decisions. The decision-making process of the artificial intelligence system is in a technical “black box”. If there is a lack of clear understanding of the operating mechanism and defects of the artificial intelligence system, major strategic decisions may ultimately be based on the analysis of maliciously fabricated, distorted information or other low-quality information; third, influencing the opponent’s cognition through large-scale information activities, using artificial intelligence to generate massive amounts of directional text, audio, images or videos, undermining political stability, confusing high-level decision-making, creating alliance rifts, and triggering or aggravating political crises.

3. Autonomous weapon systems
First, if autonomous weapon systems provide greater military capabilities, decision makers may be more inclined to use force because they believe they have a higher chance of winning. Second, military operations using autonomous weapon systems have lower expected risks in terms of casualties, which may make leaders on both sides more likely to take action. Third, autonomous weapon technology will greatly enhance the combat capabilities of existing weapon systems, such as enabling hypersonic weapons to have the autonomy to maneuver and change their trajectories, making it more difficult for the enemy to intercept; or using machine learning to improve the predictive capabilities of air defense systems, making it possible to deploy anti-hypersonic and other high-end missile defense systems, and empowering users with greater military strength. Finally, autonomous drone swarms can theoretically provide new options for conventional counterattacks against an opponent’s nuclear arsenal. This potential capability may disrupt the strategic balance and increase the risk of strategic misjudgments.

4. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Military AI has already provided new tools for completing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, and may play an even greater role in the future. The combination of military AI and existing technologies can greatly improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of completing ISR missions. For example, AI can be combined with balloons or microsatellite constellations to conduct surveillance in “near-Earth space” or enable clustering of reconnaissance drones. AI systems can also process data from a variety of sensors on a large scale to track mobile missile systems on land and even submarines in the ocean. If these capabilities become a reality, they will provide military leaders with one-way transparency that can undermine strategic stability, thereby completely undermining the survivability of the opponent’s triad nuclear forces, and greatly increase the possibility and necessity of the weaker party to take a “preemptive” strike.


5. Command, Control, and Communications (C3)
AI can make cyber and electromagnetic warfare (EW) attacks more threatening and destructive. As big data inputs become increasingly important in AI training, both sides may intentionally degrade system performance by modifying or fine-tuning data sets to “poison” their opponents, which may lead to uncertainties or predictable failures in AI command, control, and communication systems that can be exploited by opponents. Another specific concern is that military AI may affect the C3 systems of nuclear weapons. Nuclear early warning systems will increasingly rely on AI technology to quickly analyze data from various sensors, but the system may misinterpret the data and generate false alarms, which may result in a brutal nuclear war that will hurt both sides.

II. Three options for the United States to manage strategic risks of military artificial intelligence

The report points out that the United States needs to take a series of measures to guard against the various potential dangers that military artificial intelligence brings to the bilateral security relations between China and the United States. These sources of risk may overlap in reality, and risk portfolio management aims to reduce a variety of different drivers of instability. The report discusses three options for managing and controlling the strategic risks of military artificial intelligence.

1. Restricting the development of China’s military AI technology
The report emphasizes that one way that artificial intelligence may exacerbate the risk of escalation is that it provides a large enough military advantage for one party to convince the country that it can wage war and achieve its goals at an acceptable cost. Therefore, the United States needs to try to prevent China’s artificial intelligence technology from developing and avoid the balance of military power from tilting in favor of China. At the same time, vigorously develop the United States’ artificial intelligence capabilities so that it always stays in a leading position and forms a technological advantage deterrence. At present, the United States focuses on preventing China’s military artificial intelligence development, mainly on advanced semiconductors, an important hardware that supports artificial intelligence systems, while restricting data, algorithms and talents in a targeted manner. For example, the U.S. government’s crackdown on TikTok (the overseas version of Douyin) is partly due to concerns that Americans’ data may be used to promote China’s artificial intelligence technology. The United States will also strictly regulate the source code of artificial intelligence algorithms used for geospatial analysis, and further restrict the output or disclosure of general algorithms such as facial recognition software and large language models. In terms of talent policy, the U.S. government will take further measures to prevent Chinese students from studying artificial intelligence technology in the United States.

2. Strengthen unilateral responsibility management and responsibly control military artificial intelligence
The report points out that minimizing civilian casualties should be a key design principle for military AI, and the best way to reduce the risks of military AI is to place the safety and reliability of the system on an equal footing with its lethality or efficiency, and to strictly implement testing and evaluation, verification and validation. To minimize uncertainty, China and the United States need to adopt safe design principles. The United States has formulated a series of unilateral declarative policies on the development and use of military AI. The U.S. Department of Defense’s “Artificial Intelligence Principles: Several Recommendations on the Ethics of the Department of Defense’s Artificial Intelligence Applications” requires the U.S. military to be “responsible, fair, traceable, reliable and controllable” when using AI. These core principles have been reiterated and supplemented in subsequent documents, such as the “Responsible Artificial Intelligence Practice Guide”, “Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway”, and the “Autonomous Weapon System Directive” (DoD Directive 3000.09) issued in January 2023, which stipulate how to use AI and integrate it into the entire life cycle of defense projects.


3. Conduct bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to reduce strategic risks
Another way to prevent dangerous power imbalances, costly arms races, or miscalculations is to engage in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. By negotiating arms control agreements or confidence-building measures, countries can try to set boundaries for the development or use of specific military technologies and then verify compliance. China and the United States should discuss limits on risky applications of AI, such as regulating its use in nuclear command and control or offensive cyber operations. The U.S. and Chinese governments can use bilateral and multilateral channels to exchange views on the impact of AI on national security. The U.S. and Chinese militaries can also engage in dialogues in which both sides raise questions about the military capabilities of AI and its uses, and communicate on rules of engagement, operational conflicts, and other topics to fully express their respective demands and expectations. In addition to official channels, the two countries can also use 1.5-track and 2-track dialogues to enhance understanding and consensus.

III. Nine recommendations for U.S. policymakers in the report
The emergence of military artificial intelligence may intensify competition between China and the United States and increase strategic risks. In order to effectively respond to this trend, the report believes that US policymakers should make efforts in nine aspects.

1. Restricting the development of artificial intelligence in relevant countries
The report recommends that U.S. policymakers continue to restrict the export of semiconductor production equipment and technology, advanced chips and other terminal products to China, hindering relevant countries from advancing military artificial intelligence. In addition, it is recommended that the United States find or develop creative tools to regulate artificial intelligence and its data, algorithms, and manpower. It is also recommended that the United States clearly develop military and dual-use artificial intelligence technologies, and continuously improve its policies to ensure effectiveness, while being vigilant against policies that restrict technological development.

2. Maintaining America’s Lead in Military AI
The report points out that the United States must act quickly to keep up with the development of China’s military artificial intelligence. This requires reforms in many areas, such as making “resilience” a key attribute of military systems. To succeed in this regard, not only the Department of Defense must make efforts, but also update immigration and education policies to attract, train and retain the best scientists and engineers from around the world.

3. Develop, promulgate, and implement responsible military AI norms or regulations
The United States should position itself as the leading global driver of military AI technology development, operational norms, and best practices. Key U.S. priorities in the near term should include further fleshing out the operational details of norms for conducting cyber attacks (including AI) on nuclear C3 infrastructure and fulfilling the commitments of the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). In short, U.S. actions must match its rhetoric on the responsible use of military AI.


4. Proactively engage with allies, partners, and multilateral institutions
Regional and global partnerships play a vital role in achieving U.S. strategic goals. The United States should actively integrate consultations on relevant issues into its alliances and partnerships, expand the scope of discussion in the G7, NATO, AUKUS, and bilateral relations with Japan and South Korea, and actively promote and advocate the U.S. position in multilateral forums.

5. Consult with China on reducing risks and building trust related to military AI
The report suggests that the United States could try to expand negotiation channels with China on military artificial intelligence, such as developing a vocabulary of military artificial intelligence terms between China and the United States to ensure that both sides have common definitions of key concepts and reduce misunderstandings caused by language and cultural barriers. The two sides can also formulate risk levels based on artificial intelligence capabilities, such as defining artificial intelligence related to logistics support as a low risk level and autonomous nuclear weapon artificial intelligence as a high risk level. Further discuss the application areas of artificial intelligence and stipulate the use of artificial intelligence in lethal weapons. Even if the negotiations between the two sides do not achieve the expected results, exploring these issues will help enhance mutual understanding.

6. Continue to seek to establish a strategic risk and crisis management mechanism between China and the United States
Establishing effective diplomatic channels between China and the United States, especially maintaining contacts at the summit level, is crucial to reducing strategic risks and managing potential crises. The report recommends that the United States continue to explore the establishment of a strategic risk and crisis management mechanism between China and the United States. Even if it works intermittently, it is better than having no mechanism at all.

7. Make military AI a fundamental pillar of diplomacy with China related to nuclear weapons and strategic stability
Military artificial intelligence plays an increasingly important role in the balance between nuclear capabilities and other strategic capabilities. The report recommends that the United States initiate discussions on “strategic stability” at the level of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and include military artificial intelligence in the negotiations.

8. Reducing strategic risks in other areas
The report believes that the United States should take measures as soon as possible to reduce strategic risks in other related areas and take unilateral actions with caution, such as postponing intercontinental ballistic missile tests when tensions escalate, especially when immediate testing is not required to ensure a safe, reliable and effective nuclear deterrence.

