Chinese Military in-depth Analysis of the Latest “Cognitive Warfare” Case in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

中國軍方深入解析俄烏衝突最新「認知戰」案例

2023-10-07 09:00 來源: 述策

現代英語:

It is said that on September 22, the Ukrainian Air Force used the “Storm Shadow” cruise missile to attack the Black Sea Fleet Command in Sevastopol. Since then, the life and death of Admiral Victor Sokolov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, has been a topic of concern to the outside world. After a few days of undercurrents, on September 25, the Ukrainian Special Operations Command (SOF) announced that they had successfully “killed” Admiral Sokolov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and dozens of officers below him. Even Admiral Romanchuk, commander of the Russian Zaporizhia Cluster, was injured by the Ukrainian army.

Unexpectedly, Ukraine’s news was “slapped in the face” less than a day after it was released-on September 26, the Russian Ministry of Defense held a meeting of the National Defense Committee. Senior leaders of the Ministry of Defense, commanders of various military regions, and commanders of various military services attended the meeting in person or via video. At the meeting, Admiral Sokolov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, who was declared “killed” by Ukrainian officers, appeared. After the news was released, the Ukrainian side was extremely embarrassed and had to announce that they wanted to collect more information. But then someone claimed that Admiral Sokolov, who attended the meeting, was “just a photo” and not a real person.

Nevertheless, the battle between the Russian and Ukrainian armies over the life and death of General Sokolov can be seen as a classic case of cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict. It is worthwhile for us to analyze this case specifically, and it is even more worthwhile for us to “talk about” this case and talk about the battle between the Russian and Ukrainian armies in the field of cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict.

  1. Is the “beheading” of General Sokolov not an isolated case?

It is not the first time that the Ukrainian propaganda department has fallen into the trap of “beheading” Russian generals. For example, in mid-June this year, the Ukrainian army spread rumors that the Vice President of Chechnya, Lieutenant General of the Chechen National Guard, and Kadyrov Jr.’s right-hand man, Drimkhanov, was “killed” by the Ukrainian army’s HIMARS rocket launcher.

From the perspective of the implementation process of the entire cognitive warfare, whether it was the “beheading” of Drimkhanov in June or the “beheading” of General Sokolov this time, the whole process was similar:

The first step: The Ukrainian propaganda department deliberately “created topics”. The so-called “creating topics” can be regarded as a “primer” in cognitive warfare, which serves to trigger heated public discussion. This kind of “primer” is often not necessarily released by the official, but may be released by some semi-official channels or channels with close ties to the official. For example, the fact that Lieutenant General Drimkhanov was “killed” by the Ukrainian army’s “HIMARS” rocket launcher was first said to have been released from a telegram group of the Ukrainian armed forces, and the statement was ambiguous. The earliest source of the news that Admiral Sokolov was “beheaded” this time was traced back to a telegram group in Russia. The news in this telegram group is mixed, some of which are of low credibility, but some are surprisingly accurate. In a sense, releasing the “primer” of cognitive warfare through these groups is even more likely to arouse public attention and discussion than official news.

The second step can be regarded as “reinforcement” of public opinion. The first step of cognitive warfare, namely “primer information”, often lacks details for a complete news, but it doesn’t matter. Judging from the efficiency and characteristics of information dissemination in the current society, a “lead information” that lacks details but is easy to arouse everyone’s interest, but has information barriers due to some factors, will naturally be “supplemented with details” during the dissemination process. This is true whether Admiral Sokolov was “shot dead” or Drimkhanov was “beheaded”. Information lacks details, but it is very important “Breaking News” for the media. At the same time, due to military secrets, it is impossible to cross the information barrier to obtain more information in time. Therefore, this will inevitably lead the media to a result – public opinion “reinforcement”, and everyone will do it together, and in the process of word of mouth, a lead information will be constantly detailed and “real”. For example, in the process of dissemination, Drimkhanov was “beheaded”, and the “time” and “place” of his beheading were supplemented one after another (even due to different dissemination channels, these time and place elements are also different), sometimes appearing in Kremenaya and sometimes in Gorlovka. The same is true for Admiral Sokolov’s “killing”. During the process of information dissemination, people have come up with a whole set of details such as “The Black Sea Fleet held a regular meeting on Friday, and the Ukrainian army seized the opportunity to launch a strike”, “Two missiles hit the headquarters office, and the other missile launched a supplementary strike when the rescuers went in to rescue people”. It is precisely in this “decentralized” word of mouth that the “fact” that these two senior generals were “beheaded” has been continuously strengthened, and the lack of information sources is even more conducive to the cognitive shaping of ordinary information recipients.

