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China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, 中國軍隊對耗散戰的戰術運用

中國軍隊在認知領域建構網路戰作戰節奏

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Chinese Military Establishes Battle Rhythm of Cyber Warfare in the Cognitive Domain

目前，認知域已作為獨立一域登上戰爭舞台，日益成為大國博弈的常鬥之域、必爭之地、勝戰砝碼。 分析認知域作戰特徵及發展趨勢，至少反映為以下八個面向。

認知域是軍事優勢轉化為政治勝勢的關鍵域

軍事對抗，表面上看來是雙方硬實力的對抗，深層看不管戰爭是什麼性質、何種目的，終歸是人的意志的較量。 勝利的關鍵是將己方意志強加在受眾身上的能力。 只要剝奪、擊潰了敵人的戰爭意志，就意味著贏得了戰爭。 認知域作戰，以人的意志、精神、心理等為對抗目標，增強己方意志的同時削弱敵方的意志，進而達成攻心奪志的政治目的。 從這個意義上講，認知域是軍事優勢轉化為政治勝勢的關鍵領域。 隨著戰爭形態加速向智慧化演進，認知品質優勢帶來決策行動優勢，不僅可在道德、法理上佔據制高點，塑造正義合法的有利態勢，還可透過混合戰爭、綜合博弈手段，實現小戰 甚至不戰而勝的目的。 尤其是大國競爭背景下戰爭成本高昂，各方都希望透過加大認知域爭奪力度，以「人道」且「經濟」的形式，迫使對手知難而退。

透過改變對手認知，可改變其決策和行動

實施認知攻擊的目的，就是用一隻“看不見的手”操控對手意志，讓對手感到“我不能”“我不敢”，從而達到“我不想”的效果。 外軍實踐表明，對人的意志、信念、思維、心理實施認知攻擊，可以是長期的文化植入，可以是「資訊海洋+摀嘴封聲」式的資訊壓制，可以是先入為主、搶先發聲 的主動塑造，也可以利用歷史積怨來挑動矛盾爆發。 目前，資訊科技、人工智慧技術、媒體科技強化了對認知域的直接作用，利用智慧生成軟體，可製造大量認知“彈藥”，精準作用於作戰目標的認知層，直接將“意志強加 於對手”，快速改變戰略態勢。 展望資訊化智慧化戰場，態勢感知力量與平台廣泛分佈於陸海空天網等作戰域，規劃、決策、控制等認知行為主導各作戰域行動，尤其是未來智能化戰爭中人機混合的認知 優勢將主導戰場，可以透過認知幹擾、認知混淆、認知阻斷等手段，製造戰爭認知“迷霧”，誘使對手誤判態勢，做出錯誤決策和行動。

認知域作戰是全時攻防、全員覆蓋、全程使用、全域塑造、全政府行動

認知域作戰呈現出全方位、多層次、超時空、跨領域等特點，模糊了戰時和平時、前方和後方的界限，跨越了戰場和國界，超越了單純的軍事領域，廣泛滲透於政治 、經濟、外交等各社會領域，表現為「五全」特質。 全時攻防，沒有平時戰時之分，沒有前方後方之別，表現為全時在線、全時在戰。 全員覆蓋，任何人甚至包括智慧機器人，都可能成為認知域作戰的目標對象。 全程使用，貫穿聯合作戰的戰前戰中戰後，聯合軍事行動未展開，認知塑勢行動已開始，並且伴隨軍事行動而行，不隨軍事行動停而停。 全域塑造，認知塑造貫穿戰略、戰役、戰術各層，作用範圍涵蓋陸海空天網各域，跨域賦能，對全域行動都有影響。 全政府行動，認知塑造自然具有戰略性，需要跨部門、跨領域、跨軍地、跨層級一致協調行動，以求達到最佳傳播效果。

關鍵在於奪控行動或活動的性質定義權、過程主導權、結局評判權

認知賽局鬥爭，涉及多個對抗方，看似紛繁複雜，關鍵在於圍繞認知域的「三權」展開爭奪。 其一，爭奪事件性質定義權。 即這個事件該怎麼看，是正義的還是非正義的，是合法的還是非法的。 通常採取先發制人搶先定義、建群結盟強行定義、資訊壓制單方定義、設定議題套用定義等，引導塑造民眾形成定性認知。 其二，爭奪事件過程主導權。 即這事該怎麼幹、不該怎麼做，誰做的是對的、誰做的是錯的，通常採取設局布阱等方式，試圖按照己方所期望出現的狀態，主導目標事件發展方向、 快慢、暫停、繼續與終結。 其三，爭奪事件結局評判權。 即對這事該怎麼評，誰是獲利方、誰是受損方，誰是眼前的失利者、誰是長遠的受損者，等等。 各方都試圖透過掌控事件結局的評判權，放大於己有利之處、放大於敵不利之處，目的是利用事件延伸效應，持續傷敵利己。

道義和法理是各方爭奪的焦點

軍事行動歷來講究「師出有名」。 雖然戰爭形態加速演變，但是戰爭從屬於政治的本質屬性不會改變；戰爭性質和人心向背，仍是影響戰爭勝負的關鍵因素。 認知域戰場上，佔據了政治、道義、法理的製高點，就能夠贏得民心、道義支持，營造得道多助的輿論氛圍，進而掌握制敵先機。 每次戰爭或衝突，無論是強者或弱者，無論是進攻方防守方或第三方，各方都會全力搶佔認知主導權、輿論主動權，千方百計用道義包裝自己、注重宣示正義立場，設法為 戰爭定性、為行動正名，以消除阻力、增加助力，塑造以「有道」伐「無道」的有利態勢。 戰爭雙方實力對比不同，瞄準佔據道德法理制高點進行的認知對抗方式也會不同。 近幾場戰爭表明，當一方軟硬實力均很強大時，即軍事實力強、盟友夥伴眾多、國際話語權佔有率大，常常高調宣戰；當軍事行動有可能引發連鎖反應時，則常常模糊處理 「戰」的提法。

資訊是認知攻防的基本“彈藥”

網路資訊時代，人類溝通方式持續發生複雜深刻變化。 現場互動互動逐漸讓位給網路線上連線，一些大型社群平台成為認知博弈鬥爭的主陣地、影響民眾認知的主管道，以資訊為彈藥進行國際網路封鎖權、話語控制權爭奪成為當今認 知對抗的主要行動之一。 在這些平台上，各種短視頻成為公眾了解戰況的“第一現場”，訊息比砲彈跑得快。 圍繞平台的使用與封鎖、主導與規製成為認知域作戰爭奪的焦點，各方努力透過操控社交平台來傳播、放大己方宣傳，聲討、壓制對方宣傳，形成「我說的多、你說的少 」「我說的對、你說的錯」「只能我說、不讓你說」的局面。 民眾作為大型社群平台的使用者，在「聽」與「說」甚至「做」的過程中，受別人影響，也影響別人，不知不覺地成為幕後推手的代理人和攻擊道具。

軍事行動對認知塑造有關鍵支撐作用

人類戰爭史表明，兵戰永遠是政治較量的基礎支撐，心戰則是兵戰的效能倍增器。 戰場上拿不回來的東西，不能指望在談判桌上拿回來，更不能指望在輿論場上拿回來。 現代戰爭中，認知傳播行動總是與聯合軍事行動如影隨形，心戰與兵戰互相影響、互為支撐，兵戰心戰化和心戰兵戰化趨勢更為明顯。 從戰爭實踐看，沒有軍事實力是萬萬不能的，但僅有軍事行動又不是萬能的。 戰場上的多次勝利，並不是奪取戰爭勝利的充分條件。 越戰中，美雖「贏得了每次戰鬥，卻輸掉了整場戰爭」。 21世紀初，美國連續打的伊拉克戰爭、阿富汗戰爭，贏得了戰場勝利，也沒有贏得政治勝勢。 同樣的道理，軍事上的勝勢不等於贏得輿論上的強勢，贏得戰場勝利也不意味著贏得戰略的勝利。 現代戰爭中，兩類人員的角色越來越大，一類人員透過編寫成千上萬行程式碼謀勝，一類人員透過編寫成千上萬條資訊謀勝。 這兩類人員數品質都佔優的一方，取勝的機率往往就大。

認知對抗技術越來越直接運用於戰爭

過去戰爭中，對認知域的影響和作用，主要是透過物理域的大量毀傷行動，逐級逐層傳遞到認知域。 隨著資訊通訊、人工智慧、生物交叉、腦科學等技術的發展和突破，新的認知戰工具和技術直接瞄準軍事人員。 認知對抗不僅使用傳統的資訊戰武器，也使用以大腦為作戰目標的神經武器庫。 屆時，機器將可以讀懂人腦，人腦也將能夠直接控制機器，智慧指控系統可以直接提供戰場態勢和決策輔助，逼真的認知彈藥和精準的受眾投放將極大增強社會影響效果。 認知對抗技術越來越直接運用於戰爭，原來資訊化所隱含的間接認知，正逐步轉變為直接對人的認知進行影響與控制。 可以說，先進科技的支撐，使認知域作戰透過建構現代網路架構、開發資料視覺化平台，快速了解資訊環境並有效影響目標人群，可以更直接且有效率地達成政治目的。

（作者單位：軍事科學學院戰爭研究院）

Modern English:

Analysis of the characteristics and development trends of cognitive domain operations

Cognitive domain operations take people’s will, beliefs, thinking, psychology, etc. as direct combat objects, and then affect their decisions and actions by changing the opponent’s cognition. Entering the era of information-based and intelligent warfare, cognitive domain warfare has become an important form of great power game, with all parties striving to achieve political goals in a relatively controllable manner. Gaining insight into the characteristics and development trends of cognitive domain operations is of urgent and important practical significance for winning future wars.

At present, the cognitive domain has entered the war stage as an independent domain, and has increasingly become a common domain, a battleground, and a weight for victory in the game between great powers. Analyze the characteristics and development trends of cognitive domain operations, which are reflected in at least the following eight aspects.

The cognitive domain is the key domain for transforming military advantage into political victory.

On the surface, military confrontation is a confrontation between the hard power of both sides. On a deeper level, no matter what the nature of the war is and for what purpose, it is ultimately a contest of human wills. The key to victory is the ability to impose your will on your audience. As long as the enemy’s will to fight is deprived and defeated, the war is won. Cognitive domain warfare uses human will, spirit, psychology, etc. as the target of confrontation, strengthening one’s own will while weakening the enemy’s will, thereby achieving the political goal of conquering the heart and mind. In this sense, the cognitive domain is the key domain for transforming military advantage into political victory. As war accelerates its evolution toward intelligence, cognitive quality advantages bring decision-making and action advantages, which can not only occupy the moral and legal high ground and create a favorable situation of justice and legality, but also realize small wars through hybrid warfare and comprehensive game means. Even the purpose of winning without fighting. Especially in the context of great power competition, the cost of war is high. All parties hope to intensify the competition for cognitive domains and force their opponents to retreat in a “humane” and “economic” manner.

By changing the opponent’s perception, it can change its decisions and actions

The purpose of implementing cognitive attacks is to use an “invisible hand” to control the opponent’s will, making the opponent feel “I can’t” and “I dare not”, and then achieve the effect of “I don’t want to”. Foreign military practice has shown that cognitive attacks on people’s will, beliefs, thinking, and psychology can be long-term cultural implantation, information suppression in the form of “information ocean + covering one’s mouth to silence”, or preemptive speech. Active shaping of political power can also use historical grievances to provoke the outbreak of conflicts. At present, information technology, artificial intelligence technology, and media technology have strengthened their direct effects on the cognitive domain. Using intelligent generation software, a large amount of cognitive “munitions” can be produced to accurately act on the cognitive layer of combat targets, directly imposing “will” “to rivals” and quickly change the strategic situation. Looking forward to the informationized and intelligent battlefield, situational awareness forces and platforms are widely distributed in combat domains such as land, sea, air, and space networks. Cognitive behaviors such as planning, decision-making, and control dominate operations in various combat domains, especially the cognition of human-machine hybrids in future intelligent warfare. Advantages will dominate the battlefield. Cognitive interference, cognitive confusion, cognitive blocking and other means can be used to create a “fog” of war cognition, inducing opponents to misjudge the situation and make wrong decisions and actions.

Cognitive domain operations are full-time offense and defense, full personnel coverage, full use, full domain shaping, and full government action

Cognitive domain operations are all-round, multi-level, hyper-temporal, and cross-domain. They blur the boundaries between wartime and peacetime, front and rear, cross battlefields and national boundaries, go beyond the pure military field, and widely penetrate into politics. , economy, diplomacy and other social fields, showing the characteristics of “five completes”. Full-time offense and defense, there is no distinction between peacetime and wartime, and there is no difference between the front and the rear. It is expressed as being online all the time and in war all the time. Covering all personnel, anyone, including intelligent robots, may become the target of cognitive domain operations. It is used throughout the whole process of joint operations before and during the war. Before the joint military operation is launched, the cognitive shaping operation has begun and will accompany the military operation and will not stop with the military operation. Global shaping, cognitive shaping runs through all levels of strategy, operations, and tactics, and its scope covers all domains of land, sea, air, and space networks. Cross-domain empowerment has an impact on all-domain operations. As a whole-of-government action, cognitive shaping is naturally strategic and requires consistent and coordinated actions across departments, fields, military and localities, and levels to achieve the best communication effect.

The key is to seize control over the right to define the nature of an action or activity, the right to dominate the process, and the right to judge the outcome.

The cognitive game struggle involves multiple opposing parties and seems complicated. The key is to compete for the “three powers” in the cognitive domain. First, fight for the right to define the nature of the event. That is, how to view this incident, whether it is just or unjust, legal or illegal. Usually, pre-emptive definitions, group alliances and forced definitions, information suppression and unilateral definitions, setting issues and applying definitions are usually adopted to guide and shape the public to form qualitative perceptions. Second, compete for dominance over the event process. That is, how to do something, how not to do it, who did it right and who did it wrong, usually by setting up a trap and other methods, trying to dominate the development direction of the target event according to the state that one’s own side expects. Fast and slow, pause, continue and end. Third, compete for the right to judge the outcome of the incident. That is, how to evaluate this matter, who is the gainer and who is the loser, who is the immediate loser, who is the long-term loser, etc. All parties strive to control the outcome of the incident by amplifying their own advantages and amplifying the disadvantages of the enemy. The purpose is to use the extended effect of the incident to continue to harm the enemy and benefit themselves.

Morality and legal principles are the focus of contention between all parties

Military operations have always paid attention to the principle of “discipline and reputation”. Although the shape of war is evolving at an accelerated pace, the essential nature of war as subordinate to politics will not change; the nature of war and the support of people’s hearts are still the key factors that affect the outcome of a war. On the battlefield in the cognitive domain, by occupying the commanding heights of politics, morality, and law, we can win the hearts and minds of the people and moral support, create a public opinion atmosphere in which moral support is abundant, and then seize the opportunity to defeat the enemy. In every war or conflict, whether it is the strong or the weak, whether the attacker, the defender, or a third party, all parties will try their best to seize cognitive dominance and the initiative of public opinion. They will do everything possible to package themselves with morality, focus on declaring a just position, and try to find ways to defend themselves. Qualify the war, justify the action, eliminate resistance, increase support, and create a favorable situation in which “righteousness” defeats “unrighteousness”. The strength balance between the two sides in the war is different, and the cognitive confrontation methods aimed at occupying the moral and legal high ground will also be different. Recent wars have shown that when a party has strong soft and hard power, that is, it has strong military strength, many allies and partners, and a large share of international voice, it often declares war in a high-profile manner; when military actions may trigger chain reactions, it is often handled in a vague manner. The word “war”.

Information is the basic “ammunition” for cognitive attack and defense

In the network information age, the way humans communicate continues to undergo complex and profound changes. On-site interactive interactions have gradually given way to online connections. Some large-scale social platforms have become the main battleground for cognitive games and the main channels for influencing public cognition. Using information as ammunition to fight for the right to block international networks and control discourse has become a common practice today. One of the main actions of confrontation. On these platforms, various short videos have become the “first scene” for the public to understand the war situation, and information travels faster than cannonballs. The use and blocking, dominance and regulation of platforms have become the focus of battles in the cognitive domain. All parties strive to spread and amplify their own propaganda, denounce and suppress the other party’s propaganda by manipulating social platforms, forming a “I say more, you say less” “What I said is right and what you said is wrong” is a situation where “I can only say it and you are not allowed to say it”. As users of large-scale social platforms, the public is influenced by and affects others in the process of “listening”, “speaking” and even “doing”, and unknowingly becomes the agents and attack props of those behind the scenes.

Military operations play a key supporting role in shaping cognition

The history of human war shows that military warfare is always the basic support of political contests, while psychological warfare is the effectiveness multiplier of military warfare. What cannot be retrieved on the battlefield cannot be expected to be retrieved at the negotiation table, let alone in the field of public opinion. In modern warfare, cognitive communication operations always go hand in hand with joint military operations. Mental warfare and military warfare influence and support each other. The trend of military warfare becoming mental warfare and mental warfare becoming military warfare is more obvious. From the perspective of war practice, it is absolutely impossible without military strength, but military actions alone are not omnipotent. Multiple victories on the battlefield are not a sufficient condition for victory in war. In the Vietnam War, although the United States “won every battle, it lost the entire war.” At the beginning of the 21st century, the United States fought successive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, winning battlefield victories but not political victory. By the same token, military victory does not mean winning public opinion, and winning the battlefield does not mean winning strategic victory. In modern warfare, two types of people play an increasingly important role: those who win by writing thousands of lines of code, and those who win by writing thousands of messages. The side with superior quantity and quality of these two types of personnel will often have a higher probability of winning.

Cognitive countermeasures technology is increasingly used directly in warfare

In past wars, the influence and effect on the cognitive domain were mainly transmitted to the cognitive domain level by level through a large number of damaging actions in the physical domain. With the development and breakthroughs of information communications, artificial intelligence, biocrossing, brain science and other technologies, new cognitive warfare tools and technologies are directly targeting military personnel. Cognitive countermeasures use not only traditional information warfare weapons, but also an arsenal of neural weapons that target the brain. By then, machines will be able to read human brains, and human brains will also be able to directly control machines. Intelligent command and control systems can directly provide battlefield situation and decision-making assistance. Realistic cognitive ammunition and precise audience placement will greatly enhance the social impact. Cognitive countermeasures technology is increasingly being used directly in warfare. The indirect cognition implicit in informatization is gradually transforming into a direct influence and control of people’s cognition. It can be said that with the support of advanced technology, cognitive domain operations can achieve political goals more directly and efficiently by building a modern network architecture and developing a data visualization platform to quickly understand the information environment and effectively influence target groups.