9. Strengthening Intelligence Collection, Analysis and Assessment
The direction of the development of military artificial intelligence depends not only on itself, but also on its interaction with nuclear weapons, military infrastructure, communication capabilities and other factors. Therefore, it is urgent to deepen the understanding of the overall strategic stability related to military artificial intelligence. The report recommends that the United States instruct relevant organizations to improve or, when necessary, establish multidisciplinary offices and expert backbones to pay close attention to China’s civilian and military artificial intelligence activities, monitor and analyze intelligence related to the issue, and provide recommendations.

IV. Conclusion
The military application of artificial intelligence may increase strategic risks, and countries need to work together to explore and regulate the development of artificial intelligence technology. In the face of the opportunities and challenges that artificial intelligence technology brings to human society, countries should use dialogue to dispel suspicion, replace confrontation with cooperation, and work together to promote good laws and good governance in the field of artificial intelligence, so that artificial intelligence technology can truly benefit mankind.

Text | Wen Lihao, Chen Lin (National University of Defense Technology)

現代國語：

2023年7月，新美國安全中心（CNAS）推出報告《中美關係與軍事人工智慧：美國如何在與中國的競爭中管控風險》（U.S.-China Competition and Military AI: U.S.-China Competition and Military AI），探討在中美博弈加劇和人工智慧技術迅速發展背景下，美國如何在中美關係中有效管控由人工智慧軍事化引發的一系列戰略風險，就軍事人工智慧加劇中美戰略風險的可能路徑、美國管控軍事人工智慧戰略風險的可選方案和相關措施建議展開了深入分析。報告具有較大參考價值，故將原文內容編譯如下，供讀者學習交流。

圖1：原報告封面
一、軍事人工智慧加劇中美間戰略風險的五條路徑
新興軍事人工智慧究竟會以何種方式加劇中美間的戰略風險？報告討論了五種可能的影響路徑，試圖對此問題進行分析和預測。
（一）重塑中美軍事平衡
報告指出，在人工智慧軍事化應用過程中，由於軍事實力單方面提高而造成的競爭雙方軍事實力失衡最有可能加劇中美戰略風險軍事人工智慧短期內仍將主要用於改善軍隊的裝備維護、軍事後勤、人員培訓和決策支援等過程，發揮輔助性增益性作用，但這些「幕後」任務與前線部隊和武器一樣，構成了軍事實力的基礎。此外，一些新興軍事人工智慧系統也將提高部隊的作戰能力，例如基於人機協同的「忠誠僚機」系統能夠幫助提高飛行員的任務度，儘管這種改進可能是漸進式而非革命性的，且相比完全自主的無人駕駛飛行器，「忠誠僚機」對空戰範式的變革作用有限。但毫無疑問的是，率先進行人工智慧軍事應用的一方，其軍事實力將快速發展，此消彼長間可能推動中美軍事平衡進入新階段，引發落後方的恐慌和擔憂。
（二）深刻影響資訊取得與策略決策
報告認為，軍事人工智慧或將主要以三種方式增加決策和資訊領域產生的戰略風險：一是壓縮決策時間，如果人工智慧可以幫助一方更快決策，那麼另一方可能會為了跟上對手的行動而倉促決策，這種時間壓力可能會加劇緊張局勢甚至製造一場新的危機；二是誘導決策者做出錯誤決策，人工智慧系統的決策過程處於技術「黑箱」中，如果對人工智慧系統的運作機制和缺陷缺乏清晰認知，重大戰略決策最終可能會建立在對被惡意捏造、扭曲的信息或其他劣質信息的分析的基礎上；三是通過大規模信息活動影響對手認知，借助人工智能生成海量含有指向性的文本、音頻、圖像或視頻，破壞政治穩定、混淆高層決策、製造同盟痕痕，引發或加劇同盟痕痕，引發政治危機。

圖2：基於人工智慧的「深度偽造」技術已經能夠快速產生海量的偽造訊息
（三）自主武器系統
首先，如果自主武器系統提供了更強的軍事能力，決策者將可能更傾向於使用武力，因為他們相信獲勝的機會會更高。其次，使用自主武器系統的軍事行動在人員傷亡方面的預期風險較低，這可能會讓雙方領導人更有可能採取行動。再一次，自主武器技術將極大增強現有武器系統的作戰能力，例如使高超音波速武器具備機動變軌的自主性，令敵更難攔截；或藉助機器學習提高防空系統的預測能力，使反高超音波速和其他高端飛彈防禦系統的部署成為可能，為使用方賦能更強的軍事實力。最後，具備自主性的無人機群理論上可以為針對對手核武庫的常規反擊提供新的選擇，這種潛在能力將可能打破戰略平衡，加劇戰略誤判的風險。
（四）情報、監視與偵察（ISR）
軍事人工智慧已經為完成情報、監視和偵察任務提供了新的工具，並且在未來可能會發揮更大作用。軍事人工智慧與現有技術的結合，可以大幅提高完成ISR任務的效率和性價比。例如將人工智慧與氣球或微衛星星座結合，以在「近地空間」進行監視，或為偵察無人機賦能群集性。人工智慧系統還可以大規模處理來自各種感測器的數據，以追蹤陸地上的移動飛彈系統甚至大洋中的潛艇。如果這些能力成為現實，它們將為軍事實力領導者提供能夠破壞戰略穩定性的單向透明度，進而徹底損害對手三位一體核力量的生存能力，也能極大增加弱勢方採取「先發製人」打擊的可能性和必要性。

圖3：自主武器系統應該掌握「開火權」嗎？
（五）指揮、控制與通信（C3）
人工智慧可以使網路和電磁戰（EW）攻擊更具威脅性和破壞性。隨著大數據輸入在人工智慧訓練中變得越來越重要，雙方都可能會透過修改或微調資料集來故意降低系統性能進而達到「毒害」對手的目的，這可能導致人工智慧指揮、控制和通訊系統的不確定性或可預測故障，被對手利用。另一個具體擔憂是，軍事人工智慧可能會影響核武的C3系統。核子預警系統將越來越依賴人工智慧技術來快速分析來自各種感測器的數據，但該系統可能會錯誤解讀數據，產生誤報，其結果可能引發兩敗俱傷的殘酷核戰。
二、美國管控軍事人工智慧戰略風險的三種方案
報告指出，美國需要採取一系列措施來防範軍事人工智慧對中美雙邊安全關係帶來的各種潛在危險，這些風險來源在現實中可能重疊，風險組合管理旨在減少多種不同的不穩定驅動因素，報告在此討論了管控軍事人工智慧戰略風險的三種方案。
（一） 限制中國軍事人工智慧技術發展
報告強調，人工智慧可能加劇風險升級的一種途徑是它為一方提供足夠大的軍事優勢，使該國相信它可以以可接受的成本發動戰爭並實現其目標。因此，美國需要設法阻止中國人工智慧技術發展，避免軍事力量平衡向有利於中國的方向傾斜。同時，大力發展美國的人工智慧能力，使其始終處於領先地位，形成技術優勢威懾。目前，美國阻止中國軍事人工智慧發展的重點主要集中在支援人工智慧系統的重要硬體——先進半導體上，同時有針對性地從數據、演算法和人才方面加以限制。例如美國政府對TikTok（海外版抖音）的打壓，部分原因是擔心美國人的數據可能被用來推動中國人工智慧技術進步。美國也將對用於地理空間分析的人工智慧演算法原始碼進行嚴格監管，並進一步限制臉部辨識軟體、大型語言模型等通用演算法的輸出或揭露。在人才政策方面，美國政府會採取進一步措施，阻止中國學生在美國學習人工智慧技術。

