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Military Intelligence Drives Accelerated Development of Chinese Army Cyberspace Operations

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軍事情報推動中國軍隊網路空間作戰加速發展

現代英語：

The report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out that it is necessary to “accelerate the development of military intelligence and improve joint combat capabilities and all-region combat capabilities based on network information systems”. Today’s “Liberation Army Daily” published an article pointing out that military intelligence is a new trend and new direction in the development of the military field after mechanization and informatization. We must develop intelligence on the basis of existing mechanization and informatization, and at the same time use intelligence to Traction mechanization and informatization to develop to a higher level and at a higher level. As a new combat field, cyberspace is a new field with high technological content and the most innovative vitality. Driven by military intelligence, it is ushering in a period of rapid development opportunities.

Military intelligence leads to accelerated development of cyberspace operations

■Respect the soldiers Zhou Dewang and Huang Anwei

Three major technologies support the intelligence of cyberspace weapons

Intelligence is a kind of wisdom and ability. It is the induction, cognition and application of laws by all systems with a life cycle. Intelligence is to solidify this wisdom and ability and become a state. A cyberspace weapon is a weapon used in cyberspace to carry out combat missions. Its form is dominated by software and code, and it is essentially a piece of data. The intelligence of cyberspace weapons is mainly reflected in the following three aspects:

First, intelligent vulnerability mining. Vulnerabilities are the basis for the design of cyber weapons. The ransomware that spread around the world in May this year took advantage of vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s operating system and caused a huge shock to the cybersecurity community. Vulnerabilities are expensive, ranging from tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars for a zero-day. The discovery of previous vulnerabilities mainly relied on experienced hackers, who used software tools to check and analyze the code. In the finals of the International Cybersecurity Technology Competition League held during this year’s China Internet Security Conference, participants demonstrated that intelligent robots conduct vulnerability mining on site, and then write network code through vulnerabilities to form cyber weapons, break through target systems, and seize flags. This change means that vulnerability mining has entered an era of intelligence.

Second, intelligent signal analysis and password deciphering. Signals are the carrier of network data transmission, and passwords are the last barrier to network data security. Signal analysis and password deciphering are core technologies for cyberspace operations. Breaking through signals and passwords is the basic path into cyberspace and the primary target of cyber weapon attacks. Intelligent signal analysis solves problems such as protocol analysis, modulation recognition, and individual recognition of signals through big data, cloud computing, deep learning and other technologies. Code-breaking is computational science “the crown jewel”. Through the accumulation of password data samples, intelligent code-breaking can continuously learn and find patterns, and can find the key to deciphering, thereby opening the last door of network data “safe” and solving network problems. Key links of intrusion and access.

Third, the design of an intelligent weapons platform. The U.S. military proposed the “Cyber Aircraft” project in 2009 to provide platforms such as tanks, ships, and aircraft for cyberspace operations. It can realize automatic reconnaissance, loading of cyber weapons, autonomous coordination, and autonomous attacks in cyberspace. When threatened, Self-destruction and removal of traces have certain intelligent characteristics. The weapons loaded by future “cyber aircraft” are not code compiled by software personnel, but directly based on the reconnaissance results to design intelligent cyber weapons on site in real time and achieve “ordered” development, thus greatly improving cyberspace operations. Targeted.

The intelligent trend of network-controlled weapons has become increasingly prominent

Weapons controlled by cyberspace are referred to as cyber-controlled weapons. They are weapons that connect through the network, accept cyberspace instructions, perform cross-domain tasks, and achieve combat effects in physical space. Most of the various combat weapons platforms in the future will be networked weapons platforms. In this way, the military information network is essentially the Internet of Things. Network entities such as uplink satellites, radars, and drones can detect, track, locate, and strike through the Internet. Space control, the intelligence of network-controlled weapons has flourished in battlefields such as land, sea, air, space and electricity.

In 2015, Syria used the Russian Robot Corps to defeat militants. The operation used 6 tracked robots, 4 wheeled robots, 1 automated artillery group, several drones and 1 command system. The commander dispatches drone reconnaissance through the chain of command to spot the militants, and the robots charge the militants, while accompanied by artillery and drone attack force support, delivering a fatal blow to the militants. It was only a small-scale battle, but it set the precedent for robot “group” operations.

Network-controlled intelligent weapons for sea and air battlefields are being developed and verified in large quantities. In 2014, the U.S. Navy used 13 unmanned surface boats to demonstrate and verify that unmanned boat groups intercepted enemy ships and achieved good results mainly by exchanging sensor data. When it was tested again in 2016, functions such as collaborative task allocation and tactical coordination were added, and “swarm awareness” became a distinctive feature of its intelligence.

Swarms of small and micro UAVs for aerial combat are also growing rapidly. In recent years, the U.S. Department of Defense has repeatedly tested the “Quail” micro-drone, which can drop dozens or even hundreds at a time. By improving its coordination capabilities when performing reconnaissance missions, it has made great progress in drone formation, command, control, and intelligence. Progress has been made in management and other aspects.

Space-based cyber-controlled weapons are becoming more and more “smart”. The air and space field mainly contains two types of network-controlled weapons: reconnaissance and strike. Satellites with various functions mainly perform reconnaissance missions and are typical reconnaissance sensors. With the emergence of various small and microsatellite groups, satellites have been made to exhibit new characteristics: small size, fast launch, large number, and greater intelligence. Small and microsatellite groups have greater flexibility and reliability when performing reconnaissance and communication missions, and currently the world’s satellite powers are actively developing plans for small and microsatellite groups with wider coverage.

Hypersonic strike weapons of all kinds cruised in the air and space, as if sharp swords were hanging over people’s heads. The U.S. Air Force Research Office stated that “high-speed strike weapons” will launch flight tests around 2018, and other countries are also actively developing similar weapons. The biggest features of this type of weapon are their high speed, long range, and high intelligence.

Intelligent command information system changes traditional combat command methods

Cyberspace weapons and weapons controlled by cyberspace are the “fist” of intelligent warfare, and the command information system that directs the use of these weapons is the “brain” of intelligent warfare. Cyberspace combat command information systems must keep up with intelligence simultaneously. process. At present, almost all command information systems in the world are facing the difficult problem of “intelligent lag”. In future wars, rapid decision-making and autonomous decision-making are required, which places higher requirements on intelligent auxiliary systems.

In 2007, the U.S. Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency launched a research and development program on command and control systems ——“Project Dark Green” in order to enable computer-aided commanders to make rapid decisions and win opportunities. This is a campaign tactical-level command information system. Its research and development purpose is to embed the system into the U.S. Army brigade-level C4ISR wartime command information system to achieve intelligent command of commanders. To this day, the U.S. military has not relaxed its development of intelligent command information systems.

In cyberspace operations, the network target appears as an IP address connected to the network. The large number makes it difficult for manual operations to operate efficiently, and operations require the auxiliary support of intelligent command information systems. Currently, intelligent command information systems need to realize functions such as intelligent intelligence analysis, intelligent perception, intelligent navigation and positioning, intelligent assisted decision-making, intelligent collaboration, intelligent evaluation, and intelligent unmanned combat, especially to realize cluster combat control of unmanned network control systems, which has put forward urgent needs for intelligent command information systems and requires accelerating the research and development and application of corresponding key technologies.

To sum up, intelligent cyber weapons and cyber-controlled weapons, through intelligent information system scheduling, will form huge combat capabilities and can basically carry out all actions in the current combat style. In future wars, from the formation of command forces, to target selection, mode of action, use of tactics, etc., will all be carried out in an intelligent context. The characteristics of war “gamification” will be more significant, and the combat command method will also undergo major changes.

In the future battlefield, fighting courage requires more fighting “wisdom”

■Yang Jian and Zhao Lu

At present, the development of artificial intelligence has entered a new stage, and its penetration into various fields has begun to accelerate. As a result of this process, military competition among nations around intelligence has begun. Our army has always been a heroic and tenacious people’s army that dares to fight and win. In the future, we should continue to carry forward the glorious tradition on the battlefield. At the same time, we must more extensively master and utilize the latest scientific and technological achievements, develop more intelligent weapons and equipment, and develop more intelligent weapons and equipment. Take advantage of the opportunity to win on the battlefield.

Intelligence is a trend in the development of human society, and the war on intelligence is accelerating. It is thanks to successful innovations that go beyond the original architectural computing models, the gradual popularization of nanofabrication technologies, and breakthrough advances in the study of human brain mechanisms that the development of military intelligence has acquired a solid foundation. As a result, intelligent weapons and equipment have become increasingly prominent and are beginning to surpass and replace humans in intelligence analysis, combat response, and more. In addition, in terms of manpower requirements, comprehensive support and operating costs, intelligent weapons and equipment also have obvious advantages and are increasingly becoming the dominant force in warfare.

It has been proven that the development and application of intelligent weapons and equipment has expanded the scope of capabilities for military operations and greatly improved the combat effectiveness of the troops. On the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq, UAVs have taken on most of the operational support tasks of reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and about one-third of the air strike tasks. In the past two years, Russia has also repeatedly used unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, combat robots and other equipment with a high degree of intelligence on the Syrian battlefield. Intelligent weapons and equipment are increasingly demonstrating important values that go beyond traditional weapons.

In future wars, the competition for intelligent combat systems will be the key to victory in master battles and peak duels. With the increasing imbalance in the development of military means supported by science and technology, whoever has the ability to implement intelligent operations first will be better able to take the initiative on the battlefield. The strong with the advantage of technological generation will try their best to The cost of war is minimized, while the weak will inevitably suffer huge losses and pay heavy prices. We must not only step up core technological innovation and weapons and equipment development, but also study and explore organizational structures, command methods and application models that adapt to the intelligent development of the military. We must also cultivate a team that can take on the responsibility of promoting the intelligent development of the military and forging intelligent combat capabilities. Talent team, give full play to the overall effectiveness of our military’s combat system, and compete with our opponents Win wars in a more “intelligent” way.

現代國語：

資料來源：中國軍網綜合作者：敬兵 周德旺 皇安偉 等責任編輯：胡雪珂

黨的十九大報告指出，要「加速軍事智慧化發展，提升基於網路資訊體系的聯合作戰能力、全域作戰能力」。今天的《解放軍報》刊發文章指出，軍事智能化是機械化、資訊化之後軍事領域發展的新趨勢和新方向，我們要在現有機械化和資訊化基礎上發展智能化，同時用智能化牽引機械化和信息化向更高水平、更高層次發展。網路空間作為新型作戰領域，是科技含量高、最具創新活力的新領域，在軍事智慧化的牽引下，正迎來快速發展的機會期。

軍事智慧化牽引網路空間作戰加速發展

■敬兵 週德旺 皇安偉

三大技術支撐網路空間武器智慧化

智能是一種智慧和能力，是一切有生命週期的系統對規律的感應、認知與運用，智能化就是把這種智慧和能力固化下來，成為一種狀態。網路空間武器是網路空間遂行作戰任務的武器，其形態以軟體和程式碼為主，本質上是一段資料。網路空間武器的智慧化主要體現在以下三個方面：

一是智慧化漏洞挖掘。漏洞是網路武器設計的基礎，今年5月在全球傳播的勒索病毒軟體，就是利用了微軟作業系統漏洞，為網路安全界帶來了巨大震動。漏洞價格昂貴，零日漏洞價值幾萬到幾十萬美元不等。過去漏洞的發現，主要依靠有經驗的駭客，利用軟體工具對程式碼進行檢查和分析。今年中國網路安全大會期間舉辦的國際網路安全技術對抗聯賽總決賽中，參賽人員示範由智慧機器人現場進行漏洞挖掘，然後透過漏洞編寫網路程式碼，形成網路武器，攻破目標系統，奪取旗幟。這項變化，意味著漏洞挖掘進入了智慧化時代。

二是智能化訊號分析和密碼破譯。訊號是網路資料傳輸的載體，密碼是網路資料安全的最後屏障，訊號分析和密碼破解是網路空間作戰的核心技術，突破訊號和密碼是進入網路空間的基本路徑，也是網路武器攻擊的首要目標。智慧化訊號分析將訊號的協定分析、調變辨識、個體辨識等問題，透過大數據、雲端運算、深度學習等技術來解決。密碼破解是計算科學“皇冠上的明珠”，智能化密碼破譯通過對密碼數據樣本的積累，不斷學習、尋找規律，能找到破譯的鑰匙，從而打開網絡數據“保險櫃”的最後一扇門，解決網絡入侵和接入的關鍵環節。

三是智慧化武器平台設計。美軍在2009年提出「網路飛行器」項目，為網路空間作戰提供像戰車、艦艇、飛機這樣的平台，可以實現在網路空間裡自動偵察、載入網路武器、自主協同、自主攻擊，受到威脅時自我銷毀、清除痕跡，具備了一定的智慧化特徵。未來「網路飛行器」載入的武器，不是軟體人員編好的程式碼，而是根據偵察結果直接對發現的漏洞，現場即時進行智慧化網路武器設計，實現「訂購式」開發，從而大大提高網路空間作戰的針對性。

網控武器的智慧化趨勢愈加凸顯

受網路空間控制的武器簡稱網路武器，是透過網路連接，接受網路空間指令，執行跨域任務，在實體空間達成作戰效果的武器。未來的各種作戰武器平台，大多是聯網的武器平台，這樣軍事資訊網本質上就是物聯網，上聯衛星、雷達、無人機等網路實體，從感知到發現、追蹤、定位、打擊都可透過網路空間控制，網控武器的智慧化已在陸海空天電等戰場蓬勃發展。

2015年，敘利亞利用俄羅斯機器人軍團擊潰武裝分子，行動採用了包括6個履帶式機器人、4個輪式機器人、1個自動化火砲群、數架無人機和1套指揮系統。指揮官透過指揮系統調度無人機偵察發現武裝分子，機器人向武裝分子發動衝鋒，同時伴隨火砲和無人機攻擊力量支援，對武裝分子進行了致命打擊。這只是一場小規模的戰鬥，卻開啟了機器人「組團」作戰的先河。

海空戰場網控智慧武器正在大量研發驗證。 2014年，美國海軍使用13艘無人水面艇，示範驗證無人艇集群攔截敵方艦艇，主要透過交換感測器數據，取得了不錯的效果。 2016年再次試驗時，新增了協同任務分配、戰術配合等功能，「蜂群意識」成為其智慧化的顯著特徵。

用於空中作戰的小微型無人機蜂群也正在快速發展。近年來，美國國防部多次試驗「山銻」微型無人機，可一次投放數十架乃至上百架，透過提升其執行偵察任務時的協同能力，在無人機編隊、指揮、控制、智慧化管理等方面都取得了進展。

空天網控武器越來越「聰明」。空天領域主要包含偵察和打擊兩類網控武器，各種功能的衛星主要執行偵察任務，是典型的偵察感測器。隨著各種小微衛星群的出現，使衛星表現出新的特徵：體積小、發射快、數量多、更聰明。小微衛星群在執行偵察和通訊任務時，有了更大的彈性和可靠性，目前世界衛星強國都在積極制定覆蓋範圍更廣的小微衛星群計畫。

各種高超音速打擊武器在空天巡航，彷彿懸在人們頭頂的利劍。美國空軍研究室稱「高速打擊武器」將在2018年前後啟動飛行試驗，其它各國也正積極研發類似武器。這類武器最大的特色是速度快、航程遠、智能化程度高。

智慧化指揮資訊系統改變傳統作戰指揮方式

網路空間武器和受網路空間控制的武器，是智慧化戰爭的“拳頭”，而指揮這些武器運用的指揮資訊系統是智慧化戰爭的“大腦”，網路空間作戰指揮資訊系統要同步跟上智慧化的進程。目前，幾乎全球的指揮資訊系統都面臨著「智慧滯後」的難題，未來戰爭需要快速決策、自主決策，這對智慧輔助系統提出了更高要求。

2007年，美國國防部高級研究計劃局啟動關於指揮控制系統的研發計劃——“深綠色計劃”，以期能實現計算機輔助指揮官快速決策贏得制勝先機。這是一個戰役戰術級的指揮資訊系統，其研發目的是將該系統嵌入美國陸軍旅級C4ISR戰時指揮資訊系統中去，實現指揮官的智慧化指揮。直到今天，美軍也沒有放鬆對智慧化指揮資訊系統的發展。

在網路空間作戰中，網路目標表現為一個接取網路的IP位址，數量眾多導致人工難以有效率操作，作戰更需要智慧化指揮資訊系統的輔助支撐。目前，智慧化指揮資訊系統需要實現智慧情報分析、智慧感知、智慧導航定位、智慧輔助決策、智慧協同、智慧評估、智慧化無人作戰等功能，尤其是實現對無人網控系統的集群作戰操控，這都對智慧化指揮資訊系統提出了迫切需求，需要加快相應關鍵技術的研發和運用。

綜上所述，智慧化的網路武器和網路控制武器，透過智慧化的資訊系統調度，將形成巨大的作戰能力，基本能遂行現行作戰樣式中的所有行動。未來戰爭，從指揮力量編組、到目標選擇、行動方式、戰法運用等，都將在智能化的背景下展開，戰爭「遊戲化」的特徵將更顯著，作戰指揮方式也將發生重大變化。

未來戰場 鬥勇更需鬥“智”

■楊建　趙璐

目前，人工智慧發展進入嶄新階段，並開始向各個領域加速滲透。受此一進程的影響，各國圍繞智慧化的軍事競爭已揭開序幕。我軍歷來是一支英勇頑強、敢打必勝的人民軍隊，未來戰場上應繼續發揚光榮傳統，同時要更加廣泛地掌握和利用最新的科技成果，研製出更多智能化的武器裝備，在未來戰場上掌握制勝先機。

智慧化是人類社會發展的趨勢，智慧化戰爭正加速到來。正是由於超越原有體系結構計算模型的成功創新、奈米製造技術的逐步普及，以及對人腦機制研究的突破性進展，軍事智慧化發展才擁有了堅實的基礎。因此，智慧化武器裝備的表現日益突出，並在情報分析、戰鬥反應等方面開始超越並取代人類。此外，在人力需求、綜合保障、運作成本等方面，智慧化武器裝備也具有明顯的優勢，日益成為戰爭的主導力量。

事實證明，智慧化武器裝備的發展應用，拓展了軍事行動的能力範圍，大幅提升了部隊的作戰效能。在阿富汗和伊拉克戰場上，無人機已承擔了大部分偵察、情報、監視等作戰保障任務，並承擔了約三分之一的空中打擊任務。近兩年，俄羅斯在敘利亞戰場上也曾多次使用較高智慧化程度的無人偵察機、戰鬥機器人等裝備。智慧化武器裝備正愈來愈地展現出超越傳統武器的重要價值。

未來戰爭中，作戰體系智能化的較量將是高手過招、巔峰對決的勝利關鍵。隨著以科技為支撐的軍事手段發展的不平衡性越來越大，誰先具備實施智能化作戰的能力，誰就更能掌握戰場的主動權，擁有技術代差優勢的強者會盡可能將戰爭成本降到最低，而弱者必然遭受巨大損失，付出慘重代價。我們不僅要加緊核心技術創新、武器裝備研製，還要研究探索適應軍事智能化發展的組織結構、指揮方式和運用模式，更要培養一支能夠擔起推進軍事智能化發展、鍛造智能化作戰能力的人才隊伍，充分發揮我軍作戰體系的整體效能，在與對手的較量中，以更加“智慧”的方式贏得戰爭。

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.81.cn/jwzl/2017-11/24/content_7841895888.htm

#Artificial #Intelligence, #Chinese Military Joint Oprations, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Use of Cognitive Confrontation within the Combat Domain, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare

Chinese Military Deciphering Cognitive Warfare Codes Capability Based on Operational Decision Chains

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中國軍隊基於作戰決策鏈破解認知戰密碼的能力

現代英語：

Cognition is the basis for operational decisions and operations. Cognitive warfare is a confrontation activity carried out in the cognitive domain. The purpose is to attack the enemy’s knowledge system, social consciousness, people’s morale, etc., disrupt its judgment and decision-making, and cause it to lose its decision-making advantage and action advantage. To deepen the research on cognitive warfare and decipher the cognitive warfare code, the key is to embed the combat decision-making chain and explore how to influence and interfere with the cognitive activities of the enemy’s decision-making chain, causing the enemy to form false observations, wrong judgments and poor decisions, so as to fully control Cognitive initiative.

Seeing is false, changing the facts

Observation is the starting point of cognition. No matter what kind of war, when facing any opponent, the first step is observation. The observation here is a broad concept and is about all activities to obtain all relevant information about the hostile party. Just as people perceive external things through sensory organs, observation relies on the battlefield perception system to obtain relevant data and information from the battlefield environment according to the needs of the subject, providing “ source material ” for judgment and decision-making. Observation uses intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance and other activities to obtain as much factual information and materials from all aspects of the enemy as possible and convert them into text, images, audio, video and sensor signals.

The history of war at home and abroad in ancient and modern times shows that the essence of command is the endless pursuit of certainty, including the status and intentions of enemy troops, various factors affecting the combat environment such as weather and terrain, as well as the status and actions of one’s own troops. Therefore, efficient command consists in clarifying each element and then coordinating it as a whole to achieve the best combat effect. Human judgment and decision-making are easily disturbed by information uncertainty. In the observation stage, the key to cognitive warfare is to make the enemy unable to clearly observe, incompletely observe, and distort the information of their own combat elements, and lack real information or accurate understanding, thereby weakening the enemy’s decision-making on combat at the source. The pursuit of certainty.

Measures for observing cognitive warfare, in addition to common information warfare methods, such as disguise, interference, deception, silence, etc., should also pay attention to the following aspects: First, create complex situations. War is inherently full of complexity. By creating complexity, it increases the fog and resistance on the battlefield, making it impossible for the enemy to observe the real specific situation. For example, by creating various events and operations in multi-dimensional combat areas such as land, sea, air, sky, and network, and making irregular changes, it can effectively increase the difficulty of enemy observation. The second is to interfere with observation and cognition. Observation is not aimless. It is carried out based on a certain cognition. Cognition determines what information needs to be observed, what kind of reconnaissance activities need to be carried out, etc. For example, during observation activities, by interfering with operations, the enemy’s attention in observation activities is affected, causing it to lose the ability to focus on essential issues and key issues, thereby making it unable to obtain key information. The third is to shape the factual narrative. Shaping factual narratives is to reformulate, combine, arrange, and reconstruct facts according to the needs of cognitive warfare. These facts are either created out of nothing, highlight certain details in the facts, or are difficult to verify and test, making their observation materials Mixed with fictional facts, the observed facts are far from objective facts. The fourth is to protect specific knowledge. Knowledge protection is an important aspect of cognitive warfare. The main contents include: commander’s decision-making style, combat theory reasoning process, premises and assumptions, key tactical ideas and combat principles, key decision-making procedures, mechanisms and methods, information analysis methods, especially some algorithms, passwords, etc.

Targeting the judgment, misleading the judgment

On the battlefield, simple observation and data collection do not make much sense. Only by analyzing these data “ by looking at the essence of the phenomenon, and then drawing various judgments, will we promote the formation of operational decisions. For example, during the Battle of Moscow in World War II, the Soviet Union had a lot of and messy information about the Japanese Kwantung Army. Finally, after careful analysis, it was concluded that “ the Soviet Union could be considered safe in the Far East, and the threat from Japan had been ruled out ” After the judgment, it was decided to transfer troops from the Far East to Moscow to participate in the Battle of Moscow. Judgment is the corresponding conclusion reached by analyzing and reasoning the observation results, which mainly includes: first, factual judgment, usually expressed in descriptive language, such as the current situation, enemy battlefield deployment, battlefield posture, etc.; second, value and relationship judgment, usually Expressed in evaluative language, such as threat assessment, correlation analysis, trend prediction, etc.

Judgment cognitive warfare is actually a game surrounding judgment. Normally, judgments arise on the basis of a judgment, without which there would be no conclusion of judgment. Whether a person has high blood pressure or diabetes is often based on some medical indicators, and these indicators are the criteria. The premises and assumptions of reasoning are actually based on judgments. “ Persian cat story ” circulated in World War I. Judging from the location of the command post from a Persian cat, it contains a series of judgments: there is no village around, and it cannot be a cat raised by ordinary civilians; the sound of artillery on the battlefield is rumbling, and it cannot be It is a wild cat that is cautious and avoids people; Persian cats are a valuable breed, and the position of cat owners is not low; cats appear at fixed times every day, and the command post should be near cats. Therefore, interfering with judgment is to target the judgment to design and produce information products so that the facts obtained do not match the judgment, or to minimize the leakage of information related to the judgment, so that the enemy cannot judge or make wrong judgments.

The main contents of the interference criterion are: First, the interference is based on experience. Based on enemy experience, create “ virtual facts ” to make errors in judgment. For example, in the Battle of Maling, Sun Bin halved the stove to lure Pang Juan, which is a typical example. Because according to experience, the number of stoves is directly proportional to the number of troops. Halving the number of stoves every day means that the number of people is decreasing. The possibility of reduction is that the soldiers have suffered greater casualties, which leads to the judgment of weakening combat power. The second is to interfere with the judgment based on the knowledge system. Such knowledge includes the enemy’s common sense, concepts, principles and some assumptions. For example, in the Fourth Middle East War that broke out in October 1973, Israel’s initial defeat was a misjudgment of the war situation. It believed that as long as its air force was still in an advantageous position, the other side would never dare to attack. However, Egypt began to adopt new military technology and used mobile surface-to-air missiles to support an air defense network, partially offsetting Israel’s air superiority. The third is to interfere with judgments based on universal culture. That is, design corresponding information and actions based on the enemy’s cultural characteristics so that they can be misjudged due to cultural differences. According to foreign information, during the Cold War, the United States studied the root causes of “ Soviet behavior, so it started from culture and behavior to induce the Soviet Union to make strategic misjudgments. The fourth is to interfere with methodological-based judgments. Generalizations, analogies, etc. are the basic methods of judgment. Cognitive interference based on methodology makes it difficult for the other party to understand facts and cannot be compared with known facts; complicating the causal relationship and confusing factual cause and effect, psychological cause and effect, conditional cause and effect, social cause and effect, etc., making it impossible to implement causal judgment; reducing possible signs and phenomena, making it impossible to see through the essence and make accurate judgments.

Focus on the process and influence decision-making

Operational decision-making is based on combat purposes and intentions. After observation and judgment, various factors are combined to derive the optimal solution to the problem. War or conflict behavior has game, competition and confrontation attributes, so decision-making is a game. Decisions address key issues such as whether to do it, how to do it, what purpose to achieve, or the state of termination. In information-based local wars, action-centeredness gradually replaces planning-centeredness, requiring an increase from data center warfare, information center warfare, and knowledge center warfare to decision-making center warfare. Combat decision-making has become one of the main areas of competition between the enemy and ourselves.

Decision-making cognitive warfare is to target enemy cognition and interfere with the decision-making process to affect the quality and efficiency of decision-making. Decision-making is affected by the knowledge structure of the decision-maker himself. If cognition is paranoid or the knowledge reserve is outdated, even if the judgment is correct, good decisions will still not be made. The decision-making process includes the application and change process of knowledge structure, which mainly involves procedural knowledge and conceptual principled knowledge. The former includes decision-making procedures and methods, decision-making mechanisms and evaluation methods, etc., while the latter includes understanding of battlefield posture, winning mechanism, combat concepts, combat rules, and weapons and equipment performance. Therefore, cognitive attacks on the decision-making process will greatly affect its decision-making speed and quality.

The main ways to influence cognitive warfare in decision-making are: First, squeezing the cognitive decision-making space. When watching tennis matches, commentary on non-forced errors and forced mistakes are often heard, with forced mistakes being those caused by putting pressure on the opponent. Interfering with the cognitive decision-making environment is to put pressure on the enemy’s cognitive decisions, thereby squeezing the cognitive space and weakening cognition to force the enemy to make mistakes in decision-making. For example, through virtual and real decision-making activities and actions, the opponent is trapped in decision-making difficulties, which increases the probability of low-level decision-making. The second is to attack rational cognition. Including: First, interfering with the understanding of threats and opportunities. Many examples of failures in military history are caused by misjudgment of threats and opportunities on the battlefield. Whether you despise the enemy or overestimate the enemy, you will form decision-making expectations that are different from objective reality, leading to adverse action results. Second, attack combat theory and doctrine. For example, by proposing the theory of mutual restraint, deliberately exaggerating the loopholes in the enemy’s doctrine, and amplifying the adverse effects of the enemy’s combat operations, the enemy can arouse doubts about its own theory and doctrine. Third, for procedural knowledge. Including decision-making mechanisms, procedures and methods, plan evaluation and combat evaluation methods, auxiliary decision-making systems, algorithms, thinking, etc. Attacking the weaknesses present will also cause decision-making errors. The third is to interfere with irrational factors. The use of irrational factors often creates decision-making traps, such as groupthink traps, conceit traps, etc., which have a significant impact on decision-making. The strategic deception successfully implemented by the Allied forces many times during World War II was to use the enemy’s ambiguous and misleading analysis to increase the probability that the wrong decision would win.