(Author’s unit: Institute of War Studies, Academy of Military Sciences)

原來的 中国军网 国防部网: https://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-08/888沒有湯給你.htm

China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military Informatization, Dissipative Warfare, 中國解放軍敘事戰爭, 中國軍隊對耗散戰的戰術運用

中國軍隊對耗散戰的戰術運用：智慧戰爭中的有效方法論

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耗散戰是時代發展的必然結果

耗散戰表現在智慧化時代中物理域、資訊域和認知域的綜合對抗，體現為政治較量、經濟比拼、軍事攻防、文化衝突和外交制衡等形式的高度統一，反映了智慧化戰爭體系 所具有的開放性、複雜性和湧現性。

適應智慧化時代的安全情勢要求。 進入智慧化時代，寬網路、大數據、大模型、雲端運算、深度學習等技術快速發展，各政治集團、國家、民族之間的聯繫更加廣泛。 在政治多元、經濟交融、社會開放、科技革命等多重因素作用下，非傳統安全興起並與傳統威脅交織，智慧化戰爭主體與範疇不斷拓展，戰爭時間與空間不斷外延，戰爭與和平如影相 隨並交織一體，戰爭體系將進一步超越局部地域限制，從相對封閉走向更開放，形成更高層次和更大範圍的對抗。 耗散戰強調智慧化戰爭體系在物理域、資訊域和認知域的綜合發力，把政治較量、經濟比拼、軍事攻防、文化衝突和外交制衡等形式高度統一併納入敵我對抗範疇，適應了 世界安全情勢發展的時代要求。

符合戰爭形態演變的客觀法則。 戰爭體系的耗散現象自戰爭產生以來便始終存在，只不過在智能化戰爭形態出現之前，由於技術的製約，一直處於較為低級的、簡單的狀態，戰爭對抗僅能表現為物質消耗、能量釋 散和訊息擴散中的某一種形式。 農業時代，戰爭形態主要表現為以物質要素為主導的、以人體為中心的冷兵器戰爭。 工業化時代，戰爭形態主要表現為以能量要素為主導的、以平台為中心的熱核兵器和機械化戰爭。 在資訊化時代，戰爭形態主要表現為以資訊要素為主導的、以網信體系為中心的資訊化戰爭。 進入智慧化時代，智慧化科技將敵我對抗中的認知優勢、決策優勢和行動優勢高度統一起來，實質是將物質、能量和資訊三者高度統一，透過以智賦能、以智聚能、 以智釋能，形成了以智慧要素為主導的、以智慧演算法為中心的智慧化戰爭形態，主要表現形式即為反映智慧化戰爭複雜體系對抗的耗散戰。

具有堅實的哲學理論基礎支撐。 社會形態是戰爭形態的母體，探索和認識智能化戰爭，必須基於歷史唯物主義和辯證唯物主義的基本原理，綜合考察戰爭形態的演進和智能化戰爭所處的社會形態，構建新的戰爭概念和 語境體系。 從哲學角度看，物質、能量和資訊是構成世界的三大要素，物質體現本源的存在，能量體現運動的存在，訊息則體現聯繫的存在，三者遞進交替主導著社會形態和戰爭形態的 演進和運行。 依照辯證唯物論的否定之否定原理，在資訊時代之後的智慧時代，主導社會的要素將繼物質、能量、資訊後再次輪到物質，只不過這個物質是高度資訊化後螺旋式上升後形成的 新型物質，其主要特徵就是具有了智慧化技術屬性。 因此，從本質上講，耗散戰是智慧要素將以前低階戰爭形態中物質、能量和資訊的特性優勢高度統一起來，將戰爭中普遍存在的物質消耗、能量釋散和資訊擴散等形式高度 統一起來，反映了智慧化戰爭的典型特徵。

深刻把握耗散戰的內在要義

耗散戰基於現實世界、涵蓋虛擬世界，適應了智慧化技術快速發展、非傳統安全威脅興起、戰爭主體和範疇不斷拓展的趨勢，呈現出許多新特性。

對抗綜合博弈。 隨著智慧化戰爭形態加速向更高深度和廣度發展，政治、經濟、文化、外交等領域相互聯繫和影響更具廣泛性，戰爭重心開始從軍事系統向社會系統偏移，戰爭利益攸關方 的對抗將體現為政治較量、經濟比拼、軍事攻防、文化衝突和外交制衡等多種形式的綜合博弈，追求的戰爭優勢不再只限於軍事對抗領域。 戰爭制勝方必須適應戰爭體系的開放性、複雜性和湧現性要求，從單一物質、能量和資訊的粗放式消耗和運用轉變到以智慧優勢主導戰爭體系的耗散，力爭在多領域的綜合博弈 中贏得主動和優勢。

主體跨域多元。 智慧化戰爭的主體日益泛化，傳統戰爭需要動員的戰爭潛在力量將處於常態化對抗狀態。 政治力量、各類機構和人員與傳統意義上在戰場廝殺的部隊和軍人一起構成戰爭的主體。 多元化戰爭主體將跨越現實域和虛擬域，出現在陸、海、空、天、電、心理等多個空間域，涵蓋物理域、資訊域、認知域等，涵蓋政治、經濟、文化、 外交等多類社會域。 如社會平民可以用智慧型手機收集軍事戰場上的信息並傳遞給戰爭利益攸關方，造成對戰爭關鍵訊息的擴散，進而影響戰爭決策或一場戰役和戰鬥的勝敗。

力量一體富聚。 虛實力量一體。 圍繞著戰爭目的，一切可能運用的現實力量和虛擬力量將在智能化技術支撐下實現一體化，在平行戰場上按職履責、按規行動；有無力量一體。 無人作戰力量將在經歷人工操作、人工授權、人為監督階段後，實現高度的自主性，並可與各類有人力量按需部署、按需組合，在共同的戰爭規則約束下有效協同、並行 共生；多方力量一體。 基於各領域的廣泛聯繫和戰爭體系的共同目的，黨政軍警民等各方力量將軍事行動與政治、經濟、外交、輿論、法理鬥爭密切配合、統一行動，形成綜合戰力。 總之，在國家或政治集團的一體籌劃下，智慧化戰爭的多元參戰力量雖然物理分散，但能夠圍繞共同的戰爭目的，實現邏輯集中、即時富聚，優勢互補、一體聚優。

效能累積湧現。 高階戰爭形態在具有新質技術特徵的同時，仍涵括低階戰爭形態的特徵優勢。 耗散戰強調在多域持續進行綜合對抗，這既包括物質層面的彈藥、物資、器材甚至作戰人員的消耗，也包括能量層面的不斷匯集和釋放，更包括透過資訊層面的數據、知識、演算法 等的擴散與融合，對人的思考認知、價值追求、道德觀念、情感意志、行為模式等產生不可限制的影響。 在核武的常態嚇阻下，智慧化戰爭呈現出血腥味下降，但政治孤立、經濟封鎖、文化衝突、外交扼殺等將更加嚴峻激烈的局面。 當軍事、政治、經濟、文化、外交等各系統角色持續發揮，效能累積達到某一程度，戰爭體係就會增加負熵，進而實現戰力突變和體系效能湧現，從而獲得戰爭優勢。

在選準作戰重心中打好耗散戰

智慧化戰爭體系透過對內富聚融合，對外突變湧現，跨域增效、以智耗散，達成體係作戰效能最大化，這是耗散戰蘊含的製勝機理。 要在智慧化戰爭中贏得勝勢，必須明確耗散戰的作戰重心，針對對手體系短板弱點，找準戰爭準備的發力點。

著眼體系開放性，封閉孤立對手戰爭體系。 截斷對手戰爭體系與外在戰場環境的物質、能量和資訊交流，使之缺乏物質、能量和資訊來源管道，逐漸走向孤立、封閉和虛弱狀態。 如在戰略層面，採取政治孤立的方式，使對手戰爭體系處於孤立狀態，造成體系熵增。 在戰役層面，可利用切斷資料來源、毀滅資料備份、資料作假、竄改資訊等方法，綜合採用軟硬手段，迫其戰爭體係向封閉狀態轉化，進而降低對方體系效能。

著眼體系複雜性，分域破擊對手戰爭體系。 智慧化戰爭體係要素間連結越多、連結程度越緊密，體系結構可靠性就越低。 運用複雜系統中各分層相對獨立的原理，可製訂戰略全局、戰役局部和戰術行動策略，實現對敵戰爭體系的分層分域破擊。 如在戰略層面，採用經濟封鎖的方式，大大削弱對手的戰爭實力和發展潛力。 在戰役層面，利用作戰系統通訊網路的脆弱性，以網電複合攻擊為基本路徑與手段，採用「毀端、擊元、孤群、斷網、破雲」等方式，破擊對方作戰系統結構 ，促使對方戰爭體系「坍塌」。

著眼體系湧現性，拆解疏散對手戰爭體系。 智慧化戰爭體系只有出現突變和湧現效應，才能快速形成發揮體系效能，獲得耗散戰優勢。 如果只是單一組分或要素發揮作用，不可能形成優勢湧現。 可以預見，當前興起的ChatGPT等技術以及未來更高級的智慧化技術，將提供理解和發現戰爭複雜體系運作行為、狀態和規律的全新思維方式，以及探知客觀規律、改造自然和社會的新手段， 戰爭對抗優勢方將透過虛實結合、平行一體的對抗方式，降低對手戰爭體系的耦合度，達成拆解疏散敵戰爭體系的目的。

Modern English:

Introduction

With the rapid development of intelligent technology and its widespread application in military affairs, intelligent warfare is becoming a new form of warfare after information warfare, and dissipative warfare has become a typical method of intelligent warfare. The so-called dissipative warfare refers to a combat method in which the intelligent warfare system achieves comprehensive combat power integrating material consumption, energy release and information diffusion through internal integration and integration and external mutation. Strengthening research on dissipative warfare will help us deeply reveal the winning mechanism of intelligent warfare and win the initiative in future war games.

Dissipative war is the inevitable result of the development of the times

Dissipative warfare is manifested in the comprehensive confrontation of the physical domain, information domain and cognitive domain in the intelligent era. It is reflected in the high degree of unity in the form of political contest, economic competition, military offense and defense, cultural conflict and diplomatic checks and balances, reflecting the intelligent war system. openness, complexity and emergence.

Adapt to the security situation requirements of the intelligent era. Entering the era of intelligence, technologies such as wide networks, big data, big models, cloud computing, and deep learning are developing rapidly, and the connections between political groups, countries, and ethnic groups have become more extensive. Under the influence of multiple factors such as political pluralism, economic integration, social openness, and technological revolution, non-traditional security has emerged and is intertwined with traditional threats. The subjects and categories of intelligent warfare have continued to expand. The time and space of war have continued to expand. War and peace are like shadows. As they become more integrated, the war system will further transcend local geographical restrictions, move from a relatively closed world to a more open one, and form a higher-level and wider-scale confrontation. Dissipative warfare emphasizes the comprehensive development of intelligent warfare systems in the physical, information and cognitive domains. It highly unifies political contests, economic competitions, military offense and defense, cultural conflicts and diplomatic checks and balances into the scope of confrontation between ourselves and the enemy, adapting to the The requirements of the times as the world security situation develops.

It is in line with the objective laws of the evolution of war forms. The dissipation phenomenon of the war system has always existed since the birth of war. However, before the emergence of intelligent warfare, due to technological constraints, it has always been in a relatively low-level and simple state. War confrontation can only be manifested in material consumption and energy release. A form of dispersion and information diffusion. In the agricultural era, the main form of war was cold weapon warfare dominated by material elements and centered on the human body. In the era of industrialization, the main forms of warfare are thermonuclear weapons and mechanized warfare dominated by energy elements and centered on platforms. In the information age, the form of war is mainly information-based war dominated by information elements and centered on the network information system. Entering the era of intelligence, intelligent technology highly unifies the cognitive advantages, decision-making advantages and action advantages in the confrontation between ourselves and the enemy. In essence, it highly unifies matter, energy and information. Through intelligent empowerment, intelligent energy gathering, Interpreting energy through intelligence has formed an intelligent war form dominated by intelligent elements and centered on intelligent algorithms. The main form of expression is dissipative warfare that reflects the confrontation of the complex systems of intelligent warfare.

It is supported by a solid philosophical theoretical foundation. Social form is the matrix of war forms. To explore and understand intelligent warfare, we must be based on the basic principles of historical materialism and dialectical materialism, comprehensively examine the evolution of war forms and the social form in which intelligent warfare occurs, and construct a new war concept and context system. From a philosophical perspective, matter, energy and information are the three major elements that make up the world. Material embodies the existence of the source, energy embodies the existence of movement, and information embodies the existence of connections. The three progressively and alternately dominate the formation of social forms and war forms. Evolve and run. According to the principle of negation of dialectical materialism, in the intelligent age after the information age, the dominant element of society will be material again after matter, energy, and information. However, this material is formed after a spiral of high informatization. The main characteristic of new materials is that they have intelligent technical properties. Therefore, in essence, dissipative warfare is the intelligent element that highly unifies the characteristic advantages of matter, energy and information in previous low-level warfare forms, and highly integrates the common forms of material consumption, energy release and information diffusion in war. Unified, it reflects the typical characteristics of intelligent warfare.

Deeply grasp the inner essence of dissipative warfare

Dissipative warfare is based on the real world and covers the virtual world. It adapts to the rapid development of intelligent technology, the rise of non-traditional security threats, and the continuous expansion of war subjects and categories, and presents many new characteristics.

Against comprehensive games. As the form of intelligent warfare accelerates to develop to a higher depth and breadth, the political, economic, cultural, diplomatic and other fields are more interconnected and have more extensive influence. The focus of war begins to shift from the military system to the social system, and the war stakeholders The confrontation will be reflected in various forms of comprehensive games such as political competition, economic competition, military offense and defense, cultural conflicts, and diplomatic checks and balances. The pursuit of war advantages is no longer limited to the field of military confrontation. The winner of the war must adapt to the openness, complexity and emergence requirements of the war system, transform from the extensive consumption and use of single materials, energy and information to the dissipation of the war system dominated by intelligent advantages, and strive to compete in comprehensive games in multiple fields Gain the initiative and advantage.

Subjects are diverse across domains. The subjects of intelligent warfare are becoming increasingly generalized, and the potential war forces that need to be mobilized for traditional warfare will be in a state of normalized confrontation. Political forces, various institutions and personnel, together with the troops and soldiers fighting on the battlefield in the traditional sense, constitute the main body of the war. Diversified war subjects will span the real domain and the virtual domain, appearing in land, sea, air, space, electricity, psychology and other spatial domains, covering the physical domain, information domain, cognitive domain, etc., covering politics, economy, culture, Diplomacy and other social fields. For example, civilians can use smartphones to collect information on military battlefields and pass it on to war stakeholders, causing the spread of key war information, which in turn affects war decisions or the victory or defeat of a campaign or battle.

Strength is gathered into one body. Virtual and real power are integrated. Focusing on the purpose of war, all possible real and virtual forces that may be used will be integrated with the support of intelligent technology, and they will perform their duties and act according to regulations on parallel battlefields; they will be integrated with and without forces. Unmanned combat forces will achieve a high degree of autonomy after going through the stages of manual operation, manual authorization, and human supervision. They can be deployed and combined with various manned forces on demand, and can effectively coordinate and operate in parallel under the constraints of common war rules. Symbiosis; multiple forces integrated into one. Based on the extensive connections in various fields and the common purpose of the war system, the party, government, military, police and civilians and other forces closely coordinate and act in a unified manner with political, economic, diplomatic, public opinion, and legal struggles to form a comprehensive combat capability. In short, under the unified planning of the country or political group, although the diverse participating forces in intelligent warfare are physically dispersed, they can achieve logical concentration, instant enrichment, complementary advantages, and integration of excellence around the common war purpose.

Effectiveness emerges cumulatively. While high-level warfare forms have new technological features, they still include the characteristic advantages of lower-level warfare forms. Dissipative warfare emphasizes continuous comprehensive confrontation in multiple domains. This includes not only the consumption of ammunition, materials, equipment and even combat personnel at the material level, but also the continuous collection and release of energy at the energy level. It also includes the use of data, knowledge, and algorithms at the information level. The diffusion and integration of information, etc. will have an unlimited impact on people’s thinking and cognition, value pursuit, moral concepts, emotions, will, behavior patterns, etc. Under the constant deterrence of nuclear weapons, intelligent warfare will become less bloody, but political isolation, economic blockade, cultural conflict, diplomatic stranglehold, etc. will become more serious and intense. When the military, political, economic, cultural, diplomatic and other systems continue to play their roles and the cumulative effectiveness reaches a certain level, the war system will increase negative entropy, thereby achieving a sudden change in combat power and the emergence of system effectiveness, thereby gaining a war advantage.

Choose the right focus to fight the dissipation war well

The intelligent warfare system maximizes the combat effectiveness of the system through internal aggregation and integration, external mutation emergence, cross-domain efficiency enhancement, and intelligent dissipation. This is the winning mechanism contained in dissipative warfare. To win in intelligent warfare, it is necessary to clarify the focus of dissipative warfare, target the shortcomings and weaknesses of the opponent’s system, and identify the focus of war preparations.

Focus on the openness of the system and close and isolate the opponent’s war system. Cut off the material, energy and information exchange between the opponent’s war system and the external battlefield environment, causing it to lack material, energy and information source channels, and gradually move towards a state of isolation, closure and weakness. For example, at the strategic level, political isolation is adopted to isolate the opponent’s war system, causing an increase in system entropy. At the operational level, methods such as cutting off data sources, destroying data backups, falsifying data, and tampering with information can be used to force the opponent’s war system to transform into a closed state, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the opponent’s system.

Focus on the complexity of the system and attack the opponent’s war system by domain. The more connections and the closer the connections between the elements of an intelligent warfare system, the lower the reliability of the system structure. Using the principle that each layer in a complex system is relatively independent, we can formulate overall strategic, local campaign and tactical action strategies to achieve layered and domain-based attacks on the enemy’s war system. For example, at the strategic level, the use of economic blockade can greatly weaken the opponent’s war strength and development potential. At the operational level, the vulnerability of the communication network of the combat system is exploited, and network and electricity composite attacks are used as the basic path and means, and methods such as “destroying terminals, attacking elements, lone groups, disconnecting networks, and breaking clouds” are used to destroy the opponent’s combat system structure. , prompting the opponent’s war system to “collapse”.

Focus on the emergent nature of the system and dismantle and disperse the opponent’s combat system. Only when mutation and emergence effects occur in an intelligent warfare system can it quickly form and exert its effectiveness and gain advantages in dissipative warfare. If only a single component or element plays a role, it is impossible to form an advantage. It is foreseeable that the currently emerging technologies such as ChatGPT and more advanced intelligent technologies in the future will provide a new way of thinking for understanding and discovering the operating behaviors, states and laws of complex systems of war, as well as new means of exploring objective laws and transforming nature and society. The dominant side in war confrontation will reduce the coupling degree of the opponent’s war system through a combination of virtual and real, parallel and integrated confrontation methods, and achieve the purpose of dismantling and dispersing the enemy’s war system.

中國國防部原網站：http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/888沒有湯給你html

China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military Informatization, 中國解放軍敘事戰爭, 中國軍事應用與比特幣在未來戰爭中的應用, 中國軍民融合計劃, 國防和軍隊現代化建設, 資料來源：中國外交部

打贏資訊化智慧化戰爭解放軍必須找到科技融合點推進戰術創新

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To Win The Information-based Intelligent War China’s People’s Liberation Army Must Find Science and Technology Integration Point To Evolve Innovation of Tactics

戰法，即作戰方法，指作戰中運用的策略和技術。 戰法創新，既要深謀“策”，也要鑽研“技”。 有“策”無“技”，心有餘而力不足；有“技”無“策”，雖用力而不得法。 既要有策略指導，又具備技術支撐，方能百戰百勝。 打贏資訊化智能化戰爭，開展以謀為先、以智取勝的戰法創新，必須「策」「技」並施，有效解決理論創新與技術應用脫節、作戰行動與技術路徑脫軌等問題。

思維認知「融」。 現代科技快速發展，正推動未來作戰向高端戰爭演進。 既要搶佔理論制高點，又要塑造技術新優勢，理技深度融合創新戰法，是製勝戰場的要訣。 軍人作為戰法創新的主體，必須深刻認知現代戰爭制勝機理，根植理技融合理念，拓展理技融合思維。 目前，兩個突出問題和傾向值得注意：一是科技素養不夠，容易導致對新的戰爭形態認識不深不透，僅憑以往經驗套路研究戰法，對作戰體系中哪些技術起作用、什麼技術 真管用、對敵形成技術優勢從何入手、與強敵存在哪些技術差、如何避免被敵技術壓制等知之不深，重戰法輕技術、重“智謀”輕“智能”，創新的戰法 看似管用，其實缺乏技術支撐，風險度大。 二是把握不准作戰需求，未來戰場景象描繪不夠清晰，雖然技術原理、制勝機理明白了，但對科技在作戰行動中的運用知之不夠，忽略了人的主觀能動性對作戰效能發揮起到的決定性 作用，重技術輕戰法，就技術研技術，或只鑽研技術性能而不考慮戰法運用，或只知技術功效卻不嘗試戰法創新。 凡此，應把指戰員學科技、懂科技、用科技與科技人員學軍事、懂打仗、研戰法統籌起來協調推進，建立戰技專家融合創新機制，對接研究制勝機理，協同嵌入理技融合理念 ，交互幫帶提升戰法創新素質，形成以作戰行動牽引科技運用、以科技運用支撐作戰行動的思想認識，厚實理技融合開展戰法創新的根基。

作戰設計「融」。 世界上從來沒有完全相同的兩場戰爭，戰法創新可以繼承借鑒，不能複製翻版。 目前，軍事理論創新步伐加快、先進科技發展日新月異，戰爭形態深刻變革，呈現出混合多元、變幻莫測的顯著特徵，顛覆性技術、創新性概念、重塑性理論層出不窮。 理技融合設計未來作戰，才能找準提升戰法創新的起點。 要以敢領世界先的勇氣突破思維定勢，用超前眼光、獨特視角創新作戰理論，開發並落地作戰概念，構想作戰場景，創新戰法打法，先把未來戰場的「底圖」勾勒 好，以此對接現代科技應用、牽引先進技術研發。 同時，設計未來作戰不能超越科技極限過於遙遠地“空想”，應立足於一定時期內的科技可行性，在具有現實或可預期科技運用支撐、擁有技術實現路徑的前提下創新戰法，將技術 阻斷、技術突襲、技術壓制、技術調控嵌入作戰行動。