圖4：美國藉口「國家安全」打壓TikTok
（二） 加強單邊責任管理，負責任管控軍事人工智慧
報告指出，最小化平民傷亡應作為軍事人工智慧的關鍵設計原則，降低軍事人工智慧風險的最佳方法是將系統的安全性和可靠性與其殺傷力或效率放在同等重要的位置，並嚴格執行測試和評估、驗證和確認。為了最大限度地減少不確定性，中國和美國需要採用安全的設計原則。美國就軍事人工智慧的開發和使用制定了一系列單方面的宣言性政策。美國國防部《人工智慧原則：國防部人工智慧應用倫理的若干建議》要求美軍在使用人工智慧時做到「負責、公平、可追溯、可靠和可控」。這些核心原則在後續發布的文件中得到了重申和補充，如《負責任的人工智慧實踐指南》、《負責任的人工智慧戰略和實施途徑》以及2023年1月發布的《自主武器系統指令》（DoD Directive 3000.09 ），這些文件規定瞭如何使用人工智慧並將其融入國防專案的整個生命週期。
（三）進行雙邊與多邊外交，降低戰略風險
防止危險的力量失衡、代價高昂的軍備競賽或誤判的另一種方式是進行雙邊和多邊外交。透過談判達成軍備控制協議或建立信任措施，各國可以嘗試為特定軍事技術的開發或使用設定界限，然後核查遵守情況。中國和美國應該討論對人工智慧風險應用的限制，例如規範其在核指揮與控製或進攻性網路行動中的使用。美國和中國政府可以利用雙邊和多邊管道，就人工智慧對國家安全的影響交換意見。中美兩軍也可以展開對話，雙方就人工智慧的軍事能力及其用途提出問題，並就交戰規則、行動衝突和其他主題進行溝通，充分錶達各自訴求和期望。除官方管道外，兩國還可利用1.5軌與2軌對話，增進理解與共識。
三、報告為美國決策層提供的九項措施建議
軍事人工智慧的出現可能會加劇中美競爭，增加戰略風險。為了有效因應這一趨勢，報告認為美國的政策制定者應該從9個面向進行努力。
（一）限制相關國家人工智慧的發展
報告建議美國政策制定者繼續限制半導體生產設備和技術、先進晶片等終端產品的對華出口，阻礙相關國家推動軍事人工智慧。此外，也建議美國尋找或開發監管人工智慧和其數據、演算法、人力的創意工具。明確發展人工智慧軍用和軍民兩用技術，並不斷改善其政策，確保有效性，同時警惕政策為技術發展帶來限制。
（二） 維持美國軍事人工智慧的領先地位
報告指出，美國必須迅速採取行動，跟上中國軍事人工智慧的發展速度。這需要在許多領域進行改革，例如，將「韌性」作為軍事系統的關鍵屬性。要想在這方面取得成功，不僅國防部要做出努力，還需要更新移民和教育政策，吸引、訓練和留住世界各地最優秀的科學家和工程師。
（三） 制定、頒布、實施負責任的軍事人工智慧規範或法規
美國應將自己定位為軍事人工智慧技術開發、操作規範制定和最佳實踐的全球主要推動者。美國近期的主要優先事項應包括進一步充實在核C3基礎設施上實施網路攻擊（包括人工智慧）規範的操作細節，並履行2022年《核態勢評估報告》（Nuclear Posture Review，NPR）的承諾。簡而言之，美國的行動必須與其在負責任地使用軍事人工智慧的言論相符。

圖5：美國自2018年起對華為展開全方位打壓
（四） 主動與盟友、夥伴以及多邊機構接觸
區域和全球夥伴關係在促成美國戰略目標完成方面發揮著至關重要的作用。美國應積極將相關議題的磋商納入其同盟和夥伴關係，擴大G7、北約、AUKUS及與日本和韓國雙邊關係的討論範圍，積極推進、倡導美國在多邊論壇中的立場。
（五）與中國就降低軍事人工智慧相關風險和建立信任進行磋商
報告建議，美國可以嘗試拓展與中國建立軍事人工智慧的談判管道，如開發中美軍事人工智慧術語詞彙表，保證雙方對關鍵概念有共同的定義，減少語言和文化障礙造成的誤解。雙方還可以基於人工智慧能力製定風險等級，例如將後勤保障相關的人工智慧確定為低風險等級，將自主核武人工智慧確定為高風險等級。進一步討論人工智慧應用領域，同時規定人工智慧在致命武器中的使用規範。即使雙方的談判不會達成預期結果，探討這些問題也有助於增進對彼此的理解。
（六） 持續尋求建立中美策略風險與危機管理機制
建立有效的中美外交管道，尤其是保持首腦層級的聯繫，對降低策略風險、管理潛在的危機至關重要。報告建議美國要持續探索建立中美戰略風險和危機管理機制，即使是間歇性發揮作用，也勝過沒有機制。
（七） 使軍事人工智慧成為與核武和戰略穩定相關的對華外交基本支柱
軍事人工智慧在核子能力與其他戰略能力的平衡方面發揮著越來越重要的作用。報告建議，由美國在聯合國五個常任理事國層級發起推動「戰略穩定」的討論，並將軍事人工智慧納入談判。
（八）降低其他領域的策略風險
報告認為，美國應盡快採取措施，減低其他相關領域的戰略風險，謹慎採取單邊行動。例如在局勢緊張加劇時推遲洲際彈道飛彈試射，特別是在不需要立即進行試驗來確保安全、可靠和有效的核威懾的情況下。
（九）強化情報蒐集、分析與評估
軍事人工智慧的發展走向不僅取決於它本身，還取決於它與核武、軍事基礎設施、通訊能力等因素之間的相互作用，因此迫切需要加深對軍事人工智慧相關的整體戰略穩定性的理解。報告建議美國責成相關組織完善或在需要時建立多學科辦公室和專家骨幹，密切關注中國的民用及軍事人工智慧活動，監測、分析與該問題相關的情報，並給予建議。
四、結　語
人工智慧軍事應用可能加劇戰略風險，需要各國攜手對人工智慧技術發展加以探索和規制。面對人工智慧技術為人類社會帶來的機會與挑戰，各國應以對話打消猜忌，以合作取代對立，並攜手推動人工智慧領域依良法、促善治，使人工智慧技術真正造福人類。

文 | 文力浩、陳琳（國防科技大學）

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.81it.com/2023/1024/14640888.html

#Information Support Force, #intelligent warfare, #intellligentization, Asymmetric Warfare, Chinese Artificial Intelligence, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Future Wars, Chinese Military Informatization, Chinese Military Intelligentization, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare, Dissipative Warfare, 中國解放軍敘事戰爭, 認知域戰, 認知戰

Cognitive Domain Warfare The New Main Chinese Battlefield for Language Confrontation

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認知領域戰爭：中國語言對抗的新主戰場

現代英語：

Cognitive domain warfare refers to the important form of public opinion propaganda, psychological attack and defense, winning people’s hearts, subverting confidence, influencing beliefs, fighting for thinking, and ideological struggle, guided by modern cognitive theory and science, calling on multi-domain means such as public opinion, psychology, and law, and using multi-dimensional technologies such as modern networks, media, text, pictures, videos, and numbers, aiming to fight for people’s initiative in thinking, beliefs, values, personal attitudes, emotions, identification, and judgment tendencies. Cognitive domain warfare is a complex collection of traditional public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, legal warfare, trade warfare, diplomatic warfare, scientific and technological warfare, ideological warfare, and other multi-domain warfare.

At present, cognitive domain warfare has become an important support for countries to carry out military struggles and struggles in other fields. Language confrontation driven by cognitive domain goals has become an important form of cognitive domain warfare and deserves high attention.

Language confrontation: a new area for exerting influence on combat targets

Cognitive domain operations are a result of the development of contemporary cognitive science research. They are an emerging field of operations that emerged after people actively explored the cognitive activities of the brain to gain a more complex, abstract and thorough understanding of the brain. They are also a high-end form of influence in language confrontation that targets the advanced, deep and hidden activities of the audience’s brain. Whether it is the object of information action, the producer of information, the information content itself or the channel of information, cognitive domain operations are all permeated with cognitive characteristics, and always emphasize taking action at the cognitive level.

In terms of the recipients of information, this cognition targets the deep cognitive aspects of the opponent’s audience, including its people, military, military commanders or important leaders, important figures in the political and business circles, and even directly includes the leaders of the other country or specific important generals of the army, etc. It can also be a specific group of people or the public. It can involve the cognitive preferences, cognitive shortcomings, cognitive habits, cognitive biases, and cognitive misunderstandings of individuals or groups; it can also be the beliefs, values, political identity, national identity, social and cultural identity, and emotional attitudes of individuals and groups.

From the perspective of the distributor and content of information, it should be infused with the cognitive design and arrangement of the information producer, which includes the unique cognition of the text, such as the discourse mode of the text, the narrative mode of the text, the observation perspective of things, the cognitive focus and depth of the narrative, the organization form of the sentence, the value concept and other tendencies of the sentence, the acceptability of the concept of the sentence to the other party, etc.

In terms of the channels for information issuance and dissemination, the form of text is closer to multimedia and multimodal forms, closer to the needs of cyberspace, closer to the advantages of contemporary smart phones, and closer to the characteristics of the current emerging media era, that is, it is more in line with the cognitive characteristics, cognitive habits and cognitive tendencies accepted by the audience. The dissemination form of text fully considers the cognitive effects in international communication, especially cross-cultural, cross-linguistic, cross-media and cross-group cognitive communication. In this way, the text will better influence the audience from a cognitive level.

Language confrontation responds to changes in combat styles and generates new tactics

Throughout human history, it is not difficult to find that the style of military struggle has been constantly changing. From the initial physical struggle with cold weapons to the contest of hot weapons and mechanical forces, and then to the balance and counter-balance of information capabilities under high-tech warfare conditions, in recent years, it has developed towards the intelligent decision-making competition in the direction of intelligence and unmanned. Each change has brought profound changes in tactics. In the current transitional stage of coexistence of mechanization, informatization and intelligence, people not only pay attention to the competition for dominance in the physical and information domains of the battlefield, but also pay more attention to the control of the cognitive domain that affects the main body of war, that is, the competition in the fields of thinking, cognitive patterns and styles, values, emotional attitudes, cultural models, communication patterns, psychological strengths and weaknesses, cognitive preferences, cultural and knowledge maps, and ideological identity of the personnel on both sides of the war. The latter involves the basic situation of social personnel and social existence, that is, the emerging field of cognitive domain warfare, and its tactics have strong particularity.