現代國語：

來源：中國軍網-解放軍報 作者：吳中和 朱小寧 責任編輯：王韻
2022-09-13 06:48:xx
吳中和 朱小寧

引言

認知是作戰決策與行動的基礎。認知戰是在認知域進行的對抗活動，目的是攻擊敵知識體系、社會意識、民心士氣等，打亂其判斷與決策，使其失去決策優勢與行動優勢。深化認知戰研究，破譯認知戰密碼，關鍵是嵌入作戰決策鏈，探究如何影響和乾擾敵決策鏈的認知活動，致敵形成不真實的觀察、錯誤的判斷和糟糕的決策，從而充分掌控認知主動權。

眼見為虛，改變事實

觀察是認知的起點。無論何種戰爭，面對任何對手，首先要做的第一步就是為觀察。這裡的觀察是一個廣義概念，是關於獲得敵對方所有相關資訊的一切活動。正如人類透過感覺器官感知外界事物一樣，觀察依托戰場感知系統，根據主體需要從戰場環境中獲得相關數據與訊息，為判斷和決策提供「原始材料」。觀察通過情報、偵察、監視等活動，盡可能多地獲取敵對方各方面的事實信息與材料，並將其轉化為文本、圖像、音頻、視頻和傳感器信號等。

古今中外的戰爭史表明，指揮的本質是對確定性的無盡追求，包括敵軍部隊狀態和意圖，天候、地形等影響作戰環境的種種因素，以及己方部隊的狀態和行動。因而，高效率的指揮在於廓清每個要素，然後將其整體協調起來行動，以達成最佳作戰效果。而人的判斷決策，很容易受資訊的不確定性幹擾。在觀察階段，認知戰的關鍵就在於，使敵人對己方各種作戰要素觀察不清、觀察不全、觀察的信息失真混亂，缺乏真實信息或準確理解，從而從源頭上削弱敵方對作戰決策確定性的追求。

觀察認知戰的措施，除了通常的資訊戰方法，如偽裝、幹擾、欺騙、靜默等，還應注意以下方面：一是製造復雜局面。戰爭本來就充滿複雜性，通過製造複雜性，增加戰場的迷霧和阻力，使敵人無法觀察到真實具體情況。如，透過在陸、海、空、天、網絡等多維作戰域製造各種事件與行動，並作無規則變動，可有效增加敵方觀察的難度。二是乾擾觀察認知。觀察不是毫無目的的，是基於某種認知進行的，認知決定需要觀察哪些資訊、採取何種偵察活動等。如，在觀察活動中，透過幹擾行動，影響敵方觀察活動的注意力，使其失去聚焦本質問題、關鍵問題的觀察能力，進而使其始終無法獲得關鍵資訊。三是塑造事實敘事。塑造事實敘事，就是根據認知戰需要，重新表述、組合、編排、再建構事實，這些事實要麼是無中生有，要麼是突出事實中的某些細節、要麼是難以查實和檢驗等，使其觀察材料中混雜於虛構事實，觀察的事實與客觀事實相距甚遠。四是保護特定知識。知識保護是認知戰的重要面向。主要內容有：指揮員決策風格，作戰理論推理過程、前提與假設，關鍵戰術思想與作戰原則，關鍵決策程序、機制與方法，資訊分析方法特別是一些演算法、密碼等。

瞄準判據，誤導判斷

戰場上，簡單的觀察和資料收集並沒有太多意義，只有對這些數據進行「透過現像看本質」地分析，進而得出各種判斷，才會推動形成作戰決策。如第二次世界大戰莫斯科保衛戰中，蘇聯有關日本關東軍的資訊多而雜亂，最後經過縝密分析，得出「蘇聯在遠東地區可以認為是安全的，來自日本方面的威脅已排除」的判斷後，才決定將遠東方面的部隊調往莫斯科，參加莫斯科保衛戰。判斷是對觀察結果進行分析推理而得出的相應結論，主要包括：一是事實判斷，通常用描述性語言表達，如當前形勢、敵方的戰場部署、戰場態勢等；二是價值和關系判斷，通常用評價性語言表達，如威脅評估、關聯分析、趨勢預測等。

判斷認知戰，實際上是圍繞判據展開的一種博弈。通常情況下，判斷是基於判據產生的，沒有判據，就不會有判斷結論。一個人是否患有高血壓、糖尿病，往往基於一些醫學指標，這些指標就是判據。推理的前提與假設，實際上也是基於判據。一戰中流傳的“波斯貓的故事”，從一隻波斯貓判斷出指揮所位置，就包含著一系列判據：周圍沒有村莊，不可能是普通平民養的貓；戰場上炮聲隆隆，不可能是謹慎避人的野貓；波斯貓是名貴品種，養貓的人職位不低；貓每天固定時間出現，指揮家應該就在貓出沒在貓出沒。因此，幹擾判斷就是瞄準判據進行資訊產品設計與生產，使其獲得的事實與判據不匹配，或盡量減少自己與判據相關資訊的洩漏，從而使敵方無法判斷或做出錯誤的判斷。

幹擾判據的主要內容有：一是乾擾以經驗為基礎的判據。根據敵方經驗，製造“虛擬事實”，使其判斷失誤。如馬陵之戰中孫臏日減半灶以誘龐涓，就是典型的例子。因為根據經驗，灶與軍隊人數成正比，日減半灶說明人數在減少，減少的可能性是士兵傷亡較大，從而得出戰力減弱的判斷。二是乾擾以知識體係為基礎的判據。此類知識，包括敵方的常識、概念、原則及一些假設等。如1973年10月爆發的第四次中東戰爭，以色列最初的失利在於對戰局的誤判，認為只要自己的空軍仍處於優勢地位，對方就絕對不敢進攻。但是，埃及開始採用新的軍事技術，運用移動式地空飛彈撐起一張空中防禦網，部分抵銷了以色列的空中優勢。三是乾擾以普遍文化為基礎的判據。即根據敵方文化特徵，設計相應資訊與行動，使其因文化差異而產生誤判。據國外資料介紹，冷戰時期美國曾研究了“蘇聯行為的根源”，因此從文化與行為上入手做文章，誘使蘇聯產生戰略誤判。四是乾擾以方法論為基礎的判據。概括、類比等是判斷的基本方法。針對方法論的認知幹擾，就是使對方難以了解事實，無法與已知事實類比；將因果關系復雜化，把事實因果、心理因果、條件因果、社會因果等混淆起來，無法實施因果判斷；減少可能的徵兆和現象，使其無法看透本質，無從進行準確判斷。

著眼過程，影響決策

作戰決策，是針對作戰目的和企圖，經過觀察和判斷，將各種因素綜合起來，推導出解決問題的最優方案。戰爭或沖突行為，具有博弈、競爭和對抗屬性，因而決策即是​​博弈。決策解決的是乾不干、怎麼幹，達到什麼目的或終止狀態等關鍵問題。在資訊化局部戰爭中，以行動為中心逐步取代以計畫為中心，要求從資料中心戰、資訊中心戰、知識中心戰上升為決策中心戰，作戰決策更成為敵我雙方競逐的主要領域之一。

決策認知戰，就是瞄準決策過程中敵方認知進行攻擊幹擾，以影響決策品質與效率。決策受到決策者本身知識結構的影響，如果認知發生偏執或知識儲備過時，即使判斷正確了，仍然得不出好的決策。決策過程包含了知識結構的運用與變化過程，主要涉及程序性知識和概念原理性知識，前者包括決策程序與方法、決策機制與評估方法等，後者包括對戰場態勢、制勝機理、作戰概念、作戰法則、武器裝備表現的認識等。因而，對決策過程中的認知攻擊，將大大影響其決策速度與品質。

影響決策認知戰的主要途徑有：一是擠壓認知決策空間。觀看網球比賽時，經常聽到非逼迫性失誤和逼迫性失誤的解說，逼迫性失誤是指由於給對手造成壓力引起的失誤。幹擾認知決策環境，就是給敵方認知決策壓力，從而擠壓認知空間，削弱認知力，以逼迫敵人決策出現失誤。如，透過虛實相間的決策活動與行動，讓對手陷入決策困境，致其增加出現低水準決策的機率。二是攻擊理性認知。包括：其一，幹擾對威脅與機會的認知。軍事史上許多失敗的戰例，都是誤判戰場上的威脅與機會所引起的。無論輕視敵人，或高估敵人，都會形成與客觀實際不一樣的決策預期，導致不利的行動結果。其二，攻擊作戰理論與條令。如透過提出相剋的理論、刻意渲染敵條令的漏洞、放大敵方作戰行動的不利效果等，引起敵方對自身理論與條令的懷疑。其三，針對程序性知識。包括決策的機制、程序與方法，方案評估與作戰評估方法，輔助決策系統、演算法、思維等，攻擊其中的弱點，也會造成決策失誤。第三是乾擾非理性因素。對非理性因素加以利用，往往會造成決策陷阱，如群思陷阱、自負陷阱等，對決策有重大影響。二戰中盟軍曾多次成功實施的戰略欺騙，就是利用了敵方模稜兩可和誤導性迷惑分析，讓錯誤的決策勝出的機率增大。

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.81.cn/xxqj_207719/xxjt/pl_207751/10184370888.html?big=fan

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[Chinese National Defense] Establishing Correct Awareness to Contain China and Conduct Cognitive Warfare Operations

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[中國國防]建立正確的意識，以遏制中國並進行認知戰爭行動

現代英語：

As the world continued to actively combat the COVID-19 pandemic, the British newspaper The Guardian reported in late May 2021 that Fazze, a public relations and marketing agency with close ties to Russian officials, was accused of providing funding to influential YouTubers, bloggers, and other opinion leaders in France, Germany, and other European countries to spread false information claiming that vaccines like Pfizer (BNT) and AstraZeneca (AZ) had caused hundreds of deaths. The false information also criticized the EU vaccine procurement system for harming public health in European countries, with the goal of sowing public distrust of Western vaccines and shifting public acceptance toward Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine. This is the most significant example of “perception warfare” in recent international history.

 In fact, human society has always adhered to the principle of “conquering the enemy without fighting” as the guiding principle for optimal military operations. While traditional warfare still primarily takes place in physical space, victory requires the physical capture of cities and territories, as well as the destruction of enemy forces. However, as humanity’s understanding of the nature of war deepens, the use of information technology has become a new trend in warfare, enabling the achievement of traditional combat effectiveness without the need for physical engagement. Given the increasing attention paid to “information warfare” and “hybrid warfare,” this article discusses the closely related concept of “cognitive warfare,” exploring the emerging threats facing our country and our national defense response strategy.

 Whether it’s what the US calls “hybrid warfare” or what Russia calls “information warfare,” the implications are quite similar: centered on the cognitive realm, the use of information to influence and manipulate targets, encompassing both peacetime public opinion and wartime decision-making. The rise of Nazi Germany after World War I was arguably the first modern regime to master the use of information to shape perceptions within its own country and even abroad. Its successful use of propaganda and lies, delivered through various communication technologies, was highly successful. Principles such as “repetition is power” and “negative information is more easily accepted and remembered than positive information” would later profoundly influence authoritarian governments, including Russia.

 Using information capabilities to subvert national regimes

 At the beginning of the 21st century, Russia began to pay attention to the situation where international discourse power was completely controlled by Western countries. It successively put forward theories such as “Information Warfare Theory” and “Sixth Generation Warfare Theory”, arguing that the sixth generation of warfare is a non-contact war that uses precision weapons and information warfare to traverse the battlefield. The purpose of war is no longer a devastating global war, but to achieve effects that cannot be achieved through traditional warfare by exploiting the enemy’s information capabilities to exploit its weaknesses, including changing social and cultural orientations and values, and thus subverting national regimes.

 In 2005, Russia established the international news channel “Russia Today.” Initially focused on soft power propaganda, it shifted its focus after the 2008 Georgian War to attacking negative aspects of Western society and fostering conspiracy theories. The 2014 Ukraine crisis became a training ground for Russian information warfare forces. Using electronic jamming and cyber theft, they intercepted Ukrainian communications, inferring subsequent Ukrainian actions and releasing damaging information at critical moments. They also targeted sensitive issues in eastern Ukraine, including the status of ethnic Russians and economic downturn, distributing a large amount of carefully selected, targeted information to resonate with the public, influencing their perceptions and behavior and gaining control of media opinion. In terms of “cognitive warfare,” Russia’s approach has been successful, and has become a model for the Chinese Communist Party.

 Manipulating “brain control” to control the public

 In 2014, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) proposed the cognitive operational concept of “brain control,” building on its past “three warfares” of psychological warfare, legal warfare, and public opinion warfare, as well as Russia’s theoretical framework of “information warfare.” It states that a nation’s cognitive space is composed of the superposition of countless individuals, and that “brain control” uses national languages, propaganda media, and cultural products as weapons to comprehensively infiltrate and control the cognition, emotions, and consciousness of the general public and national elites, ultimately distorting, disintegrating, and reshaping their national spirit, values, ideology, history, and culture, thereby achieving the strategic goal of winning without fighting.

 Therefore, the CCP’s “cognitive operations” fall under the broad category of psychological warfare. In the era of information globalization, it integrates information warfare, psychological warfare, and public opinion warfare, becoming the core of the CCP’s overall strategy. Since the 2016 military reform, it has been led by the newly formed “Strategic Support Force” and implemented at all political and military levels. On the one hand, the PLA has adopted American operational thinking in the field of “cognitive operations,” using units such as the 311 Base, the National University of Defense Technology, and the Academy of Military Sciences to develop tactics such as “psychological operations,” “ideological operations,” “consciousness manipulation,” and “strategic communication” to strengthen the “cognitive operations” capabilities jointly constructed by military-civilian integration and joint combat systems. On the other hand, it uses professional personnel to operate media platforms, shape the public opinion environment, and introduce “cognitive operations” into the actual combat application stage.

 The CCP’s recent “cognitive warfare” offensive against Taiwan reveals its methods and tactics. First, the CCP primarily uses the internet to collect personal data from Taiwanese citizens, using big data databases to categorize information by target group, based on political leanings, age, occupation, and other factors. Second, it leverages intelligence gathering to launch targeted cognitive attacks on specific social media platforms, influencing the psychology of the targeted groups, particularly by releasing disinformation to weaken and distract Taiwanese society. Third, it employs online virtual organizations to set up fake social media accounts, infiltrate online communities, and disguise themselves as whistleblowers, deliberately spreading fabricated information to create confusion. Cybertroopers then massively repost and discuss this information, manipulating audience perceptions and creating a cycle of disrupting information retention, manipulating cognitive psychology, and altering thinking patterns.

 Identify fake news and fight back together

 At this stage, the CCP’s campaign for “brain control” over Taiwan aims to influence Taiwanese society’s cognition, distorting public opinion, devaluing democratic values, intensifying opposition, disrupting political conditions, and undermining public trust in the government. The following preventive measures can be taken within the national defense system:

 1. Strengthening educational functions

 Through national defense education in schools, institutions, and society, we will raise the public’s awareness of the threat posed by the CCP’s “cognitive warfare” and their ability to identify false information, and cultivate the habit of rationality, verification, and calmness.

 2. Follow the constraints

 Although there are currently no internationally accepted legal rules that can clearly define the extent to which cognitive warfare constitutes an act of war, making it even more difficult to hold people accountable, media platforms can still strengthen the review of their own reporting content in accordance with existing regulations, and the public can also refrain from spreading suspicious information and following the trend of tennis melee, so as to facilitate the establishment of information verification measures and mechanisms.

 3. Combining Military and Civilian Strength

 Incorporate information and communication-related institutions and industries into the national defense mobilization mechanism, coordinate in peacetime the review, analysis, and disposal of fake news, strengthen talent training and research cooperation, and enhance the capabilities of professional units of the government and the national army; in wartime, cooperate with the overall national actions and carry out countermeasures.

 Currently, Taiwan already has the National Security Bureau’s National Security Operations Center responsible for responding to controversial information from hostile foreign forces. There’s also the non-profit Taiwan Fact-Checking Center. Facing the challenges of cognitive warfare, we must continue to integrate various sectors, strive for international intelligence exchange and experience sharing, optimize the media environment, collaborate across multiple channels, and instantly identify the authenticity and source of information, jointly building our offensive capacity to respond to cognitive warfare.

 Conclusion

 In reality, all countries around the world face threats related to cognitive warfare and information-based psychological warfare. However, democratic and free societies are by no means vulnerable to cognitive warfare attacks and must instead rely on diverse strategies and methods to protect them. We aim to establish a more comprehensive and substantive framework, build a powerful counterforce, and enhance the quality and discernment of our citizens, thereby gaining immunity from the CCP’s cognitive warfare campaign to seize control of our minds.

(The author is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Tamkang University)

現代國語：

在全球持續積極對抗新冠疫情之際，英國《衛報》2021年5月下旬報道，與俄羅斯官員關係密切的公關和營銷機構Fazze被指控向法國、德國和其他歐洲國家頗具影響力的YouTube用戶、博主和其他意見領袖提供資金，用於傳播虛假信息，聲稱輝瑞（BNTAZ）和阿斯特利康（BNTAZ）和阿斯特疫苗已導致數百人死亡。這些假訊息也批評歐盟疫苗採購體系損害了歐洲國家的公共衛生，目的是挑起大眾對西方疫苗的不信任，並促使大眾接受俄羅斯的Sputnik V疫苗。這是近代國際史上最顯著的「感知戰」案例。

事實上，人類社會自古以來，均以「不戰而屈人之兵」作為最佳軍事行動指導原則，儘管傳統戰爭主要仍在物理空間進行，需透過實際攻城掠地、消滅敵有生力量，才能獲得勝利。然隨人類對戰爭本質認知深化，利用資訊科技，於不需實體短兵相接的情況下，卻能達到傳統戰爭效果，已成為新型態戰爭趨勢。鑑於「資訊戰」、「混合戰」日益受重視，謹就與其密切相關的「認知作戰」概念進行論述，並探討我國所面臨的新型威脅及全民國防因應策略。

無論是美國所稱的「混合戰」，或俄國所說的「資訊戰」，其實指涉意涵很相似，即以認知領域為核心，利用訊息影響、操控對象目標涵蓋承平時期輿論及戰時決策的認知功能。一戰後，逐漸興起的納粹德國，可謂當代首個擅長運用資訊形塑本國，甚至外國民眾認知的政權，其透過各種傳播技術的政治宣傳與謊言包裝，相當成功；而所謂「重複是一種力量」、「負面訊息總是比正面訊息，更容易讓人接受和印象深刻」等實踐原則，日後更深刻影響專制極權政府與現在的俄羅斯。

藉資訊能力 顛覆國家政權

俄國於進入21世紀初，開始注意國際話語權遭西方國家完全掌控的情形，陸續提出「資訊戰理論」、「第6代戰爭理論」等論述，主張第6代戰爭是以精確武器及資訊戰，縱橫戰場的非接觸式戰爭，戰爭目的不再是毀滅性的全球大戰，而是藉利用敵方弱點的資訊能力，達成傳統戰爭無法實現的效果，包括改變社會文化取向、價值觀，進而顛覆國家政權等。

2005年，俄國成立國際新聞頻道「Russia Today」，起初主要是軟實力宣傳，2008年「喬治亞戰爭」後，轉為攻擊西方社會負面問題與製造陰謀論；2014年「烏克蘭危機」，成為俄軍資訊戰部隊的練兵場，透過電子干擾、網路竊密等手段，截收烏國對外通聯訊息，依此推判烏方後續舉動，並選擇在關鍵時機，釋放對烏國政府不利消息；另選定烏東地區敏感議題，包括俄裔民族地位、經濟不振等，投放大量經篩選的特定資訊，引發民眾共鳴，從而影響烏東人民認知與行為，取得媒體輿論主動權。就「認知作戰」言，俄國作法是成功的，更成為中共的效法對象。

操弄「制腦權」 控制社會大眾

中共2014年於過去心理戰、法律戰、輿論戰等「三戰」基礎，以及俄國「資訊戰」理論架構上，提出「制腦權」認知操作概念，指國家認知空間係由無數個體疊加而成，「制腦」是以民族語言、宣傳媒體、文化產品為武器，全面滲透、控制社會大眾與國家精英之認知、情感與意識，最終扭曲、瓦解、重塑其民族精神、價值觀念、意識形態、歷史文化等，達致不戰而勝的戰略目標。

是以，中共「認知作戰」屬於廣義心理戰範疇，是資訊全球化時代，融合資訊戰、心理戰及輿論戰的戰法，成為中共整體戰略主軸，並自2016年「軍改」後，由新組建的「戰略支援部隊」操盤，在各政略、軍事層次開展執行。一方面，共軍擷取美國在「認知作戰」領域的操作思維，以311基地、國防科技大學、軍事科學院等單位研提「心理作戰」、「思想作戰」、「意識操縱」、「戰略傳播」等戰法，以加強軍民融合及聯戰體系共同建構的「認知作戰」能力；另一方面，則以專業人員操作媒體平臺，形塑輿論環境，將「認知作戰」導入實戰運用階段。

從近年中共對臺進行的「認知作戰」攻勢，可拆解其途徑與手段。首先，中共主要係以網路蒐集國人個資，透過大數據資料庫，劃分政治傾向、年齡、職業等不同目標族群資訊；其次，配合情報偵蒐，針對個別社群媒體展開認知精準打擊，影響目標群眾心理，尤其釋放假訊息，以削弱、分散臺灣社會注意力；再次，則運用網路虛擬組織設置社群媒體假帳號，打入網路族群，偽裝成揭密者、吹哨者，刻意傳散變造資訊，製造混亂，再由網軍大量轉傳、討論，操弄受眾認知，進入阻斷資訊記憶、操縱認知心理、改變思考模式的運作循環。

識別假訊息 全民齊反制

基於現階段，中共對臺「制腦權」作戰，影響臺灣社會認知的目的，在於扭曲輿論、貶低民主價值、激化對立、擾亂政情、減損民眾對政府信任等，於全民國防體系可採取的防制辦法包括：

一、強化教育功能

分別透過全民國防之學校教育、機關教育、社會教育途徑，提高公眾對中共「認知作戰」威脅的認識，與對假訊息識別能力，養成理性、查證、冷靜習慣。

二、遵循約束規範

儘管目前尚無國際通用的法律規則，可明確定義何種程度的認知作戰已構成戰爭行為，更難以究責；然各媒體平臺仍可按既有規範，對自身報導內容加強審查，民眾也可做到不傳播可疑訊息、不跟風網壇混戰，俾利訊息查證措施與機制建立。

三、結合軍民力量

將資訊與傳播相關機構、產業，納入全民防衛動員機制，平時協調因應假訊息審查、分析、處置，加強人才培訓、研究合作，提升政府、國軍專業單位能力；戰時則配合國家整體作為，執行反制任務。

目前我國已有國安局「國家安全作業中心」執行對境外敵對勢力爭議訊息應處有關工作，民間亦有非營利組織成立的「臺灣事實查核中心」。面對「認知作戰」挑戰，仍應持續整合各界力量，爭取國際情報交流與經驗共享，優化媒體環境，多管道合作，即時辨識訊息真偽與來源，共同建設應處「認知作戰」攻勢能量。

結語

事實上，世界各國都同樣面臨「認知作戰」、「資訊心理戰」等相關威脅，然民主自由的社會環境，絕非易受「認知作戰」攻擊的溫床，更需仰賴多元策略與方式守護。期以更完善周全的實質架構，建構強而有力的反制力量，並提升我國公民素質及識別能力，於中共奪取「制腦權」的認知作戰中，獲得免疫。

（作者為淡江大學戰略研究所博士）

中國原創軍事資源：https://www.ydn.com.tw/news/newsInsidePage?chapterID=1431550

#認知戰, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Use of Cognitive Confrontation within the Combat Domain, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare

China’s Weaponized Communication in International Public Opinion Warfare: Scenarios and Risk Responses

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中國在國際公眾輿論戰爭中的武器交流：場景和風險回應

現代英語：

【Abstract】 In the international public opinion war, weaponized communication has penetrated into military, economic, diplomatic and other fields, bringing imagination and practice “everything can be weaponized”. Weaponized communication manipulates public perception through technology, platforms, and policies, reflecting the complex interaction of power distribution and cultural games. Driven by globalization and digitalization, cognitive manipulation, social fragmentation, emotional polarization, digital surveillance, and information colonization have become new means of influencing national stability, which not only exacerbates competition between information-powerful and weak countries, but also provides information-weak countries with the opportunity to achieve reversal through flexible strategies and technological innovation. Under the global asymmetric communication landscape, how to find a point of convergence and balance between technological innovation and ethical responsibility, strategic goals and social balance will be key elements that will influence the future international public opinion landscape.

【Keywords】 Public opinion warfare; weaponized communication; information manipulation; asymmetric communication; information security

If “propaganda is a rational recognition of the modern world” [1], then weaponized communication is a rational application of modern technological means. In the “public opinion war”, each participating subject achieves strategic goals through different communication methods, making them superficially reasonable and concealed. Unlike traditional military conflicts, modern warfare involves not only physical confrontation, but also competition in several fields, including information, economics, psychology, and technology. With the advancement of technology and globalization, the shape of war has changed profoundly, and traditional physical confrontations have gradually shifted to multi-dimensional and multi-field integrated warfare. In this process, weaponized communication, as a modern form of warfare, becomes an invisible means of violence that affects the psychology, emotions and behavior of the opposing enemy or target audience by controlling, guiding and manipulating public opinion, thereby achieving political, military or strategic ends.》 “On War” believes that war is an act of violence that makes the enemy unable to resist and subservient to our will. [ 2] In modern warfare, the realization of this goal not only relies on the confrontation of military forces, but also requires support from non-traditional fields such as information, networks, and psychological warfare. Sixth Generation Warfare heralds a further shift in the shape of warfare, emphasizing the application of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data, and unmanned systems, as well as comprehensive games in the fields of information, networks, psychology, and cognition. The “frontline” of modern warfare has expanded to include social media, economic sanctions, and cyberattacks, requiring participants to have stronger information control and public opinion guidance capabilities.

At present, the spread of weaponization has penetrated into the military, economic, diplomatic and other fields, bringing with it the apprehension that “everything can be weaponized”. In the sociology of war, communication is seen as an extended tool of power, with information warfare penetrating deeply and accompanying traditional warfare. Weaponized communication is precisely under the framework of information control, by shaping public perceptions and emotions, consolidating or weakening the power of states, regimes or non-state actors. This process not only occurs in wartime, but also affects power relations within and outside the state in non-combatant states. In international political communication, information manipulation has become a key tool in the great power game, as countries try to influence global public opinion and international decision-making by spreading disinformation and launching cyberattacks. Public opinion warfare is not only a means of information dissemination, but also involves the adjustment of power games and diplomatic relations between countries, directly affecting the governance structure and power pattern of the international community. Based on this, this paper will delve into the conceptual evolution of weaponized communication, analyze the social mentality behind it, elaborate on the specific technical means and the risks they entail, and propose multidimensional strategies to deal with them at the national level.

1. From weaponization of communication to weaponization of communication: conceptual evolution and metaphor

Weapons have been symbols and tools of war throughout human history, and war is the most extreme and violent form of conflict in human society. Thus, “weaponized” refers to the use of certain tools for confrontation, manipulation or destruction in warfare, emphasizing the way in which these tools are used.“ Weaponization ”(weaponize) translated as“ makes it possible to use something to attack an individual or group of people”. In 1957, the term “weaponization” was proposed as a military term, and Werner von Braun, leader of the V-2 ballistic missile team, stated that his main work was “weaponizing the military’s ballistic missile technology‘ [3].

“Weaponization ”first appeared in the space field, during the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the two major powers tried to compete for dominance in outer space.“ Weaponization of space ”refers to the process of using space for the development, deployment or use of military weapons systems, including satellites, anti-satellite weapons and missile defense systems, etc., with the purpose of conducting strategic, tactical or defensive operations. From 1959 to 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union proposed a series of initiatives to ban the use of outer space for military purposes, especially the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space orbit. In 2018, then-U.S. President Trump signed Space Policy Directive-3, launching the construction of the “Space Force” and treating space as an important combat area on the same level as land, air, and ocean. In 2019, the “Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Strengthening Contemporary Global Strategic Stability” proposed “prohibiting the placement of any type of weapons in outer space” [4].

In addition to weaponization in the space sector, there is also a trend towards weaponization in the military, economic and diplomatic fields.“ Military weaponization” is the use of resources (such as drones, nuclear weapons, etc.) for military purposes, the deployment of weapons systems, or the development of military capabilities. During the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022, a report from the Royal United Services Institute showed that Ukraine lost approximately 10,000 drones every month due to the impact of Russian jamming stations. [ 5] “weaponization” also often appears in expressions such as “financial war ”“diplomatic battlefield”. In the economic sphere, weaponization usually refers to the use of shared resources or mechanisms in the global financial system by countries or organizations; diplomatic weaponization is manifested in countries pursuing their own interests and exerting pressure on other countries through economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and manipulation of public opinion. Over time, the concept of “weaponization” has gradually expanded into the political, social, cultural and other fields, especially in the information field, and since the 2016 United States presidential election, manipulation of public opinion has become a universal tool in political struggles. David Petraeus, a former director of the CIA in the United States, once said at a National Institute for Strategic Studies conference that the time has come for “the weaponization of everything”.[ 6]

As a metaphor, “weaponization” not only refers to the use of actual physical tools, but also symbolizes the transformation of adversarial and aggressive behavior, emphasizing how the concept of “weapons” permeates daily life, cultural production, and political strategies, showing how social actors use various tools to achieve strategic goals. Nowadays, many areas that should remain neutral, such as the media, law and government agencies, are often described as “weaponized” to criticize their excessive politicization and improper use, highlighting their illegality and negative impact on society. Influence. Through this metaphor, one unconsciously contrasts the current political environment with an idealized and seemingly more moderate past, making one think that the political climate of the past was more rational and civilized, while the present appears too extreme and oppositional.[ 7] Therefore, the essence of “weaponization” is the process of political mediation, which is the use of various means and channels by political forces to influence or control areas that should remain neutral, making them political purposes and tools of political struggle.

In the field of information, the weaponization of communication is a long-standing and strategic means. During World War I and II, propaganda and public opinion warfare were widely used in various countries, and means of communication were used as a psychological tactic. Weaponized communication is the embodiment of the weaponization of communication in the modern information society. It uses algorithms and big data analysis to accurately control the speed and scope of information dissemination, and then controls public opinion and emotions. It reflects the combination of technology, platforms and strategies, making Political forces can more accurately and efficiently control the public perception and public opinion environment. As the ontology of public opinion, information is “weaponized” and used to influence social cognition and group behavior, and the concept of “war” has changed accordingly, no longer just traditional military confrontation, but also includes psychological warfare and cognitive warfare through information dissemination and public opinion manipulation. This shift has led to a range of new terms such as unrestricted warfare, new generation warfare, asymmetric warfare, and irregular warfare. Almost all of these terms are borrowed from “warfare” (warfare) to emphasize diverse conflicts in the information field, and information becomes the core content of “weaponization”.

Although there is some view that the term “war” does not apply to situations where hostilities are not formally declared [8], weaponized communication extends the concept of “war” by weakening the traditional political attributes of war and treating overt or covert forces and forms in various fields in general terms. as an act of communication. It is important to note that in English terms “weaponization” there are two formulations: one is “weaponized noun ”noun“, which means that something has been ”weaponized“ with a weapon function or purpose, and the other is ”weaponization of noun, which refers to the process of converting something into a weapon or having the nature of a weapon. In the academic sphere, Chinese translations differ, although weaponized communication and weaponization of communication are not yet strictly distinguished.“ Weaponized communication ”which focuses more on the means of communication or the message itself“ being weaponized” in order to achieve a certain strategic goal, and “weaponization of communication”, which emphasizes the process of communication itself as a transformation process of weapons. When discussing specific technical means, most academic papers adopt weaponized or weaponizing as a prefix to modify specific means of dissemination.

This article focuses on specific communication strategies in the international public opinion war, focusing on describing the weaponization phenomenon that has occurred, so unified use “weaponized communication” is a method of using communication means, technical tools and information platforms to accurately control information flow, public cognition and emotional response, a strategic communication method to achieve specific military, political or social purposes. Weaponized communication is also not a simple state of war or wartime, but a continuous communication phenomenon. It reflects the interaction and game between various subjects and is the flow of information sharing and meaning space.

2. Application scenarios and implementation strategies of weaponized communication

If at the end of the 1990s, weaponization in the information field was still a “dead topic”, and countries were mainly chasing upgrading competitions for physical weapons such as missiles and drones, then entering the 21st century, cyber wars have truly entered the public eye, and deeply embedded in people’s daily lives, through social media and smart devices, the public will inevitably be involved in the war of public opinion and unconsciously become participants or communication nodes. With the spread of technology, weaponized means gradually expanded from state-led instruments of war to socialized and politicized areas, and control over individuals and society shifted from explicit state apparatus to more covert conceptual manipulation. The exposure of Project Prism (PRISM) has raised strong global concerns about privacy breaches, highlighting the potential for states to use advanced technology for surveillance and control, seen as a new type of weaponization. Since Trump was elected President of the United States in 2016, the large-scale application of information weapons such as social robots has become a common phenomenon in the global political game. Information warfare ——including electronic warfare, computer network warfare, psychological warfare, and military deception—— is widely used to manipulate the flow of information and influence the landscape of public opinion. Not only do these methods work in military wars and political elections, but they also gradually permeate cultural conflicts, social movements and transnational games, perpetuating the traditional logic of information warfare. Nowadays, weaponized communication, as a socio-political tool, profoundly affects the ecology of public opinion, international relations and the daily lives of individuals.

(1) Information manipulation warfare in the military field

Information flow can directly influence the direction of military conflicts, shaping public and military perceptions and decisions, which in turn affects morale, strategic judgment, and social stability. In modern warfare, information is no longer a mere aid, and the field of information has become a central battleground. By manipulating the flow of information, the enemy’s situation assessment may be misled, the will to fight is weakened, and the trust and support of the people are shaken, which in turn affects the decision-making process and continuity of the war.

