Category Archives: #Information Support Force

Chinese Military Research on Conceptual System-based Superior Warfare – How to Fight in Information Warfare System Operations? Analysis of Nine Typical Combat Styles

中國軍事體系優勢作戰概念研究-資訊化作戰體系如何作戰?九種典型作戰風格分析

現代英語:

System “Gathering Excellent War” It is “systematic warfare in information warfare. It does not necessarily refer to a certain combat style, but is composed of multiple combat styles and tactics” “combination boxing”, or combat style group . Emphasizes that, depending on the combat mission, combat opponent and the changing battlefield situation, any appropriate means and style of combat can be used flexibly to form combat advantages as long as it is conducive to forming comparative advantages and achieving system victory. In the specific implementation process of “system-based superior warfare”, these specific combat styles and operational tactics can not only be organized and implemented separately as part of joint all-domain operations, but also emphasize fighting “combination boxing”, using multiple strategies simultaneously, and winning as a whole. 


       In order to better understand its core connotation, this article lists Nine typical combat styles including overall deterrence warfare, electromagnetic disturbance warfare, network penetration warfare, and cognitive control disturbance warfare And analyze .

       System “Juyouzhan” ――combination boxing that flexibly uses multiple combat styles“
        1. Overall deterrence war: Emphasis on multi-domain joint deterrence; Three elements should be present in the implementation of an overall deterrent war ; Strong overall strength is central to achieving effective deterrence
        2. Electromagnetic Disturbance Warfare : The key to competing for information advantage; On the combined means approach, information empowerment is achieved through “connection + sharing” ; Crack down on effective tactics for unmanned cluster operations
       3. Cyber-sabotage: Soft “kill” is the main focus, combining soft and hard, focusing on breaking the net and reducing energy failure
       4. Cognitive scrambling: Control the cognitive power of situational awareness and compete for information advantage; control the decision-making power of command and compete for decision-making advantage; control “brain” power and seize the advantage of brain control
       5. Agile mobile warfare: High-efficiency and rapid decision-making; high-efficiency formation of a favorable combat situation; high-efficiency and instant gathering of combat forces; agile mobile warfare is an innovative development of traditional mobile warfare
       6. Swarm autonomous warfare: It is conducive to forming a system advantage to suppress the enemy; it is conducive to enhancing the combat effect; it is conducive to falling into the enemy’s combat dilemma
       7. Point-and-kill War: Achieving an efficient cost ratio for operations; targeting key nodes is an important option; large-scale system support is a basic condition; it is inseparable from precise intelligence support
       8. Supply-breaking: The supply guarantee chain has a huge impact on the overall combat situation; the center of gravity of the attack is a key node in cutting off the enemy’s supply guarantee chain; the focus is on choosing the right time and making full use of tactics
       9. System “paralysis battle:” The objectives of the operation are to make the enemy combat system run out of order; to strike the key nodes of the combat system with heavy blows; and to carry out soft strikes against the enemy combat system

        For learning reference only, welcome to communicate and correct! Article views do not represent the position of this body
       The concept of combat was first proposed as a new combat style. Innovative combat styles are a core element in the development of combat concepts. It can be said that system-gathering battle is a general term for a series of specific tactics. The following nine typical combat styles constitute the tactical system of system-gathering and superior warfare. They are: One is Overall deterrence warfare, actively organize static power display and deterrence actions in system excellence battles, and strive to defeat others without fighting or small battles; Two is Electromagnetic disturbance warfare uses various combat methods and action styles such as electronic detection, attack and defense to disrupt, prevent and destroy the enemy’s electromagnetic capabilities, actively compete for the advantages of the electromagnetic spectrum, seize the right to control information, and then win the initiative in combat; Three is In cyber attack warfare, various means such as soft strikes and hard destruction are used to defeat the enemy’s command network, intelligence network, communication network, logistics supply network, and disrupt the enemy’s command and support; Four is Cognitively Controlled Disturbance. Form a controlling advantage in the cognitive space through information attacks, public opinion attacks, and brain attacks; Five is Agile mobile warfare. Quickly adjust the deployment of troops and weapons, quickly gather capabilities on the battlefield, and seize combat opportunities; Six is Swarm autonomous warfare. Extensively use unmanned combat methods such as “bee swarms”, “wolf swarms”, and “fish swarms” to independently organize actions and distributed attacks to achieve joint human-machine victory; Seven is Pointkill. Accurately obtain intelligence, carry out multi-domain precision strikes, strive to shake the overall situation with one point, and maximize combat benefits; Eight is Supply-breaking. Organize an elite force to attack enemy logistics supplies and equipment supply supply chains, supply lines and supply bases, defeat the enemy and lose supplies and withdraw from the battle; Nine is System “paralysis battle”. A variety of means, such as breaking the net, exercising, and hitting nodes, are used to interfere with, delay, destroy, or even paralyze the effective operation of the enemy’s combat system and weaken its functions.


       1. Overall deterrence
       Overall deterrence warfare refers to actively organizing static power display and deterrence actions in the system’s battle for excellence, and striving to defeat others without fighting or small battles. Sun Tzu said: “Subduing one’s troops without fighting is a good thing.” Deterrence and war are the two main forms of military activity. And “deterrence” is mainly the act of showing determination and will to potential opponents by showing strength or threatening to use strong strength to deter opponents from action. It can be said that the overall deterrence war in the system-based battle of excellence is an important means or tactic to achieve the goal of “stopping” human troops without fighting. Clausewitz emphasized that the first rule of strategy is to be as strong as possible, first in general, and then in key locations. Modern warfare is system-to-system confrontation. The overall deterrence war under informationized local warfare requires not only traditional deterrence methods and capabilities on land, sea, air and space, but also new deterrence methods and capabilities such as space deterrence, electromagnetic deterrence, and network deterrence. It also requires an overall deterrence that shows the overall strength of the country. Especially with the rapid development of advanced technologies such as information technology, the technological revolution, industrial revolution, and military revolution have accelerated their integration, and strategic competitiveness, social productivity, and military combat effectiveness have become more closely coupled. Winning the information war is to a greater extent a contest between the will of the country and the overall strength of the country. To contain the war, we must first act as a deterrent to our opponents in terms of overall strength.


       1.1 Emphasis on multi-domain joint deterrence
       Means of deterrence typically include both nuclear and conventional deterrence. In the “system-based battle for excellence”, the overall deterrence war is implemented, aiming to comprehensively use conventional deterrence methods across the land, sea, air and space power grids to achieve the purpose of deterrence. Especially with the application of information network technology and space and directed energy technology in the military, space, networks, electromagnetic weapons, etc. have become new means of deterrence. Space deterrence, It mainly uses equipment such as rapid response electromagnetic orbit weapons, space-to-ground networked anti-navigation and positioning service systems, large elliptical orbit laser weapons, and high-power microwave weapons to threaten and attack the opponent’s space targets and form a deterrent against enemy space information “interference blocking”. Cyber deterrence mainly uses cyberspace situational awareness and attack equipment to threaten and attack the opponent’s military network and other critical information infrastructure to achieve deterrence against the enemy. Electromagnetic deterrence mainly uses electromagnetic spectrum combat systems to threaten and attack enemy detection, navigation, communications and other information weapons and equipment systems to achieve deafening and blinding deterrence against the enemy.

1.2 The implementation of overall deterrence should have three major elements
       Implementing an overall deterrent war and achieving the desired effect of deterrence usually requires three main elements: One is strength. The deterrent must have the reliable ability or strength to frighten and fear the opponent; the second is determination and will. The deterrent party must dare to use this capability when necessary; third, to transmit information clearly. The deterring party must make the ability to act and the determination clearly known to the other party accurately and effectively.


       Historically, the criteria for judging deterrent strength have varied in three main ways: First, the active military force; second, the combined national strength or war potential; and third, the total number of main battle weapons and equipment. For quite a long period of history, the number of troops was deterrence, and the strength of military strength depended directly on the size of the active military, the amount of vital weapons and equipment, and non-material factors such as the morale of the army’s training organization. After the twentieth century, with the expansion of the scale of warfare, deterrence power has become less limited to the strength of the military and the quantity of vital weapons and equipment, but is determined by the nation’s war potential, which includes economic power, scientific and technological power, energy resources, and even population size, among others. The overall deterrence war in the system’s “gathering and excellence war”, the formation of its deterrence strength is mainly based on the network information system, as well as the joint global deterrence capability formed under the integration of the system.


       1.3 Strong overall strength is the core of achieving effective deterrence
       The development of information technology and its widespread penetration and application in the military sector provide favourable conditions for building overall strength and achieving overall deterrence. System “Juyouzhan” is supported by the network information system, making full use of the permeability and connectivity of information technology, not only integrating various combat forces, combat elements, and combat units into an organic whole, realizing the military system combat advantages, but also integrating Various fields related to war and national mobilization, such as national politics, economy, diplomacy, finance, transportation, and energy, are connected and integrated into the national war mobilization system Gather all forces and resources to form an overall synergy, realize the emergence effect of system capabilities, show the overall strength advantage, and form a powerful invisible deterrent of united efforts and sharing the same hatred Create a situation that makes the enemy “powerful but unable to act ”“able to act but ineffective”, and play a role in containing and winning the war.
       In the “overall deterrence war”, the scope of national war mobilization will be wider, not limited to a certain direction or region, but throughout the country and even the relevant regions of the world; mobilization time will be faster, and using networks and information systems, mobilization and action information can be quickly transmitted to everyone and every node at the first time; action coordination and synergy will be more consistent, and all forces distributed in various regions can be based on the same situation Under the same order, the operation is unified at almost the same time, which greatly improves the efficiency of operational synergy; resources are more fully utilized, and various war resources based on the Internet can quickly realize the conversion between peacetime and wartime, military-civilian conversion, and achieve integrated front and rear guarantees and precise guarantees.


       2. Electromagnetic Disturbance Warfare
       Electromagnetic disturbance warfare refers to the flexible use of electronic detection, attack and defense and other combat methods and action styles to disrupt, prevent and destroy the enemy’s electromagnetic capabilities, actively compete for the advantages of the electromagnetic spectrum, seize information control rights, and then win operational initiative.


       2.1 The key to competing for information advantage Informatization local warfare is highly dependent on the electromagnetic spectrum, the Control and counter-control of electromagnetic space have become the focus of competition for information rights. Organize and carry out electromagnetic obstruction warfare, mainly to destroy the enemy’s electromagnetic spectrum and protect one’s own side from destruction. The electromagnetic spectrum is the main carrier for transmitting information. The use of electromagnetic means to disrupt the enemy’s electromagnetic spectrum will effectively reduce the enemy’s information combat capabilities and enable our own side to ensure the rapid and effective flow of information in the scenario of ownership of information rights, driving command flow, action flow, and material flow through information flow, energy flow, and then have the dominance and initiative in combat.


       2.2 The basic focus is to implement electromagnetic disturbance warfare in the battle to deactivate the enemy’s combat system. It is mainly aimed at the enemy’s dependence on electromagnetic space. At the same time, in order to ensure its own effective use of electromagnetic space, it organizes various electronic reconnaissance and interference, attack, defense and support forces to attack enemy communication networks, radar networks, computer networks and command centers, communication hubs, radar stations, etc Computer network nodes, global navigation and positioning systems, space link systems such as the “Heaven and Earth Integrated Internet”, and various other frequency-using weapons and equipment carry out interference and attacks, block and destroy their communication and data transmission, and destroy the enemy’s combat system. “Connection” and “sharing” structural center of gravity provide support for seizing information control and electromagnetic control from the root, thereby weakening the enemy’s command and control capabilities Deactivating and disabling the enemy’s entire combat system.


       2.3 Crack effective tactics for unmanned cluster operations
     “Unmanned autonomous group operations such as swarms ”“wolves ”“fishes” are important features of information-based local warfare with intelligent characteristics. The various unmanned autonomous clusters are large in number, diverse in type, and complex in characteristics, and each individual can complement each other and play a role in replacing each other. It will be very difficult to intercept and damage the entire unmanned cluster. However, from a technical point of view, for unmanned combat clusters to achieve effective synergy, each individual must share and interact with each other. Once the communication coordination between unmanned clusters is interfered with, it will be impossible to share battlefield posture and information, and will not be able to coordinate actions with each other, making it difficult to achieve the combat effectiveness it deserves. This gives the other party an opportunity to implement interception of communications and electromagnetic interference. Therefore, the implementation of electromagnetic spectrum warfare, interference and attacks on the information and communication networks of unmanned clusters, and the destruction of their information sharing and interaction will make it impossible for each individual in the unmanned cluster to achieve effective synergy and thus lose its operational capabilities.


       3. Cyber-sabotage
       Cyber-blowout, It refers to military confrontation operations that comprehensively use technologies such as networks and computers and other effective means to control information and information networks. It is a major combat style of cyberspace operations and competition for network control. Its main combat operations are both soft-kill and hard-destroy, focusing on soft and combining soft and hard. Among them, soft kill is mainly a cyber attack, that is, it comprehensively uses blocking attacks, virus attacks and other means to block and attack enemy information networks, command systems, weapon platforms, etc., making it difficult for enemy networks, command information systems, etc. to operate effectively or even paralyze; hard destruction mainly uses precision fire strikes, high-energy microwaves, electromagnetic pulses, and anti-radiation attacks to paralyze and destroy enemy information network physical facilities Destroy enemy combat and weapons and equipment entities.
       The important thing is to “break the net and reduce energy failure”. Organizing a cyber attack in a “system-based battle of excellence” is to target the weaknesses of the combat opponent’s military information network, use the advantages of the system to organize various cyber attack forces, and conduct combat command networks, reconnaissance intelligence networks, communication networks and even logistics throughout the entire operation. Supply networks, etc., continue to carry out soft killing and hard destruction operations to destroy the enemy’s network system The overall function of the enemy’s combat system is reduced or even disabled. It mainly targets core targets such as the enemy’s basic information network, intelligence network, command network, and support network, and implements a series of combat operations such as network-to-electronics coordinated attacks, deception and confusion, link blocking, and takeover control, so that the enemy’s intelligent combat network system becomes incapacitated and ineffective, achieving a critical victory that paralyzes the enemy system.


      4. Cognitively Controlled Disturbance Warfare
      Cognitive interference control war refers to interfering with, destroying or controlling the enemy’s thinking and cognition through information attacks, public opinion attacks, and brain attacks in the system optimization war, so that the enemy cannot make correct judgments and decisions, thereby controlling the enemy in cognitive space. form a controlling advantage.
      Cognitive domains, That is, “human thinking space and consciousness space are areas that have a critical impact on combat decision-making and judgment”. The development of information technology, especially artificial intelligence technology, and its widespread application in the military field have expanded the battle of war from physical space and information space to cognitive space, making cognitive space a completely new combat domain. With the development of information and intelligent technology and its widespread and in-depth application in the military field, the Human-machine intelligence tends to converge This has made the status of cognition in intelligent warfare more prominent, and the cognitive field has gradually become an important battlefield. The right to control cognition has become a key element of future battlefield control. Fighting for cognitive control has become an important combat style for winning information-based local warfare operations with intelligent characteristics.


       4.1 Control the cognitive rights of situational awareness and compete for information advantages
       In the system’s “excellence battle”, information flow drives the flow of matter and energy, and information advantage determines decision-making advantage. Rapid and accurate knowledge of intelligence information and battlefield situations has an important impact on seizing command and decision-making advantages. Therefore, when organizing and implementing system-based battle gathering, we must make full use of intelligent technology and big data technology to conduct comprehensive analysis and judgment on massive intelligence information data, mine and extract the required intelligence information, and achieve more accurate and faster understanding of battlefield situations and combat environments. Cognition ensures that the enemy is discovered first and the enemy is recognized first from the source. While removing one’s own side “the fog of war”, create “the fog” for the opponent. Therefore, in order to compete for cognitive rights, we must not only control and process information before the enemy, but also take measures such as online public opinion attacks and high virtual reality chaos to actively create and spread false information, disrupt and disrupt the perception and cognition of hostile battlefield situations, maximize confusion and increase uncertainty, interfere with the opponent’s combat decisions, and delay its combat operations.


       4.2 Control and command decision-making power and compete for decision-making advantages
       Decision strengths determine action strengths. Quick decision-making by the commander is the key to shortening “the command cycle” and achieving quick wins. The organizational system focuses on excellent combat, and the success or failure of combat operations depends largely on the speed of the commander’s decision-making. It is necessary to “use intelligent auxiliary decision-making systems, select the best combat plans, scientifically and rationally allocate combat resources, and maximize combat effectiveness; use ubiquitous intelligent networks to access required combat nodes and combat platforms at any time to build and form an integrated combat system.” Achieve decentralized deployment of power, information, and capabilities, cross-domain linkage, form advantages at locations and times required for operations, gather energy to release energy, and gather advantages to win; Implementation “core attack”, Errors or deviations in the enemy’s command decisions are caused by hacking into the other party “chip”, tampering with its programs, and command and decision system algorithms.


       4.3 Control “brain” power and seize the advantage of brain control
       Cognitive interference control warfare in the system’s “gathering excellence war” emphasizes “attacking the heart and seizing the will”, that is, using network warfare, electromagnetic warfare and other methods to control the enemy’s human brain and consciousness cognition as well as the control system of the unmanned autonomous platform “attacking the heart Cognitive control warfare to control the brain and seize ambitions” Replace “destroy” with “control”, To achieve the goal of stopping and winning the war at the minimum cost. Attacking the heart and controlling the brain is different from traditional strategic deterrence. It places more emphasis on active attack. It is an active attack operation that mainly uses advanced information combat technology, brain control technology, etc. to attack the enemy’s decision-making leader, as well as intelligent unmanned autonomous combat platforms, auxiliary decision-making systems, etc., carry out controlled “brain” attacks, directly control and disrupt the opponent “brain”, influence and control the enemy’s decision-making, or disable it Enable stealth control of enemy combat operations. For example, “Targeting human cognitive thinking, using brain reading and brain control technology, and using mental guidance and control methods to directly carry out “inject ”“invasive” attacks on the brains of enemy personnel, interfering with, controlling or destroying the cognitive system of enemy commanders.”, deeply control it from the perspective of consciousness, thinking and psychology, seize “control intellectual power”, disrupt the enemy’s decision-making, destroy the enemy’s morale, and force the enemy to disarm.


      5. Agile Mobile Warfare
      Agile mobile warfare refers to the efficient decision-making, efficient adjustment of troop deployment and high-efficiency real-time gathering of combat forces in systematic battle, efficient gathering of capabilities on the existing battlefield, and seizing combat opportunities. Agility is the ability to respond quickly and timely to changes in the battlefield environment. It has the characteristics of responsiveness, robustness, flexibility, elasticity, innovation and adaptability.

Table 1 Connotation of the concept of agile warfare


      5.1 Efficient and fast decision-making
      To implement agile and mobile warfare, we must first make efficient and rapid decisions to win operational opportunities. Therefore, it is necessary to comprehensively use various means of reconnaissance, detection, perception and surveillance to obtain battlefield posture and target information in a timely manner, especially characteristic information, activity trajectories and real-time position information of time-sensitive targets, so as to ensure precise intelligence support for rapid decision-making. Efficient decision-making is also reflected in the speed of intelligence processing. It takes less time to screen effective intelligence information, formulate action plans at a faster speed according to changes in circumstances, and seize the initiative and seize the opportunity with one step ahead. High-efficiency decision-making focuses on shortening the decision-making cycle, taking the target time window as the central point, and integrating decision-making command with combat units and weapon platforms, rapid response, and overall linkage to improve combat efficiency.


      5.2 High efficiency forms a favorable combat situation
      It is necessary to “keep abreast of changes in the battlefield situation at any time, rely on the support of information networks, and achieve dynamic reorganization of combat forces and integration during movement through cross-domain, cross-dimensional, and diversified three-dimensional maneuvers. Combat resources flow efficiently throughout the region and gather during movement to achieve mobility and excellence.”, forming a favorable battlefield situation. Agile mobile warfare relies on data fusion processing, intelligent assisted decision-making and other means to quickly form combat plans, quickly project combat forces at a high frequency according to the case, organize troops to quickly form favorable combat deployments, and realize enemy discovery, enemy decision-making, and enemy fire, first enemy assessment, change the balance of power in the shortest time and fastest speed, form combat advantages, and improve the efficiency of combat operations.


      5.3 Efficient and instant gathering of combat power
      To organize agile mobile warfare, the key is to select the right combat force within a limited time, coordinate the entire battle situation, and form an overall synergy to ensure a fatal blow. Therefore, in response to changes in battlefield posture, especially target situations, it is necessary to draw up groups to form a joint mobile combat system formed by multi-domain combat forces, gather combat forces in real time, deploy quickly and mobilely to a favorable battlefield, and carry out real-time strikes against the enemy. For deep space, deep sea, etc. to become a new combat space, an intelligent unmanned autonomous combat platform can be organized Rapid mobility is deployed to lurk near key targets or important passages that are difficult for humans to reach due to physiological limitations, and ambush operations are carried out on standby, creating new cross-domain checks and balances.


      5.4 Agile mobile warfare is an innovative development of traditional mobile warfare
      In the history of both ancient and modern warfare at home and abroad, there have been numerous examples of successful battles that relied on rapid covert maneuvers to achieve combat objectives. However, the combat process of information-based local warfare has been greatly compressed, the combat rhythm has accelerated rapidly, and fighter aircraft are fleeting. It has put forward higher requirements for fast mobile capture fighters. It is difficult to meet the requirements of joint operations and all-area operations under information conditions alone “fast pace, high speed”. requirements, so agile mobility must be implemented.


       6. Unmanned cluster autonomous warfare
       Unmanned cluster autonomous warfare refers to the widespread use of unmanned combat methods such as “bees”“ wolves ”“fishes” in system optimization warfare to independently organize actions and distributed attacks to achieve joint human-machine victory. With unmanned autonomous equipment becoming the main combat force on the battlefield, defeating the enemy with unmanned autonomous equipment clusters and numerical superiority has become an important combat style in information warfare.


       6.1 It is conducive to forming a system advantage to suppress the enemy
       Unmanned cluster independent warfare gives full play to the special advantages of unmanned combat weapons such as all-weather, unlimited, difficult to defend, and low consumption, and builds and forms large-scale unmanned combat clusters or formations such as unmanned “bee swarms”“ wolves ”“fish swarms”, and organizes independently, mutual coordination, can implement close-range and full-coverage reconnaissance, or act as bait to interfere or deceive, or cooperate with main battle weapons to implement distributed coordinated attacks Enable overall mobility and joint control of the enemy.


       6.2 Conducive to enhancing combat effectiveness
       In “unmanned cluster autonomous operations”, different combat units within the unmanned cluster organization are responsible for different functions and different tasks, including those responsible for reconnaissance, those carrying out electromagnetic interference and fire strikes, and those playing “decoy” roles. Clusters transmit and share battlefield information through inter-group networks, perform their respective duties according to the division of labor, and collaborate in real-time, independently, and dynamically according to battlefield changes. They not only give full play to their advantages in quantity and scale, but also use information networks and intelligent integration technology to achieve integration effects, using cluster advantages to consume enemy defense detection, tracking and interception capabilities, rapidly saturating and paralyzing the enemy’s defense system.


       6.3 Conducive to getting into enemy combat difficulties
       Unmanned cluster autonomous warfare uses a large number of autonomous unmanned combat platforms with different functions to form an unmanned combat cluster integrating reconnaissance and detection, electronic interference, cyber attacks, and fire strikes. It can carry out multi-directional and multi-directional operations against the same target or target group. Multiple, continuous attacks will make it difficult for the enemy to make effective counterattacks.


       7. Pointkill Battle
       “Precise point-killing warfare” refers to accurately obtaining intelligence in system-based battles, implementing multi-domain precision strikes, striving to shake the overall situation with one point, and maximizing combat benefits. Informationized local warfare is an overall confrontation between systems. Implementing precise point-killing warfare and precise strikes on important nodes and key links of the enemy’s combat system will destroy the enemy’s combat system and reduce enemy combat capabilities, which will achieve twice the result with half the effort. Combat effect.


      7.1 Achieve efficient combat cost ratio
      Achieving maximum combat effectiveness at the minimum cost is a goal pursued by both sides of the war. With the widespread application of information technology in the military field and the advent of information warfare, precision-guided weapons, intelligent kinetic energy weapons, integrated surveillance and attack drones, and laser weapons are widely equipped with troops; through the use of big data, artificial intelligence and other technologies, it has become possible to accurately calculate the required troops and weapons. These all provide material and technical conditions for achieving precision point kill warfare, achieving operational objectives at a lesser cost, and achieving operationally efficient fee ratios.


       7.2 Targeting key nodes is an important option
       The key to precise point-killing battles is to hit the key points and nodes. If you don’t hit, it will be enough. If you hit, it will be painful. If you hit, you will win. If you hit a point, you will break the enemy’s system and shake the overall situation. The target of the strike is not limited to the enemy’s dispersed deployment of ships and aircraft, but should also be targeted at local, dynamic, time-sensitive targets or independent targets such as enemy command centers, important hubs, and even major generals and commanders, in pursuit of deterrence, shock and enemy-breaking system effects. It will also be an effective countermeasure to use precision strike fire to carry out “point-kill” strikes in response to the distributed tactic of decomposing expensive large-scale equipment functions into a large number of small platforms and implementing decentralized deployment of forces.


       7.3 Large-scale system support is the basic condition
       The implementation of precise point-kill warfare cannot be separated from the support of a large-scale system. Focusing on achieving combat goals, the required troops and weapons are transferred from each operational domain that is dispersed and deployed. With the support of the network information system, they are dynamically integrated to form a precision strike system to achieve overall linkage and system energy gathering. Through reasonable and sufficient firepower, the target is concentrated. Strike to achieve precise use of troops and precise release of energy. To implement precise point-and-kill operations to be precise, all links within the entire combat system need to be closely connected without any mistakes. The U.S. military’s killing of bin Laden in 2011 can be said to be a typical strategic precision killing operation supported by the strategic system.


       7.4 It is inseparable from precise intelligence support
       In precision point kill warfare, precise intelligence support is always the key to achieving operational goals. Therefore, before the war, various means should be used to collect various enemy intelligence information, especially accurate analysis and judgment of enemy targets. During combat operations, various sensors and intelligence reconnaissance methods should be used to accurately grasp enemy target changes and dynamic target situations in a timely manner, so as to provide powerful and effective intelligence support for the implementation of precise point-kill warfare. The U.S. military’s targeted killing operation against Soleimani was a typical precise point-killing battle supported by an efficient intelligence system.


       8. Supply-breaking
       Supply chain-breaking warfare refers to organizing elite forces in a system-gathering battle to attack the enemy’s logistics supplies and equipment supply supply chain, supply lines and supply bases, defeat the enemy and lose supplies and withdraw from the battle. In response to weaknesses such as the enemy’s long logistics supply line and large equipment support stalls, the organization of elite forces to build “chain-breaking warfare” combat systems, and to carry out sustained, precise and devastating strikes against enemy logistics supplies and equipment supply chains, supply lines and supply bases, will make it unsustainable due to the loss of supplies and will have to withdraw from the battle.


       8.1 The supply guarantee chain has a huge impact on the overall combat situation
       Logistics equipment support is an important basis for operations. The constant supply of logistical supplies and weapons and equipment ultimately determines the size of an army’s combat troops, whether they can fight, in what season, where they can fight, how far they can leave their rear bases, how long they can fight, how fast they can maneuver, and so on. In information warfare, the consumption of battlefield materials has increased exponentially. Not only has the dependence on logistics equipment support for operations not decreased, but it has become larger and larger. Moreover, the requirements for the specialization of support have also become higher and higher In particular, modern combat equipment is available in a wide variety of models and specifications, with huge volumes of mixed transport, more dispersed troop deployment and very high requirements for transport capacity, which makes bases, communication lines and transport more important than ever. The stable and efficient operation of the supply guarantee chain and continuous and uninterrupted supply guarantee are the key to operational victory and have a huge impact on the overall operational situation.


       8.2 The center of gravity of the attack is a key node in cutting off the enemy’s supply guarantee chain
       The operational center of gravity of supply chain-breaking warfare is a key link in attacking the enemy’s supply support chain, and its continuous support capability is lost through chain-breaking. Therefore, the organization of supply chain-breaking warfare should mainly target enemy ground railway and road transport lines, maritime supply convoys, military requisitioned merchant ships and combat support ships, large and medium-sized air transport aircraft, and rear supply bases. For example, striking the enemy’s maritime supply support chain and cutting off the enemy’s fuel, ammunition, fresh water, and food supplies will make the enemy aircraft carrier battle group lose its ability to continue fighting, which in turn will even affect the outcome of a battle.