技高一籌「融」。 在現代戰爭中，人是決定性因素的地位沒有變，而科技對戰爭勝負的影響更加凸顯，爭奪科技勝勢在很大程度上決定戰爭勝負，必須始終把科技運用嵌入作戰鏈條、貫穿作戰全程 ，以技術效應支撐戰法運用，以技術優勢驅動作戰效能發揮。 當前，戰法創新中的理技融合，主要矛盾並非技術中少理論，而是理論中缺乏技術，最迫切的是著力推進前沿科技向作戰理論融合滲透。 要加強以武器裝備平台為依託的實質融合，著眼於最大限度地啟動作戰效能，廣泛進行基於行動效能釋放的裝備作戰運用研究、裝備作戰試驗鑑定，透過模擬推演、數據分析來偵測作戰行動的有效性 ，以「數算」驗證「勝算」。 要加強基於作戰任務選擇「最優解」技術手段的深度性融合，從研究作戰對手、確定行動方法，到擬製作戰預案、組織對抗演訓，都要充分考慮敵我技術力量對比，貫徹非對稱 作戰思想，把以優制劣、避強擊弱作為基本原則，謀求技術壓制並防敵壓制，謀求技術阻斷並防敵阻斷，謀求技術顛覆並防敵顛覆，最大限度發揮技術優勢，竭 全力限制敵方技術發揮，以此塑造有利態勢、支撐戰法運用。

集智聚力「融」。 資訊化智能化時代，不論是理論研究，或科技創新，都呈現出開放連結、交叉滲透的顯著特徵。 理技融合進行戰法創新，開放共享是重要的成長點。 推進人機一體式戰法創新，人出智謀、機器來算，以算的結果反推修訂戰法成果，在人機交互中實現理技融合；推進指技人才團隊式戰法創新，組建“ 科學家+指揮官」「戰鬥員+技術員」混合群體，實行聯調聯試、聯演聯訓、聯算聯謀，以戰法的科學性、技術的先進性謀求聯戰聯勝；推進開源眾 籌式戰法創新，軍內軍外結合，線上線下互動，以更開闊的視野、更靈活的形式，集中廣大官兵和各類專業化人才的聰明智慧，開展戰法創新領域的「創客 ”活動，發展匯聚新戰法“資源池”“成果庫”，以實現理技融合的最大效益。

實踐迭代“融”。 理論成果在實務運用中得到檢驗和昇華，科技手段在作戰行動中顯現功能與效益。 戰法創新非一日之功，理技融合也應迭代進步、滾動發展。 要注重整合應用資訊科技與智慧技術，虛擬構設未來作戰景象，在感觸與體驗智慧化作戰環境中創新戰法；要深入開展戰法創新成果虛擬模擬論證，透過虛擬實驗、模擬檢驗，充分驗證 戰法設計的可行性、作戰行動的有效性；要結合演訓活動進行技術性能檢測，透過武器裝備與資訊系統的聚能與釋能實際狀況分析，充分檢驗技術應用的功效與缺陷所在。 從而，在複盤研討、反覆論證、資料檢驗中動態發現與解決問題，理論不適用的修改理論，技術行不通的升級技術，讓戰法引進新領域技術，讓技術顛覆傳統式戰法，實現 技戰一體有機結合，持續推動戰法創新螺旋上升滾動發展。

Modern English:

Find the integration point of theory and technology for innovative tactics

Tactic, that is, combat methods, refers to the strategies and techniques used in combat. To innovate tactics, we must not only think deeply about “strategies”, but also study “techniques”. If there is “strategy” but no “skill”, the mind will be more than sufficient but the strength is insufficient; if there is “skill” but no “strategy”, no matter how hard you try, you will not be able to achieve the goal. It requires both strategic guidance and technical support to be victorious in every battle. To win information-based and intelligent wars and carry out strategic innovation that puts strategy first and wins by outsmarting, we must implement both “policy” and “technique” to effectively solve problems such as the disconnect between theoretical innovation and technological application, and the derailment of combat operations and technological paths.

“Integration” of thinking and cognition. The rapid development of modern science and technology is promoting the evolution of future combat to high-end warfare. It is necessary to seize the theoretical commanding heights and create new technological advantages. In-depth integration of science and technology and innovative tactics are the keys to victory on the battlefield. As the main body of innovation in tactics, military personnel must have a deep understanding of the winning mechanism of modern warfare, root the concept of integrating science and technology, and expand the thinking of integrating science and technology. At present, two outstanding problems and tendencies are worth noting: First, insufficient scientific and technological literacy, which can easily lead to an in-depth understanding of new forms of warfare. Only relying on past experience and routines to study tactics, and which technologies are effective and which technologies in the combat system. I don’t know much about how effective it is, where to start to form a technological advantage over the enemy, what are the technical differences with powerful enemies, how to avoid being suppressed by the enemy’s technology, etc. We emphasize tactics over technology, emphasis on “wisdom” over “intelligence”, and innovative tactics. It seems to work, but in fact it lacks technical support and is highly risky. The second is that the combat needs are not accurately grasped, and the future battlefield scene is not clearly described. Although the technical principles and winning mechanisms are understood, the application of science and technology in combat operations is not known enough, and the decisive role of human subjective initiative in combat effectiveness is ignored. Function, focusing on technology over tactics, researching technology based on technology, or only studying technical performance without considering the application of tactics, or only knowing the efficacy of technology without trying to innovate tactics. In this regard, officers and soldiers should learn, understand, and use science and technology and science and technology personnel should learn military affairs, understand warfare, and study warfare methods in a coordinated and coordinated manner, establish an integration and innovation mechanism for combat technology experts, conduct joint research on winning mechanisms, and collaboratively embed the concept of science and technology integration , interactively help and improve the quality of tactical innovation, form an ideological understanding that combat operations drive the application of science and technology, and use science and technology application to support combat operations, and lay a solid foundation for integrating theory and technology to carry out tactical innovation.

Combat design “integration”. There are never two identical wars in the world. Innovation in tactics can be inherited and learned from, but cannot be copied. At present, the pace of military theoretical innovation is accelerating, advanced science and technology are developing at a rapid pace, and the form of warfare is undergoing profound changes, showing the distinctive characteristics of being mixed, diverse, and unpredictable. Subversive technologies, innovative concepts, and reshaping theories are emerging one after another. Only by integrating science and technology to design future operations can we find and improve the starting point for tactical innovation. We must have the courage to lead the world and break through the stereotypes, use forward-looking and unique perspectives to innovate combat theories, develop and implement combat concepts, conceive combat scenarios, innovate tactics, and first outline the “base map” of the future battlefield. Well, in this way, we can connect the application of modern science and technology and promote the research and development of advanced technology. At the same time, the design of future operations cannot be too far-fetched and “utopian” beyond the limits of science and technology. It should be based on the feasibility of science and technology within a certain period of time, and on the premise of having the support of realistic or foreseeable technology application and having a path for technological implementation, innovate tactics and integrate technology. Interdiction, technological surprise, technological suppression, and technological control are embedded in combat operations.

“Integration” with superior skills. In modern wars, the status of people as the decisive factor has not changed, but the impact of technology on the outcome of wars has become more prominent. The fight for technological victory determines the outcome of wars to a large extent. The use of science and technology must always be embedded in the combat chain and throughout the entire combat process. , use technical effects to support the application of tactics, and use technical advantages to drive combat effectiveness. At present, the main contradiction in the integration of theory and technology in the innovation of tactics is not the lack of theory in technology, but the lack of technology in theory. The most urgent thing is to promote the integration of cutting-edge technology into combat theory. It is necessary to strengthen the substantive integration based on weapons and equipment platforms, focus on activating combat effectiveness to the maximum extent, carry out extensive research on the combat application of equipment based on operational effectiveness release, equipment combat testing and identification, and test the effectiveness of combat operations through simulation deductions and data analysis. , verify the “probability of winning” with “number calculations”. It is necessary to strengthen the in-depth integration of technical means to select “optimal solutions” based on combat tasks. From studying combat opponents and determining action methods to formulating combat plans and organizing confrontation exercises, we must fully consider the technical strength comparison between the enemy and ourselves, and implement asymmetric The operational philosophy takes the superiority of the inferior and the avoidance of the strong to attack the weak as the basic principle, seeks technological suppression and prevents the enemy from suppressing it, seeks technological blockage and prevents the enemy from blocking it, seeks technological subversion and prevents the enemy from subverting it, maximizes the use of technological advantages, and does everything possible. Make every effort to limit the enemy’s technological performance in order to create a favorable situation and support the use of tactics.

Gather wisdom and strength to “integrate”. In the era of informationization and intelligence, both theoretical research and scientific and technological innovation show the remarkable characteristics of open linkage and cross-penetration. The integration of science and technology carries out strategic innovation, and open sharing is an important growth point. Promote the innovation of man-machine integrated tactics, where people use their ingenuity and machines do calculations, and use the calculation results to revise the results of tactics, and realize the integration of science and technology in human-computer interaction; promote the innovation of team-based tactics for finger-technical talents, and form a ” A mixed group of “scientists + commanders” and “combatants + technicians” implements joint debugging and testing, joint exercises and training, and joint calculations and calculations, and seeks joint victory with the scientific nature of tactics and advanced technology; promotes open source and mass Tactics innovation, integration within and outside the military, online and offline interaction, with a broader vision and more flexible form, pool the wisdom of officers and soldiers and various professional talents to carry out “makers” in the field of tactics innovation “Activities, develop and gather new tactics “resource pools” and “results libraries” to achieve maximum benefits from the integration of science and technology.

Practice iterative “integration”. Theoretical achievements have been tested and sublimated in practical applications, and scientific and technological means have demonstrated their functions and benefits in combat operations. Innovation in tactics is not something that can be accomplished in a day, and the integration of science and technology should also be iteratively progressed and developed on a rolling basis. It is necessary to focus on the integrated application of information technology and intelligent technology, to virtually construct future combat scenarios, and to innovate tactics while feeling and experiencing the intelligent combat environment; it is necessary to carry out in-depth virtual simulation demonstrations of the innovative results of tactics, and fully verify them through virtual experiments and simulation tests. The feasibility of tactical design and the effectiveness of combat operations; technical performance testing must be carried out in conjunction with drills and training activities, and the efficacy and flaws of technical applications must be fully tested by analyzing the actual energy collection and release of weapons, equipment and information systems. Therefore, problems can be discovered and solved dynamically during review discussions, repeated demonstrations, and data testing, and we can modify theories where the theory is not applicable and upgrade technologies where technology is not feasible, so that tactics can introduce new field technologies, and technology can subvert traditional tactics and achieve success. The organic combination of technology and combat continues to promote the spiral and rolling development of tactical innovation.

中國國防部原文來源: http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/888沒有湯適合你.html

中國軍事應用與比特幣在未來戰爭中的應用, 中國軍民融合計劃, 中國軍用反衛星武器研製, 中國軍隊聚焦認知域戰是主攻戰場對抗的新著力點, 認知領域操作, 資料來源：中國外交部

透過智慧戰爭洞察中國軍隊打贏戰爭的演變

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Insight into Chinese Military’s Evolution of Winning Wars through the use of Intelligent Warfare

引言

軍事理論家常說，勝利往往向那些能預見戰爭特性變化的人微笑，而不是向那些等待變化發生後才去適應的人微笑。 近年來，以人工智慧為代表的顛覆性技術發展迅速，並廣泛應用於軍事領域，使戰爭形態加速向智慧化演變，與之相應的戰爭觀也正在發生嬗變。 及時發現變化，主動應對變化，積極適應變化，才能夠在未來戰爭中立於不敗之地。

從“以強打弱”到“以智制拙”

「強勝弱敗」是帶有一定普遍性的戰爭制勝法則。 即使是那些以弱勝強的戰例，往往也必須在局部和特定時段形成對敵的力量優勢才能真正取勝。 在智慧化戰爭時代，智力優勢對戰鬥力的貢獻率遠高於其他要素。

在智慧化戰爭對抗中，人的智慧廣泛滲透到作戰領域、移植到武器系統，全域多維、各種類型的智慧化作戰平台能夠快速耦合作戰力量，根據任務需求建構作戰體系，自主實施協同作戰， 任務結束迅速回歸待戰狀態，呈現智慧自主趨勢。 智慧程度更高更強的一方，能夠更好地開發和運用「以智制拙」機理，甚至據此設計戰爭、主導戰局發展，取得最終勝利。 也要看到，智慧化戰爭時代很可能存在由低到高的多個發展階段，盡可能讓自己處於高級階段，攻擊對手使其處於低維度的階段，也是以高打低「智勝」機理 的運用。

從“消滅力量”到“摧毀認知”

隨著戰爭形態加速向智慧化演進，作戰空間逐漸由物理域、資訊域拓展至認知域，以有形戰場擴展到無形戰場，由人的精神和心理活動構成的認知空間已成為新的作戰 空間。 與傳統戰爭中以消滅敵人有生力量為主要目的不同，智能化戰爭將更著重於削弱敵方的士氣，瓦解敵方的意志，摧毀敵方的認知。

透過智慧分析對手的性格偏好、心理特徵、決策習慣，可有針對性地「量身定制」威懾訊息，利用智慧化等前沿技術優勢，以形象逼真的方式向對手展現強大實力，使焦慮、猜疑 、恐慌等情緒在其內部不斷發酵，最終導致不攻自破。 被譽為「新石油」的大數據在豐富情報來源的同時，也成為作用於對手認知的重要「武器」。 透過對大數據進行加工處理，並刻意“洩露”給對手，將給其製造新的“戰爭迷霧”，使其陷入認知迷茫的境地。 在智慧化戰爭中，圍繞著攻心奪誌所展開的鬥爭博弈將更加激烈，而佔據認知優勢的一方將比對方先勝一籌，更加容易掌握主動、先機。

從“以人為主”到“人機協同”

在傳統戰爭中，軍事力量的組織與運用均以人為主。 隨著智慧技術的廣泛應用，無人裝備的比例不斷提高。 在智慧化戰爭中，作戰任務將由人機協同完成，兩者將實現有機融合、優勢互補。 外軍提出的第三次「抵銷戰略」將人機協作等作為重點發展的關鍵技術，其先後提出的「忠誠僚機」等概念也旨在探索實現有人/無人協同作戰。 可以預見，人機協同將在未來戰爭中發揮重要作用。

利用無人偵察力量進行立體多維的戰場態勢感知，可為有人作戰力量即時提供情報支援；利用無人平台攜帶中繼負荷，可為有人作戰力量持續提供通訊中繼支援；利用無人作戰力量深入 前方戰場，可吸引敵方攻擊，迫敵暴露位置，為有人作戰力量提供目標引導和火力支援；利用無人運輸裝備為前線提供物資補給，可提高後勤保障效率，降低運輸成本，減少非必要的 人員傷亡。 在人工智慧的輔助下，有人作戰力量與無人作戰力量將在數量規模、功能作用等方面實現科學分工與合理搭配，從而使整體效能最大化。

從“以大吃小”到“以快吃慢”

在傳統戰爭中，往往需要透過增加兵力數量來彌補在裝備性能等方面的短板。 “兵之情主速”，軍事智能化的飛速發展大大提升了信息傳遞速度和武器打擊精度，大幅縮減了偵察預警、情報處理、指揮決策、火力打擊、毀傷評估的時間，加速OODA殺傷鏈循環 ，使「發現即摧毀」成為可能。

高超音波飛彈、雷射武器、微波武器、電磁脈衝武器等新型快速殺傷武器進一步將戰爭節奏推向「秒殺」。 在海灣戰爭中，OODA環的迴路時間需要3天；在伊拉克戰爭中，迴路時間已縮短至10分鐘以內；而在敘利亞戰爭中，迴路已幾乎實現了近實時。 在智慧化戰爭中，利用察打一體無人平台對敵方的核心指揮所、高層指揮官等高價值目標進行快速定點清除，將使對方還來不及反應就遭受重創，甚至面臨癱瘓的險境。 可見勝利不一定眷顧軍力規模龐大的一方，行動迅速而精準的一方將更有可能贏得戰場先機。 根據統計，人工智慧應對戰場變化所需的反應時間比人類快400倍以上。 面對瞬息萬變的戰場態勢，人們將更傾向於借助人工智慧技術實現指控係統的自適應規劃和自主決策，使指控模式由“人在環路上”轉變為“人在環路外”，從而在減輕 指揮人員負擔的同時，提高作戰效率和執行任務的成功率。

從“整合製勝”到“集群制勝”

傳統的裝備發展概念是將大量資金投入到高度整合的高精尖武器平台研發中，以期在戰爭中憑藉代際優勢和性能優勢實現對敵方的降維打擊。 然而，開發部署多功能高階平台不僅需要耗費大量的時間和經費，當把多個軟硬體模組整合到單一武器平台時，還可能出現彼此之間不相容的情況。 一旦該平台被摧毀，將造成重大損失。 人工智慧等顛覆性技術的軍事應用促使無人群聚快速發展。 無人集群具有數量規模大、綜合成本低、去中心化等優勢，無人平台之間相互協調、分工合作，可自主決策並有組織地執行作戰任務，即使部分無人平台被毀，也不 影響整體作戰效能。 外軍提出的「決策中心戰」「馬賽克戰」等作戰概念，即著眼利用無人集群完成作戰任務。 在智慧化戰爭中，透過將偵察監視、資訊通聯、指揮控制、火力打擊等功能分散到大量功能單一的無人作戰單元中，建構高魯棒性、高彈性的“殺傷網”，然後根據任務 需要對組合方式進行調整，將使其湧現出強大的群體智能，給對手製造極大的不確定性，進而把對手困在OODA環的判斷環節，無法做出有效決策。 此外，由於無人集群數量龐大，可使對手的探測、跟踪、攔截能力迅速達到飽和，對手因無法摧毀集群中的所有無人平台，而不得不面臨防禦工事失效的困境。

從“軍事主導”到“多元混合”

傳統戰爭主要依賴暴力手段使敵方屈服於己方意志，通常具有較強的戰爭強度，平時與戰時界線分明。 隨著軍事鬥爭領域向太空、網路、智慧等新型領域不斷拓展，以及經濟、文化、外交、法律等手段在戰爭中的作用不斷凸顯，智能化戰爭將在「灰色地帶」為代表的多個領域 以「多管齊下」的形式展開。 戰爭強度可能會減弱，平戰界線將更加模糊。 無論是2019年沙烏地阿拉伯油田因遭到無人機攻擊而導致一半石油停產，或是2021年美國最大輸油管因遭遇網路攻擊而導致大面積油料短缺，各類新型攻擊手段所帶來的深遠影響均 不可小覷。

隨著智慧化技術的發展成熟，綜合運用多種手段對對手的工業、交通、金融、通訊、能源、醫療等設施和網路發動的攻擊將更加普遍。 智慧化戰爭的門檻將呈現下降趨勢，參戰方可能採取不宣而戰的方式發起融合經濟戰、外交戰、網路戰、輿論戰、心理戰、法律戰等多種樣式的混合戰爭，使對手疲 於應付。

從“實戰驗兵”到“實驗演兵”

在傳統條件下，由於缺乏科學的模擬模擬與評估工具，因此只有在實戰中才能檢驗出軍隊的真實能力。 在智慧化條件下，利用虛擬實境技術可基於實際的戰場環境和任務背景創造具有較強立體感和真實感的虛擬場景。 該場景不僅可以從聲音、外觀、性能等多個維度對武器裝備等客觀事物進行還原，還能模擬大霧、大雨和暴風雪等各種惡劣天氣，以可視化的形式展現戰場的地形、氣象、水文 、電磁、核化等訊息，接近戰場的真實狀況。

根據現實中敵方的特徵設定虛擬環境中的假想敵，並對戰局的可能走向進行智慧模擬仿真，可使官兵在正式開戰前就已在虛擬實境中數次「親歷」戰爭，從而對裝備性能 、戰爭節奏、敵我情況都了然於胸，在執行現實任務時將更加游刃有餘。 在伊拉克戰爭爆發前，美軍曾秘密開發了一款模擬巴格達作戰環境的電腦遊戲，在派遣到伊拉克執行任務的人員中，接受過遊戲訓練的人員生存率高達90%。 隨著現實中收集到的數據不斷豐富完善，虛擬戰場的搭建將更加逼真，對戰場態勢的走向預測將更加準確，關於演習的綜合評估將更加可信，敵對雙方都力圖通過智能推演即可預先 獲知戰爭結果，將可能出現不戰或小戰就「屈人之兵」的情況。

Modern English:

Insight into the evolution of the winning mechanism of intelligent warfare

■Xie Kai, Zhang Dongrun, Liang Xiaoping

introduction

Military theorists often say that victory tends to smile on those who can foresee changes in the character of warfare, rather than on those who wait for changes to occur and then adapt. In recent years, disruptive technologies represented by artificial intelligence have developed rapidly and are widely used in the military field, accelerating the evolution of war into intelligence. Correspondingly, the concept of war is also changing. Only by discovering changes in a timely manner, proactively responding to changes, and actively adapting to changes can we remain invincible in future wars.