The Gulf War is regarded as the beginning of modern information warfare. In this war, the United States carried out systematic strikes against Iraq through high-tech means ——including electronic warfare, air strikes, and information operations——. The U.S. military used satellites and AWACS early warning aircraft to monitor the battlefield situation in real time, and induced the Iraqi army to surrender from a psychological level by airdropping leaflets and radio stations to convey to Iraqi soldiers the advantages of the U.S. military and its preferential treatment policy after surrender. The war marked the key place of information control in military conflicts, demonstrating the potential of information warfare in modern warfare. In the 21st century, cyberwarfare has become an important part of information warfare. Cyberwarfare involves not only the dissemination and manipulation of information, but also control over enemy social functions through attacks on critical infrastructure. In 2007, Estonia suffered a large-scale DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service Attack) attack, demonstrating a trend towards the fusion of information manipulation and cyberattacks. In the WannaCry ransomware incident in 2017, attackers used a Windows system vulnerability (EternalBlue) to encrypt the files of approximately 200,000 computers in 150 countries around the world and demanded a ransom, seriously affecting the British National Health Service (NHS) and causing the interruption of emergency services. and hospital system paralysis, further revealing the threat of cyber warfare to critical infrastructure. In addition, in long-term conflicts, infrastructure control is widely used to undermine the strategic capabilities of adversaries to compete for public information space due to its ability to directly determine the speed, scope, and direction of information dissemination. Israel has effectively weakened Palestinian communications capabilities by restricting the use of radio spectrum, controlling Internet bandwidth and disrupting communications facilities. At the same time, Israel also restricts the development of the Palestinian telecommunications market through economic sanctions and legal frameworks, suppresses Palestinian competitiveness in the flow of information, and consolidates its own strategic advantage in the conflict [9] in order to maintain the unequal flow of information.

Social media provides an immediate and extensive channel for information manipulation, allowing it to cross borders and influence global public sentiment and political situations, as well as shifting the focus of war from mere physical destruction to manipulation of public opinion. During the Russo-Ukrainian War, deepfake technology was used as a visual weapon, which significantly interfered with public perception and public opinion about the war. On March 15, 2022, a fake video of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was circulated on Twitter, in which he “called” Ukrainian soldiers to lay down their weapons, triggering public confusion for a short period of time. Similarly, fake videos of Russian President Vladimir Putin have been used to confuse the public. Although the videos were promptly annotated “Stay informed” by the platform (pending instructions on understanding the situation), they still caused obvious interference to public emotions and perceptions within a short period of time. These events highlight the critical role of social media in modern information warfare, where state and non-state actors can exert interference in military conflicts through disinformation, emotional manipulation, and other means.

The complexity of information manipulation warfare is also reflected in its dual nature ——both a tool for attack and a means of defense. In the military sphere, states ensure national security, protect critical infrastructure, maintain military secrets, and in some cases influence adversary combat effectiveness versus decision-making by defending against and countering cyberattacks. In 2015 and 2017, Russian hackers launched large-scale cyber attacks against Ukraine (such as BlackEnergy and NotPetya). Ukraine successfully resisted some attacks and took countermeasures by quickly upgrading its cyber defense systems, avoiding larger-scale infrastructure paralysis. In addition, units such as the NATO Center of Excellence for Strategic Communications and the British 77th Brigade focus on researching public opinion shaping in peacetime [10], using strategic communications, psychological warfare, and social media monitoring to expand strategic control in the information field and strengthen defense and public opinion shaping capabilities, further increasing the strategic height of information warfare.

Today, information manipulation warfare is a key link in modern military conflicts. Through the high degree of integration of information technology and psychological manipulation, it not only changes the rules of traditional warfare, but also profoundly affects public perception and the global security landscape. By taking control of critical infrastructure and social media platforms, countries, multinational corporations or other actors can gain strategic advantages in the global information ecosystem by restricting the flow of information and manipulating communication paths.

(2) Public opinion intervention in political elections

Political elections are the most direct field of competition for power in democratic politics, and the dissemination of information has an important influence on voter decision-making in the process. By calculating propaganda and other means, external forces or political groups are able to manipulate the sentiments of voters and mislead the public, thereby influencing the results of elections, destabilizing politics or weakening the democratic process, and elections are thus the most effective application scenario for weaponized communication.

In recent years, global political elections have shown a trend towards polarization, with large ideological differences between groups with different political affiliations. Polarization leads the public to selectively accept information that is consistent with their own views, while excluding other information, and this “echo chamber effect” intensifies the public’s one-sided perception of positions, giving greater scope for public opinion intervention. And the rise of information dissemination technology, especially computational propaganda, has enabled external forces to more accurately manipulate public opinion and influence voter decision-making. Computational Propaganda refers to the use of computing technology, algorithms and automated systems to control the flow of information to disseminate political information, interfere with election results and influence public opinion. Its core characteristics are algorithm-driven accuracy and the scale of automated communication. By breaking through The limitations of traditional manual communication have significantly enhanced the effect of public opinion manipulation. In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the Trump team analyzed Facebook user data through Cambridge Analytica and pushed customized political advertisements to voters, accurately affecting voters’ voting intentions [11]. This incident was seen as a classic case of computational propaganda interfering in elections, and also provided an operational template for other politicians, driving the widespread use of computational propaganda worldwide. In the 2017 French presidential election, candidate Emmanuel Macron’s team was hacked, and internal emails were stolen and made public, claiming that Macron had secret accounts overseas and was involved in tax evasion in an attempt to discredit his image. During the 2018 Brazilian presidential election, the team of candidate Jair Bolsonaro used WhatsApp groups to spread inflammatory political content, targeting and pushing a large number of images, videos and inflammatory messages to influence voter sentiment. According to statistics, from 2017 to 2019, the number of countries using computing for propaganda worldwide increased from 28 to 70, and in 2020 this number rose to 81. This suggests that computational propaganda is redefining the rules of public opinion in global elections through technical means and communication strategies.

Computational propaganda is also an important tool for state actors in the war of public opinion intervention. In 2011, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) launched Operation “Voice of Ernest” in the Middle East to distort conversations on Arabic-language social media by establishing and managing multiple false identities (sockpuppets). Russia also frequently uses computational propaganda to intervene, operating about 200,000 social media accounts in Canada, using far-right and far-left movements to spread pro-Russian rhetoric, create false social hot spots, and try to undermine Canada’s support for Ukraine [12]. As an important part of computing propaganda, social robots create the heat of public opinion through automation and scale, increase the exposure of information on social platforms through specific tags, and control the priority of issues. During the 2016 U.S. election, Russia used social robots to post content supporting Putin and attacking the opposition, covering up the opposition’s voice through information overload, and strengthening the pro-Putin public opinion atmosphere. [ 13] During the 2017 Gulf crisis, Saudi Arabia and Egypt used Twitter bots to create anti-Qatar hashtags#AlJazeeraInsultsKingSalman, which made it a hot topic and fictionalized the peak of anti-Qatar sentiment, which in turn affected global public opinion attitudes towards Qatar. [ 14] Deepfake technology further improves the accuracy and concealment of computing propaganda. In 2024, a fake video of U.S. President Joe Biden went viral on X (formerly Twitter), showing him using offensive language in the Oval Office, sparking controversy in public opinion and influencing voter sentiment. According to a survey by cybersecurity firm McAfee, 63% of respondents had watched a political deepfake video within two months, and nearly half said the content influenced their voting decisions.[ 15]

Globally, computing propaganda has infiltrated public opinion wars in various countries, affecting social stability and national security. The Israel Defense Forces waged a public opinion war against Palestine through digital weapons, Turkey cultivated “a patriotic troll army” to manipulate public opinion at home and abroad, and the Mexican government used botnets to influence public opinion. Computational propaganda is changing the landscape of global political communication as an important means of modern public opinion intervention warfare. With the development of technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, computing propaganda may also interfere with electoral processes through more covert and efficient means, or even directly threaten the core operating logic of democratic institutions.

(3) Symbolic identity war in the cultural field

Weaponized communication attempts to influence the public’s thoughts, emotions, and behaviors by manipulating information, symbols, and values, which in turn shapes or changes society’s collective cognition and cultural identity. This mode of communication consists not only in the transmission of information, but also in promoting the transmission and identification of a specific ideological or political idea through a specific narrative framework, cultural symbols and emotional resonance. Through the manipulation of cultural symbols, social emotions and collective memory, weaponized communication interferes with social structure and cultural identity in the cultural field, becoming a core means of symbolic identity warfare.

Memes, as a cultural symbol that combines visual elements and concise words, stimulate the emotional response of the audience in a humorous, satirical or provocative way, affecting their political attitudes and behaviors. Pepe the Frog began as a harmless comic book character that was repurposed and weaponized by far-right groups to spread hate speech, gradually evolving into a racist and anti-immigrant symbol. Memes transform complex political sentiments into easy-to-spread visual symbols that quickly stir up public distrust and anger over policy, seen as “weaponized iconoclastic weaponization” (Iconoclastic Weaponization). This process, by manipulating cultural symbols in order to achieve the purpose of political or social struggle [16], aggravates the public’s division of society and politics. For example, during Brexit, memes bearing the words “Take Back Control” Take Back Control spread rapidly, reinforcing nationalist sentiments.

In addition to the manufacture of cultural symbols, the screening and shielding of symbols are equally capable of shaping or deepening a certain cultural identity or political stance. Censorship has been an important means for power to control information since ancient times, and as early as the ancient Greek and Roman periods, governments censored public speeches and literary works to maintain social order and power stability. Entering the digital age, the rise of the Internet and social media has driven the modernization of censorship, and platform censorship has gradually replaced traditional censorship methods as a core tool for contemporary information control and public opinion guidance. Algorithm review detects sensitive topics, keywords, and user behavior data through artificial intelligence, automatically deletes or blocks content deemed “violations”, and the review team of social media manually screens user-generated content to ensure its compliance with platform policies and laws and regulations. The role of platform censorship is not only to limit the dissemination of certain content, but also to guide public opinion and shape the public perception framework through push, deletion and blocking. Although mainstream social platforms control the spread of information through strict content moderation mechanisms, some edge platforms such as Gab, Gettr, Bitchute, and others have become hotbeds of extreme speech and malicious information due to the lack of effective censorship. These platforms do not place sufficient restrictions on content publishing, allowing extreme views and disinformation to spread wantonly. For example, Gab has been repeatedly criticized for its extremist content and is accused of promoting violence and hatred. In the “echo chamber”, users can only access information that is consistent with their own views. This information environment further strengthens extreme ideas and leads to increased antagonism among social groups.[ 17]

Language, as a carrier and tool for information dissemination, can profoundly influence group behavior and cultural identity through emotional manipulation, symbolic politics, and social mobilization. The weaponization of language focuses on how language forms and cultural contexts affect the way information is received, emphasizing how language can be used to manipulate, guide or change people’s cognition and behavior. This involves not only the use of specific lexical and rhetorical devices, but also the construction of specific social meanings and cultural frameworks through linguistic representations. As another important tool of symbolic identity warfare, language shapes the narrative framework “of antagonism between the enemy and the enemy”. The Great Translation Movement spread the nationalist rhetoric of Chinese netizens to international social media platforms through selective translation, triggering negative perceptions of China. This language manipulation amplifies controversial content through emotional expression and deepens the cultural bias of the international community.

The deep logic of the weaponization of language lies in emotional and inflammatory forms of language. Western countries often justify acts of intervention by using the labels of justice such as “human rights” and “democracy”, legitimizing political or military action. White supremacists reshape ideologies using vague labels such as “alt-right”, transforming traditional “white supremacist” with strongly negative connotations into a more neutral concept, reducing the vocabulary’s social resistance, broadening the base of its supporters with a broad “umbrella” identity. Through the infiltration of secular discourse, hate politics and extreme speech are justified, gradually creating a political normality. Language is truly weaponized after the public routineizes this politics.[ 18] In Nigeria, hate-mongering content spreads through racial, religious and regional topics, profoundly deteriorating social relations. [ 19] Linguistic ambiguity and reasonable denial strategies have also become powerful tools for communicators to circumvent their responsibilities and spread complex social and political issues in simplified narratives. Through negative labeling and emotional discourse, Trump’s America First policy deliberately puts forward views that are opposed to mainstream opinions by opposing globalization, questioning climate change science, and criticizing traditional allies, stimulating public distrust of globalization, reshaping the cultural identity of national interests first. [ 20]

III Risks and challenges of weaponized dissemination: legitimacy and destructiveness

Although weaponized communication poses a great risk to the international public opinion landscape, it may be given some legitimacy by certain countries or groups through legal, political or moral frameworks in specific situations. For example, after the “9/11” incident, the United States passed the Patriot Act to expand the surveillance authority of intelligence agencies and implement extensive information control in the name of “anti-terrorism”. This “legitimacy” is often criticized as undermining civil liberties and eroding the core values of democratic society.

In the international political game, weaponized transmission is more often seen as a means of “Gray Zone” (Gray Zone). Confrontations between countries are no longer limited to economic sanctions or diplomatic pressure, but are waged through non-traditional means such as information manipulation and social media intervention. Some States use “the protection of national interests” as a pretext to disseminate false information, arguing that their actions are compliant and, although they may be controversial under international law, are often justified as necessary means “to counter external threats”. In some countries where the regulation of information lacks a strict legal framework, interference in elections is often tolerated or even seen as a “justified” political exercise. At the cultural level, certain countries attempt to shape their own cultural influence on a global scale by disseminating specific cultural symbols and ideologies. Western countries often promote the spread of their values in the name of “cultural sharing” and “communication of civilizations”, but in actual operations, they weaken the identity of other cultures by manipulating cultural symbols and narrative frameworks, leading to global cultural ecology. imbalance. The legal framework also provides support, to a certain extent, for the justification of weaponized dissemination. In the name of “counter-terrorism” and “against extremism”, some countries restrict the dissemination of so-called “harmful information” through information censorship, content filtering and other means. However, this justification often pushes moral boundaries, leading to information blockades and suppression of speech. Information governance on the grounds of “national security”, although internally recognized to a certain extent, provides space for the proliferation of weaponized communications.

Compared to legitimacy, the spread of weaponization is particularly devastating. At present, weaponized communication has become an important tool for power structures to manipulate public opinion. It not only distorts the content of information, but also profoundly affects public perception, social emotions, and international relations through privacy violations, emotional mobilization, and cultural penetration.

(1) Information distortion and cognitive manipulation

Distortion of information means that information is deliberately or unintentionally distorted during dissemination, resulting in significant differences between what the public receives and the original information. On social media, the spread of disinformation and misleading content is rampant, and generated content from artificial intelligence models (such as GPT) may be exacerbated by bias in training data. Gender, race, or social bias may be reflected in automatically generated text, amplifying the risk of information distortion. The fast-spreading nature of social media also makes it difficult for traditional fact-checking mechanisms to keep up with the spread of disinformation. Disinformation often dominates public opinion in a short period of time, and cross-platform dissemination and anonymity complicate clarification and correction. The asymmetries in communication undermine the authority of traditional news organizations, and the public’s preference for trusting instantly updated social platform information over in-depth coverage by traditional news organizations further diminishes the role of news organizations in resisting disinformation.

In addition to the distortion of the information itself, weaponized communication makes profound use of the psychological mechanisms of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance refers to the psychological discomfort that occurs when an individual is exposed to information that conflicts with their pre-existing beliefs or attitudes. By creating cognitive dissonance, communicators shake the established attitudes of their target audience and even induce them to accept new ideologies. In political elections, targeted dissemination of negative information often forces voters to re-examine their political positions or even change their voting tendencies. Weaponized communication further intensifies the formation of “information cocoon houses” through selective exposure, allowing audiences to tend to access information consistent with their own beliefs, ignoring or rejecting opposing views. This not only reinforces the cognitive biases of individuals, but also allows disinformation to spread rapidly within the group, making it difficult to be broken by external facts and rational voices, and ultimately forming a highly homogeneous ecology of public opinion.

(2) Privacy leakage and digital monitoring

In recent years, the abuse of deepfakes has exacerbated the problem of privacy violations. In 2019, the “ZAO” face-changing software was removed from the shelves due to default user consent to portrait rights, revealing the risk of overcollection of biometric data. Photos uploaded by users that have been processed through deep learning can either generate an accurate face-changing video or become a source of privacy leaks. What’s more, techniques such as deepfakes are abused for gender-based violence, the faces of multiple European and American actresses are illegally planted with fake sex videos and widely distributed, and although the platforms remove this content in some cases, the popularity of open-source programs makes it easy for malicious users to copy and share forged content. In addition, when users use social media, they tend to authorize the platform by default to access their devices’ photos, cameras, microphones and other app permissions. Through these rights, the platform not only collects a large amount of personal data, but also analyzes users’ behavioral characteristics, interest preferences, and social relationships through algorithms, allowing it to accurately deliver ads, recommend content, and even implement information manipulation. This large-scale data acquisition drives global discussion of privacy protections. In Europe, the General Data Protection Regulation attempts to strengthen the protection of individuals’ right to privacy through strict regulations on data collection and use. However, due to “implicit consent” or complex user agreements, platforms often bypass regulations that make the data-processing process less transparent, making it difficult for regular users to understand what the data is actually used for. Section 230 of the U.S. Communications Decency Act provides that online platforms are not legally responsible for user-generated content, a provision that has fueled the development of content moderation on platforms but has also left them with little incentive to respond to privacy infringements. Platforms, motivated by commercial interests, often lag behind in dealing with disinformation and privacy issues, leading to ongoing shelving of audit responsibilities.

In terms of digital surveillance, social platforms work with governments to make user data a core resource “of surveillance capitalism”. The National Security Agency (NSA) implements mass surveillance through phone records, Internet communications, and social media data, and works with large enterprises such as Google and Facebook to obtain users’ online behavioral data for intelligence gathering and behavioral analysis worldwide. The abuse of transnational surveillance technologies is what pushes privacy violations to an international level. Pegasus spyware developed by the Israeli cybersecurity company NSO, which compromises target devices through “zero-click attacks”, can steal private information and communication records in real time. In 2018, in the case of the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the Saudi government monitored its communications through Pegasus, revealing the profound threat this technology poses to individual privacy and international politics.

(3) Emotional polarization and social division

Emotions play a key role in influencing individual cognition and decision-making. Weaponized communication influences rational judgment by inciting feelings of fear, anger, sympathy, etc., and pushes the public to react irrationally, driven by emotions. War, violence and nationalism often become the main content of emotional mobilization. Through carefully designed topics, communicators implant elements such as patriotism and religious beliefs into information dissemination, quickly arousing public emotional resonance. The widespread adoption of digital technologies, particularly the combination of artificial intelligence and social media platforms, further amplifies the risk of emotional polarization. The rapid spread of disinformation and extreme speech on the platform comes not only from the sharing behavior of ordinary users, but is also driven by algorithms. Platforms tend to prioritize the push of emotional and highly interactive content, which often contains inflammatory language and extreme views, thus exacerbating the spread of hate speech and extreme views.

Social media hashtags and algorithmic recommendations play a key role in emotional polarization. After the Charlie Hebdo incident, the #StopIslam hashtag became a communication tool for hate speech, with the help of which users posted messages of hatred and violent tendencies. During the 2020 presidential election in the United States, extreme political rhetoric and misinformation on social platforms were also amplified in a bitter partisan struggle. Through precise emotional manipulation, weaponized communication not only tears apart public dialogue, but also greatly affects the democratic process of society. Another particular extremist mobilization tactic is “Weaponized Autism”, where far-right groups use the technical expertise of autistic individuals to implement emotional manipulation. These groups recruit technically competent but socially challenged individuals, transforming them into enforcers of information warfare by giving them a false sense of belonging. These individuals, guided by extremist groups, are used to spread hate speech, carry out cyberattacks and promote extremism. This phenomenon reveals not only the deep-seated mechanisms of emotional manipulation, but also how technology can be exploited by extremist groups to serve the larger political and social agenda.[ 21]

(4) Information colonization and cultural penetration

“Weaponized Interdependence” theory Weaponized Interdependence Theory reveals how states use key nodes in political, economic, and information networks to exert pressure on other states. [ 22] Especially in the field of information, developed countries further consolidate their cultural and political advantages by controlling the implementation of information flows “information colonization”. Digital platforms became the vehicles of this colonial process, the countries of the Global South were highly dependent on Western-dominated technology platforms and social networks for information dissemination, and in sub-Saharan Africa, Facebook has become synonymous with “the Internet”. This dependence not only generates huge advertising revenues for Western businesses, but also has a profound impact on indigenous African cultures and values through algorithmic recommendations, especially in terms of gender, family, and religious beliefs, making cultural penetration the norm.

Digital inequality is another manifestation of information colonization. The dominance of developed countries in digital technology and information resources has increasingly marginalized countries of the South in the economic, educational and cultural fields. Palestine’s inability to effectively integrate into the global digital economy due to inadequate infrastructure and technological blockade both limits local economic development and further weakens its voice in global information dissemination. Through technological blockades and economic sanctions, the world’s major economies and information powers restrict other countries’ access to key technological and innovation resources, which not only hinders the development of science and technology in target countries, but also exacerbates the rupture of the global technology and innovation ecosystem. Since withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear Deal in 2018, U.S. economic sanctions on Iran have blocked its development in the semiconductor and 5G sectors, and the asymmetry between technology and innovation has widened the gap in the global technology ecosystem, putting many countries at a disadvantage in information competition.

IV Reflection and discussion: the battle for the right to speak in the asymmetric communication landscape

In the competitive landscape of “Asymmetric Communication”, strong parties often dominate public opinion through channels such as mainstream media and international news organizations, while weak parties need to use innovative communication technologies and means to make up for their disadvantages and compete for the right to speak. At the heart of this communication landscape lies Information Geopolitics, the idea that the contest of power between states depends not only on geographical location, military power, or economic resources, but also on control over information, data, and technology. The game between the great powers is no longer limited to the control of physical space, but extends to the competition for public opinion space. These “information landscapes” involve the right to speak, information circulation and media influence in the global communication ecosystem. In this process, the country continuously creates landscapes to influence international public opinion and shape the global cognitive framework, thereby achieving its strategic goals. The strategy of asymmetric communication is not only related to the transmission of information content, but more importantly, how to bridge the gap between resources and capabilities with the help of various communication technologies, platforms and means. The core of information communication is no longer limited to the content itself, but revolves around the right to speak. The competition unfolds. With the rise of information warfare and cognitive warfare, whoever has the information will have a head start in global competition.

(1) Technology catching up under the advantage of latecomers

Traditional large countries or strong communicators control the dominance of global public opinion, and by contrast, weak countries often lack communication channels to compete with these large countries. The theory of latecomer advantage advocates that latecomer countries can rapidly rise and circumvent inefficient and outdated links in early technological innovation by leaping forward and bypassing traditional technological paths and introducing existing advanced technologies and knowledge. In the context of weaponized communication, this theory provides information-weak countries with a path to break through the barriers of communication in large countries through emerging technologies, helping them to catch up at the technical level. Traditional media are often constrained by resources, influence and censorship mechanisms, with slow dissemination of information, limited coverage and vulnerability to manipulation by specific countries or groups. The rise of digital media has brought about a fundamental change in the landscape of information dissemination, enabling disadvantaged countries, with the help of globalized Internet platforms, to directly target international audiences without having to rely on traditional news organizations and mainstream media. Through emerging technologies, disadvantaged countries can not only transmit information more precisely, but also rapidly expand their influence in international public opinion through targeted communication and emotional guidance. Later-developing countries can use advanced technologies (such as big data, artificial intelligence, 5G networks, etc.) to achieve precise information dissemination and create efficient communication channels. Taking “big data analysis” as an example, latecomer countries can gain an in-depth understanding of audience needs and public opinion trends, quickly identify the pulse of global public opinion, implement targeted communication, and quickly expand international influence. AI technology not only predicts the direction of public opinion development, but also optimizes communication strategies in real time. The popularization of 5G networks has greatly improved the speed and coverage of information dissemination, allowing latecomer countries to break through the limitations of traditional communication models in a low-cost and efficient manner and form unique communication advantages.

Through transnational cooperation, late-developing countries can integrate more communication resources and expand the breadth and depth of communication. For example, Argentina has established “Latin American News Network” with other Latin American countries to push Latin American countries to speak with a single voice in international public opinion and counter the single narrative of Western media through news content sharing. In Africa, South Africa has partnered with Huawei to promote the “Smart South Africa” project to build a modern information infrastructure and promote digital transformation and efficiency improvements in public services. Governments of late-developing countries should invest more in technological research and development and innovation, and encourage the development of local enterprises and talent. At the same time, attention should be paid to the export of culture and the construction of the media industry, so as to enhance the country’s voice in the international information space through globalized cooperation and decentralized communication models. Governments can fund digital cultural creations, support the growth of local social media platforms, and integrate more communication resources through an international cooperation framework.

(2) Construction of barriers in information countermeasures

Unlike a full-scale conflict that may be triggered by military action, or the risks that economic sanctions may pose, weaponized dissemination is able to achieve strategic objectives without triggering full-scale war, and it is extremely attractive based on cost and strategic considerations. Because weaponized communication is characterized by low cost and high returns, an increasing number of State and non-State actors have chosen to manipulate information in order to reach strategic objectives. The spread of this means of dissemination makes countries face even more complex and variable threats in the face of attacks involving information from outside and inside. With the increasing intensity of information warfare, mere traditional military defense can no longer meet the needs of modern warfare. Instead, building a robust information defense system becomes a key strategy for the country to maintain political stability, safeguard social identity, and enhance international competitiveness. Therefore, how to effectively deal with external interference in information and manipulation of public opinion, as well as counter-information, has become an urgent issue for all countries to address. A complete cybersecurity infrastructure is key to maintaining national security against the manipulation or tampering of sensitive information from outside. Take, for example, the European Union’s push to strengthen cybersecurity in member states through its “Digital Single Market” strategy, which requires internet companies to be more aggressive in dealing with disinformation and external interference. The EU’s cybersecurity directives also provide for member states to establish emergency response mechanisms to protect critical information infrastructure from cyberattacks. In addition, the EU has established cooperation with social platform companies, such as Facebook, Twitter and Google, to combat the spread of fake news by providing anti-disinformation tools and data analysis technologies. Artificial intelligence, big data, and automation technologies are becoming important tools for information defense, used to monitor information propagation paths in real time, identify potential disinformation, and resist public opinion manipulation. In the field of cybersecurity, big data analysis helps decision makers identify and warn against malicious attacks, and optimize countermeasures. The application of these technologies will not only enhance information defence capabilities at the domestic level, but also enhance national initiative and competitiveness in the international information space.

Counter-mechanisms are another important component of the information defence system, especially under pressure from international public opinion, where real-time monitoring of the spread of external information and timely correction of disinformation become key to safeguarding the initiative of public opinion. Since the 2014 Crimean crisis, Ukraine has built a rather large-scale cyber defense system through cooperation with NATO and the United States. Ukraine’s National Cyber Security Service has set up “information countermeasures teams” to counter cyberthreats, using social media and news release platforms to refute false Russian reports in real time, a tactic that has significantly boosted Ukraine’s reputation and trust in international public opinion.

(3) Agenda setting in public opinion guidance

In the global competitive landscape of informatization and digitalization, public opinion guidance involves not only the content of information dissemination, but more importantly, how to set the agenda and focus on hot topics of global concern. The agenda-setting theory suggests that whoever can take control of the topics of information circulation can guide the direction of public opinion. Agenda setting influences public attention and evaluation of events by controlling the scope and focus of discussion of topics, and the rise of social media provides a breakthrough for information-disadvantaged countries to compete for dominance in information dissemination through multi-platform linkage. In the case of Ukraine, for example, during the Russo-Ukrainian War, it disseminated the actual war situation through social media, not only publishing the actual combat situation, but also incorporating the emotional demands of the people, and using the tragic narrative of civilian encounters and urban destruction to inspire sympathy and attention from the international community. While resisting interference from external information, the State also needs to proactively disseminate positive narratives and tell cultural stories that can resonate with the international community. The story should correspond to the emotional needs of international public opinion, while at the same time showing the uniqueness of the country and strengthening the link with the international community. Taking my country’s “One Belt, One Road” co-construction as an example, in the “One Belt, One Road” co-construction country, my country has invested in and constructed a large number of infrastructure projects. These projects not only helped improve local economic basic conditions, but also demonstrated China’s globalization process. Responsibility provides a window for cultural cooperation and exchange activities, showing the rich history and culture of the Chinese nation to the world It has demonstrated the inclusiveness and responsibility of Chinese culture to the international community.

However, because countries of the Global South often face constraints in terms of resources, technology and international communication platforms, and have difficulty in competing directly with developed countries, they rely on more flexible and innovative means of communication to participate in the setting of the global agenda. For example, Brazil is under negative public opinion pressure from the Western media when it comes to dealing with issues of environmental protection and climate change, especially the deforestation of the Amazon forest. To this end, the Brazilian government actively creates the country’s image in the field of environmental protection by using social media to publish recent data and success stories about Amazon protection. At the same time, Brazil has strengthened its voice on climate issues by engaging with other developing countries in global climate change negotiations and promoting South-South cooperation. Large international events, humanitarian activities and the production of cultural products, among others, are also effective ways of telling national stories. International sports events such as the World Cup and the Olympic Games are not only a display platform for sports competitions, but also an exhibition venue for national image and cultural soft power. By hosting or actively participating in these global events, the country can show its strength, value and cultural charm to the world, promoting a positive public opinion agenda.

“War is nothing more than the continuation of politics through another means”[23]. This classic Clausewitz assertion is modernized in the context of weaponized communication. Weaponized communication breaks through the physical boundaries of traditional warfare and becomes a modern strategic means of integrating information warfare, cognitive warfare, and psychological warfare. It manipulates the flow of information and public perception in a non-violent form, so that State and non-State actors can achieve political goals without relying on direct military action, reflecting a highly strategic and targeted nature. By manipulating information, emotions and values, weaponized communication can achieve strategic goals while avoiding all-out war, and in global competition and conflict, it has become an important means of political suppression by powerful countries against weak ones.

The core of weaponized communication lies in weakening the enemy’s decision-making and operational capabilities through information manipulation, but its complexity makes the communication effect difficult to fully predict. Although information-powerful countries suppress information-weak countries through technological advantages and communication channels, the effectiveness of communication is uncertain. Especially in the context of the globalization of social media and digital platforms, the boundaries and effects of information flow are becoming increasingly difficult to control. This complexity offers the weak countries the opportunity to break through the hegemony of discourse and promote the reverse game of information dissemination. Weak countries can use these platforms to launch confrontations, challenge the information manipulation of powerful countries, and take their place in global public opinion. The asymmetric game reflects the dynamic balance of international public opinion, whereby communication is no longer one-way control, but more complex interaction and dialogue, giving the weak the possibility of influencing public opinion. The current international public opinion landscape is still dominated by the one-way suppression of information-weak countries by information-powerful countries, but this situation is not unbreakable. Information warfare has a high degree of asymmetry, and information-weak countries can counter it step by step with technological innovation, flexible strategies and transnational cooperation. By exerting “asymmetric advantages”, weak countries are not only able to influence global public opinion, but also to enhance their voice with the help of joint action and information-sharing. Transnational cooperation and the establishment of regional alliances provide the weak countries with a powerful tool to counter the powerful, enabling them to form a synergy in international public opinion and challenge the dominance of the information powers. Under the “war framework”, countries can flexibly adjust their strategies and proactively shape the information dissemination pattern, rather than passively accepting information manipulation by powerful countries.