       8.3 The key is to choose the right time and make full use of tactics
       It is crucial to organize the implementation of supply chain-breaking warfare and to choose a favorable time to strike. The timing of strikes in supply chain-breaking warfare should be organized and implemented when the enemy’s supply maneuvers are selected, so as to surprise and attack unprepared concealed tactics, carry out sudden strikes on enemy supply vehicles, ships and transport aircraft, and terminate their supply operations. Specific tactics usually include covert ambush warfare, organizing capable forces to ambush the routes and routes that enemy transportation must pass through, waiting for opportunities to carry out covert surprise attacks; stealth surprise warfare, using submarines, stealth fighters, etc. to covertly move forward to carry out attacks on enemy transportation targets, and win by surprise; long-range precision warfare, using long-range conventional surface-to-surface missile forces to attack enemy supply bases and airports Long-range precision strikes are carried out at the departure points of supplies such as docks.


       9. System “paralysis battle”
       System destruction and paralysis war refers to the comprehensive use of various means such as breaking the network, breaking the chain, and defeating nodes in the system optimization war to interfere with, delay, destroy, or even paralyze the effective operation of the enemy’s combat system and weaken the functions of the enemy’s combat system. The essence of system destruction and paralysis warfare is to weaken the correlation and structural power between the elements of the enemy’s combat system, degrade the functions of the system, and fail to play a role in doubling capabilities.


       9.1 The combat goal is to disorderly operate the enemy’s combat system
       In information warfare, the combat systems of both warring parties have their own internal order, and this order is the key to maintaining and supporting the operation of the combat system. The side that can maintain and navigate the internal order of the combat system will gain an advantage and, conversely, a disadvantage. Therefore, the goal of “disrupting the enemy’s winning mechanism and causing the enemy’s combat system to become disordered” should be established in system destruction and paralysis warfare. This requires that the system be fully utilized in the battle of paralysis Information technology in particular intelligent algorithms The “powerful enabling effect” can quickly adjust and reconstruct one’s own combat system, quickly generate and release powerful combat power, and implement agile and precise strikes on the enemy’s combat system, causing the enemy’s combat system to lose normal operating order and become disordered. The system functions are destroyed and the overall combat capabilities are significantly reduced.


       9.2 A key node in the heavy strike combat system
       Systematic confrontation is a major feature of information warfare. System is an important foundation and support for system confrontation, and is also the key to effectively exerting combat effectiveness by integrating various combat forces, weapon platforms and weapon systems on the battlefield. Whether the system can be kept robust and run smoothly has a decisive influence on the achievement of war and campaign victories. In the battle to destroy and paralyze the system, the key is to focus on the enemy’s integrated combat system of land, sea, air and space power grids, breaking the network, breaking the chain, and attacking nodes. By attacking key node targets, the operating mechanism of the enemy’s combat system will be out of order, and it may even be severely damaged or destroyed. Paralysis. Therefore, the basic direction of system destruction and paralysis warfare is to select key units, key nodes, and key elements of the enemy’s combat system to carry out strikes, attack one point, destroy one part, and paralyze the whole, so as to achieve the goal of defeating the enemy.


       9.3 Implement soft strikes against the enemy’s combat system
       When organizing and implementing system breaking and hard destruction, it simultaneously organizes soft-kill combat operations such as electronic warfare, cyber warfare, psychological warfare, and public opinion warfare, and carries out soft strikes on the information domain and cognitive domain of the enemy’s combat system. Electronic warfare uses the power of electronic warfare to carry out strong electromagnetic interference against the enemy, causing its information to malfunction and fall into the fog of war; cyber warfare uses the power of cyber attack to attack the enemy’s network information system, causing the enemy’s command and communication system and computer network to be severely damaged, causing its command to malfunction and fall into information islands or even war islands; psychological warfare and public opinion warfare, using psychological warfare and public opinion warfare methods It carries out psychological strikes and public opinion guidance against the enemy, severely damaging his will to fight and inducing his cognitive disorientation. Organizing “people’s livelihood wars” to attack the opponent’s major national economy and people’s livelihood facilities can also play a role in the enemy’s combat system “drawing fuel from the bottom of the cauldron”. In the 1999 Kosovo War, the US military did not attack the Yugoslav army, but attacked its war potential target system, causing the Yugoslav soldiers and civilians to lose their will to fight and lead to defeat. 

現代國語:

體系聚優戰是資訊化戰爭中的體係作戰,其不限定特指某一種作戰樣式,而是由多種作戰樣式和戰法組成的“組合拳”,或作戰樣式群。強調根據作戰任務、作戰對手和戰場情勢變化,只要有利於形成相對優勢、達成體系製勝,可以靈活運用任何適宜的作戰手段和样式,形成作戰優勢。在體系聚優戰具體實施過程中,這些具體作戰樣式和行動戰法既可以作為聯合全局作戰的一部分單獨組織實施,更強調打“組合拳”,多策並舉,整體制勝。
為更能理解其核心內涵,本文列舉了整體威懾戰、電磁擾阻戰、網路破擊戰、認知控擾戰等九大典型作戰樣式,並進行分析。

體系聚優戰――靈活運用多種作戰樣式的「組合拳」作者:學術plus高級觀察員 東週
本文主要內容及關鍵字
1.整體威懾戰:強調多域聯合威懾;實施整體威懾戰應具備三大要素;強大整體實力是實現有效威懾的核心
2.電磁擾阻戰:爭奪資訊優勢的關鍵;在組合手段方法上,透過「連結+共享」實現資訊賦能;破解無人集群作戰的有效戰法
3.網路破擊戰:軟殺傷為主,軟硬結合,重在破網降能失效
4.認知控擾:控制態勢感知認知權,爭奪資訊優勢;控制指揮決策權,爭奪決策優勢;控制「腦」權,奪取腦控優勢
5.敏捷機動戰:高效率快速決策;高效率形成有利作戰態勢;高效率即時聚合作戰力量;敏捷機動戰是對傳統機動作戰的創新發展
6.蜂群自主戰:有利於形成體系優勢壓制敵方;有利於增強作戰效果;有利於陷敵於作戰困境
7.精確點殺戰:實現作戰的高效費比;打關鍵節點目標是重要選項;大範圍體系支撐是基本條件;離不開精確情報保障
8.補給斷鍊戰:供應保障鏈對作戰全局影響巨大;打擊重心是斷敵供應保障鏈的關鍵節點;重在選準時機活用戰法
9.體系毀癱戰:作戰目標是使敵作戰體系運作失序;重拳打擊作戰體系的關鍵節點;對敵作戰體系實施軟打擊

僅供學習參考,歡迎交流指正!文章觀點不代表本機構立場
作戰概念首先是作為一種新的作戰樣式提出。創新作戰樣式是作戰概念開發的核心內容。可以說,體系聚優戰是一系列具體戰法的總稱。以下九大典型作戰樣式構成了體系聚優戰的戰法體系。分別為:一是整體威懾戰,在體系聚優戰中積極組織靜態威力展示和威懾行動,力爭不戰或小戰而屈人之兵;二是電磁擾阻戰,運用電子偵攻防等多種作戰手段和行動樣式,擾亂、阻止、破壞敵電磁能力的發揮,積極爭奪電磁頻譜優勢,奪取制資訊權,進而贏得作戰主動;三是網路破擊戰,運用軟打擊和硬摧毀等多種手段,破敵指揮網、情報網、通信網、後勤補給網,亂敵指揮保障;四是認知控擾。透過資訊攻擊、輿論攻擊、腦攻擊,在認知空間形成控制優勢;五是敏捷機動戰。快速調整兵力兵器部署,在即設戰場快速聚集能力,搶奪作戰先機;六是蜂群自主戰。廣泛運用「蜂群」、「狼群」、「魚群」等無人作戰手段,自主組織行動、分散式攻擊,實現人機聯合製勝;七是精確點殺戰。精準獲取情報,實施多域精確打擊,力爭打一點撼全局,實現作戰效益最大化;八是補給斷鏈戰。組織精銳力量,打敵後勤物資裝備供應補給鏈、補給線和補給基地,破敵失去補給而退出戰鬥;九是體系毀癱戰。綜合採取破網、鍛鍊、打節點等多種手段,幹擾、遲滯、破壞甚至癱瘓敵作戰體係有效運轉,削弱敵作戰系統功能。
1.整體威懾戰
整體威懾戰是指在體系聚優戰中積極組織靜態威力展示和威懾行動,力爭不戰或小戰而屈人之兵。孫子曰:「不戰而屈人之兵,善之善者也。」威懾和戰爭是軍事活動的兩種主要形式。而威懾,主要是透過展現力量或威脅使用強大實力,向潛在對手錶明決心意志,以嚇阻對手行動的行為。可以說,體系聚優戰中的整體威懾戰是實現不戰而「止」人之兵的重要手段或戰法。克勞塞維茨強調,策略的第一條規則是盡可能強大,首先是整體的強大,然後是在關鍵部位的強大。現代戰爭是體系與體系的對抗。資訊化局部戰爭下的整體威懾戰,不僅要有陸海空天傳統威懾手段和能力,也需要太空威懾、電磁威懾、網路威懾等新型威懾手段和能力,更需要有顯示國家整體實力的整體威懾。特別是隨著資訊科技等先進科技的快速發展,科技革命、產業革命、軍事革命加速融合,戰略競爭力、社會生產力和軍隊戰鬥力耦合關聯更加緊密,打贏資訊化戰爭更大程度上是國家意志和國家整體實力的較量。若要遏止戰爭,首先要從整體實力上對對手形成嚇阻。
1.1 強調多域聯合威懾
威懾手段通常包括核威懾和常規威懾。在體系聚優戰中,實施整體威懾戰,旨在綜合運用陸海空天電網全域常規威懾手段,以達成威懾目的。特別是隨著資訊網路技術及太空、定向能技術在軍事上的應用,太空、網路、電磁武器等成為新型威懾手段。太空威懾,主要以快速回應電磁軌道武器、天地網路化反導航定位服務系統、大橢圓軌道雷射武器、高功率微波武器等裝備,威脅攻擊對手空間目標,形成對敵空間訊息「幹擾阻斷」威懾。網路威懾,主要是以網路空間態勢感知和攻擊裝備,威脅攻擊對手軍事網路及其它關鍵資訊基礎設施,實現對敵威懾。電磁威懾,主要以電磁頻譜作戰系統,威脅攻擊敵探測、導航、通訊等資訊化武器裝備系統,實現對敵致聾致盲威懾。 1.2 實施整體嚇阻戰應具備三大要素
實施整體威懾戰並達成嚇阻預期效果,通常必須具備三大要素:一是實力。威嚇方必須具備令對手感到忌憚畏懼的可靠能力或力量;二是決心意志。威懾方在必要時必須敢於使用這種能力;三是明確傳遞訊息。威懾方必須將行動能力與決心準確、有效地讓對方清楚知道。
從歷史上看,判斷威懾實力的標準主要有三個面向變化:一是現役軍事力量;二是綜合國力或戰爭潛力;三是主戰武器裝備總數。在相當長一段歷史時期內,軍隊數量就是威懾,軍事實力的強弱直接取決於現役軍隊的規模、重要武器裝備的數量,以及軍隊訓練組織士氣等非物質因素。二十世紀後,隨著戰爭規模的擴大,威懾實力已不再僅限於軍隊兵力和重要武器裝備的數量,而是由國家戰爭潛力所決定,其中包括經濟實力、科技實力、能源資源,甚至人口數量,等等。體系聚優戰中的整體威懾戰,其威懾實力的形成主要基於網路資訊體系,以及在該體系融合整合下形成的聯合全局威懾能力。
1.3 強大整體實力是實現有效威懾的核心綜合分析研判,挖掘提取所需情報訊息,實現對戰場態勢、作戰環境的更精準、更快速認知,從源頭確保先敵發現、先敵認知。在消除己方「戰爭迷霧」的同時,也要為對手製造「迷霧」。因此,爭奪認知權,不僅要先敵掌握、先敵處理信息,還要採取網絡輿論攻擊、高度虛擬現實亂真等措施,積極製造、散佈虛假信息,破壞、擾亂敵對戰場態勢的感知、認知,最大限度地製造混亂、增加不確定性,幹擾對手的作戰決策,遲滯其作戰行動。
4.2 控制指揮決策權,爭奪決策優勢
決策優勢決定行動優勢。指揮者的快速決策是縮短「指揮週期」、實現快速勝利的關鍵。組織體系聚優戰,作戰行動成敗很大程度取決於指揮的決策速度。要利用智慧輔助決策系統,優選最佳作戰方案,科學合理調配作戰體系,實現力量、資訊、能力分散部署、跨域聯動,在作戰所需地點、時間形成優勢,集子聚釋能、聚變勝負實施、跨域聯動,在作戰所需地點、時間形成優勢,集子聚釋能、聚變勝負實施法實作「攻芯」,透過反義程式定義、原則性反制勝;
4.3 控制「腦」權,奪取腦控優勢
體系聚優戰中的認知控擾戰,強調“攻心奪志”,即利用網絡戰、電磁戰等方式,對敵方人腦和意識認知以及無人自主平台的控制系統實施“攻心控腦奪志”的認知控制戰,以“控制”取代“摧毀”,以最小代價實現止戰、勝戰之目的。攻心控腦與傳統的謀略威懾不同,其更強調主動攻擊,是一種主動攻擊行動,主要運用先進信息作戰技術、控腦技術等,對敵決策首腦,以及智能化無人自主作戰平台、輔助決策系統等,實施控“腦”攻擊,直接控制、擾亂對手“大腦”,影響、控制敵對決策,或使其失能,實現隱形敵作戰。如以人的認知思維為目標,利用讀腦、腦控技術,運用心智導控手段,直接對敵方人員大腦實施“注入”“侵入”式攻擊,幹擾、控製或破壞敵指揮人員認知體系,從意識、思維和心理上對其深度控制,奪取“制智權”,以亂敵決策、破敵士氣,迫敵繳械。
5.敏捷機動戰
敏捷機動戰,指在體系聚優戰中高效率決策、高效率調整兵力兵器部署和高效率即時聚合作戰力量,在既設戰場高效率聚集能力,搶奪作戰先機。敏捷是一種快速及時應對戰場環境變化的能力,具有響應性、穩健性、柔性、彈性、創新性和適應性等特徵。
表1 敏捷作戰概念內涵

5.1 高效率快速決策
實施敏捷機動戰,首先要高效率快速決策,贏得作戰先機。因此,要綜合運用各種偵察探測感知與監視手段,及時獲取戰場態勢和目標信息,特別是時敏目標的特徵信息、活動軌跡以及實時位置信息,確保為快速決策提供精準情報支持。高效率決策也體現在情報處理速度上,要用更少的時間甄別有效情報訊息,根據情況變化,以更快的速度製定行動方案,快敵一步佔據主動,奪取先機。高效率決策重在縮短決策週期,要以目標時間窗口為中心點,決策指揮與作戰單元、武器平台一體協同、快速反應、整體連動,提高作戰效率。
5.2 高效率形成有利作戰態勢
要隨時掌握戰場態勢變化,依靠資訊網支撐,透過跨域、跨維、多樣化立體機動,達成作戰力量動態重組、動中融合,作戰資源全局高效流動、動中聚集,實現機動聚優,形成有利戰場態勢。敏捷機動戰依賴資料融合處理、智慧化輔助決策等手段,快速形成作戰方案,依案高頻率快速投送作戰力量,組織部隊快速形成有利作戰部署,實現先敵發現、先敵決策、先敵開火、先敵評估,以最短時間、最快速度改變力量對比,形成作戰優勢,提高作戰行動效率。
5.3 高效率即時聚合作戰力量
組織敏捷機動戰,關鍵在於有限時間內選準作戰力量,協調整個戰局,形成整體合力,確保一擊致命。因此,要針對戰場態勢特別是目標情況變化,抽組形成由多域作戰力量形成的聯合機動作戰系統,即時聚合作戰力量,快速機動部署至有利戰場,對敵實施即時打擊。針對深空、深海等成為新的作戰空間,可組織智慧化無人自主作戰平台,快速機動部署至人類因生理所限而難以到達的重點目標或重要通道附近潛伏,待機實施伏擊作戰,形成新的跨域制衡優勢。
5.4 敏捷機動戰是對傳統機動作戰的創新發展
古今中外戰爭史上,靠著快速隱密機動達成作戰目的的成功戰例比比皆是。但資訊化局部戰爭作戰進程大幅壓縮,作戰節奏極速加快,戰機稍縱即逝,對快速機動捕捉戰機提出更高要求,僅靠「快節奏、高速度」已難以滿足資訊化條件下聯合作戰、全局作戰的要求,因而必須實施敏捷機動。
6.無人集群自主戰
無人集群自主戰,指在體系聚優戰中廣泛運用「蜂群」「狼群」「魚群」等無人作戰手段,自主組織行動、分散式攻擊,實現人機聯合製勝。隨著無人自主裝備成為戰場上的主要作戰力量,以無人自主裝備集群和數量優勢戰勝敵人,已成為資訊化戰爭中的重要作戰風格。
6.1 有利於形成體系優勢壓制敵方
無人群聚自主戰充分發揮無人作戰兵器全天候、無極限、難防禦、低消耗等特殊優勢,建構組成無人「蜂群」「狼群」「魚群」等大規模無人作戰集群或編隊,自主組織、相互協同,可實施近距離、全覆蓋偵察,或充當誘敵實施幹擾、欺騙,或配合主戰兵器實施分佈式協同攻擊,實現整體分散式協同攻擊者。
6.2 有利於增強作戰效果
在無人群聚自主作戰中,無人群集編成內的不同作戰單元分別擔負不同功能、不同任務,既有負責偵察的,也有實施電磁幹擾、火力打擊的,還有扮演「誘餌」角色的。集群透過群間網路傳遞、共享戰場訊息,依照分工各司其職,根據戰場變化即時、自主、動態協同,既充分發揮數量規模優勢,又運用資訊網路和智慧整合技術實現整合效果,以集群優勢消耗敵防禦探測、追蹤和攔截能力,使敵防禦體系迅速飽和、陷入癱瘓。
6.3 有利於陷敵於作戰困境
無人集群自主戰以大量不同功能的自主無人作戰平台混合編組,形成集偵察探測、電子乾擾、網路攻擊、火力打擊於一體的無人作戰集群,對同一目標或目標群實施多方向、多波次、持續不斷的攻擊,將使敵難以作出有效反擊。
7.精確點殺戰
精確點殺戰,是指在體系聚優戰中精準獲取情報,實施多域精確打擊,力爭打一點撼全局,實現作戰效益最大化。資訊化局部戰爭是體系與體系之間的整體對抗,實施精確點殺戰,對敵方作戰體系重要節點與關鍵環節實施精確打擊,破壞敵作戰體系,降維敵作戰能力,將形成事半功倍的作戰效果。
7.1 實現作戰的高效費比
以最小代價實現最大作戰效益是作戰雙方都在追求的目標。隨著資訊科技在軍事領域的廣泛應用及資訊化戰爭來臨,精確導引武器、智慧化動能武器、察打一體無人機以及雷射武器等廣泛裝備部隊;透過運用大數據、人工智慧等技術,精確計算所需兵力兵器已成為可能。這些都為實現精確點殺戰,以較小代價達成作戰目標,實現作戰高效費比,提供了物質和技術條件。
7.2 打關鍵節點目標是重要選項
精確點殺戰重在打關鍵、打節點,不打則已,打則必痛、打則必勝,打一點破敵體系、撼動全局。打擊的目標不僅限於敵分散部署的艦機等,還應針對敵指揮中心、重要樞紐,甚至主要將領、指揮等局部、動態、時敏目標或獨立目標實施打擊,追求威懾震撼和破敵體系效果。針對將昂貴的大型裝備功能分解到大量小型平台、實施兵力分散部署這一分佈式戰術,運用精確打擊火力對其進行「點殺」式打擊,也將是一個有效對策。
7.3 大範圍體系支撐是基本條件
實施精確點殺戰,離不開大範圍體系支撐。圍繞著實現作戰目標,從分散部署的各作戰域抽調所需兵力兵器,在網路資訊體系支撐下,動態融合形成精確打擊體系,實現整體連動、體系聚能,透過合理夠用的火力集中對目標實施打擊,達成精確用兵、精確釋能。實施精確點殺戰要做到精確,需要整個作戰體系內各環節緊密銜接,不能有絲毫差錯。 2011年美軍擊斃賓拉登作戰行動,可以說是戰略體系支撐下的一次典型的戰略精確點殺作戰行動。
7.4 離不開精確情報保障
在精確點殺戰中,精確情報保障始終是達成作戰目標的關鍵。因此,戰前應動用各種手段蒐集敵方各種情報資料信息,特別要對敵方目標作出精準分析研判。作戰行動中,應動用各種感測器和情報偵察手段,適時精準掌握敵方目標變化及動態目標狀況,為實施精確點殺戰提供有力有效的情報保障。美軍對蘇萊曼尼的定點清除行動,就是一場典型的以高效情報體系支撐的精確點殺戰。
8.補給斷鍊戰
補給斷鏈戰,是指在體系聚優戰中組織精銳力量,打敵後勤物資和裝備供應補給鏈、補給線和補給基地,破敵失去補給而退出戰鬥。針對敵後勤補給線長、裝備保障攤子大等弱點,組織精銳力量建構「斷鍊戰」作戰體系,對敵後勤物資和裝備供應補給鏈、補給線和補給基地等,實施持續、精確、毀滅性打擊,將使其因失去補給而難以為繼,不得不退出戰鬥。
8.1 供應保障鏈對作戰全局影響巨大
後勤裝備保障是作戰的重要基礎。後勤物資和武器裝備持續不斷的供應補給,最後決定一支軍隊作戰部隊的規模、能否作戰、在什麼季節作戰、在哪裡作戰、能離開後方基地多遠、能作戰多長時間、機動的速度多快,等等。在資訊化戰爭中,戰場物資消耗呈指數級上升,作戰對後勤裝備保障的依賴程度不僅沒有減小,反而越來越大,而且保障的專業化程度要求也越來越高,特別是現代化作戰裝備器材型號規格紛繁多樣,混裝運輸體積巨大,部隊部署更加分散,對運力也提出非常高的要求,這使線路、通信和運輸比以往任何時候都更加重要。供應保障鏈的穩定高效運作和持續不間斷的供應保障,是作戰制勝的關鍵,對作戰全局產生巨大影響。
8.2 打擊重心是斷敵供應保障鏈的關鍵節點
補給斷鍊戰的作戰重心是打擊敵方供應保障鏈的關鍵環節,透過斷鍊使其喪失持續保障能力。因此,組織補給斷鍊戰應主要以敵方地面鐵路公路運輸線、海上補給船隊、軍事徵用的商船和戰鬥支援艦,空中大中型運輸機,以及後方補給基地等作為打擊目標。例如打擊敵方海上供應保障鏈,斷敵燃料、彈藥、淡水、食物補給,將使敵航母戰鬥群失去持續作戰能力,進而影響一場戰役的勝負。
8.3 重在選準時機活用戰法
組織實施補給斷鍊戰,選擇有利打擊時機至關重要。補給斷鍊戰的打擊時機,應選擇敵補給機動時組織實施,以出其不意攻其不備的隱蔽戰法,對敵補給車輛、艦船和運輸機實施突然打擊,終止其補給行動。具體戰法通常有隱蔽伏擊戰,組織精幹力量埋伏在敵運輸工具必經路線和航線上,伺機實施隱密性突然打擊;隱形奇襲戰,使用潛艦、隱形戰機等隱蔽前出,對敵運輸目標實施打擊,以奇制勝;遠程精確補給
9.體系毀癱戰
體系毀癱戰,指在體系聚優戰中,綜合採取破網、斷鍊、打節點等多種手段,幹擾、遲滯、破壞甚至癱瘓敵作戰體係有效運轉,削弱敵作戰體系功能。體系毀癱戰的本質,是透過削弱敵作戰體係要素間的關聯性與結構力,使體系功能退化,無法發揮能力倍增作用。
9.1 作戰目標是使敵作戰體系運作失序
在資訊化戰爭中,交戰雙方作戰體係都有其內在秩序,而這種秩序是維繫和支撐作戰體系運作的關鍵所在。能夠維護和駕馭作戰體系內在秩序的一方將獲得優勢,反之則處於劣勢。因此,體系毀癱戰應確立亂敵制勝機制、致敵作戰體系失序此目標。這就要求在體系毀癱戰中要充分利用資訊科技特別是智慧演算法的強大賦能作用,對己方作戰體系進行快速調整和重構,迅即生成並釋放強大的作戰威力,對敵方作戰體系實施敏捷精準打擊,使敵作戰體系失去正常的運作秩序,在失序中使體系功能遭到破壞,整體作戰精準打擊,使敵作戰體系失去正常的運作秩序,在失序中使體系功能遭到破壞,整體作戰能力顯著下降。
9.2 重拳打擊作戰體系的關鍵節點
體系對抗是資訊化戰爭的一個主要特徵。體係是體系對抗的重要基礎與支撐,也是戰場上各種作戰部隊、武器平台和
資訊科技的發展及在軍事領域的廣泛滲透和應用,為建構整體實力、實現整體威懾提供了有利條件。體系聚優戰以網路資訊體系為支撐,充分利用資訊科技的滲透性和聯通性,不僅把各種作戰力量、作戰要素、作戰單元融合為一個有機整體,實現軍事上的體係作戰優勢,而且把國家政治、經濟、外交、金融、交通、能源等與戰爭和國家動員相關的各領域,都連接、匯入國家戰爭動員體系,凝聚各方面力量和資源形成整體合力,實現體系能力的湧現效應,從整體上顯示綜合實力優勢,形成眾志成城、同仇敵愾的強大無形威懾,塑造使敵「有力量但不能行動」「能行動但沒有效果」的態勢,起到遏制和打贏戰爭的作用。
在整體威懾戰中,國家戰爭動員的範圍將更加廣泛,不僅限於某一方向、區域,而是遍及全國各地,乃至世界有關地區;動員時間更加迅速,利用網絡和信息系統,動員和行動信息可在第一時間迅速傳達到每個人、每個節點;行動協調和協同更加一致,分佈在各域各地的各方力量可以基於同一態勢、根據同一命令幾乎在同一時間統一行動,極大提高行動協同效率;資源利用更加充分,基於網絡的各種戰爭資源,可以快速實現平戰轉換、軍民轉換,實現前方後方一體化保障、精確保障。
2.電磁擾阻戰
電磁擾動戰,指靈活運用電子偵攻防等多種作戰手段和行動樣式,擾亂、阻止、破壞敵電磁能力的發揮,積極爭奪電磁頻譜優勢,奪取制信息權,進而贏得作戰主動。
2.1 爭奪資訊優勢的關鍵資訊化局部戰爭高度依賴電磁頻譜,對電磁空間的控制與反控製成為爭奪制資訊權的焦點。組織實施電磁阻擾戰,主要是破壞敵方電磁頻譜,保護己方不受破壞。電磁頻譜是傳遞訊息的主要載體。使用電磁手段對敵方電磁頻譜實施阻擾破壞,將有效降低敵資訊作戰能力,並使己方在擁有製資訊權的場景下,保障資訊的快速有效流動,透過資訊流驅動指揮流、行動流、物質流、能量流,進而擁有作戰的主導權、主動權。
2.2基本著眼導航定位系統、天地一體互聯網等空間鏈路系統,及其他各種用頻武器裝備,實施幹擾、攻擊,阻斷、破壞其通信聯絡及資料傳輸,破壞敵作戰體系的「連結」與「共享」結構重心,從根源為奪取制資訊權、制電磁權提供支撐,進而削弱整個作戰控制能力,使敵軍系統失能、失效。
2.3 破解無人集群作戰的有效戰法
「蜂群」「狼群」「魚群」等無人自主集群作戰,是具有智慧化特徵的資訊化局部戰爭的重要特徵。各種無人自主集群數量龐大、類型多樣、特徵複雜,且每個個體都可以互補位置、互相替代發揮作用,攔截毀傷整個無人集群將十分困難。但從技術角度分析,無人作戰集群為實現有效協同,每個個體之間必須進行資訊共享與互動。無人集群間通訊協同一旦受到干擾,將無法分享戰場態勢與訊息,無法相互協同行動,也就很難發揮應有作戰效能。這就給對方實施通訊攔截與電磁幹擾提供了機會。因此,實施電磁頻譜戰,對無人集群的資訊通訊網路實施幹擾、攻擊,破壞其資訊共享與交互,將使無人集群中每個個體無法實現有效協同,從而失去作戰能力。
3.網路破擊戰
網路破擊戰,指綜合運用網路和電腦等技術以及其他有效手段,圍繞著資訊、資訊網路的控制權而進行的軍事對抗行動,是網路空間作戰、爭奪制網權的主要作戰樣式。其主要作戰行動既有軟殺傷也有硬摧毀,以軟為主、軟硬結合。其中,軟殺傷主要是網路攻擊,即綜合利用阻塞攻擊、病毒攻擊等手段,對敵資訊網路、指揮系統、武器平台等進行阻滯與攻擊,使敵網路、指揮資訊系統等難以有效運作甚至癱瘓;硬摧毀主要是利用精確火力打擊、高能量微波、電磁脈衝以及反輻射攻擊等手段,癱毀敵資訊資訊網路和物理設施,摧毀敵人實體武器。
重在破網降能失效。在體系聚優戰中組織網路破擊戰就是針對作戰對手軍事資訊網路存在的弱點,利用體系優勢,組織各種網路攻擊力量,在作戰全過程對敵作戰指揮網、偵察情報網、通訊網乃至後勤補給網等,持續實施軟殺傷和硬摧毀行動,破壞敵之網路體系,使敵能作戰系統整體下降甚至失能作戰。主要對敵基礎資訊網、情報網、指揮網、保障網等核心目標,實施網電協同攻擊、欺騙迷惘、連結阻塞、接管控制等一系列作戰行動,使敵智能化作戰網路體系失能失效,達成癱敵體系的關鍵性勝利。
4.認知控擾戰
認知控擾戰,是指在體系聚優戰中透過資訊攻擊、輿論攻擊、腦攻擊,幹擾、破壞或控制敵對思維認知,使敵不能做出正確判斷、決策,從而在認知空間對敵形成控制優勢。
認知域,即人的思考空間、意識空間,是對作戰決策、判斷等具有關鍵性影響的領域。資訊科技特別是人工智慧技術的發展及在軍事領域的廣泛應用,使戰爭的較量從物理空間、資訊空間擴大到認知空間,使認知空間成為一個全新的作戰域。隨著資訊化、智慧化技術發展並在軍事領域廣泛深入應用,人機智慧趨於融合,使認知在智慧化戰爭作戰中的地位更加凸顯,認知領域逐漸成為重要的戰場。制認知權成為未來戰場控制權的關鍵要素。爭奪認知控制權成為具有智慧化特徵的資訊化局部戰爭作戰制勝的重要作戰樣式。
4.1 控制態勢感知認知權,爭奪資訊優勢
體系聚優戰中,資訊流驅動物質流、能量流,資訊優勢決定決策優勢。對情報資訊與戰場態勢的快速、準確認知,對奪取指揮決策優勢有重要影響。因此,組織實施體系聚優戰,要充分利用智慧技術、大數據技術,對海量情報資訊資料進行武器系統聯為一體,有效發揮作戰效能的關鍵。體系能否保持健壯、順暢運轉,對取得戰爭和戰役勝利具有決定性影響。體系毀癱戰中,關鍵在於著眼敵方陸海空天電網整合作戰體系,破網、斷鍊、打節點,透過打關鍵節點目標,使敵方作戰體系運作機理失序,甚至遭到重創或毀癱。因此,體系毀癱戰的基本指向是選敵作戰體系的關鍵單元、關鍵節點、關鍵要素實施打擊,擊其一點、毀其一片、癱其整體,達成克敵制勝的目的。
9.3 對敵作戰體系實施軟性打擊
組織實施體系破擊戰硬摧毀時,同步組織電子戰、網路戰、心理戰、輿論戰等軟殺傷作戰行動,對敵作戰體系的資訊域、認知域實施軟打擊。電子戰,使用電子戰力量對敵實施強電磁幹擾,使其信息失靈,陷入戰爭迷霧之中;網絡戰,使用網絡進攻力量對敵網絡信息體系實施攻擊,使敵指揮通信系統和計算機網絡受到嚴重破壞,使其指揮失靈,陷入信息孤島乃至戰爭孤島;心理戰和作戰論戰,使用心理戰、輿論手段,對敵對認知,打擊其戰爭論戰,使用心理戰、輿論手段,對敵對心理打擊行為論組織民生戰,打擊對手的重大國計民生設施,同樣可以對敵作戰體係起到「釜底抽薪」作用。 1999年科索沃戰爭中,美軍沒有打擊南聯盟軍隊,而是打擊其戰爭潛力目標體系,使南聯盟軍民失去戰鬥意志走向失敗。