Flexibility of topics: Cognitive domain operations can select many topics in the cognitive domain and carry out flexible and flexible combat operations. According to the current situation and needs, topics can be selected from the relatively macroscopic strategic level (such as the ideology and system of the opponent’s entire society, etc.), the mesoscopic campaign level (such as social problems in the local field or direction of the opponent’s society: social welfare policy or environmental protection policy, etc.), and very microscopic tactical issues in society (such as the unfairness, injustice, and non-beautiful side of society reflected by a certain person or a specific event). Macro, meso, and micro cognitive domain issues are interconnected and transformed into each other. It is very likely that a microscopic topic will also become a major macroscopic strategic topic. The raising of issues depends on the relationship with the entire military operation. Cognitive domain operations should be subject to the overall combat operations and serve the needs of the macroscopic political and diplomatic situation. More importantly, topics should be prepared in peacetime, and data on various topics should be collected in peacetime, especially paying attention to various important data in the real society. Once needed, these data can be quickly transformed into arrows, bullets, and shells shot at the enemy’s cognitive domain, and even become strategic weapons that affect the overall situation.

Controllability of the operational level: The important design of cognitive operations is that it can be controlled and regulated as a whole at the operational level, and can be upgraded or reduced in dimension according to changes in the situation. If it is necessary at the strategic level, the commander can open the strategic level design and force investment; if it is necessary at the campaign level, it can also be controlled at the corresponding campaign level; if it is only necessary at the level of specific small problems, it can also be controlled at the corresponding niche local level, so that the entire action serves the needs of the overall combat operation. The strategic campaign tactics here refer more to operational design and force investment. Since the battlefield situation may change rapidly, some issues may also change at the level, with strategic issues affecting the effects of the campaign and tactical levels; some issues, due to the particularity of tactical issues, become campaign and strategic level issues that affect the overall situation.

Dominance of emerging media: The main influence channel of cognitive domain has shifted from traditional paper media and print media to emerging media. Traditional media mainly rely on single media, such as newspapers, magazines, books, flyers, posters, etc. to convey information; the emergence of television in the later period brought three-dimensional media. In the Internet era, especially the Internet 2.0 era and the birth of smart communication devices, people rely more on multi-media, multi-modal, short videos and short texts to convey information. The introduction of various advanced devices such as smart phones, smart tablets, smart players, and the birth of various emerging social software and tools have made emerging media the main tool for people to communicate and exchange. Emerging media, emerging social software and tools have become an important space for various forces to play games and struggle in social security, public opinion security, ideological security, social security and political security. Internet security, especially whether the security of new social media, emerging social software and tools can be mastered, is, to some extent, the key to whether a country’s cognitive domain can be secure. Information in emerging media tools and new media space has become the main battlefield, main position and main space for competition in cognitive operations of various countries. It is worth pointing out that ideas and theories that influence people’s cognition will become the most influential weapons at all levels of cognitive domain operations.

Language confrontation adapts to the intelligent era, cognitive computing enhances new computing power

In the era of artificial intelligence, based on the substantial improvement in big data analysis and application, supercomputing capabilities, intelligent computing capabilities, natural language processing capabilities, smartphone communication capabilities, and new generation network communication capabilities, humans have begun to accurately model and analyze language culture, psychological cognition, group emotions, and social behavior for the entire society, the entire network domain, local groups, local different groups, and specific individuals. In particular, people have a deep understanding and grasp of brain cognition, human brain thinking, thinking patterns, habitual preferences, image schemas, cognitive frameworks, and even neural networks, human-computer collaboration, and brain control technology. As long as there is enough diverse dynamic data, people can calculate and simulate all people’s psychological activities, emotional activities, cognitive activities, social opinions, and behavioral patterns. Through deep calculations, actuarial calculations, and clever calculations, people’s cognitive world can be accurately grasped, and a fine and profound control of people’s cognitive domain can be formed. This aspect also presents the following characteristics:

The dimensionality of computation: As an emerging field, all aspects of the cognitive domain can be digitized and made fully computable for all aspects of the entire process and all individuals. This can be achieved by widely collecting various types of information and then sorting out the information to form big data on the diverse factors of the opponent’s subjects. This will allow various computations to be conducted on the entire population, groups, between groups, and between individual data. As a result, all kinds of activities based on thinking, psychology, emotion, speech, behavior, etc. that were previously impossible to achieve can be completed, displayed, and accurately grasped through computation.

Cognitive nature of computation: computation in the cognitive domain reflects a strong cognitive nature. It can reveal more of the connections between things, events, and people that are difficult to observe with the naked eye. It can reveal the clustering and hierarchical relationships between concepts in the same event framework, and reflect the deep cognitive connections between concepts, whether explicit or implicit, direct or indirect. It reveals the complex conceptual network system between concepts, allowing people to see a deep cognitive world that completely transcends ordinary naked eye observation.

Intelligence of computation: The computation in cognitive domain also reflects strong intelligence. This intelligence is manifested in the fact that intelligent conclusions can be drawn through computation. For example, through the collection of a large amount of text and data mining, we can find the relationship between various topics, various viewpoints, various tendencies, various groups of people, various positions, and various demands that cannot be seen by human power, so as to form a more comprehensive, in-depth, accurate, and systematic understanding of a certain issue and make scientific and optimized decisions. Such decisions may be consistent with human intelligence, or they may surpass or even far exceed human intelligence. By making good use of the power of cognitive computing, especially by integrating the data of our country and the data of our opponents, we can better prevent, warn, and deploy in advance, and achieve the best, optimal, fastest, and most accurate strikes and counterattacks, and better reflect efficient, powerful, and targeted protection. Cognitive computing here is more about the possible reactions of a possible macro, meso, or micro topic in different groups of people, different time periods, and different backgrounds, in the entire network domain or a local network domain, or within a specific group, especially the analysis and inspection of the active and passive situations that both parties may present when playing games with opponents, and the attack and defense of cognitive domain.

New application of giving full play to the status of discourse subject and releasing the power of discourse

Cognitive domain operations have a very important support, that is, it mainly relies on language media to play a role, mainly exerts influence through the discourse level, mainly forms an implicit effect on the cognitive domain through the narrative of discourse, mainly exerts potential effects through cultural models, and exerts explicit or implicit effects through cross-cultural communication. It is mainly reflected in the following aspects:

Uniqueness of textual discourse: The cognitive domain needs to be influenced by information. Although information may be presented through the special visual effects of video images, fundamentally speaking, the uniqueness of the discourse expressed by the text becomes the main support for producing cognitive influence. Among them, the mode of discourse expression, the skills of discourse expression, the main design of the persuasiveness and appeal of discourse expression, and especially the uniqueness of discourse narrative will be the key to influencing people’s cognition. This may include the perspective of the narrative, the theme and style of the narrative, the story framework of the narrative, the language innovation of the narrative, the key sentences of the narrative, the philosophical, humanistic, religious, social, natural and other feelings contained in the narrative, the identities of different participants in the narrative, the diversified evaluation of the narrative, the authenticity, depth and emotional temperature of the narrative, the subtle influence of the narrative on the viewpoint, the personal emotions, values, ideology, and position evaluation released by the narrative. The uniqueness of textual discourse is an important reliance for cognitive domain operations to exert cognitive influence through text. Making full use of the complexity of the text, giving play to the respective advantages of diverse texts, and giving play to the role of implicit and explicit cognitive influence of the text connotation have become the key to cognitive domain operations of textual discourse. The most important thing is to innovate the text discourse, win readers with newer words, more novel expressions, and more unique expressions, so that readers can understand and feel the ideas in the text imperceptibly, and accept the ideas of the text silently.

Potentiality of cultural models: In cognitive domain operations, we must deeply grasp the characteristics and models of different countries and national cultures. Different countries and different nationalities have different cultural models. Their philosophical thinking, traditional culture, religious beliefs, customs, and ways of thinking are all obviously different. Citizens of different cultures also have different national psychology and national cognitive models. They should also have typical cognitive preferences belonging to their own national culture, as well as corresponding shortcomings and weaknesses. Some of them obviously have a huge difference in understanding from other nationalities in their own country, and even misunderstandings and hostility. Therefore, cognitive domain operations at the cultural level are to grasp the overall cultural models of different countries, build cultural models of different groups in different countries, build different cognitive models of different countries on different things, and fully grasp the overall attitude and behavior of a country on a series of things and issues, especially for some typical cases, cultural taboos, religious requirements, spiritual pursuits, and overall concepts. With the help of existing theories and discoveries, we should comprehensively construct the basic performance of different groups of people in the cognitive field on some typical problems, sensitive problems, and important problems, so as to provide important reference and guidance for the next step of cognitive operations. Strengthening the study of the cultural patterns of different enemy personnel, especially military personnel, personnel in key positions, including the study and construction of the basic cultural characteristics and models of enemy generals, officers, soldiers, etc., such as the character’s psychological cognitive behavior and cultural model portrait, has become the core practice of cognitive domain operations. The cognitive analysis of ordinary enemy personnel, especially the general public, citizens, and specific groups, including special non-governmental organizations, is also of great value.

