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“Studying the Military, Studying War, Studying Fighting” Chinese Military Special Topic: The Key to Winning Cognitive Warfare

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「學軍事、學戰爭、學打仗」中國軍事專題：打贏認知戰爭的關鍵

現代英語：

Information Network: The Key to Winning the Cognitive War

■Zhai Chan

introduction

In today’s era of information and intelligent integration, information networks, with their advantages of deep reach, wide popularity, and strong interactivity, will play an irreplaceable and important role in cognitive warfare. With the support of information networks, cognitive warfare will be more powerful and more scalable. A deep understanding of the mechanism, laws, basic forms, methods and means of cognitive warfare of the role of information networks will help to timely control the initiative of cognitive warfare and lay the foundation for victory.

The Mechanism and Laws of Information Networks and Cognitive Warfare

The essence of cognitive warfare in the role of information networks is to provide massive amounts of information through core algorithms, create biased cognitive scenarios, and influence the thinking and cognition of people and intelligent machines. This process integrates the operating rules of information networks and the internal mechanisms of thinking and cognition, has strong predictability, and is the underlying structure and key point that must be grasped in information network cognitive warfare.

The stickiness effect based on path dependence. The highly developed information network in today’s society provides a platform that people cannot live without for learning, working, living, entertainment, military construction, combat and military struggle preparation, forming an interconnected path dependence between each other. This platform uses information as the core and the network as the medium. Through invisible stickiness, it connects different groups of people, societies, countries and the military together, connecting the entire world into a closely connected global village. Objectively, it also provides a bridge and a link for conducting cognitive operations, influencing the opponent’s thinking and cognition, and winning cognitive wars. In 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered an “Internet Freedom” speech, advocating the “Internet Freedom” strategy, attempting to use the channel formed by people’s high dependence on the Internet to influence the thinking and cognition of the people of the opponent country, especially the younger generation, and spread American values.

Interactive influence based on information exchange. Education believes that interactive communication can effectively overcome the cognitive barriers formed by one-way information transmission, reach consensus, form empathy, and strengthen empathy through mutual information exchange, emotional integration, and mutual needs. A big difference between information networks and traditional communication media is that they provide a carrier that can interact and communicate on a large scale, at a fast pace, and with high efficiency. In this carrier, the party with strong information can repeatedly confirm the influence, adjust methods and strategies, and intervene in the thinking and cognition of the other party through the interactive mechanism provided by the carrier, based on the other party’s thought fluctuations, emotional changes, attitude feedback, etc. For a long time, the United States has maintained a “engagement + containment” strategy toward China. One very important consideration is that this kind of engagement can effectively overcome the communication barriers and information gaps formed by simple blockade and confrontation, enhance the interaction between the two governments and peoples, and thus find opportunities to open gaps and influence our ideas and ideologies. Although this strategy takes place in the traditional field, it is inherently consistent with the interactive influence mechanism of information networks based on information exchange.

The seductive influence based on the preset scene. The concealment, virtuality and permeability of the information network allow its controllers to create extremely deceptive, tempting and inflammatory information scenes through water army flooding, information filtering and “fishing in troubled waters” and other technical and strategic means, so that the opponent is deeply trapped in it without knowing it, and instead develops towards the preset process and results. This directional manipulation of the information network can subtly and efficiently influence, infect and shape the opponent’s thinking and cognition, so that the opponent is unconsciously led by the rhythm, and the combat effect is far better than the confrontation. On the eve of the Iraq War, the US media spread false information such as the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq through the Internet and other platforms, accusing the Saddam regime of collusion with al-Qaeda, rampant corruption, and unprovoked harm to the Iraqi people. At the same time, they tried every means to cover up the truth, filter out the anti-war voices of their own people, and strive to create an atmosphere that the Saddam regime is evil and hateful and that the whole of America is united in hatred of the enemy.

The basic form of cognitive warfare in the role of information networks

The laws of war and the mechanism of victory determine the basic form of war. The laws and mechanisms of cognitive warfare based on information networks inherently determine the external forms of this war. The most basic and representative ones include information confusion warfare, misleading thinking warfare, and will-destroying warfare.

Information confusion warfare. It is to infuse the network with a large amount of complex information that combines the real and the fake, which is both true and illusory, so that the enemy’s information network capacity is overloaded, malfunctions, and disordered operations, or causes specific audiences to become “deaf, blind, and insensitive”, have cognitive abilities blocked, and their thinking, cognition, and decision-making judgments are hindered. This form of warfare is often used in the early stages of combat and in opaque battlefields. The party with information advantage can make the enemy fall into a state of panic and bewilderment, resulting in perception failure, loss of thinking, and self-disorder. Bloomberg reported that the Space Force, the sixth branch of the U.S. military that was recently established, plans to purchase 48 jammer systems by 2027, aiming to disrupt satellite signals “in the event of a conflict with a major power.” Many national militaries generally feel that the information they receive is not too little but too much. The massive amount of information coming from all directions has put tremendous pressure on situation perception and analysis and judgment.

Misleading thinking warfare. This is to form a biased information scene by instilling specific information that contains the intentions of the party controlling the information network, misleading, deceiving and influencing the thinking of specific countries, armies and people, causing them to deviate from the correct development track and deviate in a direction that is beneficial to oneself and detrimental to the enemy. It is the highest level and common practice of cognitive attack. This kind of misleading is based on strong external pressure, on specious strategies, and on information mixed with water as a weapon. It targets the opponent’s thinking characteristics and weak links, and implements clear-cut deception, causing the opponent to lose his way in tension and panic, and fall into the “trap” unknowingly. In recent years, while implementing the great power competition strategy, some countries have used cyber trolls to fabricate false situations, create false information, and spread true rumors to fan the flames around our country and encourage some countries that have historical grievances with our country and frictions with our country in reality to seek trouble. The purpose is to induce us to divert our attention, weaken the investment of resources and strength in the main strategic direction, deviate from the track of great power rejuvenation, and seek to reap the benefits of the two fishermen.

Will-destroying war. Futurist Alfred Toffler said that whoever controls the human mind controls the entire world. War is ultimately a confrontation between people. People’s psychological activities largely affect their mental state, which in turn affects their will to fight. Will-destroying war is different from traditional warfare that indirectly affects people’s will through material destruction. It directly affects the psychological activities, mental state and thinking decisions of key figures, thus affecting military morale, fighting will and combat actions. With the development of science and technology and social progress, the intervention in people’s will has entered the stage of “technology + strategy” from the traditional strategy-based intervention. More than a decade ago, scientists developed a “sound beam” weapon that uses an electromagnetic network to emit extremely narrow sound waves from hundreds of meters away, interfering with the enemy’s judgment and even causing mental confusion among strong-willed soldiers. In recent years, studies have shown that artificial speech synthesis technology based on brain wave signals can extract signals from the brain and synthesize speech that humans can directly understand.

Information networks are the main means of cognitive warfare

“Technology + strategy” constitutes the basic means of modern cognitive warfare. As a product of modern scientific and technological development, the information network’s means of effecting cognitive warfare are also mainly reflected in “technology + strategy”. This provides us with a basic entry point for understanding and grasping the ways and scientific paths of information network’s effect on cognitive warfare, thereby winning the war.

Big data construction. As the core component of the information network, data is not only the carrier of information, but also the “new oil” driven by the value of the information network, and the basic ammunition for cognitive warfare. Through massive data, complex information scenarios are constructed for my use, or the opponent’s cognitive confusion, or misleading and deceiving thinking, or destroying beliefs and wills are formed, which constitutes the basic logic of cognitive warfare in the information network. In this logical framework, data is undoubtedly the most basic resource and the most core element. A few years ago, authoritative departments calculated that the world produces about 2.5 exabytes (EB) of data every day, of which only 20% is structured data that can be directly used, and the remaining 80% needs to be analyzed, identified, and screened. These data resources, which are growing exponentially, provide an inexhaustible supply of “data ammunition” for constructing data information scenarios and conducting cognitive warfare.

Intelligent push. In the information network era, intelligent push has become a convenient channel for people to absorb external information, gain identification of thinking, emotional resonance, and influence the thinking and cognition of others. Using advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence to collect, organize, and analyze people’s thinking habits and behavioral preference data to form personalized and customized perception push can produce an “echo wall” of social cognitive trends and an information cocoon that shackles people. At the same time, it is also conducive to empathizing with others, understanding the thinking trends and possible actions of opponents, and taking targeted countermeasures. In our daily lives, we all have the experience of receiving a large amount of similar information after shopping online or searching for certain types of information. This intelligent push method is applied to cognitive operations, which can easily enable the information leader to use information network data to conduct forward-looking analysis and judgment on the decisions and actions that may be made by the command and decision-making level of the combat target, and induce them to make the decision-making actions they hope to see or make corresponding response measures in advance.

Emotional infiltration. Freud said that we are not pure wisdom or pure souls, but a collection of impulses. In the information network space, the concepts that can be widely and quickly disseminated are often not calm, rational, and objective thinking and analysis, but mostly impulsive and irrational emotional mobilization. This is determined by the fast pace of information dissemination and news release. The cognitive need to respond quickly to this information, in turn, leads to the reflexive, impulsive, and emotional response of “fast thinking”, which transforms seemingly isolated social cases into highly coercive and inflammatory psychological hints and behavioral drives, and explosively promotes irrational decision-making and actions. In June 2009, a diplomatic cable disclosed by WikiLeaks described the lavish banquets held by the family of Tunisia’s Ben Ali regime and described the regime as a corrupt and tyrannical “mafia”. This deepened the resentment of the country’s citizens and became an important driving force behind the “Jasmine Revolution” that overthrew the Ben Ali regime.

現代國語：

來源：解放軍報 作者：翟嬋 責任編輯：劉上靖 2021-11-18 06:49:14
資訊網絡：認知戰制勝要津

■翟 嬋

引 言

在資訊化智慧化融合發展的當今時代，資訊網絡以其觸角深、受眾廣、互動性強等優勢，在認知戰中將發揮無可取代的重要作用。有了資訊網絡的加持，認知戰將如虎添翼、如魚得水。深刻掌握資訊網絡作用認知戰的機理規律、基本形態、方法手段等，有助於及時掌控認知戰主動權，為贏得勝利奠定基礎。

資訊網絡作用認知戰的機理規律

資訊網絡作用認知戰的本質在於透過核心演算法，提供大量訊息，營造傾向性認知場景，影響人和智慧機器的思維認知。這個過程融合資訊網絡運行規律和思維認知內在機理，具有很強的可預知性，是資訊網絡認知戰必須把握的底層架構和關鍵之點。

基於路徑依賴的黏性影響。當今社會高度發達的資訊網絡，提供了一個人們學習、工作、生活、娛樂，軍隊建設、作戰和軍事鬥爭準備須臾離不開的平台，在彼此之間形成一個互聯互通的路徑依賴。這一平台以資訊為核、網絡為媒，透過無形的黏性把不同人群、社會、國家包括軍隊連接在一起，既將整個世界打通成一個緊密聯繫的地球村，客觀上也為開展認知作戰、影響對手思維認知、制勝認知戰爭提供了橋樑和紐帶。 2009年美國國務卿希拉裡曾發表「互聯網自由」演說，鼓吹「互聯網自由」戰略，企圖利用人們對互聯網的高度依賴形成的作用通道，影響對手國民眾特別是青年一代的思維認知，傳播美式價值觀。

基於資訊交換的互動影響。教育學認為，互動交流能有效克服訊息單向傳遞所形成的認知屏障，在彼此訊息交換、情感融通、需求相促中達成共識、形成同理心、強化同理。資訊網絡與傳統交流溝通媒介的一個很大不同，在於提供了一個能大範圍、快節奏、高效率互動交流的載體。在這一載體中，資訊強勢一方能透過載體提供的互動機制，依據另一方的思想波動、情緒變化、態度回饋等，反復確認影響，調整方法策略，幹預另一方的思維認知。長期以來，美國對華保持「接觸+遏制」戰略，一個很重要的考慮就在於這種接觸能有效克服單純封鎖對抗形成的溝通壁壘和信息鴻溝，增強兩國政府和民眾之間的互動，從而尋找機會打開缺口，影響我們的思想觀念和意識形態。這項戰略雖然發生在傳統領域，但與資訊網絡基於資訊交換的互動影響機理內在一致。

基於預設場景的誘導影響。資訊網絡的隱蔽性、虛擬性、滲透性，使其掌控者能通過水軍灌水、資訊過濾、「渾水摸魚」等技術和謀略手段，營造極具欺騙性、誘惑性、煽動性的信息場景，使對手深陷其中而不自知，反而朝著預設的過程和結果發展。這種對資訊網絡的指向性操控，能潛移默化地高效影響、感染和塑造對手的思維認知，使之不知不覺被帶節奏，收到遠比對抗硬槓好得多的作戰效果。伊拉克戰爭前夕，美國媒體透過網路等平台大肆散佈伊拉克存在大規模殺傷性武器等虛假訊息，指責薩達姆政權與基地組織相互勾連、腐敗成風，還無端殘害伊拉克人民，同時又想方設法掩蓋事實真相，過濾本國人民的反戰聲音，極力營造薩達姆政權邪惡可恨、全美上下同仇敵愾的氛圍。

資訊網絡作用認知戰的基本形態

戰爭規律和製勝機理決定戰爭的基本形態。資訊網絡作用認知戰的規律機理內在規定著這種戰爭的外在呈現形態。其中最基本、最具代表性的包括資訊迷茫戰、思維誤導戰和意志毀傷戰。

資訊迷茫戰。就是用海量虛實結合、亦真亦幻的復雜信息灌注網絡，使敵對方信息網絡容量過載、功能失常、運轉失序，或導致特定受眾對象“失聰失明失感”、認知能力擁堵、思維認知和決策判斷受阻。這一戰爭形態常用於作戰初期和不透明戰場，擁有資訊優勢的一方能使敵對方陷入茫然不知所措的恐慌狀態，從而感知失靈、思維失據、自亂陣腳。彭博社稱，美國成立不久的第六大軍種——太空軍，計劃2027年前採購48套幹擾系統，旨在“與大國發生沖突情況下”，幹擾迷茫其衛星信號。不少國家軍隊普遍感到，現在獲取的資訊不是太少了而是太多了，來自四面八方的巨量資訊大量聚集，給態勢感知和分析判斷造成巨大壓力。

思維誤導戰。就是透過灌輸包含資訊網絡掌控方意圖指向的特定訊息，形成傾向性訊息場景，誤導欺騙和影響特定國家、軍隊和人群思維理念，使之偏離正確發展軌道，朝著於己有利、於敵有損的方向偏移，是認知攻擊的最高境界和慣常做法。這種誤導以強大的外部壓力為前提，以似是而非的策略為基礎，以摻雜水分的信息為武器，針對對手思維特點和薄弱環節，實施導向鮮明的誘騙，使對手在緊張慌亂中迷失方向，不知不覺落入「圈套」。這些年來，一些國家在實施大國競爭戰略的同時，通過網絡水軍虛構假情況、製造假信息、散佈真謠言，在我國週邊煽風點火，鼓動一些在歷史上與我國有積怨、現實中有摩擦的國家尋尋覓滋事，目的就是要誘導我們轉移注意力，削弱在主要戰略方向上的資源力量投入，偏離強國復興的軌道，謀取漁翁之利。

意志毀傷戰。未來學家托夫勒說，誰控制了人的心理，誰就控制了整個世界。戰爭說到底是人與人的對抗，人的心理活動很大程度影響人的精神狀態，進而影響作戰意志。意志毀傷戰與傳統作戰透過物質摧毀間接影響人的意志不同，它透過直接影響關鍵人物的心理活動、精神狀態和思維決策，影響軍心士氣、戰鬥意志和作戰行動。隨著科技發展和社會進步，對人的意志的干預，已經由傳統以謀略為主演進到“技術+謀略”階段。早在十多年前就有科學家研製出“聲波集束”武器，通過電磁網絡從數百米外發射極為狹窄的聲波“音柱”，幹擾敵人判斷甚至使意志堅強的軍人精神錯亂。近年來有研究表明，基於腦電波信號的人工語音合成技術可提取大腦中的信號，合成人類能夠直接理解的語音。

資訊網絡作用認知戰的主要手段

「技術+謀略」構成現代認知戰的基本手段。資訊網絡作為現代科技發展的產物，其對認知戰的作用手段也主要體現在「技術+謀略」上。這為我們認識並掌握資訊網絡作用認知戰的方式、科學路徑，從而製勝戰爭提供了基本切入點。

大數據構塑。數據作為資訊網絡的核心構件，不僅是資訊的載體，而且是資訊網絡價值驅動的“新石油”，更是作用認知戰的基本彈藥。透過大量資料構塑為我所用的複雜資訊場景，或對對手進行思維認知迷茫，或給予思維誤導欺騙，或進行信念意志摧毀，構成資訊網絡作用認知戰的基本邏輯。在這個邏輯架構中，數據無疑是最基礎的資源、最核心的元素。遠在幾年前，權威部門就統計，全球每天生產約2.5艾字節（EB）的數據，其中僅20%是可以直接利用的結構化數據，其餘80%則需要進行分析、甄別、篩選。這些幾何級數成長湧現的數據資源，為構塑數據資訊場景、實施認知戰提供了取之不盡用之不竭的「數據彈藥」。

智能化推送。資訊網絡時代，智慧化推播成為人們攝取外在訊息，獲得思考認同、情感共鳴、影響他人思考認知的便利管道。運用人工智慧等先進技術收集、整理、分析人的思維慣性、行為偏好數據，形成擬人化客製化感知推送，能夠產生社會認知趨同的「回音壁」和桎梏人的信息繭房，同時也有利於推己及人、了解對手的思維趨向和可能行動，有針對性地採取應對措施。生活中，我們都有一次或幾次網上購物、搜索某類信息後，大量類同信息推送進來的經歷，這種智能化推送手段應用到認知作戰中，很容易使信息主導方通過信息網絡數據，對作戰對象指揮決策層可能做出的決策、採取的行動等予以前瞻分析研判，誘導其作出希望看到的決策行動或預先作出相應的應對措施。

情緒化浸染。佛洛伊德說，我們不是純粹的智慧、純粹的靈魂，而是一個沖動的集合。在資訊網絡空間，能夠得到廣泛且快速傳播的觀念認知，往往不是冷靜理性客觀的思維分析，多是沖動非理性的情緒情緒動員。這是由資訊傳播、新聞發布「先發製人」的快節奏決定的。對這些資訊作出快速反應的認知需求，反過來又導致「快思維」條件反射性、沖動性、情緒化反應，將看似孤立的社會個案轉化為具有強烈壓迫性、煽動性的心理暗示和行為驅動，暴發性催生非理性決策行動。 2009年6月維基解密披露的一份外交電文中，描繪了突尼斯本·阿里政權家族宴會的奢靡場景，並煞有介事地將該政權形容為腐敗暴政的“黑手黨”，這加深了該國國民怨恨情緒，從而成為引燃推翻本·阿里政權的「茉莉花革命」重要推手。

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/4899062.html?big=fan

#Information Support Force, #intelligent warfare, #intellligentization, #中國太空軍, #中國的耗散戰, #中國軍事人工智慧武器化, #新興戰爭技術, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Future Wars, Information Support Force, Intelligent Warfare, 中华人民共和国网络安全法, 中國太空軍, 中國支持認知對抗的軍事決策與觀點, 中國的情報戰, 中國的耗散戰, 中國認知戰和領域作戰, 中國軍事分析:認知域作戰的特徵與發展趨勢, 中國軍事應用與比特幣在未來戰爭中的應用, 中國軍事未來戰爭, 中國軍事特徵及認知域作戰與戰爭發展趨勢, 中國軍事認知域作戰的重點是什麼、重點在哪裡？, 中國軍隊, 中國軍隊對耗散戰的戰術運用, 中國軍隊對耗散戰的戰術運用, 中國軍隊瞄準未來戰爭打好五場認知戰, 中國軍隊聚焦認知域戰是主攻戰場對抗的新著力點, 以認知為中心的戰爭：應對複雜戰爭的作戰概念, 元宇宙, 國家網絡空間安全戰略, 美國軍事網絡戰：黑客入侵防禦成為無菸的戰爭, 解放軍展望未來戰爭發展, 認知域戰, 認知域戰, 認知域操作, 認知對抗, 認知戰, 認知領域操作, 資料來源：中國外交部

Comprehensive Review of Chinese Military Intelligent Warfare: Intelligent Combat Command

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中國軍事智慧戰爭全面回顧：智慧作戰指揮

現代英語：

Liu Kui, Qin Fangfei

Tips

● Modern artificial intelligence is essentially like a “brain in a vat”. If it is allowed to carry out combat command, it will always face the problem of subjectivity loss, that is, “self” loss. This makes artificial intelligence have natural and fundamental defects. It must be based on human subjectivity and improve the effectiveness and level of combat command through human-machine hybrid.