Sociology of war emphasizes the role of social structure, cultural identity, and group behavior in warfare. Weaponized communication is not only a continuation of military or political behavior, but also profoundly affects the psychosocial, group emotions, and cultural identity. Powerful countries use information dissemination to shape other countries’ perceptions and attitudes in order to achieve their own strategic goals. However, from a sociological perspective, weaponized transmission is not a one-way suppression, but rather the product of complex social interactions and cultural responses. In this process, the information-weak countries are not completely vulnerable, but, on the contrary, they can counter external manipulation with “soft power” with the help of cultural communication, social mobilization and dynamic confrontation of global public opinion, shaping a new collective identity and demonstrating the legitimacy of “weak weapons”.

(Fund Project: Research results of the National Social Science Fund Major Project to Study and Interpret the Spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China “Research on Promoting the Integrated Management of News Publicity and Online Public Opinion” (Project No.: 24ZDA084))

現代國語：

作者：

郭小安 康如诗来源：

　 发布时间：

2025-05-06

【摘要】在國際輿論戰中，武器化傳播已滲透軍事、經濟、外交等領域，帶來“一切皆可武器化”的想像與實踐。武器化傳播通過技術、平台和政策操控公眾認知，體現了權力分配與文化博弈的複雜互動。在全球化和數字化的推動下，認知操控、社會分裂、情感極化、數字監控、信息殖民已成為影響國家穩定的新型手段，這不僅加劇了信息強國與弱國間的競爭，也為信息弱國提供了通過靈活策略和技術創新實現逆轉的機會。在全球非對稱傳播格局下，如何在技術創新與倫理責任、戰略目標與社會平衡間找到契合點和平衡點，將是影響未來國際輿論格局的關鍵要素。

【關鍵詞】輿論戰；武器化傳播；信息操縱；非對稱傳播；信息安全

如果說“宣傳是對現代世界的理性認可”[1]，那麼武器化傳播則是對現代技術手段的理性應用。在輿論戰中，各參與主體通過不同傳播手段實現戰略目標，做到表面合理且隱蔽。與傳統軍事衝突不同，現代戰爭不僅涉及物理對抗，還涵蓋信息、經濟、心理及技術等多個領域的競爭。隨著技術進步和全球化的推動，戰爭形態發生深刻變化，傳統的物理對抗逐漸轉向多維度、多領域的綜合作戰。在這一過程中，武器化傳播作為一種現代戰爭形式，成為通過控制、引導和操縱輿論，影響敵對方或目標受眾的心理、情感與行為，進而實現政治、軍事或戰略目的的隱形暴力手段。 《戰爭論》認為，戰爭是讓敵人無力抵抗，且屈從於我們意志的一種暴力行為。 [2]在現代戰爭中，這一目標的實現不僅依賴於軍事力量的對抗，更需要信息、網絡與心理戰等非傳統領域的支持。第六代戰爭（Sixth Generation Warfare）預示戰爭形態的進一步轉變，強調人工智能、大數據、無人系統等新興技術的應用，以及信息、網絡、心理和認知領域的全面博弈。現代戰爭的“前線”已擴展到社交媒體、經濟制裁和網絡攻擊等層面，要求參與者俱備更強的信息控制與輿論引導能力。

當前，武器化傳播已滲透到軍事、經濟、外交等領域，帶來“一切皆可武器化”的憂慮。在戰爭社會學中，傳播被視為權力的延伸工具，信息戰爭深刻滲透並伴隨傳統戰爭。武器化傳播正是在信息控制的框架下，通過塑造公眾認知與情感，鞏固或削弱國家、政權或非國家行為者的權力。這一過程不僅發生在戰時，也在非戰斗狀態下影響著國家內外的權力關係。在國際政治傳播中，信息操控已成為大國博弈的關鍵工具，各國通過傳播虛假信息、發動網絡攻擊等手段，試圖影響全球輿論和國際決策。輿論戰不僅是信息傳播的手段，更涉及國家間權力博弈與外交關係的調整，直接影響國際社會的治理結構與權力格局。基於此，本文將深入探討武器化傳播的概念流變，分析其背後的社會心態，闡述具體的技術手段及所帶來的風險，並從國家層面提出多維應對策略。

一、從傳播武器化到武器化傳播：概念流變及隱喻

武器在人類歷史上一直是戰爭的象徵和工具，戰爭則是人類社會中最極端、暴力的衝突形式。因此，“被武器化”是指將某些工具用於戰爭中的對抗、操控或破壞，強調這些工具的使用方式。 “武器化”（weaponize）譯為“使得使用某些東西攻擊個人或團體成為可能”。 1957年，“武器化”一詞作為軍事術語被提出，V-2彈道導彈團隊的領導者沃納·馮·布勞恩表示，他的主要工作是“將軍方的彈道導彈技術‘武器化’”[3]。

“武器化”最早出現在太空領域，時值美蘇軍備競賽時期，兩個大國力圖爭奪外太空主導權。 “太空武器化”是指將太空用於發展、部署或使用軍事武器系統的過程，包括衛星、反衛星武器和導彈防禦系統等，目的是進行戰略、戰術或防禦性行動。 1959年至1962年，美蘇提出了一系列倡議，禁止將外太空用於軍事目的，尤其是禁止在外層空間軌道部署大規模毀滅性武器。 2018年，當時的美國總統特朗普簽署了《空間政策指令-3》，啟動“太空軍”建設，將太空視為與陸地、空中、海洋同等的重要作戰領域。 2019年，《中華人民共和國和俄羅斯聯邦關於加強當代全球戰略穩定的聯合聲明》中倡議“禁止在外空放置任何類型武器”[4]。

除太空領域的武器化外，軍事、經濟、外交等領域也顯現武器化趨勢。 “軍事武器化”是將資源（如無人機、核武器等）用於軍事目的、部署武器系統或發展軍事能力。 2022年俄烏戰爭期間，英國皇家聯合軍種研究所的報告顯示，烏克蘭每月因俄羅斯干擾站的影響，損失約10000架無人機。 [5]“武器化”也常出現在“金融戰爭”“外交戰場”等表述中。在經濟領域，武器化通常指國家或組織對全球金融系統中的共享資源或機制的利用；外交武器化則表現為國家通過經濟制裁、外交孤立、輿論操控等手段，追求自身利益並對他國施加壓力。隨著時間的推移，“武器化”概念逐漸擴展到政治、社會、文化等領域，尤其在信息領域，自2016年美國總統大選以來，輿論操縱已成為政治鬥爭的普遍工具。美國前中央情報局局長戴維·彼得雷烏斯曾在國家戰略研究所會議上表示，“萬物武器化”（the weaponization of everything）的時代已經來臨。 [6]

作為一種隱喻，“武器化”不僅指實際物理工具的使用，還像徵著對抗性和攻擊性行為的轉化，強調“武器”這一概念如何滲透至日常生活、文化生產和政治策略中，展現社會行動者如何利用各種工具達成戰略目的。時下，許多本應保持中立的領域，如媒體、法律和政府機構，常被描述為“武器化”，用以批判它們的過度政治化和被不正當利用，突出其非法性及對社會的負面影響。通過這一隱喻，人們無意識地將當前的政治環境與理想化的、看似更溫和的過去進行對比，使人們認為過去的政治氛圍更加理性和文明，而現今則顯得過於極端和對立。 [7]因此，“武器化”的實質是政治中介化的過程，是政治力量通過各種手段和渠道，影響或控製本應保持中立的領域，使其成為政治目的和政治鬥爭的工具。

在信息領域，傳播武器化是長期存在的一種戰略手段。第一、二次世界大戰期間，各國就廣泛使用了宣傳和輿論戰，傳播手段被作為一種心理戰術使用。武器化傳播是傳播武器化在現代信息社會中的體現，其利用算法和大數據分析精準地控制信息的傳播速度和範圍，進而操控輿論和情感，反映了技術、平台和策略的結合，使得政治力量可以更加精準和高效地操控公眾認知與輿論環境。信息作為輿論的本體，被“武器化”並用於影響社會認知和群體行為，“戰爭”的概念也隨之變化，不再只是傳統的軍事對抗，還包括通過信息傳播和輿論操控實現的心理戰和認知戰。這種轉變促生了一系列新術語，例如無限制戰爭（unrestricted warfare）、新一代戰爭（new generation warfare）、非對稱戰爭（asymmetric warfare）和非常規戰爭（irregular warfare）等。這些術語幾乎都藉用“戰爭”（warfare）強調信息領域中的多樣化衝突，信息成為被“武器化”的核心內容。

儘管有部分觀點認為“戰爭”一詞不適用於未正式宣布敵對行動的情況[8]，但武器化傳播通過弱化戰爭的傳統政治屬性，將各領域的公開或隱蔽的力量和形式籠統地視作傳播行為，從而擴展了“戰爭”這一概念的外延。值得注意的是，在英文術語中“武器化”有兩種表述方式：一種是“weaponized noun（名詞）”，即表示某物已經“被武器化”，具備武器功能或用途；另一種是“weaponization of noun”，指將某物轉化為武器或具有武器性質的過程。在學術領域，儘管weaponized communication和weaponization of communication尚未嚴格區分，但中文翻譯有所區別。 “武器化傳播”更側重於傳播手段或信息本身“被武器化”，以實現某種戰略目標；“傳播武器化”則強調傳播過程本身作為武器的轉化過程。在討論具體技術手段時，多數學術論文采用weaponed或weaponizing作為前綴，以修飾具體的傳播手段。

本文重點討論的是國際輿論戰中的具體傳播策略，著重描述已經發生的武器化現象，故統一使用“武器化傳播”，其是一種利用傳播手段、技術工具和信息平台，通過精確操控信息流動、公眾認知與情感反應，達到特定軍事、政治或社會目的的策略性傳播方式。武器化傳播也並非單純的戰爭或戰時狀態，而是一種持續的傳播現象，它反映了各主體間的互動與博弈，是信息共享和意義空間的流動。

二、武器化傳播的應用場景及實施策略

如果說20世紀90年代末，信息領域的武器化仍是一個“死話題”，各國主要追逐導彈、無人機等實體武器的升級競賽，那麼步入21世紀，網絡戰爭則真正衝進了公眾視野，並深刻嵌入人們的日常生活，經由社交媒體和智能設備，公眾不可避免地捲入輿論戰爭，不自覺地成為參與者或傳播節點。隨著技術的普及，武器化手段逐漸從國家主導的戰爭工具擴展到社會化和政治化領域，對個人和社會的控制從顯性的國家機器轉向更隱蔽的觀念操控。棱鏡計劃（PRISM）的曝光引發了全球對隱私洩露的強烈擔憂，凸顯了國家利用先進技術進行監視和控制的潛力，這被視為一種新型的武器化。自2016年特朗普當選美國總統以來，社交機器人等信息武器的大規模應用，成為全球政治博弈中的常見現象。信息作戰——包括電子戰、計算機網絡作戰、心理戰和軍事欺騙——被廣泛用於操控信息流動，影響輿論格局。這些手段不僅在軍事戰爭和政治選舉中發揮作用，還逐漸滲透到文化衝突、社會運動及跨國博弈之中，傳統的信息作戰邏輯得以延續。如今，武器化傳播作為一種社會政治工具，深刻影響著輿論生態、國際關係以及個人的日常生活。

（一）軍事領域的信息操縱戰

信息流能夠直接影響軍事衝突的走向，塑造公眾和軍隊的認知與決策，進而影響士氣、戰略判斷和社會穩定。在現代戰爭中，信息不再是單純的輔助工具，信息領域已成為核心戰場。通過操控信息流向，敵方的形勢評估可能被誤導，戰鬥意志被削弱，民眾的信任與支持被動搖，進而影響戰爭的決策過程與持續性。

海灣戰爭（Gulf War）被視為現代信息戰的開端。在這場戰爭中，美國通過高科技手段——包括電子戰、空中打擊和信息操作——實施了對伊拉克的系統性打擊。美軍利用衛星和AWACS預警機實時監控戰場態勢，通過空投傳單和廣播電台向伊拉克士兵傳遞美軍優勢及投降後的優待政策，從心理層面誘使伊軍投降。這場戰爭標誌著信息控制在軍事衝突中的關鍵地位，展示了信息戰在現代戰爭中的潛力。進入21世紀，網絡戰成為信息戰的重要組成部分。網絡戰不僅涉及信息的傳播和操控，還包括通過攻擊關鍵基礎設施實現對敵方社會功能的控制。 2007年愛沙尼亞遭遇大規模DDoS（Distributed Denial of Service Attack）攻擊，展示了信息操縱與網絡攻擊融合的趨勢。 2017年在WannaCry勒索軟件事件中，攻擊者利用Windows系統漏洞（EternalBlue）加密全球150個國家約20萬台計算機文件，要求支付贖金，嚴重影響英國國家健康服務體系（NHS），導致急診服務中斷和醫院系統癱瘓，進一步揭示了網絡戰對關鍵基礎設施的威脅。此外，在長期衝突中，基礎設施控制因能夠直接決定信息傳播的速度、範圍和方向，被廣泛用於削弱對手的戰略能力，爭奪公共信息空間。以色列通過限制無線電頻譜使用、控制互聯網帶寬和破壞通信設施，有效削弱了巴勒斯坦的通信能力。同時，以色列還通過經濟制裁和法律框架限制巴勒斯坦電信市場的發展，壓制巴勒斯坦在信息流動中的競爭力，鞏固自身在衝突中的戰略優勢[9]，以維持信息的不平等流動。

社交媒體為信息操縱提供了即時、廣泛的信息傳播渠道，使其能夠跨越國界，影響全球公眾情緒和政治局勢，也使戰爭焦點從單純的物理破壞轉向輿論操控。俄烏戰爭期間，深度偽造技術作為視覺武器，對公眾認知和戰爭輿論產生了顯著干擾。 2022年3月15日，烏克蘭總統澤連斯基的偽造視頻在Twitter上傳播，視頻中他“呼籲”烏克蘭士兵放下武器，引發了短時間內的輿論混亂。同樣，俄羅斯總統普京的偽造視頻也被用以混淆視聽。儘管這些視頻被平台迅速標註“Stay informed”（等待了解情況）的說明，但其在短時間內仍然對公眾情緒和認知造成明顯干擾。這些事件凸顯了社交媒體在現代信息戰中的關鍵作用，國家和非國家行為體可以通過虛假信息、情感操控等手段對軍事衝突施加干擾。

信息操縱戰的複雜性還體現在其雙重特性上——既是攻擊工具，也是防禦的手段。在軍事領域，各國通過防禦和反擊網絡攻擊來確保國家安全、保護關鍵基礎設施、維護軍事機密，並在某些情況下影響對手的戰鬥力與決策。 2015年和2017年，俄羅斯黑客發起了針對烏克蘭的大規模網絡攻擊（如BlackEnergy和NotPetya），烏克蘭通過迅速升級網絡防禦系統，成功抵禦部分攻擊並採取反制措施，避免了更大規模的基礎設施癱瘓。此外，北約戰略傳播卓越中心和英國第77旅等單位專注研究和平時期的輿論塑造[10]，利用戰略傳播、心理戰和社交媒體監控等手段，擴大信息領域的戰略控制，並強化了防禦與輿論塑造能力，進一步提高了信息戰的戰略高度。

如今，信息操縱戰已經成為現代軍事衝突中的關鍵環節。通過信息技術與心理操控的高度結合，它不僅改變了傳統戰爭的規則，也深刻影響著公眾認知和全球安全格局。國家、跨國公司或其他行為體通過掌控關鍵基礎設施和社交媒體平台，限制信息流動、操控傳播路徑，從而在全球信息生態中獲得戰略優勢。

（二）政治選舉的輿論干預戰

政治選舉是民主政治中最直接的權力競爭場域，信息傳播在此過程中對選民決策具有重要影響。通過計算宣傳等手段，外部勢力或政治團體能夠操縱選民情緒、誤導公眾認知，從而左右選舉結果、破壞政治穩定或削弱民主進程，選舉因此成為武器化傳播最具效果的應用場景。

近年來，全球政治選舉呈現極化趨勢，持不同政治立場的群體之間存在巨大的意識形態差異。極化導致公眾選擇性接受與自身觀點一致的信息，同時排斥其他信息，這種“回音室效應”加劇了公眾對立場的片面認知，為輿論干預提供了更大的空間。而信息傳播技術，尤其是計算宣傳的興起，使外部勢力能夠更加精準地操控輿論和影響選民決策。計算宣傳（Computational Propaganda）指利用計算技術、算法和自動化系統操控信息流動，以傳播政治信息、干預選舉結果和影響輿論，其核心特徵在於算法驅動的精準性和自動化傳播的規模化，通過突破傳統人工傳播的限制，顯著增強了輿論操控的效果。 2016年美國總統選舉中，特朗普團隊通過劍橋分析公司分析Facebook用戶數據，為選民定向推送定制化的政治廣告，精準影響了選民的投票意向[11]。這一事件被視為計算宣傳干預選舉的典型案例，也為其他政客提供了操作模板，推動了計算宣傳在全球範圍內的廣泛應用。 2017年法國總統選舉中，候選人埃馬紐埃爾·馬克龍（Emmanuel Macron）團隊遭遇黑客攻擊，內部郵件被竊取並公開，內容稱馬克龍在海外擁有秘密賬戶並涉及逃稅，企圖抹黑其形象。 2018年巴西總統選舉期間，候選人雅伊爾·博索納羅（Jair Bolsonaro）團隊利用WhatsApp群組傳播煽動性政治內容，定向推送大量圖像、視頻和煽動性消息以影響選民情緒。據統計，自2017年至2019年，全球採用計算宣傳的國家由28個增加至70個，2020年這一數量上升至81個。這表明，計算宣傳正通過技術手段和傳播策略，重新定義全球選舉中的輿論規則。

計算宣傳也是國家行為者在輿論干預戰中的重要工具。 2011年，美國國防高級研究計劃局（DARPA）在中東地區開展“歐內斯特之聲”行動，通過建立和管理多個虛假身份（sockpuppets），扭曲阿拉伯語社交媒體的對話。俄羅斯也頻繁利用計算宣傳實施干預，在加拿大操作約20萬個社交媒體賬戶，借助極右翼和極左翼運動散佈親俄言論，製造虛假的社會熱點，試圖破壞加拿大對烏克蘭的支持[12]。作為計算宣傳的重要組成部分，社交機器人通過自動化和規模化手段製造輿論熱度，藉由特定標籤在社交平台上增加信息的曝光率，操控議題的優先級。 2016年美國大選期間，俄羅斯利用社交機器人發布支持普京和攻擊反對派的內容，通過信息過載（information overload）掩蓋反對派聲音，強化親普京的輿論氛圍。 [13]2017年海灣危機期間，沙特阿拉伯和埃及通過Twitter機器人製造反卡塔爾標籤#AlJazeeraInsultsKingSalman的熱度，使其成為熱門話題，虛構了反卡塔爾情緒的高峰，進而影響了全球範圍內對卡塔爾的輿論態度。 [14]深度偽造技術則進一步提升了計算宣傳的精準性與隱蔽性。 2024年，美國總統喬·拜登的偽造視頻在X（原Twitter）上迅速傳播，視頻顯示其在橢圓形辦公室使用攻擊性語言，引發輿論爭議並影響選民情緒。據網絡安全公司McAfee調查，63%的受訪者在兩個月內觀看過政治深度偽造視頻，近半數表示這些內容影響了他們的投票決定。 [15]

在全球範圍內，計算宣傳已滲透各國輿論戰中，影響著社會穩定與國家安全。以色列國防軍通過數字武器對巴勒斯坦展開輿論戰，土耳其培養了“愛國巨魔軍隊”操控國內外輿論，墨西哥政府利用殭屍網絡影響輿論。作為現代輿論干預戰的重要手段，計算宣傳正在改變全球政治傳播的格局。隨著人工智能、量子計算等技術的發展，計算宣傳還可能通過更隱蔽和高效的方式乾預選舉流程，甚至直接威脅民主制度的核心運行邏輯。

（三）文化領域的符號認同戰

武器化傳播通過操控信息、符號和價值觀，試圖影響公眾的思想、情感和行為，進而塑造或改變社會的集體認知與文化認同。這種傳播方式不僅在於信息的傳遞，更通過特定的敘事框架、文化符號和情感共鳴，推動某種特定的意識形態或政治理念的傳播與認同。通過操縱文化符號、社會情感和集體記憶，武器化傳播在文化領域干擾社會結構與文化認同，成為符號認同戰的核心手段。

模因（Meme）作為一種集視覺元素和簡潔文字於一體的文化符號，以幽默、諷刺或挑釁的方式激發觀眾的情感反應，影響他們的政治態度和行為。佩佩模因（Pepe the Frog）起初是一個無害的漫畫角色，被極右翼群體重新利用並武器化，用以傳播仇恨言論，逐漸演變為種族主義和反移民的象徵。模因將復雜的政治情緒轉化為便於傳播的視覺符號，迅速激起公眾對政策的不信任和憤怒，被視為“武器化的偶像破壞主義”（Iconoclastic Weaponization）。這一過程通過操控文化符號，以達到政治或社會鬥爭的目的[16]，加劇了公眾對社會和政治的分裂。例如，在英國脫歐期間，帶有“Take Back Control”（奪回控制權）字樣的模因迅速傳播，強化了民族主義情緒。

除了文化符號的製造外，符號的篩选和屏蔽同樣能夠塑造或加深某種文化認同或政治立場。審查制度自古以來就是權力控制信息的重要手段，早在古希臘和古羅馬時期，政府就對公共演講和文學作品進行審查，以維持社會秩序和權力穩定。進入數字時代，互聯網和社交媒體的興起推動了審查制度的現代化，平台審查逐漸取代傳統的審查方式，成為當代信息控制和輿論引導的核心工具。算法審查通過人工智能檢測敏感話題、關鍵詞和用戶行為數據，自動刪除或屏蔽被視為“違規”的內容，社交媒體的審核團隊會對用戶生成的內容進行人工篩選，確保其符合平台政策和法律法規。平台審查的作用不僅是限制某些內容的傳播，更是通過推送、刪除和屏蔽等方式引導輿論，塑造公眾認知框架。儘管主流社交平台通過嚴格的內容審核機制控制信息傳播，但一些邊緣平台，如Gab、Gettr、Bitchute等因缺乏有效審查，成為極端言論和惡意信息的溫床。這些平台未對內容髮布做出足夠限制，極端觀點和虛假信息得以肆意擴散，例如，Gab因極端主義內容屢遭批評，被指助長暴力和仇恨。在迴聲室中，用戶只能接觸與自身觀點一致的信息，這種信息環境更強化了極端思想，導致社會群體間的對立加劇。 [17]

語言作為信息傳播的載體和工具，能夠通過情感操控、符號政治和社會動員等方式，深刻影響群體行為和文化認同。語言武器化聚焦於語言形式和文化語境如何影響信息的接收方式，強調語言如何被用來操控、引導或改變人們的認知與行為。這不僅涉及特定詞彙和修辭手法的使用，更包括通過語言表述建構特定的社會意義和文化框架。作為符號認同戰的另一重要工具，語言塑造了“敵我對立”的敘事框架。大翻譯運動（Great Translation Movement）通過選擇性翻譯中國網民的民族主義言論，將其傳播到國際社交媒體平台，引發了對中國的負面認知。這種語言操控通過情緒化表達放大了爭議性內容，加深了國際社會的文化偏見。

語言武器化的深層邏輯在於情緒化和煽動性的語言形式。西方國家常以“人權”與“民主”等正義化標籤為乾預行為辯護，合法化政治或軍事行動。白人至上主義者使用“另類右翼”等模糊標籤重塑意識形態，將傳統的帶有強烈負面含義的“白人至上主義”轉化為一個較為中立的概念，降低了該詞彙的社會抵抗力，用寬泛的“傘式”身份擴大其支持者的基礎。通過對世俗話語的滲透，仇恨政治和極端言論被正當化，逐漸形成一種政治常態。當公眾將這種政治日常化後，語言實現了真正的武器化。 [18]在尼日利亞，煽動仇恨的內容通過種族、宗教和地區話題擴散，深刻惡化了社會關係。 [19]語言的模糊性和合理否認策略也成為傳播者規避責任的有力工具，在被簡化的敘事中傳播複雜的社會和政治議題。特朗普的美國優先（America First）政策通過否定性標籤和情緒化話語，以反對全球化、質疑氣候變化科學、抨擊傳統盟友等方式，故意提出與主流意見相對立的觀點，激發公眾對全球化的不信任，重塑國家利益優先的文化認同。 [20]

三、武器化傳播的風險與挑戰：正當性與破壞性

儘管武器化傳播給國際輿論格局帶來了巨大風險，但特定情形下，其可能會被某些國家或團體通過法律、政治或道德框架賦予一定的正當性。如“9·11”事件後，美國通過《愛國法案》擴大了情報部門的監控權限，以“反恐”為名實施廣泛的信息控制，這種“正當性”常被批評為破壞公民自由，侵蝕了民主社會的核心價值。

在國際政治博弈中，武器化傳播更常被視為“灰色區域”（Gray Zone）的手段。國家間的對抗不再局限於經濟制裁或外交壓力，而是通過信息操控、社交媒體干預等非傳統方式展開。部分國家以“保護國家利益”為藉口傳播虛假信息，辯稱其行為是合規的，儘管這些行為可能在國際法上存在爭議，但往往被合理化為“反制外部威脅”的必要手段。在一些信息監管缺乏嚴格法律框架的國家，選舉的干預行為往往被容忍，甚至被視為一種“正當”的政治活動。在文化層面，某些國家通過傳播特定的文化符號和意識形態，試圖在全球範圍內塑造自身的文化影響力。西方國家常以“文化共享”和“文明傳播”為名，推動其價值觀的傳播，而在實際操作中，卻通過操控文化符號和敘事框架，削弱其他文化的認同感，導致全球文化生態的不平衡。法律框架也在一定程度上為武器化傳播的正當性提供了支持。一些國家以“反恐”和“反對極端主義”為名，通過信息審查、內容過濾等手段限制所謂“有害信息”的傳播。然而，這種正當性往往突破了道德邊界，導致信息封鎖和言論壓制。以“國家安全”為理由的信息治理，雖然在一定程度上獲得了內部認可，卻為武器化傳播的氾濫提供了空間。

相較於正當性，武器化傳播的破壞性尤為顯著。目前，武器化傳播已成為權力結構操控輿論的重要工具，其不僅扭曲了信息內容，還通過隱私侵犯、情感動員和文化滲透等方式，深刻影響了公眾認知、社會情緒以及國際關係。

（一）信息失真與認知操控

信息失真指信息在傳播過程中被故意或無意扭曲，導致公眾接收到的內容與原始信息存在顯著差異。在社交媒體上，虛假信息和誤導性內容的傳播日益猖獗，人工智能模型（如GPT）的生成內容，可能因訓練數據的偏見而加劇這一問題。性別、種族或社會偏見可能被反映在自動生成的文本中，放大信息失真的風險。社交媒體的快速傳播特性也使傳統的事實核查機制難以跟上虛假信息的擴散速度。虛假信息在短時間內往往佔據輿論主導地位，跨平台傳播和匿名性使得澄清與糾正變得更加複雜。傳播的不對稱性削弱了傳統新聞機構的權威性，公眾更傾向於相信即時更新的社交平台信息，而非傳統新聞機構的深入報導，這進一步削弱了新聞機構在抵制虛假信息中的作用。

除了信息本身的失真，武器化傳播還深刻利用了認知失調的心理機制。認知失調指個體接觸到與其已有信念或態度相衝突的信息時產生的心理不適感。傳播者通過製造認知失調，動搖目標受眾的既有態度，甚至誘導其接受新的意識形態。在政治選舉中，定向傳播負面信息常迫使選民重新審視政治立場，甚至改變投票傾向。武器化傳播通過選擇性暴露進一步加劇了“信息繭房”的形成，讓受眾傾向於接觸與自身信念一致的信息，忽視或排斥相反觀點。這不僅強化了個體的認知偏見，也讓虛假信息在群體內部快速擴散，難以被外界的事實和理性聲音打破，最終形成高度同質化的輿論生態。

（二）隱私洩露與數字監控

近年來，深度偽造技術的濫用加劇了隱私侵權問題。 2019年，“ZAO”換臉軟件因默認用戶同意肖像權而被下架，揭示了生物特徵數據的過度採集風險。用戶上傳的照片經深度學習處理後，既可能生成精確的換臉視頻，也可能成為隱私洩露的源頭。更嚴重的是，深度偽造等技術被濫用於性別暴力，多名歐美女演員的面孔被非法植入虛假性視頻並廣泛傳播，儘管平台在部分情況下會刪除這些內容，但開源程序的普及讓惡意用戶能夠輕鬆複製和分享偽造內容。此外，用戶在使用社交媒體時，往往默認授權平台訪問其設備的照片、相機、麥克風等應用權限。通過這些權限，平台不僅收集了大量個人數據，還能夠通過算法分析用戶的行為特徵、興趣偏好和社交關係，進而精準投放廣告、內容推薦甚至實施信息操控。這種大規模數據採集推動了對隱私保護的全球討論。在歐洲，《通用數據保護條例》（General Data Protection Regulation）試圖通過嚴格的數據收集和使用規定，加強個人隱私權保障。然而，由於“隱性同意”或複雜的用戶協議，平台常常繞過相關規定，使數據處理過程缺乏透明度，導致普通用戶難以了解數據的實際用途。美國《通信規範法》第230條規定，網絡平台無需為用戶生成的內容承擔法律責任，這一規定推動了平台內容審核的發展，但也使其在應對隱私侵權時缺乏動力。平台出於商業利益的考慮，往往滯後處理虛假信息和隱私問題，導致審核責任被持續擱置。

在數字監控方面，社交平台與政府的合作使用戶數據成為“監控資本主義”的核心資源。美國國家安全局（NSA）通過電話記錄、互聯網通信和社交媒體數據，實施大規模監控，並與Google、Facebook等大型企業合作，獲取用戶的在線行為數據，用於全球範圍內的情報收集和行為分析。跨國監控技術的濫用更是將隱私侵犯推向國際層面。以色列網絡安全公司NSO開發的Pegasus間諜軟件，通過“零點擊攻擊”入侵目標設備，可實時竊取私人信息和通信記錄。 2018年，沙特記者賈馬爾·卡舒吉（Jamal Khashoggi）被謀殺一案中，沙特政府通過Pegasus監聽其通信，揭示了這種技術對個體隱私和國際政治的深遠威脅。

（三）情感極化與社會分裂

情感在影響個體認知與決策中起著關鍵作用。武器化傳播通過煽動恐懼、憤怒、同情等情緒，影響理性判斷，推動公眾在情緒驅動下做出非理性反應。戰爭、暴力和民族主義常成為情感動員的主要內容，傳播者通過精心設計的議題，將愛國主義、宗教信仰等元素植入信息傳播，迅速引發公眾情感共鳴。數字技術的廣泛應用，特別是人工智能和社交媒體平台的結合，進一步放大了情感極化的風險。虛假信息與極端言論在平台上的快速傳播，不僅來自普通用戶的分享行為，更受到算法的驅動。平台傾向優先推送情緒化和互動性高的內容，這些內容常包含煽動性語言和極端觀點，從而加劇了仇恨言論和偏激觀點的傳播。