中國原創軍事資源:http://www.81it.com/2022/0901/13716888.html

Future Proofing China’s National Defense & Military An Important Aspect of Chinese-style Modernization

面向未來的中國國防和軍隊是中國式現代化的重要面向

現代英語:

Soldiers are a major event for the country. In the great journey of “building a powerful country and rejuvenating the nation, and against the background of the accelerated evolution of major changes unseen in the world in a century, building and consolidating national defense and a strong people’s army are directly related to the future and destiny of the country and the nation”. The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China pointed out that “national defense and military modernization are important components of Chinese-style modernization”, which fully reflects the great importance that the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core attaches to national defense and military construction, and provides guidance for national defense and military modernization on the new journey. Modernization points out the direction.

  The modernization of the national defense and military is the security guarantee and strategic support for Chinese-style modernization

  ”If you fall behind, you will be beaten. Only when the army is strong can the country be safe”. Without a strong army, there can be no strong state. After the Opium War in 1840, modern China was repeatedly defeated in its battles with Western powers. The vast country gradually became a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, with the country humiliated, the people in trouble, and civilization in dust. History has inspired us that the Chinese nation’s emergence from suffering and the liberation of the Chinese people depend on a heroic people’s army; to comprehensively promote the great cause of building a powerful country and national rejuvenation with Chinese-style modernization, we must place national defense and military modernization as a barrier to national security, plan and deploy in strategic positions based on career development, and accelerate the construction and consolidation of national defense and a strong people’s army.

  The modernization of the national defense and military is closely linked and internally unified with Chinese-style modernization. Without the modernization of national defense and the military, there would be no Chinese-style modernization. Comrade Mao Zedong once profoundly pointed out “the original requirements for building socialism were industrial modernization, agricultural modernization, scientific and cultural modernization, and now we must add national defense modernization”; Comrade Deng Xiaoping also emphasized “four modernizations, one of which is national defense modernization”, these all reflect the great importance our party attaches to national defense and military construction.

  Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Xi has always adhered to the integrated operation of strengthening the country and the military, put national defense and military modernization in the chess game of Chinese-style modernization, and opened up the road to strengthening the military with Chinese characteristics, forming a new strategy for national defense and military modernization by 2027, 2035, and the middle of this century, a new “three-step” strategy for national defense and military modernization that connects near, medium and long-term goals Created a new situation in the cause of strengthening the military. Guided by the party’s goal of strengthening the military in the new era, we will comprehensively implement the strategy of reforming and strengthening the military, promote the reform of the leadership and command system, the reform of scale structure and force organization, and the reform of military policies and systems. Our military’s organizational structure will achieve historic changes, and the force system will achieve revolutionary changes. Reshaping, the basic framework of the socialist military policy system with Chinese characteristics has been constructed and formed. Our military system has been completely new, its structure has been completely new, its pattern has been completely new, and its appearance has been completely new It has laid a solid foundation for the modernization of national defence and the army.

  Military means, as a means of guaranteeing the realization of great dreams, can only stop a war if it can be fought. The current and future periods are critical periods for comprehensively promoting the great cause of building a powerful country and rejuvenating the nation through Chinese-style modernization, and will inevitably encounter various risks, challenges and even turbulent waves. We must comprehensively modernize our national defense and military, build the People’s Army into a world-class military, effectively guarantee Chinese-style modernization, and safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests.

   Comprehensive and accurate grasp of the scientific connotation of national defense and military modernization

  Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Xi has issued a series of important expositions around “Chinese-style modernization”, summarizing the Chinese characteristics, essential requirements and major principles for the formation of Chinese-style modernization, building a theoretical system for Chinese-style modernization, and promoting the new era and new journey. Chinese-style modernization provides scientific guidance and also carries out strategic design and scientific deployment for national defense and military modernization.

  The most fundamental thing about modernizing the national defense and military is to uphold the absolute leadership of the party over the military. The leadership of the Party is the fundamental guarantee of Chinese-style modernization, which determines the fundamental nature of Chinese-style modernization, and it must also determine the fundamental nature of national defense and military modernization. To promote the modernization of national defense and the military on the new journey, we must fully implement a series of fundamental principles and systems for the party to lead the people’s army, comprehensively and thoroughly implement the chairman’s responsibility system of the Military Commission, and effectively unify thoughts and actions into the decisions and arrangements of the Party Central Committee and President Xi; Adhere to the party’s management of cadres and talents, and highlight political standards and combat capabilities Ensure that the barrel of the gun is always in the hands of those who are loyal and reliable to the party; improve the comprehensive and strict governance of the party system, enhance the political and organizational functions of party organizations at all levels, and integrate the party’s leadership throughout the entire process of continuing to deepen national defense and military reforms in all aspects.

  To modernize national defense and the military is to modernize military doctrine, military organization, military personnel, and weapons and equipment. This reflects the inherent requirements for the construction of military forces resulting from changes in the concept of victory in modern warfare, elements of victory and methods of victory, and clarifies the main signs of the basic realization of national defence and military modernization. To realize the modernization of military theory is to keep pace with the times, innovate war and strategic guidance, and form a military theoretical system that is contemporary, leading, and unique; to realize the modernization of organizational form is to deepen the reform of national defense and the military, and the military force structure layout is scientific and reasonable, strategic deterrence capabilities are consolidated and improved, new areas and new quality combat forces continue to grow, and elite operations, system support, and joint victory have become the basic application models; To realize the modernization of military personnel is to deeply implement the strategy of strengthening the military with talents in the new era, promote the comprehensive transformation and upgrading of military personnel’s capabilities, structural layout, and development management, and forge high-quality, professional new military talents with both ability and political integrity; to realize the modernization of weapons and equipment, It is necessary to focus on strengthening national defense scientific and technological innovation and accelerating the development of strategic, cutting-edge and disruptive technologies Accelerate the upgrading of weapons and equipment and the development of intelligent weapons and equipment.

  For the modernization of national defence and the military, we must adhere to the integrated development of mechanization, informatization and intelligence. The military conflicts and local wars that have taken place in recent years have shown that new qualitative combat capabilities generated based on intelligent combat systems are increasingly becoming core military capabilities. Based on mechanization, dominated by informatization, and oriented by intelligence, the three superimpose, penetrate, and support each other, jointly giving rise to new forms of warfare and methods of warfare. Only by accelerating the integrated development of mechanization, informatization and intelligence and keeping up with the new military revolutionary trends in the world can we seize the opportunity and take the initiative in seizing the commanding heights of the military struggle.

  The modernization of national defence and the army is a guarantee of security for insisting on the path of peaceful development. Since ancient times, soldiers have not been warlike. Chinese-style modernization is modernization on the path of peaceful development. Building a consolidated national defense and a strong military commensurate with international status and national security and development interests is a strategic task of China’s socialist modernization drive and an insistence on taking the path of peaceful development. Safety guarantee is an inevitable choice for summarizing historical experience. China has always pursued a defensive defence policy and adhered to the strategic idea of active defence, and no matter how far it develops, China will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion. To promote the modernization of national defense and the military on the “new journey”, we must faithfully implement the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind, resolutely oppose all forms of hegemony and bullying, and contribute China’s strength to building a beautiful world of lasting peace and universal security.

   Advancing the modernization of national defence and the military at a new historical starting point

  The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China included “continuous deepening of national defense and military reforms into the overall plan for further comprehensive deepening of reforms, and made a series of major strategic arrangements for improving the leadership and management system and mechanism of the people’s army, deepening the reform of the joint operations system, and deepening cross-military and civilian reforms”. On the new journey, we must deeply understand and grasp the themes, major principles, major measures, and fundamental guarantees for further comprehensively deepening reforms, resolutely implement the new “three-step” strategy for national defense and military modernization, and accelerate the modernization of military theory, military organizational form, and military personnel. Modernize and modernize weapons and equipment, and lead the modernization of national defense and the military to move forward with better strategies, higher efficiency, and faster speed.

  Strengthening the Party’s theoretical and scientific leadership in military guidance. Our party insists on combining the basic principles of Marxism with the practice of building the people’s army, absorbing the essence of China’s excellent traditional military culture, and constantly exploring new realms in the development of contemporary Chinese Marxist military theory and military practice. As an important part of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military has achieved a new leap forward in the Sinicization and modernization of Marxist military theory. It is the fundamental guiding ideology of our party building and military governance in the new era. We must unremittingly arm our minds with Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, further firmly establish the guiding position of Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military in national defense and military construction, and build and consolidate national defense and a strong people’s army under the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military. Take new and greater steps on the road to strengthening the military with Chinese characteristics.

  Efforts should be made to make the main responsibility and business of war preparation more solid and effective. The People’s Army is an armed group that performs the party’s political tasks. It must be both politically strong and capable. In the final analysis, this ability can win wars. To accelerate the modernization of national defense and the military, we must firmly grasp the fundamental direction of winning wars, establish the only fundamental standard of combat effectiveness, focus all our energy on fighting wars, and work hard on fighting wars. Conscientiously implement the military strategic policy for the new era, operate war preparation and cessation, deterrence and actual combat, war operations and the use of military forces in peacetime as a whole, innovate strategies, tactics and tactics, effectively shape the situation, manage crises, contain wars, and win wars. Adhere to the principle of “training troops as they fight, and comprehensively improve the actual combat level of military training and the ability to perform missions and tasks”.

  Promote high-quality development of national defense and military construction through “reform and innovation”. Reform is a key move that will determine the growth of our army and its future. On the new journey, we must put innovation at the core of the overall military construction and development, transform development concepts, innovate development models, enhance development momentum, and promote the transformation of national defense and military modernization from quantitative growth to qualitative improvement. Focus on integrating national defense and military construction into the national economic and social development system on a wider scale, at a higher level, and to a deeper extent, continuously improve the quality and efficiency of national defense and military modernization, promote the simultaneous improvement of national defense strength and economic strength, and consolidate and improve the integration National strategic system and capabilities, and constantly write a new chapter of strengthening the country and the military.

現代國語:

時間:2024年11月15日 08:20 來源:解放軍報
兵者,國之大事。在強國建設、民族復興偉大征程中,在世界百年未有之大變局加速演進的背景下,建構鞏固國防和強大人民軍隊直接關係國家和民族的前途命運。黨的二十屆三中全會指出,“國防和軍隊現代化是中國式現代化的重要組成部分”,充分體現了以習近平同志為核心的黨中央對國防和軍隊建設的高度重視,為新征程上國防和軍隊現代化建設指明了方向。

國防與軍隊現代化是中國式現代化的安全保障與戰略支撐

落後就要挨打,軍強才能國安。沒有一支強大的軍隊,就不可能有強大的國家。 1840年鴉片戰爭以後,近代中國在與西方列強的較量中屢屢戰敗,泱泱大國逐步淪為半殖民地半封建社會,國家蒙辱、人民蒙難、文明蒙塵。歷史啟示我們,中華民族走出苦難、中國人民實現解放,有賴於一支英雄的人民軍隊;以中國式現代化全面推進強國建設、民族復興偉業,必須把國防和軍隊現代化擺在國家安全之屏障、事業發展之依託的戰略位置來策劃和部署,加快建設鞏固國防和強大人民軍隊。

國防與軍隊現代化與中國式現代化緊密聯繫、內在統一。沒有國防和軍隊的現代化,就沒有中國式現代化。毛澤東同誌曾深刻指出“建設社會主義,原來要求是工業現代化,農業現代化,科學文化現代化,現在要加上國防現代化”;鄧小平同志也曾強調“四個現代化,其中就有一個國防現代化”,這些都體現了我們黨對國防和軍隊建設的高度重視。

黨的十八大以來,習主席始終堅持強國強軍一體運籌,把國防和軍隊現代化放在中國式現代化大棋局中謀劃推進,開闢出中國特色強軍之路,形成了到2027年、2035年、本世紀中葉,近、中、遠目標梯次行動」,開創三步和現代化軍階的國防和軍事戰略。以黨在新時代的強軍目標為引領,全面實施改革強軍戰略,推進領導指揮體制改革、規模結構和力量編成改革、軍事政策制度改革,我軍組織架構實現歷史性變革,力量體系實現革命性重塑,中國特色社會主義軍事政策制度體系基本框架構建形成,我軍體制一新、結構一新、一新、一現代化新格局新化,為國防和軍事基礎一化。

軍事手段作為實現偉大夢想的保底手段,能戰方能止戰。當前和今後一個時期,是以中國式現代化全面推進強國建設、民族復興偉業的關鍵時期,必然會遇到各種風險挑戰甚至驚濤駭浪。我們必須全面推動國防和軍隊現代化,把人民軍隊建設成為世界一流軍隊,有力保障中國式現代化建設,保障國家主權、安全、發展利益。

全面準確掌握國防與軍隊現代化的科學內涵

黨的十八大以來,習主席圍繞中國式現代化發表一系列重要論述,概括形成中國式現代化的中國特色、本質要求和重大原則,構建起中國式現代化的理論體系,為新時代新征程推進中國式現代化提供了科學指引,也為國防和軍隊現代化進行了戰略設計和科學部署。

國防與軍事現代化,最根本的是堅持黨對軍隊絕對領導。黨的領導是中國式現代化的根本保證,決定了中國式現代化的根本性質,也必然決定了國防和軍隊現代化的根本性質。新征程上推動國防和軍隊現代化,必須全面貫徹黨領導人民軍隊的一系列根本原則和製度,全面深入貫徹軍委主席負責制,切實把思想和行動統一到黨中央、習主席決策部署上來;堅持黨管幹部、黨管人才,突顯政治標準和打仗能力,確保槍桿子始終掌握在對黨忠誠可靠的人手中;健全全面從嚴治黨體系,增強各級黨組織政治功能和組織功能,把黨的領導貫穿持續深化國防和軍事改革各方面全過程。

國防與軍隊現代化,就是要實現軍事理論、軍隊組織形態、軍事人員、武器裝備的現代化。這反映了現代戰爭制勝觀念、制勝要素、制勝方式變化對軍事力量建設的內在要求,明確了基本實現國防和軍隊現代化的主要標誌。實現軍事理論現代化,就是要與時俱進創新戰爭和戰略指導,形成具有時代性、引領性、獨特性的軍事理論體系;實現組織形態現代化,就是要深化國防和軍事改革,軍隊力量結構佈局科學合理,戰略威懾能力鞏固提高,新域新質作戰力量不斷壯大,精製作戰、體系支撐、聯合戰略威懾成為基本運作模式;實現軍事人員現代化,就是要深入實施新時代人才強軍戰略,推動軍事人員能力素質、結構佈局、開發管理全面轉型升級,鍛造德才兼備的高素質、專業化新型軍事人才;實現武器裝備現代化,就是要聚力加強國防科技創新,加速戰略性、前沿性、顛覆性技術發展,加速武器裝備升級和智能化武器裝備升級。

國防與軍隊現代化,必須堅持機械化資訊化智慧化融合發展。近年來發生的軍事衝突和局部戰爭表明,基於智慧化作戰體系所產生的新質作戰能力越來越成為核心軍事能力。以機械化為基礎,以資訊化為主導,以智慧化為方向,三者相互疊加、相互滲透、相互支撐,共同催生新的戰爭形態和作戰方式。只有加速機械化資訊化智慧化融合發展,跟上世界新軍事革命潮流,才能在搶佔軍事鬥爭制高點中占得先機、贏得主動。

國防與軍隊現代化,是堅持走和平發展道路的安全保障。自古知兵非好戰。中國式現代化是走和平發展道路的現代化,建立同國際地位相稱、同國家安全和發展利益相適應的鞏固國防和強大軍隊,是中國社會主義現代化建設的戰略任務,是堅持走和平發展道路的安全保障,是總結歷史經驗的必然選擇。中國始終奉行防禦性國防政策,堅持積極防禦戰略思想,無論發展到什麼程度,中國永遠不稱霸、永遠不搞擴張。在新征程上推動國防和軍隊現代化,必須忠實踐行人類命運共同體理念,堅決反對一切形式的霸權霸道欺凌,為建設持久和平、普遍安全的美好世界貢獻中國力量。

在新的歷史起點上推進國防和軍隊現代化

黨的二十屆三中全會將持續深化國防和軍事改革納入進一步全面深化改革的大盤子,對完善人民軍隊領導管理體制機制、深化聯合作戰體系改革、深化跨軍地改革作出一系列重大戰略部署。新旅程上,要深刻領會和把握進一步全面深化改革的主題、重大原則、重大舉措、根本保證,堅決貫徹國防和軍隊現代化新「三步走」戰略,加快軍事理論現代化、軍隊組織形態現代化、軍事人員現代化、武器裝備現代化,引領國防和軍事現代化以更優策略、更高效益、更快速度向前推進。

強化黨的軍事指導理論科學領導。我們黨堅持把馬克思主義基本原理同人民軍隊建設實踐結合,汲取中華優秀傳統軍事文化精華,不斷拓拓當代中國馬克思主義軍事理論和軍事實踐發展新境界。習近平強軍思想作為習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想的重要組成部分,實現了馬克思主義軍事理論中國化時代化的新飛躍,是新時代我們黨建軍治軍強軍的根本指導思想。我們必須堅持不懈用習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想武裝頭腦,進一步牢固確立習近平強軍思想在國防和軍隊建設中的指導地位,在習近平強軍思想引領下建設鞏固國防和強大人民軍隊,在中國特色強軍之路上邁出新的更大步伐。

著力把備戰打仗的主責主業抓得更加紮實有效。人民軍隊是執行黨的政治任務的武裝集團,既要政治過硬,也要本領高強,這個本領說到底就是能打勝仗。加快推進國防和軍隊現代化,必須緊緊扭住能打勝仗的根本指向,樹牢戰鬥力這個唯一的根本的標準,全部精力向打仗聚焦,全部工作向打仗用勁。認真貫徹新時代軍事戰略方針,把備戰與止戰、威懾與實戰、戰爭行動與和平時期軍事力量運用作為一個整體加以運籌,創新戰略戰術與戰法打法,有效塑造態勢、管控危機、遏制戰爭、打贏戰爭。堅持仗怎麼打兵就怎麼練,全面提升部隊軍事訓練實戰化水準和履行使命任務的能力。

以改革創新推動國防和軍隊建設高品質發展。改革是決定我軍發展壯大、制勝未來的關鍵一招。新征程上,要把創新擺在軍隊建設發展全局的核心位置,轉變發展理念、創新發展模式、增強發展動能,推動國防和軍隊現代化由量的成長轉向質的提升。著力在更廣範圍、更高層次、更深程度上將國防和軍隊建設融入國家經濟社會發展體系之中,不斷提高國防和軍隊現代化質量效益,促進國防實力和經濟實力同步提升,鞏固提高一體化國家戰略體系和能力,不斷書寫強國強軍新篇章。

中國原創軍事資源:https://www.mva.gov.cn/sy/zt/zt1/xxgcddsjdjs/qwjd/202411/t20241120_453942888.html

Chinese Military Adhering to Integrated Development of Mechanization, Informatization & Intelligence

中國軍隊堅持機械化、資訊化、智慧化融合發展

現代英語:

Adhere to the integrated development of mechanized informatization and intelligence

——Seriously study, publicize and implement the spirit of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China

The report to the 20th CPC National Congress emphasized “upholding the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligence,” elevating the requirement for the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligence (hereinafter referred to as the “three modernizations”) to a new strategic level. To thoroughly study, publicize, and implement the spirit of the 20th CPC National Congress and strive to achieve the goals of the PLA’s centenary, we must focus on understanding and grasping the primary characteristics, profound mechanisms, basic principles, and strategic measures of the integrated development of the “three modernizations,” and effectively promote their implementation.

Recognize the main characteristics of the integrated development of the “three transformations”

Mechanization, informatization, and intelligence are progressive and interdependent. From a chronological perspective, the three transformations did not originate simultaneously. Without the prerequisites and foundations of the previous transformations, the subsequent transformations could not occur and develop. For example, without mechanization, there would be no informatization. Informatization requires the physical substance provided by mechanization. Without mechanized combat platforms and ammunition as carriers of information nodes, the “connectivity” of informatization would be lost. Informatization is the nucleus of intelligence. Without the sufficient computing power and data provided by advanced informatization, the next generation of artificial intelligence cannot achieve the chain breakthroughs it promises. Without a solid foundation of mechanization, a military cannot advance informatization, and without a solid foundation of mechanization and informatization, it cannot effectively advance intelligence.

Based on this understanding, it’s difficult to leapfrog mechanization and informatization to embrace intelligence. Generally speaking, the latter can only replace the former in specific areas, not completely replace or surpass it. If the foundation of the former’s core technologies, foundational areas, and key stages is not solid, bottlenecks and shortcomings will be difficult to address quickly. Not only will these bottlenecks be difficult to address with the latter, but their weak foundation will also hinder the latter’s development, hindering overall development. If we skip mechanization and informatization and shift our focus entirely to intelligence, haste may lead to failure.

Mechanization, informatization, and intelligence will overlap and coexist for a long time. The term “basic mechanization” generally refers to the fact that mechanization has reached a late stage of development, with its contribution to combat effectiveness having already experienced diminishing returns. Further investment in mechanization will significantly reduce the cost-effectiveness. This does not mean that there will be no more mechanization construction tasks; it simply means that the proportion of investment in informatization and intelligence will gradually decrease compared to informatization and intelligence. Informatization is not the end of mechanization; a certain degree of mechanization will continue during the informatization process. Similarly, intelligence is not the end of mechanization and informatization; a certain degree of informatization and mechanization will continue during the intelligence process. Each of the “three transformations” is only a construction focus for a specific historical period; no one “transformation” is exclusive to any given period.

Based on this understanding, we cannot pursue a “starting from scratch” approach, overthrowing mechanization and informatization in favor of intelligentization. The “three transformations” cannot be viewed in isolation. They are meant to be inclusive, integrated, and mutually exclusive, not selective. The subsequent transformation does not negate or terminate the previous one, nor does it mean discarding the achievements of the previous one and starting over with a new one. We must ensure a smooth transition and gradual upgrade of the combat system from mechanization to informatization and then to intelligentization. Taking intelligentization as an example, intelligentization does not mean completely overthrowing the existing informatized combat system and establishing a completely new, independent intelligent combat system.

Intelligent informationization uses the virtual to control the real, empowering and increasing efficiency in mechanization. The “real” here primarily refers to “hardware,” represented by physical entities such as combat platforms and ammunition, while the “virtual” primarily refers to “software,” centered around combat data and algorithms. While mechanization primarily relies on hardware development, informationization and intelligentization primarily rely on software development, optimizing and upgrading hardware and increasing its efficiency through software. In terms of development priorities, payloads surpass platforms, software surpasses payloads, and algorithms surpass software. Software costs in informationization and intelligentization far exceed hardware costs.

Based on this understanding, we must not pursue development that prioritizes hardware over software or creates a disconnect between the virtual and the real. In the era of intelligence, if the supporting software and core algorithms that serve as the “brains” of weapons and equipment lag behind, even the highest hardware performance indicators will be merely “inflated,” and it will be difficult to realize its combat potential in actual combat. Military combat practice demonstrates that in the era of intelligence, we should prioritize the development of general-purpose chips and core algorithms for military intelligence technology from the outset to avoid being caught in a passive position.