Cross-cultural strategic communication: Cognitive domain operations are international language and cultural communications, and need to follow the laws of international communication. We must grasp the basic paradigm of international communication, skillfully combine our own stories with international expressions, and skillfully combine the other party’s language and culture with our own stories and ideas; we must be good at combining different art forms, including text, pictures, paintings, music (sound), video and other means or multimodal means to achieve international communication of information. At the same time, we must coordinate multi-dimensional macro communication at the strategic level: we must use various means to carry out communication through military-civilian integration, military-civilian coordination, and military-civilian integration; in addition to non-governmental organizations, we must especially rely on civilian forces, experts, opinion leaders, and ordinary people to help the military carry out cognitive domain operations; we must unify the setting of topics, speak out in multiple locations and dimensions, form a strategic communication situation, and form a good situation for emergency solutions for major actions, major issues, and major crisis management, form a good public opinion atmosphere, create positive effects, and eliminate or extinguish adverse effects. In particular, we must establish a capable team that is proficient in foreign languages, understands cross-cultural skills, knows the laws of international communication, and can speak out skillfully on international multi-dimensional platforms. These people can usually conduct extensive topic perception, information collection and discussion, and use common or special topics to build personal connections and establish fan communities. More importantly, at critical moments, they can exert influence through their fan groups and complete strategic communication tasks.

At present, with the prevalence of hybrid warfare, multi-domain warfare and global warfare, cognitive domain warfare has become a common means of mixing and blending. The process of cognitive domain warfare from unfamiliarity, emerging, development to growth is also the advanced stage, complex stage and upgraded stage of the development of traditional public opinion warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare. Its rise is more deceptive, ambiguous, concealed, embedded, implanted and unobservable, especially considering its deep integration with the entry of contemporary emerging media, and it is constantly learning and drawing on new ideas, new technologies and new means that integrate into multiple disciplines, cross-disciplines and cross-disciplinary disciplines. As a result, cognitive domain warfare has become a form of warfare that we must be highly vigilant and guard against. (Liang Xiaobo, professor and doctoral supervisor at the College of Arts and Sciences of the National University of Defense Technology)

[This article is a phased result of the National Social Science Fund Major Project “National Defense Language Capacity Building in the Perspective of National Defense and Military Reform”]

(Source: China Social Sciences Network)

(Editors: Chen Yu, Huang Zijuan)

現代國語：

認知域作戰指的是以現代認知理論和科學為指導，調用輿論、心理、法律等多域手段，運用現代網絡、傳媒、文字、圖片、視頻、數字等多維技術，開展輿論宣傳、心理攻防、人心爭取、信心顛覆、信仰影響、思維爭奪以及意識形態斗爭的重要形式，意在爭奪人們在思維、信仰、價值觀、個人態度、情感、認同與評判傾向方面主動權。認知域作戰是傳統輿論戰、心理戰、法律戰及貿易戰、外交戰、科技戰、思想戰等多域戰的復合集合體。

當前，認知域作戰已成為國家間開展軍事斗爭和其他領域斗爭的重要依托，認知域目標驅動的語言對抗已經成為認知域作戰的重要形式，值得高度關注。

語言對抗針對作戰對象施加影響的新領域

認知域作戰是當代認知科學研究發展的伴隨結果，是人們積極探索大腦認知活動獲得對大腦更為復雜更為抽象更為透徹的理解后產生的一種新興作戰領域，更是語言對抗以受眾大腦的高級深層隱性活動為作用對象的高端影響形式。不管是從信息作用的對象、信息的生產者、信息內容本身還是信息的渠道，認知域作戰都無不貫穿了認知的特點，自始至終都突出從認知層面開展行動。

從信息的接受對象來說，這個認知針對的是對手受眾大腦深層的認知方面，包括其民眾、軍隊、軍事指揮員或者重要領導、政界商界的重要人物，甚至直接包括對方國家領導人或者軍隊的特定重要將領等，也可以是特定的人群或者民眾。它可以涉及個人或者群體的認知偏好、認知短板、認知習慣、認知偏差、認知誤區﹔也可以是個人和群體的信仰、價值觀念、政治認同、民族認同以及社會和文化認同與情感態度。

從信息的投放者和內容來說，它應該是注入了信息生產者的認知設計和安排，這個包括文本的獨特認知性，比如文本的話語模式、文本的敘事模式、事物的觀察視角、敘事的認知焦點與深度、語句的組織形式、語句的價值觀念等傾向性、語句的概念的對方可接受性等。

從信息發出和傳播的渠道來說，文本的形式更加貼近多媒體多模態形式，更加貼近網絡空間的需要，更加貼近當代智能手機的優勢，更加貼近當下新興媒體時代的特點，也就是更加符合受眾接受的認知特點認知習慣和認知傾向。文本的傳播形式充分考慮國際傳播中的認知效果，特別是跨文化、跨語言、跨媒體、跨群體的認知傳播。如此，文本將會從認知層面，更好地對受眾施加影響。

語言對抗應對作戰樣式變革生成新戰法

縱觀人類歷史，我們不難發現，軍事斗爭的樣式一直在不斷變化。從最初的借助冷兵器的體力纏斗發展成為熱兵器機械力量的較量，又發展成為高科技戰爭條件下的信息化能力的制衡與反制衡，近年來又向著智能化無人化方向的智能決策比拼發展，每一次變革都帶來深刻的戰法變化。當下的機械化信息化智能化的共處過渡階段，人們不僅重視戰場的物理域和信息域主導權的爭奪，更重視影響戰爭主體——人的認知域的掌控，也就是作戰雙方人員的思維方式、認知模式與風格、價值觀念、情感態度、文化模型、溝通模式、心理強弱項、認知偏好、文化與知識圖譜、意識形態認同等領域的爭奪。后者涉及社會人員和社會存在的基本態勢，也就是認知域作戰施加影響的新興領域，其戰法有著強烈的特殊性。

議題靈活機動性：認知域作戰可挑選認知域的諸多議題，開展靈活機動的作戰行動。議題根據當下的情況與需要，既可以選擇涉及較為宏觀的戰略層面（如對方全社會的意識形態與制度等），也可以選擇中觀的戰役層面（如對方社會局部領域或方向的社會問題：社會福利政策或環境保護政策等），還可以選擇涉及社會中非常微觀的戰術問題（如某個人、某個具體事件所折射出的社會的非公平、非正義、非美好的一面）。宏觀、中觀、微觀的認知域問題相互聯系、相互轉化，很有可能一個微觀的議題也會成為一個宏觀的重大戰略性議題。而問題的提出要視與整個軍事行動的關系，要使認知域作戰服從於全局的作戰行動，服務於宏觀的政治、外交大局的需要。更為重要的是，議題要准備在平時，要把各種議題的數據收集在平時，特別是要關注現實社會中的各種重要數據。一旦需要，這些數據就可以迅速轉變為射向敵方認知域的箭頭、子彈、炮彈，甚至成為影響全局的戰略性武器。

作戰層次可控性：認知作戰其重要的設計是，在作戰的層面上，是整體可以控制的，也是可以調控的，可以根據形勢的變化，做出相應的升級或者降維。如果需要戰略層面的，指揮人員可以開通戰略層面的設計和力量投入﹔如果需要戰役級別的，也可以控制在相應戰役層面﹔如果僅僅需要是在特定的小問題層面，也可以將其控制在相應的小眾局域層面，使得整個行動服務於整體作戰行動的需要。這裡的戰略戰役戰術，更多的指的是作戰設計和力量的投入。由於戰場態勢可能瞬息萬變，有些議題也有可能在層級上發生變化，由戰略性的議題影響到戰役和戰術級的效果﹔有些議題，則由於戰術議題的特殊性，成為影響全局的戰役戰略級議題。

新興媒介主導性：認知域的主要影響渠道，已經從傳統的紙質媒體和平面媒體轉向了新興媒體。傳統媒介主要依靠單一媒介，如報紙、雜志、書籍、傳單、海報等來傳遞信息﹔后期電視的產生帶來了立體媒體。到了互聯網時代，特別是互聯網2.0時代和智能通訊設備的誕生，人們更加依靠多媒介、多模態以及短視頻、短文本的形式來傳遞信息。各種智能手機、智能平板、智能播放器等高級設備的推陳出新，各種新興社交軟件和工具的誕生，使得新興媒體成為當下人們開展溝通和交流的主要工具。新興媒體、新興社交軟件和工具已經成為當下各種力量在社會安全、輿論安全、意識形態安全、社會安全和政治安全展開博弈和斗爭的重要空間。互聯網安全，特別是能否掌握住新型的社交媒體、新興社交軟件和工具等的安全，在某種程度上說，是一國認知域能否安全的關鍵。新興媒體工具和新型媒體空間的信息已經成為各個國家認知作戰的主戰場、主陣地和主要爭奪空間。值得指出的是，左右人們認知的思想和理論將成為認知域作戰各層面的最為有影響力的武器。

語言對抗適應智能時代認知計算增強新算力

人工智能時代，在大數據分析與運用、超級計算能力、智能計算能力、自然語言處理能力、智能手機傳播能力以及新一代網絡通信能力大幅提高的基礎上，人類已經開始可以對全社會、全網域、局部群體、局部不同群體以及特定個體開展精准的語言文化、心理認知、群體情感、社會行為建模和分析。特別是人們對大腦認知、人腦思維、思維模式、習慣偏好、意象圖式、認知框架、乃至神經網絡、人機協同、腦控技術等的深刻認識和把握，隻要有足夠多樣化的動態數據，人們就可以把人們的心理活動、情感活動、認知活動、社會輿論以及行為方式等全部計算模擬出來，通過深算、精算、妙算，可以精准地把握人們的認知世界，形成對人們認知域的精細和深刻的掌控。這方面又呈現以下特征：

