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#Information Support Force, #新興戰爭技術, Asymmetric Warfare, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese Military Future Wars, Chinese Military Informatization, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Combat Planning, Command information Systems, Dimensionality Reduction Strikes, Dissipative Warfare, Information Support Force, Intelligent Warfare, Multi-Domain Operations, National Defense and Military Modernization, 中國的情報戰, 中國的耗散戰, 中國解放軍敘事戰爭, 中國軍事特徵及認知域作戰與戰爭發展趨勢, 中國軍事認知域作戰的重點是什麼、重點在哪裡？, 認知戰

Truly Integrating Chinese Military Combat Preparation into Current Adversarial Defeat Operations

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將中國軍事備戰真正融入當前抗擊作戰

現代英語：

Key points

　　● Our military’s preparations for military struggle are being carried out under the special background of dramatic changes in world military affairs. If we lack a strong awareness of keeping pace with the times and theoretical preparations for pioneering and innovation, we will not be able to carry the spirit of the times throughout the entire process of military struggle preparations.

　　● The many stages of military transformation and their possible changes are uncertain, which leads to different value judgments and behavioral norms. The only way to decide on these judgments and norms is to put them into the “general coordinates” of military transformation.

　　● Keeping pace with the times does not mean following the trend or following a routine. Leapfrog development is an inherent requirement of keeping pace with the times. The new historical mission requires us to shorten or even surpass certain development stages and take a road of military struggle preparation with distinctive characteristics.

　　The era of rapid change gave birth to great ideas. In his speech on May 31, General Secretary Jiang Zemin pointed out: “To implement the requirements of the ‘Three Represents’, the whole party must always maintain a spirit of keeping pace with the times and constantly open up new horizons for the development of Marxist theory…” The idea of ​​keeping pace with the times proposed by Chairman Jiang is a high-level summary of the spirit of the times and a lasting spiritual driving force for promoting military innovation. It will surely have a profound impact on military struggle preparations. Guided by the important thought of “Three Represents”, we must vigorously promote the spirit of keeping pace with the times, open up the work situation with pioneering and innovation, and enhance combat effectiveness with emancipated minds, so as to put “winning” into practice.

　　The most prominent background of military struggle preparation is the new military transformation

　　The important thought of “Three Represents” is the result of the Chinese Communists observing and thinking about the changes in the world and China today, and adhering to and developing Marxism in new practices. Keeping pace with the times is a concept that reflects the essential characteristics of the times. To examine military struggle preparations with this concept, we should first look at what kind of changes have taken place in the background of our times.

　　There are many factors that affect the preparation for military struggle: the development of the international situation, the evolution of the strategic pattern, the judgment of security threats… However, the most direct, profound and extensive influence is the new round of military revolution that emerged at the end of the last century.

　　———A revolution in combat elements: simultaneous improvement in strike, defense, and mobility. For thousands of years, no military revolution has achieved simultaneous development of strike, defense, and mobility in a short period of time. The military revolution taking place today is turning the ideal model of simultaneous improvement of the three combat capabilities into reality.

　　The improvement of strike capability is mainly due to precision-guided weapons. The accuracy of traditional unguided weapons is generally in a stable inverse relationship with the strike distance, but precision-guided weapons are changing the “range-accuracy” law. The accuracy does not decrease with the increase of range. This change has a strong impact on the time, space and effectiveness concepts formed in the previous generation of wars, and new tactics such as “non-contact combat” and “out-of-area strike” have emerged.

　　In all previous military reforms, the transformation of defense capabilities has always been “half a beat slower”, and the battlefield strictly follows the iron rule of “saving oneself by destroying the enemy”. Some people even believe that the armor revolution in the 20th century was just an extension of the idea of ​​”blocking and offsetting the opponent’s attack power” in the cold weapon era, and it is not really a defense revolution. Today, a real defense revolution has quietly arrived. The representative technology is stealth technology, known as “low detectability technology”. It breaks through the traditional routine that has been followed for thousands of years, “saves itself” by reducing the probability of the target being discovered, and at the same time creates conditions for achieving the suddenness of the attack. It can be called an offensive defense method of “saving oneself” first and then “destroying the enemy”, and its development prospects are unlimited.

　　Mobility is shifting to “air”, and military mobility is showing multi-dimensional and three-dimensional characteristics. With the cross-generational improvement of intelligence support, command and control, and mobility tools, air mobility has leapt from the tactical level to the campaign level. At present, the number of helicopters in the main forces of the military of some developed countries is roughly equal to that of tanks, with an average of one helicopter for every 100 soldiers. Once the ground is no longer an obstacle, what new landscape will appear on the battlefield?

　　———Revolution in the military structure: integration of all services. Integration is a prominent manifestation of the achievements of the new military revolution in the field of command and coordination. Since the establishment of services, the military has believed in the idea of ​​​​integrated operations, but the difficulty of “horizontal flow” of information has restricted the improvement of the overall combat capability of the military. Since the 1980s, digital communication equipment, friend-or-foe identification systems, global positioning systems, and computer networks have successively entered the battlefield. For the first time, troops of different types, levels, and spaces have the ability to “horizontally flow” information, creating conditions for integrated operations. Reflecting this trend is the concept of “action-centered warfare” proposed by the US military in recent years. Based on the development of sensor technology, computer network technology and rapid response capabilities, the US military has transformed “plan-centered warfare” into “action-centered warfare”, which will be a profound change in the field of military command and coordination, and the integrated operations of all services will reach a new level.

　　Integration is also reflected in the formation of the army. First, the boundaries between the services are weakened. Since World War II, the power of the services has usually been directly controlled by the strategic command, forming a clear boundary between the services. In future joint operations, the traditional command system can no longer adapt to the special requirements of timeliness. It is necessary to break the original boundaries between the services and form an integrated force. At present, the establishment of a “joint task force” composed of an army brigade task force, an air force fighter squadron, a naval ship unit and a marine expeditionary unit is a new attempt by the military of developed countries to seek integration. Secondly, the boundaries between the services are weakened. The military of developed countries has formed mixed-service synthetic forces. For example, the US Air Force will establish 10 expeditionary aerospace forces by 2003 based on the “mixed wing” experiment in the past few years; the United Kingdom has mixed the Navy’s “Sea Harrier” aircraft with the Air Force’s “Harrier” fighter since 2000. It can be foreseen that in the near future, a new pattern will emerge in the relatively stable military structure formed in the era of mechanized warfare. Some scholars call it a “revolution of relationships” and a “revolution of structure”, which is indeed a vision.

　　———Revolution of combat systems: transformation from mechanized army to informationized army. Human society is facing the third major transformation in history, and the wave of information revolution continues. A few years ago, the concept of informationization as “intelligent” warfare was still beyond people’s vision, but today few people doubt its emergence.

　　Since the advent of the industrial age, war has shown an accelerating development trend, especially in the half century after World War II. Mechanization, as the mainstream of war, has reached its peak, but it has also fallen into a dilemma: the physical performance of weapons and equipment has reached its limit, and the return on investment is very small; the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons make it increasingly difficult to play a role in war; the harm to innocent people and the pollution to the environment caused by weapons of mass destruction have led to ecological deterioration… There is almost no way to continue to develop within the framework of mechanization. People began to seek new ways, that is, to solve the problems of strike efficiency and combat effectiveness from a deeper level, and strive to achieve precision, controllability and intelligence, and this is informatization. At present, the armies of many countries are working hard to open up a path of change to break out of the dilemma of mechanized warfare. The trend of mechanized warfare giving way to information warfare is irreversible. President Jiang has a keen insight into the major changes in the world’s military field and pointed out that the essence of the new military revolution is the information revolution, which has pointed out the direction for our army to meet the challenges of the new military revolution in the world.

　　At present, the armed forces of developed countries are vigorously promoting the informatization of weapons and equipment. While actively developing C4I systems, precision-guided munitions, smart weapons, and digital individual equipment, they also focus on doing a good job in top-level design, integrating target reconnaissance and surveillance, target information processing and transmission, precision strikes, and damage assessment to form a “military system”. In this way, the combat system of the industrial age, which is suitable for exerting the potential of firepower and mobility, has been gradually transformed into a combat system of the information age, which is suitable for the rapid flow and use of information.

　　Our military’s preparations for military struggle coincide with the real upheaval in the world’s military field. Having experienced this revolution, we should have a stronger sense of the times and urgency than ever before. When we are preparing for real threats, we must not ignore or forget that we are in a new era, and we must not be busy responding and indifferent to the general trend. Not being attached to things we are already familiar with, keenly absorbing the new things shown to us by the historical trend, taking advantage of the trend, and taking a bigger step, this is the powerful response of the idea of ​​keeping pace with the times to the challenges of the times.

　　Designing the “general coordinates” of military struggle preparation in accordance with the general trend of military transformation

　　In his “May 31” speech, General Secretary Jiang pointed out: “Adhering to the ideological line of emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts and promoting the spirit of keeping pace with the times are decisive factors in the Party’s maintaining its advanced nature and creativity under the conditions of long-term governance. Whether our Party can always do this will determine China’s development prospects and destiny.” If we understand keeping pace with the times from the perspective of “determining destiny,” military struggle preparations will be able to find reference in a broader context.

　　———Inspiration from history: Those who follow the trend will prosper, and those who go against the trend will perish. Those who follow the historical trend are destined to be favored by history, and those who seize the initiative are often those armies that are extremely sensitive to the historical trend. In the mid-19th century, Prussia was earlier than other countries to realize the challenges brought by the Industrial Revolution to the military field, and took the lead in realizing the transition of the military system to mechanized warfare, which gave it a decisive advantage over those European armies with more troops and higher technological levels in the following decades.

　　On the contrary, there is a clear gap between the huge military investment and the results achieved, and the reason is probably the lack of a keen sense of smell to seize the opportunity. From the mid-17th century to the end of the 18th century, Chinese society developed to the extreme under the original system framework, and the military was also in the heyday of the cold weapon era. Almost at the same time, a series of earth-shaking changes took place in the world: the gunpowder revolution was in full swing, and the mechanization revolution followed. Faced with the impact of military changes, the Qing army clung to the pedantic idea that “riding and shooting are the foundation of Manchuria”, calling inventions and creations “strange skills and tricks” and viewing strong ships and powerful guns as sorcery. The Qing Dynasty was eventually passively beaten and lost its power and humiliated the country.

　　History has striking similarities, but the choices of historical paths have their merits and demerits. Today, the world’s military is once again facing major changes, major developments, and major turning points. After the Gulf War, the Central Military Commission was keenly aware that the world’s military field was undergoing extensive and profound changes, and promptly formulated a military strategic policy for the new era, requiring that the basis of military struggle preparation be placed on winning local wars under modern technology, especially high-tech conditions; in 1996, under the guidance of this strategic policy, it was proposed that the guiding ideology of military construction must achieve two fundamental changes from quantity and scale to quality and efficiency, and from manpower-intensive to technology-intensive; in 1997, with great wisdom and extraordinary courage, the “three-step” strategy for the cross-century development of the military was determined… These major measures fully reflect the forward-looking vision of keeping pace with the times. Over the past decade, the reason why our military’s preparation for military struggle in the new era has been able to make continuous progress and breakthroughs is because the spirit of the times that keeps pace with the times has been integrated into it.

　　———Useful experience: Take reform as the focus of military struggle preparation. After the Cold War, the international situation changed, and the armies of various countries began to redesign their development blueprints. The general practice is to attach great importance to the impact of new military changes, emphasize the historical opportunity of war transformation, and promote military reform in accordance with the requirements of the times. Waves of reforms have emerged one after another, and finally formed a reform trend that swept the world.

　　According to the “2001-2002 Strategic Assessment Report” recently published by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies, after the “9.11” incident, the US military proposed a new round of military reform plans, which included six important components, the first of which was “concepts on future wars.” With a new view on future wars, the war machine must be remodeled. In fact, the former Soviet army was the first to realize the current military revolution, but the US military came later. When many mechanized armies were still arguing about whether informatization would come, the US military quietly began the informatization reform and established the “Senior Steering Committee for Military Revolution Research” in 1994 as the organizational leadership of military reform. Each branch of the military has also established corresponding institutions, such as the Army Digitalization Office and Ground Information Warfare Center, the Navy New Operational Concept Committee and Fleet Information Warfare Center, and the Air Force Information Warfare Center. After years of accumulation, a large number of beneficial results have been achieved, providing coordinates for the military’s informatization transformation.

　　The deeper the reform, the more difficult it is to operate. The armies of many countries have seen that the military system that has been perfected in the mechanized era has little room for transformation, and must vigorously promote the new military revolution. The US Department of Defense has set up five working groups to focus on how to use information technology to completely transform the US military, and has established six combat laboratories dedicated to studying information warfare. The US military believes that it is currently unable to effectively cope with various complex new security challenges, and needs to carry out military reforms with the goal of rapid, flexible, and effective joint operations of all arms, including the establishment of a standing joint task force, the development of required leapfrog technologies, the enhancement of the flexibility of command organizations, the reform of procurement strategies, the abandonment of old military systems to free up funds for new systems, and so on. Although the conditions for promoting the new military revolution in Russia, Britain, France, Japan and other countries are not as complete as those in the United States, they have also formulated long-term national defense development strategies and military construction plans, and accelerated the pace of their own military reforms to meet the challenges of the new military revolution. These reform measures reflect the general direction and are worth learning from for our army.

　　———The call of mission: Unify military struggle preparation and building a first-class army. The tasks of our army’s military struggle preparation are determined, but the reference system of army building is not solidified. The changing international environment, the uncertain strategic pattern and the complex surrounding security situation faced by our country have determined that once a war breaks out, our combat opponents and combat directions may not be single, and the main strategic direction is also relative and variable. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, almost none of the several local wars we have fought were carried out in the strategic direction we have prepared. If we only target one opponent and imagine one situation, it is undoubtedly a strategic shortsightedness.

　　In the face of this situation, how can we prepare for military struggle? The answer is: improve the starting point of military struggle preparation and build a first-class army. In a reality full of uncertainty and unpredictability, the most important thing is to have the “ability” to cope with various situations. This is like participating in a large-scale international competition. It is not enough to just defeat one opponent. Only by defeating a series of opponents can you win the championship, which requires comprehensive strength. Therefore, military struggle preparation should be planned for the long term, not overly focusing on recent threats and ignoring long-term construction. While highlighting the key points, we should focus on developing the ability of the entire army to cope with challenges and unexpected events. This ability can only be obtained by strengthening quality construction and catching up with the world’s military powers. Take advantage of our “latecomer advantage”, draw nourishment from the history of military development in developed countries, accelerate the process of catching up with advanced technology, advanced systems, and advanced ideas, avoid the detours they have taken, and finally form our own advantages. In this way, we can prepare for recent threats while also taking care of the future.

　　The military revolution is global, but it will not automatically visit every country. Although it has made it possible for the armies of developing countries to catch up, opportunities only come to those who respond correctly. We have unified the two strategic tasks of preparing for real military struggles and strengthening the quality of military construction, preparing while building, using preparation to drive construction and construction to promote preparation. This is undoubtedly the right choice.

　　Taking a Distinctive Path of Military Struggle Preparation in the Trend of Change

　　Due to different starting points, the military of different countries has shown diversity in the choice of development path. A foreign scholar once asserted: “What aspects of an army lag behind and how much it lags behind completely determines the pattern of historical change.” In the field of economics, this phenomenon is called “path dependence.” If the path of change of the world’s military powers is regarded as the only model and applied to oneself without thinking, then it will inevitably lead to a serious misalignment of the starting point, path and goal.