Clarify the profound mechanism of the integrated development of the “three transformations”

The integrated development of the “three transformations” is not a simple mixing, combination, or compounding of the “three transformations,” but rather a process of mutual inclusion, mutual penetration, and mutual promotion. From “you are you, I am me” to “you are in me, I am in you,” and then to “you are me, I am you,” achieving a seamless blend and unity, generating cumulative, aggregate, and multiplier effects, and achieving a qualitative leap in overall combat effectiveness. The integrated development of the “three transformations” primarily follows the following mechanisms:

Advantage-overlaying mechanism. Whether mechanization, informatization, or intelligentization, the supporting technology clusters for each “transformation” will give rise to a series of new weaponry and equipment, generate new combat forces, and ultimately form new combat capabilities with different operational mechanisms. The combined advantages of these new combat capabilities with existing combat capabilities can produce a systemic emergence effect, greatly enhancing the overall combat capability of the military; it can enrich one’s own combat means, methods, and approaches, and put the enemy in a dilemma of multiple difficulties.

Upgrade and expansion mechanism. Informatization, through the digital transformation and networking of various mechanized combat platforms, aggregates and upgrades mechanized combat systems into informationized combat systems, resulting in a qualitative leap in combat effectiveness. Intelligence can also be integrated with mechanization and informatization through upgrades and expansions. On the one hand, intelligent technologies are used to upgrade the control systems of mechanized combat platforms, continuously enhancing the autonomous combat capabilities of individual weapons and equipment. On the other hand, intelligent technologies are used to optimize and upgrade informationized combat systems, significantly enhancing their capabilities in information acquisition, transmission, processing, sharing, and security, and comprehensively improving the combat capabilities of the system.

A mechanism for addressing shortcomings and replacing them. The history of military development shows that as a particular “industry” develops, it often encounters bottlenecks that are difficult to resolve with its own technological system alone. This necessitates the urgent need for innovative solutions using the technical means and development strategies of other “industries.” Currently, machinery is becoming increasingly sophisticated and complex, making its design and control increasingly difficult. Informatization has led to an “information explosion,” making it increasingly difficult to quickly translate this information into decision-making information. These problems are difficult to effectively address within the technological systems of mechanization and informatization alone. However, the application of intelligent technology can effectively overcome bottlenecks in mechanical control and information processing capabilities. Furthermore, technological breakthroughs in the first “industry” can offset the shortcomings of the second. For example, hypersonic missiles can outpace the response capabilities of networked and informationized defense systems, enabling rapid penetration, which to some extent offsets an adversary’s information advantage.

Grasp the basic principles of the integrated development of the “three transformations”

In promoting the integrated development of the “three transformations”, we should focus on the following basic principles:

The principle of mutual promotion and symbiosis. Each “transformation” differs fundamentally in its combat effectiveness generation mechanisms and development goals. The simultaneous and parallel development of the three transformations presents both favorable conditions for mutual enhancement, mutual promotion, and mutual support, but also unfavorable factors such as competition over development areas, resource allocation, and investment volume. We must ensure that the three transformations form a healthy symbiotic relationship within the overall development process, avoiding conflicts, frictions, and constraints that could lead to a situation where 1+1+1 is less than 3, and strive to achieve systemic emergence and synergistic effects.

The principle of overall coordination. The importance of the “three transformations” is not ranked in order of importance. We should not emphasize one at the expense of the others. Instead, the three transformations should be considered as a system, coordinated and advanced as a whole. While informatization and intelligentization appear more advanced and complex, we should not assume that mechanization is low-end, simple, and easy to implement, or that the importance of mechanization can be ignored with the advent of informatization and intelligentization. On the one hand, if mechanization is not fully implemented, it will hinder progress and become a bottleneck restricting overall development. Similarly, without the sufficient computing power and data provided by full informatization, the next generation of artificial intelligence cannot achieve a series of breakthroughs. On the other hand, mechanization also has high-end cutting-edge fields such as hypersonic aircraft and deep-sea submersibles that can have a disruptive effect.

The principle of prioritizing key areas. Total investment in national defense and military development is limited. Given a relatively fixed overall budget, investing more in one area will inevitably result in less investment in others. We should accurately assess the contribution of each area to combat effectiveness over the coming period, identify the area that will most significantly increase combat effectiveness as the priority for development, rationally allocate resources in a prioritized manner, and scientifically determine the direction and amount of investment. Failure to prioritize the development of the “three areas” and applying a “sprinkle pepper” approach to each area can easily result in a low input-output ratio and may even cause military development to stray from its correct trajectory.

Strengthening strategic measures for the integrated development of “three transformations”

In practice, we should strive to change the inertial thinking of relying on latecomer advantages and unconsciously falling into the habit of following development, strive to get out of the passive catch-up development model, and turn to the pursuit of concurrent advantages and first-mover advantages. We should develop intelligence on the basis of existing mechanization and informatization, and at the same time use intelligence to drive mechanization and informatization to a higher level. We should use the integrated development of the “three transformations” as a powerful engine to promote the transformation and development of the military and achieve a comprehensive leap in the overall construction level.

We must effectively strengthen top-level design and overall coordination for the integrated development of the “three transformations.” We must fully recognize the long-term, complex, and arduous nature of the integrated development of the “three transformations,” adhere to the unity of technological and conceptual integration, and avoid simply applying the existing mechanization and informatization construction model to the integrated development of the “three transformations.” We must also avoid generalization and labeling of the “three transformations.” We must strengthen top-level design and overall coordination with strong organizational leadership, streamline multiple relationships, pool the strengths of all parties, and create a positive synergy.

Proactively plan key areas for the integrated development of the three transformations. First, address areas where one transformation affects and constrains the development of others. Quickly identify technical bottlenecks within each transformation, compile a list of these bottlenecks, and increase investment in focused research to address these shortcomings as quickly as possible. Second, address areas where one transformation could potentially offset the achievements of others. During the integrated development of the three transformations, even after one has become dominant, we should still prioritize developing new operational mechanisms within the others, potentially disrupting the strategic balance and generating disruptive impacts, potentially even offsetting the achievements of the others. Third, address areas where the three transformations intersect and intersect. The “edge zones, intersections, and junctions” of the three transformations are also crucial for rapidly generating new qualitative combat capabilities. Currently, we should particularly proactively plan for areas such as “ubiquitous network plus” and “artificial intelligence plus.”

(Author’s unit: Academy of Military Science, Institute of War Studies)

中國軍網 國防部網
2022年11月10日 星期四

現代國語:

黨的二十大報告強調“堅持機械化信息化智能化融合發展”,把機械化信息化智能化(以下簡稱“三化”)融合發展要求提升到新的戰略高度。深入學習宣傳貫徹黨的二十大精神,奮力實現建軍一百年奮鬥目標,應著力認清把握「三化」融合發展的主要特徵、深刻機理、基本原則和戰略舉措,切實推動「三化」融合發展落地落實。

認清「三化」融合發展的主要特徵

機械化資訊化智能化逐次遞進有序依存。從時序來看,「三化」不是同時起源的,沒有前一「化」作為前提和基礎,就沒有後一「化」的發生和發展。例如,沒有機械化就沒有資訊化。資訊化建設需要機械化建設提供物理實體,沒有機械化作戰平台和彈藥作為資訊節點的載體,資訊化的「聯」就失去了物件。資訊化是智慧化的孕育母體。沒有高度資訊化提供足夠的算力和數據,新一代人工智慧也不可能產生鍊式突破。一支軍隊沒有一定的機械化基礎,就無法推進資訊化,沒有一定的機械化資訊化基礎,也無法很好地推進智慧化。

基於這個認識,我們難以跨越機械化資訊化直接擁抱智慧化。通常說來,後一「化」對前一「化」只有在個別領域可以替代,而不可能全局替代或全面跨越。如果前一「化」的核心技術、基礎領域和關鍵階段的「底子」打得不牢,出現瓶頸和短板時將無法在短時間內彌補,不但難以被後一「化」解決,反而會因基礎不牢影響後一「化」發展,進而拖累整體發展。如果跳過機械化、資訊化,把建設重點全面轉向智慧化,可能欲速則不達。

機械化資訊化智能化相互​​交疊長期並存。通常所說的基本實現機械化,意思是機械化發展到後期,其戰鬥力貢獻已經產生了邊際遞減效應,繼續加大機械化投入,效費比將大大降低。但這並不意味著此後就沒有任何機械化建設任務了,只是與資訊化、智慧化相比對其投入比重將逐步降低。資訊化不是機械化的終結,資訊化過程中還有一定的機械化,智能化也不是機械化、資訊化的終結,智能化過程中還有一定的資訊化、機械化。 「三化」中的每一「化」都只是某一歷史時期的建設重點,不存在某一時期被某一「化」排他性獨佔的情況。

基於這個認識,我們不能搞推翻機械化資訊化,專搞智慧化的「另起爐灶」式發展。不能以割裂的觀點看待“三化”,“三化”是“三合一”式的兼容並蓄,不是“三選一”式的互斥排他。後一「化」不是對前一「化」的否定和終結,不是摒棄前一「化」所取得的發展成果推倒重來另搞一套,必須確保作戰體係由機械化到資訊化再到智能化的平滑過渡和漸進升級。以智慧化為例,智慧化絕不是顛覆性地推倒原有資訊化作戰體系,另建一個全新的獨立的智慧化作戰體系。

智慧化資訊化對機械化以虛控實、賦能增效。這裡所說的“實”主要是指以作戰平台、彈藥等物理實體為代表的“硬體”,“虛”主要是指以作戰數據、演算法等為核心的“軟體”。機械化以硬體建置為主,資訊化和智慧化則以軟體建置為主,透過軟體對硬體進行最佳化升級和賦能增效。在建置優先順序上,載重超越平台、軟體超越載重、演算法超越軟體,資訊化和智慧化建設中的軟體成本遠超硬體成本。

基於這個認識,我們不能搞「重硬輕軟」或「虛實脫節」式發展。進入智能化時代,如果作為武器裝備“大腦”的配套軟體和核心演算法落後,其硬體性能指標再高都只是“虛高”,實戰中很難發揮出作戰潛能。軍事鬥爭實踐表明,進入智慧化時代,應在一開始就注重軍事智慧技術的通用晶片和核心演算法研發,避免陷入被動。

明晰「三化」融合發展的深刻機理

「三化」融合發展,不是「三化」簡單的混合、化合或複合,而是相互包容、相互滲透、相互促進。從“你是你、我是我”變成“你中有我、我中有你”,進而變成“你就是我、我就是你”,達到水乳交融、合而為一的程度,並產生疊加效應、聚合效應和倍增效應,實現整體戰鬥力質的躍升。 「三化」融合發展主要遵循以下機制:

優勢疊加機理。不管是機械化、資訊化或智慧化,每一「化」的支援技術群都會催生出一系列新型武器裝備,產生新型作戰力量,最終形成具有不同作戰機理的新質作戰能力。這些新質作戰能力與原有作戰能力綜合運用優勢疊加,能夠產生系統湧現效應,大大提升軍隊整體作戰能力;能夠豐富己方作戰手段、作戰方式和方法,使敵方陷入顧此失彼的多重困境。

升級拓展機理。資訊化透過對各類機械化作戰平台進行數位化改造和網路化鏈接,將機械化作戰體系聚合升級為資訊化作戰體系,催生戰鬥力產生質的飛躍。智慧化也可透過升級拓展方式,與機械化、資訊化融為一體。一方面,運用智慧技術升級機械化作戰平台的操控系統,不斷提升其單件武器裝備的自主作戰能力。另一方面,運用智慧技術優化升級資訊化作戰體系,使其資訊取得、傳輸、處理、共享、安全等能力均大幅增強,體係作戰能力全面提升。

補短替代機理。從軍隊建設歷史來看,某一「化」在深化發展過程中,往往會出現僅靠自身技術體系難以解決的瓶頸問題,迫切需要其他「化」的技術手段和發展思路另闢蹊徑來解決。目前,機械越來越精密複雜,設計和控制難度越來越大;資訊化導致“資訊爆炸”,快速轉化為決策資訊的難度越來越大,這些問題在機械化、資訊化自身技術體系內難以得到有效解決,而運用智慧技術可有效突破機械操控能力、資訊處理能力的瓶頸。此外,前一「化」所產生的技術突破也可能抵消後一「化」的不​​足。如高超音波飛彈速度可以超出網路化資訊化防禦體系的反應能力實現快速突防,這在一定程度上抵消了對手的資訊優勢。

掌握「三化」融合發展的基本原則

在推動「三化」融合發展過程中,應著重於以下基本原則:

互促共生原則。各「化」在戰鬥力生成機制、建設發展目標等方面有著本質不同,「三化」同時並行發展,既存在著相互提升、相互促進、相互支撐的有利條件,也可能存在著發展領域方向、資源投向投量之爭等不利因素。應確保「三化」在建設全局形成良性共生關係,避免相互衝突、摩擦、掣肘造成1+1+1<3的不良後果,力求產生系統湧現及協同效應。

整體協調原則。 “三化”的重要性並不分高下,不能只強調某一“化”,而忽視其他“化”,應把“三化”視為一個體系整體協調推進。雖然資訊化、智慧化似乎更為高級和複雜,但不能認為機械化就是低端、簡單和易於實現的,或者說有了資訊化和智慧化,機械化的重要性就可以忽略。一方面,如果機械化完成度不高,就會拖後腿,成為限制整體發展的瓶頸。同樣,沒有充分資訊化後提供的足夠算力和數據,新一代人工智慧也不可能產生鍊式突破。另一方面,機械化也存在高超音波速飛行器、深海潛水器等可產生顛覆性效果的高端前緣領域。

突出重點原則。國防和軍隊建設的總投入是有限的,在「大盤子」相對固定的情況下,在某一「化」上投入得多,必然在其他「化」上投入得少。應準確評估今後一段時期每一「化」對戰力的貢獻率,把最能提升戰鬥力增量的一「化」確定為建設重點,有主有次地合理分配資源,科學確定投向投量。 「三化」建設重點不突出,對各「化」建設採取「撒胡椒麵」式平均用力,容易造成投入產出比不高,甚至可能導致軍隊建設偏離正確的發展方向。

強化「三化」融合發展的策略性舉措

實踐中,應努力轉變依賴後發優勢、不自覺陷入跟隨發展的慣性思維,努力走出被動追趕的發展模式,轉向追求並發優勢、先發優勢,在現有機械化和信息化基礎上來發展智能化,同時用智能化牽引機械化和信息化向更高層次發展,把“三化”集成發展作為軍隊發展的強躍水平,實現整體建設的整體水平的全面建設。

切實加強「三化」融合發展的頂層設計和統籌協調。應充分認識「三化」融合發展的長期性複雜性艱鉅性,堅持技術融合與理念融合相統一,防止簡單套用機械化資訊化原有建設模式抓「三化」融合發展,避免「三化」融合被「泛化」和「貼標籤」。應以強而有力的組織領導加強頂層設計和統籌協調,理順多重關係,匯聚各方力量,形成正向合力。

前瞻佈局「三化」融合發展重點領域。一是某一「化」影響限制其他「化」發展的短板弱項領域。盡快整理各「化」中的技術瓶頸,拉出「卡脖子」技術清單,並加大投入集中攻關,盡快補齊短板。二是某一「化」可能抵銷其他「化」建設成果的質變顛覆領域。在「三化」融合發展過程中,當某一「化」成為主導後,仍應高度注重發展其他「化」中採用新的作戰機理,可能打破戰略平衡並產生顛覆性影響,甚至可能在一定程度上抵消其他「化」建設成果的技術領域。三是「三化」相互交叉鄰接領域。 「三化」的「邊緣帶、交叉點、接合部”,同樣也是快速催生新質戰鬥力的重要領域,當前尤其應前瞻佈局「泛在網路+」和「人工智慧+」等領域。

(作者單位:軍事科學學院戰爭研究院)

中國軍網 國防部網
2022年11月10日 星期四

中國原創軍事資源:http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/4926673.html

Advantages, Prospects of Multi-domain Integration & Cross-domain Attack and Defense

多域融合與跨域攻防的優勢與前景

現代英語:

“Multi-domain fusion operations” and “cross-domain collaborative operations” are the latest operational ideas proposed by the US military in recent years, guiding the gradual upgrade and evolution of the US military’s combat concepts to joint concepts, and building a new war style based on this, covering all combat fields such as “land, sea, air, space, and network”, and integrating various capabilities such as space, network, deterrence, transportation, electromagnetic spectrum, and missile defense. Through this new combat idea, we can compete with competitors such as Russia in various fields, develop asymmetric advantages, and ensure the leading position of our country’s military strength. What advantages do multi-domain fusion operations and cross-domain offense and defense have in actual combat, and what are their development prospects?

The evolution of the concept of global warfare

After the mid-1970s, the U.S. Army successively proposed combat concepts such as “central combat”, “expanded battlefield” and “integrated battlefield”, forming the “air-ground integrated combat” combat theory. Air-ground integrated combat requires the coordination and unity of ground forces and the air force, and conducts deep operations on the basis of the air force’s battlefield air interdiction and offensive air support. For the first time, the combat concept of multi-service coordinated operations appeared, and this combat theory was also tested in actual combat in the Gulf War. This is the starting point for the birth of the concept of multi-domain warfare and even global warfare.

On October 3, 2016, at the annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army, General David G. Perkins, then commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, delivered a public speech in which he used the word “domain” for the first time to accurately summarize the new form of international warfare, and put forward the view that “all domains of the United States are challenged” and “advantages in a single domain cannot win the war”, and then introduced the concept of “multi-domain combat”. The operational concept of “multi-domain combat” requires close cooperation between the combat forces of various services, abandoning the inertia of the service thinking of pursuing control in a single domain, and providing a “multi-domain solution” for the national command authorities.

In October 2018, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command issued the 1.5 version of the concept of “U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations 2028”. As the most mature version of the concept, it replaced the original word “battle” with “operation” and extended the concept of “multi-domain combat”. The concept of “multi-domain combat” is only applicable to the conflict stage, but in the case that the competition between nation states has become a new factor in the world situation, simply winning the actual conflict has very limited significance for the overall combat background, so the concept of “multi-domain” must be extended and deepened. The concept of “multi-domain combat” introduces relevant cross-government and cross-institutional elements into the “competition continuum” of “competition, armed conflict and return to competition”, and puts forward the three core concepts of “calibrating force posture, using multi-domain formations, and achieving multi-domain aggregation” in “multi-domain warfare”, clarifies the specific needs of “multi-domain formations”, and refines the corresponding combat capabilities that troops at different levels need to have in “multi-domain warfare”.

“Cross-domain coordination” refers to the mutual cooperation of various services to make up for the deficiencies of other forces in combat, thereby achieving complementary efficiency in various fields and successfully completing combat missions. Guided by the basic ideas of multi-domain integration and cross-domain coordination, the US military has formed the concept of “full-domain warfare”, that is, to develop the joint combat capabilities of various services throughout the entire process of combat and training, and realize the transformation of the army into a joint combat force.

The advantages of all-domain operations are obvious

Judging from the current international military development situation, countries will face an increasingly complex, deadly, extremely active, and urbanized battlefield. The combat environment is becoming increasingly fragile, and the combat mode of the traditional battlefield is no longer applicable to contemporary warfare. Against this background, the US military has proposed the concept of full-domain warfare in order to cope with the increasingly complex international environment. What are the advantages of multi-domain warfare and cross-domain attack and defense on the modern battlefield?

Multi-domain integration enables the advantages of different arms to overlap and their disadvantages to complement each other. The predecessor of multi-domain warfare, “Air-Land Integrated Warfare”, was a combat style of joint operations between the Air Force and the Army that the U.S. military attempted to establish in the early 1980s in response to the huge threat posed by Soviet tank clusters to NATO on the European plains. This combat mode requires a high degree of coordination between ground forces and air forces. Ground forces conduct offensive mobile defense operations on the front line, while the Air Force blocks the replenishment of front-line forces by striking the enemy’s rear, thereby providing tactical support to the front-line army. This is also the first time in the history of the U.S. military that the Air Force and the Army have conducted in-depth cooperation, which has increased the complexity and flexibility of the U.S. military’s operations, made the U.S. military’s tactical options richer and more dynamic, and posed a greater strategic deterrence to the enemy.

On the other hand, cross-domain attack and defense can expand asymmetric advantages and impose greater restrictions on the enemy’s power. Since the concept of cross-domain attack and defense emphasizes the coordination of offensive and defensive forces in different fields, during the battle, the army can exert greater pressure on the enemy through its own advantageous fields, making it difficult for the enemy’s power to be maximized, thereby expanding the asymmetric advantage, maximizing its own strength and weakening the enemy’s power. In recent years, all countries have attached great importance to the technical development and research in the field of network electromagnetics. To some extent, this is because the field of network electromagnetics is a new product that came with the information age. Emerging powers that try to catch up with old powers can establish their own advantages through the development of this field, while old powers do not want to be overtaken and have fields that can be used as weaknesses by the enemy. Therefore, all countries have unanimously regarded the research and development of the field of network electromagnetics as one of their current key areas of development, which also reflects the great power of cross-domain attack and defense in modern information-based intelligent warfare.

Global war has broad prospects for development

At present, the concept of “global warfare” only has a theoretical basis, and it still takes a lot of effort to convert theory into practice. The vice chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff clearly stated in an interview: “The seamless integration of various fields and effective command and control are still a daunting challenge. We are not sure how to do it, and no one has a ready-made answer.”

In the process of achieving true joint operations, there are obstacles in various aspects, including culture, economy, and politics. These problems will affect the establishment of truly joint combat forces and joint combat modes. First, each service has formed its own unique combat style and combat culture in the long-term development process. The differences in the culture of different services may lead to different concepts of combat focus on the construction of joint combat forces, which in turn leads to unclear directions and goals for force construction. Secondly, the budget for military construction is limited, and each service will try its best to use it for the update and research and development of its own weapons and equipment, resulting in the budget giving priority to meeting the needs of each service rather than joint combat needs. Finally, it is difficult for the Ministry of National Defense to obtain the power of integrated government and allies. “Cross-domain coordination” is a game of national comprehensive power, which includes politics, economy, diplomacy, intelligence and other aspects. It requires the coordination and coordination of government agencies in various fields of the country, and relying solely on the Ministry of National Defense does not have enough power to achieve the integration of various forces.

These issues all affect the development of “all-domain warfare”, but in any case, as a new combat concept, “all-domain warfare” will surely become an important mode of future combat. The United States released the “Joint All-Domain Combat Software” in April this year, aiming to develop theater-level joint all-domain combat software to allocate combat resources and achieve coordinated killing in the fields of land, sea, air, space, and electromagnetic fields. This action also shows the United States’ determination to achieve “all-domain warfare.” (Zhang Haoyue, Shen Qiyou, Ma Jianguang)

(Editors: Huang Zijuan, Chen Yu)

現代國語:

“多域融合作戰”與“跨域協同作戰”是美軍近年來最新提出的作戰思想,指導著美國軍種作戰概念逐步向聯合概念升級演進,並以此為基礎打造全新戰爭樣式,建設涵蓋“陸、海、空、天、網”等全部作戰領域,融合太空、網絡、威懾、運輸、電磁頻譜、導彈防禦等各種能力的聯合作戰部隊。透過這種全新的作戰思想與俄羅斯等競爭對手在各領域內角力較量,發展不對稱優勢,確保本國軍事實力的領先地位。多域融合作戰與跨域攻防在實戰中有著怎樣的優勢,發展前景又如何呢?

全局戰概念演變過程

1970年代中期後,美國陸軍先後提出了「中心戰」、「擴大的戰場」和「一體化戰場」等作戰思想,形成了「空地一體戰」作戰理論。空地一體作戰要求地面部隊與空軍協調統一,在空軍實施戰場空中遮斷和進攻性空中支援的基礎上進行縱深作戰,首次出現了多兵種協同作戰的作戰思想,這一作戰理論也在海灣戰爭中得到了實戰檢驗。這就是多域戰乃至全局戰思想誕生的起點。

2016年10月3日,美陸軍協會年會上,時任美國陸軍訓練與條令司令部司令的大衛·G·珀金斯將軍發表公開演講,首次使用“域”一詞精確概括出了國際戰爭的新形式,提出美國“所有領域均受到挑戰”、“單一領域的優勢 無法贏得戰爭”等觀點,進而推出了“多域戰鬥”的概念。 「多域戰鬥」的作戰思想要求各軍種作戰力量之間密切合作,摒棄追求各自單一領域制權的軍種思維慣性,為國家指揮當局提供一種「多域方案」。

2018年10月,美國陸軍訓練與條令司令部頒布了《美國陸軍多域作戰2028》概念1.5版本,作為目前最為成熟的一版概念,它以“作戰”一詞替換了原有的“戰鬥”,對“多域戰鬥”概念進行了延伸拓展。 「多域戰鬥」的概念僅適用於衝突階段,但在民族國家競爭成為世界局勢新要素的情況下,僅僅贏得實戰衝突的勝利對於作戰大背景的意義是非常有限的,因此必須將「多域」概念延拓深化。 「多域作戰」這個概念就是在「競爭、武裝衝突和重回競爭」這個「競爭連續體」中引入了跨政府、跨機構的相關要素,提出「多域戰」中的「校準力量態勢、運用多域編隊、達成多域聚合」三項核心理念,明確了「多域編隊」的具體需求,細化了不同層級部隊在「多域作戰」中具備的具體領域作戰能力」。

「跨域協同」指的是各軍種透過相互合作彌補其他部隊在戰鬥中存在的不足進而實現各領域的互補增效,最終成功完成戰鬥任務。在多域融合與跨域協同的基本思想指引下,美軍形成了「全域戰」的概念,即在戰訓的全過程中發展各兵種聯合作戰的能力,實現軍隊向聯合作戰部隊轉型。

全局作戰優勢顯著

就目前國際軍事發展情勢來看,各國面對的將是一個日益複雜、致命、極度活躍、都市化的戰場,作戰環境越來越脆弱,傳統戰場的作戰模式已經不再適用於當代戰爭。在這種背景下,美軍提出了全域戰的理念,以期應對日益複雜的國際環境。多域作戰與跨域攻防在現代化戰場上究竟有何優勢呢?

多域融合能使不同兵種力量優勢疊加,劣勢互補。多域戰的前身「空地一體戰」就是20世紀80年代初,美軍為應對蘇聯坦克集群在歐洲平原對北約造成的巨大威脅而試圖建立的空軍與陸軍協同作戰的作戰樣式。這種作戰模式要求地面部隊與空中力量高度協同,地面部隊進行前線進攻性機動防禦作戰,空軍則透過打擊敵軍後方阻滯其對前線兵力的充實,進而為前線陸軍提供戰術支援。這也是美軍歷史上 首次進行空軍與陸軍的深度協作,提高了美軍軍隊作戰的複雜度與靈活性,使美軍戰術選擇更加豐富且具有活力,對敵人造成更大了戰略威懾。

另一方面,跨域攻防能擴大不對稱優勢,對敵軍力量發揮產生更大限制。由於跨域攻防的概念強調不同領域攻防力量相互配合,因此,在戰鬥過程中,軍隊可以透過自己的優勢領域向敵軍施加更大壓力,使敵人的力量難以得到最大程度的發揮,進而擴大不對稱優勢,最大程度展現自身實力而削弱敵軍力量。各國近年都來非常重視網路電磁領域的技術開發研究,某種程度上就是因為網路電磁領域是隨著資訊時代而來的新產物,試圖趕超老牌強國的新興大國能夠透過這個領域的發展建立自身優勢,而老牌強國不希望被追趕,出現能夠被敵軍當作弱點打擊的領域。因此各國都不約而同地將網路電磁領域的研究發展作為了自己目前發展的重點領域之一,這也體現了跨域攻防在現代資訊化智慧戰爭中的巨大力量。

全局戰發展前景廣闊

目前,「全局戰」這一理念只是擁有了理論基礎,要將理論轉換為實踐仍需許多努力,美軍參聯會副主席在接受采訪時明確表示:“各領域的無縫融合和有效 指揮控制仍是一項艱鉅的挑戰,我們還不清楚究竟要如何做到,沒人有現成的答案。”

在實現真正的聯合作戰過程中,存在著包括文化、經濟、政治等各方面的阻礙,這些問題都會影響真正意義上的聯合作戰部隊、聯合作戰模式的建立。首先,各軍種在長期發展過程中都形成了本軍種特有的作戰樣式與戰鬥文化,不同軍種文化的分歧可能導致對聯合作戰部隊建設的作戰重點觀念不同,進而造成部隊建設的方向模糊,目標不明確。其次,軍隊建設預算有限,各軍種都會盡力爭取用於自身武器裝備更新研發,導致預算優先滿足各軍種需求而非聯合作戰需求。最後,國防部難以獲取整合政府與盟國力量,「跨域協同」是國家綜合力量的博弈,包含了政治、經濟、外交、情報等各個方面,需要國家各領域政府機構力量的配合協同,而僅依靠國防部是沒有足夠的權力實現各力量的整合。

這些問題都影響著“全局戰”的發展進程,但無論如何,作為新型作戰理念的“全局戰”都必將成為未來作戰的重要模式,美國更是在今年4月發布了“聯合全局作戰軟體”,旨在開發戰區級聯合全局作戰軟體,以編配作戰資源,實現陸、海、空、天、電磁等領域的協同殺傷。這項行動也昭示了美國實現「全域戰」的決心。 (張顴月、申起有、馬建光)

(編按:黃子娟、陳羽)

中國原創軍事資源:https://military.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0817/c1011-31824792888.html

Chinese Military Self-coupled Operations: China’s New Trend in Future Joint Operations

中國軍隊自主耦合作戰:中國未來聯合作戰新趨勢

現代英語:

Faced with changes in technology, warfare, and opponents, the combat mode of fixed formation, task balance, and tree-shaped command formed in traditional warfare will be difficult to adapt to battlefield needs. It is urgent to change the concept and innovate the implementation of self-coupling operations. The so-called self-coupling operations refer to the support of big data, cloud computing, and intelligent network information systems. The participating forces focus on the commander’s intentions, based on mission objectives and combat needs, breaking through regional, organizational, and field restrictions, and instantly perceive the situation, quickly and dynamically form groups, and autonomously match tasks, aggregate system advantages, and maximize the release of system combat capabilities.