● In intelligent combat command, the commander is mainly responsible for planning what to do and how to do it, while the intelligent model is responsible for planning how to do it specifically.

“Brain in a vat” is a famous scientific hypothesis. It means that if a person’s brain is taken out and placed in a nutrient solution, the nerve endings are connected to a computer, and the computer simulates various sensory signals. At this time, can the “brain in a vat” realize that “I am a brain in a vat”? The answer is no, because as a closed system, when a person lacks real interactive experience with the outside world, he cannot jump out of himself, observe himself from outside himself, and form self-awareness. Modern artificial intelligence is essentially like a “brain in a vat”. If it is allowed to implement combat command, it will always face the problem of subject loss, that is, “self” loss. This makes artificial intelligence have natural and fundamental defects, and it must be based on human subjectivity and improve the effectiveness and level of combat command through human-machine hybrid.

Based on “free choice”, build a “man-planned” command model

On the battlefield, the commander can choose which target to attack, and can choose to attack from the front, from the flank, from the back, or from the air; he can isolate but not attack, surround but not attack, talk but not attack… This is human autonomy, and he can freely choose what to do and how to do it. But machines can’t do that. The combat plans they give can only be the plans implied in the intelligent model. As far as the specific plan given each time is concerned, it is also the most likely plan in the sense of probability statistics. This makes the plans generated by artificial intelligence tend to be “templated”, which is equivalent to a “replica machine”. It gives similar answers to the same questions and similar combat plans for the same combat scenarios.

Compared with artificial intelligence, different commanders design completely different combat plans for the same combat scenario; the same commander designs different combat plans when facing similar combat scenarios at different times. “Attack when the enemy is unprepared and take them by surprise”, the most effective plan may seem to be the most dangerous and impossible plan. For commanders, facing combat scenarios, there are infinite possibilities in an instant, while for artificial intelligence, there is only the best-looking certainty in an instant, lacking creativity and strategy, and it is easy for the opponent to predict it. Therefore, in intelligent combat command, based on human autonomy, the commander is responsible for planning and calculation, innovating tactics and tactics, and designing basic strategies, and the machine is responsible for converting basic strategies into executable and operational combat plans, forming a “man-planned” command mode. More importantly, autonomy is the unique mark of human existence as human being. This power of free decision-making cannot and is not allowed to be transferred to machines, making people become vassals of machines.

Based on “self-criticism”, build a command model of “people against machine”

Human growth and progress are usually based on the real self, focus on the ideal self, and criticize the historical self in a negation-negation style. Artificial intelligence has no “self” and has lost its self-critical ability. This makes it only able to solve problems within the original cognitive framework. The combat ideas, combat principles, and tactics of the model are given when the training is completed. If you want to update and improve your knowledge and ideas, you must continuously train the model from the outside. Mapped to a specific combat scenario, the intelligent model can only provide the commander with a pre-given problem solution. It is impossible to dynamically adjust and update it continuously during a battle.

People with a self-critical spirit can jump out of the command decision-making thinking process and review, evaluate, and criticize the command decision. In the continuous self-criticism, the combat plan is constantly adjusted, and even the original plan is overturned to form a new plan. In the command organization group, other commanders may also express different opinions on the combat plan. The commander adjusts and improves the original plan on the basis of fully absorbing these opinions, and realizes the dynamic evolution of the combat plan. Therefore, combat command is essentially a dynamic process of continuous forward exploration, not a static process given in advance by the combat plan. When the machine generates a combat plan, the commander cannot accept it blindly without thinking, but should act as an “opponent” or “fault finder”, reflect on and criticize the combat plan, and raise objections. Based on the human’s objections, the machine assists the commander to continuously adjust and optimize the combat plan, forming a command mode of “human opposing and machine correcting”.

Based on “self-awareness and initiative”, we build a command model of “people lead and machines follow”

Comrade Mao Zedong once said that what we call “conscious initiative” is the characteristic that distinguishes humans from objects. Any complex practical activity to transform the world starts with a rough and abstract idea. To transform abstract concepts into concrete actions, it is necessary to overcome various risks and challenges, give full play to conscious initiative, and take the initiative to set goals, make suggestions, and think of ways. Artificial intelligence without conscious initiative, when people ask it questions, it only gives the answers implied in the model, without caring whether the answer can be used, targeted, or practical. In other words, when an abstract and empty question is raised, it gives an abstract and empty answer. This is also why the current popular large model unified operation mode is “people ask questions and machines answer”, rather than “machines ask questions”.

Relying on conscious initiative, even the most abstract and empty problems can be transformed step by step into specific action plans and specific action practices. Therefore, in intelligent combat command, the commander is mainly responsible for planning what to do and what ideas to follow, while the intelligent model is responsible for planning how to do it specifically. If the combat mission is too abstract and general, the commander should first break down the problem into details, and then the intelligent model should solve the detailed problem. Under the guidance of the commander, the problem is gradually solved in stages and fields, and the combat goal is finally achieved, forming a command mode of “people lead and machines follow”. It’s like writing a paper. First you make an outline and then you start writing. People are responsible for making the outline, and the specific writing is done by the machine. If the first-level outline is not specific enough, people can break it down into a second-level or even a third-level outline.

Based on “self-responsibility”, build a command model of “human decision-making and machine calculation”

Modern advanced ship-borne air defense and anti-missile systems usually have four operational modes: manual, semi-automatic, standard automatic, and special automatic. Once the special automatic mode is activated, the system will no longer require human authorization to launch missiles. However, this mode is rarely activated in actual combat or training. The reason is that humans, as the responsible subject, must be responsible for all their actions, while the behavior of machines is the absence of the responsible subject. When it comes to holding people accountable for major mistakes, machines cannot be held accountable. Therefore, life-and-death matters must not be decided by a machine without autonomous responsibility. Moreover, modern artificial intelligence is a “black box”. The intelligent behavior it exhibits is inexplicable, and the reasons for right and wrong are unknown, making it impossible for people to easily hand over important decision-making power to machines.

Because AI lacks “autonomous responsibility”, all problems in its eyes are “domesticated problems”, that is, the consequences of such problems have nothing to do with the respondent, and the success or failure of the problem solving is irrelevant to the respondent. Corresponding to this are “wild problems”, that is, the consequences of such problems are closely related to the respondent, and the respondent must be involved. Therefore, in the eyes of AI without self, there are no “wild problems”, all are “domesticated problems”, and it stays out of any problem. Therefore, in intelligent combat command, machines cannot replace commanders in making judgments and decisions. It can provide commanders with key knowledge, identify battlefield targets, organize battlefield intelligence, analyze battlefield conditions, predict battlefield situations, and even form combat plans, formulate combat plans, and draft combat orders. However, the plans, plans, and orders it gives can only be used as drafts and references. As for whether to adopt them and to what extent, it is up to the commander to decide. In short, both parties make decisions together, with artificial intelligence responsible for prediction and humans responsible for judgment, forming a command mode of “human decision-making and machine calculation”.

現代國語：

從「缸中之腦」看智慧化作戰指揮

■劉 奎 秦芳菲

要點提示

●現代人工智慧，本質上就如同“缸中之腦”，如果讓它實施作戰指揮，始終會面臨主體缺失即“自我”缺失的問題。這使得人工智慧存在天然的、根本的缺陷，必須基於人的主體性，透過人機混合來提升作戰指揮效能和水平

●智能化作戰指揮中，指揮員主要負責規劃做什麼、依什麼思路做，智能模型則負責規劃具體怎麼做

「缸中之腦」是一項著名科學假設。意思是，假如人的大腦被取出放在營養液中，神經末梢接上計算機，由計算機模擬出各種感知信號。這時候，「缸中之腦」能不能意識到「我是缸中之腦」？答案是不能，因為人作為一個封閉的系統，當與外界缺乏真實的互動體驗時，人是無法跳出自身、從自身之外觀察自身並形成自我意識的。而現代人工智慧，本質上就如同“缸中之腦”，如果讓它實施作戰指揮，始終會面臨主體缺失即“自我”缺失的問題。這使得人工智慧存在天然的、根本的缺陷，必須基於人的主體性，透過人機混合來提升作戰指揮效能和水準。

基於“自由選擇”，建構“人謀機劃”的指揮模式

戰場上，指揮員可以選擇打哪一個目標，可以選擇從正面打、從翼側打、從背後打、從空中打；可以隔而不打、圍而不打、談而不打……這就是人的自主性，可以自由選擇做什麼、怎麼做。但機器不行，它給出的作戰方案，只能是智慧模型中蘊含的方案。就每次給出的特定方案而言，也是機率統計意義上可能性最大的方案。這使得人工智慧生成的方案呈現“模板化”傾向，相當於一個“復刻機”，同樣的問題，它給出的是相似的回答，同樣的作戰場景，它給出的就是相似的作戰方案。

與人工智慧相比，同樣的作戰場景，不同的指揮員設計的作戰方案完全不同；同一指揮員在不同的時間面對相似的作戰場景，設計的作戰方案也不相同。 “攻其無備，出其不意”，最有效的方案很可能看上去是最危險、最不可能的方案。對於指揮員，面對作戰場景，一瞬間有無限可能，而對於人工智慧，一瞬間卻只有看上去最好的確定，缺乏創意、缺少謀略，很容易為對方所預料。所以，在智慧化作戰指揮中，要基於人的自主性，由指揮員負責籌謀算計、創新戰法打法、設計基本策略，由機器負責將基本策略轉化為可執行可操作的作戰方案，形成「人謀機劃」的指揮模式。更重要的是，自主性是人作為人而存在的獨特標志，這種自由作決定的權力不可能也不允許讓渡給機器，使人淪為機器的附庸。

基於“自我批判”，建構“人反機正”的指揮模式

人類的成長進步，通常是立足現實自我，著眼理想自我，對歷史自我進行否定之否定式的批判。人工智慧沒有“自我”，同時也喪失了自我批判能力。這使得它只能停留在原有認知框架內解決問題，模型擁有的作戰思想、作戰原則、戰法打法，是在訓練完成時所給予的。如果想獲得知識和想法的更新提升，就必須從外部對模型進行持續訓練。映射到特定作戰場景，智慧模型給指揮員提供的只能是事先給定的問題解決方案，要想在一次作戰中不斷地動態調整更新是做不到的。

具有自我批判精神的人類，可以跳脫指揮決策思考過程，對指揮決策進行審視、評價、批判。在持續地自我批判中不斷對作戰方案進行調整，甚至推翻原有方案，形成新的方案。在指揮機構群體中，其他指揮人員也可能對作戰方案提出不同意見，指揮員在充分吸納這些意見的基礎上，調整改進原有方案，實現作戰方案的動態進化。所以，作戰指揮本質上是一個不斷向前探索的動態過程，不是作戰方案事先給定的靜態過程。當機器生成作戰方案時，指揮員不能不加思考地盲目接受，而應充當“反對者”“找茬人”，對作戰方案展開反思批判，提出反對意見，機器根據人的反對意見，輔助指揮員不斷調整、優化作戰方案，形成「人反機正」的指揮模式。

基於“自覺能動”，建立“人引機隨”的指揮模式

毛澤東同志說過，我們名之曰“自覺的能動性”，是人之所以區別於物的特點。任何一項改造世界的複雜實踐活動，都是從粗糙的、抽象的想法開始的，要將抽象觀念轉化為具體行動，需要克服各種風險和挑戰，充分發揮自覺能動性，主動定目標、出主意、想辦法。沒有自覺能動性的人工智慧，人們向它提出問題，它給出的只是模型中蘊含的答案，而不會管這個答案能不能用、有沒有針對性、可不可以實際操作，即提出抽象、空洞的問題，它給出的就是抽象、空洞的回答。這也是為什麼時下流行的大模型統一的運行模式是“人問機答”，而不是“機器提出問題”。

依賴自覺能動性，再抽象、空洞的問題都能由人一步一步轉化為具體的行動方案、具體的行動實踐。因此，在智慧化作戰指揮中，指揮員主要負責規劃做什麼、依什麼思路做，智慧模型則負責規劃具體怎麼做。若作戰任務太過抽象籠統，應先由指揮員對問題進行分解細化，再由智慧模型對細化後的問題進行解算。在指揮引導下，分階段、分領域逐步解決問題，最終達成作戰目標，形成「人引機隨」的指揮模式。這就像寫一篇論文，先列出提綱，再進行寫作，列提綱由人負責，具體寫作由機器完成，如果感覺一級綱目不夠具體，可由人細化為二級乃至三級綱目。

基於“自主負責”，建立“人斷機算”的指揮模式

現代先進的艦載防空反導系統，通常有手動、半自動、標準自動、特殊自動四種作戰模式，一旦啟用特殊自動模式，系統發射導彈將不再需要人的授權幹預。但該模式無論在實戰還是在訓練中都很少啟用。究其原因，人作為責任主體要對自己的所有行為負責，而機器行為背後卻是責任主體的缺失，當要為重大失誤追責時，機器是無法負責的。所以，生死攸關的大事決不能讓一個沒有自主責任的機器決定。況且，現代人工智慧是一個“黑箱”，它所展現的智能行為具有不可解釋性，對與錯的原因無從知曉，讓人無法輕易將重大決定權完全交給機器。

由於人工智慧缺乏“自主責任”，會使它眼中的問題全是“馴化問題”，也就是該類問題產生的後果與回答者沒有關系，問題解決的成功也罷、失敗也罷，對回答者來說無所謂。與之相應的是“野生問題”，也就是該類問題產生的後果與回答者息息相關，回答者必須置身其中。所以，在缺失自我的人工智慧眼中沒有“野生問題”，都是“馴化問題”，它對任何問題都置身事外。因此，在智慧化作戰指揮中，機器不能取代指揮員做出判斷和決策。它可以為指揮員提供關鍵知識、識別戰場目標、整編戰場情報、分析戰場情況、預測戰場態勢，甚至可以形成作戰方案、制定作戰計劃、擬製作戰命令，但它給出的方案計劃命令，只能作為草稿和參考，至於採不採用、在多大程度上採用，還得指揮員說了算。簡單來說，就是雙方共同做出決策，人工智慧負責預測，人負責判斷，形成「人斷機算」的指揮模式。

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16361814.html

#Information Support Force, #Russia #Ukraine, Asymmetric Warfare, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare, Combat Planning, Intelligent Warfare, Mosaic Warfare, National Defense and Military Modernization, Russia Network Forces, Russian Cyber Warfare

Chinese Military in-depth Analysis of the Latest “Cognitive Warfare” Case in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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中國軍方深入解析俄烏衝突最新「認知戰」案例

2023-10-07 09:00　來源: 述策

現代英語：

It is said that on September 22, the Ukrainian Air Force used the “Storm Shadow” cruise missile to attack the Black Sea Fleet Command in Sevastopol. Since then, the life and death of Admiral Victor Sokolov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, has been a topic of concern to the outside world. After a few days of undercurrents, on September 25, the Ukrainian Special Operations Command (SOF) announced that they had successfully “killed” Admiral Sokolov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and dozens of officers below him. Even Admiral Romanchuk, commander of the Russian Zaporizhia Cluster, was injured by the Ukrainian army.

Unexpectedly, Ukraine’s news was “slapped in the face” less than a day after it was released-on September 26, the Russian Ministry of Defense held a meeting of the National Defense Committee. Senior leaders of the Ministry of Defense, commanders of various military regions, and commanders of various military services attended the meeting in person or via video. At the meeting, Admiral Sokolov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, who was declared “killed” by Ukrainian officers, appeared. After the news was released, the Ukrainian side was extremely embarrassed and had to announce that they wanted to collect more information. But then someone claimed that Admiral Sokolov, who attended the meeting, was “just a photo” and not a real person.

Nevertheless, the battle between the Russian and Ukrainian armies over the life and death of General Sokolov can be seen as a classic case of cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict. It is worthwhile for us to analyze this case specifically, and it is even more worthwhile for us to “talk about” this case and talk about the battle between the Russian and Ukrainian armies in the field of cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict.

  1. Is the “beheading” of General Sokolov not an isolated case?

It is not the first time that the Ukrainian propaganda department has fallen into the trap of “beheading” Russian generals. For example, in mid-June this year, the Ukrainian army spread rumors that the Vice President of Chechnya, Lieutenant General of the Chechen National Guard, and Kadyrov Jr.’s right-hand man, Drimkhanov, was “killed” by the Ukrainian army’s HIMARS rocket launcher.

From the perspective of the implementation process of the entire cognitive warfare, whether it was the “beheading” of Drimkhanov in June or the “beheading” of General Sokolov this time, the whole process was similar:

The first step: The Ukrainian propaganda department deliberately “created topics”. The so-called “creating topics” can be regarded as a “primer” in cognitive warfare, which serves to trigger heated public discussion. This kind of “primer” is often not necessarily released by the official, but may be released by some semi-official channels or channels with close ties to the official. For example, the fact that Lieutenant General Drimkhanov was “killed” by the Ukrainian army’s “HIMARS” rocket launcher was first said to have been released from a telegram group of the Ukrainian armed forces, and the statement was ambiguous. The earliest source of the news that Admiral Sokolov was “beheaded” this time was traced back to a telegram group in Russia. The news in this telegram group is mixed, some of which are of low credibility, but some are surprisingly accurate. In a sense, releasing the “primer” of cognitive warfare through these groups is even more likely to arouse public attention and discussion than official news.