　　———Establish a brand-new development strategy. In the 21st century, the war will inevitably enter the informationization stage. In this transition, the armies of countries around the world may undergo new differentiation, resulting in major differences and imbalances in combat capabilities. To avoid being left behind in the new competition, conventional strategies will not work. We must find a way to catch up quickly.

　　Mechanization is the path to development for Western armies. This is because the historical background at that time provided them with special conditions. It is impossible for our army to have these historical conditions again and to achieve the same level of development in the form of mechanized warfare. Therefore, we should seriously reflect on whether we can really catch up with the armies of developed countries in the framework of mechanization.

　　Information warfare is a great leap forward in the form of warfare. In fact, the development from the old form to the new form is achieved through a series of huge changes within the combat system. This transformation is not a linear transition from the old form to the new form, but a “transfer development”. Just as “steamboats are not evolutionary sailboats; cars are not evolutionary improvements on horses and carriages; transistors are not better vacuum tubes”, “transfer development” is a change in the nature and direction of combat means. Its prominent features are its transition, nonlinearity, discontinuity and innovation. Looking forward from the perspective of the old form in a straight line, you cannot see the new form.

　　Our army is still in the process of mechanization. The limitations of mechanization are rapidly emerging but have not yet been fully exposed. In some areas of information technology, our army has gradually entered the new military revolution, and even in some parts and to some extent, it is not behind many Western countries’ armies. This shows a fact that mechanization and informatization are not completely connected in a straight line. Under certain conditions, it is possible to achieve leapfrog development. The agricultural civilization of ancient Egypt was not built on the basis of the world’s most developed hunting and gathering civilization, and the British pioneering industrial civilization did not have the world’s most developed agricultural civilization.

　　The discontinuity and transition of the new war form often provide a historical opportunity for the army that was not advanced to catch up. The information revolution provides an opportunity for our army to achieve leapfrog development without fully developed mechanization.

　　———Use informatization to drive mechanization. The “generational” development of weapons and equipment is not only an important part of the new military revolution, but also its origin. A fundamental question is: for which generation of war are the weapons systems being developed or introduced preparing? If we use yesterday’s equipment to meet tomorrow’s war, we will inevitably run into a wall. Let’s take an example. The radar system used by the vast majority of early warning aircraft currently in service is an active radiation radar, which will basically have no survivability in the next generation of war. If we blindly introduce such early warning aircraft, is it a strategic miscalculation? Obviously, forward-looking awareness is particularly important for equipment development.

　　The so-called advanced consciousness, for our army at this stage, is to establish the development concept of “using informatization to drive mechanization”. The information revolution has provided opportunities for our army to develop by leaps and bounds, but it is impossible to completely leapfrog the mechanization stage. The mechanization level of our army’s weapons and equipment is still not high, and some are even only semi-mechanized. Using informatization to drive mechanization means moderately developing mechanization, but not pursuing the most advanced mechanization, not affecting the capital investment in informatization transformation, not over-performing the mechanized command system and mechanism, and ensuring the smooth progress of informatization transformation while maintaining the mechanized combat mode. Combine moderate development of mechanization with informatization, and while maintaining the former, focus on the latter.

　　———Deepen reform while inheriting. As early as 1996, President Jiang pointed out: “From the current trend of world military development, the problem of unreasonable organizational system of our army is also quite prominent. The adjustment and reform of organizational system should continue to be carried out actively and steadily.” Any army is following the organizational tradition that has been tested by practice and reflects its own characteristics. For example, Sweden has adopted the organizational system of integrating soldiers with civilians for hundreds of years, and the organizational system of the Indian Army still retains the “wing system” tradition of the British Indian period… However, the impact point of military reform is often aimed at the organizational system first. The “hub” position of the organizational system makes it the focus of any army that wants to make a difference.

　　As the military revolution develops in depth, a series of innovative achievements in weapons and equipment, personnel quality and combat theory will eventually need to be materialized in a smooth system, and scientific mechanisms will be used to express and reflect them, so that they can release energy most quickly and effectively. The adjustment of the organizational system of our army should break through the accumulated problems, transcend tradition, create enough space to promote institutional reform, and unswervingly work towards the direction of “appropriate scale, reasonable structure, and flexible command” required by Chairman Jiang. The so-called keeping pace with the times means that we should boldly reform the focus and difficulties of these top-level designs, and should not be burdened by the details in front of us.

　　———Using science and technology as the driving force. In the process of new military transformation, our army’s scientific spirit and scientific and technological awareness are keeping pace with the times. The whole army has carried out extensive, in-depth and long-term scientific and technological training activities, and has embarked on a new training development path driven by science and technology.

　　Historically, armies that reject science and technology have always been doomed. During World War II, the Japanese Kwantung Army believed that “belief rather than knowledge is the factor in completing the mission”, and its combat regulations insisted on “hand-to-hand combat”. In the “Zhanggufeng Incident” in 1938, although the casualties in hand-to-hand combat only accounted for 2.8% of the total casualties, the Kwantung Army’s combat regulations in 1941 still emphasized “hand-to-hand combat” and lacked training to deal with tanks and aircraft. After the war, the Japanese army admitted that the Kwantung Army “had almost zero modern combat training”. Western armies have a tradition of advocating science, and they attach great importance to timely revising training regulations and adjusting training content according to the development of military technology. It is reported that the US Air Force no longer conducts training in close-range air combat projects, but focuses on controlling missile flight.

　　In recent years, the whole army has carried out a comprehensive reform of the content of education and training in accordance with the requirements of the military strategic policy of the new era, and has achieved phased results. However, the reform that has been carried out is preliminary, and there is still a long way to go. The innovation of education and training content should focus on the requirements of the next generation of war on personnel quality and combat capability, and make a good overall design from top to bottom. In recent years, our army has built a military training information network for the whole army and campus networks of various colleges and universities, established a large number of modern teaching venues and training grounds, developed and distributed a large number of training simulation equipment that matches new equipment, and realized the interconnection and interoperability of campaign and tactical training simulation systems… We will hold high the torch of the spirit of the times, keep pace with the times, and rely closely on scientific and technological progress to continuously push education and training to a new level.

現代國語：

柴宇球、曾蘇南、本報記者張國育

內容提要

●我軍軍事鬥爭準備是在世界軍事真正發生劇變的特殊背景下進行的。如果缺乏與時俱進的強烈意識和開拓創新的理論準備，就無法把時代精神貫穿軍事鬥爭準備的整個過程

●軍事變革的許多階段及其可能變化具有不確定性，因此產生了不同的價值判斷和行為準則。決定這些判斷和準則的取捨，只能把它們放到軍事變革的「總座標」中去考慮

●與時俱進不是隨波逐流，不是按部就班，跨越式發展是與時俱進的題中應有之義。新的歷史使命要求我們縮短甚至超越某些發展階段，走具有鮮明特色的軍事鬥爭準備之路

激變時代催生偉大思想。江澤民總書記在「5·31」演講中指出：「貫徹好『三個代表』要求，必須使全黨始終保持與時俱進的精神狀態，不斷開拓馬克思主義理論發展的新境界…」。江主席提出的與時俱進思想，是時代精神的高度概括，也是推動軍事創新的持久的精神動力，它必將對軍事鬥爭準備產生深遠影響。以「三個代表」重要想法為指導，大力弘揚與時俱進的精神，用開拓創新打開工作局面，用解放思想提升戰鬥力，才能把「打得贏」落實。

軍事鬥爭準備最突出的時代背景是新軍事變革

「三個代表」重要思想是中國共產黨人觀察、思考當今世界和中國的變化，在新的實踐中堅持與發展馬克思主義的結果。與時俱進，則是反映了時代本質特徵的觀念。用這個觀念來檢視軍事鬥爭準備，首先應當看我們所處的時代背景究竟發生了什麼樣的改變。

影響軍事鬥爭準備的因素很多：國際情勢的發展，戰略格局的演變，對安全威脅的判斷……但是，影響最直接、最深刻、最廣泛的，當首推上世紀末期興起的新一輪軍事革命。

———戰鬥要素的革命：打擊力、防護力、機動力同步提升。千百年來，還沒有哪一次軍事變革在短時間內使打擊、防護、機動能力獲得同步發展。而當今發生的這場軍事變革，正把三種作戰能力同時提升的理想模式變成現實。

打擊能力的提升主要得益於精確導引武器。傳統非導引武器的命中精準度一般與打擊距離構成穩定的反比關係，而精確導引武器卻在改變「射程-精準度」規律，它不因射程的增大而降低精準度。這項變革猛烈衝擊著上一代戰爭中形成的時間觀、空間觀和效能觀，「非接觸作戰」、「防區外打擊」等新戰法應運而生。

在歷次軍事變革中，防護能力的變革總是“慢半拍”，戰場嚴格遵循“靠消滅敵人來保存自己”的鐵律。甚至有人認為，20世紀的裝甲革命只是冷兵器時代「阻隔與抵消對方打擊威力」的思路的延伸，實在算不上是一次防護革命。今天，一場真正意義上的防護革命悄然而至，代表性的技術是被稱為「低可探測性技術」的隱身技術，它突破了沿襲數千年的傳統套路，透過降低目標被發現的機率來“保存自己”，同時又為達成攻擊的突然性創造了條件，堪稱先“保存自己”再“消滅敵人”的進攻性防護手段，其發展前景不可限量。

機動力正向「空中化」轉移，軍隊機動呈現多維立體的特徵。隨著情報保障、指揮控制、機動工具的跨代式改善，空中機動能力從戰術級躍升到了戰役級。目前，有些已開發國家軍隊主力部隊的直升機數量與坦克大致相等，平均每100名士兵就有一架直升機。一旦地面不再成為障礙物時，戰場將出現什麼新景觀？

———軍隊結構的革命：諸軍兵種一體化。一體化是新軍事變革的成果在指揮協同領域的突出體現。自從有了軍兵種，軍隊就信奉整體作戰思想，但由於資訊的「橫向流動」比較困難，制約了軍隊整體作戰能力的提升。自1980年代以來，數位化通訊設備、敵我識別系統、全球定位系統、電腦網路相繼躋身戰場，不同類型、不同層級、不同空間的部隊第一次具備了資訊「橫向流動」的能力，為一體化作戰創造了條件。反映這一趨勢的是近年來美軍提出的「行動中心戰」概念。基於感測器技術、電腦網路技術及快速反應能力的發展，美軍把“計劃中心戰”轉變為“行動中心戰”，這將是軍隊指揮協同領域的一次深刻變革，諸軍兵種一體化作戰將由此達到一個新水平。

一體化也體現在軍隊編成上。首先是軍種界限的弱化。二次大戰以來，軍種力量通常由戰略統帥部直接掌握，形成了涇渭分明的軍種界限。未來聯合作戰，傳統的指揮體制已無法適應對時效性的特殊要求，必須打破原有的軍種界限，組成一體化部隊。目前，建立由陸軍旅特遣隊、空軍戰鬥機中隊、海軍艦艇部隊和陸戰隊遠徵分隊組成的“聯合特遣部隊”，就是發達國家軍隊謀求一體化的新嘗試。其次是兵種界線的弱化。已開發國家軍隊紛紛組成兵種混編合成部隊，如美國空軍在前幾年「混編聯隊」試驗的基礎之上，將在2003年前建立10​​支遠徵型航空航天部隊；英國從2000年開始將海軍的「海鷂」飛機與空軍的「鷂」式戰鬥機混合編組。可以預見，在不遠的將來，機械化戰爭時代所形成的相對穩定的軍隊結構將出現新格局。有些學者稱之為“關係的革命”、“結構的革命”，不失為一種遠見。

———作戰體系的革命：機械化軍隊轉變為資訊化軍隊。人類社會正面臨歷史上第三次大轉型，資訊革命的浪潮持續不斷。幾年前，作為「智慧化」戰爭的資訊化概念尚在人們的視野之外，而今天沒有多少人再懷疑它的出現。

戰爭自進入工業時代以來，呈現出加速度發展趨勢，尤其是第二次世界大戰後的半個世紀，機械化作為戰爭形態的主流已經達到它的巔峰，但同時也陷入了困境：武器裝備的物理性能達到極限，大量的投入回報甚微；核武的災難性後果，使其越來越難以在戰爭中發揮作用；大規模殺傷性武器造成的對無辜人民的傷害和對環境造成的污染，導致生態惡化……在機械化的框架中繼續發展幾乎沒有出路，人們開始尋求新的方式，即從更深層面上解決打擊效率和作戰效果問題，努力實現精確化、可控化和智能化，而這就是信息化。目前，許多國家軍隊都在努力開拓跳出機械化戰爭困境的變革之路，機械化戰爭讓位給資訊化戰爭的趨勢不可逆轉。江主席敏銳洞察世界軍事領域發生的重大變化，精闢指出了新軍事變革的本質是資訊化革命，為我軍迎接世界新軍事變革的挑戰指明了方向。

目前，已開發國家軍隊都在大力推進武器裝備的資訊化建設，在積極發展C4 I系統、精確制導彈藥、靈巧武器、數位化單兵裝備的同時，注重搞好頂層設計，使目標偵察與監視、目標資訊處理與傳輸、精確打擊與毀傷評估實現一體化，形成「軍事大系統」。這樣，就把工業時代的適於發揮火力和機動力潛能的作戰體系，逐步改造成了資訊時代的適於資訊快速流動和使用的作戰體系。

我軍軍事鬥爭準備恰逢世界軍事領域正發生著真正的劇變，親歷了這場革命，我們應有比以往更強烈的時代感和緊迫感。當我們針對現實威脅認真準備的時候，我們一定不可以忽略或忘記我們正置身一個新的時代，一定不可以忙於應對而淡漠大勢。不眷戀我們已經熟悉了的東西，敏銳吸納歷史潮流為我們展示的新鮮事物，乘勢而上，把步子邁得更大一點，這就是與時俱進思想對時代挑戰的有力回應。

按照軍事變革大趨勢設計軍事鬥爭準備“總坐標”

江總書記在「5·31」演講中指出：「堅持解放思想、實事求是的思想路線，弘揚與時俱進的精神，是黨在長期執政條件下保持先進性和創造力的決定性因素。我們黨能否始終做到這一點，決定著中國的發展前途和命運。

———歷史的啟蒙：順應趨勢者昌，逆趨勢而動者亡。順應歷史潮流注定得到歷史的青睞，搶先者往往是那些對歷史潮流異常敏感的軍隊。 19世紀中葉，普魯士比其他國家更早察覺到工業革命對軍事領域帶來的挑戰，率先實現了軍事體係向機械化戰爭的過渡，從而使它在後來數十年間比那些兵力更多、科技水平更高的歐洲軍隊都佔有決定性優勢。

相反的情形是，軍事上的巨額投入與所取得的成果之間存在明顯落差，其原因恐怕也是缺乏乘勢而動的靈敏嗅覺。 17世紀中葉至18世紀末，中國社會在原有的體系框架下發展到了極致，軍事上也處於冷兵器時代的鼎盛期。幾乎在同一時間，世界發生了一系列改天換地的變革：火藥革命方興未艾，機械化革命接踵而至。面對軍事變革的衝擊，滿清軍隊卻死抱著“騎射乃滿洲根本”的迂腐觀念，把發明創造稱為“奇技淫巧”，把堅船利炮看成妖術。大清王朝最終被動挨打，喪權辱國。