From “using the strong to defeat the weak” to “using wisdom to control the weak”

“The strong wins and the weak loses” is a certain universal law for winning wars. Even in those battles in which the weak defeat the strong, it is often necessary to form a strength advantage over the enemy locally and at a specific period of time in order to truly win. In the era of intelligent warfare, the contribution rate of intelligence superiority to combat effectiveness is much higher than other factors.

In intelligent warfare, human intelligence has widely penetrated into the combat field and been transplanted into weapon systems. All-domain, multi-dimensional, and various types of intelligent combat platforms can quickly couple combat forces, build combat systems based on mission requirements, and independently implement collaborative operations. After the mission ends, it quickly returns to the ready-to-fight state, showing a trend of intelligent autonomy. The side with higher and stronger intelligence can better develop and use the “wisdom to control” mechanism, and even design wars based on this, dominate the development of the war situation, and achieve final victory. It should also be noted that in the era of intelligent warfare, there are likely to be multiple stages of development from low to high. Try to keep yourself in an advanced stage and attack the opponent to a low-dimensional stage. This is also the mechanism of “outsmarting” by using high to defeat low. application.

From “destroying power” to “destroying cognition”

As the form of war accelerates to evolve towards intelligence, the combat space gradually expands from the physical domain and information domain to the cognitive domain, and extends from the tangible battlefield to the invisible battlefield. The cognitive space composed of human spirit and psychological activities has become a new combat space. space. Different from the main purpose of traditional war, which is to eliminate the enemy’s physical strength, intelligent warfare will pay more attention to weakening the enemy’s morale, disintegrating the enemy’s will, and destroying the enemy’s cognition.

By intelligently analyzing the opponent’s personality preferences, psychological characteristics, and decision-making habits, deterrence information can be “tailored” in a targeted manner, and the advantages of cutting-edge technologies such as intelligence can be used to demonstrate powerful strength to the opponent in a realistic way, making anxiety and suspicion Emotions such as fear and fear continued to ferment within it, eventually leading to its self-defeat. Big data, known as the “new oil”, not only enriches the source of intelligence, but also becomes an important “weapon” that affects the opponent’s cognition. By processing big data and deliberately “leaking” it to the opponent, a new “fog of war” will be created for it, making it fall into a state of cognitive confusion. In intelligent warfare, the struggle for the heart and mind will become more intense, and the party with the cognitive advantage will be better than the other party, making it easier to seize the initiative and take advantage of opportunities.

From “people-oriented” to “human-machine collaboration”

In traditional warfare, the organization and use of military force are dominated by people. With the widespread application of smart technology, the proportion of unmanned equipment continues to increase. In intelligent warfare, combat tasks will be completed by man-machine collaboration, and the two will achieve organic integration and complementary advantages. The third “offset strategy” proposed by foreign military forces focuses on human-machine collaboration as a key technology for development. Concepts such as “loyal wingman” proposed by them are also aimed at exploring the realization of manned/unmanned collaborative operations. It is foreseeable that human-machine collaboration will play an important role in future wars.

The use of unmanned reconnaissance forces to carry out three-dimensional and multi-dimensional battlefield situation awareness can provide real-time intelligence support for manned combat forces; the use of unmanned platforms to carry relay loads can continuously provide communication relay support for manned combat forces; the use of unmanned combat forces can provide in-depth The forward battlefield can attract enemy attacks, force the enemy to expose their positions, and provide target guidance and fire support for manned combat forces; using unmanned transportation equipment to provide material supplies to the front line can improve logistics support efficiency, reduce transportation costs, and reduce unnecessary Casualties. With the assistance of artificial intelligence, manned combat forces and unmanned combat forces will achieve scientific division of labor and reasonable coordination in terms of quantity, scale, functions, etc., thereby maximizing overall effectiveness.

From “eating the small with the big” to “eating the slow with the fast”

In traditional wars, it is often necessary to increase the number of troops to make up for shortcomings in equipment performance and other aspects. “Soldiers love the main speed”, the rapid development of military intelligence has greatly improved the speed of information transmission and weapon strike accuracy, greatly reduced the time for reconnaissance and early warning, intelligence processing, command decision-making, fire strikes, damage assessment, and accelerated the OODA kill chain cycle , making “discovery and destruction” possible.

New rapid-kill weapons such as hypersonic missiles, laser weapons, microwave weapons, and electromagnetic pulse weapons have further pushed the pace of war to “instant kill.” In the Gulf War, the loop time of the OODA loop took 3 days; in the Iraq War, the loop time has been shortened to less than 10 minutes; and in the Syrian War, the loop time has almost achieved near real-time. In intelligent warfare, the use of unmanned platforms that integrate surveillance and combat to quickly and precisely eliminate high-value targets such as the enemy’s core command posts and high-level commanders will cause the opponent to suffer heavy damage before it has time to respond, and may even face the danger of paralysis. It can be seen that victory does not necessarily favor the side with large military strength. The side that moves quickly and accurately will be more likely to gain the upper hand on the battlefield. According to statistics, the reaction time required for artificial intelligence to respond to battlefield changes is more than 400 times faster than that of humans. Faced with the ever-changing battlefield situation, people will be more inclined to use artificial intelligence technology to realize adaptive planning and autonomous decision-making of the command and control system, so that the command and control mode changes from “people on the loop” to “people outside the loop”, thereby mitigating the While reducing the burden on command personnel, it can improve combat efficiency and the success rate of mission execution.

From “Integration to Win” to “Cluster to Win”

The traditional equipment development concept is to invest a large amount of money in the research and development of highly integrated, sophisticated weapon platforms, in order to achieve dimensionality reduction against the enemy by virtue of generational advantages and performance advantages in war. However, the development and deployment of multi-functional high-end platforms not only requires a lot of time and money, but when multiple software and hardware modules are integrated into a single weapon platform, there may also be mutual incompatibility. Once the platform is destroyed, significant losses will occur. The military application of disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence has promoted the rapid development of unmanned swarms. Unmanned clusters have the advantages of large scale, low overall cost, and decentralization. The unmanned platforms coordinate with each other, divide labor and cooperate, and can make decisions independently and carry out combat tasks in an organized manner. Even if some unmanned platforms are destroyed, there will be no Affect overall combat effectiveness. The operational concepts such as “decision-centered warfare” and “mosaic warfare” proposed by foreign military forces focus on using unmanned swarms to complete combat missions. In intelligent warfare, by dispersing reconnaissance and surveillance, information communication, command and control, fire strike and other functions into a large number of unmanned combat units with single functions, a highly robust and elastic “kill network” is constructed, and then based on the mission The combination method needs to be adjusted, which will allow it to emerge with powerful group intelligence, creating great uncertainty for the opponent, thereby trapping the opponent in the judgment link of the OODA loop and unable to make effective decisions. In addition, due to the large number of unmanned swarms, the opponent’s detection, tracking, and interception capabilities can quickly reach saturation. Because the opponent cannot destroy all unmanned platforms in the swarm, the opponent has to face the dilemma of defense failure.

From “military dominance” to “diversified mixture”

Traditional war mainly relies on violent means to make the enemy succumb to one’s own will. It usually has a strong war intensity and has a clear boundary between peacetime and wartime. As the field of military struggle continues to expand into new fields such as space, network, and intelligence, and the role of economic, cultural, diplomatic, legal and other means in war continues to become more prominent, intelligent warfare will be carried out in many fields represented by “grey zones” In the form of “multi-pronged approach”. The intensity of war may weaken, and the boundaries between peace and war will become more blurred. Whether it is the Saudi oil fields that were attacked by drones in 2019, which caused half of its oil production to cease, or the largest oil pipeline in the United States that suffered a cyber attack in 2021, which caused a large-scale oil shortage, the far-reaching impact of various new attack methods has been Not to be underestimated.

As intelligent technology develops and matures, it will become more common to use a variety of means to launch attacks on opponents’ industrial, transportation, financial, communications, energy, medical and other facilities and networks. The threshold for intelligent warfare will show a downward trend, and warring parties may resort to undeclared warfare to launch hybrid wars that integrate economic warfare, diplomatic warfare, cyber warfare, public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, legal warfare and other styles to tire out their opponents. To cope.

From “actual combat test” to “experimental exercise”

Under traditional conditions, due to the lack of scientific simulation and evaluation tools, the true capabilities of the military can only be tested in actual combat. Under intelligent conditions, virtual reality technology can be used to create virtual scenes with a strong three-dimensional sense and realism based on the actual battlefield environment and mission background. This scene can not only restore objective things such as weapons and equipment from multiple dimensions such as sound, appearance, and performance, but can also simulate various severe weather such as heavy fog, heavy rain, and blizzards, and visually display the terrain, meteorology, and hydrology of the battlefield. , electromagnetic, nuclear and other information, close to the real situation on the battlefield.

Setting the imaginary enemy in the virtual environment based on the characteristics of the enemy in reality and conducting intelligent simulation of the possible direction of the war situation can enable officers and soldiers to “experience” the war several times in virtual reality before the official war begins, thereby having a better understanding of the performance of the equipment. , the rhythm of war, and the situation between ourselves and the enemy are all clear, and you will be more comfortable when performing realistic tasks. Before the outbreak of the Iraq War, the US military secretly developed a computer game that simulated the combat environment in Baghdad. Among the personnel sent to perform tasks in Iraq, the survival rate of those who received game training was as high as 90%. As the data collected in reality continue to be enriched and improved, the construction of the virtual battlefield will become more realistic, the prediction of the direction of the battlefield situation will be more accurate, and the comprehensive assessment of the exercise will be more credible. Both sides of the enemy will strive to predict the situation through intelligent deduction. Knowing the outcome of the war, it may be possible to “subdue the enemy’s troops” without fighting or with a small battle.

China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military Informatization, 中國解放軍敘事戰爭, 中國軍事應用與比特幣在未來戰爭中的應用, 中國軍民融合計劃, 中國軍用反衛星武器研製, 中國軍隊做好戰爭準備, 國家網絡空間安全戰略, 國防和軍隊現代化建設

中國軍隊做好戰爭準備，科學研究旨在實現戰場統治

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Chinese Military Readies for War with Scientific Research Designed to Achieve Domination on the Battlefield

4月下旬，軍事科學院戰爭研究院順利完成上報兩項作戰重大問題研究工程的立項論證建議書。 這是研究院著眼履行核心職能，科研攻關始終瞄準備戰打仗的具體實踐。

戰爭研究院是全軍專門研究戰爭、設計戰爭的科學研究機構。 作為新組成單位，大項任務多、臨時任務多、論證申報任務多是他們科學研究工作的主要特徵。 年初，針對人少事急、科研任務壓茬推進的實際情況，該研究院黨委對照戰鬥力標準，把旨在強軍勝戰的科研工作擺在重要位置。 他們依據備戰急需、打仗急用、部隊急盼的標準，調整確立了戰爭與作戰問題研究、條令法規編排等方向的重點科研任務，壓減了10餘項偏離主責主業的課題，新增 了一批戰爭形態、作戰風格等聚焦備戰打仗的課題研究。 該研究院領導介紹，院黨委要求班子成員在重大科研任務中既掛帥又出征，做到主要精力向重點任務投放，力量配備、經費支持等向作戰研究傾斜。

同時，研究院持續深化「小核心、大外圍」協同攻關，不斷創新科學研究組織模式。 他們在研究院內部進行軍事理論人員和軍事科技人員「捆綁式」研究，打通科研壁壘；與軍事醫學研究院、國防工程研究院等兄弟單位互派專家參與重大專案研究，實現優勢互補；組織科研 人員參加各類重大演訓活動，找準科研需求；舉辦多邊軍事交流活動，使科研人員及時了解最新軍事科技動態。 此外，他們也積極與地方科研院所合作，將地方優質科研資源為己所用，形成研究戰爭、設計戰爭、運籌戰爭、驗證戰爭的閉合迴路。

去年以來，該研究院先後完成百餘項科研課題，在核心作戰概念開發、聯合作戰實驗等研究上取得重要突破，提交國家高端智庫研究報告、重要問題評估報告等60餘份，推出一批戰略 性強、原創性強、前瞻性強的創新成果。

Modern English:

In late April, the Institute of War Research of the Academy of Military Sciences successfully completed the submission of project demonstration proposals for two major combat issue research projects. This is a concrete practice of the institute focusing on fulfilling its core functions and always aiming at scientific research and preparation for war.

The War Research Institute is a scientific research institution specializing in the study and design of war in the entire military. As a newly established unit, the main characteristics of their scientific research work are many major tasks, many temporary tasks, and many demonstration and application tasks. At the beginning of the year, in response to the actual situation where there were few people and urgent tasks and scientific research tasks were being pushed forward, the party committee of the institute put the scientific research work aimed at strengthening the army and winning the war in an important position in accordance with the combat effectiveness standards. Based on the criteria of urgent need for war preparation, urgent need for war, and urgent need of troops, they adjusted and established key scientific research tasks in the research of war and combat issues, and the compilation of doctrines and regulations, etc., and reduced more than 10 topics that deviated from their main responsibilities and main business, and added new A batch of research on war forms, combat styles and other topics focusing on war preparation and combat were carried out. According to the leader of the institute, the party committee of the institute requires team members to both take command and go out on major scientific research tasks, so that the main energy should be devoted to key tasks, and force allocation and financial support should be tilted towards combat research.

At the same time, the institute continues to deepen the collaborative research of “small core and large periphery” and continuously innovates the scientific research organization model. They carry out “bundled” research by military theoretical personnel and military scientific and technological personnel within the institute to break down barriers to scientific research; they exchange experts with sister units such as the Military Medical Research Institute and the National Defense Engineering Research Institute to participate in major project research to achieve complementary advantages; organize scientific research Personnel participate in various major exercises and training activities to identify scientific research needs; multilateral military exchange activities are held to keep scientific researchers informed of the latest military science and technology trends. In addition, they also actively cooperate with local scientific research institutes to use local high-quality scientific research resources for their own use, forming a closed loop of researching war, designing war, operating war, and verifying war.

Since last year, the institute has completed more than 100 scientific research projects, made important breakthroughs in the development of core operational concepts and joint operational experiments, submitted more than 60 national high-end think tank research reports and important issue assessment reports, and launched a number of strategies. Innovative results that are highly innovative, original and forward-looking.

解放軍原文參考：https://military.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0514/c1888沒有湯給你.html

China's Informatization - 中國信息化

中國使用人工智慧作為武器系統

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China’s Use of Artificial Intelligence as a Weapon System

繼可自主執行對地攻擊的F-16無人僚機、X-58“女武神”和X-62 VISTA自主飛行項目之后，美軍開啟“毒液”項目，將人工智能引擎廣泛應用於當前和未來的各型飛機上，意圖讓其獲得自主飛行能力。與此同時，ChatGPT的出現讓人驚嘆於人工智能的強大。那麼，在以信息化和智能化作為重要發展方向的未來軍事中，人工智能的應用將擔任什麼角色，造成什麼影響呢？

見微知著——從當今發展見未來

1956年，人工智能被首次提出，60多年的不斷發展，其已成為一門廣泛的交叉和前沿科學，成為各國提升國家競爭力、維護國家安全的重大戰略手段。

美國於2019年發布一系列關於人工智能的戰略部署，加大對人工智能及相關技術的投入與開發﹔截止2022年底，中國國家AI創新應用先導區增至11個，覆蓋各大戰略區域及長江中游城市群﹔俄羅斯在經濟中運用的人工智能約佔整體管理量的20%，計劃於2024年提升至50%。

由以色列拉斐爾先進防務系統公司推出的海上破壞者，採用人工智能和決策算法，可利用人工智能進行深度學習巡航導彈以適應各種場景。作為世界上首款高智能巡航導彈，該導彈能自動識別目標，在GPS失效的情況下仍能自主完成精准命中目標。

在人工智能的幫助下，各類無人裝備進行著相對應的工作以滿足預警、探測、偵查、作戰等功能，自主分析態勢，獲取情報，並依此進行智能決策，指揮控制，最終達到適應復雜、高強度、高不確定性的戰場環境。

尖矛利盾——以攻守對立促成長

隨著信息化不斷發展，現代戰爭現代戰爭高強度、高動態、多領域等特征愈發明顯，逐漸由信息化向智能化演進，需要壓縮OODA環，充分發揮智能武器的優勢，不斷提高戰場態勢快速感知和快速准確決策的能力，提升裝備的集群作戰能力。

在實戰中，真實戰場局勢風雲變幻，天氣、士兵狀態、物資情況等影響因素眾多，所帶來的數據量大，人工智能處理起來相對困難。同時，如果雙方都使用人工智能來指導戰爭，將導致一方所需要處理的數據量與預測量成指數提高，而目前採用的弱人工智能可能無法處理如此巨大的數據量。而且人工智能對於戰場數據的分析屬於黑盒結構，指揮官無法預測其做出決策的邏輯判斷以及預期效果，容易與實時的戰爭形勢不符，發生嚴重決策錯誤。

目前，世界各國都認識到了人工智能對於戰爭的重要性，都在積極研發新型穩定的人工智能。早在2018年，美就已經投入了51億美元建立了專門的人工智能研究機構，而各國也在不斷與民間的人工智能系統合作，不斷強化軍用人工智能，將其用於自動化的無人機器，並為這種機器加裝武器設備與敵我判別標識系統。同時，人工智能對於通信的加密以及數據圖像的強有效的分析將導致各國衛星受到嚴密關注，很容易觸發各國敏感神經，打破戰略對峙局面。

觀往知來——鑒傳統經驗善規章

近期爆火的強人工智能ChatGPT已經達到了能夠幫助人類撰寫論文的水平，甚至讓學術界都感嘆“博學而專業”。隨著信息時代的發展，各國意識到了傳統的戰爭形式已不完全適用於現代戰爭。在如今高強度網絡信息的影響下，利用人工智能影響一國的科技研發、輿論甚至選舉，以更低的成本產生更高的效益。

綜合目前人工智能的表現，其在未來戰爭中可能會逐漸接手一些事務進行處理並提供參考意見，但戰爭的主體仍是人類，所以我們更應該合力加強對人工智能的管理，將其應用於民生而非軍事領域，全方位改善人類生活，為維護國家安全和人類和平福祉而共同努力。

Modern English:

Following the F-16 unmanned wingman, X-58 “Valkyrie” and X-62 VISTA autonomous flight projects that can independently perform ground attacks, the US military launched the “Venom” project to widely apply artificial intelligence engines to current and future aircraft. On various types of aircraft, the intention is to allow them to obtain autonomous flight capabilities. At the same time, the emergence of ChatGPT makes people marvel at the power of artificial intelligence. So, in the future military where informatization and intelligence are important development directions, what role will the application of artificial intelligence play and what impact will it have?

Seeing the subtleties and knowing the work – looking at the future from today’s development

Artificial intelligence was first proposed in 1956. After more than 60 years of continuous development, it has become an extensive cross-cutting and cutting-edge science, and a major strategic means for countries to enhance national competitiveness and maintain national security.

The United States released a series of strategic deployments on artificial intelligence in 2019 to increase investment and development in artificial intelligence and related technologies; by the end of 2022, China’s national AI innovation application pilot zones will have increased to 11, covering major strategic regions and the Yangtze River Midstream city agglomeration: The artificial intelligence used in Russia’s economy accounts for about 20% of the overall management volume, and plans to increase it to 50% in 2024.

The Maritime Destroyer, launched by Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, uses artificial intelligence and decision-making algorithms. It can use artificial intelligence to conduct deep learning cruise missiles to adapt to various scenarios. As the world’s first highly intelligent cruise missile, the missile can automatically identify targets and accurately hit targets autonomously even when GPS fails.

With the help of artificial intelligence, various types of unmanned equipment perform corresponding tasks to meet the functions of early warning, detection, reconnaissance, combat, etc., independently analyze the situation, obtain intelligence, and make intelligent decisions, command and control accordingly, and ultimately achieve adaptation Complex, high-intensity, high-uncertainty battlefield environment.

Sharp spears and sharp shields—promoting growth through offensive and defensive opposition

With the continuous development of informatization, the characteristics of modern warfare such as high intensity, high dynamics, and multiple fields have become more and more obvious. It is gradually evolving from informatization to intelligence. It is necessary to compress the OODA loop, give full play to the advantages of smart weapons, and continuously improve the battlefield situation. The ability to sense quickly and make quick and accurate decisions improves the equipment’s swarm combat capability.