The second step can be regarded as “reinforcement” of public opinion. The first step of cognitive warfare, namely “primer information”, often lacks details for a complete news, but it doesn’t matter. Judging from the efficiency and characteristics of information dissemination in the current society, a “lead information” that lacks details but is easy to arouse everyone’s interest, but has information barriers due to some factors, will naturally be “supplemented with details” during the dissemination process. This is true whether Admiral Sokolov was “shot dead” or Drimkhanov was “beheaded”. Information lacks details, but it is very important “Breaking News” for the media. At the same time, due to military secrets, it is impossible to cross the information barrier to obtain more information in time. Therefore, this will inevitably lead the media to a result – public opinion “reinforcement”, and everyone will do it together, and in the process of word of mouth, a lead information will be constantly detailed and “real”. For example, in the process of dissemination, Drimkhanov was “beheaded”, and the “time” and “place” of his beheading were supplemented one after another (even due to different dissemination channels, these time and place elements are also different), sometimes appearing in Kremenaya and sometimes in Gorlovka. The same is true for Admiral Sokolov’s “killing”. During the process of information dissemination, people have come up with a whole set of details such as “The Black Sea Fleet held a regular meeting on Friday, and the Ukrainian army seized the opportunity to launch a strike”, “Two missiles hit the headquarters office, and the other missile launched a supplementary strike when the rescuers went in to rescue people”. It is precisely in this “decentralized” word of mouth that the “fact” that these two senior generals were “beheaded” has been continuously strengthened, and the lack of information sources is even more conducive to the cognitive shaping of ordinary information recipients.

After several days of fermentation, the cognitive war has come to the third step – “the final word”. The Ukrainian official did not “finally decide” the “beheading” of Drimkhanov. Kadyrov Jr. couldn’t sit still first, and soon released a video of himself and Drimkhanov sitting together for a meal and picnic, and even took out his mobile phone on the spot to show the shooting time, “slapping his face”. Admiral Sokolov was “finally decided” by large departments such as the Ukrainian Special Operations Command and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. According to the process of cognitive warfare, this kind of official media “final word” should play the role of completing the cognitive shaping process in the field of cognitive warfare, that is, completing a complete logical closed loop from releasing “primers” to “speculation reinforcement” by the outside world, and finally “stamping and confirming” by the official. However, the Russian army took the initiative and performed a “slap in the face on the spot”, which not only made all the information dissemination of the Ukrainian army in front of it useless, but also made Ukraine’s two key units, the Special Operations Command and even the Ministry of Defense, become clowns.

  1. Cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, is the Ukrainian army coming in full force?

Many people may be puzzled by the Ukrainian army’s cognitive warfare propaganda department’s personal participation in the rumor that Chechen Vice President Delimkhanov or General Sokolov was “killed” by the Ukrainian army: If the Russian side responds quickly, pulls these senior generals out to show their faces, and self-confirms that “I am still alive”, then won’t the rumors of the Ukrainian cognitive warfare be self-defeating?

It seems reasonable, but the Russian army did not clarify it once it was rumored. Why? Because things are not that simple.

First, from a tactical perspective, if the Russian army arranges for generals to come out and refute rumors every time the Ukrainian army creates a rumor about a senior general, the most direct consequence is that it will cause unnecessary interference and trouble to the daily combat command of senior generals. In combat operations, the time of senior officers above the rank of general is very precious, the daily workload is extremely high, and the brainpower is extremely consumed. It is impossible for them to have so much time to appear and refute rumors endlessly. If the Russian army refutes a rumor every time the Ukrainian army creates a rumor, then these senior generals will have nothing to do in their daily lives and just shoot videos to refute rumors every day.

Second, for information that enters the cognitive shaping cycle, in some cases, “refutation” is not only useless, but will further create more rumors. For example, regarding the “beheading” of General Sokolov, although the Russian army has arranged to refute the rumor, some Ukrainian groups are still “picking on it”, believing that General Sokolov did not move in front of the camera and that the time and place of General Sokolov’s interview could not be seen, so it was just “information countermeasures” arranged by the Russian side. Even for some Russian generals who were “officially announced” and “beheaded” by Ukraine last year but then appeared on certain occasions, such as Major General Gerasimov, Chief of Staff of the 41st Army, there are still Ukrainian supporters who claim that “this person is dead”. The only reason is that this person did not show up again after showing up!

Therefore, in the field of cognitive warfare, many things are not as simple as we think.

Having said that, at the strategic level, there is indeed a big gap between the Russian army and the Ukrainian army in the field of cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict. The Ukrainian army is very good at creating topics, and it is flexible and mobile and pays attention to participation.

In terms of creating topics, Ukraine takes the initiative to create topics almost every time in cognitive warfare, from the Mariupol Theater incident at the beginning, to the Bucha incident later, to the chemical explosion in Rubezhnoy, and the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant incident and the explosion of the New Kakhovka Hydropower Station Dam. Almost every time, Ukraine “takes the lead”. Russia is in a state of passive response, and as a result, Ukraine continues to create topics and continuously attacks, which puts it in a disadvantageous position.

In terms of mobility and flexibility, the Ukrainian army is very familiar with the characteristics of modern media communication. For example, in the cognitive warfare against the “beheading” of Admiral Sokolov, the Ukrainian army took advantage of the characteristics of modern media’s fast communication speed and decentralized communication mode, released the “primer” in a semi-official form, and let netizens “reinforce” it (in fact, it is the self-growth of information), and finally the more authoritative official media came out to “finalize the final word”.

In terms of “focusing on participation”, the Ukrainian army is better at creating a sense of participation of ordinary netizens in specific topics. For example, after the Bucha incident and the Battle of Mariupol, Ukraine immediately launched a set of websites called “The Executioner’s Book”. Anyone can log in to these websites or network plug-ins at will and register the so-called “Russian army’s atrocities” or Russian army movements. The United States immediately responded and opened the “Observation Post” project belonging to the US State Department in response to the “Executioner’s Book” project, which is used to record the “atrocities” of the Russian army in the conflict. These public topics are set up quite cleverly, making the outside world feel that they are highly involved, while the specific content is true and false, which is different from the false information indoctrination of traditional information warfare. In the cognitive warfare of the Ukrainian army, these highly involved projects once made the entire network trend one-sided.

Compared with the propaganda and operation of the Ukrainian army in the field of cognitive warfare, the Russian army is far behind in the field of cognitive warfare. For example, in response to Ukraine’s formation of a combat mode that emphasizes mass participation and mass experience in the cognitive field, Russia is still using the old method – announcing ambiguous combat conditions in the form of daily combat reports, with only Major General Konashenko “acting as an emotionless reading machine” in front of the camera. As a result, most combat observers do not take his combat reports seriously. Another example is the tactics of Ukraine frequently setting topics and carrying out cognitive shaping in steps, and Russia can only defend itself. Every time Ukraine creates topics, Russia responds passively, and then Ukraine continues to create new topics based on Russia’s response, leaving Russia in a state of exhaustion. From this perspective, the Russian army’s cognitive warfare against the Ukrainian side’s “beheading” of Admiral Sokolov, and the sudden arrangement of the rumor-busting “face-slapping”, is just a tactical “flash of inspiration”, and the effect does not seem to be very good. It has not completely changed the basic power comparison between the Russian and Ukrainian armies in the field of cognitive warfare. Ukraine’s “cognitive warfare advantage” over Russia will continue.

  1. How do we deal with cognitive warfare in the new combat form?

In terms of definition, “cognitive warfare” can be traced back to the concept of “network-centric warfare” proposed by the US military in military reform at the beginning of this century. After years of development, by 2017, related discussions began to frequently appear in the speeches of senior NATO generals. For example, on August 14, 2017, Stewart, director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, clearly put forward the assertion that “the fifth-generation war is cognitive warfare” at the 2017 Defense Intelligence Information System Annual Conference. On September 17, 2017, Goldfein, then Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, also clearly put forward the concept of “cognitive warfare” at the annual meeting of the US Air Force Association. Soon, NATO comprehensively developed this novel operational concept. In March 2020, NATO released the concept book “Operation 2040”, which clearly stated that “information and cognitive warfare” will play an important role in future operations. In June, NATO appointed François du Creuse, former French colonel and head of the NATO Innovation Center, to study cognitive warfare, and produced a detailed report on “Cognitive Warfare” in January 2021. In June 2021, NATO held a scientific conference on cognitive warfare and released a special report on “Cognitive Warfare: Cognition Dominates the Future”, thus forming a more systematic and complete cognitive warfare theory.

Compared with traditional information warfare and propaganda warfare, the biggest feature of cognitive warfare is that it is based on the working principle of the human brain, that is, the process of acquiring, perceiving, understanding, processing, inferring, evaluating, judging, calculating, and making decisions on external information. In short, cognitive warfare is superior in terms of operational characteristics. It is not a unilateral indoctrination, but a good use of people’s cognitive process to “reshape” everyone’s worldview, values, ideology, and even cognitive and understanding processes in an all-round way, so as to fully rebuild the individual’s interpretation and response to information and interfere with the individual’s ideology and value orientation. The final result is not only to use various false information to disrupt the opponent, but more importantly to reshape the opponent’s social psychology, thereby affecting the opponent’s strategic decision-making, “defeating the enemy without fighting.” This determines that cognitive warfare is a new generation of propaganda warfare and information warfare. Compared with the traditional information warfare that focuses on the tactical level, the role of cognitive warfare can be further improved to the strategic level, which may affect the direction or outcome of the war.

So, facing a new type of combat form such as cognitive warfare, referring to the current situation in which Russia has been at a disadvantage in the field of cognitive warfare with Ukraine in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict, how should we respond to future cognitive warfare?

From a strategic perspective, we should realize that in the field of cognitive warfare, pure passive response is the most unreliable and inefficient form of combat. For example, Russia’s passive response to Ukraine’s agenda setting is equivalent to passively being beaten. Of course, compared with firepower warfare or mobile warfare, cognitive warfare is a thorough “open conspiracy” without too much feint and deception. It mainly relies on the ideological superiority and media skills of the West, and relies on the legal rights of the Western media in the field of the “fourth power”. Since we are temporarily at a disadvantage in the field of media compared with Western countries, it is actually a relatively difficult thing to implement cognitive confrontation with them in the whole system and at all levels. Therefore, even if we also adopt the strategy of strategic offensive in cognitive warfare, its implementation effect may not be as good as that of the other party. One way may be to firmly grasp our basic plate strategically and form a “you fight yours, I fight mine” pattern.

In the field of tactics, we should fully learn from the experience and lessons of both sides in cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Judging from the cognitive warfare strategy implemented by the Ukrainian army, in areas such as topic shaping, it mainly exploits the loopholes of information asymmetry. Then, our possible response strategy is to disclose some information in a timely manner and change the original concept that “military operations must be kept confidential and not disclosed to the outside world.” In fact, public information itself is a process of cognitive shaping. Both sides can carry out a lot of cognitive warfare confrontation around the timing, content, and timing of information disclosure. For example, in the field of setting topics, we can “take the initiative” and first seek the ability to set topics and carry out cognitive shaping in countries such as the Belt and Road, BRICS or Shanghai Cooperation Organization countries, at least to ensure that the people of our country and some friendly countries can offset the influence of the Western cognitive warfare. For another example, in response to the “cognitive warfare” implemented by the other party against different groups in multiple dimensions and levels, or the rumors created step by step, we can make extensive use of the influence of KOL (Key Opinion Leader) and the platform to form a “cognition against cognition” combat pattern.

In short, cognitive warfare, as a new combat style that has been studied by NATO for many years, appeared in large numbers in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict and played a certain role, deserves further research to ensure that it is invincible in future military operations.

This articleThe article on cognitive warfare is just an appetizer, and there will be a main course later. This studio took about a year to complete the “Research on Cognitive Warfare in the United States and Other Western Countries”, which has a text of more than 40,000 words (excluding more than 7,000 words of notes), which is much richer and more in-depth. The report will be officially launched and introduced the day after tomorrow, so stay tuned.

現代國語：

據稱，9月22日烏克蘭空軍使用「風暴陰影」巡航飛彈襲擊塞瓦斯托波爾黑海艦隊司令部。此後，關於黑海艦隊司令維克托.索科洛夫上將的生死一直是外界關注的議題。經過幾天暗流湧動後，9月25日，烏克蘭特戰司令部（SOF）對外宣布，他們成功「擊斃」黑海艦隊司令索科洛夫上將及以下數十名軍官，甚至俄軍札波羅熱集群司令羅曼丘克上將也被烏軍擊傷。

沒想到，烏克蘭的消息剛放出來不到一天就慘遭「打臉」——9月26日，俄羅斯國防部召開國防委員會會議，國防部高級領導人、各軍區司令、各軍兵種司令等以現場出席或視訊連線的方式參會，會上赫然出現了被烏軍官宣「擊斃」的黑海艦隊司令索科洛夫上將。消息放出後，烏方極為尷尬，只好宣布他們要收集更多資訊。但隨後又有人宣稱說參會的索科洛夫上將“只是照片”，不是真人。

儘管如此，從這次俄烏兩軍圍繞索科洛夫上將的生死問題展開的鬥法，可以被看做是俄烏軍事衝突中關於認知戰的一個經典案例，既值得我們就這一案例進行專門剖析，更值得我們從這個案例中“說開去”，談一談俄烏軍事衝突中俄烏兩軍在認知戰領域展開的較量。

一、索科洛夫上將“被斬首”，並非孤例？

關於「斬首」俄軍將領，烏克蘭宣傳部門栽進坑裡已經不是第一次了。例如今年6月中，烏克蘭軍隊造謠稱車臣副總統、車臣國民近衛軍中將、小卡德羅夫左膀右臂德里姆哈諾夫被烏軍海馬火箭砲「擊斃」。

從整個認知戰的實施過程看，無論是6月那次德里姆哈諾夫被“斬首”，還是這次索科洛夫上將被“斬首”，整個過程大同小異：

第一步：烏克蘭宣傳部門有意「製造議題」。所謂“製造議題”，在認知戰中可以被視為一個“引子”，作用是引發輿論熱議。這種「引子」往往不一定由官方放出，可能是由一些半官方的管道或與官方關係比較緊密的管道放出。例如德里姆哈諾夫中將被烏軍的「海馬」火箭炮「打死」一事，最早據說是從烏克蘭武裝部隊的一個電報群組裡放出來的，而且說法模稜兩可。這次索科洛夫上將被“斬首”，最早的消息來源經過追溯則是俄羅斯的某個電報群組。這種電報群組的消息魚龍混雜，有些消息則可信度很低，但有些消息卻出奇準確。將認知戰的「引子」透過這些群組放出，某種意義上說甚至比官方消息更容易引發輿論關注和討論。

第二步可以被視為輿論的「補強」。認知戰的第一步即「引子資訊」對一個完整的新聞來說往往缺乏細節，但不要緊。從當前社會訊息傳播的效率和特徵來看，一個缺乏細節、但容易引起大家興趣、卻又因某種因素出現信息壁壘的“引子信息”，在傳播過程中，大家自然會對其進行“細節補充」。無論是索科洛夫上將被“擊斃”還是德里姆哈諾夫被“斬首”，都是如此。資訊缺乏細節，但對傳媒來說偏偏又是非常重要的「Breaking News」（突發新聞），同時基於軍事機密的因素，想穿越資訊壁壘及時獲取更多的資訊也不可能。因此，這必然會使傳媒導向一個結果——輿論“補強”，而且是大家一起上，在口耳相傳的過程中不斷把一個引子信息細節化、“真實”化。例如德里姆哈諾夫被「斬首」在傳播過程中，先後彌補上了他被斬首的「時間」、「地點」（甚至由於傳播管道不同，這些時間和地點要素也各不相同），時而出現在克雷緬納亞，時而出現在戈爾洛夫卡。索科洛夫上將被「擊斃」同樣如此，訊息在傳播過程中，被先後腦補出一整套「黑海艦隊週五開例會，烏軍抓住機會實施打擊」、「兩發飛彈一發擊中了司令部辦公室，另一發飛彈在救援人員進去救人的時候實施了補充打擊」這種細節。正是在這種「去中心化」的口耳相傳，這兩名高級將領被「斬首」的「事實」被不斷強化，消息來源的缺失甚至更有利對普通信息受眾進行認知塑造。

經過數天發酵之後，認知戰來到第三步－「一錘定音」。德里姆哈諾夫被“斬首”一事並沒有輪到烏克蘭官方“一錘定音”，小卡德羅夫先坐不住了，很快放出了自己和德里姆哈諾夫坐在一起吃飯野餐的視頻，甚至當場拿出手機展示拍攝時間，進行「打臉」。索科洛夫上將則是烏軍特戰司令部、烏克蘭國防部這樣的大部門出面完成「一錘定音」。按照認知戰的過程，這種官方媒體“一錘定音”應該起到在認知戰領域完成認知塑造過程的作用，也就是完成一個從放出“引子”，到外界“猜測補強”，最後官方「蓋章確認」的完整邏輯閉環。但俄軍居然後發製人，表演了一出“當場打臉”，不僅讓烏軍前面的所有信息傳播都變成了無用功，還讓烏克蘭的兩個要害單位特戰司令部甚至國防部變成了小丑。

二、俄烏衝突中的認知戰，烏軍來勢洶洶？

對於烏軍認知戰宣傳部門親自上陣、造謠車臣副總統德里姆哈諾夫或索科洛夫上將被烏軍“擊斃”，很多人可能大惑不解：如果俄羅斯方面迅速反應，把這些高級將領拉出來亮個相，自我確認一下“我還活著”，那麼烏方認知戰的謠言不就不攻自破了嗎？

看似有理，但俄軍並沒有被造謠一次就照上面的辦法澄清一次。為什麼？因為事情沒有那麼簡單。

其一，從戰術角度來說，如果烏軍每製造一個關於高級將領的謠言，俄軍就安排將領出面闢謠，最直接的後果就是對高級將領的日常作戰指揮造成不必要的干擾和麻煩。在作戰行動中，將官以上的高級軍官時間非常寶貴，每天工作量極高，對腦力消耗極大，根本不可能有那麼多時間沒完沒了地現身闢謠。如果烏軍每造一個謠俄軍就闢一個謠，那這些高級將領平時啥也別幹了，就天天拍視頻闢謠吧。

其二，對於進入認知塑造循環的訊息來說，某些情況下，「闢謠」不僅沒用，還會進一步製造出更多謠言。例如索科洛夫上將被“斬首”一事，儘管俄軍已經安排了闢謠，但一些烏克蘭群組依然在“挑刺死磕”，認為索科洛夫上將在鏡頭前沒有動，索科洛夫上將在受訪時看不出時間和地點，因此只是俄方安排的「資訊反制」。甚至對一些去年曾經被烏克蘭方面「官方宣布」「斬首」、但隨後又在某些場合露面的俄軍將官，比如第41集團軍參謀長格拉西莫夫少將，目前依然有烏克蘭支持者宣稱“此人已死”，唯一的原因就是這人在露面之後居然沒有再度露面！

所以，在認知戰領域，很多事沒有想的那麼簡單。

話又說回來，在戰略層面上，俄軍在俄烏軍事衝突的認知戰領域相比烏軍確實存在較大差距。烏軍非常善於製造議題，而且機動靈活，注重參與。

製造議題方面，幾乎每次認知戰都是烏克蘭主動製造議題，從一開始的馬裡烏波爾大劇院事件，到後來的布查事件，再到魯別日諾耶的化學物質爆炸事件，還有後來的札波羅熱核電廠事件和新卡霍夫卡水力發電廠大壩爆破事件，幾乎每次都是烏克蘭「先聲奪人」。俄羅斯則處於被動應對的狀態，結果被烏克蘭繼續製造議題連續攻訐，處於不利地位。