Using the most appropriate forces to carry out the most appropriate tasks and achieve the best release of combat effectiveness has always been the highest level of war guidance.

Turning over the pages of human war history, coupling energy release is closely related to the development of war and command coordination. What has changed is the coupling organizational form – evolving from “other coupling” to “self coupling”; what remains unchanged is the pursuit of coupling value – the pursuit of the best release of combat effectiveness and the pursuit of the best combat benefits.

In the cold weapon era, the two sides formed simple formations and fought face to face. The war leaders often relied on their own exemplary role or simple organization to achieve effective coordination of different combat forces and combat actions, thereby maximizing the release of combat energy. In this sense, in the cold weapon era, combat was mainly organized by the commander’s orders, that is, “hetero-coupling”.

In the era of hot weapons, with the increase of the strike distance, weapons and equipment such as artillery, aircraft, tanks, and ships have appeared one after another. Combat operations have become more complicated and mutual coordination has become more important. Commanders and their command agencies must make careful pre-war planning and rely on wired/wireless communications to implement wartime control. The release of combat effectiveness is mainly achieved by the force organization, task allocation, action sequence, and support guarantee determined by the commander, that is, it has not yet gotten rid of the constraints of “other coupling”. However, due to the rapid changes in the battlefield situation, pre-war planning and organization have been difficult to adapt to actual combat needs. In response to battlefield uncertainty, with a focus on giving full play to the subjective initiative of the task force, command methods such as decentralized command, delegated command, and task-based command have emerged one after another. From the perspective of energy release, these command methods can be used as self-coupling operations based on command authorization.

In modern joint operations, unmanned forces have emerged, long-range precision strikes have become the new cutting-edge, stealth and high speed have gradually become the main force, multi-dimensional battlefields are deployed in full depth, multiple forces are mixed, and multi-domain operations are coordinated and efficient. Although the release of combat effectiveness still relies on “other coupling”, more emphasis is placed on “self-coupling”. The concept of “mosaic warfare” proposed by foreign militaries in recent years aims to emphasize the use of technical architecture to enable existing systems to be flexibly networked and quickly configured, and to provide the desired combat capabilities at the time and place specified by the commander. In recent years, in local wars and armed conflicts, the military of some countries has reconstructed the killing link based on the network information system, issued tasks based on the network, and the combat units implemented “order-based” strikes, which has begun to show signs of self-coupling operations.

Information and intelligent technology provides a means to support the best release of combat effectiveness, and it is mandatory to migrate to self-coupling combat.

With the widespread use of new technologies such as big data, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and quantum communications, it has become possible to distribute combat forces in all dimensions and to make heterogeneous isomorphism, to make extreme use of combat resources and to release them on demand, thus forcing the transformation of combat methods to self-coupled combat.

Real-time battlefield situation perception provides a “smart eye” for self-coupled operations. Supported by information network technology, multi-domain, multi-dimensional and multi-dimensional early warning and reconnaissance means such as space-based monitoring, air early warning, maritime detection, underwater surveillance, and ground perception can obtain battlefield intelligence information in real time and efficiently process and integrate various types of information, so that combat units distributed in various fields and full depth can obtain complete, accurate, and real-time battlefield situations, so that the entire combat system can clearly perceive potential threats and accurately judge the targets of attack, providing a “clairvoyance” for its autonomous implementation of combat operations.

Cross-domain operations and real-time strikes provide an “arm” for self-coupling operations. The concept of “multi-domain warfare” proposed by foreign militaries is actually a combination of the strengths of multiple domains to overcome the weaknesses of other domains. In recent local wars, foreign militaries have practiced cross-generational integration, system-based counterattacks, division-based counterattacks, and unmanned clusters to attack high-value targets with humans, which mostly reflect this asymmetric balance concept of multi-domain operations. The development of intelligent technology will further change this way of fighting. The “perception-decision-strike-assessment” link of various combat units will achieve instantaneous transmission from “sensor to shooter”, and strike preparations will achieve “zero warm-up”, and “discovery is destruction” can be truly realized. This “zero reaction” of cross-domain operations provides a “fist” for the implementation of self-coupling operations.

Highly intelligent decision-making systems provide the “brain” for self-coupled operations. With the evolution of artificial intelligence, the “external brain” functions of staff officers, such as auxiliary decision-making, command and control, and evaluation and deduction, will be increasingly replaced by artificial intelligence “smart brains”, and ubiquitous “intelligent staff officers” will replace the large group of staff officers. With the support of intelligence, force allocation will shift to real-time task-based combination, force selection will shift to domain aggregation, system selection, and on-demand selection, combat operations will shift to immediate response, synchronous collaboration, and precise energy release, the command system will be reshaped into a command structure with star-point distribution and different authority, and the command method will shift to task issuance and node control. Strike power, information power, and protection power will be released on the most appropriate target at the most needed time and in the most appropriate way to achieve the maximum transformation of combat potential.

The network information system provides the “meridians” for self-coupling operations. With the development of information technology, the network aggregation function of the network information system is more powerful than ever before. The dispersed combat forces, combat units, and weapons and equipment become equal network information nodes based on various information links, and can obtain and use information without distinction. Just like the meridians of the human body, this characteristic of the network information system not only facilitates the command organization to issue instructions and control actions, but also transports blood and provides nutrients for combat units. Based on the network information system, the joint combat command organization can not only issue tasks in the cloud to truly achieve “decentralization”, but also monitor the battlefield situation, perceive the effects of operations, and deploy force resources; combat units can carry out “order-based” task selection, and carry out autonomous actions based on network intelligence brains to minimize internal consumption of forces and form local optimal combat capabilities.

Strive to explore the way of combat operations dominated by “other coupling” in strategic campaigns and “self coupling” in tactics

Victory always smiles upon those who can foresee the changes in the nature of war. In response to changes in technology, warfare, and opponents, we must base ourselves on the current reality of the troops, look forward to future combat developments, and step up efforts to promote concept renewal, training transformation, and condition building, so as to get closer and closer to actual combat.

Actively promote the renewal of combat concepts. At present, intelligent unmanned combat forces have been widely used in modern battlefields, and joint operations are rapidly developing towards cohesive integration. We should break through the constraints of the concept of controlling platform weapons and transform to system optimization, highlight the rapid combination of forces and planning actions in battle, and build a modular and resilient combat system; we should break through the constraints of the traditional concept of the number of combat resources and transform to micro-group multi-function, build a highly intelligent combat group, and promote the transformation of the combat system to adaptive and system-emergent functions; we should break through the constraints of the traditional concept of overall control and transform to task command, set tasks, goals, and forces based on the situation, and promote the action mode of superior card point command and multi-level parallel implementation; we should break through the constraints of the traditional concept of coordination and transform to autonomous combat, based on task allocation, rule coordination, and situation collaboration, to promote the optimal release of combat energy.

Speed up the improvement of the combat rules system. The promotion of self-coupling combat is inseparable from the rules and constraints of unified action, mutual integration, and coordination of various combat forces within the system. These rules are not only the necessary prerequisites for intelligent decision-making support systems, but also the key to avoiding arbitrary actions and coordination disorders. An efficiency priority rule should be established, that is, according to the combat capabilities and strike effects of multi-domain combat units, the effectiveness of paralysis and disability should be used as the force selection standard to provide a basis for the integration of combat forces in different domains and of different qualities; a force-dominant rule should be established, that is, the coordination relationship between different forces should be clarified, and force-dominant rules should be established according to tasks, sub-targets, and fields, to provide a basis for the timing and coordination of combined domain actions; an authorization rule should be established, that is, combat units perform the command and responsibility of a certain field, a certain direction, or a certain action according to the authorization of the commander, to provide a basis for responding to the battlefield and commanding the lower level; a control rule should be established to clarify the timing, method, and authority of the commander’s control to ensure that the operation is always carried out according to the commander’s intention.

Focus on building a strong information support network. The joint combat system supported by cloud connection is the prerequisite for achieving system confrontation and system optimization. We should focus on the high-speed flow of information, build a cloud battlefield network chain that penetrates the barriers of military services, shares intelligence information, and connects combat units, to provide support for the dispersed deployment, network-based reorganization, and cross-domain integration of combat forces; we should aim at intelligent decision-making, accelerate the development of intelligent auxiliary models for rapid information processing and rapid solution generation, and provide support for cloud-based task release and intelligent order matching; we should improve the data resource pool, distinguish between enemy and friendly combat targets, platform equipment, combat units, and combat groups, and build a resource pool with fresh and authentic data and dynamic updates to provide objective support for mission operations.

現代國語:

來源:中國軍網-解放軍報 作者:彭海 劉孝良 張付林 責任編輯:黃敏

2023-03-30 06:52:00

面對科技之變、戰爭之變、對手之變,傳統戰爭中形成的固定編組、任務衡定、樹形指揮的作戰模式將難以適應戰場需要,亟需轉變觀念,創新實施自耦合作戰。所謂自耦合作戰,是指依託大數據、雲計算、智能化的網絡資訊體系支撐,參戰力量圍繞指揮員意圖,基於任務目標與作戰需求,打破地域、建制和領域限制,即時感知態勢、快速動態組群、自主匹配任務,聚合體系優勢,最大限度地釋放體係作戰能力。

用最合適力量遂行最恰當任務,達到作戰效能最佳釋放,歷來是戰爭指導的最高境界

翻開人類戰爭史的畫卷,耦合釋能與戰爭發展相生相伴、與指揮協同緊密關聯。變化的是耦合組織形式——從「他耦合」到「自耦合」演進;不變的是耦合價值追求——追求作戰效能最佳釋放,尋求最佳作戰效益。

冷兵器時代作戰,雙方擺成簡單隊形,展開面對面廝殺,戰爭指導者往往依靠自身的表率作用或簡單的組織,來實現不同的作戰力量、作戰行動的有效配合,從而最大限度地釋放作戰能量。從這種意義上看,冷兵器時代作戰,主要是透過將帥的發號施令,即「他耦合」來組織能量釋放。

熱兵器時代,隨著打擊距離的增大,火砲、飛機、坦克、艦艇等武器裝備相繼出現,作戰行動更加復雜,相互配合更加重要,必須由指揮員及其指揮機關進行周密戰前籌劃,依靠有線/無線通信實施戰中調控。作戰效能釋放,主要依靠指揮者所確定的力量編組、任務分配、行動時序、支援保障來實現,即仍沒有擺脫「他耦合」束縛。但由於戰場態勢的快速變化,戰前規劃組織已經難以適應實戰需求。應對戰場不確定性,著重發揮任務部隊主觀能動性,分散指揮、委託式指揮、任務式指揮等指揮方式相繼出現。從能量釋放角度來看,這些指揮方式可以作為基於指揮授權實施的自耦合作戰。

現代聯合作戰,無人力量嶄露頭角,遠程精打成為新銳,隱身高速漸成主力,多維戰場全縱深布勢,多元力量混合發力,多域行動協同增效,雖然作戰效能釋放還依靠“他耦合”,但更加註重“自耦合”。近年外軍提出的「馬賽克戰」概念,旨在強調透過技術架構使已有系統靈活組網並快速配置,在指揮官指定時間與地點提供期望的作戰能力。近年來,局部戰爭和武裝沖突中,有的國家軍隊基於網絡資訊體系,重構殺傷鏈路,依網發布任務,作戰單元實施「接單式」打擊,已經初現自耦合作戰端倪。

資訊化智慧化技術為作戰效能最佳釋放提供了手段支撐,強制要求向自耦合作戰遷移

隨著大數據、雲計算、人工智慧、量子通訊等新技術的廣泛運用,使作戰力量全維分佈、異質同構,作戰資源極限運用、按需釋放成為可能,強制推動作戰方式向自耦合作戰轉變。

戰場態勢即時感知為自耦合作戰提供了「慧眼」。在資訊網絡技術支撐下,天基監控、空中預警、海上探測、水下偵監、地面感知等多域多維多元預警偵察手段,實時獲取戰場情報信息,高效處理融合各類信息,使得分佈於各領域、全縱深的作戰單元,可以獲得完整、精準、實時的戰場態,使整個作戰體係可以清晰感知潛在威脅、準確性打擊目標

跨域行動即時打擊為自耦合作戰提供了「臂膀」。外軍提出的「多域戰」概念,其實質是集多域之所長克他域之所短。在近幾場局部戰爭中,外軍實踐的跨代融合、體系抗擊、以分抗散,以無人集群打有人高價值目標等大都體現了多域作戰的這一非對稱制衡理念。智慧技術發展將進一步改變這種作戰方式,各類作戰單元“感知—決策—打擊—評估”鏈路將實現從“傳感器到射手”的瞬間傳遞,打擊準備實現“零預熱”,“發現即摧毀”得以真正實現。這種跨域行動“零反應”,為實施自耦合作戰提供了“拳頭”。

高度智慧決策系統為自耦合作戰提供了「大腦」。隨著人工智慧的演進,參謀人員的輔助決策、指揮控制和評估推演等「外腦」功能,將更多地被人工智慧「智腦」所取代,泛在的「智慧參謀」將取代龐大的參謀人員群體。在智能化加持下,力量編配將向基於任務的實時組合轉變,力量選用將向並域聚優、體系選優、按需擇優轉變,作戰行動將向即時反應、同步協作、精準釋能轉變,指揮體係將重塑為星點分佈、權限不同的指揮架構,指揮方式向任務下達、節點把控轉變,打擊力、信息力、最成功

網絡資訊體係為自耦合作戰提供了「經絡」。隨著資訊科技的發展,網絡資訊體系的網聚功能較之以往任何時代都更加強大,分散配置的作戰力量、作戰單元、武器裝備基於各種資訊連結成為地位平等網絡資訊節點,可無差別獲取與使用資訊。正如人體的經絡一樣,網絡資訊體系這一特性,不僅為指揮機構下達指令、調控行動提供便利,也為作戰單元輸送血液、提供養分。基於網絡資訊體系,聯合作戰指揮機構不僅可以雲發布任務,真正實現“去中心化”,也可監控戰場態勢、感知行動效果、調配力量資源;作戰單元可以進行“接單式”任務選擇,基於網絡智腦進行自主式行動,最大限度地降低力量內耗,形成局部最優作戰能力。

努力探索戰略戰役上「他耦合」為主導、戰術上「自耦合」為主體的作戰行動之道

勝利總是向那些能預見戰爭特性變化的人微笑。應對科技之變、戰爭之變、對手之變,必須立足當前部隊實際、前瞻未來作戰發展,加緊推動觀念更新、訓練轉型、條件建設,向著實戰貼近再貼近。

積極推動作戰理念更新。當前,智慧無人作戰力量已大量運用於現代戰場,聯合作戰正向內聚式融合快速發展。應突破掌控平台利器觀念束縛向體系聚優轉變,突出戰中快速組合力量、規劃行動,打造模塊化韌性強的作戰體系;應突破傳統作戰資源多少觀念束縛向微群多能轉變,打造高度智能化作戰群,推動作戰體係向自適應、系統湧現功能轉變;應突破傳統統攬統管觀念束縛向任務指揮轉變,基於態勢定任務、定目標、定力量,推動上級卡點指揮、多級並行實施的行動方式;應突破傳統協同觀念束縛向自主作戰轉變,基於任務編配,基於規則配合,基於態勢協作,推動作戰能量最佳釋放。

加緊完善作戰規則體系。推動實現自耦合作戰,離不開對體系內部各作戰力量統一行動、互相融合、協調配合的規則約束。這些規則,既是智慧化輔助決策系統必備的前提,也是避免行動隨意、協同失調的關鍵。應建立效能優先規則,即根據多域作戰單元作戰能力、打擊效果,以癱體失能成效為力量選用標準,為不同域、不同質作戰力量融合提供依據;應建立力量主導規則,即明確不同力量間協同關系,按任務、分目標、逐領域建立力量主導規則,為並域行動時序、配合提供依據;應建立授權性規則,即作戰單元根據指揮員授權履行某一領域、某一方向或某一行動指揮權責,為響應戰場、指揮下沉提供依據;應建立調控性規則,明確指揮員調控時機、調控方式、調控權限,確保作戰始終按指揮員意圖實施。

著力建強資訊支撐網系。雲聯支撐的聯合作戰體系,是實現體系對抗、體系聚優的前提基礎。應著眼資訊高速流轉,打造貫通軍種壁壘、共享情報資訊、銜接作戰單元的雲態戰場網鏈,為作戰力量分散部署、依網重組、跨域融合提供支撐;應瞄準智能決策,加速研發信息快速處理、方案快速生成的智能輔助模型,為任務雲發布、依網重組、跨域融合提供支撐;應瞄準智能決策,加速研發信息快速處理、方案快速生成的智能輔助模型,為任務雲發布、接單智能匹配.

中國原創軍事資源:http://www.81.cn/ll_208543/16213160888.html

Chinese Military Cross-domain Joint Operations: New Trend in Future PLA Joint Operations

中國軍隊跨域聯合作戰:未來解放軍聯合作戰新趨勢

中國軍網 國防部網
2020年9月8日 星期二

現代英語:

With the continuous improvement of information technology and the expansion of combat space, the combat capabilities of various services in modern warfare have been qualitatively improved. The joint combat concept that used to focus on the “service attributes” of combat forces is shifting to the “combat domain” affiliation of combat forces. On the basis of achieving “divided domain jointness” in a single combat domain, it seeks “cross-domain jointness” between various combat domains, thereby maximizing the combat capability of one’s own system.

Cross-domain joint operations are an advanced form of joint operations development

Since the transition from mechanization to informatization of warfare, the concept of joint operations that comprehensively utilizes the combat capabilities of various services has been gradually established, and has demonstrated a strong system combat power in recent local wars. At present, with the continuous development of information technology, supported by information and communication technology, the combat capabilities of various services are constantly enhanced, and the tentacles of action are constantly extending to multiple spaces, with overlapping situations in various dimensions. The traditional integration and integration of joint combat capabilities based on “services and arms” seems to be somewhat inadequate and difficult to meet the development requirements of information-based joint operations. It needs to be coordinated with a new concept of joint operations.

The combat domain has become the glue point for the integration of joint combat capabilities. There is no clear definition of the combat domain at present. Combined with the definition of domain in the modern Chinese dictionary, it can be understood as the scope involved in combat operations. There are many ways to divide this scope in the field of military operations. The most common one is according to the spatial scope involved in military operations, namely, land, sea, air, space, network, electromagnetic and other combat spaces. These combat spaces all have professional combat forces relying on this space. Around the competition for control of this space, an independent combat space domain, namely, the combat domain, has gradually formed. At present, the combat forces and combat operations of each service have more or less extended their tentacles to the traditional scope of other services. In joint operations, if the service continues to integrate joint capabilities, the operations in a certain combat space will appear in a situation of multiple command and control, with low command efficiency and large internal losses. Therefore, it is necessary to find another way to seek a new glue point for the integration of joint combat capabilities of various services. At present, integrating joint combat capabilities based on combat domains has become a new development direction. For example, during the Iraq War, the U.S. Army’s Joint Ground Component Command unified the command of the combat operations of the Army’s 5th Army and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force’s ground forces, and the Joint Air Component Command unified the command of the combat operations of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps flight forces.

Cross-domain joint operations are the combination of combat domains and military services. Cross-domain operations involve at least two combat domains in terms of the scope of combat space. For example, operations conducted by naval ships, naval aviation, and the Marine Corps involve three combat domains: land, sea, and air, and may even involve cyber and electromagnetic space. However, this may only be naval operations, and is not considered a joint operation. Joint operations involve at least two military services in terms of the military service attributes of combat forces. For example, operations jointly conducted by the Marine Corps, the Air Force Airborne Force, and the Army’s ground combat forces can be called land joint operations. However, this type of joint operation is mainly carried out on land, and cross-domain operations are not fully reflected. Cross-domain joint operations are a combination of the concepts of cross-domain operations and joint operations, that is, combat operations must involve at least two combat domains, and at least two military services must participate in combat operations.

Cross-domain joint operations are the main mode of future joint operations

With the support of the network information system, the barriers that previously affected the “coordination” of combat operations between the various services and arms and the “integration” of combat capabilities between various combat domains have been gradually broken down, and the conditions for implementing high-level and high-efficiency joint operations have basically been met. In future joint operations, the combat operations of various participating forces will be linked by the network information system and will work together around the overall combat intent. The combat concept of multi-domain coordination and cross-domain integration has become a general trend.

Future joint operations require multi-domain coordination. At present, from the perspective of the combat space of each service, each service has a certain cross-domain combat capability. The Army has the Army Aviation, the Air Force has the Airborne Force, and the Navy has the Naval Aviation and Marine Corps. At the service level, multiple combat domains have the ability to coordinate and engage in combat. This multi-domain coordination can be called “small coordination”. In future joint operations based on network information systems, these multi-domain coordination at the service level must develop to a higher level, toward the direction of integrating the capabilities of different services in the same combat space, that is, the direction of “big coordination”, that is, to achieve domain-specific joint operations between different services. In addition, combat domains such as space, network, and electromagnetic space are indispensable and important components of joint operations. Even if a certain service implements relatively independent combat operations in a specific range and a certain joint combat stage, it will also need the support of space, network, and electromagnetic space combat operations. Therefore, future joint operations will inevitably be coordinated engagements in multiple combat space domains.

Future multi-domain operations require cross-domain joint operations. From the overall perspective of operations, the future will involve joint operations involving multiple services and multiple combat domains, and the operations of various services in various combat domains are interconnected and mutually supportive. On the surface, although some operations are carried out in a certain combat domain, the effects or targets they produce are in other combat domains. For example, the army destroys or occupies the enemy’s airport in ground combat, which has a significant impact on the air force’s seizure of air superiority; for example, electronic countermeasures forces implement electronic interference on space targets, causing the enemy’s reconnaissance and communication satellites to be paralyzed, which will have a huge impact on combat operations in land, sea, air and network combat domains. Therefore, future joint operations must be multi-domain operations, and multi-domain operations must achieve cross-domain joint operations, and better promote the achievement of combat objectives through the connection of actions and effects.

Cross-domain collaboration is an important way to achieve cross-domain efficiency

As the development direction of future joint operations, cross-domain joint operations seek to integrate the combat capabilities of different combat domains and complement each other’s advantages, so as to achieve the best combat effect in each combat domain. By superimposing the effects of each combat domain, the battle situation will develop in a direction that is beneficial to oneself, thereby achieving the overall or local goals of the war. Cross-domain joint operations based on network information systems can achieve cross-domain effects and cross-domain efficiency.

Transformation from cross-domain action to cross-domain effect. There are two ways to understand cross-domain: the traditional understanding is the cross-domain of combat entities in geographic space, which is mainly reflected in the potential relationship in the combat space field, that is, the attack platform and the target platform are divided into different geographic spaces. For example, using land-based anti-satellite weapons to attack the opponent’s satellite is cross-domain; while using space-based anti-satellite weapons to attack the opponent’s satellite does not fall into the cross-domain category. Another understanding is cross-domain combat effectiveness, that is, combat operations in the same geographic space can also produce cross-domain effects. For example, the action of land combat forces to destroy the opponent’s airport and thus reduce the opponent’s air combat capability can also be considered as a cross-domain category.

The first understanding has already existed in the mechanized warfare period. The corresponding effect is mainly achieved through the coordinated actions of various military services, that is, the “action domain” and the “target domain” belong to different spaces, and the combat effectiveness is directly reflected in the “target domain”, focusing on the spatial attributes of the equipment means. In the current and even future information-based joint operations, cross-domain operations will be more inclined to the second understanding, that is, the “action domain” and the “target domain” can be both “same domain” and “different domains”, but the combat effectiveness can be reflected in the “different domain”, which is not limited by the spatial attributes of the equipment means themselves, but is related to the space and scope of the impact of the combat effect, and therefore has a wider range of applicability.

Transformation from joint efficiency enhancement to cross-domain efficiency enhancement. With the continuous expansion of the combat space and the improvement of the performance of weapons and equipment, a relationship of mutual checks and balances has been formed between the various combat space fields. For example, the so-called “controlling the land with the air” and “controlling the land with the sea” are the embodiment of this kind of checks and balances. The reason why each service develops its own cross-domain combat capabilities is also to focus on this kind of checks and balances in the combat space field. However, each service has its own key areas of construction, and it is impossible to develop the combat capabilities of each combat space field in a balanced manner. This requires the use of the combat effects of other services to promote the improvement of the combat effectiveness of this service.

In the era of mechanized warfare and the early stage of information warfare, each service fully exerted the combat effectiveness of its own service forces in combat according to the plan, and created conditions for the combat of other services on the basis of completing its own combat tasks. Compared with the army without joint combat capability, its combat effectiveness is significantly higher by several orders of magnitude. However, due to the imperfect construction of command information system and network, and the long-term fragmentation of various services, information transmission and sharing are restricted, the coordination between the forces of various services is relatively mechanical, and the complementarity, integration and utilization rate of combat effects cannot reach the ideal state. With the advancement of information technology, the participating forces in joint operations based on the network information system can smoothly realize the joint operation of different domains, and on this basis, conduct cross-domain joint operations with other combat domains. Through the efficient flow of information, the combat operations of each domain can achieve self-synchronous coordination around the combat mission, and the combat effect of a certain domain will be quickly utilized by other domains, and a cascade amplification effect will be generated, spreading to each domain, thereby achieving cross-domain efficiency.