歷史有著驚人的相似之處，歷史道路的選擇卻有高下優劣之分。當今，世界軍事又面臨大變動、大發展、大轉折。海灣戰爭以後，中央軍委敏銳察覺到世界軍事領域正在發生廣泛而深刻的變革，及時制定了新時期軍事戰略方針，要求把軍事鬥爭準備的基點放在打贏現代技術特別是高技術條件下的局部戰爭上；19 96年，在這一戰略方針的指導下，提出軍隊建設的指導思想必須實現由數量規模型向質量效能型、由人力密集型向科技密集型的兩個根本性轉變；1997年，又以高度的智慧和過人的膽魄，確定了軍隊跨世紀發展“三步走”戰略……這些重大舉措，充分體現了與時俱進的前瞻性視野。十多年來，我軍新時期軍事鬥爭準備之所以能夠不斷取得進展與突破，就是因為把與時俱進的時代精神融入其中。

———有益的經驗：把改革當作軍事鬥爭準備的著力點。冷戰後，國際局勢起了變化，各國軍隊開始重新設計發展藍圖。普遍的做法是，高度重視新軍事變革的影響，強調掌握戰爭形態轉型的歷史機遇，並依照時代要求推動軍事改革。一個波次接一個波次的改革浪潮此起彼伏，最終形成了席捲全球的改革之勢。

根據倫敦國際戰略研究所最近發表的《2001-2002年度戰略評估報告》稱，「9·11」事件以後，美軍提出了新一輪的軍事改革計劃，其中包括六個重要組成部分，首要部分是「關於未來戰爭的設想」。對未來戰爭有了新看法，必然對戰爭機器進行新的改造。其實，最早意識到當今這場軍事變革的是前蘇軍，但美軍後來居上，當許多機械化為主的軍隊還在爭論資訊化是否會到來時，美軍不動聲色地開始了資訊化改革，於1994年成立了“軍事革命研究高級指導委員會”，作為軍事改革的組織領導機構。各軍種也成立了相應的機構，如陸軍數位化辦公室和地面資訊戰中心、海軍新作戰概念委員會和艦隊資訊戰中心、空軍資訊戰中心等。經過多年積累，取得了大量有益成果，為軍隊資訊化改造提供了座標。

改革越深入，操作的難度就越高。許多國家的軍隊已經看到，在機械化時代日臻完善的軍事體系已經沒有太大的改造空間，必須大刀闊斧地推進新軍事革命。美國國防部專門成立了5個工作小組，集中探討如何使用資訊科技徹底改造美軍，並且建立了6個專門研究資訊戰的戰鬥實驗室。美軍認為，目前還不能有效地應付各種複雜的新安全挑戰，需要以迅速、靈活、各兵種有效聯合行動為目標進行軍事改革，包括設立一支常備聯合特遣部隊，開發需要的躍進技術，增強指揮機構的彈性，改革採購策略，放棄舊的軍事系統以便為新系統騰出經費，等等。俄、英、法、日等國推行新軍事革命的條件雖然不如美國完備，但它們也紛紛制定面向長遠的國防發展戰略與軍隊建設規劃，加快本國軍事改革的步伐，以迎接新軍事革命的挑戰。這些反映了大方向的改革舉措，值得我軍借鏡。

———使命的呼喚：把軍事鬥爭準備和建設一流軍隊統一起來。我軍軍事鬥爭準備的任務是確定的，而軍隊建設的參考係卻不是凝固的。多變的國際環境、未定的戰略格局以及我國所面臨的複雜的周邊安全形勢，這些都決定了一旦發生戰事，我們的作戰對手和作戰方向可能都不是單一的，主要戰略方向也具有相對性和可變性。建國後，我們所進行的幾場局部戰爭，幾乎沒有一場是在我們準備好了的戰略方向進行的。如果僅僅瞄準一個對手，設想一種情況，無疑是一種戰略短視。

面對這種局面，如何做好軍事鬥爭準備？答案是：提高軍事鬥爭準備的起點，建立一支一流軍隊。在充滿不確定性和不可測性的現實中，具備應付各種情況的「能力」才是最重要的。這如同參加大型國際賽，光是戰勝一個對手不行，只有戰勝一系列對手才能奪冠，這就需要綜合實力。所以，軍事鬥爭準備要從長計議，不過度專注近期威脅而忽略長遠建設，在突出重點的同時，著力去開發整個軍隊應付挑戰和不測事件的能力。這種能力只有透過加強品質建設，在追趕世界軍事強國的過程中獲得。利用我們的“後發優勢”，從發達國家軍隊發展的歷史中汲取營養，加速對先進技術、先進體制、先進思想的追趕過程，避免他們走過的彎路，最終形成自己的優勢。這樣，我們才能在為近期威脅作好準備的同時，也關照好未來。

軍事革命是全球性的，但它不會自動光顧每一個國家，它雖然使後發國家軍隊有了奮起追趕的可能性，但機運只為那些正確應對者而來。我們把現實軍事鬥爭準備和加強軍隊質量建設兩大戰略任務統一起來，邊準備，邊建設，以準備牽引建設，以建設促進準備，這無疑是正確的抉擇。

在變革潮流中走具有特色的軍事鬥爭準備之路

不同國家軍隊由於起點不同，對發展道路的選擇呈現出多樣性。國外某學者曾斷言：「一支軍隊什麼方面落後、落後多少完全規定了歷史的變化模式。」經濟學領域稱這種現象為「路徑依賴」。如果把世界軍事強國的變革之路視為唯一模式，不假思索地套於自身，那麼，必然導致起點、途徑與目標的嚴重錯置。

———確立嶄新的發展思路。戰爭形態在21世紀必定跨入資訊化階段，世界各國軍隊有可能在這場過渡中發生新的分化，形成作戰水準的重大差異與不平衡。要避免在新的角逐中落伍，常規的思路肯定不行，必須找到一條快速追趕的路徑。

機械化是西方軍隊的發達之路，這是由於當時的歷史背景給西方軍隊提供了特殊條件，而我軍不可能重新具備這些歷史條件，不可能在機械化戰爭形態中獲得同等發達水平。因此，我們應該認真反思在機械化框架中能否真正趕上已開發國家軍隊的問題。

資訊化戰爭是戰爭形態的大飛躍。其實，從舊形態轉向新形態的發展是透過作戰系統內部一系列巨大轉變來實現的，這種轉變不是舊形態向新形態的直線推移，而是一種「轉移式發展」。正如「蒸氣船不是進化發展的帆船；汽車不是馬和馬車的進化型改進；晶體管不是一種較好的真空管」一樣，「轉移式發展」是作戰手段的本質、方向的改變，其突出特徵是它的轉折性、非線性、間斷性和創新性，從舊型態的視角向前直線展望是看不到新型態的。

我軍目前尚處在機械化進程中，機械化的局限性正在快速顯現但尚未完全暴露，而我軍在資訊科技某些領域已逐漸涉足新軍事革命，甚至在某些局部某種程度上並不比許多西方國家軍隊落後。這顯示了一個事實，機械化與資訊化並不完全是直線相接的，在具備一定的條件下，有可能實現跨越式發展。古埃及的農業文明並不是建立在世界最發達的採獵文明基礎上，英國開拓工業文明也不是擁有世界最發達的農業文明。

新戰爭形態的間斷性、轉折性往往會給原本並不先進的軍隊提供一個後來居上的歷史機會。資訊革命為我軍在不擁有充分發展的機械化的基礎上實現跨越式發展提供了機會。

———用資訊化牽引機械化。武器裝備的「斷代性」發展，既是新軍事變革的重要內容，也是它的始因。一個帶根本性的問題是：正在研發或引進的武器系統是為哪一代戰爭做準備？如果用昨天的裝備迎接明天的戰爭，難免會碰壁。試舉一例。現在正在服役的絕大多數預警機，採用的雷達系統是主動式輻射雷達，這在下一代戰爭中將基本沒有生存能力，如果盲目引進此類預警機，是不是一種戰略失算？顯然，超前意識對裝備發展來說尤其重要。

所謂超前意識，對現階段的我軍來說，就是確立「用資訊化牽引機械化」的發展觀。資訊革命為我軍跨越式發展提供了機遇，但機械化階段不可能完全跨越，我軍武器裝備的機械化水準還不高，有些甚至只是半機械化。用資訊化牽引機械化，就是適度發展機械化，但不追求最發達的機械化，不影響資訊化改造的資金投入，不過度完善機械化指揮體系和機制，在維持機械化作戰方式的同時，保證資訊化改造順利進行。把適度發展機械化與資訊化結合起來，在維持前者的同時，重心向後者傾斜。

———在繼承中深化改革。江主席早在1996年就指出：「從當前世界軍事發展的動向看，我軍的編制體制不合理的問題也比較突出，編制體制的調整改革要繼續積極穩妥地進行。」任何軍隊都在沿襲著經過實踐檢驗、體現自身特色的編制傳統，如瑞典幾百年來一直採取了寓兵於民的組織體制，印度陸軍的編制體制仍然保留著英印時期的「聯隊制」傳統……但是，軍事變革的衝擊點往往先瞄準編制體制。編制體制所處的「樞紐」地位，使它成為任何一支有所作為的軍隊所關注的焦點。

隨著軍事革命向縱深發展，武器裝備、人員素質和作戰理論的一系列革新成果，最終都需要物化於一種順暢的體制內，用科學的機制去表現它、反映它，使其最迅速、最有效地釋放能量。我軍的編制體制調整應當衝破積弊，超越傳統，創造足夠的空間促進機構改革，堅定不移地朝著江主席所要求的「規模適度、結構合理、指揮靈便」的方向努力。所謂與時俱進，就應當在這些頂層設計的焦點、難點上大膽改革，而不應為眼前的細節所累。

———以科學技術為推動力。在新軍事變革的過程中，我軍的科學精神、科技意識都在與時俱進，全軍廣泛、深入、持久地開展科技練兵活動，走出了一條以科學技術為推動力的新的訓練發展道路。

歷史上，拒絕科學技術的軍隊均難逃厄運。在二次大戰中，日本關東軍信奉“完成任務的因素，是信念而不是知識”，戰鬥條令一味主張“白刃主義”。到了1938年“張鼓鋒事件”，儘管白刃戰傷亡僅佔總傷亡的千分之二點八，但關東軍1941年的戰鬥條令仍然強調“白刃主義”，缺少對付坦克和飛機的訓練。日軍戰後承認，關東軍「在近代作戰訓練方面幾乎等於零」。而西方軍隊則具有崇尚科學的傳統，他們十分重視根據軍事科技的發展及時修改訓練條例，調整訓練內容。據報道，美空軍已不再進行空中近距格鬥項目的訓練，而把訓練重點放在控制飛彈飛行上。

近年來，全軍按照新時期軍事戰略方針的要求，對教育訓練內容進行了全面改革，取得了階段性成果。但已經進行的改革是初步的，今後的路還很長。教育訓練內容創新，應緊緊圍繞下一代戰爭對人員素質和作戰能力提出的要求，由上至下搞好整體設計。近年來，我軍建成了全軍軍事訓練資訊網和各院校校園網，建立了一大批現代化教學場館和訓練場地，研製配發了一大批與新裝備配套的訓練模擬器材，實現了戰役戰術訓練模擬系統的互連互通……我們將高擎與時俱進這把時代精神的火炬，緊緊依靠科技進步，把教育訓練不斷推向新境界。

http://jczs.sina.com.cn 2002年7月16日 07:51 解放军报

中國原創軍事資源：https://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2002-07-16/7489888.html?from=wap

#Information Support Force, Asymmetric Warfare, China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military Future Wars, Chinese Military Informatization, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare, Dissipative Warfare, 中國解放軍敘事戰爭, 中國軍隊對耗散戰的戰術運用, 以認知為中心的戰爭：應對複雜戰爭的作戰概念, 認知域戰, 認知戰

Strengthening the Military with Chinese Characteristics A Path of Deep Reform

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中國特色強軍之路 深化改革之路

現代英語：

From November 24 to 26, 2015, the world-renowned deepening of national defense and military reform was officially launched, opening the curtain for our army to seize the strategic commanding heights of future military competition. This is the most revolutionary military reform of the People’s Liberation Army in 60 years. The reform is unprecedented in its force, structure and scope.

Give full play to the advantages of the socialist military system with Chinese characteristics

Ren Tianyou

A new round of reforms in our military has begun. With the establishment of the joint command system, theater system, and service construction and management system, China’s military reform is taking a key step forward with a new attitude. What is different from the past is that this is a comprehensive reform with the leadership and command system as the core, a “reform above the neck”, with unprecedented determination, unprecedented action, unprecedented benefits, and unprecedented risks.

In carrying out top-down reform, our army’s greatest advantage lies in the system. This reform starts from the headquarters, services, military regions and other high-level leadership organs of the army, starting from the “brain” and “center” of the army. The reason why we bravely cross the shoals and why we are full of confidence is the advantage of the socialist military system with Chinese characteristics.

The core of giving full play to the advantages of the socialist military system with Chinese characteristics is to uphold the absolute leadership of the Party over the military. If this point is not seen, the reform will make the mistake of purely military perspectives; if this point is not adhered to, it will not be able to gather motivation and innovation in the face of difficulties, and the reform will eventually become a building on gravel, which cannot withstand the battle on the battlefield and the test of history. To uphold the absolute leadership of the Party over the military is to resolutely implement the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission and Chairman Xi, break through various ideological obstacles to build consensus, and obey orders regardless of personal gains and losses and local interests. Only in this way can the military reform overcome numerous difficulties and reach the other side of victory.

Reform is a process of interest adjustment. The obstacles to military reform in ancient and modern times, both in China and abroad, also highlight the threshold of interests. It is easy to defeat the thief in the mountains, but it is difficult to defeat the thief in the heart. Compared with people’s subjective consciousness, under the new era conditions, more attention should be paid to breaking the obstacles to reforming the old system by improving the system and the legal system. The rule of law should be used to ensure the coordination of the resources of the whole army and realize the concentration of forces for reform; the rule of law should be used to withdraw and merge to reduce the space for backward combat forces and make room for new combat forces; the rule of law should be used to ensure the smooth operation of the new leadership and command system and strongly eliminate the interference from local interests and personal interests.

Who can successfully implement reforms and who can successfully manage risks are the major issues that determine the fate of reforms. As Engels said, “When the wave of technological revolution is surging around, it is no good to let these conservative prejudices dominate the army. We need newer and braver minds.” Since the Gulf War, the US military has continuously produced talented generals, from Boyd to Owens, from Powell to Ramosfeld, theorists and practitioners have emerged in an endless stream, either relying on their achievements on the battlefield or being selected through the survival of the fittest in theory. For this reason, if the talent selection rules are not refreshed, the reform may remain in the trap of “old wine in new bottles” where “old heads” monopolize new positions.

Chairman Mao Zedong said that our army matures quickly in war. This is because our army always takes the initiative to reform and forges a path to victory at the critical moment of life and death. Looking back at history, our army’s reform is often not a calm and unhurried process, but a desperate outbreak under external threats and internal pressure. The “Three Bays Reform” started with a team of less than a thousand people in the repeated failures of urban riots, and the streamlining of the army and government was carried out in the heavy siege of the Japanese invaders’ “Three Alls” policy and iron wall encirclement. Today’s reform of our army is taking place under the hegemonic countries’ flaunting of maritime hegemony and military provocations, and it is set sail in the Japanese right-wing forces’ eagerness to shake the peace constitution and then plot to subvert the post-war international order. It shoulders the mission of defending national territorial sovereignty and maintaining world peace, and it cannot tolerate delay, carelessness, or retreat. At the same time, it should be seen that this military reform is based on the country’s economic take-off and is a leap forward standing on the solid shoulders of scientific and technological innovation. The opportunity is rare and should not be missed.