機動彈性方面，烏軍對現代傳媒的傳播特徵非常熟稔，例如對索科洛夫上將被「斬首」展開的認知戰，烏軍利用了現代傳媒傳播速度快、傳播模式去中心化的特點，以半官方形式放出“引子”，放任網民對其進行“補強”（事實上就是信息的自生長），最後再由比較權威的官方媒體下場“一錘定音”。

「注重參與」方面，烏軍更善於營造普通網民對特定議題的參與感。例如布查事件和馬裡烏波爾戰役之後，烏克蘭方面立即上線了一套名叫「劊子手之書」的網站，任何人都可以隨意登陸這些網站或者網絡插件，在裡面登記所謂的「俄羅斯軍隊的暴行」或俄軍動向。美國立即回應，針對「劊子手之書」項目，開通了屬於美國國務院的「觀察站」項目，從而用於記錄俄軍在衝突中的「暴行」。這些公共議題設定相當巧妙，令外界群眾感受到的參與度極高，而在具體內容上則真真假假，不同於傳統資訊戰的假訊息灌輸。在烏克蘭軍隊的認知戰中，這些參與度極高的計畫一度讓整個網路風向呈現一面倒的趨勢。

和烏軍在認知戰領域的宣傳和操作相比，俄軍在認知戰領域差太遠。例如針對烏克蘭方面在認知領域塑造極為強調群眾參與、群眾體驗的作戰模式，俄羅斯方面依然在沿用著老辦法——以每日戰情通報的形式對外公佈模棱兩可的戰況，只有一個科納申科少將在鏡頭前“當一個沒有感情的讀稿機器”，結果絕大多數戰況觀察者都不太把他的戰況通報當回事。又如對烏克蘭方面頻繁設置議題、依照步驟進行認知塑造的戰法，俄羅斯方面更是只有招架之功。每次都是烏克蘭製造議題，俄羅斯方面被動應對，然後烏克蘭方面根據俄羅斯的應對情況繼續製造新的議題，使俄羅斯處於疲於奔命的狀態。從這個角度來看，俄軍此次針對索科洛夫上將被“斬首”的烏方認知戰塑造，突然安排闢謠“打臉”，只是戰術上“靈光乍現”而已，而且效果似乎也沒多好，也沒有徹底改變目前俄烏兩軍在認知戰領域的基本力量對比，烏克蘭對俄羅斯的「認知戰優勢」還會持續下去。

三、新型作戰形式認知戰，我們如何因應？

從定義上來說，「認知戰」最早可追溯到本世紀初美軍在軍事改革中提出的「網路中心戰」概念，經過多年的發展，到2017年，相關論述開始頻頻見於北約高級將領的言論集中，譬如2017年8月14日，美國國防情報局局長史都華在國防情報資訊系統2017年會上就明確提出了「第五代戰爭是認知戰」這一論點。到了2017年9月17日，時任美國空軍參謀長戈德費恩在美國空軍協會年會上同樣明確地提出了「認知戰」這個概念。很快，北約就對這個新穎的作戰概念進行了全面發展。 2020年3月，北約發布《作戰2040》概念書，明確提出「資訊與認知戰」將在未來作戰中扮演重要角色。 6月，北約又指派前法軍上校、北約創新中心負責人弗朗索瓦.杜.克魯澤專題研究認知戰，並在2021年1月拿出了《認知戰》的詳細報告書。 2021年6月，北約召開了認知戰科學會議，並發布了《認知戰：認知主導未來》專題報告，從而形成了較有系統、完整的認知戰作戰理論。

相較於傳統的資訊戰和宣傳戰，認知戰的最大特徵是基於人的大腦運作原理，也就是對外在資訊的獲取、感知、理解、加工、推論、評估、判斷、計算、決策的過程。總之，認知戰在作戰特質上可謂更勝一籌，不是進行單方面灌輸，而是要善於利用人們的認知過程，對每個人的世界觀、價值觀、意識形態，甚至認知、理解過程進行全方位“重塑”，從而全面重建個人對訊息的解讀和反應，干涉個人的意識形態和價值取向，最終的結果不僅是要利用各種假訊息擾亂對手，更重要的是重塑對手的社會心理，從而對對手的戰略決策產生影響，「不戰而屈人之兵」。這決定了認知戰是新一代的宣傳戰和資訊戰，相對於傳統的專注於戰術層面上的資訊戰，認知戰的角色可以進一步提高到戰略層面上，可能會影響戰爭的走向或結局。

那麼，面對認知戰這樣一種新型的作戰形式，參考俄烏軍事衝突中俄羅斯在和烏克蘭的認知戰領域長期處於下風的現狀，我們對未來的認知戰究竟該如何應對呢？

從戰略角度來看，我們應當認識到，在認知戰領域，單純的被動應對是最不可靠、效率最低的作戰形式，如俄羅斯在烏克蘭的議題設定面前被動應對等於被動挨打。當然，認知戰相比於火力戰戰或機動戰，是徹底的“陽謀”，並沒有太多佯動和詭詐，依託的主要是西方的意識形態優勢地位和傳媒功力，靠的是西方媒體「第四權」領域的法權。由於我方相比西方國家在傳媒領域暫時處於下風，要在全系統、全層面上與其實施認知對抗作戰其實是一件相對困難的事情。因此，即使我們在認知戰上同樣採取戰略進攻的策略，其實施效果可能也不如對手。辦法之一或許是從策略上牢牢把握住我們的基本盤，形成「你打你的，我打我的」格局。

而在戰術領域，要充分借鏡俄烏衝突中雙方在認知作戰上的經驗教訓。從烏克蘭軍隊實施的認知戰策略來看，在議題塑造等領域，主要鑽了資訊不對稱的空子。那麼，我方可能的因應策略是及時公開部分訊息，要改變原有的「軍事行動必須保密、不要對外界公開」的觀念。事實上，公開資訊本身就是認知塑造的過程，雙方圍繞著資訊公開的時機、內容、時序上，可以展開大量的認知戰對抗。如在設置議題領域，我方可以“先發製人”，先求得在諸如一帶一路沿線國家、金磚國家或上海合作組織國家內設置議題、展開認知塑造的能力，起碼確保本國群眾和一些友好國家能夠對沖西方認知戰領域的影響。再如，針對對方在多維度、多層次上針對不同人群實施的「認知戰」或步步為營塑造出的謠言，我方可廣泛利用KOL（Key Opinion Leader，即意見領袖）及平台的影響力，形成以「認知對認知」的作戰模式。

總之，認知戰作為一種被北約研究多年、在俄烏軍事衝突中大量出現且起到一定作用的新型作戰樣式，值得進一步進行研究，以確保在未來的軍事行動中立於不敗之地。

這篇關於認知戰的文章只是“開胃菜”，隨後還有“正餐硬菜”——本工作室歷時約一年完成了《美國等西方國家的認知作戰研究》，正文4萬多字(不含註7千多字)，要豐富和深入得多。該報告將於後天正式推出並進行介紹，敬請關注。

中國原創軍事資源：https://www.163.com/dy/article/IGEFT5CB0515NAKC888.html

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Chinese Intelligent Warfare is Accelerating and Advancing

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中國智能化戰爭正在加速推進

中國軍網 國防部網. 2022年3月17日 星期四

現代英語：

With the widespread application of artificial intelligence in the military field, intelligent warfare has gradually become a hot topic. History has repeatedly proved that the evolution of war forms will lead to profound changes in the winning mechanism. In today’s era when information warfare is developing in depth and intelligent warfare is beginning to emerge, the armies of major countries in the world have made great efforts to promote military intelligence, and many of these trends are worthy of attention.

Strengthen top-level design

Outlining a “roadmap” for intelligent warfare

Driven by a new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial revolution, intelligent military transformation is developing in depth. The United States, Russia, Japan and other countries have regarded artificial intelligence as a disruptive technology that “changes the rules of the war game” and have made early arrangements, strengthened top-level design and planning guidance, and explored the direction of military application of artificial intelligence.

The U.S. military has detailed the current status and development plan of artificial intelligence in documents such as “Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence”, “National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan”, “Artificial Intelligence and National Security”, “Integrated Roadmap for Unmanned Systems, Fiscal Year 2017-2042”, and “American Artificial Intelligence Initiative: First Annual Report”, and has elevated the development of artificial intelligence to the national strategic level. In 2021, the U.S. military pointed out in its “U.S. Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Posture: Assessment and Improvement Recommendations” that the U.S. military should consider three guiding questions in developing artificial intelligence: what is the current state of artificial intelligence related to the U.S. military; what is the current situation of the U.S. military in artificial intelligence; and what internal actions and potential legislative or regulatory actions may enhance the U.S. military’s artificial intelligence advantage.

Russia has invested a lot of resources to maintain a balance with the United States in the competition for the application of artificial intelligence in the military field. In 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at the first Defense Ministry meeting of the year that artificial intelligence will greatly promote changes in the military field, and the Russian Federation Armed Forces must accelerate the research and development of artificial intelligence application technologies such as robots, intelligent individual systems, and intelligent weapon modules, so as to form core technical capabilities and battlefield competitive advantages as soon as possible. Documents such as “Special Outline for the Research and Development of Future Military Robot Technology and Equipment before 2025”, “Future Russian Military Robot Application Concept”, and “The Development Status and Application Prospects of Artificial Intelligence in the Military Field” have established a series of mechanisms at the national level for the Russian military to promote the military application of artificial intelligence.

The Japanese government has also issued an “Artificial Intelligence Strategy” to lead the research and development of artificial intelligence technology and industrial development. In the “Robotics and Artificial Intelligence” strategic plan formulated by the United Kingdom, the application of artificial intelligence in battlefield construction is emphasized. In January 2021, the Australian Department of Defense released “Fighting the Artificial Intelligence War: Operational Concepts for Future Intelligent Warfare”, which explores how to apply artificial intelligence to land, sea and air combat.

Innovative combat concepts

Promoting the “Thinking First” Approach to Intelligent Warfare

The innovation of operational concepts has an ideological driving effect on the development of military science and technology and the evolution of war forms. In the past, people’s understanding and grasp of war mainly came from the summary of practical experience, and operational concepts were empirical concepts. In the future era of intelligent warfare, operational concepts are not only empirical concepts, but also the conception, design and foresight of operations.

The U.S. Army has proposed the concept of “multi-domain warfare”, which requires deep integration and close coordination of combat capabilities in various domains such as land, sea, air, space, electromagnetic, and network. To this end, the U.S. Army has successively issued white papers such as “Multi-Domain Warfare: The Development of Synthetic Arms in the 21st Century (2025-2040)”, “U.S. Army Multi-Domain Warfare (2028)”, and “Using Robotics and Autonomous Technologies to Support Multi-Domain Warfare”. In March 2021, the U.S. Department of the Army issued the document “Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Preparing to Win in Competition and Conflict”, indicating that “multi-domain warfare” has become a “flag” leading the transformation and development of the U.S. Army. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency proposed the concept of “mosaic warfare”, which aims to create a highly decentralized and highly adaptable “kill net” composed of different combat functional units, based on advanced computer technology and network technology. The U.S. Department of Defense strongly supports the concept of “joint all-domain operations”. In March 2020, the U.S. Air Force took the lead in writing “joint all-domain operations” into the doctrine to explore how the Air Force can play a role in “joint all-domain operations”.

The Russian military proposed the concept of “charge disintegration”. “Disintegration” is one of the most important operational concepts in Russia at present. The Russian electronic warfare forces set the goal of making the enemy’s information, charge, electronic warfare and robot systems ineffective, and believe that this goal will “determine the fate of all military operations”. Disrupting the command and control of enemy forces and weapon systems and reducing the efficiency of enemy reconnaissance and use of weapons are the primary tasks of electronic warfare. At present, the Russian military is considering forming 12 types of electronic warfare forces. The Russian military also proposed the concept of “non-nuclear containment system”, the core of which is to use non-nuclear offensive strategic weapons to contain opponents. The non-nuclear offensive strategic weapons it defines include all ballistic missiles equipped with non-nuclear warheads, as well as strategic bombers and long-range air-based and sea-based cruise missiles. In addition, the Russian military also proposed the concept of “hybrid warfare”, hoping to use artificial intelligence systems to seek battlefield information advantages.

The British Ministry of Defense has proposed the concept of “multi-domain integration” and will develop a new command and control system with intelligent capabilities to achieve comprehensive, persistent, accurate and rapid battlefield perception and force coordination.

Focus on technology research and development

Shaping the Intelligent Warfare Operational Model

The key to the effectiveness of artificial intelligence is the combination with other technologies, which is also described as the “AI stack”. Various technologies interact to produce a combined effect, thereby enhancing the capabilities and effects of each technology. In the intelligent warfare supported by artificial intelligence technology, the collaborative combat mode of “man-machine integration, cloud brain control”, the cluster combat mode of “mixed formation, group intelligence”, and the cognitive combat mode of “intelligence-led, attacking with intelligence first” will constantly update people’s understanding of war.

Focus on the research and development of innovative projects. The US military is vigorously promoting the application of artificial intelligence chips in existing weapons and equipment systems, adding “intelligent brains” to weapons to enable them to have human-like thinking and autonomous interaction capabilities. In October 2021, the US Navy launched the “Beyond Plan”, which is regarded as the “current highest priority”. It aims to accelerate the delivery of artificial intelligence and machine learning tools by building a military Internet of Things for maritime operations, integrating manned and unmanned joint formations, supporting a new intelligent naval architecture, enhancing large-scale firepower killing, and realizing intelligent distributed operations of the navy. In addition, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has also carried out cognitive electronic warfare projects such as “Adaptive Electronic Warfare Behavior Learning”, “Adaptive Radar Countermeasures”, and “Communications under Extreme Radio Frequency Spectrum Conditions”, and developed a prototype of a cognitive radar electronic warfare system. The Russian Ministry of Defense’s Intelligent Technology and Equipment Research and Experimental Center cooperated with the Institute of Control Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences to develop and test autonomous intelligent algorithms including drone swarm command and control, and also jointly developed an object automatic recognition software system based on neural network principles with the National Aviation System Research Institute.

Establish innovative R&D institutions. The continuous emergence of new technologies is an inexhaustible driving force for the vigorous development of military intelligence. High-level military intelligence construction cannot be separated from the technical research and development of professional institutions. Some countries and militaries have established R&D centers, focusing on innovative development from a technical level. The U.S. Department of Defense has established a joint artificial intelligence center, which is planned to be built into a national key laboratory to lead the promotion of hundreds of artificial intelligence-related projects and ensure the efficient use of artificial intelligence-related data and information to maintain the United States’ technological advantage in this field. Russia has established an artificial intelligence and big data alliance, a national artificial intelligence center, and a robotics technology research and experimental center under the Ministry of Defense, mainly conducting theoretical and applied research in the fields of artificial intelligence and information technology. France has established an innovative defense laboratory, the United Kingdom has set up an artificial intelligence laboratory, and India has established an artificial intelligence task force to explore related technologies.

Strengthen equipment research and development and deployment. In recent years, many countries have attached great importance to the research and development of intelligent weapons and equipment, and unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned combat vehicles, unmanned ships, unmanned submarines, etc. have continued to emerge. At present, the US Air Force has begun to practice the combat concept of “man-machine collaboration, man in the loop” on the F-35 fighter. The US XQ-58A “Valkyrie” stealth drone previously mainly carried out man-machine collaborative operations with F-35 and F-22 fighters. In April 2021, the stealth drone successfully launched the ALTIUS-600 small drone system, further enhancing its manned and unmanned collaborative combat capabilities. Russia is focusing on reconnaissance and surveillance, command and decision-making, firepower strikes, combat support and other fields, and is developing and deploying intelligent equipment. It plans to increase the proportion of unmanned combat systems in weapons and equipment to more than 30% by 2025. Russia’s ground unmanned combat weapons, represented by the “Uranus” series and “Platform-M” and “Argo” models, are developing rapidly. Among them, the Nerekhta unmanned combat vehicle can be equipped with remote-controlled machine guns and rocket launchers. In addition to the combat capabilities of ordinary armored vehicles, it also has transportation and reconnaissance functions. In addition, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces plan to officially deploy an unmanned aerial formation with strong combat capabilities in 2035.

(Author’s unit: National University of Defense Technology)

國語中文：

■賈珍珍 丁 寧 陳方舟

隨著人工智慧在軍事領域的廣泛應用，智慧化戰爭逐漸成為備受矚目的焦點話題。歷史多次證明，戰爭形態的演進將引發致勝機理的深刻改變。在資訊化戰爭向縱深發展、智慧化戰爭初露端倪的當今時代，世界主要國家軍隊紛紛下大力推動軍事智慧化，其中的諸多動向值得關注。

加強頂層設計

勾勒智能化戰爭“路線圖”

在新一輪科技革命與產業革命推動下，智慧化軍事變革正向縱深發展。美國、俄羅斯、日本等國紛紛把人工智慧視為「改變戰爭遊戲規則」的顛覆性技術，並事先佈局，加強頂層設計和規劃引領，探索人工智慧的軍事應用方向。

美軍在《為人工智慧的未來做好準備》《國家人工智慧研究與發展戰略計畫》《人工智慧與國家安全》《2017至2042財年無人係統綜合路線圖》《美國人工智慧計畫》：在首個年度報告》等文件中，詳述了人工智慧的發展現狀和發展規劃，並將人工智慧發展提升至國家戰略層面。 2021年，美軍在發布的《美國防部人工智慧態勢：評估與改進建議》中指出，美軍發展人工智慧應考慮三個指導性問題：與美軍相關的人工智慧現處於何種狀態；美軍目前在人工智慧方面的態勢如何；哪些內部行動以及潛在的立法或監管行動可能會增強美軍的人工智慧優勢。

俄羅斯投入大量資源，以維持與美國在人工智慧軍事領域應用競爭的平衡。 2021年，俄總統普丁在年度首場國防部會議上表示，人工智慧將大幅推動軍事領域變革，俄國聯邦武裝力量要加速機器人、智慧單兵系統和武器智慧化模組等人工智慧應用技術的研發工作，早日形成核心技術能力和戰場競爭優勢。 《2025年前未來軍用機器人技術裝備研發專題綱要》《未來俄軍用機器人應用構想》《人工智慧在軍事領域的發展現狀以及應用前景》等文件，從國家層面為俄軍推動人工智慧軍事應用確立了一系列機制。

日本政府也推出了《人工智慧戰略》，旨在引領人工智慧技術研發和產業發展。在英國制定的《機器人與人工智慧》戰略規劃中，強調了人工智慧在戰場建設中的應用。 2021年1月，澳洲國防部發布《打好人工智慧戰爭：未來智慧化戰爭之作戰構想》，這份文件探討如何將人工智慧應用到陸、海、空作戰領域。

創新作戰概念

推動智慧化戰爭“思想先行”

作戰概念創新對軍事科技發展、戰爭形態演變具有思想牽引作用。過去人們對戰爭的認識與掌握，主要源自於對實踐經驗的歸納總結，作戰概念即經驗概念。未來智慧化戰爭時代，作戰概念不僅是經驗概念，更是對作戰的構想、設計與前瞻。