In actual combat, the real battlefield situation is constantly changing, and there are many influencing factors such as weather, soldier status, and material conditions. The resulting data volume is large, and it is relatively difficult for artificial intelligence to process it. At the same time, if both sides use artificial intelligence to guide the war, the amount of data one side needs to process will increase exponentially with the amount of predictions, and the weak artificial intelligence currently used may not be able to handle such a huge amount of data. Moreover, artificial intelligence’s analysis of battlefield data has a black-box structure. Commanders cannot predict the logical judgment and expected effects of their decisions, which can easily be inconsistent with the real-time war situation and lead to serious decision-making errors.

At present, all countries in the world have realized the importance of artificial intelligence in warfare and are actively developing new and stable artificial intelligence. As early as 2018, the United States has invested US$5.1 billion to establish a specialized artificial intelligence research institution, and various countries are also continuing to cooperate with civilian artificial intelligence systems to continuously strengthen military artificial intelligence and use it for automated drones. , and equip this machine with weapons and equipment and a identification system for identifying friend and foe. At the same time, artificial intelligence’s encryption of communications and powerful and effective analysis of data images will cause satellites of various countries to receive close attention, which can easily trigger the sensitive nerves of various countries and break the strategic confrontation.

Observe the past and know the future – learn from traditional experience and good rules

The recently popular strong artificial intelligence ChatGPT has reached a level that can help humans write papers, and even makes the academic community lament that it is “erudite and professional”. With the development of the information age, countries have realized that traditional forms of warfare are no longer fully suitable for modern warfare. Under the influence of today’s high-intensity network information, artificial intelligence can be used to influence a country’s technological research and development, public opinion and even elections, producing higher benefits at lower costs.

Based on the current performance of artificial intelligence, it may gradually take over some matters to handle and provide reference opinions in future wars. However, the main body of the war is still human beings, so we should work together to strengthen the management of artificial intelligence and apply it to people’s livelihood. In the non-military field, we strive to improve human life in all aspects and work together to safeguard national security and human peace and well-being.

中國人民解放軍 作者：國防科技大學國際問題研究中心研究員 梁庭宇、李彥達、楊靖凱、梅鐘文 (責編：陳羽、鄧志慧)

原創中文國防部網站：https://military.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2023/xxx/S888-1010.html

China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Strategic Support Forces, 國家網絡空間安全戰略

Chinese Military Strategic Support Force – Skynet Army: It Will Change the Face of Cyberwar // 中國軍事戰略支援力量 – 天網軍隊將改變網絡戰的面貌

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Chinese Military Strategic Support Force – Skynet Army: It Will Change the Face of Cyberwar //

中國軍事戰略支援力量 – 天網軍隊將改變網絡戰的面貌

Author: Source: Netease military

DTG: 2016-01-04 08:XX:XX

Strategic support forces are not logistical support or more powerful than the Rockets. Three tears on, how effective has China’s SSF become in the realm of cyber warfare?

Abstract: On December 31, 2015, the PLA Army Leadership, Rocket Army, and Strategic Support Forces were established. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, President of the State Council, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, awarded the newly established three major units. The major steps marking the reform of the PLA’s army are beginning to be gradually implemented. Among the three new units, the strategic support force is definitely a brand new name, which naturally raises many questions. What kind of force is this?

The strategic support force should be called Skynet Army: it will change the war.

Strategic support is not logistical support

The newly established three units, the Army’s leading body is also the Army’s headquarters. The former PLA has always been the army’s boss. The mainland’s thinking is deeply rooted. Therefore, only the navy and air force headquarters, and no army command, the top leaders of the army are all from The army, the head of the navy and air force ranks among the members of the Central Military Commission, and it is more symbolic. The establishment of the Army Headquarters now means that the status of the Army will gradually be lowered and will be consistent with other services. This will lay the foundation for the model of the highest military leadership in the rotation of the heads of the Western military in the future, and further strengthen the synergy for the various services. The conditions.

The Rockets are no strangers to military fans. They are the former Second Artillery Corps, which is essentially a strategic missile force. The strategic missile unit of the former Soviet Union was called the Strategic Rocket Army. When the PLA established the strategic missile force, the international situation was surging. For the sake of low-key restraint, Zhou Enlai proposed the name of the Second Artillery. Now renamed the Rocket Army, the name is more prestige, more directly strengthen the significance of strategic deterrence.

Relative to the above two units, for those concerned about national defense construction, the strategic support force will be much more strange. When many people hear this name, the first reaction is the logistics support force, which is a big mistake! The strategic support force is actually a genuine combat force. It is nominally supportive. In many cases, it is the first open-minded pioneer to fight, even to enter the battlefield earlier than the land, sea, air force and rocket forces. According to the spokesman of the Ministry of National Defense, the strategic support force is a new type of combat force for safeguarding national security and an important growth point for our military’s new combat capability. It is mainly a strategic, basic, and supportive type. The support force is formed after the functional integration.

The strategic support force should be called Skynet Army: it will change the war.

Specifically, the strategic support force will include five parts: intelligence reconnaissance, satellite management, electronic countermeasures, cyber offense and defense, and psychological warfare. It is a combination of the most advanced corps, the net army, and other battlefields on the battlefield. More specifically, it is a combat force dedicated to the soft kill mission.

This is also the adjustment of the military reform at the military level. The PLA is divided into the traditional land, sea and air force, the strategic deterrent and the attacking rocket army and the most modern “sky-net” army. The three levels of division of labor are clear, and they can strengthen each other. The synergy between the two, to maximize the advantages of the overall war, is undoubtedly the highlight of this military reform.

Five major parts highlight high-tech content

Let’s take a closer look at the five major components of the Strategic Support Army. First, intelligence reconnaissance. This is not a spy war in the traditional sense. It is not like the old movie “The Crossing River Scout”, which disguise itself as a deep enemy. More is technical reconnaissance. With the increasing popularity of modern equipment, the leakage of various technical information is difficult to avoid, such as radio signals, electromagnetic signals, infrared signals, etc., through the collection and analysis of these signals, a large amount of valuable information can be obtained, strategic support forces The reconnaissance is mainly the technical reconnaissance in this respect, which can be carried out through modern equipment such as reconnaissance satellites, reconnaissance planes, drones, and sensors.

The strategic support force should be called Skynet Army: it will change the war.

Satellite management is the so-called “Heavenly Army”. This is a new type of force that has emerged with the rapid development of space technology, especially satellite information reconnaissance, tracking and surveillance, guided navigation and aerospace weapons. The United States established the National Space Command in 1985, marking the birth of the world’s first heavenly army. Russia subsequently separated the military space force and the space missile defense force from the strategic rocket army and established a space force with a total strength of about 90,000 people. Then with the military reform of the People’s Liberation Army, the “Heavenly Army” under the strategic support force was formally formed and became a force dedicated to space operations in the future. The significance is significant.

The history of electronic confrontation is much longer than that of the Tianjun. As early as in the First World War, both sides have had the information of the other party and the communication of the other party. To the Second World War, the means of electronic confrontation. Both the scale and the scale have been greatly developed. In July 1943, the British army used metal foil strips to interfere with the German radar in the bombing of Hamburg, Germany, which was considered the beginning of modern electronic confrontation. During the Middle East War in the 1960s, electronic confrontation played a decisive role. Under today’s technical conditions, there is no need to spend more on electronic countermeasures.

Network attack and defense is also called cyber warfare. It is the rise of the network, exploiting the loopholes and security flaws of the network to attack and destroy the data in the hardware, software and systems of the network system. In 2001, there was a large-scale civil hacking incident between China and the United States, which stimulated the United States to a certain extent. By 2009, the world’s first cyber command was established. Through the opportunity of military reform, China has set up a specialized cyber warfare force and began systematically investing and developing in the fields of information construction and network attack and defense. This is a milestone for the future war, which is bound to spread to the network. meaningful.

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In the end, it is psychological warfare, that is, by applying the principle principle of psychology, taking human psychology as the battlefield, and systematically adopting various means, including the means of communication, such as the Internet, television, and broadcasting, which cannot be separated from modern life. Cognitive, emotional, and will exert influence, mentally disintegrating enemy military and civilian fighting spirits or eliminating the influence of enemy propaganda, thus combating the enemy’s mind, in exchange for the greatest victory and benefits at the least cost. Psychological warfare sounds very mysterious. In fact, as mentioned in “Sun Tzu’s Art of War·The Tactics”: “It is the victorious battle, the good ones who are not good, the soldiers who do not fight and the good, and the good ones.” The “war without a war” is the ultimate goal of today’s psychological war. In the Battle of Normandy in the Second World War, the Allies used a large number of psychological warfare methods, which seriously affected the judgment of the German commander-in-chief and made great contributions to the victory of the battle. Since then, from the Korean War, the Vietnam War, to today’s Iraq War and the Afghan War, the US military has had professional psychological warfare troops to participate in the war. Therefore, this is the most easily overlooked military means, but it is a high level of military struggle, and even more efficient and effective than advanced aircraft cannons.

Therefore, it can be said that the strategic support force is the highest in the five major services after the reform of the PLA’s army. It can even be said to be completely different from the traditional war style of the past, and it is more characterized by ultra-modern flow.

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Soft killing

According to the strategy disclosed on the network, the armbands are supported on the network. The above is the eight-and-five-pointed star. Below is the triangular arrow and the electronic cloud orbit. Surrounded by the surrounding wheat ears, it can be seen from this pattern that the strategic support force is not a traditional one. In the sense of steel contest, you can’t see the scene of the smoke, and there is no such thing as a nuclear weapon to destroy the horror of the sea, but the soft kill of the soldiers. In a sense, soft killing is no less inferior than hard killing, and even playing a role is more important than hard killing.

In contrast, until today, the US military has only independent scattered Tianjun, Net Army and psychological warfare units, but the PLA Strategic Support Forces have integrated these units directly in the preparation, and they are able to cooperate and play the greatest combat effectiveness. . It can be said that this major reform of the military, especially the establishment of the strategic support force, is definitely a major improvement in the system.

Imagine that without the strategic support force’s satellites accurately positioned and navigated, without the electronic escaping forces and cyber warfare forces escorting, the Rocket’s strategic missiles will be difficult to function; if there is no strategic support for the technical reconnaissance intelligence support, Satellite communication links, then the land, sea and air forces on the vast battlefield are blind and deaf, and the combat effectiveness is greatly reduced. Therefore, the strategic support forces will play a major role in the invisible four-dimensional and five-dimensional battlefield space.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

战略支援部队可不是后勤支援，或比火箭军更厉害

摘要：2015年12月31日，解放军陆军领导机构、火箭军、战略支援部队成立，中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席习近平给新成立的这三大单位授旗。标志着此轮解放军军队改革重大步骤正开始逐步落实，在这三个新单位中，战略支援部队绝对是个全新的名称，自然会引起不少的疑问，这到底是支怎样的部队呢？

战略支援部队就应该叫天网军：将改变战争

战略支援可不是后勤支援

这次新成立的三个单位，陆军领导机构也就是陆军总部，原来解放军历来就是陆军老大，大陆军的思想根深蒂固，所以只有海军、空军司令部，而不设陆军司令部，军队最高领导全都出自陆军，海空军首长位列中央军委委员，也更多是象征意义。现在设立陆军总部，也就意味着陆军的地位逐渐下调，将和其他军种相一致，这为今后仿效西方各军种首长轮流担任军队最高领导的模式打下了基础，同时也对各军种进一步加强协同创造了条件。

火箭军对于军迷来说也是并不陌生，就是以前的第二炮兵，实质就是战略导弹部队。前苏联的战略导弹部队就叫战略火箭军，解放军成立战略导弹部队时，国际形势风起云涌，出于低调克制的考虑，由周恩来提议采用了第二炮兵的名称。现在改称火箭军，在名称上就威风多了，更直接地强化了战略威慑的意义。

相对上述两个单位，对于关心国防建设的人来说，战略支援部队就要陌生多了。很多人一听到这个名称，第一反应就是后勤支援部队，那就大错特错了！战略支援部队其实一样是货真价实的作战部队，名义上是支援，很多时候反而是第一个冲锋陷阵的开路先锋，甚至要比陆海空军和火箭军更早地投入战场。按照国防部发言人的话来说，战略支援部队是维护国家安全的新型作战力量，是我军新质作战能力的重要增长点，主要是将战略性、基础性、支撑性都很强的各类保障力量进行功能整合后组建而成。

战略支援部队就应该叫天网军：将改变战争

具体来说，战略支援部队将包括情报侦察、卫星管理、电子对抗、网络攻防、心理战等五大部分，是综合了这个时代最先进的天军、网军等看不见硝烟的战场上的作战部队，更确切地说是专门担负软杀伤使命的作战力量。

这也是此次军队改革在军种层面的调整，将解放军分为传统的陆海空军、战略威慑和打击的火箭军和最现代化的“天-网”军，三个层次分工明确，又能强化相互之间的协同配合，最大限度地发挥出整体战的优势，无疑是本次军队改革的重头戏。

五大部分凸现高科技含量

再来细看战略支援军的五大组成部分，先是情报侦察，这可不是传统意义上打入敌人内部的谍战无间道，也不是像老电影《渡江侦察记》那样乔装改扮深入敌后，而更多的是技术侦察。随着现代化装备越来越普遍，各种技术信息的泄漏很难避免，比如无线电信号、电磁信号、红外信号等等，通过对这些信号的搜集和分析就可以获取大量宝贵的情报，战略支援部队的侦察主要就是这方面的技术侦察，可以通过侦察卫星、侦察机、无人机、感应器等现代化装备来进行。

战略支援部队就应该叫天网军：将改变战争

卫星管理就是所谓的“天军”，这是随着航天技术的飞速发展，特别是卫星信息侦察、跟踪监视、制导导航及航天兵器的广泛应用，应运而生的新型部队。美国在1985年成立了全美航天司令部，标志着世界上第一支天军的诞生。俄罗斯随后也将军事航天部队和太空导弹防御部队从战略火箭军中分离出来，成立了一支总兵力约9万人的航天部队。那么随着解放军这次军事改革，隶属于战略支援部队的“天军”也正式组建，成为今后专门承担航天作战的部队，意义可谓重大。

电子对抗的历史就要比天军更为悠久，早在第一次世界大战中交战双方就都曾有过侦收对方的信息和干扰对方通信联络，到第二次世界大战，电子对抗的手段和规模都有了很大发展，1943年7月英军在对德国汉堡的轰炸中大规模使用金属箔条干扰德军雷达，被认为是现代电子对抗的开始。到60年代中东战争期间，电子对抗更是发挥了决定性的作用。在今天的技术条件下，电子对抗就不用再多费口舌了。

网络攻防也叫网络战，是随着网络的兴起，利用网络存在的漏洞和安全缺陷对网络系统的硬件、软件及其系统中的数据进行攻击和破坏。2001年中美之间就曾发生过大规模的民间黑客攻击事件，这在一定程度上刺激了美国，到2009年成立了世界上第一个网络司令部。中国此次借着军队改革的契机，组建了专业化的网络战部队，开始系统地在信息化建设和网络攻防领域进行投入和发展，这对于未来战争势必波及到网络的大趋势，是具有里程碑意义的。

003

最后则是心理战，也就是通过运用心理学的原理原则，以人类的心理为战场，有计划地采用各种手段，包括现代生活须臾不能脱离的网络、电视、广播等传播手段，对人的认知、情感和意志施加影响，从精神上瓦解敌方军民斗志或消除敌方宣传所造成的影响的对抗活动，从而打击敌方的心志，以最小的代价换取最大胜利和利益。心理战听起来很是玄乎，其实《孙子兵法·谋攻篇》中所提到的：“是故百战百胜，非善之善者也；不战而屈人之兵，善之善者也。” 这里的“不战而屈人之兵”就是今天心理战所要达到的终极目标。在第二次世界大战中的诺曼底登陆战役，盟军就曾运用了大量的心理战手段，严重影响干扰了德军统帅部的判断，为战役的胜利做出了巨大贡献。此后，从朝鲜战争、越南战争，直到今天的伊拉克战争和阿富汗战争，美军都曾有专业的心理战部队参战。因此，这是最容易被忽视的军事手段，但却是军事斗争的高级层次，甚至要比先进的飞机大炮更有效率和作用。

因此，可以说战略支援部队是解放军军队改革之后五大军种中，高科技含量最高的，甚至可以说是完全不同于过去传统战争的样式，更多地带有超现代流的特色。

004

不容小觑的软杀伤

根据网络上披露的战略支援部队臂章图案，上面是八一五角星，下面是三角箭头和电子云轨道，周围是环绕的麦穗，从这个图案中就可以看出，战略支援部队并不是传统意义上钢铁的较量，看不到硝烟滚滚的场景，更没有核武器那样毁山灭海的恐怖威力，而是兵不血刃的软杀伤。从某种意义上来说，软杀伤丝毫并不比硬杀伤逊色，甚至所发挥的作用更要比硬杀伤重要。

相比之下，直到今天美军才只有独立分散的天军、网军和心理战部队，但解放军战略支援部队则将这些部队直接在编制上整合在一起，更能协同配合，发挥出最大的战斗力。可以说是这次军队的大改革，特别是战略支援部队的成立，在体制上绝对是一大进步。

试想一下，如果没有战略支援部队的卫星准确地定位和导航，没有电子干扰部队、网络战部队的保驾护航，那么火箭军的战略导弹就难以发挥作用；如果没有战略支援部队技术侦察的情报保障、卫星的通讯联系，那么分布在广阔战场上的陆海空军部队就是眼盲耳聋，战斗力也要大打折扣。因此，在看不到的四维、五维战场空间，战略支援部队必将发挥出重大的作用。

Original Referring URL:  http://war.163.com/16/0104/08/

China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, DPRK Military, North Korean Military

Chinese Military Analysis of Korean Army Network Centric Warfare Capabilities // 中國軍事韓軍“網絡中心戰”建設現狀及未來發展趨勢

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Chinese Military Analysis of Korean Army Network Centric Warfare Capabilities //

中國軍事韓軍“網絡中心戰”建設現狀及未來發展趨勢

　　

“Network-centric warfare” is an important symbol in the evolution of mechanized warfare to informatized warfare. It is a high-level form of joint warfare in the information age, and a new type of warfare on the information-based battlefield of the “platform center warfare”. In recent years. Han Jun continues to deepen his understanding of network-centric warfare. Accelerated the pace of the army’s informatization construction. Han Jun’s network-centric warfare concept is embodied by the Korean military command and control system, the military information system, and the Korea-US Joint Operational Information System. This paper analyzes the status quo and future development trend of Han Jun’s “network center warfare” from the aspects of network center warfare, Korean military defense informationization, Hanjun C4I system construction, and Korea-US joint information system construction.

First, the composition of national defense information

　　The field of national defense informationization in Korea consists of five areas: basic system, modeling and simulation (M&S: Modeling & Simulation), interoperability and standardization, information security, and application systems. The basic system field consists of communication networks, servers, computers, and basic software. The field of modeling and simulation refers to the training exercise simulation system and simulation analysis system for NC Cent (Network Centric Warfare), and the simulation based acquisition (SBA) for procurement management.

　　Interoperability and standardization are prerequisites for the implementation of network-centric warfare theory. Through interoperability and standardization, information interconnection, interoperability, interoperability and real-time perception and sharing of battlefield information can be realized. Interoperability and standardization cover technical standardization, system construction standardization, and user interface standardization.

　　Information network technology brings high benefits to military construction and operational command, and also brings high risks to military information security. At present, information network technology is widely used in various fields of the Korean Army, and information security is also facing various severe challenges. The main contents of information security include: in order to ensure the integrity, availability and confidentiality of information, establish a security system under the wireless local area network (LAN) and ALL-IP environment, establish a sound information security system, and establish the security of the Korean-American information system. Program and other aspects.

　　The application system consists of a battlefield management system and a resource management system. The battlefield management system consists of a command and control system called the C4I system, a military information system that collects, processes, and transmits information, and a Korean-US joint operational information system. Han Jun’s command and control system consists of the Korean Joint Command and Control System (KJCCS: Korea Joint Command and Control System), the Ground Tactical Command Information System (ATCIS), and the Naval Tactical C4I System (KNCCS: Korea Naval Command Control System). ), Air Force Command and Control System (AFCCS), Joint Fire Operation System (JFOS-K: Joint Fire Operation System-Korea), Rear Area Tactical C4I System, Brigade Command System (B2CS: Battalion Battle Command System). The Korean military military information system consists of the Military Information Management System (MIMS). The Korea-US Joint Operations Information System consists of the Joint Operations C4I System – Joint Command and Control System (AKJCCS: Allied Korea Joint Command and Control System), Joint Military Information Distribution System (MIMS-C) and the US Army Global Joint Information Exchange System – Korea System (CENTRIXS-K), US Pacific Command Automated Data Processing System – PASS-K: Pacific Command Automated Data Processing Server Site-Korea.