(The author is the director of the Strategic Education and Research Department of the National Defense University and a major general)

(Excerpt from Guangming Daily, December 23, 2015)

Military reform: a charge to seize strategic commanding heights

Lu Jianyong Wang Xueping

Build a joint combat command organization and launch a combined attack

Information warfare is a game between systems and systems, and systems and systems. The way of winning by fighting alone has no place. In the ever-changing information battlefield, whether the various services can closely coordinate to form a joint force depends on the joint operations command organization. Looking at the armies of the powerful countries in the world today, all of them have the ability to win information warfare by building a strong joint operations command organization. After the end of the Cold War, the US military immediately began to adjust and build the leadership and command system of the headquarters, and the same is true for the armies of Russia, Britain, France and other countries. This major reform of our army, standing at the commanding heights of the world, can be said to be a global vision and strategic thinking. By 2020, we must “strive to build a modern military force system with Chinese characteristics that can win information warfare and effectively fulfill missions and tasks.” The leadership and management system and the joint operations command system are designed as a whole, and “joint operations command organizations are established”, and efforts are made to build a “combat command system of the Military Commission-theater-troops”. The joint command organization has made its debut, making the “central nervous system” of the army more efficient and flexible, as shown in the following:

Strengthened unified command. The military is an armed force group with special missions and tasks. Its special nature requires a highly unified command. President Xi Jinping stressed that “we must focus on implementing the requirements of political military construction under the new situation, promote the organic unity of leadership and control of the troops and efficient command of the troops, and form a pattern in which the CMC is in charge of overall affairs, the theater commands are responsible for combat, and the services are responsible for construction.” The so-called CMC is in charge of overall affairs, which means “strengthening the centralized and unified leadership of the CMC, and better concentrating the highest leadership and command of the military in the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission”, so that the military will always listen to the Party.

Reduced levels of command. Modern warfare is about speed. Without the rapid decision-making and command of the command organs and the rapid response of the troops, there will be no initiative on the battlefield. The CMC and the theater directly command the troops, and the command chain is greatly compressed. The will and determination of the command level are transformed into troop actions in the shortest path, which can effectively seize the initiative on the battlefield in a rapidly changing battlefield.

Achieved efficiency and effectiveness. A bloated and inefficient leadership and command structure not only makes it difficult for the military machine to operate efficiently and quickly, but also makes it easier for a powerful enemy to “attack wherever it points to.” Building a three-level command system of “CMC, theater, and troops” can effectively achieve high efficiency in combat command through the streamlining and reorganization of organs and clear division of functions.

Establish the Army Department, divide the war zones, and plan for war

For a long time, the leadership and command system of our army has been imperfect. The army’s construction, management and leadership functions are performed by various departments of the headquarters, resulting in overlapping command and management functions of the army, multiple policies and mutual constraints. This is not only not conducive to the top-level design and systematic planning of army construction, but also puts too much burden on the headquarters. The huge and repeated establishment of military district organs also leads to conflicts and dual weakening of command and management functions. These problems have seriously affected the overall construction of the army as a service, and restricted the formation and performance of the joint combat command functions of the headquarters and theater. At present, the armies of major countries in the world have established army headquarters, which are responsible for various tasks of the construction of their own services, including personnel and administrative management, education and training, military scientific research, military mobilization, weapons and equipment, and logistics support. In this military reform of our army, President Xi Jinping, based on a scientific judgment of my country’s security situation and in line with the general trend of the world’s military revolution, pointed out that deepening the reform of national defense and the army should “focus on solving the institutional obstacles, structural contradictions, and policy issues that restrict national defense and army building, promote the modernization of the army’s organizational form, further liberate and develop combat effectiveness, further liberate and enhance the vitality of the army, and build a consolidated national defense and a strong army that is commensurate with my country’s international status and compatible with national security and development interests”. Some military experts analyzed that the establishment of the Army Department in this military reform will make the army more aware of its military services. The strengthening of the top-level design of the army’s construction and development can fundamentally solve the problems of our army’s large number and scale, unreasonable proportion of arms, long and short leadership and command system, and excessive non-combat units. A sensitive, synthetic, multi-functional, and efficient army with Chinese characteristics will stand in the east of the world. The transformation of military regions into theaters of war is even more significant.

First, the theater is dedicated to fighting wars and is a complete regional combat organization. In the future, our army will have a clearer idea of ​​”what kind of war to fight and how to fight it”, and forward-looking war design will also drive and guide the development of military construction and promote the leap in the combat effectiveness of the troops. Second, the transformation of military regions into theaters is not only a reorganization of the leadership and command institutions, but also a more efficient and effective leadership and command level, and also makes military struggle preparations more targeted. At the same time, the institutionalization and normalization of theater joint training ensures that peacetime training is connected with future wars.

Establish the Military Commission’s Discipline Inspection Commission and the Political and Legal Commission to keep the military flag forever bright red

Our army has grown from nothing to something, from small to large, from weak to strong, and from victory to victory. Adhering to the absolute leadership of the Party over the army and strictly governing the army are the fundamental guarantees. This military reform is a historical opportunity for our army to catch up and overtake in the new round of military revolution. It is even more necessary to pave the way and escort it by governing the army according to law and strictly governing the army. President Xi Jinping pointed out that “we should focus on deepening the rule of law and strict governance of the army, grasp the key of governing power, and build a strict system of constraints and supervision on the exercise of power”. “Focus on solving the problem of insufficient independence and authority of military discipline inspection, inspection, audit, justice, and supervision, and strive to eradicate the soil for the breeding and spread of corruption by weaving a tight cage of the system. Establish a new Military Commission Discipline Inspection Commission, send discipline inspection teams to the Military Commission organs and theaters respectively, and promote the implementation of the dual leadership system of the Discipline Inspection Commission. Adjust and establish the Military Commission Audit Office, and implement all resident audits. Establish a new Military Commission Political and Legal Affairs Commission, adjust the military judicial system, set up military courts and military procuratorates according to regions, and ensure that they exercise their powers independently and impartially in accordance with the law.”

Optimize the force structure of the armed forces and make a leap forward in “combat effectiveness”

The military force structure in which the three armed forces revolve around the army and the army revolves around the heavy-armed forces is no longer suitable for the three-dimensional, speedy and wide-area needs of modern warfare. Looking at the military reforms of major countries in the world today, all of them seek combat effectiveness through structural reorganization, especially by drastically reducing the strength of outdated arms and accelerating the development of new combat forces, so that the army can stand at the forefront of military reform. For example, focus on the development of technical arms and arms with strong assault power, accelerate the construction of rapid reaction forces, light armored forces, special operations forces and army aviation, etc., to meet the needs of information warfare, system warfare and speed warfare. In addition, the “breaking the boundaries of military arms and creating integrated forces” in the military of some countries has also become a major trend in the development of troop formations. For example, the joint expeditionary force formed by the US military includes army divisions, naval aircraft carrier battle groups, Marine Corps units (subunits) and air force fighter wings. At this military reform meeting, President Xi Jinping emphasized that “we should focus on building elite combat forces, optimize the scale structure and troop formation, and promote the transformation of our army from quantity and scale to quality and efficiency.” We must “adjust and improve the proportion of military services, optimize the force structure of the military services, reform the troop composition according to the security needs and combat missions in different directions, and promote the development of troop composition in the direction of enrichment, synthesis, versatility and flexibility.” This clearly points out that the key to building the combat effectiveness of our army must be to firmly grasp the optimization of the military structure.

First, we should optimize the force structure of the services, accelerate the development of the navy and air force, and appropriately reduce the size of the army, so that our military force structure can effectively respond to the informationized local wars that may be launched from the sea in the future. Second, we should optimize the force structure of the services, reduce and eliminate obsolete forces, accelerate the development of new combat forces, and make the proportion of each service more reasonable. Third, we should optimize the organization of the troops, focus on the needs of diversified military tasks, build multi-type troops that can meet different directions and different threats, and improve the pertinence of military struggle preparations.

(Excerpt from Study Times, December 10, 2015)

The connotation and requirements of our army’s distinctive joint culture

Li Fengbiao

Xi Jinping pointed out: “A cause without cultural support is difficult to sustain for a long time.” As a special military culture, joint culture is the concept and behavior formed by joint command personnel in military practice regarding the knowledge system, value orientation, thinking method, moral norms and psychological awareness of joint operations. It is an important “soft power” that nourishes and enhances joint combat capabilities.

Loyalty, reliability, centralization and unity. Adhering to the absolute leadership of the Party over the military is not only the fundamental magic weapon for our military to defeat the enemy, but also the greatest advantage and feature of our military’s advanced culture. In modern information-based joint operations, political factors are more prominent, the participating forces are more diverse, the organization and command are more complex, and the coordination requirements are more stringent. To organically aggregate highly dispersed combat elements, combat units, and combat systems to form a strong combat capability, we must also have unswerving faith and centralized and unified leadership.

Reform and innovation, information dominance. In today’s era, reform and innovation are the spiritual driving force for accelerating military construction, and information dominance is the key concept for winning military games. The two will inevitably constitute the most distinctive contemporary characteristics of joint culture. In particular, through the practice of informatized local wars in recent years and the development trend of the new military revolution, it is not difficult to find that informatization has not only made traditional intelligence warfare forces, electronic warfare forces, and command and control forces more powerful, but also spawned new combat forces such as cyber warfare and psychological warfare. Information dominance is no longer just a purely technical concept, but has gradually become a new concept to guide the military transformation of various countries’ armies.

Flexible, autonomous, and systemic operations. Our army has always emphasized flexible and maneuverable strategies and tactics, which is an important magic weapon for leveraging strengths and avoiding weaknesses and attacking the enemy’s soft spots, and provides an important reference for our army’s joint culture. In the era of information warfare, the enemy and our offensive and defensive battles are rapidly changing, and the battlefield situation is changing rapidly. In particular, the significant characteristics of platform operations, system support, tactical operations, and strategic guarantees provide a solid foundation and broad space for giving full play to our army’s “live” advantages. To develop our army’s joint culture, we must correctly apply the basic principles of joint operations, integrate our army’s strategies and tactics into the multi-dimensional integrated force system of land, sea, air, space, electricity, and the Internet, and transform them into strategic guidance, tactical thinking, and command art for future joint operations. You fight yours, I fight mine, and you attack others without being attacked by others, forming an asymmetric advantage, and always mastering the strategic and operational initiative.

Integration of peacetime and wartime, comprehensive integration. In the face of the current severe test of responding to multiple security threats and completing diversified military tasks, to develop our military’s joint culture, we must not only timely transform and cultivate new ideas for preparing for war, infiltrate and reflect the scientific methods of joint operations in all areas of planning and guiding the construction of troops, coordinate and allocate various resources, and improve the level of troops built in peacetime according to joint operations standards; we must also focus on enhancing the system combat capability based on information systems in wartime, give full play to the role of information technology, use system engineering methods, integrate various subsystems and subsystems that generate combat effectiveness into an organic whole, and strive to make the integration of armed forces, military organization, command and control, and combat elements a conscious practice, so as to maximize the cohesion of combat capabilities and release combat energy.

Unity and cooperation, joint victory. Uniting as one for the common revolutionary ideal, fighting side by side, and striving for victory have always been the value concept of our army to defeat powerful enemies. Under the conditions of informatization, the rapid development of science and technology has not only unprecedentedly improved the combat capabilities of various elements, but also made the battlefield situation extremely complicated. Only by strengthening the value concept of joint victory, focusing on the linkage of systems and systems, complementary advantages, dynamic coordination, sincere unity, and efficient elite troops, can we win the greatest victory at the lowest cost. To develop the joint culture of our army, we must highlight unity and cooperation, and joint victory, actively build a concept of victory, honor, interests, and gains and losses that are consistent with joint operations, thoroughly break the constraints of the interests of the military and arms and the narrow local concepts, and consciously cultivate a joint spirit of independent coordination, conscious cooperation, and cross-linking and interaction, so that various combat forces can be optimally combined and seamlessly linked, demonstrating effectiveness and winning together.

(The author is the deputy commander of the Chengdu Military Region)

(Excerpt from the Liberation Army Daily, December 23, 2015)

Russia and the United States: Cultivating military talents for joint operations

Tian Yiwei

Comprehensively cultivating joint operations command talents, joint operations information training management talents, and joint operations information technology professionals, and promoting the construction of a high-quality joint operations talent team is a basic way to promote the formation of joint operations capabilities at the cultural level in the military reforms of countries around the world.

The Russian military has made the training of joint combat talents a priority in the development of military culture. It believes that military academies are the bases for the training of military talents and the cradle of joint culture, and they play a leading and exemplary role in the development of joint culture. In order to expand the knowledge structure of students, enhance mutual understanding between the military services, and eliminate “partisanship”, the Russian military has carried out major reforms in the military education system, strengthened the construction of the elementary, intermediate and advanced joint education system, and improved the joint combat command capability throughout the education process. At the end of 2008, the Russian military began to fully integrate the military education system. As Russian President Putin pointed out: “Military education is undergoing major reforms. We are setting up 10 large scientific research and teaching centers. All of these institutions are built in a strict vertical system and provide officers with opportunities to continuously improve their professional level based on their service. In this regard, we rely on our own traditions and draw on practical experience from around the world.”

The Education Department of the Russian Ministry of Defense revealed that in order to continuously improve the joint combat literacy of officers at all levels, the role of on-the-job short-term training will be fully utilized in the future, the knowledge structure of the officer team will be updated in a timely manner, and officers will be ensured to become high-level professionals who master modern technology. The Russian military has also opened information-based joint combat lectures at senior and intermediate military academies, and revised the teaching syllabus to make the teaching content of the academies closer to the reality of modern warfare. The Russian General Staff Military Academy organized joint combat seminars to improve the students’ information-based joint combat command capabilities and create composite commanders who are proficient in joint culture. The experience of the Russian military in strengthening the training of joint command talents tells us that it is necessary to incorporate integrated joint combat education and training based on information systems into the training of commanders, so that commanders can receive education and training on “integrated joint combat” as planned in primary and intermediate command positions, so that they can master relevant knowledge and skills before entering senior command positions and have a certain degree of joint literacy. The superb art of joint combat command has accumulated the profound heritage of joint culture and depicted the profound imprint of joint culture. It runs through the entire process of the growth of joint combat talents, penetrates into all aspects of the growth of joint combat talents, affects the thinking mode, values, mental model and behavioral habits of joint combat talents, is a catalyst and multiplier for the forging of joint combat talents, and fundamentally determines the quality and level of joint combat talent training.

In actual training, the armies of many countries in the world emphasize that all services and units should give priority to joint training, focus on cultivating commanders’ awareness and ability of coordination across services, arms, and departments, and emphasize instilling “instinctive joint thinking” in soldiers from the beginning of basic individual training, so that commanders and soldiers can fully realize that they are members of the joint force and part of the overall combat force, and consciously think about problems and take actions from a joint perspective. Taking the joint operations of the US military as an example, after going through the two stages of eliminating conflicts between services and bridging gaps between services, the US military is now in the stage of seamless integration of multi-service capabilities and is developing towards cohesive joint operations.