美陸軍提出「多域戰」概念，要求陸、海、空、天、電磁、網路等各域作戰能力深度整合與密切協同。為此，美陸軍先後發布《多域戰：21世紀合成兵種的發展（2025至2040）》《美國陸軍多域戰（2028）》《運用機器人與自主技術支援多域戰》等白皮書。 2021年3月，美陸軍部發布文件《陸軍多域轉型：準備在競爭和衝突中取勝》，顯示「多域戰」已成為引領美陸軍轉型發展的一面「旗幟」。美國防高級研究計畫局提出「馬賽克戰」概念，旨在打造一種由不同作戰功能單元構成的、以先進電腦技術與網路技術為基礎的、高度分散、具有高度適應性的「殺傷網」。美國防部大力支持「聯合全域作戰」概念。 2020年3月，美空軍率先將「聯合全域作戰」寫入條令，探討空軍如何在「聯合全域作戰」中發揮作用。

俄軍提出「指控瓦解」概念。 「瓦解」是當前俄羅斯最重要的作戰概念之一，俄軍電子戰部隊把使敵人的訊息、指控、電子戰和機器人系統失效作為目標，認為這一目標將「決定所有軍事行動的命運」。擾亂敵方部隊和武器系統的指揮和控制，降低敵方偵察和使用武器的效率，是進行電子戰的首要任務。目前，俄軍正在考慮組建12種類型的電子戰部隊。俄軍也提出「非核武遏制體系」概念，核心是使用非核武進攻性戰略武器來遏制對手。其所定義的非核武攻擊性戰略武器既包括所有裝備非核彈頭的彈道飛彈，也包括戰略轟炸機和遠程空基、海基巡航飛彈。此外，俄軍也提出「混合戰爭」概念，希望利用人工智慧系統謀求戰場資訊優勢。

英國防部提出「多域融合」概念，將發展具備智慧化能力的新型指控系統，以實現全面、持久、準確、快速的戰場感知與力量協同。

注重技術研發

塑造智慧化戰爭作戰模式

人工智慧發揮效用的關鍵是與其他多種技術的組合，這種組合也被描述為「人工智慧堆疊」。各種技術透過互動的方式產生組合效應，進而提升每項技術所產生的能力與效果。在人工智慧技術支援的智慧化戰爭中，「人機一體、雲腦控制」的協同作戰模式，「混搭編組、群體智慧」的集群作戰模式，「智慧主導、攻智為上」的認知作戰模式等，將不斷更新人們對戰爭的認知。

聚焦創新專案研發。美軍正在大力推廣人工智慧晶片在現有武器裝備系統中的應用，為武器加上“智慧大腦”，使之具備類人思考和自主互動能力。 2021年10月，美海軍推出被視為“當前最高優先事項”的“超越計劃”，旨在通過構建海上作戰軍事物聯網，整合有人無人聯合編隊，加速交付人工智能和機器學習工具，支撐全新的智慧化海軍架構，提升大規模火力殺傷、實現海軍智慧化分散式作戰。此外，美國防高級研究計畫局也進行了「自適應電子戰行為學習」「自適應雷達對抗」「極端射頻頻譜條件下的通訊」等認知電子戰項目，研發出認知雷達電子戰系統原型機。俄國防部智慧技術裝備科研試驗中心與俄聯邦科學院控制問題研究所合作，開發測試了包括無人機群指揮控制在內的自主智慧演算法，也與國家航空系統科研所共同開發基於神經網路原理的物體自動辨識軟體系統。

組成創新研發機構。新技術的不斷湧現是軍事智慧化蓬勃發展的不竭動力，高水準的軍事智慧化建設離不開專職機構的技術研發。一些國家和軍隊組成研發中心，注重從技術層面創新發展。美國國防部建立了聯合人工智慧中心，計劃將該中心打造成國家級重點實驗室，用於領導數百個與人工智慧相關的項目，確保對人工智慧相關數據資訊的高效利用，以保持美國在該領域的技術優勢。俄羅斯組成了人工智慧和大數據聯盟、國家人工智慧中心和隸屬國防部的機器人技術科研試驗中心，主要進行人工智慧和資訊科技領域的理論和應用研究。法國成立了創新國防實驗室，英國設立了人工智慧實驗室，印度組成了人工智慧特別工作小組，進行相關技術探索。

加強裝備研發列裝。近年來，多國重視研發智慧武器裝備，無人飛行器、無人戰車、無人艦艇、無人潛航器等不斷湧現。目前，美空軍已開始在F-35戰機上實踐「人機協同，人在迴路」的作戰理念。美XQ-58A「女武神」隱身無人機先前主要與F-35和F-22戰機進行人機協同作戰，2021年4月該隱身無人機成功投放ALTIUS-600小型無人機系統，進一步提升了其有人無人協同作戰能力。俄羅斯正聚焦偵察監視、指揮決策、火力打擊、作戰支援等多個領域，展開智慧裝備研發和列裝工作，計畫到2025年將無人作戰系統在武器裝備中的比例提高到30%以上。以“天王星”系列和“平台-M”“阿爾戈”等型號為代表的俄地面無人作戰武器發展迅速。其中，Nerekhta無人戰車可搭載遙控機槍和火箭發射器，除擁有一般裝甲車的戰鬥力外，還兼具運輸和偵察功能。此外，日本自衛隊計劃在2035年正式部署具有較強作戰能力的無人空中編隊。

（作者單位：國防科技大學）

中國軍事資料來源：https://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-03/17/content_311555.htm

Asymmetric Warfare, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Future Wars, Chinese Military Informatization, Chinese Military Use of Cognitive Confrontation within the Combat Domain, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare, Dissipative Warfare, Metaverse, Mosaic Warfare, 中國解放軍敘事戰爭, 中國軍事認知戰, 中國軍事認知領域作戰, 認知域戰, 認知戰

How Chinese Military Will Achieve Precise Strikes in Cognitive Domain Operations

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中國軍隊如何在認知域作戰中實現精準打擊

現代英語：

How to achieve precise strikes in cognitive domain operations

■Bu Jiang Jiang Rilie

introduction

Currently, driven by intelligent technology, cognitive domain operations are showing new characteristics such as precise perception, precise prediction and precise calculation. Studying and grasping the connotation mechanism of precision strikes in cognitive domain operations to ensure clear operational targets, personalized information generation, and precise information delivery will be more conducive to seizing the commanding heights and initiative in future cognitive domain operations.

Accurately establish combat goals

The establishment of operational goals is often the primary issue of concern in cognitive domain operations. With the continuous application of artificial intelligence, big data and other technologies, the party with a technological advantage is often able to quickly and efficiently collect cognitive data of different dimensions, levels and modalities, thereby discovering the weaknesses and sensitivities of the opponent’s cognitive system. point and detonation point.

Massive “data sources” refine target clarity. Today, as the Internet becomes more popular, cognitive data is growing exponentially. With the support of big data, psychometric and other technologies, target portraits are gradually evolving rapidly towards accurate portraits and intelligent portraits. According to foreign statistics, as of July 2022, the global Internet penetration rate reached 69%, and the Internet has become an essential platform for users’ daily lives. With the help of the Internet, both combatants can widely and quickly realize target object cognitive data collection and cognitive situation awareness, providing support for analyzing the target object’s political beliefs, values, national sentiments, public opinion positions, etc. It is reported that in foreign elections in recent years, foreign data analysis companies have captured social media user data, established character analysis models, accurately portrayed voters’ personalities and cognitive characteristics, and on this basis pushed suggestive campaigns to swing voters. advertising, thereby influencing their electoral decisions.

Dynamic “tag pool” improves target recognition rate. Labeling usually refers to the abstract classification and generalization of certain characteristics of a specific group or object. In cognitive domain operations, labeling is an important process to achieve classification and visualization of cognitive data. In the face of massive user data, establishing a mature and reliable label system is a prerequisite for sorting out, analyzing, and making good use of cognitive data. Using the label system to filter useless data and mine potential value information can provide information for presetting combat scenarios in the cognitive domain. Direct frame of reference. The development of the labeling system should be based on the logical starting point of cognitive domain operations, and ultimately comes down to the application of cognitive domain operations. For the target object, the transfer of interests, changes in personality, and changes in emotion are real-time and dynamic. The establishment of a “tag pool” can sense the cognitive dynamics of the target object in real time and accurately improve the target recognition rate.

Intelligent “algorithm library” shows target relevance. If data is compared to the “fuel” of cognitive domain operations, algorithms are the “engine” and an important source of power for cognitive precision strikes. In a certain sense, cognitive domain operations are “confrontation of data or algorithms.” Through intelligent algorithms, we can deeply mine the multi-dimensional correlation data of the target object’s behavior, build an accurate target portrait, and then combine it with machine learning algorithms to build a prediction model to automatically match and associate cognitive information with the target object, at the right time and at the right place. Deliver cognitive information in an appropriate manner to change the target object’s cognition. As analyzed by some foreign research institutions, with 10 likes, the algorithm can know you better than your colleagues; with 150 likes, the algorithm will know you better than your parents; with 300 likes, the algorithm will know you better than your closest partner you.

Accurately generate information “ammunition”

Designing information “ammunition” that conforms to the target’s thinking habits and perception style is the key to improving the cognitive domain killing effect. The development and application of intelligent science and technology provides a convenient means to achieve “private customization” of cognitive information themes, content and forms, making it possible to instantly and forcibly change the decisions and actions of target objects.

Information theme planning based on target value orientation. Cognitive information theme is the central idea represented by the information and the core of the information content. From legal advice, military deterrence, conflict and separation, and emotional summons, to moral guidance, war mobilization, behavioral instructions, and motivational incentives, different information themes exert different influences. Practice shows that the theme of cognitive information must be planned closely around the target object. According to the different value orientations shown by different combat stages and different target objects, the information theme must be optimized in a timely manner so that the information “ammunition” can satisfy the target object to the maximum extent. needs. According to the analysis of foreign research institutions, foreign election campaign advertisements in recent years are often inseparable from the support of big data. Accurately designing different advertising themes for voters with different values ​​​​can resonate with voters’ values.

Information content design based on target mindset. In the Internet era, the life trajectory, geographical location, hobbies, social relationships, etc. of the target object are all recorded on the Internet, making it possible to accurately create an “information cocoon” that caters to the target object’s way of thinking. Driven by big data technology, the interaction trajectories of target objects in the virtual world can also be easily captured, perceived and calculated. With the assistance of multimedia content intelligent generation systems, information similar to the target’s thinking habits can be generated in batches, causing the target to be trapped in an “information cocoon”. The scope of information acceptance narrows, and the perception of the outside world gradually decreases, and then falls into cognitive confusion. Know the trap. In recent years, many “color revolutions” that have occurred around the world are inseparable from the support of cognitive control. Some Western countries use “deep forgery” technology to instill false information in target objects that conforms to their way of thinking, creating anti-intellectual, The information environment stupefies the people, forming cognitive biases and inducing them to deny their own national and cultural values, thereby creating anti-government sentiments.

Information form selection based on target perceptual characteristics. Psychology believes that the formation and change of the cognitive subject’s attitude needs to go through three processes of “attention-understanding-acceptance”. Whether the target object can be affected by the dissemination of information, attracting attention is the first step. Information form is an important carrier to attract the attention of the target audience, and its form design is crucial to improving the acceptance, dissemination and infectivity of information “ammunition”. Through big data technology, we can mine the national emotions, customs and habits, religious beliefs, personal preferences and other characteristics of the target object, and scientifically judge the perceptual characteristics such as information receiving habits. On this basis, we can comprehensively use text, language, video, image and other information carriers to integrate Color, layout and other elements can cause strong stimulation to the target object’s senses. Since 2011, some Syrian anti-war activists have produced a number of anti-war propaganda short films from the perspectives of children and women and spread them on the international Internet, arousing strong responses from international public opinion. This internationally accepted information carrier meets the aesthetic needs of the public, avoids differential interpretation by the audience, and can often achieve unexpected results.

Accurately deliver information

Cognitive information delivery follows the laws of information dissemination. In order to achieve the effect of precise cognitive attack, it is necessary to deal with issues such as delivery objects, delivery channels, and delivery timing.

Extract cognitive features and filter information delivery objects. The profiling technology supported by big data makes it possible to extract the cognitive characteristics of target objects. Through the cognitive characteristic library, objects with similar characteristics can be screened out from groups of different races, different parties, different occupations, etc., thereby upgrading the traditional extensive screening method. , so that the information “ammunition” is more closely matched with the target object, thereby improving the pertinence and accuracy of cognitive attacks. In recent years, Cambridge Analytica has used machine learning methods to classify Facebook users according to five personality types: openness to experience, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and emotional instability, and established a linear regression of the five personality traits. model to establish a “target” for precise delivery of campaign advertisements. This move has many implications for the world. In the future, cognitive domain operations, based on the extensive collection of users’ cognitive characteristics, will place more emphasis on accurately dividing groups, and carry out targeted campaigns based on the differences in values ​​and behavioral habits of different groups. information delivery and behavior prediction.

Follow social habits and match information delivery channels. The deep popularization of the Internet has brought about tremendous changes in the way information is disseminated, and the ways in which people receive information are becoming more diversified and diversified. According to data from foreign research institutions, there are currently more than 4.62 billion social media users worldwide, and social media platforms have become the main battlefield in the cognitive domain. In the many “color revolutions” that have occurred in recent years, social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, controlled by Western countries, have played an important role in spreading public opinion, organizing protests, and mobilizing the public. It is reported that in similar operations, Facebook is often used to determine the schedule, Twitter is used to coordinate actions, and YouTube is used to spread the word widely. Future operations in the cognitive domain will place great emphasis on focusing on the target’s social habits and characteristics, fully understanding the target’s social circle and life circle, and selecting information delivery methods from multiple channels, including online and offline, military and civilian, to ensure the effectiveness of cognitive information. Delivery rate.

Track cognitive dynamics and accurately deliver information at the right time. Changes in cognition do not happen overnight. Blindly pursuing high rhythm and achieving goals in an instant will have the opposite effect. Therefore, cognitive domain operations must grasp the rhythm and intensity of “time immersion”, select the correct delivery time based on the cognitive dynamics of the target object, and gradually seek to expand the effect advantage. Before the target object has formed a preliminary understanding of a certain event, it is necessary to actively seize the priority of information release, carry out information “bombing” as soon as possible, and strive to “preemptively strike first.” In addition, during the public opinion fermentation stage of the incident, the subject’s cognition has not yet been completely solidified. At this time, by repeatedly disseminating a specific information, the purpose of subtly reconstructing the subject’s cognition can also be achieved.

(Author’s unit: National University of Defense Technology)

國語中文：

如何實現認知域作戰精準打擊

■卜江　蔣日烈

引言

目前，在智慧化技術的推動下，認知域作戰正呈現出精確感知、精確預測和精確計算等全新特徵。研究掌握好認知域作戰精準打擊的內涵機理，從而確保作戰目標清晰化、資訊生成個性化、資訊投射精準化，將更有利於奪取未來認知域作戰制高點和主動權。

精準確立戰目標

作戰目標的確立往往是認知域作戰關注的首要問題。隨著人工智慧、大數據等技術的不斷應用，佔據技術優勢的一方往往能夠快速、有效率地採集不同維度、不同層級、不同模態的認知數據，進而發現對手認知體系的薄弱點、敏感點和爆燃點。

海量「資料來源」細化目標清晰度。在網路深入普及的今天，認知數據正呈指數級增長，目標畫像在大數據、心理測量等技術的支撐下，正逐漸朝著精準畫像、智慧畫像的方向快速演進。根據國外統計數據顯示，截至2022年7月，全球互聯網滲透率達69%，互聯網已成為用戶日常生活的必備平台。借助互聯網，作戰雙方能夠廣泛快速地實現目標對象認知數據收集和認知態勢感知，為分析目標對象的政治信念、價值觀念、民族情感、輿論立場等提供支撐。據悉，在近年的國外大選中，國外數據分析公司就曾透過抓取社群媒體用戶數據，建立人物分析模型，精準刻畫選民性格、認知特徵，在此基礎上對搖擺選民推送暗示性競選廣告，從而影響其選舉決策。

動態「標簽池」提升目標辨識率。貼標簽通常是指對某一類特定群體或物件的某項特徵進行的抽象分類和概括。在認知域作戰中，貼標簽是實現認知資料分類與可視化的重要過程。面對海量的用戶數據，建立一套成熟可靠的標簽體係是梳理分析、用活用好認知數據的前提，利用標簽體系過濾無用數據，挖掘潛在價值信息，能夠為認知域作戰場景預設提供直接參考框架。標簽體系的開發要基於認知域作戰這個邏輯起點，最終歸結於認知域作戰應用。對於目標對象來講，興趣的遷移、性格的改變、情感的變化是即時動態的，建立「標簽池」能夠即時感知目標對象的認知動態，精準提升目標辨識率。

智慧“演算法庫”顯現目標關聯性。如果將數據比作認知域作戰的“燃料”，演算法則是“引擎”，是認知精準打擊的重要動力源。從一定意義上講，認知域作戰是「數據或演算法的對抗」。透過智慧演算法，可以深度挖掘目標對象行為的多維關聯數據，構建精準目標畫像，再結合機器學習演算法構建預測模型，將認知資訊與目標對象進行自動匹配關聯，在合適的時間、合適的地點，以合適的方式投送認知訊息，從而改變目標對象認知。正如國外一些研究機構分析發現，透過10個點贊，演算法可以比同事更了解你；150個點贊，演算法將比你父母更了解你；300個點贊，演算法將比最親密的伴侶更了解你。

精準生成資訊“彈藥”

設計符合目標對象思維習慣和感知風格的訊息“彈藥”，是提升認知域殺傷效果的關鍵所在。智慧科學技術的發展運用，為實現認知資訊主題、內容和形式的「私人客製化」提供了便捷手段，即時、強制地改變目標對象決策和行動成為可能。

基於目標價值取向的資訊主題策劃。認知資訊主題是資訊所表現的中心思想，是資訊內容的核心。從法理勸告、軍事威懾、矛盾離間、情感召喚，到義理引導、戰爭動員、行為指示、動機激勵，不同的訊息主題發揮不同的影響作用。實踐表明，認知訊息的主題必須緊緊圍繞目標對像做策劃，針對不同作戰階段、不同目標對象所表現出來的不同價值取向，及時優化信息主題，才能使信息“彈藥”最大限度地滿足目標對象的需求。根據國外研究機構分析，近年來的國外大選競選廣告背後往往離不開大數據的支撐，針對不同價值觀的選民精準設計不同廣告主題，可以引起選民價值共鳴。

基於目標思維方式的資訊內容設計。在互聯網時代，目標對象的生活軌跡、地理位置、興趣愛好、社交關係等都被網絡所記錄，精準打造迎合目標對象思維方式的「資訊繭房」成為可能。在大數據技術驅動下，目標對像在虛擬世界中的互動軌跡也很容易被捕捉、被感知和被計算。在多媒體內容智慧生成系統等輔助下，可大量產生與目標對象思維習慣類似的訊息，致使其陷於「訊息繭房」之中，訊息接受範圍變窄，對外界的感知度逐漸降低，進而陷入認知陷阱。近年來，全球發生的多起「顏色革命」背後都離不開認知控制的支撐，一些西方國家利用「深度偽造」技術，向目標對象灌輸符合其思維方式的虛假信息，製造反智化、愚民化資訊環境，形成認知偏差，誘導其否定自身民族文化價值理念，進而產生反政府情緒。