　　The resource management system is an automated information system for improving the utilization efficiency of national defense resources. It is divided into four major areas: planning finance, personnel mobilization, military needs facilities, and electronic administration. There are comprehensive financial information systems and results management systems in the planning and finance field; personnel information systems, integrated distance education systems, and mobilization information systems in the personnel mobilization field; military needs comprehensive information systems, facility information systems, transportation information systems, and ammunition information systems in the field of military needs. , defense terrain information system, medical information system; electronic administrative field has a comprehensive defense knowledge management system, business management system, record management system.

<Figure 1> Defense Information Application System.
<Figure 1> Defense Information Application System.

Second, the construction of the Korean Army C4I system

　　Han Jun’s battlefield management system consists of five major systems: KJCCS, ATCIS, KNCCS, AFCCS, and MIMS. As of 2010, all these systems have been completed. Performance improvements were made to the ATCIS system and the AFCCS system in 2011, and performance improvements were made to the KJCCS system since 2012. In 2010, the system development of the ATCIS system in the rear area was completed, and the actual deployment was completed in June 2011. Since 2009, the research and development work of the B2CS system and the preliminary research work of the ATCIS system have been carried out. In 2011, B2CS system development and ATCIS system performance improvement research and development projects were comprehensively promoted. It is estimated that in 2015, system development and test evaluation will be completed, and in 2020, it will be deployed to military-level combat units.

　　KJCCS’s performance improvement work is mainly to prepare for the establishment of the first group army and the third group army integrated/merged ground combat command. It is expected that after the performance improvement of KJCCS, the powerful new features will be greatly improved in terms of reliability, survivability and security.

　　ATCIS in the rear area will establish an information sharing system between the Army’s 2nd Combat Command and each team. The ATCIS in the rear area will be able to effectively adapt to the operational tasks and types of operations undertaken by the 2nd Combat Command, and it is highly targeted and operable. In addition, ATCIS in the rear area will be able to interoperate with KJCCS, MIMS and other systems to provide an integrated information environment for the vast rear battlefield management, ensuring high information sharing.

　　The B2CS system is the command and control system used by the Army Brigade to the squad combat units. The B2CS system will use situational awareness and information acquisition as the forerunner to realize a variety of data information sharing and visual interaction. It is a system integrating command, control, communication and intelligence, which can effectively guarantee the command and control (C2OTM) in action.

　　At present, the Korean Army’s brigade-level units are only equipped with limited C4I terminals and Position Reporting Equipment (PRE), and the commanders below the squad level are not equipped with relevant equipment. After the actual deployment of the B2CS system, it will realize the visual sharing of the battlefield information from the military to the squad through interconnection with ATCIS, and provide the basis for the close cooperation and real-time coordinated action of various combat forces and the integration of command and control.

　　The ATCIS system performance improvement project is to build a network platform for the existing system to achieve interaction between the ATCIS system and 50 weapon systems. In addition, as a supplement and extension of the wired network, a command center wireless local area network (LAN) will be constructed for the ATCIS system to enhance the flexibility of the operational network.

　　In response to the transfer of wartime operational command, Han Jun is promoting the research and development of AKJCCS system, MIMS-C system and JFOS-K system. It is expected that the AKJCCS system will interact with the CENTRIXS-K system, the CENTRIXS-K system will interact with the CENTRIXS-K system, and the JFOS-K system will interact with the US military’s firepower system.

　　In the course of using the battlefield information management system of Han Jun, many problems were discovered. At present, system improvement work for KJCCS, ATCIS, and AFCCS is underway, but KNCCS and MIMS have made little progress in this regard. The system performance upgrade work mainly focuses on interoperability with other systems, improving the authentication system, adding some application functions, and diversifying system expansion.

Judging from the current situation, the construction of the Korean Army C4I system mainly has the following problems:

　　First, in the battlefield management information system construction needs assessment stage, the proposed conceptual operational performance (ROC, Required Operational Capability) is directly reflected in the concept research phase, and then through the entire process of system development. In this way, the ROC is only based on the judgment of the R&D personnel, and is out of line with the level, type, and actual situation of the troops. As a result, the battlefield management system is singular and cannot provide the required information to the combat units in a targeted manner, resulting in users usually using only some of the functions.

　　In order to solve these problems, the ROC should first be completed with the participation of developers and users. This will fully reflect the user’s needs and make the system more practical for practical use. The user interface and usage functions should also be personalized. According to the different positions and responsibilities of the troops, the corresponding functions should be set up, and a number of nodes with different functions, which can be randomly combined, aggregated in efficiency, and can adapt and act in one body, Provide a strong foundation for the combat system.

　　Second, in the specific promotion stage of battlefield management information system construction, from the communication network to the application system construction, the old road of “chimney development” has been taken, resulting in “chimneys” and mutual disjoint, which greatly restricted the army. The improvement of comprehensive combat capability. Although the Korean Ministry of Defense issued a number of regulations and guidelines, it is required to follow the relevant technical standards from system development to system construction, but the actual situation is that these regulations have not been specifically implemented. As a result, the information of the Korean military battlefield management system is not well connected. The three military C4I systems—ATCIS, KNCCS, AFCCS, and military information system MIMS can only be indirectly linked through KJCCS.

　　In the 2009 and 2010 “Key Decisions/鹞鹰” joint exercises, there was a problem with the Common Operational Picture (COP), which failed to accurately and real-time update and improve the comprehensive sensory intelligence information of the battlefield. The results of the 2011 review by the Institute of the Ombudsman confirmed this. The specific errors are the position of the troops, the number of troops, the size of the troops, and the major equipment intelligence. The main reasons are serious problems in coding management, system interaction, database (DB) management, and information input.

　　In order to solve these problems, it is necessary to introduce not only a system based on a command and control personal computer (C2PC) that the US military is using, but also to standardize COP data. The common use in the Common Commitment Map (COP) does not mean that all users in the information system are watching the same picture. Universal means that all users share the same data source. That is, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shared the true standardized common operational map data with the three armed forces. Each user saw different presentations provided by the same data source that he or she needed.

　　Third, the core of the battlefield management information system–the application system has the necessary functions required for the troops to perform tasks, but at present it only realizes the automation of the business and functions, and can not achieve the organic integration of command and control at all levels. In addition, the functional development of the application system lacks top-level design and system planning, lacks communication and collaboration, and objectively causes low level of interconnection between systems, which cannot meet the actual needs of users. From the current point of view, it is difficult to provide resource optimization configuration plans and strong decision support to commanders and operational staff.

　　The information system is only automated, meaning that there is no business process analysis (BPA) in the system development process, and no reasonable and scientific business processes are formed. It can be said that one of the most important aspects of system development is Business Process Analysis (BPA). In the specific development, the current business process status analysis (As-Is) should be performed first. Once problems are identified or areas that need improvement, they are redesigned to the type of process that the user expects (to-Be) or optimizes. In this way, business process reengineering (BPR) based on the analysis of existing business processes can generate new and more reasonable business processes.

　　System function development does not only include software development. Research and development personnel of information systems generally believe that software development is the entire content of system function development, and data is only the content that the system transmits during the operation. In fact, the purpose of the software is to process the data, not independent. That is to say, in the process of business process, the system and data should be promoted in parallel; in the process of system development, the data should be processed into the form required by the user. This means that business process modeling (BPM: Business Process Modeling) and data modeling (DM: Data Modeling), business standardization and data standardization should be carried out simultaneously.

　　Fourth, for the weapon system, if the improvement needs are found after the development is completed, the performance improvement work will be carried out after all the problems are integrated, and there will not be too many problems. However, for the information system, even if the function is very perfect, if a specific user proposes a new functional requirement, it cannot be updated in time and improved in time, which will directly affect the actual use of the system. Without the flexibility and reliability to meet business and performance needs, information systems can hardly play a role in improving operational effectiveness.

　　It is very important to establish a sound information system optimization and maintenance system, and timely reflect business requirements/performance requirements in the operation of the system. This is simpler and more effective than directly advancing performance improvement projects. Therefore, it is necessary to designate the system R&D department to be responsible for the optimization and upgrading of the system throughout its life cycle. To this end, it is also necessary to invest the corresponding budget.

III. Construction of the joint information system between Korea and the United States

　　The CENTRIXS-K system and the PASS-K system were designed and used by the US military to share information with the Korean Army C4I system and military information systems. It is particularly worth mentioning that the CENTRIXS-K system is the joint operational command and control system of Korea and the United States under the leadership of the Korea-US Joint Command.

　　After the transfer of wartime operational command, the command of wartime operations will be dominated by the current joint command of South Korea and the United States, becoming a new model dominated by the Korean army and supported by the US military. This means that the command organization has changed from the current single system of the Korea-US Joint Command to the two command systems of the Korean Army and the US Army in Korea. At present, both Korea and the United States are considering the disintegration of the Korea-US Joint Command, the adaptation of the Korea-Jin United Association, and the establishment of the US Korean Command (US KORCOM). At that time, the chairman of the Korean Federation of Senate will be responsible for commanding the Korean army, and the US South Korean Command (Commander of the US Army in South Korea) will be responsible for commanding the troops under the jurisdiction of the US military. In addition, South Korea and the United States will also establish new cooperation institutions, in which the Alliance Military Cooperation Headquarters will assist the Military Commission (MC) to carry out strategic cooperation; the theater-level cooperation agencies will be responsible for specific cooperation matters between the Korean Federation of Senate and the US Korean Command; The Combatant Command-level cooperation agency will be responsible for specific cooperation matters between the Korean-American combat command-level forces.

　　In the face of this change in organizational structure, it is necessary for the ROK to strengthen the system construction required by Korea’s leading command and control and the Korea-US cooperation mechanism. To this end, Hanshen is developing the AKJCCS system and the MIMS-C system. It is expected that the AKJCCS system and the MIMS-C system will be used as a theater-level information circulation, joint operational command and control, joint operational function support, and cooperation means of military cooperation agencies between the two countries. As a result, changes will be brought to the command and control systems and support systems in the Korea-US Joint Information System. That is, the Korean Army through the KJCCS system, the US military through the CENTRIXS-K system to command and control their respective combat forces; the Korean Army’s Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Korean Army’s various combat command through the KJCCS system using the main functions of the AKJCCS system, the United States and South Korea Command And the US military combat command uses the main functions of the AKJCCS system through the CENTRIXS-K system.

　　In 2015, after the transfer of wartime operational command, the Korean Army’s battlefield management information system and the US military’s C4I system will achieve a fairly level of interconnection, interoperability, and interoperability. Han Jun’s battlefield management will be implemented through the KJCCS system and the three military C4I systems – ATCIS system, KNCCS system, AFCCS system, and the joint operation of Korea and the United States will be implemented through the CENTRIXS-K system and the AKJCCS system. The existing system interaction mechanism will be maintained between the Korean-American Air Force/Naval Combat Force, and the non-interoperability between the Korean-US Army/Marine Corps combat units will continue.

　　The MIMS-C system is currently in the research and development stage, and the MIMS system is only used as the Korean military’s own military information system.

　　From the perspective of joint operations, it is important that the AKJCCS system function as much as possible in the interoperability with CENTRIXS-K. The CENTRIXS-K system operation data is provided by various underlying systems, but the AKJCCS system does not have such a lower system application support system, so some functions of the CENTRIXS-K system are difficult to run on the AKJCCS system. These functions include the Crisis Action Standard Operating Procedures (CASOP), the Integrated Decision Support Framework (IDSF), and the Commander’s Critical Information Requirement (CCIR), 5X8 Card. SIGEVENT: Significant Event, etc. It is expected that after the transfer of wartime operational command, the AKJCCS system will be able to obtain the information provided by the above functions from the CENTRIXS-K system through a network link.

　　Joint Warning and Reporting Network, Joint Weather Impacts System, Theater Battle Management Core System, Theater Ballistic Missile Warning (TBMW) Wait. The CENTRIXS-K system can effectively interconnect, interoperate and interoperate with so many systems. Therefore, the functions of command and control, information sharing, cooperation and coordination, and business support are excellent, and the operation is very smooth without any problems or obstacles. However, Han Jun’s AKJCCS system can only obtain limited data from the KJCCS system, so it has great limitations in function. Therefore, it is also necessary for Han Jun to build the lower system of the AKJCCS system to ensure safe, efficient and stable operation of the AKJCCS system.

Fourth, the trend of the construction of the joint information system between Han Jun and Korea-US

　　From the point of view of the Korean military’s individual operations, to improve the combat effectiveness of the battlefield management system, it must have the necessary performance required for the mission.

　　First of all, it is necessary to realize the interaction of the Korean and American tactical C4I systems to ensure information sharing and collaboration between Korean and American tactical forces. That is to realize the Korean-American ground forces–Hanjun ATCIS system and the US Army ABCS system, the Korean-American naval–Korean army KNTDS system and the US military CENTRIXS-M system, the Korea-US Air Force–Hanjun AFCCS system and the US Air Force tactics C4I System (ACC-COIN), Korea-US Marine Corps–Hanjun ATCIS system interacts with the US Marine Corps system in real-time or near-real-time systems, and information sharing is very important.

　　Secondly, the interactive mode of the current three-armed tactical system-ATICS system, KNCCS system, and AFCCS system centered on the KJCCS system should be changed. This mode has limited the improvement of combat effectiveness. For example, direct interconnection between the three military tactical systems will effectively improve the rapid response capability, rapid maneuverability and coordinated combat capability of the troops. In addition, it is also very important to resolve the transmission delay, data loss and data inconsistency between the three military tactical C4I systems.

　　In addition, we should proactively complete the construction of basic communication networks such as top-level design, system integration, continuous promotion of TACT (Tactical Information Communication Network), satellite communication network, etc., and accelerate the establishment of a unified and complete information platform and integrated information network.

In summary, the development direction of the Korean Army C4I system can be summarized as the following four points:

　　First, the operational performance requirements (ROC) of the C4I system should be completed with the participation of R&D personnel and users. The system user interface and usage functions should be personalized, providing a strong foundation for situational awareness, command and control, and decision support. support.

　　Second, the standardization of data between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the three armed forces, sharing a unified data source (data source) and data standardization common operational map.

　　Third, the application system of the C4I system realizes interconnection, interworking, interoperation, data retrieval and troubleshooting can all be performed in the same screen. In addition, in order to form a reasonable and scientific business process, business process analysis (BPA), business process modeling (BPM) and data modeling (DM: Data Modeling) are required.

　　Fourth, timely reflect the user’s business needs, performance requirements and improvement requirements, and establish and improve the information system’s optimal maintenance system.

　In addition, the development direction of the Korean-American C4I system can be summarized as the following two points:

　　First, learn from the CENTRIXS-K system and build the lower system of the AKJCCS system to ensure efficient and stable operation of the system.

　　Second, realize the interaction of the Korean and American tactical C4I systems to ensure information sharing and collaboration between Korean and American tactical forces. Zhiyuan / Everest

Original Mandarin Chinese:

“網絡中心戰”是機械化戰爭形態向信息化戰爭形態演變過程中的一個重要標誌，是信息時代聯合作戰的高級形態，是相對“平台中心戰”的信息化戰場上的一種新型作戰模式。近年來。韓軍不斷深化對網絡中心戰的認識。加快了軍隊信息化建設的步伐。韓軍的網絡中心戰概念是通過韓軍指揮控制系統，軍事信息系統和韓美聯合作戰信息系統來體現的。本文以網絡中心戰為主線，從韓軍國防信息化組成，韓軍C4I系統建設情況，韓美聯合信息系統建設情況等方面分析了韓軍“網絡中心戰”建設現狀和未來發展趨勢。

一，國防信息化組成

韓國國防信息化領域由基礎體系，建模與仿真（M＆S：Modeling＆Simulation），互操作性與標準化，信息安全，應用系統等五大領域組成。基礎系統領域由通信網，服務器，計算機，基礎軟件等組成。建模與仿真領域指應對網絡中心戰（NCW：Network Centric Warfare）的訓練演習模擬系統和模擬分析系統，用於採辦管理工作的基於仿真的採辦（SBA：Simulation Based Acquisition）等。

互操作性及標準化是網絡中心戰理論得以實踐的前提條件。通過互操作性及標準化，可實現信息互聯，互通，互操作及作戰要素對戰場信息的實時感知與共享。互操作性及標準化的內容涵蓋技術標準化，系統建設標準化，用戶界面標準化等諸多方面。

信息網絡技術在給軍隊建設，作戰指揮帶來高效益的同時，也給軍隊信息安全帶來高風險。目前，信息網絡技術在韓軍各個領域得到廣泛應用，同時信息安全也面臨各種嚴峻挑戰。信息安全的主要內容包括：為了確保信息的完整性，可用性和保密性，制定無線局域網（LAN），ALL-IP環境下的安全制度，建立健全信息安全保障體系，確立韓美信息系統互聯互通安全方案等方面。

應用系統由戰場管理系統和資源管理系統組成。戰場管理系統由被稱為C4I系統的指揮控制系統，收集，處理及傳遞信息的軍事信息系統，韓美聯合作戰信息系統構成。韓軍的指揮控制系統由韓軍聯合指揮控制系統（KJCCS：韓國聯合指揮控制系統），地面戰術C4I系統（ATCIS：陸軍戰術指揮信息系統），海軍戰術C4I系統（KNCCS：韓國海軍指揮控制系統），空軍戰術C4I系統（AFCCS：空軍指揮控制系統），戰區聯合火力運用系統（JFOS-K：聯合火力作戰系統 – 韓國），後方地區戰術C4I系統，大隊級以下戰鬥指揮系統（B2CS：營戰指揮系統）組成。韓軍軍事信息系統由軍事信息綜合處理系統（MIMS：Military Intelligence Management System）組成。韓美聯合作戰信息系統由聯合作戰C4I系統 – 聯合指揮控制系統（AKJCCS：盟軍韓國聯合指揮控制系統），聯合軍事信息流通系統（MIMS-C）和美軍全球聯合情報交換系統 – 韓國分系統（CENTRIXS-K），美國太平洋司令部自動數據處理系統 – 韓國分系統（PASS-K：Pacific Command Automated Data Processing Server Site – 韓國）組成。

資源管理系統是用於提高國防資源利用效率的自動化信息系統，具體分企劃財政，人事動員，軍需設施，電子行政四大領域企劃財政領域有綜合財政信息系統，成果管理系統;人事動員領域有人事信息系統，綜合遠程教育系統，動員信息系統;軍需設施領域有軍需綜合信息系統，設施信息系統，運輸信息系統，彈藥信息系統，國防地形信息系統，醫療信息系統;電子行政領域有國防綜合知識管理系統，業務管理系統，記錄管理系統。

<圖1>國防信息化應用系統。
<圖1>國防信息化應用系統。
二，韓軍C4I系統建設情況
韓軍的戰場管理系統由KJCCS，ATCIS，KNCCS，AFCCS，MIMS等五大系統組成。截止到2010年為止，這些系統已全部建設完畢。2011年對ATCIS系統和AFCCS系統進行了性能改進，2012年起對KJCCS系統進行性能2010改進。年完成後方地區ATCIS系統的體系研發工作，2011年6月完成了實戰部署。2009年年起，進行了B2CS系統的研發工作和ATCIS系統的先期研究工作。2011年， B2CS系統研發和ATCIS系統性能改進研發項目全面推進。預計2015年，將完成體系開發和測試評估工作2020年實戰部署至軍級作戰單位。

KJCCS的性能改進工作主要是為第一集團軍，第三集團軍整合/合併後的地面作戰司令部的設立做準備。預計KJCCS性能改進後，在具備強大的全新功能的同時，在可靠性，生存性，安全性方面會有大幅提升。

後方地區ATCIS將在陸軍第2作戰司令部和各大隊間建立起信息共享系統。後方地區ATCIS將能夠有效適應第2作戰司令部擔負的作戰任務，作戰類型，具有很強的針對性和可操作另外，後方地區ATCIS還將能夠與KJCCS，MIMS等系統實現互聯互通互操作，為廣闊的後方地區戰場管理提供一體化信息環境，保證信息的高度共享。

B2CS系統為陸軍大隊至小隊作戰部隊使用的指揮控制系統.B2CS系統將以態勢感知，信息獲取為先導，實現多種數據信息共享和可視化交互，是集指揮，控制，通信，情報為一體的系統，可有效保障行動中的指揮和控制（C2OTM）。

目前，韓陸軍大隊級部隊僅配備有限的C4I終端和位置報告設備（PRE：Position Reporting Equipment），小隊級以下的指揮官根本沒有配備相關裝備.B2CS系統的實戰部署後，將通過與ATCIS的互聯互通，實現從軍到小隊的戰場信息可視化共享，為實現各種作戰力量的密切配合和實時協調行動以及指揮控制一體化提供基礎。