計算的全維性：認知域作為一個新興領域，其涉及的方方面面都可以被數據化並實現全方位全過程全個體可計算，可以通過廣泛的收集各類型信息，經過信息梳理進而可體現為關於作戰對手主體因素多樣化的大數據，從而可以就此開展面向全體、群體、群體之間以及個體數據及其之間的各種計算，由此，以往無法實現的基於思維、心理、情感、言論、行為等方面的各種活動都可以通過計算來完成、展示和精准把握。

計算的認知性：認知域的計算體現了了強烈的認知性，它更多地可以揭示各種事物、事件、人物之間的難以用肉眼觀察到的關聯關系，可以揭示同一事件框架中各種概念之間的聚類和層級關系，體現各概念之間或明或暗、或直接或間接的深層認知聯系，揭示概念之間的復雜概念網絡體系，使人們看到完全超越一般肉眼觀察的深層認知世界。

計算的智能性：認知域的計算又體現了強烈的智能性。這種智能性表現為通過計算，會得出具有智慧性的結論。譬如可以通過大量文本收集和數據挖掘，尋找人工力量受限而看不到的各種主題、各種觀點、各種傾向、各種人群、各種立場、各種訴求之間的關系，形成對某一問題的更為全面、縱深、精確、系統的認識，做出科學優化的決策。這類決策既可能是與人類智能相符，也可能是超越甚至遠遠勝過人類的智能。運用好認知計算的力量，特別是綜合本國的數據和對手的數據，可以更好地做到提前預防、提前預警、提前開展布局，並能夠實現最好最優最快最精准地打擊和反擊，也能夠更好地體現高效有力有針對性的防護。這裡的認知計算，更多的是對某一可能的宏觀中觀或微觀的議題在不同人群、不同時間段、不同背景下，在全網域或者某一局域網域、某一特定群體內部可能產生的反響，特別是對與對手展開博弈時雙方可能呈現的主動、被動的態勢開展分析和檢視，對認知域的攻防等。

發揮話語主體地位釋放話語力量的新運用

認知域作戰有一個非常重要的依托，就是它主要依托語言媒介來發揮作用，主要通過話語層面來施加影響，主要通過話語的敘事性來形成對認知域的隱性作用，主要通過文化模式來施加潛在作用，通過跨文化的傳播來施加或明或暗的作用。其主要體現為以下方面：

文本話語獨特性：認知域是需要用信息來施加影響的。盡管信息可能依托視頻圖片的特殊視覺效果來展現，但從根本上說，文本所綜合表達話語的獨特性成為產生認知影響的主要依托。這其中，話語表達的模式、話語表達的技巧、話語表達說服力和感染力的主要設計，特別是話語敘事獨特性將是影響人們認知的關鍵。這可能會包括敘事的視角，敘事的主題、風格，敘事的故事框架，敘事的語言創新，敘事的關鍵語句，敘事蘊含的哲學、人文、宗教、社會、自然等情懷，敘事的不同參與者身份，敘事的多樣化評價，敘事的真實度、深度和情感溫度，敘事對於觀點的潛移默化影響作用，敘事釋放的個人情感、價值觀念、意識形態、立場評價等。文本話語的獨特性，是認知域作戰以文本施加認知影響的重要依靠。充分利用文本的復雜性，發揮多樣化文本各自優勢，發揮文本內涵的隱性和顯性認知影響的作用，已經成為文本話語認知域作戰的關鍵。其中最為重要的，就是要創新文本話語，用更加嶄新的話語、更加新奇的表述，更加獨特的表達來贏得讀者，使讀者了解並在潛移默化中感受文本中的思想，並在無聲無息中接受文本的思想。

文化模式潛在性：認知域作戰，一定要深刻把握不同國家和民族文化的特點和模式。不同國家、不同民族，其文化的模型不一樣，哲學思維、傳統文化、宗教信仰、風俗習慣、思維方式皆有明顯不同﹔不同文化下的國民，也有著不同樣的民族心理、民族性的認知模式，還應該有典型的屬於本民族本文化的認知偏好，也有相應的短處與弱點，有的還明顯存在與本國其他民族有巨大差異的認識，甚至還有誤解和敵意。因此，認知域作戰在文化層面，就是要把握好不同國家的總體文化模型，建設不同國家不同群體的文化模型，建設不同國家在不同事物上的不同認知模型，充分把握某一國家在一系列事物和議題上的總體態度和行事方式，特別是針對一些典型案例、文化禁忌、宗教要求、精神追求、總體觀念等。要借助現有理論和發現，綜合構建在認知領域不同人群對一些典型問題、敏感問題、重要問題的基本表現，為下一步開展認知作戰提供重要的參考和指導。加強對敵方不同人員的文化模式研究，特別是軍隊人員，重點崗位的人員，包括對方將領、軍官、士兵等的基本文化特點和模型的研究與構建，譬如人物心理認知行為與文化模型畫像，已經成為認知域作戰的核心做法。對對方普通人員，特別是一般國民、市民的認知模式，以及特定人群，包括特殊的非政府組織力量等的認知分析，也同樣具有重要價值。

跨文化戰略傳播性：認知域作戰，是面向國際的語言傳播和文化傳播，需要遵循國際傳播的規律。要把握好國際傳播的基本范式，要把本國故事與國際表達巧妙結合，要將對方語言與文化和本國的故事與思想巧妙結合﹔要善於結合不同的藝術形式，包括文字、圖片、繪畫、音樂（聲音）、視頻等手段或者多模態的手段來實現信息的國際傳播。同時，還要在戰略層面統籌多維宏觀的傳播：要利用各種手段，依靠軍民融合軍民協同軍民一體開展傳播﹔除了非政府組織之外，特別是要依靠民間力量，依靠專家、意見領袖、普通民眾來幫助軍隊來開展認知域作戰﹔要統一設置議題，多點多位多維發聲，形成戰略傳播態勢，為重大行動、重大議題、重大危機管控等形成應急解決的良好態勢，形成良好輿論氛圍，營造積極效應，消除不利影響或者扑滅不利影響。特別是要建立一支能夠精通外語、懂得跨文化技巧、知曉國際傳播規律、能在國際多維平台巧妙發聲的精干隊伍。這些人員平時可以開展廣泛的議題感知、收集和討論，借助普通議題或者特殊議題建立人脈關系，建立粉絲群落﹔更重要的是，在關鍵時刻，通過他們的粉絲群體，施加影響，完成戰略傳播任務。

當前，隨著混合戰多域戰全域戰的大行其道，認知域作戰已經成為雜糅其間、混合其間的常用手段，認知域作戰由陌生、新興、發展到壯大的歷程，更是傳統輿論戰、心理戰、法律戰發展的高級階段復雜階段升級階段。它的興起，更具有欺騙性、模糊性、隱蔽性、嵌入性、植入性和不可觀察性，特別是考慮它與當代新興媒體進場深度接軌深度融合，而且還不斷學習借鑒融入多學科、跨學科、交叉學科的新思想、新技術、新手段。由此，認知域作戰已然成為我們必須高度警惕高度提防的作戰形式。（國防科技大學文理學院教授、博士生導師梁曉波）

【本文系國家社科基金重大項目“國防與軍隊改革視野下的國防語言能力建設”階段性成果】

（來源：中國社會科學網）

(責編：陳羽、黃子娟)

2022年05月17日10:xx | 

中國原創軍事資源：https://military.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2022/0517/c1011-32423539888.html

#Artificial #Intelligence, #Information Support Force, #intelligent warfare, #intellligentization, Asymmetric Warfare, Chinese Artificial Intelligence, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations

China Strengthening Innovation in Military Theory During the New Era and New Journey

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新時代新徵中國加強軍事理論創新

吳霞
2025-05-29 08:xx 資料來源：中國軍網

現代英語：

President Xi Jinping stressed that in the new era and new journey, the world is undergoing a century-long transformation, the new military revolution is developing rapidly, and my country’s security and development needs are undergoing profound changes. It is more urgent to achieve the goal of strengthening the military, and we must comprehensively strengthen military theory work. To accelerate the formation of a military theory system that is contemporary, leading, and unique, we must expand our thinking horizons, strengthen military theory innovation, strive to seize the commanding heights of military theory innovation, and gain new advantages in military theory competition, and thus seize the initiative in the strategic game between major powers.

Reconstructing a pluralistic cognitive framework based on the characteristics of the war era

Since the 21st century, with the development of global politics, economy, culture, and science and technology, the characteristics of modern warfare have undergone profound changes. The system confrontation, spatial superposition, and multi-domain hybrid characteristics of the high-end war game between major powers have become more prominent. The war form is accelerating towards a highly dispersed force, highly circulated information, and highly coordinated actions. We urgently need to examine the driving force of the times for innovation in military theory.

The timeliness of the evolution of war forms. After combing through the development context from traditional warfare to modern warfare and comparing and analyzing it, we can find that the simple primitive form of “building a stronghold, fighting a stupid battle, and fighting in a group” has already moved towards multiple advanced forms such as multi-domain warfare and hybrid warfare. The war concept, combat system, tactics and fighting methods are all evolving continuously. The driving force of the times is the coupling effect of “technical background determines tactical quality, and tactical innovation forces technological innovation”. Against this background, future wars will present the three major characteristics of “full-domain linkage, intelligent dominance, and unmanned front”. In essence, it is a breakthrough in nonlinear state, an update of war philosophy, and even a super-dimensional power game. The driving force behind it is the endless emergence of new combat concepts. Military theory innovation must face the compound challenges of full-domain confrontation, hybrid competitive capabilities and technological breakthroughs. The core lies in building a new war concept that can break the constraints of thinking and achieve cross-domain victory.