現代國語:

逯 杰

随着信息化水平的不断提升和作战空间的拓展,现代战争中各军种作战能力有了质的提升。以往以作战力量“军种属性”为着眼点的联合作战理念,正在向作战力量的“作战域”归属为着眼点转变,在实现单一作战域“分域联合”的基础上,谋求各作战域之间的“跨域联合”,从而最大限度地释放己方体系作战能力。

跨域联合是联合作战发展的进阶形式

战争由机械化向信息化过渡发展以来,综合运用各军种作战能力的联合作战理念逐步得以确立,并在近几场局部战争中展现了强大的体系作战威力。当前,随着信息化技术的不断发展,以信息通信技术为支撑,各军种作战能力不断增强,行动触角不断向多个空间延伸,在各维空间出现相互交叠的情况,传统以“军兵种”为基础的联合作战能力整合与集成显得有些力不从心,难以满足信息化联合作战的发展要求,需要以新的联合作战理念加以统筹。

作战域已经成为联合作战能力集成的黏合点。作战域目前没有明确的定义,结合现代汉语词典中对域的释义,可以将其理解为作战行动所涉及的范围。这种范围在军事行动领域有多种划分方法,最为普遍的是按照军事行动所涉及的空间范围,即陆、海、空、天、网络、电磁等作战空间。这些作战空间都存在依托此空间的专业作战力量,围绕该空间控制权的争夺,逐步形成独立的作战空间领域,即作战域。当前,各军兵种作战力量和作战行动都多多少少地将触角延伸至其他军种的传统范围。在联合作战中,如果继续以军种进行联合能力集成,在某一作战空间的行动将会出现多头指挥控制的局面,指挥效率低,内部损耗大。因此,需要另辟蹊径,寻求各军种联合作战能力集成的新黏合点。当前,以作战域为依托进行联合作战能力集成已经成为新的发展方向。例如,伊拉克战争中,美军联合地面组成部队司令部统一指挥陆军第5军和海军陆战第1远征军地面部队的作战行动,联合空中组成司令部统一指挥空军、海军和海军陆战队飞行部队的作战行动。

跨域联合是作战域与军兵种的结合。跨域,是在作战空间范围上,作战行动至少涉及两个作战域。如海军舰艇、海军航空兵和海军陆战队所实施的作战,涉及陆、海、空三个作战域,甚至还可能有网络和电磁空间,但这种情况可能只是海军军种作战,并不算联合作战。联合,是在作战力量的军兵种属性上,作战行动至少涉及两个军兵种参战力量。如海军陆战队、空军空降兵和陆军地面作战力量共同实施的作战,就可以被称为陆上联合作战。但这种联合作战主要在陆域展开,跨域作战体现的并不充分。跨域联合是跨域作战与联合作战概念的结合体,即作战行动既要涉及至少两个作战域,还须至少有两个军兵种作战力量参与作战行动。

跨域联合是未来联合作战的主要模式

在网络信息体系的支撑下,以往影响各军兵种之间作战行动“配合”、各作战域之间作战能力“整合”的壁垒已经逐步被打破,实施高层次、高效率联合作战的条件已经基本具备。在未来联合作战中,各参战力量的作战行动将以网络信息体系为纽带,围绕整体作战企图联合发力,多域协同、跨域融合的作战理念已经成为大势所趋。

未来联合作战需要多域协同。当前,从各军兵种的作战空间领域来看,各军种都具有一定的跨域作战能力,陆军有陆军航空兵,空军有空降兵,海军有海军航空兵和海军陆战队等。在军种层面,多个作战域之间已经具备了协同交战的能力,这种多域协同可以被称为“小协同”。在未来基于网络信息体系的联合作战中,这些军种层面的多域协同要向更高层次发展,向不同军种同一作战空间领域能力整合的方向发展,即“大协同”的方向发展,即实现不同军种之间的分域联合。此外,太空、网络、电磁空间等作战域是联合作战不可或缺的重要组成部分,即便是某个军种在特定范围和某个联合作战阶段中实施相对独立的作战行动,也将需要太空、网络和电磁空间作战行动的支持。因此,未来的联合作战必将是多个作战空间领域的协同交战。

未来多域作战要求跨域联合。从作战的全局看,未来涉及多个军兵种和多个作战域的联合作战行动,各军兵种在各个作战域的行动相互联系和相互支撑。从表面上看,虽然有些行动是在某个作战域展开的,但是其产生的作用或者打击的目标是在其他作战域之中。如陆军在地面作战中摧毁或占领敌方的机场,这对空军夺取制空权具有重大影响;又如,电子对抗力量对太空目标实施电子干扰,导致敌方的侦察、通信卫星瘫痪,将对陆、海、空和网络等作战域的作战行动产生巨大影响。因此,未来联合作战必然是多域作战,而多域作战必须实现跨域联合,通过行动和效果的衔接来更好地促进作战目的的达成。

跨域联合是实现跨域增效的重要方式

跨域联合作战作为未来联合作战的发展方向,其谋求的是不同作战域作战能力集成、域间优势互补,从而在各个作战域达成最佳作战效果。通过各作战域效果的叠加,使战役态势向有利于己方的方向发展,进而达成战争全局或局部目的。基于网络信息体系的跨域联合可以实现效果跨域和跨域增效。

由行动跨域向效果跨域转变。对于跨域可以有两种理解:传统的理解是作战实体在地理空间的跨域,主要体现在作战空间领域的位势关系,即以攻击平台和目标平台分处不同地理空间来划分。例如,使用陆基反卫星武器攻击对方卫星,属于跨域;而使用天基反卫星武器攻击对方卫星则不属于跨域范畴。另一种理解则是作战效能的跨域,即处于同一地理空间中的作战行动也能产生跨域效果。例如,陆上作战力量通过摧毁对方机场,从而达到降低对方空中作战能力的行动,也可以认为是跨域的范畴。

第一种理解,在机械化战争时期就已经存在。主要通过各军兵种的协同行动达成相应效果,即“行动所在域”和“目标所在域”分属不同空间,作战成效直接反映在“目标所在域”,着眼于装备手段的自身空间属性。在当前乃至未来信息化联合作战中,跨域作战将更倾向于第二种理解,即“行动所在域”和“目标所在域”既可以“同域”也可以“异域”,作战成效却能够反映在“异域”,不受装备手段自身空间属性限制,而是与作战效果的影响空间和范围有关,因而具备更加广泛的应用性。

由联合增效向跨域增效转变。随着作战空间领域的不断扩展和武器装备性能的提升,各作战空间领域之间形成了相互制衡的关系,比如我们常说的“以空制地”“以海制陆”等等,就是这种制衡关系的体现。各军种之所以发展自身的跨域作战能力,也是着眼这种作战空间领域的制衡关系。但是,每个军种都有自身重点建设的领域,不可能均衡地发展各个作战空间领域的作战能力,这就需要借助其他军兵种的作战效果来促进本军种作战效能的提升。

机械化战争时代及信息化战争初期,各军种按照计划在作战中充分发挥本军种参战力量的作战效能,在完成本军种作战任务的基础上,为其他军种的作战创造条件。相较于没有联合作战能力的军队,其作战效能明显高出几个数量级。但是,由于指挥信息系统和网络建设不完善,加之各军兵种长期的条块分割,信息传递与共享受到限制,各军种力量之间的协同较为机械,作战效果的互补性、融合度和利用率还不能达到理想状态。随着信息技术的突进,基于网络信息体系联合作战的参战力量能够顺利实现分域联合,在此基础上与其他作战域进行跨域联合。通过信息的高效流转,各分域的作战行动能够围绕作战任务实现自同步协同,某个分域的作战效果将会迅速被其他分域所利用,并产生级联放大效应,扩散至各个分域,从而实现跨域增效。

中國原創軍事資源:http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2020-09/08/content_270364888.htm

Chinese Military’s Brief Analysis of Multi-dimensional Central Warfare

中國軍隊多維中心戰淺析

現代英語:

2023-09-27 11:58:xx

Source: Guangming Military

Since the 1990s, the concepts of multi-dimensional central warfare, such as network-centric warfare, personnel-centric warfare, action-centric warfare, and decision-centric warfare, have been proposed one after another. The evolution of the concept of multi-dimensional central warfare reflects the overall goal of seeking advantages such as platform effectiveness, information empowerment, and decision-making intelligence by relying on military science and technology advantages, and also reflects the contradictory and unified relationship between people and equipment, strategy and skills, and the strange and the normal. Dialectically understanding these contradictory and unified relationships with centralized structured thinking makes it easier to grasp the essential connotation of its tactics and its methodological significance.

Strengthen the integration of the “human” dimension in the combination of people and equipment

The concepts of personnel-centric warfare and platform-centric warfare largely reflect the relationship between people and weapons and equipment. Some have specially formulated human dimension strategies, emphasizing continuous investment in the human dimension of combat effectiveness, which is the most reliable guarantee for dealing with an uncertain future. Since the beginning of the 21st century, with the rapid development of intelligent weapons and equipment, unmanned combat has emerged, and voices questioning the status and role of people have arisen one after another. It is imperative to strengthen the integration of the human dimension and enhance the synergy of the human dimension.

First, we need to enhance spiritual cohesion. Marxism believes that consciousness is the reflection of objective matter in the human mind. Tactics are the expression and summary of combat experience, and they themselves have spiritual or conscious forms. When studying tactics, we naturally need to put spiritual factors first. Some scholars believe that war is still fundamentally a contest of human will. In the information age, people’s spirits are richer and more complex, and enhancing the spiritual cohesion of the human dimension is more challenging and difficult. To enhance people’s spiritual cohesion, we need to coordinate the cultivation of collective spirit and individual spirit, maximize the satisfaction of individual spiritual needs in leading the collective spirit, realize individual spiritual pursuits in shaping the value of collective spirit, and empower people’s spirit with all available and useful information; we need to coordinate the cultivation of critical spirit and innovative spirit, adhere to the tactical epistemology of dialectical materialism, resolutely oppose idealism and mechanism in tactical cognition, and constantly inherit and innovate in criticism; we need to coordinate the cultivation of fighting spirit and scientific spirit, and promote the revolutionary spirit of facing death with courage and winning, and promote the spirit of winning by science and technology.

The second is to enhance the organizational structure. Organizations are the organs of the military, and people are the cells of the organization. The settings of military organizations in different countries have their own characteristics and commonalities. For example, the Ministry of National Defense is generally set up to distinguish between the structure of military branches, hierarchical structures and regional structures, and to distinguish between peacetime and wartime organizations. Although the purpose of construction and war is the same, the requirements for the unity of construction and the flexibility of war are different. To enhance the organizational structure and promote the consistency of war and construction, it is necessary to smooth the vertical command chain, reasonably define the command power and leadership power, command power and control power, so that the government and orders complement each other, and enhance the vertical structural strength of the organization; it is necessary to open up horizontal coordination channels, explore the establishment of normalized cross-domain (organizations, institutions, departments) coordination channels, change the simple task-based coordination model, and enhance the horizontal structural strength of the organization; it is necessary to improve the peace-war conversion mechanism, focus on the organization connection, adjustment and improvement in the change of leadership or command power of the troops, and maintain the stability and reliability of the organizational structure network.

The third is to enhance material support. The spiritual strength of people in combat can be transformed into material strength, but spiritual strength cannot be separated from the support of material strength. To enhance material support and thus realize the organic unity of material and spirit, it is necessary to ensure combat equipment, bedding, food, and medical care, build good learning venues, training facilities, and re-education channels, provide good technical services in combat regulations, physiological medicine, etc., help design diversified and personalized capacity improvement plans and career development plans, and provide strong material and technical support for the development of people’s physical fitness, skills, and intelligence, and thus comprehensively improve people’s adaptability and combat effectiveness in the uncertain battlefield environment of the future.
             

Deepen the practice of the “skill” dimension in the combination of combat and skills

The combination of combat skills is an important principle of tactical application. The technology includes not only the technology at the practical operation level (such as shooting technology), but also the technology at the theoretical application level (such as information technology). It can be said that tactics, technology, art and procedures together constitute its “combat methodology”. Scientific and technological development and scientific technology are important characteristics of scientific and technological development. To deepen the combination of combat skills, it is necessary to correctly grasp the relationship between technology and tactics, art and procedures, and continuously deepen the practice of the “skill” dimension.

First, promote the tacticalization of advanced technology. Technology determines tactics, which is the basic view of dialectical materialism’s tactical theory. The evolution of the concept of multi-dimensional central warfare is also an example of technology driving the development and change of tactics. Engels once pointed out: “The entire organization and combat methods of the army and the related victory or defeat… depend on the quality and quantity of the population and on technology.” However, technology-driven tactics have a “lag effect”, especially in the absence of actual combat traction. This requires actively promoting the military transformation of advanced civilian technologies and the tactical application of advanced military technologies. On the one hand, we must actively introduce advanced civilian technologies, especially accelerate the introduction and absorption of cutting-edge technologies such as deep neural networks and quantum communication computing; on the other hand, we must strengthen tactical training of advanced technology equipment, closely combine technical training with tactical training, and promote the formation of new tactics and new combat capabilities with new equipment as soon as possible.

Second, promote the technicalization of command art. “Art” is a highly subjective concept. Some Chinese and foreign scholars believe that “the art of command is rooted in the commander’s ability to implement leadership to maximize performance”, while others believe that “the art of command is the way and method for commanders to implement flexible, clever and creative command”. Chinese and foreign scholars generally regard command as an art. The main reason is that although command has objective basis and support such as combat regulations, superior orders and technical support, the more critical factor lies in the commander’s subjective initiative and creativity, which is difficult to quantify by technical means. With the development of disciplines and technologies such as cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience, the cognitive structure and mechanism of command will become more explicit, the mysterious veil of “command art” will gradually fade, and the technicalization of command art will become an inevitable trend. This requires continuous strengthening of technical thinking, continuous deepening of the construction of artificial intelligence-assisted command decision-making means, continuous deepening of the application of human brain decision-making mechanisms, practical use of technology to deconstruct art, and continuous promotion of the technicalization of command art.

The third is to promote the regulation of combat technology. Many scholars place technology on a position that is almost as important as tactics. This insistence on the integrated development of tactical regulation and the regulation of specialized military technology and special combat technology is an important way to promote the systematic and standardized construction of combat regulations and further achieve the integration and unification of tactics and technology at the legal level.
              

Seeking the advantage of the “odd” dimension in combining the odd and the regular

The odd and the even are a basic contradictory structure of tactics, with inherent identity. Without the odd, there is no even, and without the even, there is no odd; either the odd or the even, ever-changing. The choice of the odd and the even is the category of decision-centered warfare, and the application of the odd and the even is the category of action-centered warfare. In the 1990s, the theories of asymmetric warfare, non-contact warfare, and non-linear warfare were proposed. If “symmetric warfare, contact warfare, and linear warfare” are even, then “asymmetric warfare, non-contact warfare, and non-linear warfare” can be called odd. From the perspective of natural science, “symmetry, contact, and linear” are general, and “asymmetry, non-contact, and non-linear” are detailed. It is an inevitable requirement to grasp the dimension of “odd” in the combination of odd, odd, and even, and to seek the advantages of the “three nons”.

First, seek “asymmetric” advantages. “Symmetry” and “asymmetry” originally refer to the morphological characteristics of things or space. Symmetrical warfare is a battle between two troops of the same type, and asymmetric warfare is a battle between two different types of troops. The theory of asymmetric warfare requires the scientific and reasonable organization of troops, combat forces and weapon systems of different military services, deployment in a wide area, and the concentration of superior forces to deal a fatal blow to the enemy at the best combat opportunity, and then quickly redeploy the forces. Due to the limited combat power, the troops have positive asymmetric advantages and negative asymmetric disadvantages. Seeking asymmetric advantages and avoiding asymmetric disadvantages is the common expectation of the warring parties, which will lead to such a situation that the warring parties cycle back and forth between symmetry and asymmetry. Therefore, to seek “asymmetric” advantages, it is necessary to seek asymmetry in combat power, combat capability, combat command and other aspects, adhere to and carry forward “avoid the strong and attack the weak, avoid the real and attack the virtual”, “you fight yours, I fight mine”, and effectively play advantages and avoid disadvantages in asymmetry. For example, when weapons and equipment are symmetrical, strive to gain an asymmetric advantage in personnel capabilities; when forces are symmetrical, strive to gain an asymmetric advantage in command art.

The second is to seek “non-contact” advantages. “Contact” and “non-contact” are a description of the distance between different things. Contact in the military field is usually defined by the projection distance of weapons. The concept of “non-contact combat” originated from World War II and was created during the Cold War. The connotation of contact combat and non-contact combat changes with the change of the striking distance of weapons and equipment. The warring parties always seek to attack each other at a farther distance or in a wider space without being threatened. Since the 1990s, the theory of “non-contact combat” has been used in many local wars. Non-contact combat is a combat action style that implements long-range precision strikes outside the defense zone while being far away from the opponent. Non-contact combat embodies the idea of winning by technology, flexible mobility, and center of gravity strikes. With the rapid development of military science and technology, the armies of major countries in the world will have the ability to perceive and strike globally, and the connotation of “non-contact” will be further compressed to space, cognitive domain and other space fields. To this end, on the one hand, we must base ourselves on the reality of “contact combat”, learn from each other’s strengths and overcome our weaknesses in contact, and continuously accumulate advantages; on the other hand, we must expand the space for “non-contact combat”, seize the initiative and seize the opportunity in non-contact, and continuously expand our advantages.

The third is to seek “nonlinear” advantages. “Linear” and “nonlinear” usually refer to people’s thinking or behavior patterns. The movement of all things in the universe is complex and mostly nonlinear, while human cognition always tends to be simple, abstract, and linear, and has invented concepts such as logic lines, time lines, and linear mathematics. In military science, the transition from linear operations to nonlinear operations reflects the development and progress of military technology theory. Since the second half of the 20th century, nonlinear operations have been on the historical stage. Some scholars have pointed out that in linear operations, each unit mainly acts in a coordinated manner along a clear front line of its own side. The key is to maintain the relative position between its own units to enhance the safety of the units; in nonlinear operations, each unit simultaneously carries out combat operations from multiple selected bases along multiple combat lines. The key is to create specific effects at multiple decision points against the target. Linear operations mainly reflect the action-centered warfare idea, while nonlinear operations mainly reflect the target-centered warfare idea. To this end, on the one hand, we must deepen the use of linear warfare and make full use of its practical value in facilitating command, coordination and support; on the other hand, we must boldly try non-linear warfare and maximize its potential advantages of extensive mobility and full-dimensional jointness. (Yin Tao, Deng Yunsheng, Sun Dongya)

現代國語:

2023-09-27 11:58:xx

來源:光明軍事
自1990年代以來,網路中心戰、人員中心戰、行動中心戰、決策中心戰等多維度的中心戰概念先後被提出。多維度中心戰概念的演變,反映了依靠軍事科技優勢尋求平台效能、資訊賦能、決策智能等優勢的總體目標,更反映了人與裝、謀與技、奇與正等方面的對立統一關係。以中心式結構化思維辯證地認識這些對立統一關係,更便於掌握其戰術的本質內涵及其方法論意義。
強化人裝結合中「人」維度融合
人員中心戰與平台中心戰概念很大程度上反映的是人與武器裝備的關係。有的專門制定人維度策略,強調在戰鬥力的人維度進行持續投入,對於應對不確定的未來是最可靠的保障。進入21世紀以來,隨著智慧化武器裝備的快速發展,無人作戰異軍突起,對人的地位作用的質疑聲音此起彼伏,強化人維度的融合、增強人維度的合力勢在必行。
一是增強精神凝聚力。馬克思主義認為,意識是客觀物質在人腦中的反映。戰術是戰鬥經驗的表現與概括,本身俱有精神或意識上的形態,研究戰術自然要把精神因素放在第一位。有學者認為,戰爭從根本上來說仍然是人類意志的較量。在資訊化時代,人的精神更加豐富複雜,增強人維度精神上的凝聚力,挑戰和難度更高。增強人的精神凝聚力,需要統籌培養集體精神與個體精神,在引領集體精神中最大限度滿足個體精神需求,在培塑集體精神價值中實現個體精神追求,用一切可用、有用的信息賦能人的精神;需要統籌培養批判精神與創新精神,堅持辯證唯物論的戰術知識論,堅決反對戰術認識上的唯心論和機械論,不斷在批判中繼承、在繼承中創新;需要統籌培養戰鬥精神與科學精神,既要弘揚視死如歸、敢打必勝的革命精神,又要發揚科學制勝、技術制勝的精神。


二是增強組織結構力。組織是軍隊的器官,人是組織的細胞。不同國家軍事組織的設置有其特性,也有其共通性。例如普遍設有國防部,區分軍種結構、層級結構與區域結構,區分平時編制與戰時編成。儘管建與戰在目的上是一致的,但是建的統一性與戰的彈性在要求上不盡相同。增強組織結構力進而促進戰建一致,需要暢通縱向指揮鏈路,合理界定指揮權與領導權、指揮權與控制權,做到政令相長,增強組織的縱向結構力;需要打通橫向協同管道,探索建立常態化的跨領域(組織、機構、部門)協同途徑,改變單純的任務式協同模式,增強組織的橫向結構力;需要健全平戰轉換機制,重點關注部隊領導權或指揮權變更中組織銜接、調整和健全等工作,保持組織結構網絡的穩定性、可靠性。
三是增強物質保障力。戰鬥中人的精神力量可以轉化為物質力量,但精神力量也離不開物質力量的支撐。增強物質保障力進而實現物質與精神的有機統一,需要像為決策保障情報、為槍砲保障彈藥、為車輛保障油料一樣,保障好戰鬥裝具、被裝、伙食、醫療,建設好學習場地、訓練設施和再教育渠道,提供好戰條令、生理醫學等方面技術服務,幫助設計多樣化個人化的能力提升計劃、職業發展規劃,為發展人的體能、技能和智能,進而全面提高人在未來不確定性戰場環境中的適應性和戰鬥力,提供堅強的物質和技術支撐。

深化戰技結合中「技」維度實踐
戰技結合是戰術運用的重要原則。其中的技術不僅包括實務操作層面的技術(如射擊技術),也包括理論應用層面的技術(如資訊科技)。可以認為,戰術、技術、藝術和程序共同構成了其「戰鬥方法論」。科學技術化和技術科學化是科學技術發展的重要特徵。深化戰技結合,需要正確掌握技術與戰術、藝術、程序的關係,不斷深化「技」維度實踐。


一是推動先進技術戰術化。技術決定戰術,是辯證唯物論戰術論的基本觀點。多維度中心戰概念的演變,也是技術推動戰術發展變革的例子。恩格斯曾指出:“軍隊的全部組織和作戰方式以及與之有關的勝負……,取決於居民的質與量和取決於技術。”然而,技術推動戰術具有“滯後效應”,尤其在缺少實戰牽引的情況下。這就需要主動推進先進民用技術的軍事轉化和先進軍事技術的戰術應用。一方面,要積極引進民用先進技術,尤其要加速推進深度神經網路、量子通訊運算等尖端技術的引進吸收;另一方面,要加強先進技術裝備戰術訓練,把練技術與練戰術緊密結合起來,推動新裝備盡快形成新戰術和新戰力。
二是推動指揮藝術技術化。 「藝術」是一個具有較強主體性的概念。中外學者有的認為“指揮藝術根植於指揮官實施領導以最大限度提高績效的能力”,有的認為“指揮藝術是指揮官實施靈活巧妙和富有創造性指揮的方式與方法”。中外學者普遍將指揮視為藝術,主要原因在於:指揮儘管有作戰條令、上級命令和技術保障等客觀方面的依據和支撐,但更關鍵的因素在於指揮員的主觀能動性和創造性,而這是比較難以用技術手段加以量化的。隨著認知心理學、認知神經科學等學科和技術的發展,指揮的認知結構和作用機制將更加顯性化,「指揮藝術」的神秘面紗將逐漸退去,指揮藝術技術化將會成為必然趨勢。這需要不斷強化技術思維,持續深化人工智慧輔助指揮決策手段建設,持續深化人類大腦決策機理運用,切實用技術解構藝術,不斷推動指揮藝術技術化。


三是推動戰鬥技術條令化。不少學者把技術置於與戰術近乎同等重要的地位。這種堅持戰術條令化與兵種專業技術和專門戰鬥技術條令化的融合發展,是推動戰鬥條令體系化規範化建設,進而實現戰術與技術在法規層面融合統一的重要途徑。

謀求奇正結合中「奇」維度優勢
奇與正是戰術的一種基本矛盾結構,具有內在同一性。無奇便無正,無正也無奇;或奇或正,千變萬化。奇與正的選擇是決策中心戰的範疇,奇與正的運用是行動中心戰的範疇。 1990年代,非對稱作戰、非接觸作戰、非線式作戰理論被提出。若稱「對稱作戰、接觸作戰、線式作戰」為正,則可稱「非對稱作戰、非接觸作戰、非線式作戰」為奇。從自然科學角度來看,「對稱、接觸、線式」是概述的,「非對稱、非接觸、非線式」是詳實的。把握好奇正結合中「奇」的維度,謀取「三非」優勢是必然要求。
一是謀取「非對稱」優勢。 「對稱」與「非對稱」本來是對事物或空間的形態特徵的指稱。對稱作戰是兩種相同類型部隊之間的交戰,非對稱作戰是兩種不同類型部隊之間的交戰。非對稱作戰理論要求對不同軍兵種部隊、作戰力量和武器系統進行科學合理編組,在寬廣的地域展開部署,在最佳的作戰時機集中優勢力量給敵人以致命的打擊,然後迅速重新部署力量。由於作戰力量的有限性,部隊有正面的非對稱優勢,就有負面的非對稱劣勢。謀取非對稱優勢、規避非對稱劣勢是交戰雙方的共同期望,進而造成這樣一種局面──交戰雙方在對稱與非對稱之間往復循環。因此,謀取“非對稱”優勢,要謀取作戰力量、作戰能力、作戰指揮等多方面上的非對稱,堅持和發揚“避強擊弱、避實擊虛”“你打你的,我打我的”,在非對稱中有效發揮優勢、規避劣勢。例如,在武器裝備對稱時爭取佔據人員能力上的非對稱優勢,在力量對稱時爭取佔據指揮藝術上的非對稱優勢。
二是謀取「非接觸」優勢。 「接觸」與「非接觸」是對不同事物之間距離狀態的一種描述。軍事領域的接觸通常是以武器的投射距離來界定的。 「非接觸作戰」的概念起源於二戰,產生於冷戰時期。接觸作戰與非接觸作戰的內涵是隨著武器裝備打擊距離的改變而改變的。交戰雙方也總是謀求在免受威脅的更遠距離或更廣空間攻擊對方。自1990年代以來,「非接觸作戰」理論在多場局部戰爭中被運用。非接觸作戰是在遠離對方的情況下實施防區外遠程精確打擊的作戰行動樣式。非接觸作戰體現了技術制勝、靈活機動、重心打擊的思想。隨著軍事科技的快速發展,世界主要國家軍隊將具備全球感知和全球打擊的能力,「非接觸」的內涵將進一步壓縮至太空、認知域等太空領域。為此,一方面要立足「接觸作戰」實際,在接觸中取長補短、固強補弱,不斷積蓄勝勢;另一方面要拓展「非接觸作戰」空間,在非接觸中搶抓先手、搶佔先機,不斷拓展優勢。
三是謀取「非線式」優勢。 「線式」與「非線式」通常是指人的思維或行為模式。宇宙萬物運動是複雜的,大抵是非線式的,而人類的認知總是傾向於簡單的、抽象的、線式的,並發明了邏輯線、時間線以及線性數學等概念。軍事學中,從線式作戰到非線式作戰,反映了軍事技術理論的發展進步。 20世紀下半葉起,非線作戰就登上歷史舞台。有學者指出,線式作戰中各部隊主要沿著明確的己方前沿協調一致行動,關鍵是保持己方部隊之間的相對位置,以增強部隊的安全性;非線式作戰中各部隊從選定的多個基地沿多條作戰線同時實施作戰行動,關鍵是針對目標在多個決定點製造特定效果。線式作戰體現的主要是行動中心戰思想,非線式作戰體現的主要是目標中心戰思想。為此,一方面要深化運用線式作戰,充分利用其便於指揮、協同和保障的實用價值;另一方面要大膽嘗試非線式作戰,最大限度地發揮其廣泛機動、全維聯合的潛在優勢。 (殷濤、鄧雲生、孫東亞)

中國原創軍事資源:http://www.81it.com/2023/0927/14581888.html

A Comprehensive Look at Chinese Military Intelligent Warfare

全面檢視中國軍事智能化戰爭

現代英語:

Source: China Military Network-People’s Liberation Army Daily Author: Gao Kai and Chen Liang Editor-in-charge: Zhao Leixiang

2025-01-23 06:50:x

“Order dispatch”: a new style of precision strike

■Gao Kai, Chen Liang

Lenin once said, “If you don’t understand the times, you can’t understand war.” In recent years, the widespread use of information and intelligent technology in the military field has promoted the deep integration of technology and tactics, and has given birth to “order-based” precision strikes based on intelligent network information systems. Commanders and command agencies can generate strike list requirements based on combat missions. The decision-making system can intelligently match strike platforms, autonomously plan action paths, and scientifically select strike methods based on personalized needs such as strike time, combat space, and damage indicators, thereby quickly and accurately releasing strike effectiveness.

The operational characteristics of “order-to-order” precision strikes

As the informationization and intelligence of weapons and ammunition continue to improve, the cost of modern warfare is also increasing. How to use limited strike resources to achieve the best cost-effectiveness and maximize combat effectiveness has become a central issue for commanders and command agencies in combat planning. “Order-based” precision strikes can provide a “feasible solution” for this.

Instant optimization and precise energy release. Modern warfare places more emphasis on structural strikes and destruction of the enemy’s combat system, and achieves combat objectives by quickly and accurately releasing combat effectiveness. This requires commanders and command agencies to seize the fleeting “window” of opportunity and strike high-value, nodal, and key targets in the enemy’s combat system before the enemy responds. The traditional “discovery-guidance-strike-assessment” combat loop is time-consuming and has poor combat effectiveness. Therefore, “order-dispatching” precision strikes need to rely on advanced intelligent network information systems, do not pre-determine the strike platform, and publish a list of strike targets in real time. The auxiliary decision-making system quickly evaluates the strike performance of various weapon platforms and the expected damage to the target, autonomously assigns strike platform tasks, quickly links and regulates multi-domain firepower strike forces, and autonomously closes the kill chain to quickly strike key targets.