After several days of fermentation, the cognitive war has come to the third step – “the final word”. The Ukrainian official did not “finally decide” the “beheading” of Drimkhanov. Kadyrov Jr. couldn’t sit still first, and soon released a video of himself and Drimkhanov sitting together for a meal and picnic, and even took out his mobile phone on the spot to show the shooting time, “slapping his face”. Admiral Sokolov was “finally decided” by large departments such as the Ukrainian Special Operations Command and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. According to the process of cognitive warfare, this kind of official media “final word” should play the role of completing the cognitive shaping process in the field of cognitive warfare, that is, completing a complete logical closed loop from releasing “primers” to “speculation reinforcement” by the outside world, and finally “stamping and confirming” by the official. However, the Russian army took the initiative and performed a “slap in the face on the spot”, which not only made all the information dissemination of the Ukrainian army in front of it useless, but also made Ukraine’s two key units, the Special Operations Command and even the Ministry of Defense, become clowns.

  1. Cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, is the Ukrainian army coming in full force?

Many people may be puzzled by the Ukrainian army’s cognitive warfare propaganda department’s personal participation in the rumor that Chechen Vice President Delimkhanov or General Sokolov was “killed” by the Ukrainian army: If the Russian side responds quickly, pulls these senior generals out to show their faces, and self-confirms that “I am still alive”, then won’t the rumors of the Ukrainian cognitive warfare be self-defeating?

It seems reasonable, but the Russian army did not clarify it once it was rumored. Why? Because things are not that simple.

First, from a tactical perspective, if the Russian army arranges for generals to come out and refute rumors every time the Ukrainian army creates a rumor about a senior general, the most direct consequence is that it will cause unnecessary interference and trouble to the daily combat command of senior generals. In combat operations, the time of senior officers above the rank of general is very precious, the daily workload is extremely high, and the brainpower is extremely consumed. It is impossible for them to have so much time to appear and refute rumors endlessly. If the Russian army refutes a rumor every time the Ukrainian army creates a rumor, then these senior generals will have nothing to do in their daily lives and just shoot videos to refute rumors every day.

Second, for information that enters the cognitive shaping cycle, in some cases, “refutation” is not only useless, but will further create more rumors. For example, regarding the “beheading” of General Sokolov, although the Russian army has arranged to refute the rumor, some Ukrainian groups are still “picking on it”, believing that General Sokolov did not move in front of the camera and that the time and place of General Sokolov’s interview could not be seen, so it was just “information countermeasures” arranged by the Russian side. Even for some Russian generals who were “officially announced” and “beheaded” by Ukraine last year but then appeared on certain occasions, such as Major General Gerasimov, Chief of Staff of the 41st Army, there are still Ukrainian supporters who claim that “this person is dead”. The only reason is that this person did not show up again after showing up!

Therefore, in the field of cognitive warfare, many things are not as simple as we think.

Having said that, at the strategic level, there is indeed a big gap between the Russian army and the Ukrainian army in the field of cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict. The Ukrainian army is very good at creating topics, and it is flexible and mobile and pays attention to participation.

In terms of creating topics, Ukraine takes the initiative to create topics almost every time in cognitive warfare, from the Mariupol Theater incident at the beginning, to the Bucha incident later, to the chemical explosion in Rubezhnoy, and the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant incident and the explosion of the New Kakhovka Hydropower Station Dam. Almost every time, Ukraine “takes the lead”. Russia is in a state of passive response, and as a result, Ukraine continues to create topics and continuously attacks, which puts it in a disadvantageous position.

In terms of mobility and flexibility, the Ukrainian army is very familiar with the characteristics of modern media communication. For example, in the cognitive warfare against the “beheading” of Admiral Sokolov, the Ukrainian army took advantage of the characteristics of modern media’s fast communication speed and decentralized communication mode, released the “primer” in a semi-official form, and let netizens “reinforce” it (in fact, it is the self-growth of information), and finally the more authoritative official media came out to “finalize the final word”.