基於目標感知特性的資訊形式選擇。心理學認為，認知主體的態度的形成與改變需經過「注意力-了解-接受」三個過程，目標對象能否受到訊息傳播的影響，吸引註意是第一步。資訊形式作為引起目標對象注意的重要載體，其形式設計對提高訊息「彈藥」的接受度、傳播力、感染性至關重要。透過大數據技術可以挖掘目標對象民族情感、風俗習慣、宗教信仰、個人喜好等特徵，科學判斷訊息接受習慣等感知特性，在此基礎上綜合運用文本、語言、視頻、圖像等資訊載體，加以融入色彩、佈局等元素，可以給目標感官造成強烈刺激。自2011年以來，一些敘利亞反戰人士以兒童、婦女等視角，製作出多部反戰宣傳短片在國際互聯網上傳播，引起國際社會輿論強烈反響。這種國際通用的資訊載體，符合大眾審美需求，避免了受眾差異性解讀，往往能達到意想不到的效果。

精準實現資訊投送

認知訊息投送遵循資訊傳播規律，要達到認知精準打擊效果，需要處理好投送對象、投送管道、投送時機等問題。

提取認知特徵，篩選訊息傳遞對象。大數據支撐的畫像技術使提取目標對象認知特徵成為可能，透過認知特徵庫，可以從不同種族、不同黨派、不同職業等群體中篩選出具有相似特徵的對象，從而升級傳統的粗放篩選方式，讓資訊「彈藥」與目標對象更加匹配，從而提高認知攻擊的針對性和精準性。近年來，劍橋分析公司曾使用機器學習方法，依照經驗開放型、盡責型、外向型、親和型、情緒不穩定型五類人格對臉書用戶進行分類，建立了五種人格特質的線性回歸模型，為精準投送競選廣告立起「標靶」。此舉對世人的啟示是多方面的，未來認知域作戰，在廣泛蒐集用戶認知特徵的基礎上，將更加強調精準劃分群體，依據不同群體的價值觀念和行動習慣的差異，進行有目的地信息投送和行為預測。

遵循社交習慣，匹配資訊投送管道。互聯網的深度普及使資訊的傳播方式正發生巨大變革，人們接受資訊的方式更加多樣化、多元化。根據國外調研機構數據顯示，目前全球社群媒體用戶超過46.2億，社群媒體平台成為認知域作戰主戰場。在近年來發生的多起「顏色革命」中，臉書、推特、優兔等社群媒體在西方國家操縱下，在輿論傳播、組織抗議、動員民眾等方面發揮了重要作用。據悉，在類似行動中臉書往往用來確定日程，推特用來協調行動，優兔用來廣泛傳播。未來的認知域作戰，十分強調著眼目標對象社交習慣和特點，充分掌握目標對象的社交圈、生活圈，從線上線下、軍用民用等多渠道選擇信息投送方式，從而確保認知信息的送達率。

追蹤認知動態，把準資訊投送時機。認知的改變，並非一蹴而就，一味地追求高節奏、瞬間達成目的反而會起到反面效果。因此，認知域作戰要掌握好「時間沉浸」的節奏與力度，根據目標對象認知動態選準投送時間，逐步漸進地謀求擴大效果優勢。在目標對像對某一事件還未形成初步認知前，要積極搶佔信息的發布優先權，第一時間進行信息“轟炸”，力求“先發製人、先入為主”。此外，在事件的輿論發酵階段，主體的認知還未徹底固化，此時透過不斷重復傳播某個特定訊息，也可以達到潛移默化地重構主體認知的目的。

（作者單位：國防科技大學）

中國軍事資料來源：https://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16209631.html

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How the Chinese Military Identify Key Targets for Cognitive Domain Operations

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中國軍隊如何辨識認知域作戰的關鍵目標

現代英語：

Cognitive domain combat targets refer to the specific role of cognitive domain combat. In cognitive domain combat, compared with combat targets, combat targets solve the problem of precise aiming, that is, to let commanders understand and grasp the precise coordinates of what to hit, where to hit, and to what extent. Only by deeply understanding the connotation and characteristics of cognitive domain combat targets can we accurately find key targets through appearances and thus seize the initiative in future combat.

Cognitive focus that influences behavioral choices

The cognitive focus is the “convergence point” of the cognitive subject’s multi-dimensional thinking cognition in war activities. As a dynamic factor, it affects the cognitive process and behavioral results. Generally speaking, the cognitive factors that affect individual behavioral choices in war activities mainly include political attribute cognition, interest-related cognition, group belonging cognition, risk loss cognition, emotional orientation cognition, war morality cognition, etc. For war activities and groups or individuals who pay attention to war activities, the cognitive focus that affects their attitudes, tendencies and behaviors is not the same. Judging from the local wars and regional conflicts in the world in recent years, there are obvious differences in the cognitive focus of different groups or individuals. Politicians pay more attention to political attribute cognition and interest-related cognition, those who may intervene in the war pay more attention to risk loss cognition and interest-related cognition, ordinary people pay more attention to interest-related cognition and emotional orientation cognition, and people in other countries outside the region generally pay more attention to war morality cognition and group belonging cognition because their own interests will not be directly lost. In combat practice, foreign militaries are good at targeting the cognitive focus of different objects, accurately planning topics, and pushing related information to induce specific behavioral choices. For example, before the Gulf War, the Hill Norton public relations company fabricated the non-existent “incubator incident” by using Naira, the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States, as a “witness” to show the “inhumanity” of the Iraqi army, induce the American people’s ethical and moral cognition, and then support the US government to send troops to participate in the Gulf War.

Style preferences that constrain command decisions

Cognitive style directly affects decision-making behavior preferences. Cognitive style refers to the typical way of individual cognition, memory, thinking, and problem solving. According to the preference of command decision-making style, commanders can be divided into calm cognitive style and impulsive cognitive style. Commanders with calm cognitive style pay attention to accuracy but not speed in the decision-making process. The quality of the decisions they make is high, but they are prone to fall into the comparison and analysis of various intelligence information sources and overemphasize the accuracy and objectivity of information analysis. Commanders with calm cognitive style are often easily disturbed by the diverse and diverse information stimulation in battlefield cognitive offensive and defensive operations, and their mental energy is easily disturbed and dissipated, which may lead to missed opportunities. Commanders with impulsive cognitive style pay attention to speed but not accuracy. The decision-making reaction speed is fast, but the quality is not high. They are easily emotional and prone to conflict with team members. Commanders with impulsive cognitive style are also prone to over-interpret the ambiguous external security environment, and constantly look for “evidence” to strengthen and verify individual erroneous thinking, narrowing individual attention and leading to command decision-making deviations. In combat practice, foreign armies pay more attention to analyzing the decision-making style of commanders of combat opponents, and then select specific information to influence them psychologically. For example, during the U.S. invasion of Panama, when besieging the hiding place of Panamanian President Noriega, the U.S. military repeatedly played rock and heavy metal music, and used language that stimulated and humiliated Noriega to carry out cognitive and psychological attacks on him, causing Noriega to gradually collapse physically and mentally.

Backdoor channel to control thinking and cognition

Once a computer is infected with a “Trojan” virus, it will send a connection request to the hacker control terminal at a specific time. Once the connection is successful, a backdoor channel will be formed, allowing the hacker to control the computer at will. Similarly, the human brain also has a cognitive “backdoor” and may be controlled by others. Cognitive psychologists have found that by sending information to the target object’s audio-visual perception channel, carefully pushing information content that the target object recognizes and accepts, catering to the target object’s existing experience memory, conforming to the target object’s thinking habits, and stimulating the target object’s emotional pain points, it is possible to control and interfere with the target object’s cognition and promote its instinctive emotional and behavioral reactions. With the support of cutting-edge cognitive science and technology, using the two modes of automatic start and control processing of brain information processing, the target object can easily fall into a “cognitive cocoon”. In cognitive domain operations, by immersing individuals in massive amounts of artificially constructed information, and continuously providing them with “evidence” to prove that their judgments and cognitions are “correct”. Over time, the individual’s cognitive vision becomes smaller and smaller, and the ability to perceive the external environment gradually decreases. Eventually, they will not be able to see the truth of the matter and will be immersed in the “cognitive cocoon” and unable to extricate themselves. When foreign militaries conduct operations in the cognitive domain, they often target their opponents’ cognitive biases on a certain issue and continuously push situational information and intelligence information through various channels to support their opponents’ so-called “correct cognition,” causing errors and deviations in their opponents’ command decisions.

Sensory stimuli that induce attention

Effective perceptual stimulation is the first prerequisite for attracting the attention of the target object. The human brain will perceive and react to stimuli within the perceptual range. Cognitive psychology experimental research has found that information such as dynamic, dangerous, relevant, survival safety, and contrast between before and after is more likely to attract the attention of the human brain. In the era of intelligence, the psychological cognitive process of the target object often follows the law of “attracting attention, cultivating interest, actively searching, strengthening memory, actively sharing, and influencing others”. In combat, foreign troops often use exclusive revelations, intelligence leaks, authoritative disclosures, on-site connections, and other methods, and cleverly use exaggeration, contrast, association, metaphor, suspense, and contrast to push information that subverts common sense, cognitive conflicts, and strong contrasts to attract the attention of the target object. For example, the “Lin Qi rescue incident” created by the US military in the Iraq War and the “Gaddafi Golden Toilet” in the Libyan War mostly choose stories familiar to the audience as the blueprint, hiding the purpose and embedding the viewpoint in the story plot, which attracted the attention of the general public. In addition, the human brain will also process stimuli outside the perceptual range. In recent years, the military of Western countries has attached great importance to the research of subthreshold information stimulation technology, and has developed subthreshold visual information implantation technology, subthreshold auditory information implantation technology, subthreshold information activation technology, subconscious sound manipulation technology of the nervous system, etc., continuously expanding the application scope of neurocognitive science and technology in the military field.

Meta-value concepts that give rise to cognitive resonance

In cognitive theory, cognitive resonance refers to information that can cross the cognitive gap between the two parties and trigger the ideological and psychological resonance and cognitive empathy of both parties, thereby achieving the deconstruction and reconstruction of the other party’s cognitive system. In cognitive domain warfare, this cognitive energy-gathering effect is not a simple concentration of power, but an internal accumulation of system synergy. Under the diffusion and dissemination of modern information media, this cognitive resonance effect can spread rapidly to all parts of the world in a short period of time, and produce secondary indirect psychological effects or more levels of derivative psychological effects, presenting a state of cumulative iteration. Once it exceeds the psychological critical point, it will present a state of psychological energy explosion, thereby changing the direction or outcome of the event. The targets that can induce this cognitive resonance are mainly value beliefs, moral ethics, common interests, etc. In war, if one party touches or violates human meta-values, common emotional orientation, etc., it is very easy to induce collective condemnation, bear the accusation of violating human morality, and fall into a moral trough. For example, a photo during the Vietnam War shows a group of Vietnamese children, especially a 9-year-old girl, running naked on the road because of burns after being attacked by US napalm bombs. In 1972, this photo caused a huge sensation after it was published, setting off an anti-war wave in the United States and even the world, and accelerating the end of the Vietnam War.

Cognitive gaps in a split cognitive system

In daily life, seemingly hard steel is very easy to break due to the brittleness of the material due to factors such as low temperature environment, material defects, and stress concentration. The same is true for the cognitive system. Cognitive gaps refer to the cracks, pain points, weaknesses, and sensitive points in the cognitive thinking of the target object, which are mainly manifested as the individual’s worry that he is unable to cope with or adapt to the environment, and under the influence of anxiety, cognitive vulnerability is formed. The experience of security threats, the looseness of group structure, the confusion of beliefs and ideals, and the loss of voice of authoritative media will all cause cognitive conflicts and tearing of the target object. In cognitive domain operations, sometimes seemingly powerful combat opponents hide a large number of thinking cracks and psychological weaknesses behind them. Often a news event can shake the cognitive framework of the combat opponent and puncture the cognitive bubble. In addition, this cognitive psychological conflict will also cause moral damage and psychological trauma to individuals. In recent years, the U.S. and Western countries’ troops carrying out overseas missions have faced “enemies disguised as civilians” that appear anytime and anywhere, and their uncertainty about the battlefield environment has continued to increase. They generally lack the perception of the significance of combat, and are filled with guilt and sin. A large number of soldiers developed post-traumatic stress disorder, the number of self-harm on the battlefield, post-war suicides and crimes increased sharply, and the number of suicides among veterans of the war even exceeded the number of deaths on the battlefield.

(Author’s unit: Political Science Academy of National Defense University)

國語中文：

引言

認知域作戰標靶是指認知域作戰的具體作用指向。在認知域作戰中，相較於作戰對象，作戰標靶解決的問題是精確瞄準，也就是讓指揮官了解掌握具體打什麼、往哪裡打、打到什麼程度的精準座標問題。只有深刻理解認知域作戰標靶的內涵特點，才能透過表象準確找到關鍵標靶，以便在未來作戰中掌握先機。

影響行為選擇的認知重心

認知重心是戰爭活動中認知主體多元思維認知的“匯聚點”，作為一種能動因素影響認知進程和行為結果。一般而言，影響戰爭活動中個人行為選擇的認知因素，主要包含政治屬性認知、利益關聯認知、群體歸屬認知、風險損失認知、情緒定向認知、戰爭道德認知等。對於戰爭活動以及關注戰爭活動的群體或個體而言，影響其態度、傾向和行為的認知重心並不相同。從近年來的世界局部戰爭和地區衝突來看，不同群體或個體關注的認知重心有著明顯差異，政治人物更加關注政治屬性認知和利益關聯認知，戰爭可能介入者更關注風險損耗認知和利益關聯認知，一般民眾更關注利益關聯認知和情感定向認知，而域外他國民眾由於自身利益不會受到直接損失，普遍更關注戰爭道德認知和群體歸屬認知。外軍在作戰實踐中，善於針對不同對象的認知重心，精準策劃主題，推送關聯訊息，誘發特定的行為選擇。如同在海灣戰爭前，希爾·諾頓公關公司炮製了根本不存在的“育嬰箱事件”，就是利用科威特駐美大使的女兒娜伊拉“做證”，展現伊拉克軍隊的“慘無人道”，誘發美國民眾的倫理道德認知，進而支持美國政府派兵參加海灣戰爭。

制約指揮決策的風格偏好

認知風格直接影響決策行為偏好。認知風格是指個體認知、記憶、思考、解決問題的典型方式。根據指揮決策風格偏好，指揮家可以分為冷靜型認知風格和衝動型認知風格。冷靜型認知風格的指揮者在決策過程中重視準確但不重視速度，作出的決策品質較高，但容易陷入對各類情報資訊來源的比對分析，過度強調資訊分析的準確客觀。冷靜型認知風格的指揮在戰場認知攻防行動中，常常容易受到紛繁多元的信息刺激幹擾，心智精力容易被擾亂和耗散，進而可能貽誤戰機。衝動型認知風格的指揮者重視速度但不重視準確度，作出的決策反應速度較快，但品質不高，且容易情緒激動，易與團隊成員發生衝突。衝動型認知風格的指揮者也容易將模稜兩可的外在安全環境進行過度曲解，並不斷尋找「證據」強化和驗證個體錯誤思維，使個體注意力變窄，導致出現指揮決策偏差。外軍在作戰實務中，比較著重分析作戰對手指揮官決策風格，進而選擇特定資訊對其進行心理影響。如美軍入侵巴拿馬戰爭中，在圍攻巴拿馬總統諾列加躲藏處時，美軍反複播放搖滾和重金屬音樂，運用刺激和羞辱諾列加的語言對其進行認知打擊和心理進攻，使諾列加身心逐漸崩潰。

控制思維認知的後門通道

電腦一旦中了「木馬」病毒，會在特定時間向駭客控制端發送連線請求，一旦連線成功就會形成後門通道，使得駭客可以隨心所欲地控制電腦。與之相似，人類大腦也存在認知“後門”，也可能被他人控制。認知心理學家研究發現，透過給目標對象視聽感知通道發送訊息，精心推送目標對象認可的、接受的信息內容，迎合目標對像已有的經驗記憶，順應目標對象思維習慣，刺激目標對象的情感痛點，就可以控制干擾目標物認知，促進其產生本能情緒行為反應。在尖端認知科學技術的支撐下，運用大腦資訊加工的自動啟動和控制加工兩種模式，目標物很容易陷入「認知繭房」之中。認知域作戰中，透過讓個體沉浸在人為構設的海量資訊之中，並源源不斷地為其提供「證據」用來佐證其判斷和認知是「正確」的。長此以往，個體的認知視野就變得越來越小，對外在環境的感知能力逐漸降低，最終會看不到事情的真相，沉湎於「認知繭房」中無法自拔。外軍在認知域作戰中，常常針對作戰對手對某一問題的認知偏差，持續透過多種管道推送佐證作戰對手自以為「正確認知」的態勢訊息和情報訊息，使作戰對手指揮決策出現失誤和偏差。

誘發關注的感知覺刺激

有效的知覺刺激是引發目標對象關注的首要前提。人類大腦對感知覺範圍內的刺激會有所察覺，並做出各種反應。認知心理學實驗研究發現，動態、危險、利害關係人、生存安全、前後反差等類別資訊更容易引起人類大腦的注意。在智慧化時代，目標對象的心理認知過程往往遵循「引起注意、培養興趣、主動搜尋、強化記憶、主動分享、影響他人」的規律。外軍在作戰中，常運用獨家爆料、情報外洩、權威揭露、現場連線等方式，巧用誇張、對比、聯想、比喻、懸念、襯託等手法，推播顛覆常識、認知衝突、對比強烈等訊息，來引發目標對象注意。例如伊拉克戰爭中美軍塑造的“營救女兵林奇事件”，利比亞戰爭中的“卡扎菲黃金馬桶”，大多選擇受眾對象熟知的故事為藍本，藏目的、寓觀點於故事情節，吸引了廣大民眾的注意力。此外，人類大腦也會對感知覺範圍外的刺激進行加工。近年來，西方國家軍隊非常重視知覺閾下資訊刺激技術的研究，開發發展了閾下視覺訊息植入技術、閾下聽覺訊息植入技術、閾下訊息啟動技術、神經系統潛意識聲音操控技術等，不斷擴大神經認知科學技術在軍事領域的應用範圍。

催生認知共振的後設價值概念

認知理論中，認知共振是指跨越雙方認知鴻溝，能夠引發雙方思想心理與認知共鳴共感的訊息，進而實現對對方認知體系的解構與重建。在認知域作戰中，這種認知聚能效應不是簡單意義上的力量集中，而是體系合力的內在累積。在現代資訊傳媒的擴散傳播作用下，這種認知共振效應能在短時間內迅速擴散到全球各地，並產生二次間接心理效應或更多層次的衍生心理效應，呈現出一種累積迭代的狀態，一旦超過心理臨界點，即呈現出心理能量爆發狀態，從而改變事件走向或結果。能夠誘發這種認知共振的靶標，主要有價值信念、道德倫理、共通利益等。戰爭中，若某一方觸及或違反人類元價值觀、共同情感指向等，則極易誘發集體聲討，承擔違背人類道德的指責，陷於道義低谷。如越戰期間的一張照片，畫面呈現的是遭遇美軍凝固汽油彈襲擊後，一群越南孩子特別是一名9歲女孩在公路上因為燒傷而裸體奔跑。 1972年，這張照片刊登後引發巨大轟動，掀起美國乃至全球的反戰浪潮，加速了越戰的結束。

分裂認知體系的認知縫隙

日常生活中，看似堅硬的鋼鐵，受低溫環境、材質缺陷、應力集中等因素影響，非常容易因材料脆性而斷裂，認知體係也是如此。認知縫隙是指目標對象認知思考中的裂縫、痛點、弱點與敏感點，主要表現為個體擔心自己沒有能力應對或無法適應環境的想法，並在焦慮情緒的作用下，構成認知脆弱性。安全威脅的經驗、團體結構的鬆散、信念理想的迷惘、權威媒介的失聲等，都會使得目標物出現認知上的衝突與撕裂。認知域作戰中，有時看似強大的作戰對手，背後卻潛藏著大量的思維裂隙與心理弱點，往往一個新聞事件就能動搖作戰對手的認知框架，刺破認知泡沫。此外，這種認知心理衝突也會使個體產生道德損傷和心理創傷。近年來，執行海外任務的美西方國家軍隊面對隨時隨地出現的“偽裝成平民的敵人”，對戰場環境的不確定感不斷提升，普遍缺乏作戰意義感知，進而內心充滿內疚與罪惡。大量士兵產生戰爭創傷後壓力障礙，戰場自殘自傷、戰後自殺與犯罪人數激增，參戰老兵自殺人數甚至超過戰場死亡人數。

（作者單位：國防大學政治學院）唐國東

中國軍網 國防部網 // 2023年3月23日 星期四

中國原創軍事資源：https://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2023-03/23/content_336888.htm

Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Future Wars, Chinese Military Informatization, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare, Dissipative Warfare, 中國解放軍敘事戰爭, 認知域戰, 認知戰

Chinese Military Analysis on the Application of Metaverse in Military Communication

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中國軍事分析虛擬宇宙在軍事通訊的應用

現代英語翻譯:

Abstract: Metaverse, as an innovative concept of the clustering effect of advanced technologies, will become the key to future media content production and cognitive advantage. Looking forward to the development prospects of Metaverse, this article explains the concept of Metaverse and analyzes its development prospects, key technologies and practical applications, aiming to provide reference for the application of Metaverse in the field of military communication.