Multi-domain energy gathering and coordinated strike. The advantage of modern combat precision strikes over previous firepower strikes lies in the information-based and intelligent combat system, which does not require human intervention and relies on a closed strike chain to autonomously complete tasks such as “detection, control, attack, and evaluation”. It can not only save the cost of strikes and reduce resource waste, but also achieve adaptive coordination based on unified combat standards. Therefore, the “order-to-order” precision strike requires the firepower strike forces distributed in various combat fields to establish a unified standard grid. As long as a demand is issued at one point, multiple points can respond and the overall linkage can be achieved. Forces and firepower can be flexibly concentrated, and multiple means and rapid multi-domain energy gathering can be used to determine the strike direction, strike order, and strike method of each strike platform on the move. Through system integration, time can be effectively saved, and multi-domain precision strikes can be carried out on key node targets and key parts of core targets of the enemy, giving full play to the overall power of the superposition and integration of the combat effectiveness of each combat unit.

The attack must break the enemy’s system and be quick and decisive. Modern warfare is a “hybrid war” implemented simultaneously in multiple fields. The interweaving influence and confrontation of new domains and new qualities such as information, aerospace, and intelligence are more obvious. This requires both sides of the war to be able to discover and act one step faster than the enemy, destroy and paralyze the enemy’s combat system, and reduce the efficiency of the enemy’s system. On the one hand, it is necessary to accurately identify the nodes of the enemy system and instantly optimize and accurately strike; on the other hand, it is necessary to conceal one’s own intentions and strike forces, and strike quickly when the enemy is unprepared. “Order dispatch” type precision strikes can well meet these two requirements. With the support of network information systems, intelligent integration of firepower strike forces in various fields can be achieved, and multi-source information perception, data cross-linking, and multi-domain coordinated strikes can be achieved. The seamless and high-speed operation of “target perception-decision-making command-firepower strike-damage assessment” is realized, and information and firepower are highly integrated to quickly achieve combat objectives.

The system composition of “order dispatch” type precision strike

The “order-based dispatch” precision strike builds an efficient closed strike chain, compresses action time, improves strike effectiveness, enables various firepower strike platforms to better integrate into the joint firepower strike system, and provides fast and accurate battlefield firepower support. The key lies in the “network” and the focus is on the “four” systems.

Multi-domain platform access network. With the support of information and intelligent technology, an integrated information network system with satellite communication as the backbone will be established, and the firepower strike platforms distributed in the multi-dimensional battlefield will be integrated into the combat network to establish a battlefield “cloud”. Different combat modules will be distinguished, and “subnet clouds” such as “detection, control, attack, and evaluation” will be established. Relying on the integrated communication network chain, the “subnet cloud” will be linked to the “cloud”, which can enhance the firepower strike platform’s full-domain, full-time, on-the-go access, autonomous networking, and spectrum planning capabilities, and realize the network interconnection of firepower platforms, domain-based combat systems, and joint combat systems, as well as the interconnection of internal strike forces.

Joint reconnaissance and perception system. Relying on various reconnaissance and surveillance forces within the joint combat system, conduct all-weather, multi-directional, and high-precision battlefield perception of the combat area. This requires the construction of a full-dimensional reconnaissance and perception force system that exists in physical and logical spaces, tangible and intangible spaces, and the deployment of intelligent perception equipment over a wide area to form an intelligence data “cloud”. Through the intelligence data “cloud”, the enemy situation is analyzed, the key points of the enemy combat system and time-sensitive targets are found, and the reconnaissance information is updated in real time to show the dynamics of the target.

Intelligent command and decision-making system. Relying on a new command and control system with certain intelligent control capabilities, various planning and analysis models are constructed to expand functions such as intelligent intelligence processing, intelligent task planning, automatic command generation, and precise action control. Databases such as the target feature library, decision-making knowledge base, and action plan library are expanded and improved to strengthen the system support capabilities for task planning, action decision-making, and control in the process of combat organization and implementation, improve planning and decision-making and combat action control capabilities, clarify “how to fight, where to fight, and who will fight”, and achieve accurate “order dispatching”.

Distributed firepower strike system. Relying on the intelligent network information system, on the one hand, it integrates land, sea, air, space and other multi-dimensional firepower strike platforms, strengthens the functions of intelligent target identification and remote control strike, and realizes various combat methods such as remote control combat of combat units, manned and unmanned coordinated combat, and flexible and mobile combat; on the other hand, it can build a low-cost firepower strike platform mainly composed of low-altitude and ultra-low-altitude unmanned strike platforms such as crossing aircraft and cruise missiles. By adding different functional combat payloads, it can work closely with high-end firepower strike platforms to implement battlefield guidance, precision strikes, firepower assessment and other tasks, and efficiently complete the “order”.

Autonomous damage assessment system. Relying on the reconnaissance and surveillance forces within the joint combat system to build a damage assessment system, after the firepower platform completes the strike, it will autonomously conduct strike effect verification on the target. It mainly conducts real-time, dynamic, objective, and systematic analysis and evaluation of the target’s appearance, degree of functional loss, etc., and promptly transmits relevant information to decision-making and command centers at all levels through video images. The evaluation center will judge “how well the strike was” and whether it meets the expected damage requirements. If it does not meet the requirements, the combat operations can be adjusted in a timely manner and supplementary strikes can be carried out to provide strong support for maximizing combat effectiveness.

Planning and implementation of “order-based” precision strikes

The “order dispatch” type of precision strike is just like the way online ride-hailing services operate. Through a series of processes such as formatted “order” generation, intelligent object matching, and autonomous path planning, it independently completes the “OODA” combat cycle. Its actions are more efficient, the strikes are more precise, and the coordination is closer.

Firepower requirements are reported in real time, and combat units “submit orders” on demand. Reconnaissance elements distributed in different combat areas and multi-dimensional battlefield spaces use radar, optical, infrared and technical reconnaissance methods to form battlefield target intelligence information through wide-area multi-source detection. This information is connected to the battlefield information network through intelligence links and is transmitted to combat units anytime and anywhere. The combat units will perform correlation processing, multi-party comparison and verification, and comprehensively compile battlefield target information to generate accurate task “orders”. The combat unit analyzes the target value and connects to the decision-making platform on demand, builds an “order”-style closed strike chain, and submits task “orders” in real time to achieve in-motion optimization and precise adaptation.

Differentiate fire strike tasks, and the decision center intelligently “dispatches orders”. Through the battlefield information network and relying on the intelligent task planning system, the decision center can automatically parse the task “order” information data submitted by the combat unit, and automatically generate the task requirements such as the type and quantity of ammunition, strike method and damage index required for the fire strike action according to the nature, coordinate position, movement status, threat level, etc. of the battlefield target, and form a fire support task “order”. Through intelligent matching of the best firepower platform, link nodes are connected as needed, and intelligent command-based “dispatching” is carried out, which is immediately delivered to the firepower platform waiting for combat.

The firepower platform can “accept orders” immediately by matching the best targets at all times. The firepower platforms distributed at multiple points in the battlefield area can respond to “accept orders” immediately through the battlefield information network. The firepower platform and the combat unit can establish a chain autonomously, and directly establish a guided strike chain after mutual “identity” verification, coordinate and cooperate with the firepower strike operation, and adjust the strike method and shooting parameters in time according to the damage to the target after the strike and the dynamics of the battlefield target, and then carry out firepower strikes again until the “dispatching” task is completed. The firepower platform always follows the principle of “strike-transfer-strike-transfer”, completes the strike task, quickly moves the position, stays in a combat state at all times, and receives “orders” online in real time. After the task is completed, the guided strike chain between the firepower platform and the combat unit will be automatically cancelled.

Acquire damage information from multiple sources, and the assessment center will “evaluate” in real time. Comprehensively use long-distance information-based intelligent reconnaissance methods such as satellite reconnaissance, radar reconnaissance, and drone reconnaissance to implement multi-domain three-dimensional reconnaissance, obtain the target’s fire damage information in real time, and provide accurate assessments for precision fire strikes. Comprehensively determine the damage effect, conduct quantitative and qualitative evaluations of the strike effect, distinguish the three damage states of the target’s physical, functional, and system, and provide timely feedback to the decision-making center. According to the damage assessment results of the strike target, timely put forward control suggestions, adjust the fire strike plan, optimize combat operations, and achieve precise control of fire strikes, so that commanders can accurately control the combat process and achieve efficient command and control of the effectiveness of fire strikes.

現代國語:

「訂單派單」:精確打擊新樣式

■高 凱 陳 良

引言

列寧說過,「不理解時代,就不能理解戰爭」。近年來,資訊化智慧化技術在軍事領域的廣泛運用,促進了技術與戰術深度融合,依托智能化網絡資訊體系,催生出「訂單派單」式精確打擊。指揮員及指揮機關可依據作戰任務格式化產生打擊清單需求,決策系統依據打擊時間、作戰空間、毀傷指標等個性化需求智慧匹配打擊平台、自主規劃行動路徑、科學選擇打擊方式,進而快速精準釋放打擊效能。

「訂單派單」式精確打擊的作戰特點

隨著武器彈藥資訊化智慧化程度不斷提升,現代作戰成本也不斷提高。如何運用有限打擊資源打出最高效費比,實現作戰效能最大化,已成為指揮員及指揮機關作戰籌劃的中心問題,「訂單派單」式精確打擊可為此提供「可行解」。

即時聚優精確釋能。現代作戰更強調對敵作戰體系進行結構性打擊破壞,透過快速且精準地釋放作戰效能實現作戰目的。這就要求指揮員及指揮機關能夠抓住稍縱即逝時機的“窗口”,在敵未做出反應之時對其作戰體系內高價值、節點性、關鍵性目標實施打擊。傳統的「發現—引導—打擊—評估」的作戰環路耗時長,作戰效果不佳。因此,「訂單派單」式精確打擊,需要依托先進的智能化網絡信息體系,不預先確定打擊平台,實時發布打擊目標清單,由輔助決策系統對各種武器平台的打擊性能與目標打擊毀傷預期等進行快速評估,自主分配打擊平台任務,快速鏈接調節多領域火力打擊力量,自主閉合殺傷鏈,對關鍵目標實施快速打擊。

多域聚能協同打擊。現代作戰精確打擊較以往火力打擊的優勢在於資訊化智能化的作戰體系,無需人工介入,依托閉合打擊鏈自主完成「偵、控、打、評」等任務,不僅能夠節省打擊成本,減少資源浪費,還能夠實現基於統一作戰標準的自適應協同。因此,「訂單派單」式精確打擊,需要分佈在各作戰領域的火力打擊力量能夠建立統一標準網格,只要一點發出需求,就能夠多點響應、全局聯動,靈活集中兵力、火力,多手段、快速多域聚能,動中確定各打擊平台打擊方向、打擊次序以及打擊方式。透過體系整合有效節約時間,對敵關鍵節點目標以及核心目標的關鍵部位實施多域精確打擊,充分發揮各作戰單元作戰效能疊加融合的整體威力。

擊要破體速戰速決。現代作戰是在多領域同步實施的“混合戰爭”,資訊、空天、智慧等新域新質力量交織影響、對抗更加明顯。這就需要作戰雙方能夠快敵一秒發現、快敵一步行動,毀癱敵作戰體系、降低敵體系運作效率。一方面,要透過找準敵體系節點,即時聚優精準打擊;另一方面,要隱蔽己方企圖及打擊力量,乘敵不備快速打擊。 「訂單派單」式精確打擊能夠很好地契合這兩點需求,在網絡資訊系統的支撐下,智慧融合各領域火力打擊力量,實現資訊多源感知、數據相互交鏈、多域協同打擊,實現「目標感知—決策指揮—火力打擊—毀傷評估」無縫高速運轉,資訊火力高度融合,快速達成作戰目的。

「訂單派單」式精確打擊的體系構成

「訂單派單」式精確打擊通過構建高效閉合打擊鏈,壓縮行動時間,提高打擊效果,使各火力打擊平台能夠更好地融入聯合火力打擊體系,並提供快速精準的戰場火力支援,其關鍵在“網”,重點在“四個”系統。

多領域平台接取網。在資訊化智慧化技術支撐下,建立以衛星通訊為骨幹的一體化資訊網系,將分佈在多維域戰場的火力打擊平台融入作戰網絡建立戰場“雲”,區分不同作戰模塊,建立“偵、控、打、評”等“子網雲”,並依託一體化的通訊網鏈將“子網雲”鏈入“雲”,能夠提升火力打擊平台全局全時、動中接入、自主組網、頻譜規劃的能力,實現火力平台、分域作戰體係與聯合作戰體系的網絡互聯,以及內部打擊力量的互聯互通。

聯合偵察感知系統。依托聯合作戰體系內的各種偵察監視力量對作戰地域進行全天候、多方位、高精度戰場感知。這就要建立物理空間和邏輯空間、有形空間和無形空間泛在存在的全維域偵察感知力量系統,廣域佈設智能感知設備,形成情報數據“雲”,通過情報數據“雲”分析敵情態勢,找出敵作戰體系關鍵點以及時敏性目標,實時更新偵察信息,展現目標動態。

智慧指揮決策系統。依托具備一定智能控制能力的新型指控系統,構建各類籌劃分析模型,擴展情報智能處理、任務智能規劃、指令自動生成、行動精確控制等功能,擴充完善目標特徵庫、決策知識庫、行動預案庫等數據庫,強化戰鬥組織與實施過程中的任務規劃、行動決策和控制的系統支撐能力,提升行動籌劃決策和明確行動能力,誰來打」

分佈火力打擊系統。依托智能網絡資訊系統,一方面,融入陸、海、空、天等多維域火力打擊平台,強化目標智能識別、遠程遙控打擊等功能,實現作戰單元遠程遙控作戰、有人無人協同作戰、靈活機動作戰等多種作戰方式;另一方面,可構建以穿越機、巡導彈等低空超低空無人打擊平台為主的低成本火力打擊平台,通過加掛不同功能作戰載荷,與高端火力打擊平台密切協同來實施戰場引導、精確打擊、火力評估等任務,高效完成“訂單”。

自主毀傷評估系統。依托聯合作戰體系內的偵察監視力量建構毀傷評估系統,在火力平台打擊完畢後,自主對目標實施打擊效果核查。主要就目標的外觀狀態、功能喪失程度等進行實時、動態、客觀、系統的分析和評估,並及時通過視頻圖像的方式將相關信息返回至各級決策指揮中心,由評估中心判斷“打得怎麼樣”,是否達到預期毀傷要求。如不符合,可適時調控作戰行動,進行補充打擊,為最大限度釋放作戰效能提供強力支撐。

「訂單派單」式精確打擊的規劃實施

「訂單派單」式精確打擊就如同網約車的運作方式一樣,透過格式化「訂單」生成、智能化對象匹配、自主化路徑規劃等一系列流程,自主完成「OODA」作戰循環,其行動更為高效、打擊更為精準、協同更為密切。

實時提報火力需求,作戰單元按需「提單」。分佈在不同作戰地域、多維戰場空間的偵察要素,通過雷達、光學、紅外和技術偵察等方式,廣域多源偵獲形成戰場目標情報資訊。這些資訊依托情報鏈路接入戰場資訊網,隨時隨地被傳至作戰單元,由作戰單元進行關聯處理、多方對比印證,綜合整編戰場目標訊息,產生精確的任務「訂單」。作戰單元分析目標價值按需連通決策平台,建立“訂單”式閉合打擊鏈,實時提報任務“訂單”,實現動中集優、精準適配。

區分火力打擊任務,決策中心智能「派單」。決策中心通過戰場資訊網,依托智能任務規劃系統,能夠自動解析作戰單元提報的任務“訂單”信息數據,根據戰場目標性質、坐標方位、移動狀態、威脅程度等,自動生成火力打擊行動所需彈種彈量、打擊方式和毀傷指標等任務要求,形成火力支援任務“訂單”,通過智能匹配最佳火力平台,連通式鏈路節點,按需送飛機服務“訂單”。

全時匹配最優目標,火力平台快速即時「接單」。多點分佈在戰場區域內的火力平台,通過戰場信息網迅即響應“接單”,火力平台與作戰單元之間自主建鏈,相互核驗“身份”後直接建立引導打擊鏈,協同配合火力打擊行動,並根據打擊後目標毀傷情況以及戰場目標動態,及時調整打擊方式、射擊參數等,而後再次實施火力打擊,直至完成“派單”任務。火力平台始終遵循「打擊—轉移—打擊—轉移」的原則,完成打擊任務,迅即轉移陣地,全時保持待戰狀態,實時在線接收「訂單」。任務結束後,火力平台與作戰單元之間的引導打擊鏈會自動取消。

多源獲取毀傷訊息,評估中心即時「評單」。綜合運用衛星偵察、雷達偵察、無人機偵察等遠距離資訊化智能化偵察手段,實施多域立體偵察,實時獲取目標的火力毀傷訊息,為開展精確火力打擊提供準確評估。綜合判定毀傷效果,對打擊效果進行定量和定性評估,區分目標物理、功能和系統三種毀傷狀態,及時回饋至決策中心。根據打擊目標的毀傷評估結果,適時提出調控建議,調整火力打擊計畫,優化作戰行動,實現對火力打擊的精確控制,便於指揮員精準把控作戰進程,達成對火力打擊效能的高效指揮控制。

資料來源:中國軍網-解放軍報 作者:高凱 陳亮 責任編輯:趙雷翔
2025-01-23 06:50:xx

中國原創軍事資源:http://www.81.cn/ll_208543/16365873888.html

What strategic risks will military artificial intelligence bring to the game between China and the United States?


軍事人工智慧將為中美博弈帶來哪些戰略風險?

現代英語:

2023-10-24 10:21:32Source: Military High-Tech Online
In July 2023, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) released a report titled US-China Competition and Military AI: US-China Competition and Military AI, which explores how the United States can effectively manage a series of strategic risks caused by the militarization of artificial intelligence in Sino-US relations against the backdrop of intensified Sino-US competition and rapid development of artificial intelligence technology. It also conducts an in-depth analysis of the possible paths by which military artificial intelligence can intensify the strategic risks between China and the United States, the options for the United States to manage the strategic risks of military artificial intelligence, and the related measures and recommendations. The report has great reference value, so the original content is compiled as follows for readers to learn and communicate.

Five ways military AI exacerbates strategic risks between China and the United States


How will emerging military artificial intelligence exacerbate strategic risks between China and the United States? The report discusses five possible impact paths and attempts to analyze and predict this issue.

1. Reshaping the Sino-US Military Balance
The report points out that in the process of militarized application of artificial intelligence, the imbalance of military strength between the competing parties caused by the unilateral improvement of military strength is most likely to aggravate the strategic risks between China and the United States. In the short term, military artificial intelligence will still be mainly used to improve the equipment maintenance, military logistics, personnel training and decision support of the military, and play an auxiliary and beneficial role, but these “behind-the-scenes” tasks, like front-line troops and weapons, constitute the basis of military strength. In addition, some emerging military artificial intelligence systems will also improve the combat capabilities of the troops. For example, the “loyal wingman” system based on human-machine collaboration can help improve the pilot’s mission, although this improvement may be incremental rather than revolutionary, and compared with fully autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles, the “loyal wingman” has limited effect on the transformation of the air combat paradigm. But there is no doubt that the military strength of the party that takes the lead in the military application of artificial intelligence will develop rapidly, and the rise and fall of this may push the military balance between China and the United States into a new stage, causing panic and concern for the lagging party.

2. Profound impact on information acquisition and strategic decision-making
The report believes that military artificial intelligence may increase strategic risks in the decision-making and information fields in three main ways: first, compressing decision-making time. If artificial intelligence can help one party make decisions faster, the other party may make hasty decisions in order to keep up with the opponent’s actions. This time pressure may exacerbate tensions and even create a new crisis; second, inducing decision makers to make wrong decisions. The decision-making process of the artificial intelligence system is in a technical “black box”. If there is a lack of clear understanding of the operating mechanism and defects of the artificial intelligence system, major strategic decisions may ultimately be based on the analysis of maliciously fabricated, distorted information or other low-quality information; third, influencing the opponent’s cognition through large-scale information activities, using artificial intelligence to generate massive amounts of directional text, audio, images or videos, undermining political stability, confusing high-level decision-making, creating alliance rifts, and triggering or aggravating political crises.

3. Autonomous weapon systems
First, if autonomous weapon systems provide greater military capabilities, decision makers may be more inclined to use force because they believe they have a higher chance of winning. Second, military operations using autonomous weapon systems have lower expected risks in terms of casualties, which may make leaders on both sides more likely to take action. Third, autonomous weapon technology will greatly enhance the combat capabilities of existing weapon systems, such as enabling hypersonic weapons to have the autonomy to maneuver and change their trajectories, making it more difficult for the enemy to intercept; or using machine learning to improve the predictive capabilities of air defense systems, making it possible to deploy anti-hypersonic and other high-end missile defense systems, and empowering users with greater military strength. Finally, autonomous drone swarms can theoretically provide new options for conventional counterattacks against an opponent’s nuclear arsenal. This potential capability may disrupt the strategic balance and increase the risk of strategic misjudgments.

4. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Military AI has already provided new tools for completing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, and may play an even greater role in the future. The combination of military AI and existing technologies can greatly improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of completing ISR missions. For example, AI can be combined with balloons or microsatellite constellations to conduct surveillance in “near-Earth space” or enable clustering of reconnaissance drones. AI systems can also process data from a variety of sensors on a large scale to track mobile missile systems on land and even submarines in the ocean. If these capabilities become a reality, they will provide military leaders with one-way transparency that can undermine strategic stability, thereby completely undermining the survivability of the opponent’s triad nuclear forces, and greatly increase the possibility and necessity of the weaker party to take a “preemptive” strike.


5. Command, Control, and Communications (C3)
AI can make cyber and electromagnetic warfare (EW) attacks more threatening and destructive. As big data inputs become increasingly important in AI training, both sides may intentionally degrade system performance by modifying or fine-tuning data sets to “poison” their opponents, which may lead to uncertainties or predictable failures in AI command, control, and communication systems that can be exploited by opponents. Another specific concern is that military AI may affect the C3 systems of nuclear weapons. Nuclear early warning systems will increasingly rely on AI technology to quickly analyze data from various sensors, but the system may misinterpret the data and generate false alarms, which may result in a brutal nuclear war that will hurt both sides.

II. Three options for the United States to manage strategic risks of military artificial intelligence

The report points out that the United States needs to take a series of measures to guard against the various potential dangers that military artificial intelligence brings to the bilateral security relations between China and the United States. These sources of risk may overlap in reality, and risk portfolio management aims to reduce a variety of different drivers of instability. The report discusses three options for managing and controlling the strategic risks of military artificial intelligence.

1. Restricting the development of China’s military AI technology
The report emphasizes that one way that artificial intelligence may exacerbate the risk of escalation is that it provides a large enough military advantage for one party to convince the country that it can wage war and achieve its goals at an acceptable cost. Therefore, the United States needs to try to prevent China’s artificial intelligence technology from developing and avoid the balance of military power from tilting in favor of China. At the same time, vigorously develop the United States’ artificial intelligence capabilities so that it always stays in a leading position and forms a technological advantage deterrence. At present, the United States focuses on preventing China’s military artificial intelligence development, mainly on advanced semiconductors, an important hardware that supports artificial intelligence systems, while restricting data, algorithms and talents in a targeted manner. For example, the U.S. government’s crackdown on TikTok (the overseas version of Douyin) is partly due to concerns that Americans’ data may be used to promote China’s artificial intelligence technology. The United States will also strictly regulate the source code of artificial intelligence algorithms used for geospatial analysis, and further restrict the output or disclosure of general algorithms such as facial recognition software and large language models. In terms of talent policy, the U.S. government will take further measures to prevent Chinese students from studying artificial intelligence technology in the United States.

2. Strengthen unilateral responsibility management and responsibly control military artificial intelligence
The report points out that minimizing civilian casualties should be a key design principle for military AI, and the best way to reduce the risks of military AI is to place the safety and reliability of the system on an equal footing with its lethality or efficiency, and to strictly implement testing and evaluation, verification and validation. To minimize uncertainty, China and the United States need to adopt safe design principles. The United States has formulated a series of unilateral declarative policies on the development and use of military AI. The U.S. Department of Defense’s “Artificial Intelligence Principles: Several Recommendations on the Ethics of the Department of Defense’s Artificial Intelligence Applications” requires the U.S. military to be “responsible, fair, traceable, reliable and controllable” when using AI. These core principles have been reiterated and supplemented in subsequent documents, such as the “Responsible Artificial Intelligence Practice Guide”, “Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway”, and the “Autonomous Weapon System Directive” (DoD Directive 3000.09) issued in January 2023, which stipulate how to use AI and integrate it into the entire life cycle of defense projects.


3. Conduct bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to reduce strategic risks
Another way to prevent dangerous power imbalances, costly arms races, or miscalculations is to engage in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. By negotiating arms control agreements or confidence-building measures, countries can try to set boundaries for the development or use of specific military technologies and then verify compliance. China and the United States should discuss limits on risky applications of AI, such as regulating its use in nuclear command and control or offensive cyber operations. The U.S. and Chinese governments can use bilateral and multilateral channels to exchange views on the impact of AI on national security. The U.S. and Chinese militaries can also engage in dialogues in which both sides raise questions about the military capabilities of AI and its uses, and communicate on rules of engagement, operational conflicts, and other topics to fully express their respective demands and expectations. In addition to official channels, the two countries can also use 1.5-track and 2-track dialogues to enhance understanding and consensus.

III. Nine recommendations for U.S. policymakers in the report
The emergence of military artificial intelligence may intensify competition between China and the United States and increase strategic risks. In order to effectively respond to this trend, the report believes that US policymakers should make efforts in nine aspects.

1. Restricting the development of artificial intelligence in relevant countries
The report recommends that U.S. policymakers continue to restrict the export of semiconductor production equipment and technology, advanced chips and other terminal products to China, hindering relevant countries from advancing military artificial intelligence. In addition, it is recommended that the United States find or develop creative tools to regulate artificial intelligence and its data, algorithms, and manpower. It is also recommended that the United States clearly develop military and dual-use artificial intelligence technologies, and continuously improve its policies to ensure effectiveness, while being vigilant against policies that restrict technological development.

2. Maintaining America’s Lead in Military AI
The report points out that the United States must act quickly to keep up with the development of China’s military artificial intelligence. This requires reforms in many areas, such as making “resilience” a key attribute of military systems. To succeed in this regard, not only the Department of Defense must make efforts, but also update immigration and education policies to attract, train and retain the best scientists and engineers from around the world.

3. Develop, promulgate, and implement responsible military AI norms or regulations
The United States should position itself as the leading global driver of military AI technology development, operational norms, and best practices. Key U.S. priorities in the near term should include further fleshing out the operational details of norms for conducting cyber attacks (including AI) on nuclear C3 infrastructure and fulfilling the commitments of the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). In short, U.S. actions must match its rhetoric on the responsible use of military AI.


4. Proactively engage with allies, partners, and multilateral institutions
Regional and global partnerships play a vital role in achieving U.S. strategic goals. The United States should actively integrate consultations on relevant issues into its alliances and partnerships, expand the scope of discussion in the G7, NATO, AUKUS, and bilateral relations with Japan and South Korea, and actively promote and advocate the U.S. position in multilateral forums.

5. Consult with China on reducing risks and building trust related to military AI
The report suggests that the United States could try to expand negotiation channels with China on military artificial intelligence, such as developing a vocabulary of military artificial intelligence terms between China and the United States to ensure that both sides have common definitions of key concepts and reduce misunderstandings caused by language and cultural barriers. The two sides can also formulate risk levels based on artificial intelligence capabilities, such as defining artificial intelligence related to logistics support as a low risk level and autonomous nuclear weapon artificial intelligence as a high risk level. Further discuss the application areas of artificial intelligence and stipulate the use of artificial intelligence in lethal weapons. Even if the negotiations between the two sides do not achieve the expected results, exploring these issues will help enhance mutual understanding.