社交媒體標籤和算法推薦在情感極化中扮演著關鍵角色。在查理周刊事件後，#StopIslam標籤成為仇恨言論的傳播工具，用戶借助該標籤發布仇視和暴力傾向的信息。在美國2020年總統選舉期間，社交平台上的極端政治言論和錯誤信息也在激烈的黨派鬥爭中被放大。通過精確的情感操控，武器化傳播不僅撕裂了公共對話，還極大影響了社會的民主進程。另一種特殊的極端主義動員策略是“武器化自閉症”（Weaponized Autism），即極右翼團體利用自閉症個體的技術專長，實施情感操控。這些團體招募技術能力較強但有社交障礙的個體，通過賦予虛假的歸屬感，將其轉化為信息戰的執行者。這些個體在極端組織的指引下，被用於傳播仇恨言論、執行網絡攻擊和推動極端主義。這種現像不僅揭示了情感操控的深層機制，也表明技術如何被極端團體利用來服務於更大的政治和社會議程。 [21]

（四）信息殖民與文化滲透

“武器化相互依賴”理論（Weaponized Interdependence Theory）揭示了國家如何利用政治、經濟和信息網絡中的關鍵節點，對其他國家施加壓力。 [22]特別是在信息領域，發達國家通過控制信息流實施“信息殖民”，進一步鞏固其文化和政治優勢。數字平台成為這一殖民過程的載體，全球南方國家在信息傳播中高度依賴西方主導的技術平台和社交網絡，在撒哈拉以南非洲地區，Facebook已成為“互聯網”的代名詞。這種依賴不僅為西方企業帶來了巨大的廣告收入，還通過算法推薦對非洲本土文化和價值觀，尤其是在性別、家庭和宗教信仰等方面，產生了深遠影響，使文化滲透成為常態。

數字不平等是信息殖民的另一表現。發達國家在數字技術和信息資源上的主導地位，使南方國家在經濟、教育和文化領域日益邊緣化。巴勒斯坦因基礎設施不足和技術封鎖，難以有效融入全球數字經濟，既限制了本地經濟發展，又進一步削弱了其在全球信息傳播中的話語權。全球主要經濟體和信息強國通過技術封鎖和經濟制裁，限制他國獲取關鍵技術與創新資源，這不僅阻礙了目標國的科技發展，也加劇了全球技術與創新生態的斷裂。自2018年退出《伊朗核協議》以來，美國對伊朗的經濟制裁導致其在半導體和5G領域發展受阻，技術與創新的不對稱拉大了全球技術生態的差距，使許多國家在信息競爭中處於劣勢。

四、反思與討論：非對稱傳播格局中的話語權爭奪

在國際非對稱傳播（Asymmetric Communication）競爭格局下，強勢方常常通過主流媒體和國際新聞機構等渠道佔據輿論的主導地位，而弱勢方則需要藉助創新傳播技術和手段來彌補劣勢，爭奪話語權。這一傳播格局的核心在於信息地緣政治（Information Geopolitics），即國家之間的權力較量不僅僅取決於地理位置、軍事力量或經濟資源，更取決於對信息、數據和技術的控制。大國間的博弈已不再僅限於物理空間的控制，而擴展至輿論空間的爭奪。這些“信息景觀”涉及全球傳播生態中的話語權、信息流通和媒體影響力等，在這一過程中，國家通過不斷製造景觀，以影響國際輿論、塑造全球認知框架，進而實現其戰略目標。非對稱傳播的策略不僅關乎信息內容的傳遞，更重要的是如何借助各種傳播技術、平台和手段彌補資源與能力上的差距，信息傳播的核心不再局限於內容本身，而圍繞著話語權的爭奪展開。隨著信息戰和認知戰的興起，誰掌握了信息，誰就能在全球競爭中占得先機。

（一）後發優勢下的技術赶超

傳統的大國或強勢傳播者掌控著全球輿論的主導權，相比之下，弱勢國家往往缺乏與這些大國抗衡的傳播渠道。後發優勢理論主張後發國家能夠通過跳躍式發展，繞過傳統的技術路徑，引進現有的先進技術和知識，從而迅速崛起並規避早期技術創新中的低效和過時環節。在武器化傳播的背景下，這一理論為信息弱國提供了通過新興科技突破大國傳播壁壘的路徑，有助於其在技術層面上實現赶超。傳統媒體往往受到資源、影響力和審查機制的限制，信息傳播速度慢、覆蓋面有限，且容易受到特定國家或集團的操控。數字媒體的崛起使信息傳播的格局發生了根本性變化，弱勢國家能夠借助全球化的互聯網平台，直接面向國際受眾，而不必依賴傳統的新聞機構和主流媒體。通過新興技術，弱勢國家不僅能更精準地傳遞信息，還能通過定向傳播和情感引導，迅速擴大其在國際輿論中的影響力。後發國家可以利用先進技術（如大數據、人工智能、5G網絡等）實現精準的信息傳播，打造高效的傳播渠道。以大數據分析為例，後發國家可以深入了解受眾需求和輿情趨勢，快速識別全球輿論脈搏，實施定向傳播，快速擴大國際影響力。人工智能技術不僅能夠預測輿論發展方向，還能實時優化傳播策略。 5G網絡的普及大大提升了信息傳播的速度與覆蓋範圍，使後發國家能夠以低成本、高效率的方式突破傳統傳播模式的局限，形成獨特的傳播優勢。

通過跨國合作，後發國家可以整合更多的傳播資源，擴大傳播的廣度與深度。例如，阿根廷與拉美其他國家共同建立了“拉美新聞網絡”，通過新聞內容共享，推動拉美國家在國際輿論中發出統一的聲音，反擊西方媒體的單一敘事。在非洲，南非與華為合作推動“智慧南非”項目，建設現代化信息基礎設施，促進數字化轉型和公共服務效率的提升。後發國家政府應加大對技術研發和創新的投入，鼓勵本土企業和人才的發展。同時，還應注重文化輸出和媒體產業建設，通過全球化合作和去中心化傳播模式提升國家在國際信息空間中的話語權。政府可以資助數字文化創作，支持本地社交媒體平台的成長，並通過國際合作框架整合更多傳播資源。

（二）信息反制中的壁壘構建

與軍事行動可能引發的全面衝突，或經濟制裁可能帶來的風險不同，武器化傳播能夠在不觸發全面戰爭的情況下實現戰略目標，基於成本和戰略考量，其具有極大的吸引力。由於武器化傳播具備低成本、高回報的特點，越來越多的國家和非國家行為體選擇通過操控信息來達到戰略目標。這種傳播手段的普及，使得國家在面對來自外部和內部的信息攻擊時，面臨更加複雜和多變的威脅。隨著信息戰爭的日益激烈，單純的傳統軍事防禦已經無法滿足現代戰爭的需求。相反，構建強有力的信息防禦體系，成為國家保持政治穩定、維護社會認同和提升國際競爭力的關鍵策略。因此，如何有效應對外部信息干擾和輿論操控，並進行信息反制，已成為各國迫切需要解決的問題。完善的網絡安全基礎設施是維護國家安全的關鍵，用以防范敏感信息不被外部操控或篡改。以歐盟為例，歐盟通過“數字單一市場”戰略推動成員國加強網絡安全建設，要求互聯網公司更積極地應對虛假信息和外部干預。歐盟的網絡安全指令還規定各成員國建立應急響應機制，保護重要信息基礎設施免受網絡攻擊。此外，歐盟還與社交平台公司，如Facebook、Twitter和Google等建立合作，通過提供反虛假信息工具和數據分析技術來打擊假新聞傳播。人工智能、大數據和自動化技術正在成為信息防禦的重要工具，被用以實時監控信息傳播路徑，識別潛在的虛假信息和抵禦輿論操控。在網絡安全領域，大數據分析幫助決策者識別和預警惡意攻擊，並優化反制策略。這些技術的應用不僅能夠在國內層面增強信息防禦能力，還能提高國家在國際信息空間中的主動性和競爭力。

反制機制是信息防禦體系的另一重要組成部分，尤其是在國際輿論壓力下，實時監控外部信息傳播並及時糾正虛假信息成為維護輿論主動權的關鍵。烏克蘭自2014年克里米亞危機以來，通過與北約和美國合作，建立了頗具規模的網絡防禦體系。烏克蘭的國家網絡安全局為應對網絡威脅設立了“信息反制小組”，利用社交媒體和新聞發布平台實時駁斥俄羅斯的虛假報導，這一策略顯著提升了烏克蘭在國際輿論中的聲譽和信任度。

（三）輿論引導中的議程設置

在信息化和數字化的全球競爭格局中，輿論引導不僅涉及信息傳播內容，更關鍵的是如何設置議程並聚焦全球關注的熱點話題。議程設置理論表明，誰能掌控信息流通的議題，誰就能引導輿論的方向。議程設置通過控制話題的討論範圍和焦點，影響公眾對事件的關注與評價，社交媒體的興起為信息弱勢國提供了突破口，使其可以通過多平台聯動來爭奪信息傳播的主導權。以烏克蘭為例，其在俄烏戰爭中通過社交媒體傳播戰爭實況，不僅發布戰鬥實況，還融入民眾的情感訴求，借助平民遭遇和城市破壞的悲情敘事，激發國際社會的同情與關注。在抵禦外部信息干擾的同時，國家還需要主動傳播正面敘事，講述能夠引發國際社會共鳴的文化故事。故事應該符合國際輿論的情感需求，同時展現國家的獨特性，強化與國際社會的聯繫。以我國的“一帶一路”共建為例，在“一帶一路”共建國家，我國投資建設了大量基礎設施項目，這些項目不僅幫助改善了當地的經濟基礎條件，也展示了中國在全球化進程中的責任擔當，更為文化合作和交流活動提供了窗口，向世界展示了中華民族豐富的歷史文化，為國際社會展現了中華文化的包容性和責任感。

但由於全球南方國家往往面臨資源、技術與國際傳播平台的限制，難以直接與發達國家競爭，因此它們依賴更加靈活、創新的傳播手段來參與全球議程的設置。例如，巴西在應對環保和氣候變化議題上，尤其是亞馬遜森林的砍伐問題，面臨來自西方媒體的負面輿論壓力。為此，巴西政府利用社交媒體發布關於亞馬遜保護的最新數據和成功案例，積極塑造國家在環境保護領域的形象。同時，巴西通過與其他發展中國家合作，參與全球氣候變化談判，推動南南合作，增強了在氣候問題上的話語權。大型國際事件、人道主義活動和製作文化產品等，也是講述國家故事的有效方式。國際體育賽事如世界杯、奧運會等，不僅是體育競技的展示平台，更是國家形象和文化軟實力的展現場所，通過承辦或積極參與這些全球性事件，國家能夠向世界展示其實力、價值和文化魅力，推動積極的輿論議程。

“戰爭無非是政治通過另一種手段的延續”[23]。這一克勞塞維茨的經典論斷在武器化傳播的語境下得到了現代化的詮釋。武器化傳播突破了傳統戰爭的物理邊界，成為一種融合信息戰、認知戰和心理戰的現代戰略手段。它以非暴力的形式操控信息流向和公眾認知，使國家和非國家行為者無須依賴直接軍事行動即可實現政治目標，體現出極強的戰略性和目標性。通過操控信息、情緒和價值觀，武器化傳播能夠在避免全面戰爭的同時達成戰略目的，在全球競爭和衝突中，已成為強國對弱國進行政治壓制的重要手段。

武器化傳播的核心在於通過信息操控削弱敵方的決策力與行動能力，但其複雜性使得傳播效果難以完全預測。儘管信息強國通過技術優勢和傳播渠道壓制信息弱國，傳播效果卻充滿不確定性。尤其是在社交媒體和數字平台全球化的背景下，信息流動的邊界和效果愈加難以控制。這種複雜性為弱國提供了突破話語霸權的機會，推動信息傳播的反向博弈。弱國可以利用這些平台發起對抗，挑戰強國的信息操控，在全球輿論中佔據一席之地。非對稱性博弈反映了國際輿論的動態平衡，傳播不再是單向的控制，而是更為複雜的交互和對話，賦予弱者影響輿論的可能性。當前國際輿論格局仍以信息強國對信息弱國的單向壓制為主，但這一局面並非不可打破。信息戰爭具有高度的不對稱性，信息弱國可以憑藉技術創新、靈活策略和跨國合作逐步反制。通過發揮“非對稱優勢”，弱國不僅能夠影響全球輿論，還能藉助聯合行動和信息共享提升話語權。跨國合作與地區聯盟的建立，為弱國提供了反制強國的有力工具，使其能夠在國際輿論上形成合力，挑戰信息強國的主導地位。在戰爭框架下，各國可以靈活調整策略，主動塑造信息傳播格局，而非被動接受強國的信息操控。

戰爭社會學強調社會結構、文化認同和群體行為在戰爭中的作用。武器化傳播不僅是軍事或政治行為的延續，更深刻影響社會心理、群體情感和文化認同。強國利用信息傳播塑造他國的認知與態度，以實現自己的戰略目標。然而，從社會學視角來看，武器化傳播並非單向的壓制，而是複雜的社會互動和文化反應的產物。在這一過程中，信息弱國並非完全處於弱勢，相反，它們可以藉助文化傳播、社會動員和全球輿論的動態對抗，以“軟實力”反擊外部操控，塑造新的集體認同，展示“弱者武器”的正當性。

（基金項目：研究闡釋黨的二十屆三中全會精神國家社科基金重大專項“推進新聞宣傳和網絡輿論一體化管理研究”（項目編號：24ZDA084）的研究成果）

References:

[1] Lasswell H D Propaganda techniques in the world wars [M] Beijing: Renmin University Press, 2003

[2] Clausewitz C V. On War: Volume 1 [M] Academy of Military Sciences of the People’s Liberation Army of China, translated Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1978.

[3]Herrman J. If everything can be ‘weaponized，’ what should we fear？ [EB/OL]. （2017-03-14）[2024-12-20].https：//www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/magazine/if-everything-can-be-weaponized-what-should-we-fear.html.

[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Joint statement by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on strengthening contemporary global strategic stability (full text) [EB/OL].https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/1179_674909/201906/t20190606_7947892.shtml.

[5]Mazarr M J， Casey A， Demus A， et al. Hostile social manipulation： present realities and emerging trends[M]. Santa Monica， CA USA： Rand Corporation， 2019.

[6]Bob Y J. Ex-CIA director Petraeus： Everything can be hijacked， weaponized[EB/OL].（2018-01-30）[2024-12-20].https：//www.jpost.com/israel-news/ex-cia-director-petraeus-everything-can-be-hijacked-weaponized-540235.

[7]Mattson G. Weaponization： Metaphorical Ubiquity and the Contemporary Rejection of Politics[EB/OL].OSF（2019-01-08）[2024-12-20].osf.io/5efrw.

[8]Robinson L， Helmus T C， Cohen R S， et al. Modern political warfare[J]. Current practises and possible responses， 2018.

[9]Kreitem H M. Weaponization of Access， Communication Inequalities as a Form of Control： Case of Israel/Palestine[J]. Digital Inequalities in the Global South， 2020： 137-157.

[10]Laity M. The birth and coming of age of NATO StratCom： a personal history[J]. Defence Strategic Communications， 2021， 10（10）： 21-70.

[11]Confessore N. Cambridge Analytica and Facebook： The scandal and the fallout so far[J]. The New York Times， 2018（4）.

[12]McQuinn B， Kolga M， Buntain C， et al. Russia Weaponization of Canada’s far Right and far Left to Undermine Support for Ukraine[J]. International Journal，（Toronto，Ont），2024，79（2）：297-311.

[13]Stukal D， Sanovich S， Bonneau R， et al. Why botter： how pro-government bots fight opposition in Russia[J]. American political science review， 2022， 116（3）： 843-857.

[14]Jones M O. The gulf information war| propaganda， fake news， and fake trends： The weaponization of twitter bots in the gulf crisis[J]. International journal of communication13（2019）：27.

[15]Genovese D. Nearly 50% of voters said deepfakes had some influence on election decision. [EB/OL].（2024-10-30）[2024-12-20].https：//www.foxbusiness.com/politics/nearly-50-voters-said-deepfakes-had-some-influence-election-decision.

[16]Peters C， Allan S. Weaponizing memes： The journalistic mediation of visual politicization[J]. Digital Journalism， 2022， 10（02）：217-229.

[17]Gorissen S. Weathering and weaponizing the# TwitterPurge： digital content moderation and the dimensions of deplatforming[J]. Communication and Democracy， 2024， 58（01）： 1-26.

[18]Pascale C M. The weaponization of language： Discourses of rising right-wing authoritarianism[J]. Current Sociology， 2019， 67（06）： 898-917.

[19]Ridwa1ah A O， Sule S Y， Usman B， et al. Politicization of Hate and Weaponization of Twitter/X in a Polarized Digital Space in Nigeria[J]. Journal of Asian and African Studies， 2024.

[20]Mercieca J R. Dangerous demagogues and weaponized communication[J]. Rhetoric Society Quarterly， 2019， 49（03）： 264-279.

[21]Welch C， Senman L， Loftin R， et al. Understanding the use of the term “Weaponized autism” in an alt-right social media platform[J]. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders， 2023， 53（10）： 4035-4046.

[22]Farrell H， Newman A L. Weaponized interdependence： How global economic networks shape state coercion[J]. International security，2019，44（01）：42-79.

[23] Clausewitz C V. On War: Volume 1 [M] Academy of Military Sciences of the People’s Liberation Army of China, translated Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1978

作者簡介：郭小安，重慶大學新聞學院教授、博士生導師，重慶市哲學社會科學智能傳播與城市國際推廣重點實驗室執行主任（重慶 400044）；康如詩，重慶大學新聞學院碩士生（重慶 400044）。

中國原創軍事資源：https://www.cjwk.cn/journal/guidelinesDetails/192031322246497484888

#Artificial #Intelligence, #Chinese #Quantum #technology, #Information Support Force, #intelligent warfare, #intellligentization, #中國軍事人工智慧武器化, #新興戰爭技術, #智慧化戰爭, #智慧戰爭, #軍事資訊化與智慧化, Asymmetric Warfare, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Artificial Intelligence, Chinese Military Future Wars, Chinese Military Use of Cognitive Confrontation within the Combat Domain, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare, Dissipative Warfare, Information Support Force, Intelligent Warfare, Mosaic Warfare, Multi-Domain Operations, 認知域戰, 認知戰

Chinese Military’s Brief Analysis of Multi-dimensional Central Warfare

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中國軍隊多維中心戰淺析

現代英語：

2023-09-27 11:58:xx

Source: Guangming Military

Since the 1990s, the concepts of multi-dimensional central warfare, such as network-centric warfare, personnel-centric warfare, action-centric warfare, and decision-centric warfare, have been proposed one after another. The evolution of the concept of multi-dimensional central warfare reflects the overall goal of seeking advantages such as platform effectiveness, information empowerment, and decision-making intelligence by relying on military science and technology advantages, and also reflects the contradictory and unified relationship between people and equipment, strategy and skills, and the strange and the normal. Dialectically understanding these contradictory and unified relationships with centralized structured thinking makes it easier to grasp the essential connotation of its tactics and its methodological significance.

Strengthen the integration of the “human” dimension in the combination of people and equipment

The concepts of personnel-centric warfare and platform-centric warfare largely reflect the relationship between people and weapons and equipment. Some have specially formulated human dimension strategies, emphasizing continuous investment in the human dimension of combat effectiveness, which is the most reliable guarantee for dealing with an uncertain future. Since the beginning of the 21st century, with the rapid development of intelligent weapons and equipment, unmanned combat has emerged, and voices questioning the status and role of people have arisen one after another. It is imperative to strengthen the integration of the human dimension and enhance the synergy of the human dimension.

First, we need to enhance spiritual cohesion. Marxism believes that consciousness is the reflection of objective matter in the human mind. Tactics are the expression and summary of combat experience, and they themselves have spiritual or conscious forms. When studying tactics, we naturally need to put spiritual factors first. Some scholars believe that war is still fundamentally a contest of human will. In the information age, people’s spirits are richer and more complex, and enhancing the spiritual cohesion of the human dimension is more challenging and difficult. To enhance people’s spiritual cohesion, we need to coordinate the cultivation of collective spirit and individual spirit, maximize the satisfaction of individual spiritual needs in leading the collective spirit, realize individual spiritual pursuits in shaping the value of collective spirit, and empower people’s spirit with all available and useful information; we need to coordinate the cultivation of critical spirit and innovative spirit, adhere to the tactical epistemology of dialectical materialism, resolutely oppose idealism and mechanism in tactical cognition, and constantly inherit and innovate in criticism; we need to coordinate the cultivation of fighting spirit and scientific spirit, and promote the revolutionary spirit of facing death with courage and winning, and promote the spirit of winning by science and technology.

The second is to enhance the organizational structure. Organizations are the organs of the military, and people are the cells of the organization. The settings of military organizations in different countries have their own characteristics and commonalities. For example, the Ministry of National Defense is generally set up to distinguish between the structure of military branches, hierarchical structures and regional structures, and to distinguish between peacetime and wartime organizations. Although the purpose of construction and war is the same, the requirements for the unity of construction and the flexibility of war are different. To enhance the organizational structure and promote the consistency of war and construction, it is necessary to smooth the vertical command chain, reasonably define the command power and leadership power, command power and control power, so that the government and orders complement each other, and enhance the vertical structural strength of the organization; it is necessary to open up horizontal coordination channels, explore the establishment of normalized cross-domain (organizations, institutions, departments) coordination channels, change the simple task-based coordination model, and enhance the horizontal structural strength of the organization; it is necessary to improve the peace-war conversion mechanism, focus on the organization connection, adjustment and improvement in the change of leadership or command power of the troops, and maintain the stability and reliability of the organizational structure network.

The third is to enhance material support. The spiritual strength of people in combat can be transformed into material strength, but spiritual strength cannot be separated from the support of material strength. To enhance material support and thus realize the organic unity of material and spirit, it is necessary to ensure combat equipment, bedding, food, and medical care, build good learning venues, training facilities, and re-education channels, provide good technical services in combat regulations, physiological medicine, etc., help design diversified and personalized capacity improvement plans and career development plans, and provide strong material and technical support for the development of people’s physical fitness, skills, and intelligence, and thus comprehensively improve people’s adaptability and combat effectiveness in the uncertain battlefield environment of the future.
             

Deepen the practice of the “skill” dimension in the combination of combat and skills

The combination of combat skills is an important principle of tactical application. The technology includes not only the technology at the practical operation level (such as shooting technology), but also the technology at the theoretical application level (such as information technology). It can be said that tactics, technology, art and procedures together constitute its “combat methodology”. Scientific and technological development and scientific technology are important characteristics of scientific and technological development. To deepen the combination of combat skills, it is necessary to correctly grasp the relationship between technology and tactics, art and procedures, and continuously deepen the practice of the “skill” dimension.

First, promote the tacticalization of advanced technology. Technology determines tactics, which is the basic view of dialectical materialism’s tactical theory. The evolution of the concept of multi-dimensional central warfare is also an example of technology driving the development and change of tactics. Engels once pointed out: “The entire organization and combat methods of the army and the related victory or defeat… depend on the quality and quantity of the population and on technology.” However, technology-driven tactics have a “lag effect”, especially in the absence of actual combat traction. This requires actively promoting the military transformation of advanced civilian technologies and the tactical application of advanced military technologies. On the one hand, we must actively introduce advanced civilian technologies, especially accelerate the introduction and absorption of cutting-edge technologies such as deep neural networks and quantum communication computing; on the other hand, we must strengthen tactical training of advanced technology equipment, closely combine technical training with tactical training, and promote the formation of new tactics and new combat capabilities with new equipment as soon as possible.

Second, promote the technicalization of command art. “Art” is a highly subjective concept. Some Chinese and foreign scholars believe that “the art of command is rooted in the commander’s ability to implement leadership to maximize performance”, while others believe that “the art of command is the way and method for commanders to implement flexible, clever and creative command”. Chinese and foreign scholars generally regard command as an art. The main reason is that although command has objective basis and support such as combat regulations, superior orders and technical support, the more critical factor lies in the commander’s subjective initiative and creativity, which is difficult to quantify by technical means. With the development of disciplines and technologies such as cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience, the cognitive structure and mechanism of command will become more explicit, the mysterious veil of “command art” will gradually fade, and the technicalization of command art will become an inevitable trend. This requires continuous strengthening of technical thinking, continuous deepening of the construction of artificial intelligence-assisted command decision-making means, continuous deepening of the application of human brain decision-making mechanisms, practical use of technology to deconstruct art, and continuous promotion of the technicalization of command art.

The third is to promote the regulation of combat technology. Many scholars place technology on a position that is almost as important as tactics. This insistence on the integrated development of tactical regulation and the regulation of specialized military technology and special combat technology is an important way to promote the systematic and standardized construction of combat regulations and further achieve the integration and unification of tactics and technology at the legal level.
              

Seeking the advantage of the “odd” dimension in combining the odd and the regular

The odd and the even are a basic contradictory structure of tactics, with inherent identity. Without the odd, there is no even, and without the even, there is no odd; either the odd or the even, ever-changing. The choice of the odd and the even is the category of decision-centered warfare, and the application of the odd and the even is the category of action-centered warfare. In the 1990s, the theories of asymmetric warfare, non-contact warfare, and non-linear warfare were proposed. If “symmetric warfare, contact warfare, and linear warfare” are even, then “asymmetric warfare, non-contact warfare, and non-linear warfare” can be called odd. From the perspective of natural science, “symmetry, contact, and linear” are general, and “asymmetry, non-contact, and non-linear” are detailed. It is an inevitable requirement to grasp the dimension of “odd” in the combination of odd, odd, and even, and to seek the advantages of the “three nons”.

First, seek “asymmetric” advantages. “Symmetry” and “asymmetry” originally refer to the morphological characteristics of things or space. Symmetrical warfare is a battle between two troops of the same type, and asymmetric warfare is a battle between two different types of troops. The theory of asymmetric warfare requires the scientific and reasonable organization of troops, combat forces and weapon systems of different military services, deployment in a wide area, and the concentration of superior forces to deal a fatal blow to the enemy at the best combat opportunity, and then quickly redeploy the forces. Due to the limited combat power, the troops have positive asymmetric advantages and negative asymmetric disadvantages. Seeking asymmetric advantages and avoiding asymmetric disadvantages is the common expectation of the warring parties, which will lead to such a situation that the warring parties cycle back and forth between symmetry and asymmetry. Therefore, to seek “asymmetric” advantages, it is necessary to seek asymmetry in combat power, combat capability, combat command and other aspects, adhere to and carry forward “avoid the strong and attack the weak, avoid the real and attack the virtual”, “you fight yours, I fight mine”, and effectively play advantages and avoid disadvantages in asymmetry. For example, when weapons and equipment are symmetrical, strive to gain an asymmetric advantage in personnel capabilities; when forces are symmetrical, strive to gain an asymmetric advantage in command art.

The second is to seek “non-contact” advantages. “Contact” and “non-contact” are a description of the distance between different things. Contact in the military field is usually defined by the projection distance of weapons. The concept of “non-contact combat” originated from World War II and was created during the Cold War. The connotation of contact combat and non-contact combat changes with the change of the striking distance of weapons and equipment. The warring parties always seek to attack each other at a farther distance or in a wider space without being threatened. Since the 1990s, the theory of “non-contact combat” has been used in many local wars. Non-contact combat is a combat action style that implements long-range precision strikes outside the defense zone while being far away from the opponent. Non-contact combat embodies the idea of winning by technology, flexible mobility, and center of gravity strikes. With the rapid development of military science and technology, the armies of major countries in the world will have the ability to perceive and strike globally, and the connotation of “non-contact” will be further compressed to space, cognitive domain and other space fields. To this end, on the one hand, we must base ourselves on the reality of “contact combat”, learn from each other’s strengths and overcome our weaknesses in contact, and continuously accumulate advantages; on the other hand, we must expand the space for “non-contact combat”, seize the initiative and seize the opportunity in non-contact, and continuously expand our advantages.