(The author is the political assistant of the Foreign Military Department of the Academy of Military Sciences)

(Excerpt from Reference News on December 28, 2015)

Source: Red Flag Digest Magazine, Issue 2, 2016

現代國語：

編者以 2015年11月24日至26日，備受世界矚目的深化國防和軍事改革正式啟動，拉開了我軍搶佔未來軍事競爭戰略制高點的大幕。這是人民解放軍60年來撼動性最強的一次軍改，改革推進力度之大、調整結構之多、影響範圍之廣，可謂前所未有。

發揮中國特色社會主義軍事制度優勢

任天佑

我軍新一輪改革大幕已經拉開。隨著聯合指揮體制、戰區體制、軍種建設管理體制的確立，中國軍事變革正以嶄新姿態邁出關鍵一步。與以往不同的是，這是以領導指揮系統為核心的全面改革，是“脖子以上的改革”，改革決心之大前所未有，改革動作之大前所未有，改革效益之大前所未有，改革風險之大也前所未有。

進行自上而下的改革，我軍最大的優勢在製度。這次改革從總部、軍種、軍區這些軍隊的高層領率機關開始，從軍隊「大腦」和「中樞」起步。我們憑什麼勇涉險灘，憑什麼充滿自信，憑的是中國特色社會主義軍事制度優勢。

發揮中國特色社會主義軍事制度優勢，核心在於堅持黨對軍隊絕對領導。不看到這條，改革就會犯單純軍事觀點的毛病；不堅持這一點，就會在攻堅克難面前凝聚不起動力和創新力，最終讓改革變成沙礫上建樓房，經不起戰場上的較量，經不起歷史的檢驗。堅持黨對軍隊絕對領導，就是要堅決貫徹黨中央、中央軍委和習主席的決策部署，衝破各種思想障礙以凝聚共識，不計個人得失、局部利益而聽令而行。惟如此，軍事改革才能突破千難萬險，到達勝利的彼岸。

改革是利益調整的過程，古今中外軍事改革的阻礙也突顯在利益這道門檻上。破山中賊易，破心中賊難。與人的主觀自覺性相比，新的時代條件下，更應著重於透過完善製度法制，破除改革舊體制的攔路虎。以法治化確保全軍資源的統籌力，實現集中力量辦改革；以法治化撤併壓縮落後作戰力量空間，為新型作戰力量騰籠換鳥；以法治化保障新型領導指揮系統的平穩運行，強力破除來自局部利益、個人利益的干擾。

什麼人才能成功執行改革，什麼人才能成功駕馭風險，這是決定改革命運的大事。正如恩格斯所說：「當科技革命的浪潮正在四周洶湧澎湃的時候，讓這些保守的偏見在軍隊中佔統治地位，是沒有好處的。我們需要更新、更勇敢的頭腦。」海灣戰爭以來，美軍不斷湧現悍將乾才，從博伊德到歐文斯，從鮑威爾到拉莫斯菲爾德，理論家、實戰家層出不窮，不是在戰場上靠戰績打拼出來，便是在理論上優勝劣汰而來。為此，不刷新人才選拔規則，改革就可能停留在「舊腦殼」壟斷新位置的「新瓶裝舊酒」陷阱。

毛澤東主席說，我們這支軍隊在戰爭中成熟得快。這是因為我軍總是在生死存亡的關頭以主動變革闖出勝利之路。回顧歷史，我軍改革往往不是水到渠成般的從容不迫，而是在外有威脅、內有壓力下的絕地爆發。 「三灣改編」是在城市暴動的屢屢失敗中從不足千人的隊伍起步的，精兵簡政是在日寇「三光」政策、鐵壁合圍的重重圍困中展開的。今天我軍的改革，是在霸權國家炫耀海洋霸權、武力挑釁下發生的，是在日本右翼勢力撼動和平憲法進而圖謀顛覆戰後國際秩序的蠢蠢欲動中起航的，它肩負捍衛國家領土主權、維護世界和平的使命，容不得拖延，容不得馬虎，更容不得退縮。同時要看到，這次軍事改革是以國家經濟起飛為基礎的，是站在科技創新堅實肩膀上的躍進，機遇難得，機不可失。

(作者為國防大學戰略教學部主任、少將)

(摘自2015年12月23日《光明日報》)

軍改：搶佔戰略制高點的衝鋒號

盧建永 王雪平

建構聯合作戰指揮機構，打好組合拳

資訊化戰爭是體系與體系、系統與系統的博弈，單打獨鬥的勝利方式已沒有了用武之地。在變幻莫測的資訊化戰場上，諸軍兵種能否密切協調形成合力，聯合作戰指揮機構是「牛鼻子」。展望當今世界強國軍隊，無不透過建強聯合作戰指揮機構，使軍隊具備打贏資訊化戰爭的能力。冷戰結束後，美軍便立即著手進行總部領導指揮體制的調整與建設，俄羅斯、英國、法國等軍隊也是如此。我軍此次重磅改革，站在世界制高點思考，可謂全球視野、戰略思維。 2020年前要「努力建構能夠打贏資訊化戰爭、有效履行使命任務的中國特色現代軍事力量體系」。對領導管理體制和聯合作戰指揮體制進行一體設計”，“組建聯合作戰指揮機構”，著力構建“軍委—戰區—部隊的作戰指揮體系”。聯合指揮機構登台亮相，讓軍隊的“中樞神經”更加高效靈活，具體表現為：

強化了統一指揮。軍隊是擔負特殊使命任務的武裝力量集團，其特殊性要求必須高度統一指揮。習近平主席強調，「要著眼於貫徹新形勢下政治建軍的要求，推進領導掌握部隊和高效指揮部隊有機統一，形成軍委管總、戰區主戰、軍種主建的格局」。所謂軍委管總，就是“強化軍委集中統一領導，更好使軍隊最高領導權和指揮權集中於黨中央、中央軍委”，讓軍隊永遠聽黨的話。

減少了指揮層次。現代戰爭打的是“速度”，沒有指揮機關的快速決策、指揮和部隊的快速反應，就沒有戰場上的主動權。軍委會、戰區直接指揮部隊，指揮連結大大壓縮，指揮層的意志、決心，最短路徑轉化為部隊行動，在瞬息萬變的戰場上可有效搶佔先機，贏得戰場主動。

實現了精幹高效。臃腫低能的領導指揮機構，不僅難以讓軍隊機器高效快速運轉，更容易成為強敵「指哪兒打哪裡」的第一口餐。建構「軍委會、戰區、部隊」三級指揮體系，透過機關精修、重組，職能分工明確，可有效達成作戰指揮的高效益。

設陸軍部、劃戰區，專職謀打仗

長期以來，我軍陸軍領導指揮體制不健全，陸軍的建設、管理和領導職能由總部機關各部門代行，導致陸軍指揮與管理職能重疊，政出多門，相互制約，不僅不利於對陸軍建設進行頂層設計和系統規劃，而且使總部機關承受了過重的負擔。軍區機關的龐大與重複性設置，也導致指揮與管理職能相互衝突、雙重弱化。這些問題，既嚴重影響了陸軍作為一個軍種的整體建設，也限制了總部和戰區聯合作戰指揮功能的形成與發揮。目前，世界主要國家軍隊陸軍均建有陸軍總部，負責本軍種建設的各項工作，包括人事及行政管理、教育訓練、軍事科研、兵役動員、武器裝備及後勤支援等。我軍此次軍改，習近平主席基於對我國安全情勢的科學判斷，順應世界軍事革命大勢，指出深化國防和軍隊改革要「著力解決制約國防和軍事建設的體制性障礙、結構性矛盾、政策性問題，推進軍隊組織形態現代化，進一步解放和發展戰鬥力，進一步解放和增強軍隊活力，建立同我國國際地位相稱、同國家安全和發展利益相適應的鞏固國防和強大軍隊」。有軍事專家分析，此次軍改設陸軍部，將使陸​​軍的軍種意識更強，陸軍建設發展頂層設計的強化，可從根本上解決我軍陸軍數量規模大、兵種比例不合理、領導指揮體制縱長橫短，以及非作戰單位過度過濫的問題，一支靈敏、合成、多能、高效的中國特色陸軍將立於世界東方。而軍區變戰區，意義更重大。

一是戰區專職謀打仗，是一個完整的區域性作戰組織，未來我軍「打什麼仗、仗怎麼打」就會更清楚，而前瞻性的戰爭設計也會拉動和牽引軍隊建設發展，促進部隊戰鬥力躍升。二是軍區變戰區，既是一次領導指揮機構脫胎換骨的力量重組，領導指揮層更精幹高效，也使軍事鬥爭準備的針對性更強，同時戰區聯合訓練的製度化、常態化，確保了平時訓練與未來戰爭對接。

組成軍委紀委、政法委，讓軍旗永遠鮮紅

我軍從無到有、從小到大、從弱到強、從勝利走向勝利，堅持黨對軍隊絕對領導，從嚴治軍是根本保證。這次軍改，是我軍在新一輪軍事革命潮起湧動中能否迎頭趕上、彎道超車的歷史機遇，更需以依法治軍、從嚴治軍為其開路護航。習近平主席指出，「要著眼於深入推進依法治軍、從嚴治軍，抓住治權這個關鍵，建構嚴密的權力運作制約和監督體系」。 「專注於解決軍隊紀檢、巡視、審計、司法、監督獨立性和權威性不夠的問題，以編密紮緊制度的籠子，努力剷除腐敗現象滋生蔓延的土壤。組建新的軍委紀委，向軍委機關部門和戰區分別派駐紀檢組，推動紀委雙重領導體制落到實處。依法獨立公正行使職權。

優化軍兵種力量結構，讓「戰鬥力」實現跨越

三軍圍繞陸軍轉、陸軍圍繞重裝部隊的軍兵種力量結構，已不適應現代戰爭立體性、速度性、廣域性的需要。縱觀當今世界主要國家軍改，無不向結構重組要戰鬥力，特別是透過重刀削減過時兵種力量，加速新銳作戰力量發展，使軍隊挺立於軍事變革潮頭。如，重點發展技術兵種和突擊力強的兵種，加快快速反應部隊、輕型裝甲部隊、特種作戰部隊和陸軍航空兵建設等，以應對資訊化戰爭體系戰、速度戰的需要。另外，一些國家軍隊「打破軍兵種界線，創建一體化部隊」也成為部隊編組形式發展的大趨勢。如美軍組成的聯合遠徵部隊包括陸軍師、海軍航空母艦戰鬥群、海軍陸戰隊部(分)隊和空軍戰鬥機聯隊。這次軍改會上，習近平主席強調指出，「要著眼打造精銳作戰力量，優化規模結構和部隊編成，推動我軍由數量規模型轉向質量效能型」。若要「調整改善軍種比例，優化軍種力量結構，依照不同方向安全需求和作戰任務改革部隊編成，推動部隊編成向充實、合成、多能、靈活方向發展」。鮮明地指出了我軍戰鬥力建設必須牢牢抓住軍兵種結構來優化這個關鍵。

一是優化軍種力量結構，加速海、空軍力量發展，適當壓縮陸軍數量規模，使我軍力量結構能有效應對未來可能從海上發起的資訊化局部戰爭。二是優化兵種力量結構，削減、淘汰過時的兵種力量，加速發展新銳作戰力量，使各軍種的兵種比例更合理。三是優化部隊編制，著眼多樣化軍事任務需求，建設能滿足不同方向、不同威脅的多類型部隊，提高軍事鬥爭準備的針對性。

(摘自2015年12月10日《學習時報》)

我軍特色聯合文化的內涵要求

李鳳彪

習近平指出：「一項沒有文化支撐的事業難以持續長久」。作為一種特殊的軍事文化，聯合文化是聯合指揮人才在軍事實踐中關於聯合作戰的知識體系、價值取向、思維方法、道德規範和心理意識等形成的觀念形態和行為方式，是滋養和提升聯合作戰能力的重要“軟實力”

忠誠可靠、集中統一。堅持黨對軍隊的絕對領導，既是我軍克敵制勝的根本法寶，也是我軍先進文化的最大優勢、最大特色。現代資訊化聯合作戰，政治因素更加凸顯、參戰力量更加多元、組織指揮更加複雜、協同要求更加嚴格，把高度分散的作戰要素、作戰單元、作戰體係有機聚合起來，形成強大的戰鬥力，同樣必須有忠貞不渝的信念和集中統一的領導。

改革創新、資訊主導。在當今時代，改革創新是加速軍隊建設的精神動力，資訊主導是贏得軍事博弈的關鍵理念，二者必然構成聯合文化最鮮明的時代特色。特別是透過近年來資訊化局部戰爭實踐和新軍事革命發展大勢，不難發現資訊化不僅使傳統的情報戰力量、電子戰力量、指揮控制力量變得更加強大，而且催生了網路戰、心理戰等新的作戰力量，資訊主導已不僅是純粹技術性概念，逐漸成為指導各國軍隊軍事轉型的全新理念。

靈活自主、體係作戰。我軍歷來強調靈活機動的戰略戰術，這是揚長避短、擊敵軟肋的重要法寶，為我軍聯合文化提供了重要藉鏡。進入資訊化戰爭時代，敵我攻防交戰轉換迅捷、戰場形勢瞬息萬變，尤其是平台作戰、體系支撐，戰術行動、戰略保障的顯著特徵，為充分發揮我軍「活」的優勢提供了堅實基礎和廣闊空間。發展我軍聯合文化，就要正確運用聯合作戰的基本原則，把我軍戰略戰術融會貫通於陸、海、空、天、電、網多維一體的力量體系中，轉化為未來聯合作戰的戰略指導、戰術思想和指揮藝術，你打你的、我打我的，致人而不致於人，形成非對稱優勢，始終掌握戰略和作戰主動。

平戰一體、綜合集成。面對當前應對多種安全威脅、完成多樣化軍事任務的嚴峻考驗，發展我軍聯合文化，不僅要及時轉換和培育備戰打仗的新思路，把聯合作戰的科學方法滲透體現到策劃和指導部隊建設的整個過程各領域，搞好各種資源統籌配置，提高平時按照聯合作戰標準建設部隊的層次水平；而且要著眼增強戰時基於信息系統的體係作戰能力，發揮信息技術作用，運用系統工程方法，把生成戰鬥力的各個子系統、分系統整合成一個有機的整體，努力使武裝力量一體化、軍隊編成一體化、指揮控制一體化、作戰要素一體化成為自覺遵循，最大限度地凝聚作戰能力、釋放作戰能量。

團結協作、聯合製勝。為共同革命的理想團結一心、並肩奮戰、爭取勝利，向來是我軍戰勝強敵的價值理念。在資訊化條件下，科技的快速發展既使各要素作戰能力空前提升，也使戰場情況異常複雜，只有強化聯合製勝的價值理念，做到著眼體系、系統聯動，優勢互補、動態協同，精誠團結、精兵高效，才能以最小的代價贏得最大的勝利。發展我軍聯合文化，就要突顯團結協作、聯合製勝，積極建構與聯合作戰相符合的勝利觀、榮譽觀、利益觀、得失觀，徹底破除軍兵種利益掣肘和局部狹隘觀念，自覺養成自主協同、自覺配合、交鏈互動的聯合精神，使各種作戰力量最優組合、無縫鏈接，彰顯效能、合力製勝。

(作者為成都軍區副司令)

(摘自2015年12月23日《解放軍報》)

俄美：培養聯合作戰軍事人才

田義偉

全面培養聯合作戰指揮人才、聯合作戰資訊化訓練管理人才、聯合作戰資訊科技專業人才，推動高素質聯合作戰人才隊伍建設，是世界各國軍隊改革中在文化層面促進聯合作戰能力形成的基本途徑

俄軍把培養聯合作戰人才作為軍事文化的優先發展方向，認為軍隊院校是軍事人才培育的基地，是孕育聯合文化的搖籃，對聯合文化的發展起到引領示範作用。俄軍為拓展學員的知識結構，增進軍兵種之間的相互了解，消除“門戶之見”，對軍事教育體制進行了重大改革，強化構建初、中、高級聯合教育體制，在教育全程提升聯合作戰指揮能力。 2008年底，俄軍開始對軍事教育體系進行全面整合，正如俄總統普丁所指出：「軍事教育正在經歷重大改革。我們正在組成10個大型科研教學中心，所有這些機構都建在一套嚴格的垂直體系中，並根據服役情況為軍官們提供不斷提升自身職業水平的機會。