In terms of “focusing on participation”, the Ukrainian army is better at creating a sense of participation of ordinary netizens in specific topics. For example, after the Bucha incident and the Battle of Mariupol, Ukraine immediately launched a set of websites called “The Executioner’s Book”. Anyone can log in to these websites or network plug-ins at will and register the so-called “Russian army’s atrocities” or Russian army movements. The United States immediately responded and opened the “Observation Post” project belonging to the US State Department in response to the “Executioner’s Book” project, which is used to record the “atrocities” of the Russian army in the conflict. These public topics are set up quite cleverly, making the outside world feel that they are highly involved, while the specific content is true and false, which is different from the false information indoctrination of traditional information warfare. In the cognitive warfare of the Ukrainian army, these highly involved projects once made the entire network trend one-sided.

Compared with the propaganda and operation of the Ukrainian army in the field of cognitive warfare, the Russian army is far behind in the field of cognitive warfare. For example, in response to Ukraine’s formation of a combat mode that emphasizes mass participation and mass experience in the cognitive field, Russia is still using the old method – announcing ambiguous combat conditions in the form of daily combat reports, with only Major General Konashenko “acting as an emotionless reading machine” in front of the camera. As a result, most combat observers do not take his combat reports seriously. Another example is the tactics of Ukraine frequently setting topics and carrying out cognitive shaping in steps, and Russia can only defend itself. Every time Ukraine creates topics, Russia responds passively, and then Ukraine continues to create new topics based on Russia’s response, leaving Russia in a state of exhaustion. From this perspective, the Russian army’s cognitive warfare against the Ukrainian side’s “beheading” of Admiral Sokolov, and the sudden arrangement of the rumor-busting “face-slapping”, is just a tactical “flash of inspiration”, and the effect does not seem to be very good. It has not completely changed the basic power comparison between the Russian and Ukrainian armies in the field of cognitive warfare. Ukraine’s “cognitive warfare advantage” over Russia will continue.

  1. How do we deal with cognitive warfare in the new combat form?

In terms of definition, “cognitive warfare” can be traced back to the concept of “network-centric warfare” proposed by the US military in military reform at the beginning of this century. After years of development, by 2017, related discussions began to frequently appear in the speeches of senior NATO generals. For example, on August 14, 2017, Stewart, director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, clearly put forward the assertion that “the fifth-generation war is cognitive warfare” at the 2017 Defense Intelligence Information System Annual Conference. On September 17, 2017, Goldfein, then Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, also clearly put forward the concept of “cognitive warfare” at the annual meeting of the US Air Force Association. Soon, NATO comprehensively developed this novel operational concept. In March 2020, NATO released the concept book “Operation 2040”, which clearly stated that “information and cognitive warfare” will play an important role in future operations. In June, NATO appointed François du Creuse, former French colonel and head of the NATO Innovation Center, to study cognitive warfare, and produced a detailed report on “Cognitive Warfare” in January 2021. In June 2021, NATO held a scientific conference on cognitive warfare and released a special report on “Cognitive Warfare: Cognition Dominates the Future”, thus forming a more systematic and complete cognitive warfare theory.

Compared with traditional information warfare and propaganda warfare, the biggest feature of cognitive warfare is that it is based on the working principle of the human brain, that is, the process of acquiring, perceiving, understanding, processing, inferring, evaluating, judging, calculating, and making decisions on external information. In short, cognitive warfare is superior in terms of operational characteristics. It is not a unilateral indoctrination, but a good use of people’s cognitive process to “reshape” everyone’s worldview, values, ideology, and even cognitive and understanding processes in an all-round way, so as to fully rebuild the individual’s interpretation and response to information and interfere with the individual’s ideology and value orientation. The final result is not only to use various false information to disrupt the opponent, but more importantly to reshape the opponent’s social psychology, thereby affecting the opponent’s strategic decision-making, “defeating the enemy without fighting.” This determines that cognitive warfare is a new generation of propaganda warfare and information warfare. Compared with the traditional information warfare that focuses on the tactical level, the role of cognitive warfare can be further improved to the strategic level, which may affect the direction or outcome of the war.

So, facing a new type of combat form such as cognitive warfare, referring to the current situation in which Russia has been at a disadvantage in the field of cognitive warfare with Ukraine in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict, how should we respond to future cognitive warfare?