The third is to seek “nonlinear” advantages. “Linear” and “nonlinear” usually refer to people’s thinking or behavior patterns. The movement of all things in the universe is complex and mostly nonlinear, while human cognition always tends to be simple, abstract, and linear, and has invented concepts such as logic lines, time lines, and linear mathematics. In military science, the transition from linear operations to nonlinear operations reflects the development and progress of military technology theory. Since the second half of the 20th century, nonlinear operations have been on the historical stage. Some scholars have pointed out that in linear operations, each unit mainly acts in a coordinated manner along a clear front line of its own side. The key is to maintain the relative position between its own units to enhance the safety of the units; in nonlinear operations, each unit simultaneously carries out combat operations from multiple selected bases along multiple combat lines. The key is to create specific effects at multiple decision points against the target. Linear operations mainly reflect the action-centered warfare idea, while nonlinear operations mainly reflect the target-centered warfare idea. To this end, on the one hand, we must deepen the use of linear warfare and make full use of its practical value in facilitating command, coordination and support; on the other hand, we must boldly try non-linear warfare and maximize its potential advantages of extensive mobility and full-dimensional jointness. (Yin Tao, Deng Yunsheng, Sun Dongya)

現代國語：

2023-09-27 11:58:xx

來源：光明軍事
自1990年代以來，網路中心戰、人員中心戰、行動中心戰、決策中心戰等多維度的中心戰概念先後被提出。多維度中心戰概念的演變，反映了依靠軍事科技優勢尋求平台效能、資訊賦能、決策智能等優勢的總體目標，更反映了人與裝、謀與技、奇與正等方面的對立統一關係。以中心式結構化思維辯證地認識這些對立統一關係，更便於掌握其戰術的本質內涵及其方法論意義。
強化人裝結合中「人」維度融合
人員中心戰與平台中心戰概念很大程度上反映的是人與武器裝備的關係。有的專門制定人維度策略，強調在戰鬥力的人維度進行持續投入，對於應對不確定的未來是最可靠的保障。進入21世紀以來，隨著智慧化武器裝備的快速發展，無人作戰異軍突起，對人的地位作用的質疑聲音此起彼伏，強化人維度的融合、增強人維度的合力勢在必行。
一是增強精神凝聚力。馬克思主義認為，意識是客觀物質在人腦中的反映。戰術是戰鬥經驗的表現與概括，本身俱有精神或意識上的形態，研究戰術自然要把精神因素放在第一位。有學者認為，戰爭從根本上來說仍然是人類意志的較量。在資訊化時代，人的精神更加豐富複雜，增強人維度精神上的凝聚力，挑戰和難度更高。增強人的精神凝聚力，需要統籌培養集體精神與個體精神，在引領集體精神中最大限度滿足個體精神需求，在培塑集體精神價值中實現個體精神追求，用一切可用、有用的信息賦能人的精神；需要統籌培養批判精神與創新精神，堅持辯證唯物論的戰術知識論，堅決反對戰術認識上的唯心論和機械論，不斷在批判中繼承、在繼承中創新；需要統籌培養戰鬥精神與科學精神，既要弘揚視死如歸、敢打必勝的革命精神，又要發揚科學制勝、技術制勝的精神。


二是增強組織結構力。組織是軍隊的器官，人是組織的細胞。不同國家軍事組織的設置有其特性，也有其共通性。例如普遍設有國防部，區分軍種結構、層級結構與區域結構，區分平時編制與戰時編成。儘管建與戰在目的上是一致的，但是建的統一性與戰的彈性在要求上不盡相同。增強組織結構力進而促進戰建一致，需要暢通縱向指揮鏈路，合理界定指揮權與領導權、指揮權與控制權，做到政令相長，增強組織的縱向結構力；需要打通橫向協同管道，探索建立常態化的跨領域（組織、機構、部門）協同途徑，改變單純的任務式協同模式，增強組織的橫向結構力；需要健全平戰轉換機制，重點關注部隊領導權或指揮權變更中組織銜接、調整和健全等工作，保持組織結構網絡的穩定性、可靠性。
三是增強物質保障力。戰鬥中人的精神力量可以轉化為物質力量，但精神力量也離不開物質力量的支撐。增強物質保障力進而實現物質與精神的有機統一，需要像為決策保障情報、為槍砲保障彈藥、為車輛保障油料一樣，保障好戰鬥裝具、被裝、伙食、醫療，建設好學習場地、訓練設施和再教育渠道，提供好戰條令、生理醫學等方面技術服務，幫助設計多樣化個人化的能力提升計劃、職業發展規劃，為發展人的體能、技能和智能，進而全面提高人在未來不確定性戰場環境中的適應性和戰鬥力，提供堅強的物質和技術支撐。

深化戰技結合中「技」維度實踐
戰技結合是戰術運用的重要原則。其中的技術不僅包括實務操作層面的技術（如射擊技術），也包括理論應用層面的技術（如資訊科技）。可以認為，戰術、技術、藝術和程序共同構成了其「戰鬥方法論」。科學技術化和技術科學化是科學技術發展的重要特徵。深化戰技結合，需要正確掌握技術與戰術、藝術、程序的關係，不斷深化「技」維度實踐。


一是推動先進技術戰術化。技術決定戰術，是辯證唯物論戰術論的基本觀點。多維度中心戰概念的演變，也是技術推動戰術發展變革的例子。恩格斯曾指出：“軍隊的全部組織和作戰方式以及與之有關的勝負……，取決於居民的質與量和取決於技術。”然而，技術推動戰術具有“滯後效應”，尤其在缺少實戰牽引的情況下。這就需要主動推進先進民用技術的軍事轉化和先進軍事技術的戰術應用。一方面，要積極引進民用先進技術，尤其要加速推進深度神經網路、量子通訊運算等尖端技術的引進吸收；另一方面，要加強先進技術裝備戰術訓練，把練技術與練戰術緊密結合起來，推動新裝備盡快形成新戰術和新戰力。
二是推動指揮藝術技術化。 「藝術」是一個具有較強主體性的概念。中外學者有的認為“指揮藝術根植於指揮官實施領導以最大限度提高績效的能力”，有的認為“指揮藝術是指揮官實施靈活巧妙和富有創造性指揮的方式與方法”。中外學者普遍將指揮視為藝術，主要原因在於：指揮儘管有作戰條令、上級命令和技術保障等客觀方面的依據和支撐，但更關鍵的因素在於指揮員的主觀能動性和創造性，而這是比較難以用技術手段加以量化的。隨著認知心理學、認知神經科學等學科和技術的發展，指揮的認知結構和作用機制將更加顯性化，「指揮藝術」的神秘面紗將逐漸退去，指揮藝術技術化將會成為必然趨勢。這需要不斷強化技術思維，持續深化人工智慧輔助指揮決策手段建設，持續深化人類大腦決策機理運用，切實用技術解構藝術，不斷推動指揮藝術技術化。


三是推動戰鬥技術條令化。不少學者把技術置於與戰術近乎同等重要的地位。這種堅持戰術條令化與兵種專業技術和專門戰鬥技術條令化的融合發展，是推動戰鬥條令體系化規範化建設，進而實現戰術與技術在法規層面融合統一的重要途徑。

謀求奇正結合中「奇」維度優勢
奇與正是戰術的一種基本矛盾結構，具有內在同一性。無奇便無正，無正也無奇；或奇或正，千變萬化。奇與正的選擇是決策中心戰的範疇，奇與正的運用是行動中心戰的範疇。 1990年代，非對稱作戰、非接觸作戰、非線式作戰理論被提出。若稱「對稱作戰、接觸作戰、線式作戰」為正，則可稱「非對稱作戰、非接觸作戰、非線式作戰」為奇。從自然科學角度來看，「對稱、接觸、線式」是概述的，「非對稱、非接觸、非線式」是詳實的。把握好奇正結合中「奇」的維度，謀取「三非」優勢是必然要求。
一是謀取「非對稱」優勢。 「對稱」與「非對稱」本來是對事物或空間的形態特徵的指稱。對稱作戰是兩種相同類型部隊之間的交戰，非對稱作戰是兩種不同類型部隊之間的交戰。非對稱作戰理論要求對不同軍兵種部隊、作戰力量和武器系統進行科學合理編組，在寬廣的地域展開部署，在最佳的作戰時機集中優勢力量給敵人以致命的打擊，然後迅速重新部署力量。由於作戰力量的有限性，部隊有正面的非對稱優勢，就有負面的非對稱劣勢。謀取非對稱優勢、規避非對稱劣勢是交戰雙方的共同期望，進而造成這樣一種局面──交戰雙方在對稱與非對稱之間往復循環。因此，謀取“非對稱”優勢，要謀取作戰力量、作戰能力、作戰指揮等多方面上的非對稱，堅持和發揚“避強擊弱、避實擊虛”“你打你的，我打我的”，在非對稱中有效發揮優勢、規避劣勢。例如，在武器裝備對稱時爭取佔據人員能力上的非對稱優勢，在力量對稱時爭取佔據指揮藝術上的非對稱優勢。
二是謀取「非接觸」優勢。 「接觸」與「非接觸」是對不同事物之間距離狀態的一種描述。軍事領域的接觸通常是以武器的投射距離來界定的。 「非接觸作戰」的概念起源於二戰，產生於冷戰時期。接觸作戰與非接觸作戰的內涵是隨著武器裝備打擊距離的改變而改變的。交戰雙方也總是謀求在免受威脅的更遠距離或更廣空間攻擊對方。自1990年代以來，「非接觸作戰」理論在多場局部戰爭中被運用。非接觸作戰是在遠離對方的情況下實施防區外遠程精確打擊的作戰行動樣式。非接觸作戰體現了技術制勝、靈活機動、重心打擊的思想。隨著軍事科技的快速發展，世界主要國家軍隊將具備全球感知和全球打擊的能力，「非接觸」的內涵將進一步壓縮至太空、認知域等太空領域。為此，一方面要立足「接觸作戰」實際，在接觸中取長補短、固強補弱，不斷積蓄勝勢；另一方面要拓展「非接觸作戰」空間，在非接觸中搶抓先手、搶佔先機，不斷拓展優勢。
三是謀取「非線式」優勢。 「線式」與「非線式」通常是指人的思維或行為模式。宇宙萬物運動是複雜的，大抵是非線式的，而人類的認知總是傾向於簡單的、抽象的、線式的，並發明了邏輯線、時間線以及線性數學等概念。軍事學中，從線式作戰到非線式作戰，反映了軍事技術理論的發展進步。 20世紀下半葉起，非線作戰就登上歷史舞台。有學者指出，線式作戰中各部隊主要沿著明確的己方前沿協調一致行動，關鍵是保持己方部隊之間的相對位置，以增強部隊的安全性；非線式作戰中各部隊從選定的多個基地沿多條作戰線同時實施作戰行動，關鍵是針對目標在多個決定點製造特定效果。線式作戰體現的主要是行動中心戰思想，非線式作戰體現的主要是目標中心戰思想。為此，一方面要深化運用線式作戰，充分利用其便於指揮、協同和保障的實用價值；另一方面要大膽嘗試非線式作戰，最大限度地發揮其廣泛機動、全維聯合的潛在優勢。 （殷濤、鄧雲生、孫東亞）

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.81it.com/2023/0927/14581888.html

#Information Support Force, #intelligent warfare, #intellligentization, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Future Wars, Chinese Military Intelligentization, Chinese Military Use of Cognitive Confrontation within the Combat Domain, Dissipative Warfare, 認知域戰, 認知戰

Comprehensive Look at Chinese Military Intelligent Warfare: AI War brought about by AGI

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縱覽中國軍事智慧化戰爭：AGI帶來的人工智慧戰爭

現代英語：

Technology and war are always intertwined. While technological innovation is constantly changing the face of war, it has not changed the violent nature and coercive purpose of war. In recent years, with the rapid development and application of artificial intelligence technology, people have never stopped debating the impact of artificial intelligence on war. Compared with artificial intelligence (AI), general artificial intelligence (AGI) has a higher level of intelligence and is considered to be a form of intelligence equivalent to human intelligence. How will the emergence of AGI affect war? Will it change the violence and coercive nature of war? This article will discuss this issue with you with a series of thoughts.

  Is AGI just an enabling technology?

  Many people believe that although large models and generative artificial intelligence show the strong military application potential of AGI in the future, they are only an enabling technology after all, that is, they can only enable and optimize weapons and equipment, make existing equipment more intelligent, and improve combat efficiency, and it is difficult to bring about a real military revolution. Just like “cyber warfare weapons” were also highly expected by many countries when they first appeared, but now it seems a bit exaggerated.

  The disruptive nature of AGI is actually completely different. It brings huge changes to the battlefield with a reaction speed and knowledge breadth far exceeding that of humans. More importantly, it has brought about huge disruptive results by promoting the rapid advancement of science and technology. On the battlefield of the future, autonomous weapons will be endowed with advanced intelligence by AGI, their performance will be generally enhanced, and they will become “strong at attack and difficult to defend” with their speed and cluster advantages. By then, the highly intelligent autonomous weapons that some scientists have predicted will become a reality, and AGI will play a key role in this. At present, the military application areas of artificial intelligence include autonomous weapons, intelligence analysis, intelligent decision-making, intelligent training, intelligent support, etc. These applications are difficult to simply summarize as “empowerment”. Moreover, AGI has a fast development speed and a short iteration cycle, and is in a state of continuous evolution. In future operations, AGI needs to be a priority, and special attention should be paid to the possible changes it brings.

  Will AGI make war disappear?

  Historian Geoffrey Blainey believes that “wars always occur because of misjudgments of each other’s strength or will”, and with the application of AGI in the military field, misjudgments will become less and less. Therefore, some scholars speculate that wars will decrease or disappear. In fact, relying on AGI can indeed reduce a large number of misjudgments, but even so, it is impossible to eliminate all uncertainties, because one of the characteristics of war is uncertainty. Moreover, not all wars are caused by misjudgments. Moreover, the inherent unpredictability and inexplicability of AGI, as well as people’s lack of experience in using AGI, will bring new uncertainties, making people fall into a thicker “fog of artificial intelligence”.

  There are also rational problems with AGI algorithms. Some scholars believe that AGI’s mining and accurate prediction of important intelligence will have a dual impact. In actual operation, AGI does make fewer mistakes than humans, which can improve the accuracy of intelligence and help reduce misjudgments; but sometimes it may also make humans blindly confident and stimulate them to take risks. The offensive advantage brought by AGI leads to the best defense strategy being “preemptive strike”, which breaks the balance between offense and defense, triggers a new security dilemma, and increases the risk of war.

  AGI has the characteristics of strong versatility and can be easily combined with weapons and equipment. Unlike nuclear, biological and chemical technologies, it has a low threshold for use and is particularly easy to spread. Due to the technological gap between countries, people are likely to use immature AGI weapons on the battlefield, which brings huge risks. For example, the application of drones in the latest local war practices has stimulated many small and medium-sized countries to start purchasing drones in large quantities. The low-cost equipment and technology brought by AGI are very likely to stimulate the occurrence of a new arms race.

  Will AGI be the ultimate deterrent?

  Deterrence is the ability to maintain a certain capability to intimidate an adversary from taking actions that go beyond its own interests. When deterrence is too strong to be used, it is the ultimate deterrence, such as the nuclear deterrence of mutually assured destruction. But what ultimately determines the outcome is “human nature,” which is the key that will never be missing in war.

  Without the various trade-offs of “humanity”, will AGI become a formidable deterrent? AGI is fast but lacks empathy, is resolute in execution, and has an extremely compressed gaming space. AGI is a key factor on future battlefields, but it is difficult to accurately evaluate due to lack of practical experience, and it is easy to overestimate the opponent’s capabilities. In addition, in terms of autonomous weapon control, whether humans are in the loop and supervise the entire process, or are humans outside the loop and completely let go, this undoubtedly requires deep thought. Can the firing control of intelligent weapons be handed over to AGI? If not, the deterrent effect will be greatly reduced; if so, can the life and death of humans really be decided by machines that have nothing to do with them? In research at Cornell University, large war game simulation models often “suddenly use nuclear attacks” to escalate wars, even if they are in a neutral state.

  Perhaps one day in the future, AGI will surpass humans in capabilities. Will we be unable to supervise and control it? Geoffrey Hinton, who proposed the concept of deep learning, said that he has never seen a case where something with a higher level of intelligence was controlled by something with a lower level of intelligence. Some research teams believe that humans may not be able to supervise super artificial intelligence. In the face of powerful AGI in the future, can we really control them? This is a question worth pondering.

  Will AGI change the nature of war?

  With the widespread use of AGI, will battlefields filled with violence and blood disappear? Some people say that AI warfare is far beyond the capabilities of humans and will push humans out of the battlefield. When AI turns war into a war fought entirely by autonomous robots, is it still a “violent and bloody war”? When opponents of unequal capabilities confront each other, the weak may not have the opportunity to act at all. Can wars be ended before the war through war games? Will AGI change the nature of war? Is an “unmanned” “war” still a war?

  Yuval Noah Harari, author of Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, said that all human behavior is mediated by language and affects our history. The Big Language Model is a typical AGI. The biggest difference between it and other inventions is that it can create new ideas and culture. “Artificial intelligence that can tell stories will change the course of human history.” When AGI touches the control of language, the entire civilization system built by humans may be subverted, and it does not even need to generate consciousness in this process. Like Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave”, will humans worship AGI as a new “god”?

  AGI establishes a close relationship with humans through human language and changes human perceptions, making it difficult for humans to distinguish and discern, thus posing the danger of the will to war being controlled by people with ulterior motives. Harari said that computers do not need to send out killer robots. If necessary, they will let humans pull the trigger themselves. AGI accurately creates and polishes situation information and controls battlefield cognition through deep fakes. It can use drones to fake battlefield situations and build public opinion before the war. This has been seen in recent local wars. The cost of war will be greatly reduced, leading to the emergence of a new form of war. Will small and weak countries still have a chance? Can the will to war be changed without bloodshed? Is “force” no longer a necessary condition for defining war?

  The form of war may be changed, but the essence remains. Whether war is “bloody” or not, it will still force the enemy to obey its will and bring a lot of “collateral damage”, but the way of confrontation may be completely different. The essence of war lies in the “human nature” deep in the heart, and “human nature” is determined by culture, history, behavior and values, etc. It is difficult to completely replicate it with some artificial intelligence technology, so we cannot outsource all ethical, political and decision-making issues to artificial intelligence, and we cannot expect artificial intelligence to automatically generate “human nature”. Artificial intelligence technology may be abused due to passionate impulses, so it must be under human control. Since artificial intelligence is trained by humans, it will not always be free of bias, so they cannot be completely separated from human supervision. In the future, artificial intelligence can become a creative tool or partner to enhance “tactical imagination”, but it must be “aligned” with human values. These issues need to be constantly thought about and understood in practice.

  Will AGI revolutionize the theory of war?

  Most subject knowledge is expressed in natural language. The large language model, which is a collection of human writings, can connect language writings that are difficult to be compatible with scientific research. For example, some people input classical masterpieces and even philosophy, history, politics, economics, etc. into the large language model for analysis and reconstruction. It is found that it can not only conduct a comprehensive analysis of all scholars’ views, but also put forward its “own views” without losing originality. Therefore, some people say that it is also possible to re-analyze and interpret war theories through AGI, stimulate human innovation, and drive major evolution and reconstruction of war theories and systems? Perhaps there will be certain improvements and developments in theory, but war science is not only theoretical, but also practical, but practicality and reality are what AGI cannot do at all. Can the classic war theory really be reinterpreted? If so, what is the meaning of the theory?

  In short, AGI’s subversion of the concept of war will far exceed “mechanization” and “informatization”. People should boldly embrace the arrival of AGI, but also be cautious. Understand the concept so as not to be ignorant; conduct in-depth research so as not to fall behind; strengthen supervision so as not to be negligent. How to learn to cooperate with AGI and guard against AGI technology raids by opponents is what we need to pay attention to first in the future. (Rong Ming and Hu Xiaofeng)

  Afterword

  Looking to the future with an open mind

  Futurist Roy Amara has a famous assertion that people tend to overestimate the short-term benefits of a technology but underestimate its long-term impact, which is later called “Amara’s Law”. This law emphasizes the nonlinear characteristics of technological development, that is, the actual impact of technology often takes a longer time scale to fully manifest, reflecting the pulse and trend of technological development and embodying human acceptance and longing for technology.

  At present, in the process of the development of artificial intelligence from weak artificial intelligence to strong artificial intelligence, and from special artificial intelligence to general artificial intelligence, every time people think that they have completed 90% of the journey, looking back, they may have only completed less than 10% of the journey. The driving role of the scientific and technological revolution in the military revolution is becoming more and more prominent, especially the multi-faceted penetration of high-tech represented by artificial intelligence technology into the military field, which has led to profound changes in the mechanism, elements and methods of winning wars.

  In the foreseeable future, intelligent technologies such as AGI will not stop iterating, and the cross-evolution of intelligent technologies and their enabling applications in the military field will become more diversified, perhaps going beyond the boundaries of human cognition of existing war forms. The development of science and technology is unstoppable and unstoppable. Whoever can see the trend and future of science and technology, the potential and power of science and technology with a keen eye and a clear mind, and see through the “fog of war”, will be more likely to seize the initiative to win.

  This reminds us that we should have a broader perspective and thinking when exploring the development of future war forms, so that we can get closer to the underestimated reality. Where is AGI going? Where is intelligent warfare going? This is a test of human wisdom.

[Editor: Wang Jinzhi]

現代國語：

AGI帶來的戰爭思考

編者按

科技與戰爭總是交織在一起，科技創新在不斷改變戰爭面貌的同時，並沒有改變戰爭的暴力性質和強迫性目的。近年來，隨著人工智慧技術的快速發展應用，人們關於人工智慧對戰爭影響的爭論從未停止。與人工智慧（AI）相比，通用人工智慧（AGI）的智慧程度更高，被認為是與人類智慧相當的智慧形式。 AGI的出現將如何影響戰爭，會不會改變戰爭的暴力性和強迫性？本文將帶著一系列思考與大家共同探討這個問題。

AGI只是賦能技術嗎

很多人認為，雖然大模型以及生成式人工智慧展現出未來AGI強大的軍事應用潛力，但它們畢竟只是一種賦能技術，即只能對武器裝備賦能優化，使現有裝備更加智能，提高作戰效率，難以帶來真正的軍事革命。就如同「網路戰武器」在剛出現時也曾被許多國家寄予厚望，但現在看來確實有點誇大。

AGI的顛覆性其實完全不同。它以遠超人類的反應速度和知識廣度為戰場帶來巨大改變。更重要的是，它透過促進科技的快速進步，湧現出巨大的顛覆性結果。未來戰場上，自主武器將被AGI賦予高級智能，性能得到普遍增強，並且憑藉其速度和集群優勢變得「攻強守難」。屆時，一些科學家曾預言的高智慧自主武器將成為現實，而AGI在其中扮演了關鍵性角色。目前，人工智慧的軍事化應用領域包括自主武器、情報分析、智慧決策、智慧訓練、智慧保障等，這些應用很難用「賦能」來簡單概括。而且，AGI發展速度快、迭代周期短，處於不斷進化的狀態。未來作戰，需要將AGI作為優先事項，格外注意其帶來的可能改變。

AGI會讓戰爭消失嗎

歷史學家杰弗裡·布萊尼認為“戰爭總是因為對各自力量或意願錯誤的判斷而發生”，而隨著AGI在軍事領域的應用，誤判將變得越來越少。因此，有學者推測，戰爭將隨之減少或消失。其實，依托AGI確實可以減少大量誤判，但即便如此，也不可能消除所有不確定性，因為戰爭的特徵之一就是不確定性。何況並非所有戰爭都因誤判而產生，而且，AGI固有的不可預測性、不可解釋性，以及人們對AGI使用經驗的缺乏，都會帶來新的不確定性，使人們陷入更加濃重的「人工智慧迷霧」之中。

AGI演算法還存在理性難題。有學者認為，AGI對重大情報的挖掘和精確預測，會帶來雙重影響。 AGI在實際操作層面，確實比人類犯錯少，能夠提高情報準確性，有利於減少誤判；但有時也可能會使人類盲目自信，刺激其鋌而走險。 AGI帶來的進攻優勢，導致最佳防禦戰略就是“先發制人”，打破了進攻與防禦的平衡，引發了新型安全困境，反而增加了戰爭爆發的風險。

AGI具有通用性強的特點，容易與武器裝備結合。與核子、生化等技術不同，它使用門檻低，特別容易擴散。由於各國之間存在技術差距，導致人們很可能將不成熟的AGI武器運用於戰場，帶來巨大風險。例如，無人機在最新局部戰爭實務的應用，就刺激許多中小國家開始大量採購無人機。 AGI帶來的低成本裝備和技術，極有可能刺激新型軍備競賽的發生。

AGI會是終極威懾嗎

威懾是維持某種能力以恐嚇對手使其不採取超越自身利益的行動。當威懾強大到無法使用時就是終極威懾，例如確保相互摧毀的核威懾。但最終決定結果的卻是“人性”，這是戰爭永遠不會缺少的關鍵。

如果沒有了「人性」的各種權衡，AGI是否會成為令人生畏的威懾？ AGI速度很快但缺乏同理心，執行堅決，博弈空間被極度壓縮。 AGI是未來戰場的關鍵性因素，但因缺乏實務經驗很難進行準確評估，很容易高估對手能力。此外，在自主武器控制方面，是人在環內、全程監督，還是人在環外、完全放手，這無疑需要深思。智慧化武器的開火控制權能交給AGI嗎？如果不能，威懾效果將大打折扣；如果能，人類的生死就真的可以交由與其無關的機器來決定？在康乃爾大學的研究中，兵棋推演大模型經常「突然使用核攻擊」升級戰爭，即使處於中立狀態。

或許未來某一天，AGI會在能力上超過人類，我們是不是就無法對其進行監管控制了？提出深度學習概念的傑弗裡·辛頓說，從沒見過更高智能水平的東西被更低智能水平的東西控制的案例。有研究團隊認為，人類可能無法監督超級人工智慧。未來面對強大的AGI，我們真的能夠控制住它們嗎？這是一個值得人們深思的問題。

AGI會改變戰爭本質嗎

隨著AGI的大量運用，充滿暴力和血腥的戰場會不會消失？有人說，人工智慧戰爭遠超過人類能力範圍，反而會將人類推到戰場之外。當人工智慧將戰爭變成全部由自主機器人對抗時，那它還是「暴力和血腥的戰爭」嗎？當能力不對等的對手對抗時，弱者可能根本沒有行動的機會，戰爭是不是透過兵棋推演就可以在戰前被結束？ AGI會因此改變戰爭的本質嗎？ 「無人」的「戰爭」還是戰爭嗎？

《人類簡史》作者尤瓦爾·赫拉利說，人類的一切行為都透過語言作為中介並影響我們的歷史。大語言模型是一種典型的AGI，它與其他發明最大的不同在於可以創造全新的想法和文化，「會說故事的人工智慧將改變人類歷史的進程」。當AGI觸及對語言的掌控時，人類所建構的整個文明體係就可能被顛覆，在這個過程中甚至不需要其產生意識。如同柏拉圖的“洞穴寓言”，人類會不會將AGI當成新的“神明”加以膜拜？

AGI透過人類語言和人類建立親密關係，並改變人類的看法，使人類難以區分和辨別，從而存在戰爭意志被別有用心之人控制的危險。赫拉利說，電腦不需要派出殺手機器人，如果真的需要，它會讓人類自己扣下板機。 AGI精準製造和打磨態勢訊息，透過深度偽造控制戰場認知，既可用無人機對戰場態勢進行偽造，也可以在戰前進行輿論造勢，在近幾場局部戰爭中已初見端倪。戰爭成本會因此大幅下降，導致新的戰爭形態產生，小國弱國還會有機會嗎？戰爭意志是否可以不用流血就可改變，「武力」是否不再是戰爭定義的必要條件？

戰爭形態或被改變，但本質仍在。無論戰爭是否“血腥”，其仍會強迫敵人服從自己的意志並帶有大量“附帶損傷”，只不過對抗方式可能會完全不同。戰爭本質在於內心深處的“人性”，而“人性”是由文化、歷史、行為和價值觀等決定的，是很難用某種人工智能技術完全復刻出來的，所以不能將倫理、政治和決策問題全部外包給人工智能，更不能期望人工智能會自動產生“人性”。人工智慧技術可能會因激情衝動而被濫用，所以必須在人類掌控之中。既然人工智慧是人類訓練的，它就不會永遠都沒有偏見，所以它們就無法完全脫離人類的監督。在未來，人工智慧可以成為有創意的工具或夥伴，增強“戰術想像力”，但必須“對齊”人類的價值觀。這些問題需要在實踐中不斷地去思考和理解。

AGI會顛覆戰爭理論嗎

大多數的學科知識是用自然語言表達的。集人類著述之大成的大語言模型，可以將很難相容的語言著述與科學研究連結起來。例如，有人將古典名著甚至哲學、歷史、政治、經濟學等輸入大語言模型，進行分析重構。發現它既可以對所有學者觀點進行全面分析，也可以提出它“自己的見解”，而且不失創見。因此有人說，是否也可以透過AGI對戰爭理論重新加以分析解釋，激發人類創新，以驅使戰爭理論及體系發生重大演化與重構？也許從理論上確實會有一定的改進和發展，但戰爭科學不僅具有理論性，而且還具有實踐性，但實踐性、現實性卻是AGI根本做不到的。經典戰爭理論真的可以重新詮釋嗎？若是，則理論的意義何在？

總之，AGI對戰爭概念的顛覆將遠超越「機械化」與「資訊化」。對於AGI的到來，人們既要大膽擁抱，也要心存謹慎。理解概念，不至於無知；深入研究，不致於落伍；強化監管，不致於失察。如何學習與AGI合作，防範對手AGI技術突襲，是我們未來首先需要關注的事情。 （榮明 胡曉峰）

編 後

以開闊思維前瞻未來

未來學家羅伊·阿瑪拉有一個著名論斷，人們總是傾向於高估一項技術帶來的短期效益，卻又低估了它的長期影響，後被稱作“阿瑪拉定律”。這個定律，強調了科技發展的非線性特徵，即科技的實際影響往往需要在更長的時間尺度上才能完全顯現，反映了科技發展的脈動與趨勢，體現人類對科技的接納與憧憬。

目前，人工智慧由弱人工智慧到強人工智慧、由專用人工智慧到通用人工智慧的發展過程中，每次人們認為已走完全程的90%時，回首一看，可能才剛到全程的10%。科技革命對軍事革命驅動作用愈發凸顯，尤其是以人工智慧技術為代表的高新技術多方位向軍事領域滲透，使得戰爭制勝機理、制勝要素、制勝方式正在發生深刻演變。

在可以預見的未來，AGI等智慧化技術不會停止迭代的步伐，而智慧化技術交叉演化以及在軍事領域的賦能應用等都將趨於多元化，或許會跳脫出人類對現有戰爭形態認知的邊界。科技的發展已勢不可擋、也無人能擋，誰能以敏銳的眼光、清醒的頭腦，看清科技的趨勢和未來、看到科技的潛質和威力，洞穿“戰爭迷霧”，誰就更有可能搶佔制勝先機。

這提醒著人們，對於未來戰爭形態發展的探索應持更開闊的視野和思維，才可能更接近被低估的現實。 AGI向何處去？智能化戰爭往何處去？這考驗著人類的智慧。 （野鈔洋）

【責任編輯:王金志】

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.news.cn/milpro/20250121/1eb771b26d264926b0c2d23d12084f0f888/c.html

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Chinese Military to Utilize Artificial Intelligence Empowering Cognitive Confrontation Success on the Modern Battlefield

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中國軍隊將利用人工智慧增強現代戰場認知對抗的成功

現代英語：

With the advent of the “smart +” era, artificial intelligence is widely used in the military field, and conventional warfare in physical space and cognitive confrontation in virtual space are accelerating integration. Deeply tapping the potential of artificial intelligence to empower cognitive confrontation is of great significance to improving the efficiency of cross-domain resource matching and controlling the initiative in future operations.

Data mining expands the boundaries of experience and cognition

Data-driven, knowing the enemy and knowing yourself. With the advancement of big data-related technologies, data information has become cognitive offensive and defensive ammunition, and information advantage has become increasingly important on the battlefield. Empowering traditional information processing processes with artificial intelligence technology can enhance the ability to analyze related information, accelerate information integration across domains through cross-domain data collection and false information screening, and enhance dynamic perception capabilities. Artificial intelligence can also help alleviate battlefield data overload, organically integrate enemy information, our own information, and battlefield environment information, and build a holographic intelligent database to provide good support for cognitive confrontation.

Everything is connected intelligently, and humans and machines collaborate. Modern warfare is increasingly integrated between the military and civilians, and the boundaries between peace and war are blurred. Technology has redefined the way people interact with each other, people with equipment, and equipment with equipment, and battlefield data is constantly flowing. Through big data mining and cross-domain comparative analysis, unstructured data such as images, audio, and video can be refined, and the truth can be retained to expand the boundaries of experience cognition and improve the level of human-machine collaboration. The in-depth application of the Internet of Things and big data technologies has promoted the continuous improvement of the intelligent level of data acquisition, screening, circulation, and processing processes, laying a solid foundation for the implementation of cognitive domain precision attacks.

Break through barriers and achieve deep integration. Relying on battlefield big data can effectively break through the barriers of full-domain integration, help connect isolated information islands, promote cross-domain information coupling and aggregation, accelerate barrier-free information flow, and promote the transformation of data fusion and information fusion to perception fusion and cognitive fusion. The comprehensive penetration of intelligent equipment into the command system can accelerate the deep integration of situation awareness, situation prediction and situation shaping, optimize multi-dimensional information screening and cognitive confrontation layout, and promote the continuous iteration and upgrading of cognitive domain combat styles.

Intelligent algorithms enhance decision-making efficiency

Accelerate decision-making and cause confusion to the enemy. The outcome of cognitive confrontation depends to a certain extent on the game of commanders’ wisdom and strategy. Through full-dimensional cross-domain information confrontation and decision-making games, with the help of intelligent technology, we can analyze and intervene in the opponent’s cognition and behavior, and finally gain the initiative on the battlefield. At present, artificial intelligence has become a catalyst for doubling combat effectiveness. In peacetime, it can play the role of an intelligent “blue army” to simulate and deduce combat plans; in wartime, through intelligent decision-making assistance, it can improve the quality and efficiency of the “detection, control, attack, evaluation, and protection” cycle, create chaos for the enemy, and paralyze its system.

Autonomous planning and intelligent formation. In the future intelligent battlefield, “face-to-face” fighting will increasingly give way to “key-to-key” offense and defense. In cognitive domain operations, the use of intelligent algorithms to accurately identify identity information, pre-judge the opponent’s intentions, and control key points in advance can quickly transform information advantages into decision-making advantages and action advantages. Using intelligent algorithms to support cognitive domain operations can also help identify the weaknesses of the enemy’s offense and defense system, autonomously plan combat tasks according to the “enemy”, intelligently design combat formations, and provide real-time feedback on combat effects. Relying on data links and combat clouds to strengthen intelligent background support, we can strengthen combat advantages in dynamic networking and virtual-real interaction.