俄國防部教育司透露，為連續不間斷地提高各級軍官的聯合作戰素養，今後將充分發揮在職短期培訓的作用，及時更新軍官隊伍的知識結構，確保軍官成為掌握現代技術的高水平專業人員。俄軍也在高、中級軍事學院開設了資訊化聯合作戰講座，重新修訂了教學大綱，使院校教學內容更加貼近現代戰爭實際。俄總參軍事學院組織聯合作戰研討，提升學員資訊化聯合作戰指揮能力，打造精通聯合文化的複合型指揮官。俄軍加強聯合指揮人才培養的經驗告訴我們，必須把基於資訊系統的一體化聯合作戰教育訓練納入指揮員的培訓之中，使指揮人員在初、中級指揮崗位上都能按計劃接受有關「一體化聯合作戰」的教育與訓練，使其在進入高級指揮崗位之前就掌握相關的知識、技能，具備一定的聯合素養。高超的聯合作戰指揮藝術，累積著聯合文化的深厚底蘊，刻畫著聯合文化的深刻印跡。它貫穿於聯合作戰人才成長的整個過程，滲透到聯合作戰人才成長的各個方面，影響著聯合作戰人才的思維方式、價值觀念、心智模式和行為習慣，是聯合作戰人才鍛造的催化劑和倍增器，從根本上決定著聯合作戰人才培養的品質和水準。

在實際訓練中，世界上許多國家軍隊都強調，各軍兵種、各部隊要把聯合訓練放在優先的位置，著重培養指揮員跨軍種、兵種、部門的協同意識和能力，強調從基礎的單兵訓練開始，就向士兵灌輸“本能的聯合思維”，使指揮官和士兵充分認識到自己是聯合部隊的一員，是整體作戰力量的一分子，自覺地從聯合的角度思考問題，採取行動。以美軍的聯合作戰為例，美軍在經歷了消除軍種衝突，彌合軍種縫隙兩個階段後，現正處於多軍種能力無縫隙融合階段，向著內聚式聯合發展。

(作者為軍事科學院外軍部政治協理員 )

(摘自2015年12月28日《參考消息》)

資料來源：《紅旗文摘》雜誌2016年第2期

中國原創軍事資源：http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0301/c352498-28161788.html

#Information Support Force, #中國的耗散戰, Asymmetric Warfare, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese Military Future Wars, Chinese Military Informatization, Chinese Military Use of Cognitive Confrontation within the Combat Domain, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Cognitive Domain Warfare, Combat Planning, Dissipative Warfare, 中國解放軍敘事戰爭, 中國軍隊對耗散戰的戰術運用, 認知戰

Scientifically Understanding the “Innovation” in New Chinese Military Quality Combat Power

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科學認識新中國軍隊素質戰鬥力的“創新”

來源：中國軍網-解放軍報 作者：何睿潔 責任編輯：尚曉敏 發布：2024-08-22 07:02

現代英語：

A deep understanding of the background, technical vision, tactics support and generation chain of new-quality combat power is a necessary prerequisite for building a new-quality combat power growth pole and promoting the construction of new-quality combat power in new domains. New-quality combat power is an overall capability that integrates comprehensive perception, real-time command and control, precise strike, full maintenance and protection, and focused support. It is concentrated in the “six new” aspects, namely new trends, new technologies, new equipment, new systems, new tactics, and new talents, representing a fundamental change in the form of war and the way of fighting.

New trends. The accelerated advancement of the world’s new military revolution covers all areas of war and the entire process of army building. Comprehensively understanding, actively adapting to, and proactively embracing the new military reforms are crucial to accelerating the effective supply of new-quality combat power. New-domain and new-quality combat power is a weather vane of military development in an era, a new growth point for military combat power, and a commanding height on the battlefield of the future. Judging from the recent local wars and military operations in the world, new domains and new types of combat forces represented by strategic early warning, information control, algorithmic attack and defense, and unmanned intelligence are increasingly becoming key factors in accelerating the escalation of war forms and changing the rules of war. The combat power structure has changed from the traditional one based on manpower, firepower, and mobility to one based on information power, structural power, and intelligence power. These have put forward new requirements for the development of new types of combat power and pointed out new directions. The development of new types of combat power should not be delayed, and we cannot wait passively. We must be proactive, take the initiative, and fight proactively, otherwise we will miss the opportunity and even have a generation gap.

New technologies. Science and technology have always been the most active and revolutionary factors in military development. At present, new technologies in the military field cover multiple fields such as information technology, artificial intelligence, big data, blockchain, and cloud computing. The role of new technologies is not only reflected in improving the performance of a single weapon and equipment, but more importantly, it can integrate combat platforms and optimize the killing network, making battlefield information acquisition, transmission, and processing faster and more accurate, greatly improving the performance and intelligence level of weapons and equipment, and providing strong support for battlefield perception, command decision-making, coordinated operations, and system victory. Take artificial intelligence technology as an example. It can achieve real-time perception and advance prediction of battlefield situations through machine learning and big data analysis, effectively improving decision-making flexibility, battlefield control and combat success rate. Looking to the future, the development of new technologies will have a profound impact on the construction of weapons and equipment, innovation of combat styles, adjustment of organizational systems and the evolution of war forms, thereby accelerating the formation of new quality combat power with new principles and mechanisms.

New equipment. The innovation drive of military technology not only updates the types and performance of weapons and equipment, but also creates conditions for the emergence of new concept weapons in the future, greatly activating the supply side of new quality combat power. New equipment provides more diverse and more efficient means of operation for modern warfare. Compared with traditional equipment, new equipment has stronger information acquisition and processing capabilities. Advanced reconnaissance satellites and drones can obtain battlefield information in real time, providing commanders with accurate and timely intelligence support. High-performance computer systems and big data analysis technology also make information processing more efficient and accurate. New equipment has higher strike accuracy and efficiency. New equipment such as precision-guided weapons and smart ammunition can accurately identify targets, achieve precise strikes, and minimize collateral damage. New equipment has stronger battlefield survivability. The application of new protective equipment can reduce the probability of being detected and attacked by the enemy, ensure the safety of combat personnel and equipment, and effectively improve battlefield survivability. As the carrier of new technology, new equipment is the key to achieving a leap in new quality combat power.

New system. The new system is an innovation and reform of the military organizational structure to adapt to the needs of new quality combat power under the new war situation and technological background. Compared with the traditional system, the new system has distinct characteristics such as flatness, coordination, and adaptability. The flat structure of the new system breaks the traditional hierarchical organizational structure, reduces the level of information transmission, and improves decision-making efficiency and response speed; the new system strengthens cross-departmental coordination, and maximizes combat power through information sharing and resource integration among different departments; the new system has higher adaptability and can be quickly adjusted according to the war situation and combat needs, so as to better adapt to the complex and changing battlefield environment. As an important generation platform for new quality combat power, the new system plays an important supporting role in improving combat effectiveness and adaptability.

New tactics. New tactics refer to innovative and effective combat methods that adapt to new technologies and new equipment in the context of modern warfare. With the breakthrough of artificial intelligence technology, the “mast” of military intelligence has appeared on the “sea level” of the development of tactics. New tactics include the use of new tactics such as information warfare, psychological warfare, and public opinion warfare to achieve multi-domain deployment and full-dimensional offense and defense of battlefield situations; the use of new combat methods such as distributed operations and stealth operations to achieve the concealment and suddenness of combat actions; and the use of new combat modes such as joint operations and system operations to integrate and optimize combat forces. Compared with traditional tactics, new tactics have achieved innovations in strategy and tactics by using new technologies and new equipment. By optimizing operational processes and resource allocation, and focusing on flexible adjustment of strategy and tactics according to actual conditions, they can adapt to the ever-changing battlefield environment. The application of new tactics will promote the development of war in the direction of informatization and intelligence. Only by constantly adjusting and optimizing organizational structures and using new tactics to improve rapid response and coordinated combat capabilities can we be invincible in future wars.

New talents. Under the conditions of informatization and intelligence, military talents need to have higher information literacy, innovation ability and unity and cooperation ability to adapt to the needs of modern warfare. New talents should have comprehensive military theoretical knowledge and practical skills, and be proficient in modern weapons and equipment, so as to effectively deal with complex battlefield environments; they should have innovative thinking and the ability to solve difficult and blocked problems, be able to flexibly deal with various emergencies in war, and come up with effective combat plans to solve difficulties; they should have good unity and cooperation capabilities, and be able to communicate effectively with other parties, so as to form a good situation in which one party proposes coordination needs and the other parties actively cooperate. Therefore, we must regard the cultivation of new-domain and new-quality combat force talents as a long-term strategic project, strengthen demand guidance, optimize the training model, focus on shortcomings and weaknesses, implement classified incubation, strengthen practical experience, and scientifically regulate and use them.

The “six new” elements of new quality combat capability are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, and together they constitute a growth system for new quality combat capability. With the continuous advancement of science and technology and the accelerated evolution of the war situation, the connotation and extension of the “six new” elements will continue to expand and deepen, and new quality combat capability will become a key force in shaping future wars.

(Author’s unit: Air Force Engineering University)

現代國語：

何睿潔

深刻理解新質戰鬥力的產生背景、技術視野、戰法支撐和生成鏈路，是打造新質戰鬥力增長極，推進新域新質作戰力量建設的必要前提。新質戰鬥力是集綜合感知、即時指控、精確打擊、全維防護、聚焦保障於一體的整體能力，集中體現在「六新」上，即新趨勢、新技術、新裝備、新體制、新戰法、新人才，代表戰爭形態和作戰方式的根本變革。

新趨勢。世界新軍事革命的加速推進，涵蓋了戰爭和軍隊建設的各領域全過程，全面認識、積極適應、主動擁抱新軍事變革，對加速新質戰鬥力有效供給至關重要。新域新質作戰力量是一個時代軍事發展的風向標，是軍隊戰鬥力新的成長點、未來戰場的製高點。從世界近幾場局部戰爭和軍事行動看，以戰略預警、資訊控制、演算法攻防、無人智慧等為代表的新域新質作戰力量，日益成為加速戰爭形態升級、改變戰爭規則的關鍵性因素，戰鬥力結構從傳統的以兵力、火力、機動力為主，向以資訊力、結構力、智能力為主轉變，這些都給發展新質戰鬥力提出了新要求，也指出了新方向。發展新質戰鬥力事不宜遲，不能消極等待，必須積極主動，下好先手棋，打好主動仗，否則就會錯失良機，甚至出現代差。

新技術。科學技術歷來都是軍事發展中最活躍、最具革命性的因素。當前，軍事領域新技術涵蓋了資訊技術、人工智慧、大數據、區塊鏈、雲端計算等多個領域。新技術的作用不但體現在提升單一武器裝備的性能上，更重要的是它能夠整合作戰平台、優化殺傷網，使得戰場資訊獲取、傳輸、處理更加迅速準確，極大地提升了武器裝備的性能和智慧化水平，為戰場感知、指揮決策、協同作戰、體系製勝提供了強有力的支撐。以人工智慧技術為例，它能夠透過機器學習和大數據分析等技術手段，實現對戰場態勢的即時感知、超前預測，有效提高了決策彈性、戰場把控力和作戰制勝率。展望未來，新技術的發展將對武器裝備建設、作戰樣式創新、編制體制調整和戰爭形態演進產生深刻影響，從而加速形成具有新原理、新機理的新質戰鬥力。

新裝備。軍事科技的創新驅動，不但使武器裝備的種類和性能更新換代，也為未來新概念武器的出場創造條件，極大地激活了新質戰鬥力的供給側。新裝備為現代戰爭提供了更多樣、更有效率的作戰手段。與傳統裝備相比，新裝備資訊獲取與處理能力更強，先進的偵察衛星、無人機等能夠實時獲取戰場信息，為指揮員提供準確、及時的情報支持，高性能的計算機系統和大數據分析技術也使資訊處理更有效率、精確；新裝備打擊精準度與效率更高，精確制導武器、智慧彈藥等新裝備，能夠準確識別目標，實現精確打擊，最大限度地減少附帶損傷；新裝備戰場生存能力更強，新型防護裝備的應用，能夠降低被敵方探測和攻擊的機率，保障作戰人員和裝備的安全，有效提升戰場生存能力。新裝備作為新技術的載體，是實現新質戰鬥力躍升的關鍵。

新體制。新體制是在新的戰爭形態和科技背景下，為適應新質戰鬥力的需要而進行的軍事組織結構創新與變革。與傳統體制相比，新體制具有扁平化、協同性、適配性等鮮明特性。新體制的扁平化結構打破了傳統的層級組織結構，減少了資訊傳遞的層級，提高了決策效率和回應速度；新體制加強了跨部門協同，透過不同部門的資訊共享、資源整合，實現了戰鬥力的最大化；新體制具有更高的適配性，能夠根據戰爭形態和作戰需求進行快速調整，從而更好適應複雜多變的戰場環境。新體製作為新質戰鬥力的重要生成平台，對提升戰鬥效能和適應能力有重要支撐作用。

新戰法。新戰法是指在現代戰爭背景下，適應新技術、新裝備而形成的具有創新性和實效性的作戰方法。隨著人工智慧技術的突破，軍事智慧化的「桅桿」已經出現在戰法發展的「海平面」上。新戰法包括運用資訊戰、心理戰、輿論戰等新型戰法手段，實現戰場態勢的多域展開、全維攻防；運用分散式作​​戰、隱身作戰等新型作戰方式，實現作戰行動的隱蔽性和突然性；運用聯合作戰、體係作戰等新型作戰模式，整合及優化作戰力量。與傳統戰法相比，新戰法透過運用新技術和新裝備，實現了戰略和戰術層面的創新；透過優化作戰流程和資源配置，注重根據實際情況靈活調整戰略和戰術，能夠適應不斷變化的戰場環境。新戰法的應用將推動戰爭形態朝向資訊化、智慧化方向發展。只有不斷調整和優化組織結構，運用新戰法提升快速反應和協同作戰能力，才能在未來戰爭中立於不敗之地。

新人才。在資訊化智能化條件下，軍事人才需要具備更高的資訊素養、創新能力和團結協作能力，以適應現代戰爭的需求。新人才應具備全面的軍事理論知識和實戰技能，熟練掌握現代武器裝備，從而有效應對復雜的戰場環境；應具備創新思維和破解難點堵點問題的能力，能夠在戰爭中靈活應對各種突發情況，拿出有效的作戰方案破解困局；應具備良好的團結協作能力，能夠與其他各方有效溝通，從而形成一方提出協調需求、其餘各方積極配合的良好局面。因此，要把培養新域新質作戰力量人才作為長期策略工程，強化需求牽引、優化培養模式，緊盯短板弱項、實施分類孵化，加強實踐歷練、科學調控使用。

新質戰鬥力之「六新」相互關聯、相互促進，共同構成了新質戰鬥力的成長體系。隨著科技的不斷進步和戰爭形態的加速演變，「六新」的內涵和外延將不斷拓展和深化，新質戰鬥力將成為塑造未來戰爭的關鍵力量。

（作者單位：空軍工程大學）

中國原創軍事資源：https://www.81.cn/ll_208543/16332788.html

#Information Support Force, Asymmetric Warfare, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, 中國軍隊對耗散戰的戰術運用

Chinese Military “Studying the Military, Studying War, and Studying Fighting” Special Topic: Taking Control of the Initiative to Win Future Wars

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中國軍隊「學軍事、學戰爭、學打仗」專題：掌控未來戰爭主動權

現代英語：

With the rapid development of emerging technologies and their widespread application in the military field, the war situation is evolving at an accelerated pace. To win future wars, we must not only have a long-term vision, but also be meticulous, grasp the pulse of the evolution of the war situation, understand the wars that may be fought in the future, and understand the new winning mechanism, so that we can make targeted preparations for military struggle and effectively control the initiative to win future wars.