ATCIS系統性能改進項目是為現有系統搭建網絡平台，實現ATCIS系統與50個武器系統互動。另外，作為有線網絡的補充和延伸，還將為ATCIS系統構築指揮所無線局域網（LAN），以加強作戰網絡的靈活性。

為了應對戰時作戰指揮權移交，韓軍正在推進AKJCCS系統，MIMS-C系統，JFOS-K系統的研發工作。預計，AKJCCS系統將與CENTRIXS-K系統實現互動，CENTRIXS-K系統將於CENTRIXS- ķ系統實現互動，JFOS-K系統將與美軍的火力系統實現互動。

韓軍的戰場信息管理系統在使用過程中，發現了很多問題。目前，對KJCCS，ATCIS，AFCCS的系統改進工作正在進行，但KNCCS和MIMS卻在這個方面幾乎沒有任何進展。系統性能升級工作主要圍繞與其他系統互聯互通，完善認證系統，增加一些應用功能，多元化系統擴張等方面進行。

從目前的情況看，韓軍C4I系統建設工作主要存在如下問題：

第一，在戰場管理信息系統建設需求評估階段，提出的概念性的作戰性能要求（ROC，Required Operational Capability）被直接反映到概念研究階段，進而貫穿系統研發的整個過程。這樣，ROC只是根據研發人員的判斷做出的，與部隊的水平，類型，實際情況脫節，結合的不夠緊密。其結果戰場管理系統是單一化的，不能向作戰單位有針對性地提供所需情報，導致用戶通常只使用其中的部分功能。

為了解決這些問題，首先ROC應在研發人員和用戶的共同參與下完成。這樣就能充分反映用戶的需求，使系統更便於實際操作使用。用戶界面，使用功能也應該進行個性化配置，根據部隊不同的崗位，職責設定相應的功能，建設一批具有不同功能，既可隨機組合，效能聚合，又能自主適應，一體行動的節點，為作戰體系提供強大的基礎支撐。

第二，在戰場管理信息系統建設的具體推進階段，從通信網到應用系統建設都走了“煙囪式發展”的老路，導致彼此之間“煙囪林立”，互不相通，極大地限制了軍隊綜合作戰能力的提升。雖然韓國防部下發了一些規定和指針，要求從體系開發到系統建設都要遵循相關的技術標準，但是實際情況是這些規定並未能得到具體落實。其結果韓軍戰場管理系統信息間互聯互通不暢，三軍C4I系統-ATCIS，KNCCS，AFCCS和軍事信息系統MIMS只能通過KJCCS進行間接聯動。

在2009年和2010年的“關鍵決心/鷂鷹”聯合演習中通用作戰圖（COP：Common Operational Picture）出現問題，未能準確，實時地更新和完善戰場綜合感知情報信息。2011年監察院的審查結果也證實了這一內容。具體的錯誤內容為部隊位置，部隊數量，兵力規模，主要裝備情報等，其原因主要是編碼管理，系統互動，數據庫（DB）管理，信息輸入等方面出現嚴重漏洞。

為了解決這些問題，不但要引進類似美軍正在使用的指揮與控制個人計算機（C2PC）等為基礎的系統，還要實現COP數據標準化。通用作戰圖（COP）中的通用並非意味著信息系統中的所有用戶都在觀看同一畫面，通用實際上是指所有用戶在共享同樣的數據來源（數據源）。即，參聯會與三軍部隊共享著真正的標準化通用作戰圖數據，每個用戶看到的是自己所需的同一數據來源提供的不同的展示畫面。

第三，戰場管理信息系統的核心 – 應用系統雖然具備部隊執行任務所需的必備功能，但是目前只是實現了業務及功能的自動化而已，並不能實現各級指揮與控制的有機融合另外。 ，應用系統的功能開發缺乏頂層設計和系統規劃，缺乏溝通與協作，客觀造成系統間互聯互通水平低，無法滿足用戶的實際需求。從目前來看，很難向指揮官及作戰參謀提供資源優化配置方案和強有力的決策支持。

信息系統只是實現了自動化，意味著在系統開發過程中沒有進行業務流程分析（BPA：業務流程分析），沒有形成合理，科學的業務流程。可以說，系統開發中，最為重要的環節之一是業務流程分析（BPA）。在進行具體開發時，首先應進行當前業務流程狀況分析（AS-IS）。一旦發現問題或需要改進的方面，就要重新設計成用戶期望的（待）或優化了的流程類型。這樣，在分析現有業務流程的基礎上進行業務流程重組（BPR），可以產生新的更為合理的業務流程。

系統功能開發並非只包括軟件開發這一項。信息系統的研發人員通常認為，軟件開發是系統功能開發的全部內容，數據只是系統在運行過程中傳遞的內容而已。而事實上，軟件的目的是為了處理數據，並不是獨立存在著也就是說，在業務流程過程中，系統與數據應並行推進;在系統開發過程中，數據應被處理成用戶所需的形態這意味著業務流程建模（BPM：Business Process Modeling）和數據建模（DM：Data Modeling），業務標準化和數據標準化應同時進行。

第四，對於武器系統而言，開發完畢後，若發現需要改進的地方時，綜合所有問題後再進行性能改進工作，也不會有太多的問題。但是對於信息系統而言，即便功能非常完善，若特定用戶提出新的功能需求時，不能及時更新，及時改進，那麼就會直接影響到系統的實際使用。如果不能靈活可靠地滿足業務需求和性能需求，那麼信息系統就很難在提高作戰效能方面發揮作用。

建立起完善的信息系統優化維護體系，在系統的運營過程中，及時反映業務需求/性能需求等方面非常重要。這比直接推進性能改進項目更為簡單有效。所以，有必要指定系統研發機關負責系統整個生命週期內的優化升級工作。為此，投入相應的預算也是非常必要的。

三，韓美聯合信息系統建設情況

CENTRIXS-K系統和PASS-K系統是美軍為了與韓軍C4I系統和軍事信息系統實現信息共享而設計和使用的。特別值得一提的是，CENTRIXS-K系統是目前韓美聯合司令部主導下的韓美聯合作戰指揮控制系統。

戰時作戰指揮權移交後，戰時作戰指揮權將由現在的韓美聯合司令部主導，變成韓軍主導，美軍支援的新模式。這意味著指揮機構由現在的韓美聯合司令部單一體制變成韓軍，駐韓美軍兩個指揮體制。目前，韓美雙方正考慮韓美聯合司令部解體，韓參聯會機構改編，設立美國韓國司令部（US KORCOM）的方案。屆時，韓參聯會主席將負責指揮韓國軍隊，美國韓國司令部（駐韓美軍司令）將負責指揮美軍所轄部隊。另外，韓美還將新設合作機構，其中同盟軍事合作本部將協助軍事委員會（MC）進行戰略層面的合作;戰區級合作機構將負責韓參聯會與美國韓國司令部間的具體合作事項;作戰司令部級合作機構將負責韓美作戰司令部級部隊間的具體合作事項。

面對這種組織結構變化，韓軍有必要加強韓國主導指揮控制及韓美合作機制所需的系統建設。為此，韓參聯正在開發AKJCCS系統和MIMS-C系統。預計，AKJCCS系統和MIMS -C系統將作為韓美兩國間戰區級信息流通，聯合作戰指揮控制，聯合作戰功能支援，軍事合作機構合作手段等來使用。其結果，就將會給韓美聯合信息系統中的指揮控制系統，支援系統帶來變化即，韓軍通過KJCCS系統，美軍通過CENTRIXS-K系統對各自的作戰力量進行指揮控制;韓軍的參聯會及韓軍各作戰司令部通過KJCCS系統使用AKJCCS系統的主要功能，美國韓國司令部及美軍各作戰司令部通過CENTRIXS-K系統使用AKJCCS系統主要功能。

2015年，戰時作戰指揮權移交後，韓軍的戰場管理信息系統和美軍的C4I系統將實現相當水平的互聯，互通，互操作韓軍的戰場管理將通過KJCCS系統及三軍C4I系統 – ATCIS系統，KNCCS系統，AFCCS系統來實施，韓美聯合作戰將通過CENTRIXS-K系統和AKJCCS系統來實施。韓美空軍/海軍作戰部隊間將保持現有系統互動機制，另外韓美陸軍/海軍陸戰隊作戰部隊間系統不互通的狀態將會繼續持續下去。

MIMS-C系統目前正處於研發階段，MIMS系統只作為韓軍自己的軍事信息系統來使用。

從聯合作戰的角度來看，AKJCCS系統在與CENTRIXS-K的互聯互通中，盡可能多地發揮作用非常重要.CENTRIXS-K系統運行數據都是由各種下層系統提供的，但是AKJCCS系統卻不具備這樣的下層系統應用支援體系，因此CENTRIXS-K系統的部分功能很難在AKJCCS系統上運行。這些功能主要有危機處置標準操作程序（CASOP：危機行動標準操作程序），綜合決策支持框架（IDSF） ：綜合決策支持框架），指揮官重要信息需求（CCIR：指揮官的關鍵信息要求），5X8卡，主要狀況（SIGEVENT：重大事件）等。預計戰時作戰指揮權移交後，AKJCCS系統將能夠通過網絡鏈結的方式從CENTRIXS-K系統獲取上述功能所提供的信息。

CENTRIXS-K系統的下層系統由參聯的C4I-全球指揮控制系統（GCCS：全球指揮控制系統），美地面部隊戰術C4I系統 – 陸軍作戰指揮系統（ABCS：陸軍作戰指揮控制系統）的機動控制系統（MCS：機動控制系統），高級野戰砲兵戰術數據系統（AFATDS：AdvancedField Artillery Tactical Data System），防空和導彈防禦工作站（AMDWS：Air＆Missile Defense Workstation），全信源分析系統（ASAS） ，美海軍戰術C4I系統（CENTRIXS-M），美空軍戰術C4I系統（ACC-COIN：空中部隊司令部 – 興趣網絡），防空系統（ADSI：防空系統集成商），全球廣播服務（GBS：Global廣播服務），聯合監視目標攻擊雷達系統（JSTARS：聯合監視和目標攻擊雷達系統），聯合報警與報告網絡（聯合警報和報告網絡），聯合氣象影響系統（聯合天氣影響系統），戰區作戰管理中心系統（Theatre Battle Management Core Sy （）：戰區彈道導彈預警（TBMW：Theatre Ballistic Missile Warning）等.CENTRIXS-K系統能夠和如此多的系統實現有效互聯，互通，互操作，所以指揮控制，信息共享，合作協調，業務支援等功能十分優異，運行非常流暢，不存在任何問題和障礙。但是韓軍的AKJCCS系統只能從KJCCS系統獲取有限的資料，所以在功能上有很大的局限性。因此，韓軍也有必要建設AKJCCS系統的下層系統，以保證AKJCCS系統安全高效，穩定運行。

四，韓軍及韓美聯合信息系統建設趨勢

從韓軍單獨作戰的角度來看，提高戰場管理系統體系戰鬥力，必須具備任務所需的必要性能。

首先，需實現韓美戰術級C4I系統的互動，保證韓美戰術部隊間的信息共享與協作即實現韓美地面部隊間 – 韓軍ATCIS系統與美軍ABCS系統，韓美海軍間 – 韓軍KNTDS系統與美軍CENTRIXS-M系統，韓美空軍間 – 韓軍AFCCS系統與美空軍戰術C4I系統（ACC-COIN），韓美海軍陸戰隊間 – 韓軍ATCIS系統與美海軍陸戰隊系統實時或近實時系統互動，信息共享是非常重要的。

其次，應改變目前以KJCCS系統為中心的三軍戰術系統–ATICS系統，KNCCS系統，AFCCS系統的互動模式，這種模式已限制了作戰效能的提升。如三軍戰術系統間直接互聯互通，將能夠有效提高部隊快速反應能力，快速機動能力及協同作戰能力。此外，解決三軍戰術C4I系統間傳輸遲延，數據丟失，數據不一致現象也是非常重要的。

另外，還應積極主動地完成頂層設計，系統集成，持續推進戰術信息通信系統（TICN：戰術信息通信網絡），衛星通信網等基礎通信網絡建設，加快建立統一完善的信息平台及綜合信息網絡。

綜上所述，韓軍C4I系統的發展方向可以概括為以下四點：

第一，C4I系統的作戰性能要求（ROC）應在研發人員和用戶的共同參與下完成，系統用戶界面和使用功能應進行個性化配置，為態勢感知，指揮控制，決策支持等提供強大的基礎支撐。

第二，參聯會與三軍間實現數據標準化，共享統一的數據來源（數據源）和數據標準化通​​用作戰圖。

第三，C4I系統的應用系統實現互聯，互通，互操作，數據檢索和故障排除都可以在同一畫面中進行。另外，為了形成合理，科學的業務流程，要進行業務流程分析（BPA），業務流程建模（BPM：Business Process Modeling）和數據建模（DM：Data Modeling）。

第四，及時反映用戶業務需求，性能需求及改進要求，建立完善信息系統的優化維護體系。

另外，韓美C4I系統的發展方向可以概括為以下兩點：

第一，借鑒CENTRIXS-K系統的做法，建設AKJCCS系統的下層系統，保證系統高效，穩定運行。

第二，實現韓美戰術級C4I系統的互動，保證韓美戰術部隊間的信息共享與協作。知遠/珠峰

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China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China National Cyber Security Strategy, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, 中國軍事應用與比特幣在未來戰爭中的應用

Chinese Military Review: From Army Information Construction to Construction of Information Army // 中國軍事評論：從軍隊信息建設到建設信息化軍隊

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Chinese Military Review: From Army Information Construction to Construction of Information Army //

中國軍事評論：從軍隊信息建設到建設信息化軍隊

2006年04月20日 22:00

From the Army Information Construction to the Construction of Informatized Army——Opening the Eyes to See the New Military Revolution in the World

　　Li Bingyan

　　A few years ago, there was a curtain factory abroad that was on the verge of bankruptcy and turned to the consulting company. The consulting company only asked them to change the curtain factory to a shading technology factory, and the factory would survive.

　　A name change has broadened the horizon of development; a concept change has opened up the mind shackles. Updating the concept is inseparable from the concept of renewal. In the new military revolution, we need to adopt new concepts in a timely manner to show new development ideas.

　　Although the ongoing new military revolution still does not see the other side, it is clear that the change has entered a new stage.

　　This new military revolution was triggered by a new technological revolution centered on information technology. In the 1990s, the revolutionary impact of information technology on the military mainly remained at the stage of “construction”, that is, information technology embedding, networking, networking, and integration within the framework of the mechanized military organization. Technology strengthens mechanization and enhances mechanization. The theoretical community often refers to this stage of change as a revolution in the military field, which is to promote the army.

Information construction. At that time, the digital division and the digital army to be built by the US Army were carried out within the structure of the original mechanized army. Later, the US military learned from the experience of informatization of some large enterprises and multinational corporations in the society and changed the way of thinking.

　　In the past, military changes were first to change military technology, weapons and equipment, and finally to complete the transformation of the military organizational system to adapt to the new methods of warfare. The new military revolution, characterized by informatization, especially the post-launch army, should be reversed. The experience of the business community is also “first rationalization of organizational structure, re-automation, informationization.”

　　Before the 1990s, the US business community carried out informatization construction, focusing only on improving work efficiency. Although effective, it still cannot be changed. Ford Motor Company has spent a lot of money on automation, and its office efficiency has improved significantly. For example, the financial department of the North American branch has reduced the number of employees from 500 to 400 after office automation. The company leaders think it is good. Later, they learned about Japan.

Mazda Motor Company did the same job and used only five people. In contrast, Ford’s leadership was shocked. After in-depth investigation, they found that Mazda started to adjust the organizational structure, first change the workflow, and then engage in office automation. Ford’s financial system, organizational structure or traditional model has caused a lot of useless work. Later, Ford Company optimized its structure, re-engineered its business processes, and started office automation on this basis. The company’s financial staff was compressed to a quarter.

　　In the development of human society, there is a phenomenon of “path dependence”. After a social system is formed, it will continue to strengthen itself in the actual operation, so that people will not be able to get rid of the influence of the original ideas afterwards.

　　In addition, the organizational structure does not change, it is difficult to make the right decision in information. Usually, people are standing in their own units and planning work in this department, forming a “professional syndrome.” The research informatization is first of all the informationization of the unit, beyond the scope of construction of the unit, the leadership vision will not be achieved. This has led to the emergence of new “isomorphic diseases” – large and complete, small and complete, you have me, can not be interconnected, interoperable, interoperable. In this regard, some people call it the “potato effect”: a sack of potatoes, all sprouting, each self-contained system, self-enclosed, and not connected. Building these systems may be reasonable from a local perspective, but it may not be scientific or irrational from the overall perspective of informatization.

　　In the practice, the foreign military realized that if informationization is not detoured, it should start with rationalizing the system and adjusting the command system. Otherwise, all levels and departments are busy with informationization. It is likely that the faster and the more the action is now, the greater the losses will be caused once reworked in the future.

　　The rationalization of the organizational structure, the consideration of informationization, or the rationalization of organizational structure and informationization, and the simultaneous development have become a new consensus on the new military revolution. After entering the 21st century, the US military proposed a military transformation, marking a new stage in military transformation. At this stage, information technology has shifted from a “construction” role to a “deconstruction” role. That is: instead of strengthening mechanization, it is reorganizing mechanization. As a result, the army’s informatization construction has turned to the construction of an information-based army; the changes in the military field have turned to real military changes.

　　In the theoretical preparation stage of the US military, the future army that was designed was: the sensor army, the precision strike army, the dominant mobile army, and the logistics army. In the transition, after a new argument, the future goals of the US military reorganization are proposed: the full-dimensional battlefield perception army, the precision firepower strike army, the efficient command and control army, and the intelligent logistics support army.

　　In 2005, Germany proposed the idea of ​​building a “new three armed forces”, namely: rapid reaction forces, standing combat troops, and logistics support forces.

　　At the end of last year, the Russian General Staff Department completed the reform of the armed forces. The Russian military’s new round of structural reforms eliminated the arms, military regions and fleets and re-established three functional headquarters and three regional headquarters. The three functional commands are: Strategic Nuclear Power Command, Transportation Command, and Aerospace Defense Command. The three regional commands are: Western European Command, Central Asian Command and Far East Command.