The leading nature of military theory game. The game between major powers is a long-term process, in which the arms race is a traditional path of mutual game, while another emerging track is the military theory competition. First of all, military theory is the high-level logic of the game between major powers. The alternating evolution of leading, accompanying and follow-up military theories provides a blueprint for resource integration, training iteration and force optimization for the game between major powers. It also provides methods and strategies for restricting and cracking the opponent’s capabilities, which can accelerate the trend of the military system to win the battle. Secondly, with the continuous changes in the international situation and scientific and technological development, new contradictions, new problems, new goals and new threats continue to emerge, and the causes, subjects, forms, and scenarios of war and confrontation will be more complex, diverse and multi-domain integrated, and their performance will be more uncertain and nonlinear. Whoever can recognize the future war form and style and whoever has a rich concept of combat concepts can take the initiative in international games.

The deterrent effect of advanced military theories. Advanced military theories can coordinate existing war resources to the greatest extent through scientific theoretical design, and fully transform war potential into war power. Therefore, advanced military theories are both combat effectiveness that can win wars and deterrence that can deter wars. For example, people’s war is our magic weapon to defeat the enemy, which has been proven by war practice. For a long time after the founding of New China, imperialism and hegemonism did not dare to act rashly against our country. One important reason was that they were afraid of the power of our people’s war. In recent years, the form of war has accelerated its evolution towards intelligence, and new combat concepts of foreign armies have emerged in an endless stream. In the face of competition in military theory innovation on the “silent battlefield”, we must have insight into the new development of intelligent combat theory, examine the new changes in intelligent combat styles, and adhere to the principle of “you fight yours, I fight mine”. We must be good at creating advanced fighting methods to defeat the superior, and we must also be good at avoiding the real and attacking the virtual to attack the incapable, and innovate and develop theoretical deterrence with our own characteristics.

Promote cross-domain communication and integration, and deconstruct multi-dimensional innovation mechanisms

Modern warfare has broken through the boundaries of land, sea, air, space and power grids, proving the necessity of multi-domain linkage and multi-dimensional connection. In this vast military and even civilian field, the military theory innovation must integrate scientific and technological channels, build a strategic and tactical research and training platform, and seek breakthroughs from the innovation mechanism by gathering the best and releasing energy, integrating information, and integrating strikes.

The battlefield space is ubiquitous and multi-dimensionally reconstructed. The essence of battlefield space reconstruction is the breakthrough of technological civilization on physical boundaries, that is, when new technologies develop to a certain extent, the physical domain, information domain, social domain, etc. will present a reconstructed form. This reconstruction breaks the spatial limitations and time dimensions of the traditional battlefield, and deeply promotes the war confrontation from the centralized and linear physical space to the hyper-dimensional space of multi-domain integration and boundless linkage, which brings about the ubiquitous combat domain, all-encompassing combat elements, and all-encompassing combat forces, and will form a new combat form. This requires military theory to reconstruct the three-dimensionality, multi-dimensionality and linkage of modern warfare from the aspects of combat system, strategy and tactics, and node elements. Especially in the future, the mixed linkage of battlefield space such as politics, economy, military, and public opinion will bring about many sources of struggle, wide fields, and strong coupling. Military theory innovation needs to have a deep insight into the connotation and essential characteristics of the endogenous development of battlefield space, so as to reconstruct an autonomous, flexible, elastic, and closed-loop combat space and highlight the battlefield ecological mechanism of linkage and balance.

Reshaping of multi-layer technology nested structure. Modern warfare needs to integrate technical systems at different levels and in different fields to form a highly coordinated and dynamically adaptive combat system to cope with the complex needs of informatization, intelligence and precision. The huge combat system urgently needs to evolve from a single function to a systematized and networked one. The core lies in breaking the boundaries of traditional military services and equipment technology and building a multi-dimensional linkage technology ecosystem. For example, the strategic early warning system requires three-dimensional networking of space satellites, ground radars, underwater sonars, etc., that is, integration and nesting from the physical layer; the global battlefield perception network requires real-time data of space-based surveillance, air early warning, and ground reconnaissance, that is, fusion and interaction from the information layer; the joint global command and control system needs to complete target identification, threat assessment and target allocation within seconds, that is, intelligent decision-making from the cognitive layer. These cross-domain communication integrations force the deep reconstruction of the technical architecture, which in turn triggers the transformation of military organizations and actions. Technological innovation drives tactical breakthroughs, promotes the iteration of equipment systems and the reshaping of military theory systems, which is the secret of the innovation mechanism of military theory.

Cross-domain knowledge integration and cognitive reconstruction. Modern warfare has broken through the Clausewitzian “trinity” framework and presents the characteristics of quantum entanglement-style full-dimensional confrontation. For example, the US military’s “mosaic warfare” theory integrates AI and biological nerves to construct a dynamic and reconfigurable killing network. This requires that military theory innovation must have the ability of cross-domain deconstruction and cognitive reconstruction. This integration and reconstruction is not a simple superposition of knowledge, but a new dimension of understanding of war and a metacognitive system through the “emergence effect”. This requires breaking down disciplinary barriers and traditional thinking frameworks, integrating advanced technologies such as communications, navigation, detection, and quantum on the basis of cybernetics, information theory, and systems theory, and forming a knowledge ecosystem with its internal logic that can couple new tactics, combat systems, and war forms.

Create an open source theoretical ecosystem and form a distributed innovation pattern

With the development of disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, brain-computer interfaces, and multi-dimensional information, the development of military theory has shown an era trend of diversified innovation. If we can activate the innovation potential with an open source ecosystem, we may be able to develop a different innovation model for military theory from the existing ones – one that maintains the traditional background of military theory while also having the technological sharpness of the intelligent era. Its core lies in stimulating innovation through an open ecosystem, diversified cooperation, and localization.

Shaping an open source ecosystem. Traditional military theory research is highly confidential and exclusive, and inevitably has information barriers, thinking limitations, and technical gaps, which can no longer meet the needs of war development. The superiority, vitality, and professionalism shown by the open source big model inspire the world. The open source military theory ecosystem can also build an advanced basic military theory base through a controllable open sharing ecosystem of theoretical frameworks, tactical deductions, and technical solutions under the support of a hierarchical collaboration system and blockchain technology, and then derive concrete military theory plug-ins for operational concept trees, scenario sets, and style groups in various fields. Its ecological connotation lies in breaking departmental boundaries, integrating military units, scientific research institutes, local universities, social think tanks, etc., and using supply and demand announcement platforms, war game deduction platforms, information interaction platforms, etc. to form a closed-loop feedback environment of “theoretical crowd creation” with multi-party participation. This distributed collaborative ecology can accelerate the formation of theoretical innovation and iteration through the interaction between nodes, and achieve sustainable development advantages in a complex internal and external environment.

Integration of military democracy. In the process of military theory innovation, through a professional and efficient collective collaboration mechanism, scattered cognitive resources are transformed into collective combat effectiveness, forming cross-domain and cross-weapon collaboration. Its success depends on three fulcrums: an open resource organization structure, an efficient knowledge management mechanism, and a deep integration of science and technology. This innovation model reshapes the production process of modern military theory: breaking the vertical, closed, and minority participation characteristics of traditional military theory innovation, and forming a collaborative paradigm that includes sharing and competitive participation of multiple subjects. This means that military theory innovation has entered a new stage of “collective wisdom + knowledge transfer”. The key is to release innovation potential through a military democracy mechanism, and to enhance the system resilience of theoretical innovation while ensuring military effectiveness. The ultimate goal is to form a theoretical system that can both guide its own military practice and contribute to human war cognition.

Highlight its own characteristics. The “two combinations” are the fundamental way to promote the theoretical innovation of the Party. To strengthen the innovation of military theory, we must insist on combining the basic principles of Marxism with the practice of building the people’s army and absorbing the essence of China’s excellent traditional military culture. We should focus on using the “arrow” of truth to shoot the “target” of military practice in the new era, and innovate and develop military theory in the process of creatively applying Marxism to analyze and deal with contemporary Chinese military issues. We should focus on extracting rich nutrition from China’s excellent traditional military culture, absorbing the war concepts, military wisdom, strategic thinking, military tactics and strategies contained therein, and giving military theory distinct Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese style. In particular, we should focus on deeply integrating the laws of modern warfare and the laws of war guidance, the essence of China’s excellent traditional military culture and China’s national conditions and military conditions, forming a military theory generation system with autonomy, adaptability and foresight, and constantly opening up new horizons for the development of our military’s military theory.(Editors: Dai Xiaoling, Wan Peng)

現代國語：

習主席強調指出，新時代新征程，世界百年變局加速演進，新軍事革命迅速發展，我國安全和發展需求深刻變化，實現強軍目標任務更加緊迫，必須全面加強軍事理論工作。加速形成具有時代性、引領性、獨特性的軍事理論體系，就要拓展思維視野，加強軍事理論創新，努力搶佔軍事理論創新制高點，奪得軍事理論競爭新優勢，進而在大國戰略博弈中掌握主動權。