Deeply understand the connotation and characteristics of future wars

Future wars will be informationized wars with intelligent features and advanced joint operations. Their characteristics are specifically reflected in the following four “highs”:

The application of high technology changes the winning mechanism. The long-range precision, intelligent, stealth and unmanned development of weapons and equipment has promoted the evolution of war to a higher level of confrontation. It is prominently reflected in three aspects: First, there is no victory without calculation. Powerful data, algorithms and computing power provide feasible conditions for realizing superb calculation, detailed calculation and multiple calculation. From the overall decision-making of strategic battles to the tactical calculation of force use, it is necessary to occupy the advantage of “calculation” and accumulate the odds of winning at each step to increase the probability of defeating the opponent. Second, there is no victory without connection. Future combat units will present the typical characteristics of being small, scattered and active. They will be reduced from large to small and deployed in a dispersed manner. Multi-domain forces, multiple modules and multiple combinations will be connected into an autonomous and integrated combat system to achieve the emergence of structural functions and exponential growth of combat effectiveness. Third, speed is the key to success. The extension and expansion of high-tech to the terminal elements of the military system has not only brought about faster information transmission and action speeds, but also faster decision-making and system operation. Once you lag behind the enemy by one step, you are likely to fall into the danger of having your “OODA” loop locked.

High-border competition raises security threats. In future wars, national borders are no longer simply defined by geographical borders. There are also “national borders” in public domains and shared domains such as the Internet, space, deep sea, polar regions, and disruptive technologies. To gain dominance in the high borders, the following four directions must be paid attention to: First, high-covert sabotage. Cyber ​​attacks “come and go without a trace”, high-covert weapon platforms “come and go freely”, and cognitive domain covert settings “imperceptibly”, creating a serious situation that the opponent cannot see, distinguish, or defend against. Second, high-energy destruction. High-energy weapons have long continuous combat time, fast firepower transfer speed, and short firepower interruption interval, which subverts the traditional concept of firepower strike. They can be carried on land-based, sea-based, air-based, and space-based multi-dimensional platforms, and the opponent’s defense faces great difficulties. The third is high-intelligence attack. The intelligent unmanned swarm combat force has “emerged as a different force” with strong penetration capability, strong survivability, and strong battlefield recovery ability. It has become an important force in future wars. The fourth is high-speed strike. The speed of strike weapons such as aerospace aircraft has exceeded Mach 20. The global rapid strike system of some countries can carry out rapid and precise strikes on any target in the world within an hour, greatly compressing the opponent’s reaction time. The traditional defense system is facing a dangerous situation of failure.

High-level opponents place more emphasis on planning. A well-thought-out plan leads to a successful outcome. At present, countries around the world are stepping up their efforts to innovate military theories, seeking strategic advantages and initiative in future wars, which is prominently reflected in four aspects: First, foresight. See who can study the next war more clearly and thoroughly, predict the future combat environment, develop new combat styles, and design the construction and use of military forces in advance. Second, execution. See who can transform, absorb, refine and sublimate more guiding combat ideas, and implement them to the end to better guide military practice. Third, technology. See who has stronger technical perception, understanding, and application, and can continuously improve equipment performance, innovate tactics and methods, and promote the innovation and development of combat theory. Fourth, compare autonomy. See who has more “unique hidden weapons” and “killer knives”, can form a unique theoretical advantage, and give opponents an asymmetric check and balance.

High-intensity games drive global confrontation. Future wars will be highly intense and generally have three characteristics: First, globality. Wars will involve land, sea, air, space, network, electromagnetic, and psychological cognition. The combat system will be vertically connected and horizontally integrated, and global mobile integrated operations will become the basic pattern. Second, it is holistic. Focusing on strategic goals, military actions are closely coordinated and linked with political, economic, and diplomatic struggles, focusing on building an integrated national strategic system and capabilities. Third, it is persistent. Especially in the game between major powers, no party is able to destroy or change the other party’s will in a short period of time. The ultimate manifestation of the war between major powers is the comparison of comprehensive national strength.

Scientifically calibrating the basic capabilities for winning future wars

Analyzing the inherent requirements of joint operations in the context of intelligence, four basic capabilities should be possessed to win future wars.

Strategic planning capabilities based on the overall situation of the times. A good warrior seeks the situation. To design future wars, we must have a deep understanding of the general trend and plan in the process of recognizing, responding to and seeking changes. First, we must be good at understanding the overall situation. We must be able to accurately judge the enemy and our friends based on the current situation, and plan the modernization of the military around the ultimate goal, strategic goal, and stage goal. We must also be able to see the essence through the phenomenon and the depth through the appearance, and engage in all-round game with powerful enemies around the red line, bottom line, and sideline, and always maintain strategic clarity and determination. Second, we must be good at forward-looking analysis and judgment. We must be able to predict and foresee national security risks, war threats, and strategic opponents to prevent the risks of strategic misguidance and process interruption, and we must also be able to keenly detect the direction of technological breakthroughs and mechanism mutations, and accelerate the generation of new quality combat capabilities before our opponents. Thirdly, we must be good at using technology. We must improve the sensitivity of science and technology, be able to seize it when “the top of the mast is just exposed”, plan the development of key technologies, core technologies, and cutting-edge technologies, focus on the transformation and application of scientific and technological achievements, and truly transform science and technology into combat power.

Combat planning capabilities based on intelligent technology. In future wars, rapid planning and decision-making will become the key to improving combat effectiveness. We must further promote the application of intelligent technology in combat planning and strive to improve the “three transformations”. The first is the digitization of analysis and judgment. Through data mining, intelligent identification, and auxiliary decision-making, we can sift through the massive amount of information, remove the dross and retain the essence, reduce the interference of subjective misjudgment, objectively and comprehensively present the situation, and improve the accuracy of planning and decision-making based on data analysis and judgment. The second is the intelligence of planning operations. Advanced technologies such as machine learning, deep learning, and brain-like intelligence are deeply embedded in the entire process of case research, case preparation, case performance, and case revision. Force organization, action paths, and combat processes are intelligently designed based on combat objectives, and multiple sets of solutions are provided. Decision-making suggestions are provided to commanders through computer simulation and deduction, greatly improving the scientific and timely nature of combat planning. The third is the regularization of human-computer interaction. Adhere to the “man in the loop”, highlight the dominant position of commanders in the “OODA” loop, scientifically formulate human-computer interaction rules, constrain the autonomous scope of intelligent systems, and achieve a deep integration of command art and machine intelligence.

Based on the command and control capability of rapid optimization. In future wars, neither side will have an absolute advantage in the whole world. The key is to see who can seize the opportunity to instantly optimize and accurately release energy, and change the relationship between strength and weakness in a specific time and space. To this end, we must be sensitive to opportunities, grasp the battlefield situation in real time, accurately understand the battlefield situation, systematically analyze the opponent’s combat focus, core hubs, and key nodes, dynamically evaluate the difference in force advantages, study and judge the evolution of the situation, organically integrate the art of command and intelligent technology, and effectively grasp the window of advantage. We must make real-time action decisions, adapt to rapid battlefield changes, seize the window of advantage, quickly determine the target of attack based on the enemy’s and our own situation and the actual situation on the battlefield, aggregate multi-domain superior forces, flexibly implement combat organization, scientifically plan combat action task system, and make real-time decisions for precise energy release actions. We must conduct cross-domain collaborative control, adjust the interactive collaboration mode and combat control relationship of combat units in each domain in real time, flexibly adjust and optimize force organization, quickly distribute and update coordination rules, and realize multi-directional and multi-dimensional cross-domain, cross-medium, and cross-environment precise energy release. It is necessary to connect the system at all times and build a full-domain, multi-level information assurance system that can sense network damage in real time, restore network connectivity immediately, provide safe, smooth, and uninterrupted protection, and effectively support the efficient operation of the joint combat system.

System combat capability based on full-domain integration. Future wars will be full-domain, full-system, full-element, and full-process system confrontations, which require full-domain integrated system combat capabilities. The first is multi-source energy-gathering reconnaissance. Adhere to full-domain reconnaissance, joint early warning, and coordinated verification, and build a large-region joint reconnaissance intelligence system with multi-dimensional integration, full-domain coverage, highlighting key points, and deep integration of intelligence information. The second is wide-area joint deterrence. Have the ability to continuously deter opponents in space, cyberspace, deep sea, polar regions and other fields. The third is cross-domain joint action. Improve the level of field deployment, strengthen the ability to communicate in motion, promote modular and standardized construction, realize the dynamic deployment of combat forces, and improve command coordination and cross-domain delivery capabilities. The fourth is autonomous precision killing. Establish a flexible, dynamically matched, autonomously coordinated, and multi-layered firepower network, seize the opponent’s pain points and weaknesses, and focus on customizing and creating a multi-domain killing chain. Fifth, integrated support. Efficiently respond to the support needs of various domains, intelligently plan support resources, improve the strategic storage layout of combat materials, expand the pre-positioned storage network for campaigns, and enhance the long-term self-support capabilities of tactical-level combat units. Sixth, rapid mobilization support. Adapt to the suddenness and fast pace of war, improve the demand response mechanism, quickly aggregate resources and strength from all parties, and quickly transform war potential into actual combat power.

Actively prepare to win future wars

Focus on building a combat theory system that will lead future wars. Focusing on the modernization of military theory and guided by the military strategic policy of the new era, accelerate the construction of a combat theory system that can lead future war preparations. Focus on powerful enemies, stick to core missions, aim at future wars, and develop combat concepts and supporting concepts in all fields and directions. With combat concepts as the core, systematically develop combat theories to turn abstract combat concepts into concrete combat guidance that can be understood and accepted by the troops, thereby leading to practical innovations in joint combat command, combat capability requirements, joint combat training, joint combat support, and joint campaign tactics.

We should focus on building a new force system that can face war directly. New combat forces are an important growth point for combat effectiveness. We should strengthen system planning, take the initiative and fight proactively. We should keep a close eye on the frontier direction and the direction of assault, develop new weapons, and form combat capabilities in an organized manner. In addition, we should strengthen the construction of capabilities in emerging fields and strive to seize the initiative in military competition.

We must focus on building an intelligent network information system to support future wars. We must adhere to forward-looking layout, iterative advancement, and integrated development, and continuously improve the level of “network information + intelligence”. We must optimize system functions, build a “combat cloud” with real-time online response, and integrate multifunctional modules such as battlefield situation perception, command decision-making, action control, and combat support. We must promote resource sharing, establish an information grid that integrates the military and civilians, the sky and the earth, and multiple domains, strengthen the development and application of mobile communication systems, and improve the ability of mobile communication, broadband communication, and reliable communication. We must highlight independent innovation, strengthen the research and development of core technologies and products, and accelerate the transformation and application of technologies such as big data, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and quantum information in the military field.

We will focus on improving the joint training system for rehearsing future wars. In accordance with the strategic requirements of building a new military training system, we will strengthen system training, confrontation training, and forward-looking training. In terms of training guidance, we will focus on the basic capabilities required to win future wars, and emphasize strategic planning, combat planning, command and control, and combat coordination training, and establish a “weather vane” for leading training with war in mind and training for war. In terms of training content, we will accurately grasp the winning mechanism of future wars, emphasize calculation in combat planning, coordination in command and control, speed in joint tactics, and intelligence in command confrontation, and establish a training content system with multi-layer connection, multi-domain coverage, and complete supporting facilities. In terms of training mode, we will follow the requirements of all-domain joint warfare in future wars, adhere to the precision control of the whole process of domain-based training, cross-domain coordination of multi-domain segmented training, and unified command of all-domain integrated training. In terms of training support, we will use intelligent simulation technology to vigorously strengthen simulation training and virtual confrontation training based on combat scenarios and powerful enemies, and conduct rehearsal practices in the context of war as realistically as possible.

(Author’s unit: Central Theater Command)

現代國語：

隨著新興技術的快速發展及其在軍事領域的廣泛應用，戰爭形態呈現加速演變趨勢。制勝未來戰爭，既要登高望遠，又須細致入微，把準戰爭形態演變的脈搏，把未來可能要打的仗弄明白，把新制勝機理搞清楚，方能有針對性地做好軍事鬥爭準備，有效掌控打贏未來戰爭主動權。

深刻掌握未來戰爭內涵特徵

未來戰爭，是具有智慧化特徵的資訊化戰爭，是高級階段的聯合作戰，其特徵具體體現在以下四「高」：

高技術應用改變制勝機理。武器裝備的遠程精準化、智慧化、隱身化、無人化發展，推動戰爭朝向更高層次的對抗演進。突出體現在三個面向：一是無算不勝。強大的數據、演算法、算力，為實現高超的廟算、細算、多算提供了可行條件，大到戰略戰役全局決策、小到力量運用戰術計算，必須佔據「算」的優勢，積累每一步的勝算，才能增大戰勝對手的機率。二是無聯不勝。未來作戰單元呈現小、散、活的典型特點，化大為小、分散部署，多域力量、多個模塊、多種組合，聯結成自主融合的作戰體系，實現結構性功能湧現、作戰效能指數級增長。三是無快不勝。高新技術向軍事體系末端要素延伸拓展，帶來的不僅是資訊傳輸速度和行動速度變快，還有決策速度更快、體系運轉更快，一旦慢敵一步就很可能陷入「OODA」環被鎖死的險境。

高邊疆爭奪推高安全威脅。未來戰爭，國家邊疆已不再簡單用地理邊疆來定義，網絡、太空、深海、極地、顛覆性科技等公域、共域也存在著「國家邊疆」。要佔據高邊疆主導權，以下四個方向必須引起關注：一是高隱破壞。網絡攻擊“來無影去無踪”，高隱身武器平台“來去自如”，認知域隱蔽設局“潛移默化”，給對手造成看不見、辨不明、防不住的嚴峻局面。二是高能摧毀。高能量武器持續作戰時間長、火力轉移速度快、火力中斷間隔短，顛覆傳統火力打擊概念，可以搭載至陸基、海基、空基、天基多維平台，對手防禦面臨極大困難。三是高智破襲。智慧無人集群作戰力量“異軍突起”，突防能力強、生存能力強、戰場恢復能力強，已成為未來戰爭的重要力量。四是高速打擊。空天飛機等打擊武器速度已超20馬赫，部分國家的全球快速打擊系統可在一小時內對全球任何目標實施快速精確打擊，極大壓縮了對手反應時間，傳統防禦系統面臨失效的危險局面。

高水準對手更重計高一籌。計熟事定，舉必有功。當前，世界各國紛紛加強軍事理論創新力度，謀求未來戰爭的戰略優勢與主動，突顯為四比拼：一是比前瞻。看誰把下一場戰爭研究得更清楚、更透徹，能夠預測未來作戰環境，開發新的作戰樣式，超前設計軍事力量建設與運用。二是比執行。看誰能夠轉化吸收、提煉升華更具指導性的作戰思想，並且貫通到底，更好地指導軍事實踐。三是比技術。看誰技術感知力、理解力、運用力更強，能夠不斷提升裝備性能，創新戰術戰法，促進作戰理論革新發展。四是比自主。看誰掌握更多的“獨門暗器”和“撒手鐧”，能夠形成獨特的理論優勢，給對手非對稱制衡。