From a strategic perspective, we should realize that in the field of cognitive warfare, pure passive response is the most unreliable and inefficient form of combat. For example, Russia’s passive response to Ukraine’s agenda setting is equivalent to passively being beaten. Of course, compared with firepower warfare or mobile warfare, cognitive warfare is a thorough “open conspiracy” without too much feint and deception. It mainly relies on the ideological superiority and media skills of the West, and relies on the legal rights of the Western media in the field of the “fourth power”. Since we are temporarily at a disadvantage in the field of media compared with Western countries, it is actually a relatively difficult thing to implement cognitive confrontation with them in the whole system and at all levels. Therefore, even if we also adopt the strategy of strategic offensive in cognitive warfare, its implementation effect may not be as good as that of the other party. One way may be to firmly grasp our basic plate strategically and form a “you fight yours, I fight mine” pattern.

In the field of tactics, we should fully learn from the experience and lessons of both sides in cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Judging from the cognitive warfare strategy implemented by the Ukrainian army, in areas such as topic shaping, it mainly exploits the loopholes of information asymmetry. Then, our possible response strategy is to disclose some information in a timely manner and change the original concept that “military operations must be kept confidential and not disclosed to the outside world.” In fact, public information itself is a process of cognitive shaping. Both sides can carry out a lot of cognitive warfare confrontation around the timing, content, and timing of information disclosure. For example, in the field of setting topics, we can “take the initiative” and first seek the ability to set topics and carry out cognitive shaping in countries such as the Belt and Road, BRICS or Shanghai Cooperation Organization countries, at least to ensure that the people of our country and some friendly countries can offset the influence of the Western cognitive warfare. For another example, in response to the “cognitive warfare” implemented by the other party against different groups in multiple dimensions and levels, or the rumors created step by step, we can make extensive use of the influence of KOL (Key Opinion Leader) and the platform to form a “cognition against cognition” combat pattern.

In short, cognitive warfare, as a new combat style that has been studied by NATO for many years, appeared in large numbers in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict and played a certain role, deserves further research to ensure that it is invincible in future military operations.

This articleThe article on cognitive warfare is just an appetizer, and there will be a main course later. This studio took about a year to complete the “Research on Cognitive Warfare in the United States and Other Western Countries”, which has a text of more than 40,000 words (excluding more than 7,000 words of notes), which is much richer and more in-depth. The report will be officially launched and introduced the day after tomorrow, so stay tuned.

現代國語:

據稱,9月22日烏克蘭空軍使用「風暴陰影」巡航飛彈襲擊塞瓦斯托波爾黑海艦隊司令部。此後,關於黑海艦隊司令維克托.索科洛夫上將的生死一直是外界關注的議題。經過幾天暗流湧動後,9月25日,烏克蘭特戰司令部(SOF)對外宣布,他們成功「擊斃」黑海艦隊司令索科洛夫上將及以下數十名軍官,甚至俄軍札波羅熱集群司令羅曼丘克上將也被烏軍擊傷。

沒想到,烏克蘭的消息剛放出來不到一天就慘遭「打臉」——9月26日,俄羅斯國防部召開國防委員會會議,國防部高級領導人、各軍區司令、各軍兵種司令等以現場出席或視訊連線的方式參會,會上赫然出現了被烏軍官宣「擊斃」的黑海艦隊司令索科洛夫上將。消息放出後,烏方極為尷尬,只好宣布他們要收集更多資訊。但隨後又有人宣稱說參會的索科洛夫上將“只是照片”,不是真人。

儘管如此,從這次俄烏兩軍圍繞索科洛夫上將的生死問題展開的鬥法,可以被看做是俄烏軍事衝突中關於認知戰的一個經典案例,既值得我們就這一案例進行專門剖析,更值得我們從這個案例中“說開去”,談一談俄烏軍事衝突中俄烏兩軍在認知戰領域展開的較量。

一、索科洛夫上將“被斬首”,並非孤例?