6. Continue to seek to establish a strategic risk and crisis management mechanism between China and the United States
Establishing effective diplomatic channels between China and the United States, especially maintaining contacts at the summit level, is crucial to reducing strategic risks and managing potential crises. The report recommends that the United States continue to explore the establishment of a strategic risk and crisis management mechanism between China and the United States. Even if it works intermittently, it is better than having no mechanism at all.

7. Make military AI a fundamental pillar of diplomacy with China related to nuclear weapons and strategic stability
Military artificial intelligence plays an increasingly important role in the balance between nuclear capabilities and other strategic capabilities. The report recommends that the United States initiate discussions on “strategic stability” at the level of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and include military artificial intelligence in the negotiations.

8. Reducing strategic risks in other areas
The report believes that the United States should take measures as soon as possible to reduce strategic risks in other related areas and take unilateral actions with caution, such as postponing intercontinental ballistic missile tests when tensions escalate, especially when immediate testing is not required to ensure a safe, reliable and effective nuclear deterrence.

9. Strengthening Intelligence Collection, Analysis and Assessment
The direction of the development of military artificial intelligence depends not only on itself, but also on its interaction with nuclear weapons, military infrastructure, communication capabilities and other factors. Therefore, it is urgent to deepen the understanding of the overall strategic stability related to military artificial intelligence. The report recommends that the United States instruct relevant organizations to improve or, when necessary, establish multidisciplinary offices and expert backbones to pay close attention to China’s civilian and military artificial intelligence activities, monitor and analyze intelligence related to the issue, and provide recommendations.

IV. Conclusion
The military application of artificial intelligence may increase strategic risks, and countries need to work together to explore and regulate the development of artificial intelligence technology. In the face of the opportunities and challenges that artificial intelligence technology brings to human society, countries should use dialogue to dispel suspicion, replace confrontation with cooperation, and work together to promote good laws and good governance in the field of artificial intelligence, so that artificial intelligence technology can truly benefit mankind.

Text | Wen Lihao, Chen Lin (National University of Defense Technology)

現代國語:

2023年7月,新美國安全中心(CNAS)推出報告《中美關係與軍事人工智慧:美國如何在與中國的競爭中管控風險》(U.S.-China Competition and Military AI: U.S.-China Competition and Military AI),探討在中美博弈加劇和人工智慧技術迅速發展背景下,美國如何在中美關係中有效管控由人工智慧軍事化引發的一系列戰略風險,就軍事人工智慧加劇中美戰略風險的可能路徑、美國管控軍事人工智慧戰略風險的可選方案和相關措施建議展開了深入分析。報告具有較大參考價值,故將原文內容編譯如下,供讀者學習交流。

圖1:原報告封面
一、軍事人工智慧加劇中美間戰略風險的五條路徑
新興軍事人工智慧究竟會以何種方式加劇中美間的戰略風險?報告討論了五種可能的影響路徑,試圖對此問題進行分析和預測。
(一)重塑中美軍事平衡
報告指出,在人工智慧軍事化應用過程中,由於軍事實力單方面提高而造成的競爭雙方軍事實力失衡最有可能加劇中美戰略風險軍事人工智慧短期內仍將主要用於改善軍隊的裝備維護、軍事後勤、人員培訓和決策支援等過程,發揮輔助性增益性作用,但這些「幕後」任務與前線部隊和武器一樣,構成了軍事實力的基礎。此外,一些新興軍事人工智慧系統也將提高部隊的作戰能力,例如基於人機協同的「忠誠僚機」系統能夠幫助提高飛行員的任務度,儘管這種改進可能是漸進式而非革命性的,且相比完全自主的無人駕駛飛行器,「忠誠僚機」對空戰範式的變革作用有限。但毫無疑問的是,率先進行人工智慧軍事應用的一方,其軍事實力將快速發展,此消彼長間可能推動中美軍事平衡進入新階段,引發落後方的恐慌和擔憂。
(二)深刻影響資訊取得與策略決策
報告認為,軍事人工智慧或將主要以三種方式增加決策和資訊領域產生的戰略風險:一是壓縮決策時間,如果人工智慧可以幫助一方更快決策,那麼另一方可能會為了跟上對手的行動而倉促決策,這種時間壓力可能會加劇緊張局勢甚至製造一場新的危機;二是誘導決策者做出錯誤決策,人工智慧系統的決策過程處於技術「黑箱」中,如果對人工智慧系統的運作機制和缺陷缺乏清晰認知,重大戰略決策最終可能會建立在對被惡意捏造、扭曲的信息或其他劣質信息的分析的基礎上;三是通過大規模信息活動影響對手認知,借助人工智能生成海量含有指向性的文本、音頻、圖像或視頻,破壞政治穩定、混淆高層決策、製造同盟痕痕,引發或加劇同盟痕痕,引發政治危機。

圖2:基於人工智慧的「深度偽造」技術已經能夠快速產生海量的偽造訊息
(三)自主武器系統
首先,如果自主武器系統提供了更強的軍事能力,決策者將可能更傾向於使用武力,因為他們相信獲勝的機會會更高。其次,使用自主武器系統的軍事行動在人員傷亡方面的預期風險較低,這可能會讓雙方領導人更有可能採取行動。再一次,自主武器技術將極大增強現有武器系統的作戰能力,例如使高超音波速武器具備機動變軌的自主性,令敵更難攔截;或藉助機器學習提高防空系統的預測能力,使反高超音波速和其他高端飛彈防禦系統的部署成為可能,為使用方賦能更強的軍事實力。最後,具備自主性的無人機群理論上可以為針對對手核武庫的常規反擊提供新的選擇,這種潛在能力將可能打破戰略平衡,加劇戰略誤判的風險。
(四)情報、監視與偵察(ISR)
軍事人工智慧已經為完成情報、監視和偵察任務提供了新的工具,並且在未來可能會發揮更大作用。軍事人工智慧與現有技術的結合,可以大幅提高完成ISR任務的效率和性價比。例如將人工智慧與氣球或微衛星星座結合,以在「近地空間」進行監視,或為偵察無人機賦能群集性。人工智慧系統還可以大規模處理來自各種感測器的數據,以追蹤陸地上的移動飛彈系統甚至大洋中的潛艇。如果這些能力成為現實,它們將為軍事實力領導者提供能夠破壞戰略穩定性的單向透明度,進而徹底損害對手三位一體核力量的生存能力,也能極大增加弱勢方採取「先發製人」打擊的可能性和必要性。

圖3:自主武器系統應該掌握「開火權」嗎?
(五)指揮、控制與通信(C3)
人工智慧可以使網路和電磁戰(EW)攻擊更具威脅性和破壞性。隨著大數據輸入在人工智慧訓練中變得越來越重要,雙方都可能會透過修改或微調資料集來故意降低系統性能進而達到「毒害」對手的目的,這可能導致人工智慧指揮、控制和通訊系統的不確定性或可預測故障,被對手利用。另一個具體擔憂是,軍事人工智慧可能會影響核武的C3系統。核子預警系統將越來越依賴人工智慧技術來快速分析來自各種感測器的數據,但該系統可能會錯誤解讀數據,產生誤報,其結果可能引發兩敗俱傷的殘酷核戰。
二、美國管控軍事人工智慧戰略風險的三種方案
報告指出,美國需要採取一系列措施來防範軍事人工智慧對中美雙邊安全關係帶來的各種潛在危險,這些風險來源在現實中可能重疊,風險組合管理旨在減少多種不同的不穩定驅動因素,報告在此討論了管控軍事人工智慧戰略風險的三種方案。
(一) 限制中國軍事人工智慧技術發展
報告強調,人工智慧可能加劇風險升級的一種途徑是它為一方提供足夠大的軍事優勢,使該國相信它可以以可接受的成本發動戰爭並實現其目標。因此,美國需要設法阻止中國人工智慧技術發展,避免軍事力量平衡向有利於中國的方向傾斜。同時,大力發展美國的人工智慧能力,使其始終處於領先地位,形成技術優勢威懾。目前,美國阻止中國軍事人工智慧發展的重點主要集中在支援人工智慧系統的重要硬體——先進半導體上,同時有針對性地從數據、演算法和人才方面加以限制。例如美國政府對TikTok(海外版抖音)的打壓,部分原因是擔心美國人的數據可能被用來推動中國人工智慧技術進步。美國也將對用於地理空間分析的人工智慧演算法原始碼進行嚴格監管,並進一步限制臉部辨識軟體、大型語言模型等通用演算法的輸出或揭露。在人才政策方面,美國政府會採取進一步措施,阻止中國學生在美國學習人工智慧技術。

圖4:美國藉口「國家安全」打壓TikTok
(二) 加強單邊責任管理,負責任管控軍事人工智慧
報告指出,最小化平民傷亡應作為軍事人工智慧的關鍵設計原則,降低軍事人工智慧風險的最佳方法是將系統的安全性和可靠性與其殺傷力或效率放在同等重要的位置,並嚴格執行測試和評估、驗證和確認。為了最大限度地減少不確定性,中國和美國需要採用安全的設計原則。美國就軍事人工智慧的開發和使用制定了一系列單方面的宣言性政策。美國國防部《人工智慧原則:國防部人工智慧應用倫理的若干建議》要求美軍在使用人工智慧時做到「負責、公平、可追溯、可靠和可控」。這些核心原則在後續發布的文件中得到了重申和補充,如《負責任的人工智慧實踐指南》、《負責任的人工智慧戰略和實施途徑》以及2023年1月發布的《自主武器系統指令》(DoD Directive 3000.09 ),這些文件規定瞭如何使用人工智慧並將其融入國防專案的整個生命週期。
(三)進行雙邊與多邊外交,降低戰略風險
防止危險的力量失衡、代價高昂的軍備競賽或誤判的另一種方式是進行雙邊和多邊外交。透過談判達成軍備控制協議或建立信任措施,各國可以嘗試為特定軍事技術的開發或使用設定界限,然後核查遵守情況。中國和美國應該討論對人工智慧風險應用的限制,例如規範其在核指揮與控製或進攻性網路行動中的使用。美國和中國政府可以利用雙邊和多邊管道,就人工智慧對國家安全的影響交換意見。中美兩軍也可以展開對話,雙方就人工智慧的軍事能力及其用途提出問題,並就交戰規則、行動衝突和其他主題進行溝通,充分錶達各自訴求和期望。除官方管道外,兩國還可利用1.5軌與2軌對話,增進理解與共識。
三、報告為美國決策層提供的九項措施建議
軍事人工智慧的出現可能會加劇中美競爭,增加戰略風險。為了有效因應這一趨勢,報告認為美國的政策制定者應該從9個面向進行努力。
(一)限制相關國家人工智慧的發展
報告建議美國政策制定者繼續限制半導體生產設備和技術、先進晶片等終端產品的對華出口,阻礙相關國家推動軍事人工智慧。此外,也建議美國尋找或開發監管人工智慧和其數據、演算法、人力的創意工具。明確發展人工智慧軍用和軍民兩用技術,並不斷改善其政策,確保有效性,同時警惕政策為技術發展帶來限制。
(二) 維持美國軍事人工智慧的領先地位
報告指出,美國必須迅速採取行動,跟上中國軍事人工智慧的發展速度。這需要在許多領域進行改革,例如,將「韌性」作為軍事系統的關鍵屬性。要想在這方面取得成功,不僅國防部要做出努力,還需要更新移民和教育政策,吸引、訓練和留住世界各地最優秀的科學家和工程師。
(三) 制定、頒布、實施負責任的軍事人工智慧規範或法規
美國應將自己定位為軍事人工智慧技術開發、操作規範制定和最佳實踐的全球主要推動者。美國近期的主要優先事項應包括進一步充實在核C3基礎設施上實施網路攻擊(包括人工智慧)規範的操作細節,並履行2022年《核態勢評估報告》(Nuclear Posture Review,NPR)的承諾。簡而言之,美國的行動必須與其在負責任地使用軍事人工智慧的言論相符。

圖5:美國自2018年起對華為展開全方位打壓
(四) 主動與盟友、夥伴以及多邊機構接觸
區域和全球夥伴關係在促成美國戰略目標完成方面發揮著至關重要的作用。美國應積極將相關議題的磋商納入其同盟和夥伴關係,擴大G7、北約、AUKUS及與日本和韓國雙邊關係的討論範圍,積極推進、倡導美國在多邊論壇中的立場。
(五)與中國就降低軍事人工智慧相關風險和建立信任進行磋商
報告建議,美國可以嘗試拓展與中國建立軍事人工智慧的談判管道,如開發中美軍事人工智慧術語詞彙表,保證雙方對關鍵概念有共同的定義,減少語言和文化障礙造成的誤解。雙方還可以基於人工智慧能力製定風險等級,例如將後勤保障相關的人工智慧確定為低風險等級,將自主核武人工智慧確定為高風險等級。進一步討論人工智慧應用領域,同時規定人工智慧在致命武器中的使用規範。即使雙方的談判不會達成預期結果,探討這些問題也有助於增進對彼此的理解。
(六) 持續尋求建立中美策略風險與危機管理機制
建立有效的中美外交管道,尤其是保持首腦層級的聯繫,對降低策略風險、管理潛在的危機至關重要。報告建議美國要持續探索建立中美戰略風險和危機管理機制,即使是間歇性發揮作用,也勝過沒有機制。
(七) 使軍事人工智慧成為與核武和戰略穩定相關的對華外交基本支柱
軍事人工智慧在核子能力與其他戰略能力的平衡方面發揮著越來越重要的作用。報告建議,由美國在聯合國五個常任理事國層級發起推動「戰略穩定」的討論,並將軍事人工智慧納入談判。
(八)降低其他領域的策略風險
報告認為,美國應盡快採取措施,減低其他相關領域的戰略風險,謹慎採取單邊行動。例如在局勢緊張加劇時推遲洲際彈道飛彈試射,特別是在不需要立即進行試驗來確保安全、可靠和有效的核威懾的情況下。
(九)強化情報蒐集、分析與評估
軍事人工智慧的發展走向不僅取決於它本身,還取決於它與核武、軍事基礎設施、通訊能力等因素之間的相互作用,因此迫切需要加深對軍事人工智慧相關的整體戰略穩定性的理解。報告建議美國責成相關組織完善或在需要時建立多學科辦公室和專家骨幹,密切關注中國的民用及軍事人工智慧活動,監測、分析與該問題相關的情報,並給予建議。
四、結 語
人工智慧軍事應用可能加劇戰略風險,需要各國攜手對人工智慧技術發展加以探索和規制。面對人工智慧技術為人類社會帶來的機會與挑戰,各國應以對話打消猜忌,以合作取代對立,並攜手推動人工智慧領域依良法、促善治,使人工智慧技術真正造福人類。

文 | 文力浩、陳琳(國防科技大學)

中國原創軍事資源:http://www.81it.com/2023/1024/14640888.html

To Win an Information-based and Intelligent War, Chinese Military Must Find the Integration Point of Theory and Technology for Innovative Tactics

打贏資訊化智慧化戰爭,我軍必須找到理論與技術的結合點,實現戰術創新

現代英語:

2023-05-09 11:38:45

Source: China Military Network-People’s Liberation Army Daily

Find the integration point of theory and technology for innovative tactics

Li Jiyong Zou Li

Tactics, or combat methods, refer to strategies and techniques used in combat. To innovate tactics, we must not only think deeply about “strategies”, but also delve into “techniques”. If we have “strategies” but no “techniques”, we will have the will but not the strength; if we have “techniques” but no “strategies”, we will work hard but not get the method. We must have both strategic guidance and technical support to win every battle. To win the informationized and intelligentized wars and carry out tactics innovation that prioritizes strategy and wins with wisdom, we must use both “strategies” and “techniques” to effectively solve the problems of the disconnection between theoretical innovation and technological application, and the derailment between combat operations and technological paths.

Thinking and cognition “integration”. The rapid development of modern science and technology is driving future operations to evolve into high-end warfare. It is necessary to seize the commanding heights of theory and create new technological advantages. The deep integration of theory and technology to innovate tactics is the key to winning on the battlefield. As the main body of tactics innovation, soldiers must have a deep understanding of the winning mechanism of modern warfare, root the concept of theory and technology integration, and expand the thinking of theory and technology integration. At present, two prominent problems and tendencies deserve attention: First, the lack of scientific and technological literacy can easily lead to a shallow understanding of the new form of war. Only based on past experience and routines to study tactics, which technologies in the combat system work, which technologies are really useful, where to start with the formation of technological advantages over the enemy, what technical differences exist with strong enemies, and how to avoid being suppressed by enemy technology. They focus on tactics and neglect technology, and on “wisdom” and neglect “intelligence”. Innovative tactics seem to be useful, but in fact lack technical support and have a high degree of risk. Second, they fail to grasp the combat needs accurately, and the future battlefield scene is not clearly described. Although the technical principles and winning mechanisms are understood, they do not know enough about the application of science and technology in combat operations, and ignore the decisive role of human subjective initiative in combat effectiveness. They focus on technology and neglect tactics, and study technology for technology, or only study technical performance without considering the application of tactics, or only know the technical effects without trying to innovate tactics. In all these cases, we should coordinate the learning, understanding, and use of science and technology by commanders and fighters with the learning, understanding, and use of science and technology by scientific and technological personnel, establish a mechanism for the integration and innovation of combat and technical experts, connect the research on winning mechanisms, and collaboratively embed the concept of integration of theory and technology, and help each other to improve the quality of innovation in tactics, so as to form the ideological understanding that combat operations lead the application of science and technology and support combat operations with the application of science and technology, and lay a solid foundation for the integration of theory and technology to carry out innovation in tactics.

Operational design “integration”. There have never been two completely identical wars in the world. Innovation in tactics can be inherited and learned from, but cannot be copied and reproduced. At present, the pace of innovation in military theory is accelerating, advanced science and technology are developing rapidly, and the form of war has undergone profound changes, showing the significant characteristics of mixed diversity and unpredictable changes. Disruptive technologies, innovative concepts, and reshaping theories are emerging in an endless stream. Only by integrating science and technology to design future operations can we find and improve the starting point of innovation in tactics. We must break through the mindset with the courage to lead the world, innovate combat theories with advanced vision and unique perspectives, develop and implement combat concepts, conceive combat scenarios, and innovate tactics and methods. We must first draw the “base map” of the future battlefield, so as to connect with modern scientific and technological applications and drive the development of advanced technologies. At the same time, the design of future operations cannot exceed the limits of science and technology and be too far-fetched. It should be based on the scientific and technological feasibility within a certain period of time, and innovate tactics on the premise of having realistic or foreseeable scientific and technological application support and having a technological implementation path, and embed technical blocking, technical raids, technical suppression, and technical regulation into combat operations.

“Integration” with superior skills. In modern warfare, the status of people as the decisive factor has not changed, while the impact of science and technology on the outcome of war has become more prominent. The struggle for technological advantage determines the outcome of war to a large extent. We must always embed the application of science and technology into the combat chain and throughout the entire combat process, support the application of tactics with technical effects, and drive the effectiveness of combat with technological advantages. At present, the main contradiction in the integration of theory and technology in the innovation of tactics is not the lack of theory in technology, but the lack of technology in theory. The most urgent thing is to focus on promoting the integration and penetration of cutting-edge technology into combat theory. We must strengthen the substantive integration based on weapons and equipment platforms, focus on maximizing the activation of combat effectiveness, widely carry out research on the combat application of equipment based on the release of action effectiveness, and equipment combat test and appraisal, detect the effectiveness of combat operations through simulation and data analysis, and verify the “chance of victory” with “number calculations”. It is necessary to strengthen the in-depth integration of technical means to select the “optimal solution” based on combat missions. From studying combat opponents and determining methods of action to formulating combat plans and organizing confrontation exercises, we must fully consider the comparison of enemy and our own technical strength, implement asymmetric combat thinking, and take the basic principles of using the superior to defeat the inferior and avoiding the strong to attack the weak. We must seek technological suppression and prevent enemy suppression, seek technological blocking and prevent enemy blocking, seek technological subversion and prevent enemy subversion, maximize technological advantages, and do our utmost to limit the enemy’s technological performance, so as to create a favorable situation and support the use of tactics.

Gather wisdom and strength to “integrate”. In the era of informatization and intelligence, both theoretical research and scientific and technological innovation show the remarkable characteristics of open linkage and cross-penetration. The integration of theory and technology is used to carry out innovation in tactics, and open sharing is an important growth point. Promote the innovation of man-machine integrated tactics, people come up with wisdom and machines do the calculations, and reversely revise the results of tactics based on the results of calculations, so as to achieve the integration of theory and technology in human-machine interaction; promote the innovation of tactics by command and technical talents, form a mixed group of “scientists + commanders” and “combatants + technicians”, implement joint debugging, joint testing, joint exercises, joint training, joint calculations and joint planning, and seek joint combat and victory with the scientific nature of tactics and the advanced nature of technology; promote the innovation of open source crowdfunding tactics, combine the military and the outside world, interact online and offline, and concentrate the wisdom of the majority of officers and soldiers and various professional talents with a broader vision and more flexible forms, carry out “maker” activities in the field of tactics innovation, develop and gather new tactics “resource pool” and “results library”, and achieve the maximum benefits of the integration of theory and technology.

Practice iterative “integration”. Theoretical achievements are tested and sublimated in practical application, and scientific and technological means show their functions and benefits in combat operations. Innovation in tactics is not a one-day job, and the integration of theory and technology should also be iteratively improved and developed in a rolling manner. We should focus on the integrated application of information technology and intelligent technology, virtually construct future combat scenes, and innovate tactics in the feeling and experience of intelligent combat environments; we should carry out in-depth virtual simulation demonstration of innovative results of tactics, and fully verify the feasibility of tactics design and the effectiveness of combat operations through virtual experiments and simulation tests; we should carry out technical performance testing in conjunction with training and exercise activities, and fully test the effectiveness and defects of technology application through analysis of the actual situation of energy gathering and release of weapons and equipment and information systems. Therefore, we should dynamically discover and solve problems in review discussions, repeated demonstrations, and data tests, modify theories where theories are not applicable, and upgrade technologies where technologies are not feasible, so that tactics can introduce new field technologies, let technologies subvert traditional tactics, realize the organic combination of technology and combat, and continuously promote the spiral upward and rolling development of innovation in tactics.

現代國語:

2023-05-09 11:38:45來源:中國軍網-解放軍報
找準戰法創新的理技融合點
李計勇 鄒 力


戰法,即作戰方法,指作戰中運用的策略和技術。戰法創新,既要深謀“策”,也要鑽研“技”。有“策”無“技”,心有餘而力不足;有“技”無“策”,雖用力而不得法。既要有策略指導,又具備技術支撐,方能百戰百勝。打贏資訊化智能化戰爭,開展以謀為先、以智取勝的戰法創新,必須「策」「技」並施,有效解決理論創新與技術應用脫節、作戰行動與技術路徑脫軌等問題。
思維認知「融」。現代科技快速發展,正推動未來作戰向高端戰爭演進。既要搶佔理論制高點,又要塑造技術新優勢,理技深度融合創新戰法,是製勝戰場的要訣。軍人作為戰法創新的主體,必須深刻認知現代戰爭制勝機理,根植理技融合理念,拓展理技融合思維。當前,兩個突出問題和傾向值得注意:一是科技素養不夠,容易導致對新的戰爭形態認識不深不透,僅憑以往經驗套路研究戰法,對作戰體系中哪些技術起作用、什麼技術真管用、對敵形成技術優勢從何入手、與強敵存在哪些技術差、如何避免被敵法壓制等不深的技術不深,重戰不深、重戰、技術不高、重戰」。二是把握不準作戰需求,未來戰場景象描繪不夠清晰,雖然技術原理、制勝機理明白了,但對科技在作戰行動中的運用知之不夠,忽略了人的主觀能動性對作戰效能發揮起到的決定性作用,重技術輕戰法,就技術研技術,或只鑽研技術性能而不考慮戰法運用,或只知戰法運用,或只知技術凡此,應把指戰員學科技、懂科技、用科技與科技人員學軍事、懂打仗、研戰法統籌起來協調推進,建立戰技專家融合創新機制,對接研究制勝機理,協同嵌入理技融合理念,交互幫帶提高戰法創新素質,形成以作戰行動牽引科技運用、以作戰法統融合理念,交互幫帶提高戰法創新素質,形成以作戰行動牽引科技運用、以作戰以支持基實的功法進行創新運動。
作戰設計「融」。世界上從來沒有完全相同的兩場戰爭,戰法創新可以繼承借鑒,不能複製翻版。目前,軍事理論創新步伐加快、先進科技發展日新月異,戰爭形態深刻變革,呈現出混合多元、變幻莫測的顯著特徵,顛覆性技術、創新性概念、重塑性理論層出不窮。理技融合設計未來作戰,才能找準提升戰法創新的起點。要以敢領世界先的勇氣突破思維定勢,用超前眼光、獨特視角創新作戰理論,開發並落地作戰概念,構想作戰場景,創新戰法打法,先把未來戰場的「底圖」勾勒好,以此對接現代科技應用、牽引先進技術研發。同時,設計未來作戰不能超越科技極限過於遙遠地“空想”,應立足於一定時期內的科技可行性,在具有現實或可預期科技運用支撐、擁有技術實現路徑的前提下創新戰法,將技術阻斷、技術突襲、技術壓制、技術調控嵌入作戰行動。
技高一籌「融」。在現代戰爭中,人是決定性因素的地位沒有變,而科技對戰爭勝負的影響更加凸顯,爭奪科技勝勢在很大程度上決定戰爭勝負,必須始終把科技運用嵌入作戰鏈條、貫穿作戰全程,以技術效應支撐戰法運用,以技術優勢驅動作戰效能發揮。當前,戰法創新中的理技融合,主要矛盾並非技術中少理論,而是理論中缺乏技術,最迫切的是著力推進前沿科技向作戰理論融合滲透。要加強以武器裝備平台為依託的實質融合,著眼最大限度地啟動作戰效能,廣泛進行基於行動效能釋放的裝備作戰運用研究、裝備作戰試驗鑑定,透過模擬推演、資料分析來偵測作戰行動的有效性,以「數算」驗證「勝算」。要加強基於作戰任務選擇「最優解」技術手段的深度性融合,從研究作戰對手、確定行動方法,到擬製作戰預案、組織對抗演訓,都要充分考慮敵我技術力量對比,貫徹非對稱作戰思想,把以優制劣、避強擊弱作為基本原則,謀求技術壓制並防敵壓制,謀求技術阻斷並防敵阻斷,謀求技術顛覆並防敵顛覆,最大限度發揮技術優勢,竭盡全力限制敵方技術發揮,以此塑造有利態勢、支撐戰法運用。
集智聚力「融」。資訊化智能化時代,不論是理論研究,或科技創新,都呈現出開放連結、交叉滲透的顯著特徵。理技融合進行戰法創新,開放共享是重要的成長點。推動人機一體式戰法創新,人出智謀、機器來算,以算的結果反推修訂戰法成果,在人機互動中實現理技融合;推進指技人才團隊式戰法創新,組成「科學家+指揮官」「戰鬥員+技術員」混合群體,實行聯調性、聯演、聯演聯、聯算聯,以訓戰法的科學、技術的科學、聯演先進性謀求聯戰聯勝;推進開源眾籌式戰法創新,軍內軍外結合,線上線下互動,以更開闊的視野、更靈活的形式,集中廣大官兵和各類專業化人才的聰明智慧,開展戰法創新領域的“創客”活動,開發匯聚新戰法“資源池”“成果庫”,實現最大成果的效益庫”,實現最大效益。
實踐迭代“融”。理論成果在實務運用中得到檢驗和昇華,科技手段在作戰行動中顯現功能與效益。戰法創新非一日之功,理技融合也應迭代進步、滾動發展。要注重整合應用資訊科技與智慧技術,虛擬構設未來作戰景象,在感觸與體驗智能化作戰環境中創新戰法;要深入進行戰法創新成果虛擬模擬論證,透過虛擬實驗、模擬檢驗,充分驗證戰法設計的可行性、作戰行動的有效性;要結合演訓活動進行技術效能偵測,透過對武器裝備與資訊系統的聚合能與釋義能充分分析從而,在複盤研討、反覆論證、資料檢驗中動態發現與解決問題,理論不適用的修改理論,技術行不通的升級技術,讓戰法引進新領域技術,讓技術顛覆傳統式戰法,實現技戰一體有機結合,持續推動戰法創新螺旋上升滾動發展。

中國原創軍事資源:http://www.81it.com/2023/0509/14259888.html