Keywords: Metaverse; Military Communication; Development Prospects

The Metaverse has become a hot topic that people are competing to talk about, and has been selected as one of the “Top Ten Internet Terms of 2021”. Globally renowned Internet companies from Facebook to ByteDance are all planning the Metaverse. The 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict was called a “public opinion war” and “cognitive war” with various means by domestic and foreign public opinion experts. Some experts even exclaimed that cognitive domain warfare in the form of the Metaverse has begun. The Metaverse, as an innovative concept of the clustering effect of advanced technology, will become the key to future media content production and gaining cognitive advantages. Exploring the application of the Metaverse in the field of military communication has become an important topic in the era of omnimedia.

1. The special functions of the metaverse determine its broad development prospects

Metaverse was born in the 1992 science fiction novel Snow Crash. The Metaverse described in the novel is a virtual shared space parallel to the real world. According to relevant information, as early as 1990, Qian Xuesen had a vision of virtual reality and Metaverse, and gave it a very meaningful name – “Spirit Realm”. Four years later, Qian Xuesen specifically mentioned: “Spirit Realm technology is another technological revolution after the computer technology revolution. It will trigger a series of changes that will shock the world and must be a major event in human history.” Qian Xuesen had already foreseen that Metaverse-related technologies would bring profound changes to human society.

From originating from science fiction to entering reality, the industry has not yet reached a consensus on the definition of the metaverse. According to the research of relevant experts, the essential characteristics of the metaverse are two: virtual-real integration and immersive experience. Virtual-real integration means that the boundary between the digital world and the physical world gradually disappears, and the economy, life, assets and identity of the two worlds are fully integrated. Immersive experience means that people’s two-dimensional audio-visual experience of the Internet is expanded into a three-dimensional, immersive, full-sensory experience. The special functions of the metaverse determine its broad development prospects.

The Metaverse is the next generation of the Internet. Looking back at the development of the Internet, from PC Internet to mobile Internet, the sense of immersion when using the Internet has gradually increased, and the distance between virtual and reality has gradually shortened. Under this trend, the Metaverse, where both immersion and participation have reached their peak, may be the “ultimate form” of the Internet. Regarding the future development of the Metaverse, some experts predict that: in terms of hardware terminals, with the portable development of wearable devices such as VR/AR glasses, their popularity will increase significantly, and people will gradually adapt to and accept the larger visual range and more natural interaction methods brought by new devices; in terms of content ecology and application scenarios, explosive Metaverse content will continue to emerge, and application scenarios will gradually expand. In the Metaverse, user experience has achieved an improvement and transformation from “online” to “presence”, thus entering the “scenario era”.

The metaverse is a new type of holographic medium. With the development of media technology, the presentation of media content has evolved from one-dimensional, two-dimensional to multi-dimensional. The emergence of the metaverse is another revolution in communication media after radio, television, and the Internet. From the perspective of user experience, the metaverse not only expands the user’s experience space, but also brings an immersive experience of “you are not just watching the content, you are in it as a whole”. From the perspective of media products, a large number of “we are on the scene” news media products will appear in the metaverse. The media products of the metaverse will achieve the advancement of news content with immersive narratives. For example, major sudden incident reports, large-scale live events, news documentaries, etc., can make the complete news scene into a digital scene of the metaverse, allowing the audience to enter the scene from various perspectives for experience. From the perspective of communication methods, there are currently four main modes of information communication: mass communication, network communication, social communication, and intelligent communication. The arrival of the new media of the metaverse will enrich the means of information communication in the era of intelligent communication, and “holographic communication” will become possible.

The metaverse is the future battlefield of cognitive domain warfare. The essence of communication media is the communication platform and channel, which is the material basis and main weapon of cognitive narrative in cognitive domain warfare. The 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict was reported to the world in countless “first-person perspectives”. Both Russia and Ukraine spoke out on online media and social platforms to compete for the dominance of international communication cognitive narrative. As a new type of holographic medium, the metaverse transmits cognition in a full-dimensional, full-system and immersive way. It can shape people’s thinking and cognition more comprehensively, deeply and lastingly, and has immeasurable application value in cognitive warfare. In addition, the metaverse provides a parallel cognitive space that digitally twins real combat scenarios, where cognitive warfare can be efficiently promoted and presented in a panoramic manner.

2. A Preliminary Study on the Application of Metaverse in the Field of Military Communication

Like other new technologies, the metaverse was quickly applied to the field of military communication. The PLA News and Communication Center made a bold attempt and launched the “Holographic Military Newspaper” during the National People’s Congress for three consecutive years. It used technologies such as extended reality and digital construction to show a newspaper full of futuristic atmosphere: you can wear VR glasses to experience the “Holographic Military Newspaper” immersively, or you can watch it through your mobile phone. The “Holographic Military Newspaper” is the first of its kind in the domestic newspaper publishing industry and has been selected as an innovative case of deep integration and development of China’s newspaper industry. During the 2021 National People’s Congress, the center also launched the military media intelligent cartoon virtual person “Xiaojun”, which realized the same-screen interaction between 3D cartoons and real people. In 2022, the center and the Art Department of the PLA Culture and Art Center jointly launched the “2022 Metaverse Military Camp Network Spring Festival Gala”, which used metaverse technology to build a virtual space and interactive platform. Netizens and audiences can enter the three-dimensional virtual space by avatars, visit the performance site, and choose their favorite seats to watch the Spring Festival Gala. They can also interact with the audience around them through language and gestures. Some netizens commented: “It’s so shocking! The literary and artistic light cavalry team expressed it in the form of the metaverse, which shows the advancement of technology!” In addition, the center’s network department also took the lead in launching the public welfare NFT digital collection “Stars Accompany Me to Guard the Border”.

At present, the military-related authoritative media is organizing a team to promote the preliminary research and design of the Metaverse Editorial Department. Looking at the development process from traditional news editorial departments to intelligent editorial departments, combined with the advanced technology and future development of the Metaverse, experts have proposed the concept of “Metaverse Editorial Department”, that is, “Metaverse Editorial Department” enables editors and reporters at multiple locations to efficiently complete planning, interviews, editing, publishing and other tasks “face to face” in the same virtual space, the same chain of command, and the same work system. This will be the evolution of the news editorial department in the future. Each editor and reporter has his or her own virtual workspace. When there is a need for a meeting discussion, they can instantly travel to the virtual conference room for “face-to-face” communication.

3. Thoughts on how to win the cognitive war in the metaverse

A major feature of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict is the deep involvement of social media. Mobile Internet has become the main source of information related to this conflict. As mentioned earlier, the special functions of the metaverse determine its broad development prospects. How to win the cognitive war in the metaverse urgently requires us to think forward-lookingly.

Strive to achieve the autonomy and control of the core technologies of the future metaverse. As a pioneering and innovative frontier field, the metaverse has huge initial R&D costs and requires long-term and continuous high investment to achieve the docking and unification of massive standards and specifications and the connection and interaction of ultra-large-scale users. This also leads to the inherent monopoly gene of the metaverse. At present, American companies such as Facebook, Google, and Microsoft, with the support of their governments and military, have deeply laid out the metaverse, and are very likely to become the technology monopolist and ruler of the future metaverse, just like the current situation of the Internet. In this Russia-Ukraine conflict, these technology giants “one-sidedly” pointed their spearheads at Russia, restricted or even banned Russia from using its technology products, and provided support for the United States to impose comprehensive sanctions. This warns us that in order not to be constrained in technology in the future, we should concentrate the superior forces of the military and the local area, aim at the metaverse technology, work together to tackle key problems, and strive to achieve the autonomy and control of the core technologies of the future metaverse.

Develop a metaverse platform that adapts to cognitive warfare. Developing a metaverse platform that is autonomous, controllable, has a wide coverage, and has a great influence is the key to winning in the cognitive domain battlefield in the future. Back to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, in order to suppress Russia from public opinion, American social platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook, at the instruction of the US officials, directly restricted the exposure of Russian media. It can be said that they have taken advantage of the platform at the cognitive warfare level. This requires us to actively think about the future form of military communication platforms, develop metaverse platforms that adapt to cognitive warfare, and strive to create explosive products. For example, launching a metaverse version of the military’s new media platform.

We should speed up the production and accumulation of immersive content suitable for the era of the Metaverse. In addition to the traditional visible content types, content creation in the Metaverse era has also added a large amount of three-dimensional content, including panoramic shooting, digital twins of the real world, artificial construction of virtual space, and the display of virtual digital people. It is an issue that needs to be considered at present to speed up the production and accumulation of immersive content suitable for the era of the Metaverse. For example, the creation of digital history museums, the creation of heroic virtual people, the reproduction of classic battles, etc., can truly make history “perceptible” and make cultural relics “speaking”. In addition, the independent research and development of content creation tools is also critical.

國語中文：

摘 要：元宇宙作為先進技術群聚效應的創新概念，將成為未來媒體內容生產、贏得認知優勢的關鍵。展望元宇宙發展前景，本文闡釋了元宇宙概念，並圍繞其發展圖景、關鍵技術和實踐應用進行闡釋分析，旨在為元宇宙在軍事傳播領域的應用提供借鑒參考。

關鍵字：元宇宙；軍事傳播；發展前景

元宇宙，目前成為人們競相談論的熱門話題，並入選了「2021年度十大網路用語」。從Facebook到位元組跳動等全球知名網路公司都在版面元宇宙。 2022年的俄烏衝突被國內外輿論戰專家稱作是一場手段多樣的“輿論戰”“認知戰”，有專家甚至驚呼元宇宙形態下的認知域作戰拉開了序幕。元宇宙，作為先進技術群聚效應的創新概念，將成為未來媒體內容生產、贏得認知優勢的關鍵。探尋元宇宙在軍事傳播領域的應用，成為全媒體時代一門重要課題。

一、元宇宙的特殊功能決定了其廣闊的發展前景

元宇宙（Metaverse），誕生於1992年的科幻小說《雪崩》。小說中所描述的元宇宙是一個平行於現實世界的虛擬共享空間。根據相關資料顯示，早在1990年，錢學森就對虛擬實境與元宇宙有過展望，並為其起了個頗有意境的名字—「靈境」。 4年後，錢學森特別提到：「靈境技術是繼電腦科技革命之後的另一場科技革命。它將引發一系列震撼全世界的變革，一定是人類歷史中的大事。」錢學森當時就已預見元宇宙相關技術將對人類社會帶來的深層變革。

從源自科幻到走進現實，業界對於元宇宙的定義還沒能達成共識。根據相關專家的研究，認為元宇宙的本質特徵是兩個：虛實融合和沈浸體驗。虛實融合，就是數位世界和實體世界的邊界逐漸消失，實現兩個世界的經濟、生活、資產和身分認同等全方位的融合。沉浸體驗，就是人們對網路的二維視聽體驗拓展為三維立體、沉浸式的全感官體驗。元宇宙的特殊功能決定了其廣闊的發展前景。

元宇宙是下一代互聯網。回顧網路的發展歷程，從PC互聯網到行動互聯網，使用網路時的沉浸感逐漸提升，虛擬與現實的距離也逐漸縮短。在此趨勢下，沉浸感和參與度都達到高峰的元宇宙或是網路的「終極形態」。對於元宇宙的未來發展，有專家預計：硬體終端方面，隨著VR/AR眼鏡等穿戴設備的便攜化發展，其普及程度將大幅度提高,人們逐漸適應和接受新設備帶來的更大的視覺範圍和更自然的互動方式；內容生態及應用場景方面，爆款元宇宙內容將不斷湧現，應用場景也將逐步拓展。在元宇宙中，使用者體驗實現了從「線上」到「在場」的提升和轉變，從而進入「場景時代」。

元宇宙是新型全息媒介。隨著媒介技術的發展，媒體內容的呈現方式從一維、二維到多維不斷演進。元宇宙的出現，是繼廣播、電視、網路之後傳播媒介的另一次革命。從使用者體驗來看，元宇宙不僅拓展了使用者的體驗空間，也帶來了「你不只是觀看內容，你整個人就身在其中」的沉浸式體驗。從媒體產品來看，元宇宙將出現大量「我們在現場」式的新聞媒體產品。元宇宙的媒體產品將以沉浸式敘事實現新聞內容的進階。例如，重大突發事件報導、大型現場活動、新聞紀錄片等，可以將完整的新聞現場做成元宇宙的一個數位場景，讓觀眾以各種視角進入現場進行體驗。從傳播方式來看，目前，訊息傳播主要有4種傳播模式：大眾傳播、網路傳播、社交傳播、智慧傳播。元宇宙新型媒介的到來將使得智慧傳播時代訊息傳播的手段更為豐富，「全像傳播」成為可能。

元宇宙是認知域作戰的未來戰場。傳播媒介實質就是傳播平台和管道，是認知域作戰中認知敘事的物質基礎和主要武器。 2022年的俄烏衝突以無數「第一視角」的方式向全球報道，俄烏雙方都在網路媒體和社群平台發聲，爭奪國際傳播認知敘事主導權。元宇宙作為新型全像媒介，其傳導認知的方式是全維度、全系統和沈浸式的，能夠更全面、更深入、更持久地塑造人的思維認知，具有不可估量的認知戰應用價值。另外，元宇宙提供了一個將現實作戰場景數位孿生的平行認知空間，在這裡認知戰得以高效率推進和全景式呈現。

二、元宇宙在軍事傳播領域的應用初探

和其他新技術的產生一樣，元宇宙也很快被應用於軍事傳播領域。解放軍新聞傳播中心進行了大膽嘗試，連續3年在全國兩會期間推出的“全息軍報”，運用擴展現實、數字構建等技術，展示了一份充滿未來氣息的報紙：可以佩戴VR眼鏡沉浸式體驗“全息軍報”，也可以透過手機觀看。 「全像軍報」是國內報紙出版業的首創，入選了中國報業深度融合發展創新案例。 2021年全國兩會期間，該中心還推出軍媒智慧卡通虛擬人“小軍”，實現了3D卡通與現實人物的同屏互動。 2022年，該中心和解放軍文化藝術中心文藝部共同推出的“2022年元宇宙軍營網絡春晚”，利用元宇宙技術搭建虛擬空間和互動平台。網友觀眾化身虛擬人即可進入立體虛擬空間，參觀演出現場，並自行選擇喜好的座位觀看春晚，還可以跟著周圍的觀眾進行語言和手勢互動。有網友評價：「太震撼了！文藝輕騎以元宇宙的形式表現，真是科技在進步！」另外，該中心網絡部還率先推出了公益性NFT數字藏品《星星伴我守邊防》。

目前，軍隊相關權威媒體正在組織團隊推進元宇宙編輯部的前期研究和設計。縱觀傳統新聞編輯部到智慧編輯部的發展歷程，結合元宇宙先進技術和未來發展，專家提出了「元宇宙編輯部」的概念，即「元宇宙編輯部」使多點位的編輯記者在同一虛擬空間、同一指揮鏈、同一工作體系裡「面對面」有效率地完成規劃、訪談、編輯、發布等工作。這將是未來新聞編輯部的進化形態，每個編輯記者都擁有各自的虛擬工作空間，當有會議討論需求時，可以瞬間穿越到虛擬會議室進行「面對面」交流。

三、如何在元宇宙中打贏認知戰的思考

2022年俄烏衝突的一個主要特徵，是社群媒體的深度參與。行動互聯網成了這次衝突關聯資訊的主要來源。如前所述，元宇宙的特殊功能決定了其廣闊的發展前景。如何在元宇宙中打贏認知戰，迫切需要我們做前瞻性思考。

努力實現未來元宇宙核心技術的自主可控。元宇宙作為開拓性和創新性的前沿領域，前期研發成本龐大，需要長期且持續的高額投資，以實現大量標準規範的對接統一、超大規模用戶的連結互動。這也導致了元宇宙具有內在壟斷基因。目前，Facebook、Google、微軟等美國公司在其政府和軍方的支持下，深入佈局元宇宙，極大可能成為未來元宇宙的技術壟斷者和統治者，就像現在互聯網的情況一樣。在這次俄烏衝突中，上述這些科技巨頭「一邊倒」地將矛頭對準俄羅斯，限制甚至禁止俄羅斯使用其科技產品，為美國實施全面製裁施壓提供了支撐。這警告我們，為了將來在技術上不被掣肘，應該集中軍地優勢力量，瞄準元宇宙技術，協力攻關，努力實現未來元宇宙核心技術的自主可控。

發展適應認知戰的元宇宙平台。開發自主可控、覆蓋範圍廣、影響力大的元宇宙平台，是未來在認知域戰場上取得勝利的關鍵。回到俄烏衝突中，為了從輿論上打壓俄羅斯，YouTube、Twitter和Facebook等美國的社群平台在美國官方的授意下，直接限制了俄羅斯媒體的曝光率，可以說在認知戰層面佔盡了平台優勢。這就需要我們主動思考未來軍隊傳播平台型態，開發適應認知戰的元宇宙平台，努力打造爆款產品。例如，推出軍隊新媒體平台的元宇宙版本等。

抓緊生產與累積適合元宇宙時代的沉浸式內容。元宇宙時代的內容創作除了傳統可見的內容類型外，還大量增加了三維內容，包括全景拍攝、真實世界的數位孿生、虛擬空間的人工構建、虛擬數位人的展示等等。抓緊生產和累積適合元宇宙時代的沉浸式內容，是當前需要重點考慮的問題。例如，製作數位史館、打造英雄虛擬人、復現經典戰例等等，真正實現讓歷史「可感知」、讓文物「會說話」。另外，內容創作工具的自主研發也很關鍵。

（作者單位：解放軍新聞傳播中心網絡部）

中國軍事資源：https://www.81.cn/rmjz_203219/jsjz/2022nd5q_242715/tbch_242721/10193529.html

Asymmetric Warfare, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Future Wars, Chinese Military Informatization, Cognitive Domain Warfare, 認知域戰

Chinese Cognitive Warfare: Penetrating Quasi-cognitive Domains and Affects on Rules of Multi-domain Operations

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中國認知戰：準認知域的滲透及對多域作戰規則的影響

繁體中文國語：

From the battlefield of “bows and horses, riding and shooting, and swords and weapons” in the era of cold weapons to the three-dimensional battlefield of land, sea, and air in the era of industrialization, to the integrated battlefield covering multiple domains such as physics, information, and cognition in the era of informationization and intelligence, war One of the core logics of form evolution is to continuously enter new domains and integrate multiple domains. Cross-domain aggregation of operational effectiveness has become a basic and decisive mechanism for winning wars. In this process, the cognitive domain has increasingly become a new battlefield that penetrates and affects multi-domain operations, and a new commanding height that determines the success or failure of the war.