關於「斬首」俄軍將領,烏克蘭宣傳部門栽進坑裡已經不是第一次了。例如今年6月中,烏克蘭軍隊造謠稱車臣副總統、車臣國民近衛軍中將、小卡德羅夫左膀右臂德里姆哈諾夫被烏軍海馬火箭砲「擊斃」。

從整個認知戰的實施過程看,無論是6月那次德里姆哈諾夫被“斬首”,還是這次索科洛夫上將被“斬首”,整個過程大同小異:

第一步:烏克蘭宣傳部門有意「製造議題」。所謂“製造議題”,在認知戰中可以被視為一個“引子”,作用是引發輿論熱議。這種「引子」往往不一定由官方放出,可能是由一些半官方的管道或與官方關係比較緊密的管道放出。例如德里姆哈諾夫中將被烏軍的「海馬」火箭炮「打死」一事,最早據說是從烏克蘭武裝部隊的一個電報群組裡放出來的,而且說法模稜兩可。這次索科洛夫上將被“斬首”,最早的消息來源經過追溯則是俄羅斯的某個電報群組。這種電報群組的消息魚龍混雜,有些消息則可信度很低,但有些消息卻出奇準確。將認知戰的「引子」透過這些群組放出,某種意義上說甚至比官方消息更容易引發輿論關注和討論。

第二步可以被視為輿論的「補強」。認知戰的第一步即「引子資訊」對一個完整的新聞來說往往缺乏細節,但不要緊。從當前社會訊息傳播的效率和特徵來看,一個缺乏細節、但容易引起大家興趣、卻又因某種因素出現信息壁壘的“引子信息”,在傳播過程中,大家自然會對其進行“細節補充」。無論是索科洛夫上將被“擊斃”還是德里姆哈諾夫被“斬首”,都是如此。資訊缺乏細節,但對傳媒來說偏偏又是非常重要的「Breaking News」(突發新聞),同時基於軍事機密的因素,想穿越資訊壁壘及時獲取更多的資訊也不可能。因此,這必然會使傳媒導向一個結果——輿論“補強”,而且是大家一起上,在口耳相傳的過程中不斷把一個引子信息細節化、“真實”化。例如德里姆哈諾夫被「斬首」在傳播過程中,先後彌補上了他被斬首的「時間」、「地點」(甚至由於傳播管道不同,這些時間和地點要素也各不相同),時而出現在克雷緬納亞,時而出現在戈爾洛夫卡。索科洛夫上將被「擊斃」同樣如此,訊息在傳播過程中,被先後腦補出一整套「黑海艦隊週五開例會,烏軍抓住機會實施打擊」、「兩發飛彈一發擊中了司令部辦公室,另一發飛彈在救援人員進去救人的時候實施了補充打擊」這種細節。正是在這種「去中心化」的口耳相傳,這兩名高級將領被「斬首」的「事實」被不斷強化,消息來源的缺失甚至更有利對普通信息受眾進行認知塑造。

經過數天發酵之後,認知戰來到第三步-「一錘定音」。德里姆哈諾夫被“斬首”一事並沒有輪到烏克蘭官方“一錘定音”,小卡德羅夫先坐不住了,很快放出了自己和德里姆哈諾夫坐在一起吃飯野餐的視頻,甚至當場拿出手機展示拍攝時間,進行「打臉」。索科洛夫上將則是烏軍特戰司令部、烏克蘭國防部這樣的大部門出面完成「一錘定音」。按照認知戰的過程,這種官方媒體“一錘定音”應該起到在認知戰領域完成認知塑造過程的作用,也就是完成一個從放出“引子”,到外界“猜測補強”,最後官方「蓋章確認」的完整邏輯閉環。但俄軍居然後發製人,表演了一出“當場打臉”,不僅讓烏軍前面的所有信息傳播都變成了無用功,還讓烏克蘭的兩個要害單位特戰司令部甚至國防部變成了小丑。

二、俄烏衝突中的認知戰,烏軍來勢洶洶?

對於烏軍認知戰宣傳部門親自上陣、造謠車臣副總統德里姆哈諾夫或索科洛夫上將被烏軍“擊斃”,很多人可能大惑不解:如果俄羅斯方面迅速反應,把這些高級將領拉出來亮個相,自我確認一下“我還活著”,那麼烏方認知戰的謠言不就不攻自破了嗎?