Make decisions before the enemy and attack with precision. Intelligent algorithms can assist commanders in predicting risks, dynamically optimizing combat plans according to the opponent’s situation, and implementing precise cognitive attacks. In future intelligent command and control, the “cloud brain” can be used to provide algorithm support, combined with intelligent push to predict the situation one step ahead of the enemy, make decisions one step faster than the enemy, and completely disrupt the opponent’s thinking and actions. We should focus on using intelligent technology to collect and organize, deeply analyze the opponent’s decision-making and behavioral preferences, and then customize plans to actively induce them to make decisions that are beneficial to us, aiming at the key points and unexpectedly delivering a fatal blow to them.

Powerful computing power improves the overall operation level

Plan for the situation and create momentum, and suppress with computing power. “He who wins before the battle has more calculations; he who loses before the battle has less calculations.” The situation of cognitive confrontation is complex and changeable, and it is difficult to deal with it only by relying on the experience and temporary judgment of commanders. Intelligent tools can be used to strengthen the penetration of enemy thinking before the battle, actively divide and disintegrate the cognitive ability of the enemy team, and improve our battlefield control ability and combat initiative. At the same time, we should use powerful intelligent computing power to improve flexible command and overall planning capabilities, take advantage of the situation, build momentum, and actively occupy the main position of cognitive confrontation.

Smart soft attack, computing power raid. The rapid development of artificial intelligence has promoted the transformation of war from “hard destruction” to “soft killing”, which is expected to completely subvert the traditional war paradigm. For example, the latest technical concepts can be used to gain in-depth insights into the operating mechanism of the enemy system, actively familiarize oneself with the opponent, and mobilize the opponent. It is also possible to use the psychological anchoring effect and the network superposition amplification effect to interfere with the opponent’s cognitive loop link, disrupt the opponent’s command decision-making, and slow down the opponent’s reaction speed.

Cross-domain coordination and computing power support. To win the proactive battle of cognitive confrontation, we must coordinate across domains, gather forces in multiple dimensions, use intelligent tools to autonomously control the flow of information, realize the integrated linkage of physical domain, information domain and cognitive domain, lead forward-looking deployment and distributed coordination, launch a comprehensive parallel offensive, and form cognitive control over the enemy. Effectively carry out joint actions of virtual and real interaction in the entire domain, intervene in the enemy’s cognition, emotions and will, and use powerful computing power to take the initiative and fight proactive battles.

China Military Network Ministry of National Defense Network

Thursday, April 20, 2023

Chen Jialin, Xu Jun, Li Shan

現代國語：

伴隨「智慧+」時代的到來，人工智慧廣泛應用於軍事領域，物理空間的常規戰爭與虛擬空間的認知對抗加速融合。深度挖掘人工智慧潛力為認知對抗賦權，對提升跨域資源匹配效率，掌控未來作戰主動權具有重要意義。

資料挖潛拓展經驗認知邊界

數據驅動，知彼知己。隨著大數據相關技術的進步，數據資訊已成為認知攻防彈藥，資訊優勢在戰場上變得越來越重要。運用人工智慧技術賦能傳統資訊加工流程，可強化關聯資訊分析能力，透過跨領域資料擷取、虛假資訊甄別，加速資訊全局融合，強化動態感知能力。人工智慧還可協助緩解戰場數據過載，有機整合敵情、我情、戰場環境訊息，建立全像智慧資料庫，為認知對抗提供良好支撐。

萬物智聯，人機協同。現代戰爭日漸軍民一體、平戰界線模糊，技術重新定義了人與人、人與裝備、裝備與裝備的互動方式，戰場資料源源不絕。透過大數據探勘與跨域比較分析，可對影像、音訊、視訊等非結構化資料去粗取精、去偽存真，拓展經驗認知邊界，提升人機協同水準。物聯網、大數據技術的深度運用，推動資料取得、篩選、流轉、加工流程的智慧化程度不斷提升，為實施認知域精準攻擊夯實基礎。

打通壁壘，深度融合。依靠戰場大數據可有效突破全域融合的壁壘，有助於聯通條塊分割的資訊孤島，促進跨域資訊耦合聚合，加速資訊無障礙流通，推動資料融合與資訊融合向感知融合與認知融合轉化。智慧裝備全面滲透進入指揮體系，能夠加速態勢感知、態勢預測與態勢塑造的深度融合，優化多維資訊篩選與認知對抗佈局，推動認知域作戰樣式不斷迭代升級。

智慧演算法強化輔助決策效能

加速決策，致敵混亂。認知對抗的勝負，某種程度上取決於指揮家智慧謀略的博弈。可透過全維度跨域資訊對抗與決策博弈，借助智慧技術分析並介入對手認知與行為，最終贏得戰場主動。目前，人工智慧已成為戰鬥力倍增的催化劑，平時可扮演智慧「藍軍」模擬推演作戰方案；戰時透過智慧輔助決策，提升「偵、控、打、評、保」循環品質效率，給敵方製造混亂，促使其體系癱瘓。

自主規劃，智能編組。未來智慧化戰場上，「面對面」的拼殺將越來越多地讓位給「鍵對鍵」的攻防。在認知域作戰中，利用智慧演算法精準甄別身分資訊、預先研判對手企圖、事先扼控關鍵要點，能夠將資訊優勢快速轉化為決策優勢與行動優勢。利用智慧演算法支撐認知域作戰，還可協助摸清敵方攻防體系弱點，因「敵」制宜自主規劃作戰任務，智慧設計作戰編組，即時回饋作戰效果，依托資料鏈、作戰雲強化智慧後台支撐，在動態組網、虛實互動中強化作戰勝勢。

先敵決策，精準攻擊。智慧演算法可輔助指揮者預判風險，根據對手狀況動態優化作戰方案，實施精準認知攻擊。在未來智慧化指揮控制中，可利用「雲端大腦」提供演算法支撐，結合智慧推送先敵一步預判態勢，快敵一招制定決策，徹底打亂對手思路和行動。應著重運用智慧科技收集整理、深度分析對手決策和行為偏好，進而專項客製化計劃，積極誘導其作出有利於我的決策，瞄準要害出其不意地對其進行致命一擊。

強大算力提升全域運籌水平

謀勢造勢，算力壓制。 「夫未戰而廟算勝者，得算多也；未戰而廟算不勝者，得算少也。」認知對抗態勢複雜多變，僅靠指揮經驗和臨時判斷難以應對，可利用智能工具在戰前即對敵思維認知加強滲透，積極分化瓦解敵方團隊認知力，提升我戰場控局能力和作戰性。同時，應藉助強大智能算力，提升靈活指揮與全局運籌能力，順勢謀勢、借勢造勢，積極佔領認知對抗主陣地。

巧打軟攻，算力突襲。人工智慧的快速發展，推動戰爭進一步從「硬摧毀」轉向「軟殺傷」，可望徹底顛覆傳統戰爭範式。如可運用最新技術理念，深入洞察敵方體系運作機理，積極熟悉對手、調動對手。還可利用心理沉錨效應和網路疊加放大效應，幹擾對手認知循環鏈路，打亂對手指揮決策，遲滯對手反應速度。

跨域統籌，算力支撐。打贏認知對抗主動仗須全域跨域統籌、多維同向聚力，利用智慧工具自主控制資訊的流量流向，實現物理域、資訊域與認知域的一體聯動，引領前瞻性布勢與分散式協同，全面展開並行攻勢，形成對敵認知控制。有效進行全域虛實相生的聯合行動，對敵認知、情緒和意志實施幹預，借助強大算力下好先手棋、打好主動仗。

中國軍網 國防部網 // 2023年4月20日 星期四

陳佳琳 徐 珺 李 山

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2023-04/20/content_338002888.htm

#Information Support Force, #intelligent warfare, #intellligentization, #智慧化戰爭, #軍事資訊化與智慧化, Chinese Military Intelligentization, Chinese Military Use of Cognitive Confrontation within the Combat Domain, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare, Combat Planning, Information Support Force, Intelligent Warfare, Mosaic Warfare, Multi-Domain Operations

Develop Chinese Military Operational Concepts Design China’s Future War Success

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發展中國軍事作戰理念，規劃中國未來戰爭勝利

中國軍網 國防部網
2022年6月22日 星期三

現代英語：

Since the 21st century, with the deepening of the world’s new military revolution, the world’s military powers have put forward a series of new operational concepts and continuously improved them in war practice, thus driving the accelerated evolution of war. With the rapid development of information technologies such as cloud computing, blockchain, artificial intelligence, and big data, and their widespread application in the military field, people’s understanding of war has gradually changed from summarizing actual combat experience to studying and judging future wars. At present, as the source of military capability building, the strength of operational concept development capabilities will directly affect the seizure of victory opportunities. In particular, the vigorous development of the world’s new military revolution is calling for innovation in operational theory all the time. Only by developing new operational concepts and designing future wars with a forward-looking vision can we gain the initiative in military struggle preparation.

The concept of combat fundamentally solves the problem of how to fight a war.

First-rate armies design wars, second-rate armies respond to wars, and third-rate armies follow wars. The so-called “real wars happen before wars” means that before a war starts, the theory, style, and method of fighting have already been designed. How can we not win if we fight according to the designed war? The key to designing a war is to design and develop new combat concepts based on understanding the characteristics and laws of war, promote innovation in combat styles and tactics, and fundamentally solve the problem of “how to fight a war.”

In designing wars, theories come first. In recent years, the U.S. military has proposed new concepts such as “network-centric warfare”, “air-sea integrated warfare” and “hybrid warfare”, and the Russian military has proposed theories such as “non-nuclear containment strategy”, “strategic air-space campaign” and “national information security doctrine”, reflecting that the world’s military powers are vigorously studying operational theories and seizing military commanding heights. To a certain extent, operational concepts are the “organizational cells” for the formation of operational theories. Without a perfect concept generation capability, it is difficult to give birth to advanced theories. When an operational theory is proposed, it is necessary to develop relevant operational concepts so that the operational theory can be “sunk” and visualized, and better improved and transformed into military practice. When there is no operational theory concept, operational concept innovation can provide “raw materials” for the study of operational theories. The military field is the most uncertain field, and people’s understanding of war is constantly evolving. However, operational theory innovation cannot wait for the understanding to mature before starting, but needs to be based on the existing understanding, through active development and innovation of operational concepts, constructing future operational scenarios, exploring future winning mechanisms, and guiding and guiding military practice, in order to seize the initiative in war. Therefore, operational concept innovation is becoming a strategic fulcrum and lever for military construction and development.

The development of operational concepts focuses on designing core operational concepts. The core operational concept is the nucleus and embryo of the operational concept, which reflects the essential requirements of operations and contains the “genetic genes” for the growth of operational concepts. The entire concept system is derived and developed from this. At present, the understanding of the winning mechanism of informationized and intelligent warfare is becoming clearer, and it is time to focus the design of war on the development of major operational theories and key operational concepts.

Operational concept is an abstract expression of operational thinking.

The term “operational concept” originated from the US military. It is a description of how to fight in the future and is increasingly becoming an important tool for promoting the development of the military. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command Concept Development Guide points out that the operational concept is a concept, idea, and overall understanding. It is based on the inference of specific events in the combat environment. In the broadest sense, it outlines what will be done and describes how to fight in more specific measures. The US Marine Corps Combat Development Command Operations Development and Integration Directive points out that the operational concept is an expression of how to fight, used to describe future combat scenarios and how to use military art and scientific capabilities to meet future challenges. The US Air Force Operational Concept Development Directive points out that the operational concept is a conceptual description at the level of war theory, which realizes the established operational concept and intention through the orderly organization of combat capabilities and combat tasks.

In summary, the operational concept can be understood as an abstract cognition of operational ideas and action plans that is refined for specific operational problems at present or in the future. Generally speaking, the operational concept includes three parts: the first is the description of the operational problem, that is, the background of the operational concept, the operational environment, the operational opponent, etc.; the second is the description of the solution, that is, the concept connotation, application scenario, action style, winning mechanism, capability characteristics and advantages, etc.; the third is the description of capability requirements, that is, the equipment technology, basic conditions, and implementation means required to implement the operational concept. It can be seen that the operational concept should have the characteristics of pertinence, scientificity, adaptability and feasibility, and its connotation and extension will be constantly adjusted with the changes in factors such as strategic background, military policy, threat opponent, time and space environment, and capability conditions.

In a sense, operational concepts are actually transitional forms of operational theories, and their ultimate value is to guide military practice. The purpose and destination of developing new operational concepts is to tap into and enhance the combat effectiveness of the military. Only by transforming operational concepts into operational regulations and operational plans can their value be fully realized.

Innovation in combat concepts drives changes in combat styles

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the world’s military powers have, in accordance with national strategic requirements and in response to new threats and challenges, developed new operational concepts as a key means of transforming military capabilities, promoting changes in operational styles, and seeking to gain the upper hand in future battlefields. In order to further strengthen their military advantages, the world’s military powers are accelerating the introduction of a series of new operational concepts.

The US military has actively seized the opportunities brought about by scientific and technological progress, comprehensively used cutting-edge technologies such as new-generation information technology, artificial intelligence technology, unmanned autonomous technology, and proposed a series of new combat concepts such as mosaic warfare, multi-domain warfare, distributed lethality, decision-center warfare, and joint global command and control, promoting fundamental changes in combat thinking, combat style, combat space, and combat systems.

Unlike the U.S. military, the Russian military has achieved iterative innovation in operational concepts in military practice. Recently, the Russian military has been committed to promoting the construction of joint combat capabilities, accelerating the development and deployment of new unmanned equipment, focusing on building advantages in the network information battlefield, and constantly enriching the connotation of its traditional operational concepts, integrating them with new operational concepts such as hybrid warfare and mental warfare to guide war practice.

In general, in recent years, the new operational concepts proposed by the world’s military powers are driving profound changes in combat styles. Their capabilities, characteristics and advantages are mainly reflected in the following five aspects: First, the unmanned combat equipment. The proportion of unmanned equipment systems based on the new operational concept has increased significantly, and manned-unmanned collaborative combat has become one of the main combat styles, forming an advantage of unmanned over manned; second, the deployment method is decentralized. The force deployment based on the new operational concept is distributed, and the systems are interconnected and interoperable, forming an advantage of division over combination; third, the kill network is complicated. The kill network based on the new operational concept has more diverse functions. A single system can perform multiple tasks, and its failure has little impact on the combat system, forming an advantage of many over single; fourth, the response time is agile. The new operational concept emphasizes quick battles and quick decisions, taking the initiative to catch the enemy off guard, forming an advantage of fast over slow; fifth, the combat field is multidimensional. The new operational concept pays more attention to multi-domain linkage, expanding the battlefield from the traditional land, sea and air to the electromagnetic, network and cognitive domains, forming an advantage of invisible over visible.

The development of combat concepts should adhere to the systematic design approach

Using operational concepts to guide military force construction is a common practice among the world’s military powers. In comparison, the US military’s operational concept development mechanism is relatively complete, and a relatively complete operational concept development system has been established, consisting of concept types, organizational structures, normative standards, and support means.

In terms of concept types, the U.S. military’s combat concepts can basically be divided into three categories: First, a series of combat concepts developed by each service, mainly from the perspective of the service, to study potential enemies and future battlefields, redefine combat styles, and seek new ways to win. Second, a series of joint combat concepts developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, mainly composed of three levels: top-level concepts, action concepts, and supporting concepts. Third, combat concepts developed by academia, think tanks, etc., the number of such combat concepts is not as large as the first two categories, but it is still an important part of the combat concept system. Through this system, the U.S. military has implemented the grand military strategy through combat concepts layer by layer into various combat operations, various combat capabilities, and various types of weapons and equipment performance for the troops, guiding the construction of joint forces and various services.

In terms of organizational structure, taking the development of joint operational concepts as an example, the US military has established a working system consisting of five types of institutions. The first is the Joint Concept Working Group, whose main responsibility is to review the overall issues of the concept outline and concept development; the second is the Joint Concept Steering Committee, whose main responsibility is to supervise and guide the concept development plan; the third is the core writing team, whose main responsibility is to transform the original ideas in the concept outline into joint operational concepts; the fourth is the concept development team, whose main responsibility is to provide operational concept development methods and plans; the fifth is the independent red team, whose main responsibility is to conduct independent evaluations to judge the rigor and scientificity of the concept.

In terms of norms and standards, the U.S. military has a complete system of institutions to constrain and guide the development of joint operational concepts, making them standardized, standardized, and procedural, so as to manage the entire chain of concept development, which is mainly reflected in a series of directives of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and joint publications. For example, the “Joint Concept Development and Implementation Guide” aims to establish a governance structure for joint concept development, clarify the framework for joint operational concept planning, execution, and evaluation, and promote the implementation of joint operational concepts; the “Joint Regulations Preparation Process” aims to standardize the preparation process of joint regulations and provide a clear process framework for converting operational concepts into operational regulations.

In terms of support means, the design, development and verification of operational concepts is a systematic project that cannot be separated from the support of various development tools and means. For example, tools such as the DODAF2.0 model, IDEFO model and SYSML modeling language can provide standardized structured analysis models and logical description models for operational concept designers; model-based system engineering methods can provide operational concept designers and evaluation and verification personnel with capability models of equipment elements in operational concepts for designing and building operational concept frameworks. The U.S. military’s joint operational concept development uses network-based digital software with strong interconnection capabilities. All institutions involved in the development can share information in real time to improve development efficiency.

The development of combat concepts requires collaboration among multiple parties

Developing operational concepts is a multidisciplinary and multi-field task that involves many fields such as military science, philosophy, operations research, and systems science. It requires collaboration among multiple parties to ensure that it is both advanced and forward-looking in theory and applicable and feasible in practice.

Establish a small core and large peripheral research team. The department initiating the development of the operational concept should give full play to its leading role, coordinate and dispatch the research work from a global perspective; establish a joint research and development team, give full play to the collective wisdom, and widely obtain various new ideas, new methods and new viewpoints on the research of operational concepts from all parties; establish a cross-domain and cross-departmental expert committee to supervise, review and guide related work from multiple angles.

Form a multi-departmental working mechanism. To ensure smooth communication and efficient operation among departments, we must first clarify their respective tasks and responsibilities. For example, the concept initiating department is responsible for overall planning and implementation, the laboratory is responsible for technical verification, the industrial department is responsible for equipment research and development, and the combat troops are responsible for actual combat testing. Secondly, relevant normative documents should be formulated to ensure that all work has rules to follow and is carried out in an orderly manner, providing institutional guarantees for the development of combat concepts. Finally, it is also necessary to establish demand traction mechanisms, collaborative research mechanisms, iterative feedback mechanisms, etc., to open up the link from research and development to practical application of combat concepts.

Promote the organic combination of theory and practice. Only through the iterative cycle of “design research-deduction verification-actual troop test” can the operational concept be gradually adjusted, optimized and improved, and the development of war theory can be driven. Therefore, the development of operational concepts should pay special attention to the combination of theoretical innovation and practical application, and achieve the fundamental purpose of driving the generation of new quality combat power through the mutual drive of theory and practice. Specific methods include timely incorporating mature operational concepts into operational regulations, compiling training outlines or teaching materials accordingly, and gradually promoting them to troops for use; organizing relevant exercises or tests to test the maturity and feasibility of operational concepts under conditions close to actual combat, and finding and solving problems; using the capability indicators determined by the operational concept as a reference for equipment demand demonstration, driving the development of equipment technology, and promoting the improvement of combat capabilities.

The rapid development of science and technology in the new era has brought many new opportunities and challenges to the construction of military capabilities. The development of new operational concepts will help us to seize the military opportunities brought by scientific and technological progress, actively respond to the threats and challenges formed by scientific and technological development, and timely grasp the direction and laws of the evolution of war forms, which can provide important support for leading future war styles and seizing the first chance to win. At present, the international security situation is complex and changeable. To win the future information war, we need to take the development of operational concepts as the origin of national defense and military construction, actively carry out military technological innovation, promote the upgrading of weapons and equipment, achieve leapfrog development, and thus lead the trend of the new military revolution.

(Author’s unit: Second Academy of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation)

現代國語：

宋曉明

中國軍網 國防部網
2022年6月22日 星期三

自21世紀以來，隨著世界新軍事革命的深入推進，世界軍事強國提出了一系列新作戰概念，並在戰爭實踐中不斷改進，從而牽引戰爭加速演變。隨著雲端運算、區塊鏈、人工智慧、大數據等資訊科技的日新月異，以及在軍事領域的廣泛應用，人們理解戰爭的模式逐漸由歸納總結實戰經驗向研判未來戰爭轉變。目前，作為軍事能力建構源頭，作戰概念開發能力強弱，將直接影響勝戰先機的奪取。尤其是世界新軍事革命蓬勃發展，無時無刻不在呼喚作戰理論創新，只有以前瞻眼光開發新作戰概念、設計未來戰爭，才能獲得軍事鬥爭準備的主動權。

作戰概念從根本解決仗怎麼打

一流軍隊設計戰爭，二流軍隊應對戰爭，三流軍隊尾隨戰爭。所謂“真正的戰爭，發生在戰爭之前”，意思是戰爭開打之前，戰爭的理論、樣式、打法早已被設計出來。依照設計好的戰爭來打，豈有不勝之理？設計戰爭，關鍵在於摸清戰爭特徵規律的基礎上，設計發展新作戰概念，推動作戰樣式和戰法創新，從根本上解決「仗怎麼打」。

設計戰爭，理論先行。近年來，美軍先後提出「網路中心戰」「空海一體戰」等理論，反映了世界軍事強國都在大力研究作戰理論，搶佔軍事制高點。從某種程度上說，作戰概念是作戰理論形成的“組織細胞”，沒有完善的概念生成能力，很難催生先進的理論。當一個作戰理論提出時，需要發展相關作戰概念，才能使作戰理論「下沉」具象化，更好地完善並向軍事實踐轉化。當沒有作戰理論構想時，作戰概念創新可以為研究作戰理論提供「原料」。軍事領域是最具不確定性的領域，人們對戰爭的認知始終在不斷發展。但是，作戰理論創新不能坐等認識成熟後再起步，而是需要在現有認識的基礎上，透過主動開發、創新作戰概念，構設未來作戰圖景，探索未來制勝機理，牽引並指導軍事實踐，才能掌握戰爭主動權。因此，作戰概念創新，正成為軍隊建設與發展的戰略支點與槓桿。

作戰概念開發，重點在於設計核心作戰概念。核心作戰概念，是作戰概念的細胞核、胚胎，集中反映作戰本質要求，包含著作戰概念生長的“遺傳基因”，整個概念體係由此衍生與發展。目前，對資訊化、智慧化戰爭的致勝機理等的認識漸趨清晰，將設計戰爭的重心聚焦到主要作戰理論、關鍵作戰概念開發正當其時。

作戰概念是作戰思想的抽象表達

「作戰概念」一詞源自美軍，是對未來如何作戰的描述，正日益成為推進軍隊建設發展的重要抓手。美《陸軍訓練與條令司令部概念開髮指南》指出，作戰概念是理念、想法、總體認識，是依據作戰環境中具體事件的推斷，在最廣泛的意義上勾勒將要做什麼，在更具體的舉措上描述仗怎麼打。美《海軍陸戰隊作戰發展司令部作戰發展與一體化指令》指出，作戰概念是表達如何打仗，用來描述未來作戰景象及如何利用軍事藝術和科學能力迎接未來挑戰。美《空軍作戰概念發展條令》則指出，作戰概念是戰爭理論層面的概念描述，透過對作戰能力和作戰任務的有序組織，實現既定的作戰構想和意圖。

綜上所述，作戰概念可以理解為是針對當前或未來的具體作戰問題，提煉的對作戰思想與行動方案的抽象認知。一般而言，作戰概念包括三部分內容：一是對作戰問題的描述，即作戰概念的提出背景、作戰環境、作戰對手等；二是對解決方案的描述，即概念內涵、應用場景、行動樣式、制勝機理、能力特徵及優勢等；三是對能力需求的描述，即實施該作戰概念所需的裝備技術、基礎條件、實現手段等。可以看出，作戰概念應具備針對性、科學性、適應性與可行性等特徵，其內涵與外延會隨著戰略背景、軍事方針、威脅對手、時空環境、能力條件等因素的變化而不斷調整。

從某種意義上說，作戰概念其實是作戰理論的過渡形態，最終價值是指導牽引軍事實踐。發展新作戰概念的目的和歸宿，是挖掘和提升軍隊戰鬥力，只有把作戰概念轉化為作戰條令、作戰計劃，才能充分發揮其價值。

作戰概念創新牽引作戰樣式變革

進入21世紀以來，世界軍事強國根據國家戰略要求，針對新威脅挑戰，把開發新作戰概念作為軍事能力轉型的關鍵抓手，推動作戰樣式變革，謀求贏得在未來戰場中的製勝先機。為進一步強化軍事上的領先優勢，世界軍事強國正加速推出一系列新作戰概念。

美軍積極搶奪科技進步帶來的機遇，綜合運用新一代資訊科技、人工智慧技術、無人自主技術等尖端技術，提出馬賽克戰、多域作戰、分散式殺傷、決策中心戰、聯合全局指揮控制等一系列新作戰概念，推動作戰思想、作戰樣式、作戰空間和作戰體系發生根本性變化。

與美軍不同，俄軍是在軍事實踐中實現作戰概念的迭代創新。近期，俄軍致力於推動聯合作戰能力建設，加速發展部署新型無人裝備，注重打造網路資訊戰場優勢，不斷豐富其傳統作戰概念的內涵，並與混合戰爭、心智戰等新作戰概念相集成，用以指導戰爭實踐。

整體而言，近幾年，世界軍事強國提出的新作戰概念正牽引作戰樣式發生深刻變化，其能力特徵及優勢主要體現在以下五個方面：一是作戰裝備無人化，基於新作戰概念的無人裝備體系佔比顯著提高，有人無人協同作戰成為主要作戰樣式之一，形成以無人制有人的優勢；二是部署方式分散化，基於新作戰概念的力量部署呈分佈式，系統間互聯互通，具備互操作能力，形成以分制合的優點；三是殺傷網複雜化，基於新作戰概念的殺傷網功能更加多樣，單一系統可執行多種任務，且其失效對作戰體系影響較小，形成以多製單的優勢；四是響應時間敏捷化，新作戰概念更強調速戰速決，先發制人使敵方措手不及，形成以快製慢的優勢；五是作戰領域多維化，新作戰概念更注重多域聯動，將戰場從傳統的陸海空拓展到電磁、網絡和認知域，形成以無形制有形的優勢。

作戰概念開發應堅持體系化設計思路

以作戰概念指導軍事力量建設，是世界軍事強國的共同做法。比較而言，美軍的作戰概念開發機制較為完善，建構了相對完整的作戰概念開發體系，由概念類型、組織架構、規範標準、支撐手段等部分組成。

在概念類型方面，美軍作戰概念基本上可分為三類：一是各軍種主導開發的系列作戰概念，主要從本軍種角度出發，研判潛在敵人和未來戰場，對作戰樣式進行重新定義，謀求打贏的新途徑。二是參會主導開發的一系列聯合作戰概念，主要由頂層概念、行動概念和支持性概念等三個層次構成。三是學術界、智庫等主導開發的作戰概念，這類作戰概念的數量沒有前兩類那麼多，但仍是作戰概念體系的重要組成部分。透過此體系，美軍把宏大的軍事戰略透過作戰概念逐層落實為面向部隊的各類作戰行動、各種作戰能力、各型武器裝備性能，指導聯合部隊及各軍兵種建設。

在組織架構方面，以聯合作戰概念發展為例，美軍建立了由五類機構組成的工作體系。一是聯合概念工作小組，主要職責是審查概念大綱及概念研發的整體問題；二是聯合概念指導委員會，主要職責是對概念研發計畫進行監督指導；三是核心編寫團隊，主要職責是將概念大綱中原始理念轉化為聯合作戰概念；

在規範標準方面，針對聯合作戰概念的開發，美軍有完善的製度體系約束、指導，使其規範化、標準化、程序化，以便對概念開發進行全鏈條管理，主要體現在一系列參謀長聯席會議主席指令及聯合出版物中。例如，《聯合概念開發與實施指南》旨在為聯合概念發展建立治理結構，明確聯合作戰概念規劃、執行和評估的框架，推動聯合作戰概念落實；《聯合條令編制流程》旨在對聯合條令的編制流程進行規範，為把作戰概念轉化為作戰條令提供一個明確的流程框架。

在支撐手段方面，作戰概念的設計開發與驗證是一項系統工程，離不開各類開發工具與手段的支撐。例如，DODAF2.0模型、IDEFO模型及SYSML建模語言等工具，可為作戰概念設計人員提供規範的結構化分析模型與邏輯描述模型；基於模型的系統工程方法，可為作戰概念設計人員和評估驗證人員提供作戰概念中裝備要素的能力模型，用於設計並搭建作戰概念框架。美軍聯合作戰概念開發使用了基於網路的數位化軟體，具有較強的互聯互通能力，所有參與開發的機構都可以即時共享訊息，提高開發效率。

作戰概念開發成熟需要多方協同合作

發展作戰概念是一項多學科、多領域交叉的工作，涉及軍事學、哲學、運籌學、系統科學等諸多領域，需要多方協同合作，以確保其既在理論層面具備先進性、前瞻性，又在實踐層面具備適用性、可行性。

組成小核心大外圍研究團隊。作戰概念開發發起部門要充分發揮群體智慧作用，從全局角度出發，對研究工作進行統籌與調度；成立聯合研發團隊，充分發揮群體智慧作用，廣泛獲取各方對作戰概念研究的各種新方法與新觀點；設立跨領域、跨部門的專家委員會，多角度對相關工作進行監督、審查與指導。

形成多部門連動的工作機制。為確保各部門之間溝通順暢、運作高效，首先要明確各自的任務與職責。例如，概念發起部門負責總體計畫與實施、實驗室負責技術驗證、工業部門負責裝備研發、作戰部隊負責實戰檢驗。其次，要製定相關規範文件，確保各項工作有章可循、有序推進，為作戰概念研發提供製度保障。最後，還要建立需求牽引機制、協同攻關機制、迭代回授機制等，打通作戰概念從研發到實務運用的連結。

推動理論與實務有機結合。作戰概念只有透過「設計研究—推演驗證—實兵檢驗」的循環迭代，才能逐步調整、優化、完善，牽引戰爭理論發展。因此，作戰概念發展要特別注重理論創新與實務運用結合，透過理論與實務的相互驅動，達成牽引新質戰鬥力生成的根本目的。具體方式包括，將開發成熟的作戰概念及時納入作戰條令，相應地編寫訓練大綱或教材，逐步推廣至部隊使用；透過組織相關演訓或試驗，在貼近實戰條件下檢驗作戰概念的成熟度與可行性，查找並解決問題；把作戰概念確定的能力指標作為裝備需求論證的參考，促進引裝備技術發展，尋找並解決問題；把作戰概念確定的能力指標作為裝備需求論證的參考，促進引裝備技術發展，找到並解決問題；把作戰概念確定的能力指標作為裝備需求論證的參考，促進引裝備技術發展，找到並解決問題；把作戰概念確定的能力指標作為裝備需求論證的參考，促進引裝備技術發展，作戰能力提升。

新時代科技發展態勢迅猛，為軍事能力建設帶來許多新機會與新挑戰。發展新作戰概念，有助於敏銳抓住科技進步帶來的軍事機遇，積極應對科技發展形成的威脅與挑戰，及時掌握戰爭形態演進方向與規律，可為主導未來戰爭樣式、搶佔制勝先機提供重要支撐。當前，國際安全情勢複雜多變，打贏未來資訊化戰爭，需要我們把作戰概念開發作為國防和軍隊建設的原點，積極開展軍事技術創新，推進武器裝備更新換代，實現跨越式發展，從而引領新軍事革命潮流。

（作者單位：中國航太科工集團第二研究院）

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.81.cn/gfbmap/content/2022-06/22/content_31822288.htm

#Information Support Force, Asymmetric Warfare, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Use of Cognitive Confrontation within the Combat Domain, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare, Information Support Force, Intelligent Warfare, 中國軍隊對耗散戰的戰術運用, 域作战突出属性, 認知戰, 新軍事變革, 認知域戰, 非對稱戰爭, 馬賽克戰

China’s Military Ponders Integration Concept That Will be Adopted During Information Warfare

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中國軍方思考資訊戰中將採用的一體化概念

現代英語：

The basic form of information warfare is system confrontation. Different from any form of warfare in history, information warfare is not a discrete confrontation or local decentralized warfare with the simple superposition of various combat units and elements, but a holistic confrontation between systems. The system integration capability of war determines the effectiveness of combat and the achievement of war objectives; achieving effective integration of various systems is the fundamental way to win information warfare.