The cognitive domain becomes the key to seizing comprehensive control

In modern warfare, the cognitive domain has become the key to seizing comprehensive control. War practice shows that the cognitive domain has increasingly become the focus of planning modern warfare and achieving multi-domain integrated linkage for victory.

Cognitive domain advantage supports multi-domain combat effectiveness doubling. In modern warfare, in the physical domain, we destroy the enemy, preserve ourselves, and compete for control of land, sea, air, and space; in the information domain, we block the enemy, connect ourselves, and compete for network and information control, all of which are related to the cognitive domain. There is a profound connection between the advantage and the initiative position. In the system-versus-system game, once the opponent is suppressed in the cognitive domain and takes the initiative, it can interfere with decision-making on the key nodes of the enemy’s command chain, kill chain, and support chain, making the actions in the physical domain and information domain gain “a huge advantage”. asymmetric benefits, thereby improving the input-output ratio of combat, enhancing the speed and efficiency of local victory leading to overall victory, and reducing the subsequent constraints caused by military strikes in the economic and social life fields.

When planning and implementing multi-domain operations, attention should be paid to the role of the cognitive domain. Modern warfare is significantly complex. Elements of multi-domain operations are interconnected, impacts are transmitted in multiple directions, and risks are superimposed on each other. Every action or even a detail of a multi-domain combat operation will trigger a chain reaction in the cognitive domain on the decision-making issues, military morale, public opinion concerns, social confidence, international public opinion and other levels of both the enemy and ourselves, which will be rapid, sudden, and unexpected. It profoundly affects the overall situation of the war, and even creates a “butterfly storm” that changes the domestic and foreign affairs situation of the warring parties and even the long-term development trend of the country. To plan and implement operations in the physical domain and information domain, we must not only focus on shaping the situation and creating conditions in the cognitive domain, but also accurately control the direction and size of the release of effectiveness in the cognitive domain in accordance with the need to seize control of the brain, mind, and intelligence. The dynamic changes in the number of enemies destroyed, the temporary gains and losses of one city and one place, etc., are increasingly losing their indicator significance in evaluating the direction of the war situation. The overall impact of military operations on the war situation increasingly needs to be considered from the changes in international and domestic public perceptions caused by them. and the psychological impact on specific objects to be evaluated and considered.

The material and technical conditions for the cognitive domain to trigger integrated linkage of multiple domains are becoming increasingly mature. The rapid development of information-based intelligent cognitive perception technology has rapidly developed the game confrontation in the cognitive domain from absolutely “uncalculable” and “uncontrollable” to a considerable degree of “calculable” and “controllable”. Assisted decision-making by technologies such as big data and intelligent algorithms supports the deep integration of different combat forces in the cognitive domain and multi-dimensional command coordination, strengthening political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, military and other aspects of power, means and actions. The consistency and coordination bring about the operability of designing multiple domains, commanding multiple domains, and controlling multiple domains focusing on the cognitive domain. The widespread use of weapons and equipment such as drones and precision-guided bombs has also provided realistic and feasible tactical options for precision strikes through combat operations. The rapid popularization of intelligent communication technologies such as accurate portraits, intelligent distribution, social media live broadcast, robot writing, and virtual reality, as well as the cross-integrated development of neuroscience, cognitive science, and intelligent technology, have made it possible to plan and implement “X+ cognitive attack and defense” and achieve integrated Linked operations have become convenient and efficient.

Cognitive domain penetration affects multi-domain win-win paths

The penetration of the cognitive domain affects the integrated linkage of multiple domains. It is not a simple “1+1”, but the energy of multi-domain actions is instantly concentrated in the cognitive domain, thereby continuously injecting emergent effects that are beneficial to oneself into the overall war. To this end, it is necessary to strengthen the innovative design of combat planning and implementation paths to ensure that multi-domain advantages can be achieved under the influence of cognitive domain penetration.

Use cognitive domain operational requirements to deepen understanding of multi-domain tasks. Focus on the overall national strategic situation, clarify operational requirements in the cognitive domain, and calculate and determine operational tasks in each domain based on this. Establish the must-hit targets and avoidable targets for fire strikes, hit targets first and hit later, hit targets openly and covertly, hit targets hard and hit lightly, etc., and focus on the effect of disintegrating the morale of the opponent’s military. When establishing the goal, timing, intensity, etc. of channel seizure, we must focus on the effectiveness of depriving the opponent of social mobilization and international communication capabilities and the effectiveness of supporting our information release and external propaganda. To establish the focus of intelligence information collection, it is necessary to focus on the ability to grasp the combat power in the cognitive domain of combat opponents, describe the characteristics of cognitive attack and defense target objects in a fine-grained manner, and dynamically grasp international and domestic public opinion and social trends of thought.

Use cognitive domain combat tasks to guide multi-domain action design. Focusing on questions such as “who, what kind of cognitive impact, and to what extent”, the cognitive domain combat tasks in different combat stages and different combat scenarios are subdivided. Based on this, what actions should be organized in each domain and what actions should be captured? Overall planning and detailed design of fighter aircraft, which forces to invest, what tactics to use, how to connect and intersect various actions, etc. The reason why the besieged troops on all sides were able to disintegrate the powerful Chu army was first of all because the Han army completed the military encirclement of the Chu army, and secondly, it used the ingenuity of the captives to sing Chu songs at night. In fact, different timing of operations, different task forces, different weapons and equipment, different choices of tactics and even different naming of operations all convey very different information, and the intensity of the generated cognitive impact is also significantly different, which requires careful consideration and scientific Research and judge, and strive to maximize efficiency and optimize effects. When loading cognitive offensive and defensive actions for operations such as fire strikes, network offense and defense, electronic countermeasures, defensive operations, special operations, etc., different levels of imagination and creative thinking, different technical understanding, application and innovation, the final effect achieved is even more It’s like clouds and mud.

Organize multi-domain collaborative support with cognitive domain combat operations. Cognitive domain combat operations involve multiple participants and various action styles. Normally, they require coordinated support of military and firepower such as precise strikes, seizing key areas, and displaying momentum. In special cases, they also require coordinated strategic forces such as the deployment of cutting-edge weapons and equipment, and the organization of major training exercises. Guarantee requires the commander to make public statements and the media to embed reports and other specific personnel and specific combat units to coordinate the guarantee during the entire operation. Collaborative guarantee in terms of intelligence data, channel bandwidth, forensic information, and technical equipment is even more indispensable. To this end, it is necessary to mobilize multi-domain forces and resources in a full, real-time, systematic and precise manner, so that military warfare, mental warfare, and intellectual warfare can take advantage of each other and support each other to form a game of chess and create a combination of punches.

Pay attention to deepening the conceptual understanding of cognitive domain penetration and impact on multiple domains

Establishing the role of the cognitive domain in penetrating and influencing multi-domain actions and promoting integrated linkage to win is a deep-seated conceptual revolution that requires strengthening various supporting constructions to create conditions and lay the foundation.

Strengthen institutional guarantees. Using cognitive domain penetration to influence multi-domain integrated linkage operations puts forward higher requirements for cross-department and cross-agency collaboration. It is necessary to form a scientific and efficient command link that supports cognitive domain penetration to influence multi-domain and multi-domain integrated linkage. It is necessary to clarify the cognitive domain operational responsibilities of each element of the joint operations command organization, optimize and reorganize the command process, and ensure that the penetration and influence of the cognitive domain are reflected in operational determination, mission planning, and action design. Focusing on cross-domain integrated linkage, establish and improve working systems and collaboration mechanisms at strategic, operational, tactical and other levels, strengthen the mutual support of cognitive domain operations, physical domain operations, and information domain operations, and fully consider military strength and local related functions. The effective cooperation of departments and professional forces transforms comprehensive advantages into cognitive domain capabilities that penetrate, influence, and empower multiple domains.

Improve the commander’s ability and quality. The foreign military believes that qualified commanders in modern warfare need to be good at “quickly transforming active kinetic energy operations into more subtle cultural wars” and should have “unique intuition” and “comprehensive leadership capabilities” in this regard. To realize the integrated linkage of cognitive domain penetration and multi-domain impact in war practice, we first need to strengthen the awareness of cognitive domain operations in the minds of commanders at all levels, and strengthen the formation of a conscious initiative to use cognitive domain penetration to impact multi-domain mission planning and action design. nature, strengthen and improve the ability to implement high-efficiency cognitive attack and defense using military firepower operations and information control as means. Multi-domain coordinated command under the influence of cognitive domain penetration should be regarded as an important part of strategic battle drills, highlighting the ability of commanders to command and control multiple domains with a focus on cognitive shaping, and promote the training field to continue to be closer to winning political and military The actual requirements of the war.

Promote the updating and improvement of joint cultural concepts. Cognitive domain penetration affects multi-domain integrated joint operations, which are the sublimation and optimization of joint operations concepts and mechanisms. In particular, it requires the support and guarantee of joint culture construction that is suitable for it. On the one hand, we must strive to break the influence of traditional war thinking, break down some traditional conceptual barriers, and make cognitive guidance, multi-domain integration, and joint operations the forefront of joint cultural construction and focus on updating concepts. On the other hand, it is necessary to strengthen the construction of the theoretical system of cognitive domain penetration affecting multi-domain integrated joint operations, carry out in-depth research on the winning mechanism of cognitive domain operations and innovation of tactics, and lay a solid ideological foundation with theoretical accumulation.

原始中國軍事繁體普通話：

從冷兵器時代“弓馬騎射、刀兵相接”式戰場到工業化時代的陸、海、空三維戰場，再到信息化智能化時代涵蓋物理、信息、認知等多域的一體戰場，戰爭形態演進的核心邏輯之一即在於不斷邁入新域、整合多域。跨域聚合作戰效能，成為帶有一定基礎性和決定性的戰爭制勝機理。而在此過程中，認知域日益成為滲透影響多域作戰的新戰場，以及攸關戰爭成敗的新的制高點。

認知域成為奪控綜合制權的關鍵

現代戰爭中，認知域成為奪控綜合制權的關鍵。戰爭實踐表明，認知域日益成為運籌現代戰爭、實現多域一體聯動制勝的重心所在。

認知域優勢支援實現多域作戰效能倍增。現代戰爭中，在物理域消滅敵人、保存自己，爭奪制陸、制海、制空、制天權；在信息域阻斷敵人、聯通自己，爭奪制網、制信息權，都與認知域的優勢和主動地位有著極為深刻的關聯。在體系對體系的對壘博弈中，一旦在認知域壓制對手、掌握主動，就能對敵指揮鏈、殺傷鏈、保障鏈的關鍵節點形成決策干擾，使得物理域信息域的行動獲得“四兩撥千斤”的非對稱收益，從而提高作戰的投入產出比，增強局部勝利導向全局勝利的速度和效率，減少軍事打擊在經濟社會生活領域所產生的後續掣肘。

籌劃實施多域作戰行動應重視認知域作用發揮。現代戰爭具有顯著的復雜性，多域作戰之間的要素相互聯通、影響多向傳遞、風險彼此疊加。多域作戰行動的每個動作甚至某個細節都會在敵我雙方的決策議題、軍心意志、民意關切、社會信心、國際輿論等層面引發認知域連鎖反應，由此迅速、突然、出乎預料地影響戰爭全局，甚至釀成改變交戰方內政外交時局乃至國家長期發展走勢的“蝴蝶風暴”。籌劃實施物理域信息域行動，既要著重在認知域塑造態勢、創造條件，又要按照奪控制腦、制心、制智權的需要，在認知域精准控制效能釋放的方向和大小。殲敵數字的動態變化、一城一地的一時得失等，本身越來越失去評價戰局走向的指標意義，軍事行動對於戰局的總體影響，越來越需要從其引發的國際國內公眾認知改變和對特定對象的心理影響等層面去評估考量。

認知域引發多域一體聯動的物質和技術條件日漸成熟。信息化智能化認知感知技術的飛躍發展，使得認知域博弈對抗由絕對的“不可算”“不可控”快速向相當程度上的“可算”“可控”發展。大數據、智能算法等技術的輔助決策，支撐了對不同作戰力量在認知域的深度融合、多維聚力的指揮協同，加強了政治、經濟、外交、文化、軍事等方面力量、手段和行動的一致性協調性，帶來了著眼認知域設計多域、指揮多域、控制多域的可操作性。無人機、精確制導炸彈等武器裝備的廣泛使用，也為通過作戰行動點穴式精准打擊提供了現實可行的戰術方案選項。精准畫像、智能分發、社交媒體直播、機器人寫作、虛擬現實等智能化傳播技術的快速普及，神經科學、認知科學與智能技術的交叉融合發展，使籌劃實施“X+認知攻防”、實現一體聯動作戰變得便捷高效。

認知域滲透影響多域的聚優制勝路徑

認知域滲透影響多域一體聯動，不是簡單的“1+1”，而是將多域行動的能量在認知域即時聚優，從而將有利於己的湧現效應不斷注入戰爭全局。為此，需要加強對作戰籌劃和實施路徑的創新性設計，確保在認知域滲透影響下實現多域聚優制勝。

以認知域作戰需求加深多域任務理解。著眼國家戰略全局，明確認知域作戰需求，據此倒推測算和確定各域作戰任務。確立火力打擊的必打目標和避打目標、先打目標和後打目標、明打目標和暗打目標、重打目標和輕打目標等，要重點考量對作戰對手軍心士氣的瓦解效能。確立信道奪控的目標、時機、強度等，要重點考量對作戰對手社會動員能力、國際傳播能力等的剝奪效能和對我信息釋放、對外宣傳的支撐效能。確立情報信息搜集的重點，要重點考量掌握作戰對手認知域作戰力量、細顆粒描述認知攻防目標對象特征、動態掌握國際國內輿情和社會思潮動態等方面的能力。

以認知域作戰任務引導多域行動設計。圍繞“對誰、產生何種認知影響、影響到何種程度”等問題，細分不同作戰階段、不同作戰場景下的認知域作戰任務，據此對各域組織哪些行動、抓住哪些戰機、投入哪些力量、采用何種戰法、各類行動如何銜接交叉等進行總體規劃和細節設計。四面楚歌之所以能瓦解強楚軍隊，首先是因為漢軍在軍事上完成了對楚軍的包圍，其次是運用了俘虜夜唱楚歌這一攻心巧思。事實上，不同的行動時機、不同的任務部隊、不同的武器裝備、不同的戰法選擇甚至不同的行動命名，傳遞的信息都大相徑庭，生成的認知影響強度也有顯著區別，需要精心推敲、科學研判，力求實現效能最大化、效果最優化。在為火力打擊、網絡攻防、電子對抗、防衛作戰、特種作戰等行動加載認知攻防動作時，不同的想象能力和創意思維水平，不同的技術理解力運用力創新力，最終實現的效果更是判若雲泥。

以認知域作戰行動組織多域協同保障。認知域作戰行動參與主體多元、行動樣式多樣，常態需要精確打擊、要地奪控、示形造勢等兵力火力協同保障，特殊時也需要亮相尖端武器裝備、組織重大演訓演練等戰略力量協同保障，在作戰全程還需要指揮員公開發聲、媒體嵌入報道等特定人員、特定作戰單元協同保障，情報數據、信道帶寬、取證信息、技術裝備方面的協同保障更是須臾不可或缺。為此，就要全程、實時、體系、精准調動多域力量和資源，使兵戰、心戰、智戰相互借勢、相互策應，形成一盤棋、打出組合拳。

注重深化認知域滲透影響多域的理念認識

確立認知域對多域行動的滲透影響地位、推動一體聯動制勝，是一場深層次的理念革命，需要加強各項支撐性建設以創造條件、奠定基礎。

加強制度保障。以認知域滲透影響多域一體聯動作戰，對跨部門、跨機構的協作聯合提出了更高要求，需要形成支撐支持認知域滲透影響多域、多域一體聯動的科學高效指揮鏈路。要明確聯合作戰指揮機構各要素的認知域作戰職責，優化重整指揮流程，確保將認知域的滲透影響作用體現在作戰決心、任務規劃、行動設計之中。圍繞跨域一體聯動，在戰略、戰役、戰術等各個層面建立健全完善工作制度和協作機制，強化認知域作戰與物理域、信息域作戰的相互借勢策應，充分考慮軍隊力量與地方相關職能部門以及專業力量的有效配合，使綜合優勢轉化為認知域滲透影響多域、賦能多域的能力優勢。

提升指揮員能力素養。外軍認為，現代戰爭中合格的指揮員需要善於“將主動的動能作戰快速轉變為更為微妙的文化戰爭”，對此應具有“獨一無二的直覺”和“全面領導能力”。在戰爭實踐中實現認知域滲透影響多域一體聯動，首先需要在各級指揮員頭腦中強化認知域作戰意識，強化形成以認知域滲透影響多域任務規劃和行動設計的自覺性主動性，強化提升以兵力火力行動和信息制權奪控為手段載體實施高效能認知攻防的能力水平。要把認知域滲透影響下的多域統籌指揮作為戰略戰役演訓重要內容，突出錘煉指揮員著眼認知塑造來指揮多域、控制多域的能力，促進演訓場不斷貼近打贏政治軍事仗的現實要求。

推動聯合文化理念更新完善。認知域滲透影響多域一體聯動作戰是對聯合作戰理念和機制的升華和優化，特別需要與之相適應的聯合文化建設支撐保障。一方面，要著力破除傳統戰爭思維定式影響，打破一些傳統觀念壁壘，把認知引導、多域一體、聯動作戰作為聯合文化建設的前沿重點抓好理念更新。另一方面，要加強認知域滲透影響多域一體聯動作戰的理論體系建設，深入展開認知域作戰制勝機理研究和戰法創新，以理論積淀打牢思想根基。

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