看似有理,但俄軍並沒有被造謠一次就照上面的辦法澄清一次。為什麼?因為事情沒有那麼簡單。

其一,從戰術角度來說,如果烏軍每製造一個關於高級將領的謠言,俄軍就安排將領出面闢謠,最直接的後果就是對高級將領的日常作戰指揮造成不必要的干擾和麻煩。在作戰行動中,將官以上的高級軍官時間非常寶貴,每天工作量極高,對腦力消耗極大,根本不可能有那麼多時間沒完沒了地現身闢謠。如果烏軍每造一個謠俄軍就闢一個謠,那這些高級將領平時啥也別幹了,就天天拍視頻闢謠吧。

其二,對於進入認知塑造循環的訊息來說,某些情況下,「闢謠」不僅沒用,還會進一步製造出更多謠言。例如索科洛夫上將被“斬首”一事,儘管俄軍已經安排了闢謠,但一些烏克蘭群組依然在“挑刺死磕”,認為索科洛夫上將在鏡頭前沒有動,索科洛夫上將在受訪時看不出時間和地點,因此只是俄方安排的「資訊反制」。甚至對一些去年曾經被烏克蘭方面「官方宣布」「斬首」、但隨後又在某些場合露面的俄軍將官,比如第41集團軍參謀長格拉西莫夫少將,目前依然有烏克蘭支持者宣稱“此人已死”,唯一的原因就是這人在露面之後居然沒有再度露面!

所以,在認知戰領域,很多事沒有想的那麼簡單。

話又說回來,在戰略層面上,俄軍在俄烏軍事衝突的認知戰領域相比烏軍確實存在較大差距。烏軍非常善於製造議題,而且機動靈活,注重參與。

製造議題方面,幾乎每次認知戰都是烏克蘭主動製造議題,從一開始的馬裡烏波爾大劇院事件,到後來的布查事件,再到魯別日諾耶的化學物質爆炸事件,還有後來的札波羅熱核電廠事件和新卡霍夫卡水力發電廠大壩爆破事件,幾乎每次都是烏克蘭「先聲奪人」。俄羅斯則處於被動應對的狀態,結果被烏克蘭繼續製造議題連續攻訐,處於不利地位。

機動彈性方面,烏軍對現代傳媒的傳播特徵非常熟稔,例如對索科洛夫上將被「斬首」展開的認知戰,烏軍利用了現代傳媒傳播速度快、傳播模式去中心化的特點,以半官方形式放出“引子”,放任網民對其進行“補強”(事實上就是信息的自生長),最後再由比較權威的官方媒體下場“一錘定音”。

「注重參與」方面,烏軍更善於營造普通網民對特定議題的參與感。例如布查事件和馬裡烏波爾戰役之後,烏克蘭方面立即上線了一套名叫「劊子手之書」的網站,任何人都可以隨意登陸這些網站或者網絡插件,在裡面登記所謂的「俄羅斯軍隊的暴行」或俄軍動向。美國立即回應,針對「劊子手之書」項目,開通了屬於美國國務院的「觀察站」項目,從而用於記錄俄軍在衝突中的「暴行」。這些公共議題設定相當巧妙,令外界群眾感受到的參與度極高,而在具體內容上則真真假假,不同於傳統資訊戰的假訊息灌輸。在烏克蘭軍隊的認知戰中,這些參與度極高的計畫一度讓整個網路風向呈現一面倒的趨勢。

和烏軍在認知戰領域的宣傳和操作相比,俄軍在認知戰領域差太遠。例如針對烏克蘭方面在認知領域塑造極為強調群眾參與、群眾體驗的作戰模式,俄羅斯方面依然在沿用著老辦法——以每日戰情通報的形式對外公佈模棱兩可的戰況,只有一個科納申科少將在鏡頭前“當一個沒有感情的讀稿機器”,結果絕大多數戰況觀察者都不太把他的戰況通報當回事。又如對烏克蘭方面頻繁設置議題、依照步驟進行認知塑造的戰法,俄羅斯方面更是只有招架之功。每次都是烏克蘭製造議題,俄羅斯方面被動應對,然後烏克蘭方面根據俄羅斯的應對情況繼續製造新的議題,使俄羅斯處於疲於奔命的狀態。從這個角度來看,俄軍此次針對索科洛夫上將被“斬首”的烏方認知戰塑造,突然安排闢謠“打臉”,只是戰術上“靈光乍現”而已,而且效果似乎也沒多好,也沒有徹底改變目前俄烏兩軍在認知戰領域的基本力量對比,烏克蘭對俄羅斯的「認知戰優勢」還會持續下去。

三、新型作戰形式認知戰,我們如何因應?