立足戰爭時代特徵，重建多元式認知框架

自21世紀以來，隨著全球政治、經濟、文化、科技的發展，現代戰爭特徵發生了深刻變化，大國高端戰爭博弈下的體系對抗、空間疊加、多域混合特徵更加突出。戰爭形態向力量高度混散、資訊高度流動、行動高度協同的方向加速演進，亟需我們檢視軍事理論創新的時代動因。

戰爭形態演化的時代性。梳理傳統戰爭到現代戰爭的發展脈絡，對比分析後可以發現「結硬寨、打呆仗、群毆式」的單純原始形態已然走向多域戰、混合戰等多元高級形態，戰爭理念、作戰體系、戰法打法等均在持續發生演化，其時代動因是「技術底色決定逼成色，戰術創新技術革新」的戰術效應。在此背景下，未來戰爭將呈現「全域連動、智能主導、無人爭鋒」三大特徵，其本質上是一種非線性狀態突破，是一種戰爭哲學更新，更是一種超維力量博弈。背後推手是層出不窮的新型作戰概念，軍事理論創新必須直面全局對抗、混合競能與技術突進的複合挑戰，其核心在於建構能夠打破思維掣肘、實現跨域制勝的新型戰爭觀。

軍事理論博弈的先導性。大國博弈是一個長期過程，其中的武器裝備競賽是互相博弈的一種傳統路徑，而另一個新興賽道則是軍事理論競賽。首先，軍事理論是大國博弈的高層邏輯，先導式、伴隨式與跟進式軍事理論交替演進，為大國博弈提供了資源整合、演訓迭代和力量優化的藍圖指引，也為制約與破解對手能力提供了方法策略，可以加速軍事體系決勝的衝線趨勢。其次，隨著國際情勢、科技發展等方面的不斷變化，新矛盾、新問題、新目標、新威脅不斷湧現，戰爭和對抗的誘因、主體、形式、場景等方面將更為複雜多元和多域融合，其表現也更加充滿不確定和非線性。誰能認清未來戰爭形態樣式，誰能擁有豐富的作戰理念概念，誰能在國際博弈中佔據主動。

先進軍事理論的威懾性。先進軍事理論可以透過科學的理論設計，最大程度地統籌現有的戰爭資源，把戰爭潛力充分轉化為戰爭實力。所以，先進軍事理論既是能夠勝戰的戰鬥力，也是能夠懾戰的威懾力。例如，人民戰爭是我克敵制勝的法寶，已經得到戰爭實踐的證明。新中國成立後的相當長一段時間裡，帝國主義、霸權主義不敢對我國輕舉妄動，一個重要原因就是懼怕我人民戰爭的威力。近年來，戰爭形態向智能化加速演進，外軍新型作戰概念層出不窮，面對“寂靜戰場”上軍事理論創新的競爭，必須洞察智能化作戰理論新發展，審視智能化作戰概念層出不窮，面對“寂靜戰場”上軍事理論創新的競爭，必須洞察智能化作戰理論新發展，審視智能化作戰概念層出不窮，面對“寂靜戰場”上軍事理論創新的競爭，必須洞察智能化作戰理論新發展，審視智能化作戰樣式新變化，堅持“你打你的、我打我的”，既要擅長創造高級打法以優制工業理論，也要避實擊擊你的、我打我的”，既要擅長創造高級打法以優適能避實擊

促進跨域交流集成，解構多維式創新機理

現代戰爭突破陸海空天電網的界限，印證了多域聯動多維連結的必要性。而在此龐大的軍事甚至民用領域中聚優釋能、資訊整合、融合打擊，軍事理論創新必須整合科學技術通道、搭建戰略戰術研練平台，更需多維多域互通，從創新機理中去尋求突破。

戰場空間泛在多元重建。戰場空間重構的本質是科技文明對物理邊界的突破，也就是新科技發展到一定程度後，物理域、資訊域、社會域等將呈現重構形體。這種重建打破了傳統戰場的空間限制、時間維度，深入推動戰爭對抗從集中式、線性化的物理空間轉向多域融合、無界聯動的超維空間，由此帶來作戰要域無所不在、作戰要素無所不包、作戰力量無所不及，並將形成全新的作戰形態。這需要軍事理論從作戰體系、戰略戰術、節點要素等方面重新解構現代戰爭的立體性、多維性和連結性。特別是今後時期，政治、經濟、軍事、輿論等戰場空間的混合連動帶來的鬥爭來源多、領域廣、耦合強，軍事理論創新需深刻洞悉戰場空間內生髮育的內涵要義與本質特徵，以重構自主、靈活、彈性、閉環的作戰空間，凸顯聯動平衡的戰場生態機理。

多層技術嵌套結構重塑。現代戰爭需要透過整合不同層級、不同領域的技術系統，形成高度協同、動態適應的作戰體系，以因應資訊化、智慧化、精確化的複雜需求。龐大的作戰體系亟須將單一功能向體系化和網路化演變，其核心在於打破傳統軍兵種和裝備技術領域的界限，建構多維連動的技術生態。例如，戰略預警體系需要太空衛星、地面雷達、水下聲吶等立體組網，即從物理層整合嵌套；全局戰場感知網絡需要天基監視、空中預警、地面偵察的即時數據，即從資訊層融合交互；聯合全局指揮控制系統需要數秒內完成目標識別、威脅評估與目標分配，即從認知層智能決策。這些跨域交流整合倒逼技術架構的深度重構，由此引發軍事組織與行動破繭化蝶。技術創新驅動戰術突破，推動裝備體系迭代和軍事理論體系重塑，是軍事理論創新機制的奧秘所在。

跨域知識整合認知重建。現代戰爭突破克勞塞維茨式「三位一體」框架，呈現量子糾纏式的全維度對抗特質。如美軍「馬賽克戰」理論將AI與生物神經融合，架構動態可重建殺傷網。這要求軍事理論創新必須具備跨域解構與認知重建能力。這種整合與重建不是簡單的知識疊加，而是透過「湧現效應」產生新的戰爭理解維度與後設認知體系。這要求打破學科壁壘與傳統思維框架，在控制論、資訊理論、系統論基礎上，融合通訊、導航、偵測、量子等先進技術，以其內在邏輯形成能夠耦合新型戰術戰法、作戰體系、戰爭形態的知識生態系統。

打造開源理論生態，形成分散式創新格局

隨著人工智慧、腦機介面、多維度資訊等顛覆性技術發展，軍事理論發展呈現多元創新的時代趨勢。若能以開源生態活化創新潛力，或可走出一條不同於既有的軍事理論創新模式──既保持軍事理論傳統底色，又兼具智慧化時代的科技銳度，其核心在於從開放生態、多元合作和本土化路徑中去激發創新。

塑造開源生態。傳統軍事理論研究多具有高度保密性與排他性，也不可避免地存在資訊障礙、思考限制和技術鴻溝，已無法滿足戰爭發展需求。開源大模型顯示出的超群性、生命性、專業性給世人以啟發，開源軍事理論生態亦可在分級協作體系與區塊鏈技術的支撐下，透過理論架構、戰術推演、技術方案的可控式開放共享生態，建構一個先進的基本軍事理論基座，再衍生出各領域作戰概念樹、場景集、具象化的場景具象集。其生態內涵在於打破部門邊界，整合軍事單位、科研院所、地方高校、社會智庫等，利用供求揭榜平台、兵棋推演平台、資訊互動平台等，形成多方參與的「理論眾創」閉環回饋環境。這種分散式協作生態，可透過節點間的互動加速形成理論創新迭代合力，在複雜的內外環境中實現永續發展優勢。

融合軍事民主。在軍事理論創新過程中，透過專業、高效率的集體協作機制，將分散的認知資源轉化為集體戰鬥力，形成跨領域、跨武器協同。其成功依賴三個支點：開放的資源組織架構、高效率的知識管理機制，以及深度的理技融合。這種創新模式重塑了現代軍事理論生產流程：打破傳統軍事理論創新的垂直化、封閉化、少數化的參與特徵，形成包容多元主體共享與競爭參與的協作典範。這意味著軍事理論創新進入「集體智慧+知識遷移」的新階段，其關鍵是透過軍事民主機制釋放創新潛能，在確保軍事效能的同時提升理論創新的體系韌性。最終目的是形成既能引導自身軍事實踐，也能貢獻於人類戰爭認知的理論體系。

突顯自身特色。 「兩個結合」是推動黨的理論創新的根本途徑。加強軍事理論創新就要堅持把馬克思主義基本原理同人民軍隊建設實踐結合，汲取中華優秀傳統軍事文化精華。注重以真理之“矢”去射新時代軍事實踐之“的”，在創造性運用馬克思主義分析和處理當代中國軍事問題的過程中創新發展軍事理論。注重從中華優秀傳統軍事文化中萃取豐富營養，汲取蘊含其中的戰爭觀念、治軍智慧、戰略思想、兵法謀略等，賦予軍事理論鮮明的中國特色、中國風格、中國氣派。特別是注重將現代戰爭規律與戰爭指導規律、中華優秀傳統軍事文化精華與中國國情軍情深度融合，形成具有自主性、適應性和前瞻性的軍事理論生成體系，不斷開闢我軍軍事理論發展新境界。

(編按：代曉靈、萬鵬)

中國原創軍事資源：http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2025/0529/c40531-40490232888.html