Multi-space fusion

The battlefield space is the stage for the war hostile parties to compete. Due to the widespread use of high-tech weapons, the battlefield space of informationized warfare has been greatly expanded, forming a multi-dimensional battlefield space of land, sea, air, space, and information. Under the strong “bonding” of information technology, each battlefield space is integrated around a unified combat purpose. First, the three-dimensional, all-round reconnaissance and surveillance network covers the battlefield. Under the conditions of informatization, the military reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities have been unprecedentedly improved. The large-scale, three-dimensional, multi-means, and automated intelligence reconnaissance and surveillance network connects outer space, high altitude, medium altitude, low altitude, ground (sea), and underground (underwater) into one, thereby obtaining battlefield intelligence information in multiple fields. Second, long-range, high-precision informationized weapons are densely distributed and threaten the battlefield. The extraordinary combat capability of the informationized weapon system to cover and strike targets in the entire battlefield space has realized that discovery means destruction, and promoted the high integration of various battlefield spaces. In addition, the development of space and air power has made strikes more precise, means more flexible, and combat efficiency higher, and the battlefield space has become an integrated battlefield of sea, land, air, and space. This integrated battlefield structure has a high degree of integration of multiple spaces, and multiple spaces and multiple fields restrict each other. Third, the battlefield is restricted by electromagnetic and information competition in all time and space and throughout the entire process. The development of military information technology not only realizes the integration of tangible battlefields on land, sea, air and space through reconnaissance and strikes, but also opens up the competition for invisible battlefields in the electromagnetic and information fields. Electromagnetic and information are the soul of informationized warfare and the link between the battlefields on land, sea, air and space. They exist in the entire time and space of combat, act on all elements of war, run through the entire process of combat, and deeply affect the tangible battlefields on land, sea, air and space.

It can be seen that the informationized battlefield is precisely through the increasingly mature information technology, centering on the purpose of war and combat needs, closely integrating the multi-dimensional space of land, sea, air, space, information, etc., forming an inseparable and interdependent organic unity. Leaving any dimension of the battlefield space, or losing control of any dimension, will directly affect the overall combat effectiveness, thus leading to the failure of the war.

Fusion of multiple forces

War power is the protagonist of the battle between the two opposing sides of a war. The “integrated joint combat force” of system integration is a prominent feature of information warfare. Various participating forces in information warfare are highly integrated. Regardless of their affiliation and combat mission, they will be equal users and resources of the entire combat system and integrated into a unified large system. First, the participating forces are united. Information warfare is a joint operation in which the army, navy, air force, aerospace, special operations, information operations and other forces participate. Each participating force has advantages that other participating forces do not have or cannot replace. They communicate and connect through information technology to achieve “seamless connection” and form a force system that can play to its strengths and avoid its weaknesses and complement each other’s advantages, becoming an organic whole that combines “soft” strike and “hard” destruction capabilities, combat and support capabilities, mobility and assault capabilities, and attack and defense capabilities. Second, the participants are diversified. With the development of information networks, wars in the information age no longer have a distinction between the front and the rear, and the networking of combat systems can also make home a “battlefield”. In the industrial age, wars were “over, go home”; in the information age, wars can also be “go home and fight”. Participants in war are not limited to the military forces of countries and political groups. Non-governmental and group-based people can join the “battlefield” as long as they have high-tech knowledge and are proficient in computer applications. Third, the support force is socialized. With the development of science and technology, the mutual tolerance, intercommunication and compatibility of military and civilian technologies have been greatly enhanced. A large number of combat facilities and platforms will rely more on local basic resources. Not only does the material support in combat need to be socialized, but also the technical support and information support need to be socialized.

It can be seen that the victory or defeat of the informationized battlefield depends on the overall strength of the warring parties. Various combat forces are both interrelated and mutually influential, but any single force is difficult to determine the outcome of the war. Only when multiple forces work closely together and learn from each other’s strengths and weaknesses can the overall combat system benefits be brought into play and victory be ultimately achieved.

Multi-level integration

The war level is the pattern of the war between the two hostile parties. In information warfare, the distinction between strategy, campaign and battle is no longer as clear as in traditional warfare. Instead, there is a mutual integration of you and me, and the distinction between levels has become relatively vague. First, the war path is simplified. With the centralized use of a large number of informationized weapons and equipment and their information systems, the precision strike capability of the troops has been unprecedentedly improved. A small-scale combat operation and a high-efficiency information offensive operation can effectively achieve certain strategic goals. A battle, a campaign or a carefully planned information operation may be a war. The path to achieve the purpose of war is becoming simpler and the convergence of war, campaign and even battle in purpose and time and space is prominent. Second, command and control is real-time. The widespread use of automated command and control systems on the battlefield has greatly enhanced the command and control function. Campaign commanders and even the highest political and military leadership of the country can plan and command and control all participating forces and specific combat operations in a unified manner, and directly intervene in campaigns, battles and even the actions of individual soldiers or combat platforms in near real time. Combat and campaign operations are similar to strategic engagements. Third, the combat process is fast-tracked. Quick victory and quick decision are important features of information warfare. The combat time is showing a trend of shortening. There is no concept of time for all combat operations. More often, the participating forces at all levels are carried out simultaneously in different fields. The beginning and the end are closely linked. The combat operations in various battlefield spaces penetrate each other, are closely linked, and gradually merge into an integrated and coordinated system, which is difficult to distinguish at the level.

It can be seen that information warfare has a strong overall nature. Campaigns, as a bridge for achieving strategic and even war objectives, are gradually integrated into battles. Combat, as the most basic combat activity in war, is also gradually sublimated into strategies and campaigns. All levels are intertwined and serve to achieve the purpose of war. Only by comprehensively exerting the combat capabilities of all levels and achieving overall effects can we seize the initiative in the war.

Fusion of various styles

The combat style is the carrier for the war hostile parties to compete. Informationized warfare is a process of confrontation between multiple forces and multiple fields, and is manifested in multiple combat actions and confrontation styles. Various combat actions are inseparable from the overall combat situation, and various actions are closely linked, mutually conditional, coordinated, and integrated to form an overall combat power. The first is the unity of combat actions. The victory or defeat of informationized warfare is the result of the system confrontation between the two warring parties. Isolated and single combat actions are often difficult to work. This requires multiple military services to adopt a variety of combat styles in different combat spaces and combat fields, while the combat style dominated by a single military service can only “live” in the overall joint action as a sub-combat action, and all combat actions are unified in the system confrontation. The second is the integration of combat actions. Informationized warfare is a form of war that pursues high efficiency. Objectively, it requires that multiple combat styles and actions must be highly “integrated” from the perspective of system effectiveness. Comprehensively use a variety of combat styles and tactics, combine tangible combat actions with intangible combat actions, combine non-linear combat with non-contact combat and asymmetric combat, combine psychological warfare with public opinion warfare and legal warfare, combine regular combat with irregular combat, and combine soft strikes with hard destruction to form an overall advantage. The third is the mutation of combat actions. In information warfare, while integrating various combat resources and exerting overall power, both hostile parties strive to find the “center of gravity” and “joint points” of the other side. Once the enemy’s weak points are found, all combat forces and actions are linked as a whole and autonomously coordinated, and various styles and means of destruction are adopted to cause a sudden change in the enemy’s combat capability and a comprehensive “collapse” of the combat system, so as to achieve combat initiative and advantage.

It can be seen that information warfare is a practical activity in which various forces use a variety of combat styles and means to compete in multiple battlefield spaces and combat fields. Only when multiple combat styles and means cooperate, support and complement each other can a multiplier effect be produced, thereby exerting the maximum combat effectiveness of the entire system.

Multi-method integration

The means of war are methods used to achieve the purpose of war. In addition to powerful military means, information warfare must also use all available ways and means to cooperate with each other, organically integrate, and form a whole to achieve a favorable situation. First, the use of war means is comprehensive. All wars have a distinct political nature and serve certain political purposes. With the influence of factors such as the globalization of the world economy and the multipolarization of international politics, information warfare is more based on military means, and military means are used in combination with various means such as economy, diplomacy, culture, and technology. Second, the use of war means is gradient. With the development of the times, war as a means of maintaining and seeking power and interests has been increasingly restricted by international law and international public opinion. In addition, resorting to war requires a high price. Therefore, in the information age, the use of war means presents a gradual development gradient, usually starting from retaliation, display of force, and violent retaliation (strike) in the sense of international law, and finally developing into local or even large-scale wars. Third, the use of war means is systematic. Information warfare is a contest of the comprehensive national strength of the hostile parties. The victory of the war depends on the comprehensive and systematic use of various war means. In specific combat operations, various means of warfare have different functions and natures, occupying different positions and playing different roles in the war. Only by closely combining various effective means of warfare into an organic whole can we form a combat system that fully utilizes our strengths and avoids our weaknesses, and maximize the overall combat effectiveness.

It can be seen that information warfare is subject to more restrictive factors, simpler war objectives, and newer combat styles. In the process of decision-making and action, only by coordinating and integrating with struggle actions in other fields such as politics, economy, culture, and diplomacy can the overall goal of the war be achieved efficiently.

現代國語：

中國軍網 國防部網

2019年12月10日 星期二

張自廉 馬代武

資訊化戰爭的基本形式是體系對抗。與歷史上任何一種戰爭形態都不同，資訊化戰爭不是各作戰單元、要素簡單疊加的離散式對抗或局部分散式作戰，而是體系對體系的整體對抗。戰爭的體系融合能力，決定作戰效能的發揮和戰爭目的達成；實現各系統的有效融合，是打贏資訊化戰爭的根本途徑。

多空間融合

戰場空間是戰爭敵對雙方較量的舞台。由於高技術兵器的廣泛運用，資訊化戰爭戰場空間大為拓展，形成了陸、海、空、天、資訊等多維戰場空間。各戰場空間在資訊科技的強力「黏合」下，圍繞著統一的作戰目的融為一體。一是立體化、全方位的偵察與監視網覆蓋透視戰場。在資訊化條件下，軍事偵察與監視能力空前提高，大範圍、立體化、多手段、自動化的情報偵察與監視網，將外層空間、高空、中空、低空、地面（海上）、地下（水下）連為一體，進而獲取多領域的戰場情報資訊。二是遠射程、高精準度的資訊化武器密布威脅戰場。資訊化武器系統所具有的覆蓋和打擊戰場全空間目標的超常作戰能力，實現了發現即意味著摧毀，促進了各戰場空間的高度融合。加之太空和空中力量的發展，使打擊更精確，手段更靈活，作戰效益更高，戰場空間成為海陸空天一體化戰場。這種一體化的戰場結構，多空間高度融合，多空間、多領域相互制約。第三是全時空、全過程的電磁和資訊爭奪滲透制約戰場。軍事資訊科技的發展，不僅透過偵察、打擊等手段實現有形的陸海空天戰場一體化，也開闢了電磁和資訊領域無形戰場的爭奪。電磁和訊息是資訊化戰爭之魂，是連結陸海空天戰場的紐帶，存在於作戰的全時空，作用於戰爭的全要素，貫穿作戰的整個過程，深度影響著陸海空天各維有形的戰場。

可見，資訊化戰場正是透過日益成熟的資訊技術，圍繞著戰爭目的和作戰需要，把陸、海、空、天、資訊等多維空間緊密地融合在一起，形成不可分割、唇齒相依的有機統一體。離開了哪一維戰場空間，或是失去哪一維的控制權，都會直接影響全域作戰效能，進而導致戰爭失敗。

多力量融合

戰爭力量是戰爭敵對雙方較量的主角。體系融合的「一體化聯合作戰力量」是資訊化戰爭的突出特徵。資訊化戰爭各種參戰力量高度一體化，無論其隸屬關係如何、作戰任務如何，都將作為整個作戰系統的平等用戶和資源，融合成為一個統一的大系統。一是參戰部隊聯合化。資訊化戰爭是陸、海、空軍以及航太、特種作戰、資訊作戰等部隊參與的聯合作戰。各參戰部隊都具有其他參戰部隊所不具備或無法替代的優勢，它們通過信息技術溝通和聯繫，實現“無縫鏈接”，形成可以揚長避短、優勢互補的力量體系，成為具備“軟”打擊與“硬”摧毀能力、作戰與保障能力、機動與突擊能力、攻擊與防護能力相結合的有機整體。二是參加人員多元化。隨著資訊網路的發展，資訊時代的戰爭，不再有前方後方之分，作戰系統的網路化使家中也可能成為「戰場」。工業時代的戰爭，「結束了，回家去」；資訊時代的戰爭，也可以「回家，打仗去」。戰爭的參與者不僅只局限於國家和政治集團的軍事力量，非政府和團體性質的民眾，只要具有高技術知識就能投身“戰場”，只要熟練計算機應用都可能成為參與戰鬥的一員。三是保障力量社會化。科學技術的發展，軍用、民用技術的互容、互通和相容性大大增強，大量作戰設施和平台將更加依靠地方基礎資源，不僅作戰中的物資保障需要社會化，而且技術保障與資訊支援也需要社會化。

可見，資訊化戰場的勝負取決於交戰雙方整體力量的強弱，多種作戰力量既相互關聯，又相互影響，但其中任何單一的力量都難以決定戰爭的勝負。只有多種力量密切配合、取長補短，才能發揮整體作戰的系統效益，最終贏得勝利。

多層級融合

戰爭層級是戰爭敵對雙方較量的格局。在資訊化戰爭中，戰略、戰役、戰鬥之間已不再像傳統戰爭那樣涇渭分明，更多的是，你中有我，我中有你，層級區分變得相對模糊。一是戰爭途徑簡約化。大量資訊化武器裝備及其資訊系統的集中運用，部隊的精確打擊能力空前提高，一次小規模的作戰行動和高效益的資訊進攻行動，就能有效達成一定的戰略目的。一場戰鬥、一場戰役或一次周密計畫的資訊行動可能就是一場戰爭。達成戰爭目的的途徑不斷走向簡約，戰爭與戰役甚至戰鬥在目的和時空上的趨同性突出。二是指揮控制即時化。自動化指揮控制系統在戰場上的廣泛運用，指揮控制功能大大增強，戰役指揮員甚至國家最高政治、軍事領導層能夠對所有參戰力量和具體的作戰行動進行統一籌劃和指揮控制，近乎實時地直接幹預戰役、戰鬥甚至單兵或作戰平台的行動，戰鬥和戰役行動趨同於戰略交戰。三是作戰進程速決化。速戰速決是信息化戰爭的一個重要特徵，作戰時間呈現出縮短的趨勢，所有作戰行動已無時間上的概念，更多的是各層次的參戰力量在不同領域同時進行，開始與結束緊密相連，各戰場空間的作戰行動互相滲透、緊密聯繫、逐漸融合成一個整體聯動的綜合體系，難以作層級上的區分。

可見，資訊化戰爭整體性強，戰役作為戰鬥達成戰略乃至戰爭目的的橋樑，逐漸融合在戰鬥中；戰鬥作為戰爭中最基本的作戰活動，也逐漸昇華到戰略、戰役裡面，各層次之間，相互交融，共同為達成戰爭目的服務。只有綜合發揮各層級的作戰能力，達到整體效應，才能奪取戰爭的主動權。

多樣式融合

作戰樣式是戰爭敵對雙方較量的承載。資訊化戰爭是多力量、多領域實施對抗的過程，並表現為多種作戰行動和對抗樣式。各種作戰行動對於作戰全局來說都是不可分割的，各種行動之間也是緊密聯繫，互為條件，相互協調，融為一體，從而形成整體作戰威力。一是作戰行動的統一性。資訊化戰爭的勝負是交戰雙方體系對抗的結果，孤立、單一的作戰行動往往是難以發揮的。這就要求多個軍兵種在不同的作戰空間、作戰領域綜合採取多種作戰樣式，而單一軍兵種為主的作戰樣式將只能作為子作戰行動「棲身」於整體的聯合行動之中，所有的作戰行動統一於體系對抗之中。二是作戰行動的整合性。資訊化戰爭是追求高效益的戰爭形態，客觀上要求必須從系統效能出發，將多種作戰樣式和行動高度「整合」。綜合運用多種作戰樣式和戰法，把有形的作戰行動與無形的作戰行動結合起來，把非線式作戰與非接觸作戰、非對稱作戰結合起來，把心理戰與輿論戰、法律戰結合起來，把正規作戰與非正規作戰結合起來，把軟打擊與硬摧毀結合起來，形成整體優勢。三是作戰行動的突變性。在資訊戰爭中，敵對雙方在整合己方各種作戰資源、發揮整體威力的同時，都著力尋找對方“體系重心”“關節點”，一旦發現敵薄弱部位，所有作戰力量和行動通過整體聯動和自主協同，採取多樣式、多手段的破擊行動，造成敵作戰能力的突變和主動作戰體系的全面作戰，以實現“崩塌與優勢”，以崩潰與作戰能力的全面作戰。

可見，資訊化戰爭是各種力量在多個戰場空間、作戰領域中綜合運用多種戰鬥樣式和作戰手段同場競技的實踐活動。只有多種戰鬥樣式、作戰手段相互配合、相互支援、互補，才能產生倍增效應，進而發揮整個系統的最大作戰效能。

多手融合

戰爭手段是為達成戰爭目的而運用的方法。資訊化戰爭除了強大的軍事手段外，還必須動用一切可以動用的方式和手段，相互配合，有機融合，形成整體，以取得有利的態勢。一是戰爭手段運用綜合化。凡戰爭都有鮮明的政治性，都是為一定的政治目的服務的。隨著世界經濟全球化、國際政治多極化等因素的影響，資訊化戰爭更多的是以軍事手段為主，軍事手段與經濟、外交、文化、科技等多種手段的綜合運用。二是戰爭手段運用梯度化。隨著時代的發展，戰爭作為維護、謀求權力與利益的手段受到了國際法和國際輿論越來越多的限制，加上諸戰爭需付出高昂代價，所以信息化時代在戰爭手段運用上，呈現出逐步發展的梯度性，通常先由國際法意義上的報復、顯示武力、暴力性報復（打擊），最後發展至局部戰爭。三是戰爭手段運用的系統化。資訊化戰爭是敵對雙方綜合國力的較量，戰爭的取勝，有賴於各種戰爭手段綜合、系統運用。在具體的作戰行動中，各種戰爭手段因其功能、性質的不同，在戰爭中居於不同的地位，扮演不同的角色。只有把各種有效的戰爭手段緊密地結合成一個有機連結的整體，才能形成充分揚己之長、避己之短的作戰體系，最大限度地發揮整體作戰效能。

可見，資訊化戰爭受制因素增多、戰爭目的簡約、作戰樣式翻新，在決策與行動過程中，只有與政治、經濟、文化、外交等其他領域鬥爭行動互相配合，融為一體，才能高效地達成戰爭總體目標。

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-12/10/content_24955988.htm

#Information Support Force, #intelligent warfare, #intellligentization, Asymmetric Warfare, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Artificial Intelligence, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Future Wars, Chinese Military Informatization, Chinese Military Intelligentization, Chinese Military Use of Cognitive Confrontation within the Combat Domain, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare, Dissipative Warfare, 中國解放軍敘事戰爭, 中國軍隊對耗散戰的戰術運用, 以認知為中心的戰爭：應對複雜戰爭的作戰概念, 認知域戰, 認知戰

Professor Chen Yingwen China National University of Defense Technology Describes Military Internet of Things: Everything is Connected, Attacking & Winning from Thousands of Miles Away

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國防科技大學陳英文教授闡述軍事物聯網：萬物互聯，千里之外也能攻打

現代英語：

In mid-July 2021 World Internet of Things Expo held a press conference and revealed that the expo is scheduled to be held in Wuxi in early September. At that time, the expo will be themed “Intelligently Connecting Everything and Leading the Future with Digital”, focusing on showcasing the latest achievements in the global Internet of Things field.

The Internet of Things is changing people’s daily lives, quietly changing the form of modern warfare, and promoting the development of intelligent warfare.

Professor Chen Yingwen from the National University of Defense Technology tells you about the military Internet of Things——

Everything is connected, winning thousands of miles away

■Feng Zijian, Qu Shenghui, Qi Xucong

Schematic diagram of military Internet of Things technology simulation.

A “bridge” connecting the virtual world and the real world

The so-called Internet of Things can be simply understood as an Internet that connects everything. If the Internet is a “dialogue” in the virtual world, then the Internet of Things is a “bridge” connecting the virtual world and the real world.

The application of the Internet of Things had already appeared in wars under the name of “sensor networks” more than half a century before it attracted people’s attention.

In the 1960s, the “Ho Chi Minh Trail” on the Vietnam battlefield was covered with tens of thousands of “tropical tree” vibration sensors. These sensors are like a dense “spider web”, waiting for the “prey” to arrive. Whenever a person or vehicle passes by, the sensor detects the vibration generated by the target and records data such as its direction and speed.

At this time, tens of thousands of kilometers away, in an infiltration surveillance center code-named “Task Force Alpha”, US military technicians were receiving and processing relevant information sent back by the “sensor network”. Once a Vietnamese military convoy was discovered passing by, the command center would send instructions to the US troops stationed in Vietnam, instructing fighter planes to fly over the target and carry out bombing.

Due to the limited technology at the time, the sensors could only work for a few weeks. The “spider web” carefully built by the US military ultimately failed to prevent the Vietnamese army from transporting troops and supplies.

Although this “cooperative” combat method between humans and objects did not achieve any good results in history, it has prompted Western countries led by the United States to conduct in-depth research on Internet technology and continuously explore the interconnection between humans and objects, and objects and objects. Its highly informationized advantages are highlighted in many areas of military applications.

After decades of development, some military powers have successively developed a series of military sensor network systems, including the “Smart Dust” system for collecting battlefield information, the “Lumbas” system for remotely monitoring the battlefield environment, the “Sand Straight Line” system for monitoring the movement of weapon platforms, and the “Wolf Pack” system specifically for detecting electromagnetic signals.

Among them, the detection element of the “smart dust” system is only the size of a grain of sand, but it can realize all functions such as information collection, processing and sending, thereby enhancing the ability to control information during combat.

No combat entity will become an “island”

In the world of the Internet of Things, every grain of “sand” will have its network address. For the military Internet of Things, no operational entity will become an “island”.

During the first Gulf War, many weapons and equipment transported by the US military could not be found, resulting in a large waste of war resources. The reason is that the containers transporting weapons and equipment were not clearly marked, and personnel were unable to track the location of the transported weapons and equipment, which led to the loss of a large number of weapons and equipment.

Twelve years later, during the Iraq War, the US military installed radio frequency microchips on every container shipped to the Gulf region, and placed readers and writers according to transportation and storage needs, thereby achieving full tracking of personnel, equipment, and materials, greatly improving the effectiveness of military logistics support.

Foreign research data revealed that compared with the Gulf War, the Iraq War’s sea transport volume decreased by 87%, air transport volume decreased by 88.6%, combat equipment reserves decreased by 75%, and strategic support equipment mobilization decreased by 89%.

In fact, from the moment the electronic tags are attached and the sensing systems are installed, the originally silent equipment becomes like an organic life form that can sense and communicate with each other. Through the transformation of the Internet of Things technology, each combat entity such as combat personnel and combat equipment has become a “network node”. Through perception and communication with each other, the battlefield situation is clearer and combat operations are more efficient.

Take the personnel assessment network established by the Australian Department of Defense as an example: during combat, commanders can assess the physical functions and conditions of soldiers through sensors worn by soldiers, and then combine them with satellite positioning information to obtain the physical function status of all personnel. Commanders can use this as a basis for allocating troops, which can greatly improve the efficiency of battlefield decision-making.

Military IoT technology will play a big role in future battlefields

In today’s world, there are more and more similar military news——

In June 2016, the US military launched an airstrike using drones, killing 16 Taliban members; in September of the same year, Turkish security forces killed 6 terrorists under the guidance of their domestically produced drones.

In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the Middle East in 2020, a video released by Azerbaijan made many people feel the power of networked and intelligent weapons: after the drone discovered the enemy tank, it aimed and fired…

From sensing the battlefield situation to locking onto the target and then launching an attack on the target, the reason behind unmanned equipment becoming the main offensive entity is the huge support of military Internet of Things technology. This huge intelligent information network is like the “clairvoyance” and “super hearing” on the battlefield, allowing combat personnel to sit firmly in the “central military camp” and win the battle thousands of miles away.

“Everything is connected, and victory can be won thousands of miles away.” This is the development trend of military Internet of Things technology and an important feature of future intelligent warfare. In the era of the Internet of Everything, the military Internet of Things will connect several individual combat entities into intelligent combat groups and generate a smart combat system. In the future, it will only be necessary to give the smart combat system clear combat objectives, and military combat personnel will not have to participate in its execution process.

At present, the development of military Internet of Things technology still has a long way to go before it can realize the Internet of Everything, but we should be aware that when smart nodes reach a certain scale, the military Internet of Things will achieve a qualitative leap.

In future battlefields, military Internet of Things technology will surely play a big role in achieving victory through “connection”.

現代國語：

今年7月中旬，2021世界物聯網博覽會組委會召開新聞發布會透露，此次博覽會預定9月上旬在無錫舉行。屆時，博覽會將以「智聯萬物 數領未來」為主題，集中展現全球物聯網領域的最新成果。

物聯網，改變人們的日常生活，也悄悄改變現代戰爭形式，推動智慧化戰爭發展進程。

國防科技大學教授陳穎文為您講述軍事物聯網—

萬物互聯，決勝千里之外

■馮劍 曲晟暉 齊旭聰

軍用物聯網技術模擬示意圖。

連接虛擬世界與現實世界的一座“橋樑”

所謂物聯網，我們不妨將其簡單理解為物物相連的互聯網。如果說互聯網是虛擬世界中的一種“對話”，那麼物聯網則是連接虛擬世界與現實世界的一座“橋樑”。

物聯網應用，早在受到人們關注前的半個多世紀，就已在戰爭中以「傳感器網絡」之名現身。

上世紀60年代，越南戰場的「胡志明小徑」上，佈滿了數以萬計的「熱帶樹」振動傳感器。這些傳感器就像密密麻麻的「蛛網」一般，等待著「獵物」到來。每當有人員或車輛經過時，傳感器就會探測到目標產生的震動，並記錄其方向和速度等數據。

此時，數萬公裡之外，一家代號為「阿爾法特混部隊」的滲透監視中心裡，美軍技術人員在接收和處理著「傳感器網絡」回傳的相關資訊。一旦發現越軍車隊經過，指揮中心就會向駐紮在越南的美軍發出指令，讓戰機飛臨目標實施轟炸。

當時技術有限，傳感器實際工作時間只能維持幾週時間。美軍處心積慮搭建的這張“蛛網”，最終未能阻止越南軍隊對兵力和物資的運送。

雖然歷史上這次人與物「協同」的作戰方式並未取得什麼好的效果，卻推動了以美國為首的西方國家深入研究互聯技術，不斷探索人與物、物與物之間的互聯互通。其高度資訊化優勢，在軍事應用的多個領域凸顯出來。

經過幾十年發展，一些軍事強國先後研製出收集戰場資訊的「智慧微塵」系統、遠程監視戰場環境的「倫巴斯」系統、偵聽武器平台運動的「沙地直線」系統、專門偵收電磁信號的「狼群」系統等一系列軍事傳感器網絡系統。

其中，「智慧微塵」系統的探測元件只有沙粒大小，卻能實現資訊收集、處理和發送等全部功能，從而提升了作戰過程中的製資訊權能力。

沒有一個作戰實體會成為“孤島”

在物聯網世界裡，每一粒「沙子」都將擁有它的網路位址。對軍事物聯網來說，沒有一個作戰實體會成為「孤島」。

在第一次海灣戰爭中，美軍運送的許多武器裝備無從查找，造成了大量戰爭資源浪費。究其原因，是由於運送武器裝備的集裝箱標誌不清，人員對於傳送的武器裝備位置無法跟踪，進而導致武器裝備的大量遺失。

12年後，在伊拉克戰爭中，美軍給運送到海灣地區的每一個集裝箱均加裝了射頻微型晶片，並依據運輸和存儲需要安放了讀寫器，從而實現了對人員、裝備、物資的全程跟踪，使得軍事物流保障的有效性大大提高。

國外研究資料揭露，相較於海灣戰爭，伊拉克戰爭的海運量減少87%，空運量減少88.6%，戰役裝備儲備減少75%，戰略支援裝備動員量減少89%。

實際上，從貼上電子標簽、裝上感知系統的那一刻起，原本靜默的裝備就像一個有機生命體，它們可以相互感知和交流。透過對物聯網技術的改造，作戰人員、作戰裝備等每一個作戰實體都成了一個“網絡節點”，相互間通過感知與交流，讓戰場態勢更加清晰，也使得作戰行動更加高效。

以澳洲國防部所建立的人員評估網為例：作戰期間，指揮人員可通過士兵身上穿戴的傳感器，對士兵身體的機能與狀態進行評估，再結合衛星定位的位置信息，可獲得全體人員身體機能的態勢情況。指揮人員以此為依據進行兵力分配，可大幅提升戰場決策效率。

軍事物聯網技術在未來戰場上大有作為

當今世界，類似軍事新聞越來越多——

2016年6月，美軍利用無人機發動空襲，擊斃16名塔利班成員；同年9月，土耳其安全部隊在其國產無人機的指引下擊斃了6名恐怖分子。

在2020年中東地區的納卡沖突中，阿塞拜疆發布的一段視頻，讓許多人感受到了網絡化、智能化武器的力量：無人機發現敵方坦克後，瞄準、發射…

從感知戰場態勢到鎖定目標、再到對目標展開攻擊，無人裝備成為進攻主體的背後，是軍事物聯網技術的巨大支撐。這個龐大的智慧化資訊網絡，就如同戰場上的“千裡眼”“順風耳”，讓作戰人員穩坐“中軍帳”，就能決勝於千里之外。

「萬物互聯，決勝千里之外。」這是軍事物聯網技術的發展趨勢，也是未來智慧化戰爭的重要特徵。在萬物互聯的時代，軍事物聯網會將若干單一作戰實體連接成為智慧作戰群，生成智慧作戰體系。未來，只需給智慧作戰體係明確作戰目的，軍隊作戰人員不必參與其執行過程。

當前，軍事物聯網技術的發展距離萬物互聯還有很長一段路要走，但應清醒看到，當智慧節點達到一定規模後，軍事物聯網就會形成質的飛躍。

未來戰場，軍事物聯網技術必將大有作為，實現以「聯」制勝。

來源：中國軍網-解放軍報 作者：馮子劍 曲晟暉 齊旭聰 責任編輯：楊紅
2021-08-27 06:00

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/10081763888.html?big=fan