從定義上來說,「認知戰」最早可追溯到本世紀初美軍在軍事改革中提出的「網路中心戰」概念,經過多年的發展,到2017年,相關論述開始頻頻見於北約高級將領的言論集中,譬如2017年8月14日,美國國防情報局局長史都華在國防情報資訊系統2017年會上就明確提出了「第五代戰爭是認知戰」這一論點。到了2017年9月17日,時任美國空軍參謀長戈德費恩在美國空軍協會年會上同樣明確地提出了「認知戰」這個概念。很快,北約就對這個新穎的作戰概念進行了全面發展。 2020年3月,北約發布《作戰2040》概念書,明確提出「資訊與認知戰」將在未來作戰中扮演重要角色。 6月,北約又指派前法軍上校、北約創新中心負責人弗朗索瓦.杜.克魯澤專題研究認知戰,並在2021年1月拿出了《認知戰》的詳細報告書。 2021年6月,北約召開了認知戰科學會議,並發布了《認知戰:認知主導未來》專題報告,從而形成了較有系統、完整的認知戰作戰理論。

相較於傳統的資訊戰和宣傳戰,認知戰的最大特徵是基於人的大腦運作原理,也就是對外在資訊的獲取、感知、理解、加工、推論、評估、判斷、計算、決策的過程。總之,認知戰在作戰特質上可謂更勝一籌,不是進行單方面灌輸,而是要善於利用人們的認知過程,對每個人的世界觀、價值觀、意識形態,甚至認知、理解過程進行全方位“重塑”,從而全面重建個人對訊息的解讀和反應,干涉個人的意識形態和價值取向,最終的結果不僅是要利用各種假訊息擾亂對手,更重要的是重塑對手的社會心理,從而對對手的戰略決策產生影響,「不戰而屈人之兵」。這決定了認知戰是新一代的宣傳戰和資訊戰,相對於傳統的專注於戰術層面上的資訊戰,認知戰的角色可以進一步提高到戰略層面上,可能會影響戰爭的走向或結局。

那麼,面對認知戰這樣一種新型的作戰形式,參考俄烏軍事衝突中俄羅斯在和烏克蘭的認知戰領域長期處於下風的現狀,我們對未來的認知戰究竟該如何應對呢?

從戰略角度來看,我們應當認識到,在認知戰領域,單純的被動應對是最不可靠、效率最低的作戰形式,如俄羅斯在烏克蘭的議題設定面前被動應對等於被動挨打。當然,認知戰相比於火力戰戰或機動戰,是徹底的“陽謀”,並沒有太多佯動和詭詐,依託的主要是西方的意識形態優勢地位和傳媒功力,靠的是西方媒體「第四權」領域的法權。由於我方相比西方國家在傳媒領域暫時處於下風,要在全系統、全層面上與其實施認知對抗作戰其實是一件相對困難的事情。因此,即使我們在認知戰上同樣採取戰略進攻的策略,其實施效果可能也不如對手。辦法之一或許是從策略上牢牢把握住我們的基本盤,形成「你打你的,我打我的」格局。

而在戰術領域,要充分借鏡俄烏衝突中雙方在認知作戰上的經驗教訓。從烏克蘭軍隊實施的認知戰策略來看,在議題塑造等領域,主要鑽了資訊不對稱的空子。那麼,我方可能的因應策略是及時公開部分訊息,要改變原有的「軍事行動必須保密、不要對外界公開」的觀念。事實上,公開資訊本身就是認知塑造的過程,雙方圍繞著資訊公開的時機、內容、時序上,可以展開大量的認知戰對抗。如在設置議題領域,我方可以“先發製人”,先求得在諸如一帶一路沿線國家、金磚國家或上海合作組織國家內設置議題、展開認知塑造的能力,起碼確保本國群眾和一些友好國家能夠對沖西方認知戰領域的影響。再如,針對對方在多維度、多層次上針對不同人群實施的「認知戰」或步步為營塑造出的謠言,我方可廣泛利用KOL(Key Opinion Leader,即意見領袖)及平台的影響力,形成以「認知對認知」的作戰模式。

總之,認知戰作為一種被北約研究多年、在俄烏軍事衝突中大量出現且起到一定作用的新型作戰樣式,值得進一步進行研究,以確保在未來的軍事行動中立於不敗之地。

這篇關於認知戰的文章只是“開胃菜”,隨後還有“正餐硬菜”——本工作室歷時約一年完成了《美國等西方國家的認知作戰研究》,正文4萬多字(不含註7千多字),要豐富和深入得多。該報告將於後天正式推出並進行介紹,敬請關注。

中國原創軍事資源:https://www.163.com/dy/article/IGEFT5CB0515NAKC888.html

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