　　Generally speaking, although the structural changes of the military have their own characteristics, the common point is that they tend to be integrated and tend to be integrated, and the boundaries between the traditional arms and services are increasingly blurred. The informationized army is not just a technology, but a new structure that is linked to new technologies – ultimately, a structural decision function.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

從軍隊信息建設到建設信息化軍隊——放開眼界看世界新軍事變革

李炳彥

幾年前，國外有一家窗簾廠，瀕臨倒閉之際，求助於諮詢公司。諮詢公司只讓他們把窗簾廠改為遮光技術廠，這個廠子便活了起來。

一個名字改變，拓寬了發展視野；一個概念更換，撬開了心智枷鎖。更新觀念，離不開更新概念。在新軍事變革中，我們需要適時採用新的概念，來展現新的發展思路。

持續發生的新軍事變革雖然至今仍看不到彼岸，但清晰可見變革已經進入到一個新階段。

這場新軍事變革，是由以信息技術為核心的新技術革命引發的。上個世紀90年代，信息技術對軍隊的革命性影響，主要還停留於“建構”階段，即在機械化軍隊的組織結構框架內進行信息技術嵌入、建網、聯網、集成，實際上是用信息技術加強機械化、提昇機械化。理論界常把這一階段的變革，稱之為軍事領域裡的變革，是推動軍隊

信息化建設。當時，美陸軍要建設的數字化師、數字化軍，都是在原來機械化軍隊的結構內進行的。後來，美軍汲取社會上一些大企業、跨國公司進行信息化的經驗，改變了變革的思路。
以往的軍事變革，都是先變革軍事技術、武器裝備，最後完成軍事組織體制的變革，以適應新的作戰方式。而信息化為標誌的新軍事變革，特別是後發之軍，應當反過來進行。企業界的經驗也是“先組織結構合理化，再自動化、信息化”。

上個世紀90年代以前，美國企業界進行信息化建設，只著眼於提高工作效率，雖有成效，但還談不上變革。美福特汽車公司，曾花大筆金錢搞自動化，辦公效率明顯提高，如北美分公司的財務部，實現辦公自動化後，人員由原來的500人減少到400人,公司領導自認為不錯。後來，他們得知日本

馬自達汽車公司做同樣的工作，一共只用了5個人。兩者相對照，福特公司的領導大吃一驚。他們深入調查後發現，馬自達公司從調整組織結構入手，先改變工作流程，再搞辦公自動化。福特公司的財務制度、組織結構還是傳統模式，造成許多無用功。後來，福特公司經過優化結構，再造業務流程，在此基礎上搞辦公自動化，公司財務員工壓縮到了原來的四分之一。
人類社會在發展中，存在一種“路徑依賴”現象，即一個社會系統形成後，必將在實際運作中不斷自我強化，以致後來人們改進它的種種嘗試，都難以擺脫原有思路的影響。

另外，組織結構不改變，很難做出信息化的正確決策。通常，人們都是站在本單位、本部門謀劃工作，形成了一種“職業官能症”。研究信息化首先是本單位的信息化，超出本單位的建設範圍，領導視野就達不到了。致使出現新的“同構病”——大而全、小而全，你有我也有，不能互聯、互通、互操作。對此，有人稱之為“馬鈴薯效應”：一麻袋馬鈴薯，個個都發芽，個個自成小系統，自我封閉，互不相聯。建這些系統，從局部來看可能合理，但從信息化的全局看可能並不科學、不合理。

外軍在實踐中認識到：要想信息化不走彎路，還應從理順編制體制、調整指揮體系入手。否則，各級、各部門都忙著信息化，很可能現在動作愈快、投入愈多，將來一旦返工，造成的損失就愈大。

先組織結構合理化，在信息化，或者組織結構合理化與信息化一併考慮，同時進行，成了新軍事變革的一種新共識。進入21世紀後，美軍提出軍隊轉型，標誌著軍事變革進入了一個新階段。在這個階段，信息技術從“建構”作用，轉向“解構”作用。即：不是加強機械化，而是重組機械化。由此，軍隊信息化建設，轉向了建設信息化軍隊；軍事領域裡的變革，轉向真正的軍事變革。

美軍在理論準備階段，曾設計出的未來軍隊是：傳感器軍，精確打擊軍，主導機動軍，聚焦後勤軍。在轉型中，經過新的論證，提出美軍重組的未來目標：全維戰場感知軍，精確火力打擊軍，高效指揮控制軍，智能後勤保障軍。

德國於2005年，提出了建設“新三軍”設想，即：快速反應部隊，常備作戰部隊，後勤支援部隊。

去年底，俄軍總參謀部完成了關於武裝力量改革方案。俄軍新一輪結構改革方案，取消了軍兵種、軍區和艦隊，重新成立三個職能司令部和三個地區司令部。三個職能司令部是：戰略核力量司令部、運輸司令部、空天防禦司令部。三個地區司令部是：西歐司令部、中亞司令部和遠東司令部。

從總體上看，軍隊結構變革雖然各國都有自己的特色，但共同點是趨於綜合、趨於一體化，傳統的軍兵種之間的界限日益模糊。信息化軍隊不只是技術，重要的是與新技術相聯繫的新的結構方式——最終還是結構決定功能。

Original Referring url: http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2006-04-20/

China National Cyber Security Strategy, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀

General Qiao Liang: Confident Cyber Leadership Wins the future “network space war” // 喬亮將軍：充滿信心的網絡領導贏得了未來的“網絡太空戰爭”

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General Qiao Liang: Confident Cyber Leadership Wins the future “network space war” //

喬亮將軍：充滿信心的網絡領導贏得了未來的“網絡太空戰爭”

For nearly half a century, electronic technology and information technology have developed at an impressive speed, and thus have completely changed the style of modern warfare. Although people are accustomed to the sorting of land, sea and air when they talk about the dimensions of war, from the military technical level, the “network warfare” capability of “electronic warfare” and “cyber warfare” has no doubt that it has come to the fore. Become the first combat power. Who can dominate the electronic warfare, who can dominate the battlefield. It is a pity that this conclusion has not yet been universally accepted by the military.

Carving a sword for a sword is a portrayal of the evolution of people’s understanding and the development of things. Today, when this round of military revolution is marked by electronic technology and chip technology, as the technology matures and the potential approaches the limit and comes to an end, the soldiers of most countries have a small tube and a smaller chip. It is possible to change the style of war and not yet fully prepared for the spirit and knowledge. This is an irony for human beings living in the age of information, especially those armed with informatized weapons.

The individual representation of the appearance of the world makes people intuitively divide the whole world into parts to understand and understand. Even though electronic technology and information technology have long integrated the whole world into the grid space and welded into a “domain”, people are still accustomed to split it into different “domain” blocks. For example, many soldiers who are ignorant of traditional thinking take the battle space into five major dimensions: land, sea, air, sky, and electricity, and think that they will fight in these five dimensions. The grid space battlefield, in their view, is only one of them. Even in the concept of joint operations, which attempted to bring the five-dimensional space into one, the space and space warfare is only one of the combat areas and combat styles. It is completely unknown that the world has been “informed.” Such lag thinking can’t keep up with the pace of technological leap: the boat is far from the lake, but the sword sinks to the bottom of the lake. Those who can win and win in the future battlefield must be the army that observes and thinks, operates and controls all battlefields as a whole. Only in this way can we find the key to open the door to victory: who can control the grid space, who can control the battlefield; who can prevail in the space war, who is the winner of the war. This is the general trend that modern warfare can not be reversed today.

Electronic warfare (which has evolved into information warfare or cyberspace warfare today) is a prerequisite for all modern battles, battles and even wars. In contrast, air supremacy, sea power, and even land and power, have handed over the first battle of the future battlefield to the power of the grid. Moreover, the struggle for the right to heaven is itself part of the power of the network. In Deng Shiping’s words, modern warfare, “there is no air superiority, and no one can beat it.” Yes, in the future war, there is no power to make electricity in the net, and nothing can be beaten.

Today, it is proposed to use the “air-sea battle” concept to contain China’s US military. It is a military machine that is almost fully informatized. Therefore, the US military knows that informatization is its strength and its shortcomings. Short and short, whoever has the advantage of space and space warfare, who can restrain the US military. Some people may ask, is it from a military point of view that the space warfare is so important that people think it is more important than firepower? Yes, this is the author’s answer. Because when your opponent has been fully dimensioned, it will either be better than the opponent’s network space warfare, or defeat the war first, and then the firepower war will only destroy the opponents who are still unwilling to admit defeat. The process of physical digestion.

Why is the space warfare so important? In fact, all of our main rivals have their strengths in all-dimensional informationization, and all their shortcomings are over-informatization. The shortcoming of informationization is that there is no chip-free, thus forming chip dependence. The chip makes the weapon platform ammunition stronger, but it is also extremely fragile. An electromagnetic pulse bomb can destroy all electronic components within its explosive coverage. This kind of scene makes the opponent who is armed with the chip to the teeth very scared. For us, what we fear the opponents should be our priority to focus on development.

If you play against a full-dimensional informatization opponent, the opponent is most worried about: one is attacked by the network, and the other is destroyed by the sky-based system. Because this will make the hardware advantages of all weapon platforms meaningless. Although our opponents also have this ability, once both sides use this ability to smash opponents, it means that the two sides will return to World War II. At that time, who has the advantage of population, who has the advantage of resources, who has the advantage of manufacturing, who has the advantage of war.

Seeing this clearly helps us to get rid of some kind of paradox: the more we understand the military system of our opponents, the more we worry about the gap in our military system. The more we recognize the gap, the more we want to learn to catch up with our opponents. The result is what the opponent has, I There is also something to be. In the end, I forced myself to a dead end with the strength of the opponent and the length of the opponent. How can this road lead us to “can fight, win and win”? Ancient and modern Chinese and foreign, whereever wins, all of them are short of my enemy, even if it is hard, it is the longest attack of my enemy. There is a winner who wins the enemy with the enemy. Moreover, winning the war in the future cannot be achieved at all costs. For China, there should be a requirement that is as important as victory. Weapons and equipment development and operational plan development must consider how to reduce costs. Never have anything for the opponent, we must have something. You can’t do it with the Dragon King, and you can’t become a local tyrant. You can’t compare it with the Dragon King. Today, we have some cognitive defects on how to win the overall war of local war under informatization conditions. We always consciously and unconsciously think that playing high-tech wars is a high-cost war, and we always want to compare costs with our competitors. And fight costs.

In fact, we can completely change the way of thinking, that is to take the low-cost route. There are no heavy aircraft carriers, there is no X37, there is no global fast strike system, the opponent does not care. It only cares if you can destroy its satellite system and lick its network system. After all, the tools and means of attacking satellite weapons and electromagnetic pulse bombs are not very expensive and scarce, and their effects will be low-cost and high-yield. We can’t help but fall into the arms race with our opponents because we are worried about the gap between ourselves and our opponents.

The Americans said in the “air-sea battle” concept that “we will drag China into the competition with us in this way, so that the Chinese will put more energy into the production of such missiles such as Dongfeng 21D. Then use a lot of bait and deception to force the Chinese to consume these weapons in a meaningful direction.” In this regard, someone in the country wrote an article reminding us that “we must prevent falling into the trap of the United States.” This is not wrong in itself, but it still belongs to only know one, and I don’t know the other. It is important to know that after such articles come out, it is very likely that our understanding will produce new deviations, because there are “trap traps (ie double traps)” in the above-mentioned American discourse. First, it attempts to lure the Chinese army into the trap of an arms race. If you compete with the US military, you will spend a lot of money and resources to follow the US military and not to surpass; secondly, if you realize that this is a trap and give up the competition, you will immediately fall into another trap: since giving up the arms race Waste martial arts. For China, if we are not willing to compete with our opponents and we are not willing to squander martial arts, what should we do? The conclusion is that we can only go our own way.

To develop our own strengths and develop the things that are most beneficial to me, it is best to use my strength and defeat the enemy. At least it must be my long, the enemy’s long. I can’t do it with my short enemy, and the enemy’s long enemy will not do the same. With the enemy’s long attacking enemy, you will never win.

Take a look at the main design of the “Air-Sea Battle”: the opening is to hit your space-based system, let you blind; then hit the “reconnaissance war”, let you call you; then come to officially start a regular battle with you.

Under such circumstances, what should we do? It is a passive move, the soldiers will block, the water will cover the earth, or will it be my strength, in exchange for low-cost means, in exchange for the opponent’s high-value goal? Of course, the latter. To do this, we must first have three capabilities:

The first is satellite anti-missile capability. This ability will lead to a serious reliance on informatized opponents, making them blind, defamatory, and dumb, so that they can only return to the level of World War II to compete with conventional forces.

The second is the ability to remotely play. You must ensure that you have the ability to sink high-priced targets like aircraft carriers. If such a high-priced target is sunk, it will seriously undermine the confidence of investors around the world against the opponent, so that the capital does not dare to invest in it again, resulting in a serious war financing dilemma for the opponent. This is the national weakness of the opponent’s combat planners who are not aware of it. The confidence of the sinking aircraft carrier in global investors will be a huge blow, which will interrupt the opponent’s global capital chain.

The third is that there must be a network space combat capability. Especially the ability to attack any network system of the opponent. If China and the powerful opponents are really fighting, you must demonstrate your ability and determination to attack and smash all of the grid system from the very beginning. This is a necessary way to contain war by deterrence.

The reason is always easier said than done. How to get the power of the network in the future war, or to offset the advantage of the opponent’s network warfare? It is necessary to make yourself technological progress. But what is more necessary is the progress of thinking. The long history of evolution proves that human beings are not always in a state of thought progress in the coordinate system of time. Degradation will happen from time to time. The degradation of thinking is sad, but consciously pull the pair back to the “old battlefield”, that is, to offset the opponent’s informational combat capability, so that the opponent’s technical advantage is lost, and thus with us to return to a certain historical stage of combat, At that time, it is a feasible idea to give full play to my own advantages.

(The author is a professor at the National Defense University)

Original Mandarin Chinese:

近半個世紀以來，電子技術、信息技術以令人瞠目的速度迅猛發展，並因此全面改變了現代戰爭的風貌。儘管人們在談論戰爭的維度時，習慣於陸海空天電的排序，但從軍事技術層面講，“電子戰”“網絡戰”所構成的“網電空間戰”能力，卻毫無疑問已後來居上，成為第一戰鬥力。誰能主導電子戰，誰就能主宰戰場。可惜的是，這一結論至今還未能被各國軍隊普遍接受。

刻舟求劍，是對人們的認識滯後於事物的演變和發展的形象寫照。時至今日，當以電子技術和芯片技術為標誌的這一輪軍事革命，因技術日臻成熟，潛力逼近極限而漸近尾聲時，大多數國家的軍人對一個小小的電子管和更小的芯片就能改變戰爭的風貌，還沒做好充分接納的精神和知識準備。這對生活在信息化時代的人類，特別是掌握著信息化武器的軍隊來說，不能不說是一種諷刺。

世界外觀所呈現的個體性表徵，使人們憑直覺把整個世界區分成各個部分去認知和理解。即便電子技術、信息技術早已把整個世界都納入了網電空間而焊接成了一“域”，人們仍然習慣於將其切分成不同的“域”塊。如不少囿於傳統思維的軍人，就想當然地把作戰空間切分成陸、海、空、天、電五大維度，並以為自己將在這五種維度下作戰。而網電空間戰場，在他們看來，只不過是其中的一維。甚至在聯合作戰這一試圖把五維空間打通成一體的概念中，網電空間戰也只是其中一種作戰領域和作戰樣式而已，全然不懂大千世界已然被“信息化”了。這樣的滯後思維不可能跟上技術飛躍的步伐：舟已遠離湖面，劍卻沉在了湖底。能在未來戰場上穩操勝券者，一定是把全部戰場作為一個整體觀察和思考、操作並控制的軍隊。只有如此，才能找到打開胜利之門的鑰匙：誰能控製網電空間，誰就能控制戰場;誰能在網電空間戰中佔上風，誰就是戰爭的贏家。這是現代戰爭發展到今天誰也無法逆轉的大趨勢。

電子戰(今日已衍化成為信息戰或網電空間戰)是一切現代戰鬥、戰役乃至戰爭的前提。與此相比，制空權、制海權，甚至制陸權與製天權，都已向製網電權拱手交出了未來戰場的第一制權。何況制天權的爭奪本身就是製網電權的一部分。套用鄧小平的一句話說，現代戰爭，“沒有製空權，什麼仗都打不下來”。是的，未來戰爭，沒有製網電權，什麼仗都打不下來。

今天，提出要用“空海一體戰”構想遏制中國的美軍，是一架幾乎全面信息化了的軍事機器。因此，美軍深知信息化是其所長，亦是其所短。短就短在誰具備網電空間戰優勢，誰就能製約美軍。有人會問，難道從軍事角度講，網電空間戰真的那麼重要，以至於讓人認為比火力硬殺傷更重要嗎?是的，這正是筆者的回答。因為當你的對手已全維信息化後，它要么先勝於與對手的網電空間戰，要么先敗於此戰，其後的火力戰，只是對還不肯認輸的對手進行從心理摧毀到物理消解的過程。

為什麼網電空間戰如此重要?實際上，我們的主要對手其全部的長處就在於全維信息化，而其全部的短處也在於過度信息化。信息化的短處就是無一處無芯片，從而形成芯片依賴。芯片讓武器平台彈藥如虎添翼變得強大，而其自身卻也極端脆弱。一枚電磁脈衝炸彈，就可以讓在它爆炸覆蓋範圍內的所有電子元件被毀失能。這種場景讓用芯片武裝到牙齒的對手很恐懼。而對我們來說，讓對手恐懼的東西，就應該是我們要優先側重發展的武器。

如果跟全維信息化對手交手，對手最擔心的是：一被網攻癱瘓網絡，二被天戰摧毀天基系統。因為這將使其一切武器平台的硬件優勢都變得沒有意義。儘管我們的對手同樣也有這種能力，但一旦雙方都動用這種能力將對手癱瘓，那就意味著，對陣雙方將一起退回二戰水平。那時，誰具有人口優勢，誰有資源優勢，誰有製造業優勢，誰就有戰爭優勢。

看清這一點，有助於我們擺脫某種悖論：越了解對手的軍事系統，就越擔心自身軍事系統存在的差距，越承認差距，就越想學習追趕對手，結果就是對手有什麼，我就也要有什麼。最終把自己逼上一條以對手之長，攻對手之長的死路。這條路怎麼可能把我們引向“能打仗，打勝仗”?古今中外，凡勝仗，無一不是以我之長攻敵之短，即便是硬仗也是以我之長攻敵之長，未見有以敵之長攻敵之長而取勝者。何況，取勝於未來戰爭，不能以不惜一切代價獲勝為目的。對於中國來說，還應該有一個與勝利同樣重要的要求，武器裝備發展，作戰方案製定，都要考慮如何降低成本。決不能對手有什麼，我們就一定要有什麼。乞丐跟龍王爺比寶不行，變成土豪了，也不能跟龍王爺比寶。今天，我們對如何打贏信息化條件下局部戰爭的整體想法是存在某種認知缺陷的，總是自覺不自覺地以為打高技術戰爭就是打高成本戰爭，總想和對手一樣去比成本、拼成本。

實際上，我們完全可以換一種思路，那就是走低成本路線。有沒有重型航母，有沒有X37，有沒有全球快速打擊系統，對手並不在乎。它只在乎你能不能摧毀它的衛星系統，癱瘓它的網絡系統。畢竟，攻擊衛星武器和電磁脈衝炸彈的工具和手段都不是很昂貴、很稀缺，而其效果將是低成本、高收益。我們斷不能因為擔心自己與對手的差距，就不由自主地陷入跟對手的軍備競賽中。

美國人在“空海一體戰”構想中說，“我們要通過這個方式，把中國拖入到與我們的競賽，讓中國人把更多的精力都投入到東風21D等諸如此類導彈的生產中去，然後用大量的誘餌和欺騙迫使中國人大量地把這些武器消耗到沒有意義的方向”。對此，國內有人寫了一篇文章，提醒“我們要防止掉入美國陷阱”，這本身沒有錯，但仍然屬於只知其一，不知其二。要知道，此類文章出來以後，很有可能導致我們的認識產生新的偏差，因為上述美國人的話語中存在“陷阱的陷阱(即雙重陷阱)”。首先，它企圖將中國軍隊引誘到軍備競賽的陷阱中來。如果你跟美軍進行競賽，你就會耗費大量財力物力尾隨美軍而不得超越;其次，如果你意識到這是陷阱而放棄競賽，你又立刻就會掉入另一個陷阱：由於放棄軍備競賽而自廢武功。對中國來說，如果我們既不願意跟對手競賽，又不願意自廢武功，那我們應該怎麼辦?結論是，我們只能走自己的路。

發展我們自己之長，發展對我最有利的東西，最好以我之長，克敵之短。起碼也要以我之長，克敵之長。以我之短克敵之長不行，以敵之長克敵之長同樣也不行。以敵之長攻敵之長，你將永無勝算。

看看“空海一體戰”最主要的設計：開場就是打擊你的天基系統，讓你致盲;接著打“偵察戰”，讓你致聾;然後才來跟你正式開打常規戰。

這種情形下，我們怎麼辦?是被動接招，兵來將擋，水來土掩?還是揚我所長，以低成本手段，換取對手高價值目標?當然是後者。為此，我們必須先具備三種能力：

第一種是衛星反導能力。這種能力將一擊致癱嚴重依賴信息化的對手，使其致盲、致聾、致啞，從而只能與你一道退回二戰水平去比拼常規戰力。

第二種是遠程精打能力。必須確保你有能力擊沉類似航母這樣的高價目標。這樣的高價目標如果被擊沉，將沉重地打擊全世界投資人對對手的信心，使資本不敢再投向它，造成對手嚴重的戰爭融資困境。這是對手的作戰計劃人員沒有意識到的國家軟肋。擊沉航母對全球投資人的信心將是一個巨大的打擊，從而將打斷對手的全球資本循環鏈。

第三種是必須有網電空間作戰能力。特別是對對手的任何網絡系統攻擊的能力。如果中國和遠比自己強大的對手真的發生戰爭，你必須從一開始就展示你有攻擊並癱瘓其全部網電系統的能力和決心，這是用威懾遏制戰爭的必要方式。

道理，總是說起來容易做起來難。如何在未來戰爭中拿到製網電權，或者對沖掉對手的網電戰優勢?讓自己獲得技術進步是必須的。但更必須的，是思維的進步。漫長的進化史證明，人類在時間的坐標系上，並不總是處於思維進步狀態。退化，會不時發生。思維的退化是可悲的，但有意識地把對手拉回“舊戰場”，即對沖掉對手的信息化作戰能力，讓對手的技術優勢盡失，從而與我們一道退回某一歷史階段的作戰水平，屆時，盡情發揮我自身優勢，則不失為一種可行的思路。

（作者係國防大學教授）

Original Referring URL: https://www.81.cn/jkhc/2014-12/