高強度博弈帶動全局對抗。未來戰爭對抗賽局將是高強度的，一般有三個特性：一是全域性。戰爭將涉及陸地、海洋、空中以及太空、網絡、電磁和心理認知等領域，作戰系統縱向貫通、橫向融合，全局機動一體化作戰成為基本樣式。二是整體性。圍繞著戰略目的，軍事行動與政治、經濟、外交等爭爭緊密配合、協調聯動，著重於建構一體化國家戰略體系與能力。三是持久性。尤其是大國間博弈，任何一方都無力在短暫摧毀或改變對方意志，大國戰爭最終體現的是綜合國力的較量。

科學標定打贏未來戰爭基本能力

從智慧化背景下聯合作戰的內在要求分析，打贏未來戰爭應具備四個面向基本能力。

基於時代大局的戰略謀劃能力。善戰者，求之於勢。設計未來戰爭要深刻掌握大勢，在識變應變求變中運籌謀劃。首先，要善於洞悉全局。既要能基於時勢準確判斷敵我友，圍繞終極目標、戰略目標、階段目標佈局謀劃軍事現代化發展，也要能夠透過現像看本質、透過表像看深層，圍繞紅線、底線、邊線與強敵對手展開全方位博弈，始終保持戰略清醒與定力。其次，要善於前瞻研判。既要能夠對國家安全風險、戰爭威脅、戰略對手預知預判，防止出現戰略誤導、進程打斷的風險，也要能夠敏銳察覺科技突襲方向、機理突變方向，趕在對手之前加快生成新質作戰能力。再次，要善於運用科技。提昇科技的敏銳度，能夠在「桅桿頂剛剛露出的時候」就抓住它，佈局發展關鍵技術、核心技術、前沿技術，注重科技成果轉化運用，真正把科學技術轉化為戰鬥力。

基於智慧技術的作戰籌劃能力。未來戰爭，快速籌劃決策成為提升作戰效能的關鍵點，要深入推進智慧技術在作戰規劃中的應用，努力提升「三化」水準。一是分析判斷數據化。透過資料探勘、智慧識別、輔助決策等手段，對海量資訊進行去粗取精、去偽存真，減少主觀誤判幹擾，客觀全面呈現態勢，做到基於數據分析研判，提高籌劃決策精準度。二是籌劃作業智能化。將機器學習、深度學習、類腦智能等先進技術，深度嵌入研案、制案、演案、修案全過程，依據作戰目標智能設計力量編組、行動路徑、作戰過程，提供多套方案，通過電腦模擬推演為指揮者提供決策建議，大幅提升作戰規劃的科學性時效性。三是人機互動規則化。堅持“人在迴路”，突出指揮員在“OODA”環上的主導地位，科學制定人機交互規則，約束智能係統自主範圍，實現指揮藝術與機器智能的深度融合。

基於快速聚優的指揮控制能力。未來戰爭，對抗雙方都沒有全局全時的絕對優勢，關鍵看誰能夠搶先一步即時聚優、精準釋能，改變特定時空的強弱優劣關系。為此，要敏銳捕捉戰機，即時掌握戰場情況，準確理解戰場態勢，系統分析對手作戰重心、核心樞紐、關鍵節點，動態評估力量優勢差，研判態勢演進圖，有機融合指揮藝術與智能科技，有效把握優勢窗口。要即時行動決策，適應戰場快速變化，緊緊抓住優勢窗口，根據敵我態勢和戰場實際，快速確定打擊目標，聚合多域優勢力量，靈活實施作戰編組，科學規劃作戰行動任務體系，實現精準釋能行動的即時決策。要跨域協同控制，即時調整各域作戰單元互動協作方式、作戰控制關系，靈活調整優化力量編組，快速分發更新協同規則，實現多方向多維度跨域、跨介質、跨環境的精準釋能。要隨時聯通體系，構建覆蓋全領域、多層級的資訊保障體系，能夠實時感知網絡受損情況，即時恢復網絡通聯，提供安全、暢通、不間斷的保障，有效支撐聯合作戰體系高效運轉。

基於全域融合的體係作戰能力。未來戰爭是全領域、全系統、全要素、全流程的體系對抗，需要具備全域融合的體係作戰能力。一是多源聚能偵察。堅持全域偵搜、聯合預警、協同印證，建構多維一體、全域覆蓋、突出重點、情報資訊深度融合的大區域聯合偵察情報體系。二是廣域聯合威懾。具備在太空、網路空間、深海、極地等領域持續嚇阻對手的實力。三是跨域聯合行動。提升野戰化部署水平，強化動中通聯能力，推進模塊化標準化建設，實現作戰力量動態部署，提升指揮協同和跨域投送能力。四是自主精準殺傷。建立彈性靈活、動態匹配、自主協同、多層銜接的火力網，抓住對手痛點弱處，重點訂定打造多域殺傷鏈。五是綜合一體保障。有效率回應各域保障需求，智慧規劃保障資源，完善作戰物資戰略儲備佈局，擴大戰役預置儲備網點，增強戰術級作戰單元長時自我保障能力。六是快速動員支援。適應戰爭突然性強、節奏快的要求，完善需求響應機制，快速聚合各方資源與力量，迅速將戰爭潛力轉變為現實戰鬥力。

積極做好打贏未來戰爭各項準備

著力建構引領未來戰爭的作戰理論體系。圍繞著實現軍事理論現代化，以新時代軍事戰略方針為統領，加速建立能夠引領未來戰爭準備的作戰理論體系。聚焦強敵對手、緊貼核心使命、瞄準未來戰爭，發展各領域各方向作戰概念和支撐概念。以作戰概念為內核，體系發展作戰理論，使抽象的作戰概念變為具體化的作戰指導，能夠被部隊理解和接受，進而牽引聯合作戰指揮、作戰能力需求、聯合作戰訓練、聯合作戰保障、聯合戰役戰法等方面的實踐創新。

著力建強直面戰爭的新質力量體系。新質作戰力量是戰鬥力重要成長點，要加強系統謀劃，下好先手棋、打好主動仗。既要緊盯前緣方向，更要緊盯突襲方向，發展新型武器，成建制形成作戰能力。此外，還要加強新興領域能力建設，努力奪取軍事競爭主動權。

著力建設支撐未來戰爭的智慧化網絡資訊體系。堅持前瞻佈局、迭代推進、融合發展，不斷提升「網絡資訊+智慧化」水準。要優化體系功能，構建實時在線響應的“作戰雲”，融合集成戰場態勢感知、指揮決策、行動控制、作戰保障等多功能模塊。要推進資源共享，建立軍民一體、天地一體、多域一體的資訊柵格網，加強行動通訊系統開發運用，提高動中通聯、寬帶通聯、可靠通聯能力。要突顯自主創新，加強核心技術與產品研發，加速大數據、雲端計算、人工智慧、量子資訊等技術在軍事領域的轉化運用。

著力完善預演未來戰爭的聯合訓練體系。依照建構新型軍事訓練體系的戰略要求，加強體系練兵、對抗練兵、前瞻練兵。在訓練指導上，圍繞打贏未來戰爭所需基礎能力，突顯抓好戰略謀劃、作戰籌劃、指揮控制、作戰協同訓練，確立以戰領訓、向戰抓訓的「風向標」。在訓練內容上，準確掌握未來戰爭制勝機理，作戰籌劃突出算、指揮控制突出聯、聯合戰術突出快、指揮對抗突出智，建立多層銜接、多域覆蓋、配套完善的訓練內容體系。在訓練模式上，遵循未來戰爭全局聯合要求，堅持分域全程練精準控制、多域分段練跨域協同、全局融合練一體指揮。在訓練保障上，運用智慧模擬技術，大力加強基於作戰場景、強敵對手的模擬模擬訓練和虛擬對抗訓練，盡可能逼真地進行戰爭背景下的預演實踐。

（作者單位：中部戰區）

中國原創軍事資源：http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/489870888.html

#Information Support Force, #Russia #Ukraine, Asymmetric Warfare, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare, Combat Planning, Intelligent Warfare, Mosaic Warfare, National Defense and Military Modernization, Russia Network Forces, Russian Cyber Warfare

Chinese Military in-depth Analysis of the Latest “Cognitive Warfare” Case in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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中國軍方深入解析俄烏衝突最新「認知戰」案例

2023-10-07 09:00　來源: 述策

現代英語：

It is said that on September 22, the Ukrainian Air Force used the “Storm Shadow” cruise missile to attack the Black Sea Fleet Command in Sevastopol. Since then, the life and death of Admiral Victor Sokolov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, has been a topic of concern to the outside world. After a few days of undercurrents, on September 25, the Ukrainian Special Operations Command (SOF) announced that they had successfully “killed” Admiral Sokolov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and dozens of officers below him. Even Admiral Romanchuk, commander of the Russian Zaporizhia Cluster, was injured by the Ukrainian army.

Unexpectedly, Ukraine’s news was “slapped in the face” less than a day after it was released-on September 26, the Russian Ministry of Defense held a meeting of the National Defense Committee. Senior leaders of the Ministry of Defense, commanders of various military regions, and commanders of various military services attended the meeting in person or via video. At the meeting, Admiral Sokolov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, who was declared “killed” by Ukrainian officers, appeared. After the news was released, the Ukrainian side was extremely embarrassed and had to announce that they wanted to collect more information. But then someone claimed that Admiral Sokolov, who attended the meeting, was “just a photo” and not a real person.

Nevertheless, the battle between the Russian and Ukrainian armies over the life and death of General Sokolov can be seen as a classic case of cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict. It is worthwhile for us to analyze this case specifically, and it is even more worthwhile for us to “talk about” this case and talk about the battle between the Russian and Ukrainian armies in the field of cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict.

  1. Is the “beheading” of General Sokolov not an isolated case?

It is not the first time that the Ukrainian propaganda department has fallen into the trap of “beheading” Russian generals. For example, in mid-June this year, the Ukrainian army spread rumors that the Vice President of Chechnya, Lieutenant General of the Chechen National Guard, and Kadyrov Jr.’s right-hand man, Drimkhanov, was “killed” by the Ukrainian army’s HIMARS rocket launcher.

From the perspective of the implementation process of the entire cognitive warfare, whether it was the “beheading” of Drimkhanov in June or the “beheading” of General Sokolov this time, the whole process was similar:

The first step: The Ukrainian propaganda department deliberately “created topics”. The so-called “creating topics” can be regarded as a “primer” in cognitive warfare, which serves to trigger heated public discussion. This kind of “primer” is often not necessarily released by the official, but may be released by some semi-official channels or channels with close ties to the official. For example, the fact that Lieutenant General Drimkhanov was “killed” by the Ukrainian army’s “HIMARS” rocket launcher was first said to have been released from a telegram group of the Ukrainian armed forces, and the statement was ambiguous. The earliest source of the news that Admiral Sokolov was “beheaded” this time was traced back to a telegram group in Russia. The news in this telegram group is mixed, some of which are of low credibility, but some are surprisingly accurate. In a sense, releasing the “primer” of cognitive warfare through these groups is even more likely to arouse public attention and discussion than official news.

The second step can be regarded as “reinforcement” of public opinion. The first step of cognitive warfare, namely “primer information”, often lacks details for a complete news, but it doesn’t matter. Judging from the efficiency and characteristics of information dissemination in the current society, a “lead information” that lacks details but is easy to arouse everyone’s interest, but has information barriers due to some factors, will naturally be “supplemented with details” during the dissemination process. This is true whether Admiral Sokolov was “shot dead” or Drimkhanov was “beheaded”. Information lacks details, but it is very important “Breaking News” for the media. At the same time, due to military secrets, it is impossible to cross the information barrier to obtain more information in time. Therefore, this will inevitably lead the media to a result – public opinion “reinforcement”, and everyone will do it together, and in the process of word of mouth, a lead information will be constantly detailed and “real”. For example, in the process of dissemination, Drimkhanov was “beheaded”, and the “time” and “place” of his beheading were supplemented one after another (even due to different dissemination channels, these time and place elements are also different), sometimes appearing in Kremenaya and sometimes in Gorlovka. The same is true for Admiral Sokolov’s “killing”. During the process of information dissemination, people have come up with a whole set of details such as “The Black Sea Fleet held a regular meeting on Friday, and the Ukrainian army seized the opportunity to launch a strike”, “Two missiles hit the headquarters office, and the other missile launched a supplementary strike when the rescuers went in to rescue people”. It is precisely in this “decentralized” word of mouth that the “fact” that these two senior generals were “beheaded” has been continuously strengthened, and the lack of information sources is even more conducive to the cognitive shaping of ordinary information recipients.

After several days of fermentation, the cognitive war has come to the third step – “the final word”. The Ukrainian official did not “finally decide” the “beheading” of Drimkhanov. Kadyrov Jr. couldn’t sit still first, and soon released a video of himself and Drimkhanov sitting together for a meal and picnic, and even took out his mobile phone on the spot to show the shooting time, “slapping his face”. Admiral Sokolov was “finally decided” by large departments such as the Ukrainian Special Operations Command and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. According to the process of cognitive warfare, this kind of official media “final word” should play the role of completing the cognitive shaping process in the field of cognitive warfare, that is, completing a complete logical closed loop from releasing “primers” to “speculation reinforcement” by the outside world, and finally “stamping and confirming” by the official. However, the Russian army took the initiative and performed a “slap in the face on the spot”, which not only made all the information dissemination of the Ukrainian army in front of it useless, but also made Ukraine’s two key units, the Special Operations Command and even the Ministry of Defense, become clowns.

  1. Cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, is the Ukrainian army coming in full force?

Many people may be puzzled by the Ukrainian army’s cognitive warfare propaganda department’s personal participation in the rumor that Chechen Vice President Delimkhanov or General Sokolov was “killed” by the Ukrainian army: If the Russian side responds quickly, pulls these senior generals out to show their faces, and self-confirms that “I am still alive”, then won’t the rumors of the Ukrainian cognitive warfare be self-defeating?

It seems reasonable, but the Russian army did not clarify it once it was rumored. Why? Because things are not that simple.

First, from a tactical perspective, if the Russian army arranges for generals to come out and refute rumors every time the Ukrainian army creates a rumor about a senior general, the most direct consequence is that it will cause unnecessary interference and trouble to the daily combat command of senior generals. In combat operations, the time of senior officers above the rank of general is very precious, the daily workload is extremely high, and the brainpower is extremely consumed. It is impossible for them to have so much time to appear and refute rumors endlessly. If the Russian army refutes a rumor every time the Ukrainian army creates a rumor, then these senior generals will have nothing to do in their daily lives and just shoot videos to refute rumors every day.

Second, for information that enters the cognitive shaping cycle, in some cases, “refutation” is not only useless, but will further create more rumors. For example, regarding the “beheading” of General Sokolov, although the Russian army has arranged to refute the rumor, some Ukrainian groups are still “picking on it”, believing that General Sokolov did not move in front of the camera and that the time and place of General Sokolov’s interview could not be seen, so it was just “information countermeasures” arranged by the Russian side. Even for some Russian generals who were “officially announced” and “beheaded” by Ukraine last year but then appeared on certain occasions, such as Major General Gerasimov, Chief of Staff of the 41st Army, there are still Ukrainian supporters who claim that “this person is dead”. The only reason is that this person did not show up again after showing up!

Therefore, in the field of cognitive warfare, many things are not as simple as we think.

Having said that, at the strategic level, there is indeed a big gap between the Russian army and the Ukrainian army in the field of cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict. The Ukrainian army is very good at creating topics, and it is flexible and mobile and pays attention to participation.

In terms of creating topics, Ukraine takes the initiative to create topics almost every time in cognitive warfare, from the Mariupol Theater incident at the beginning, to the Bucha incident later, to the chemical explosion in Rubezhnoy, and the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant incident and the explosion of the New Kakhovka Hydropower Station Dam. Almost every time, Ukraine “takes the lead”. Russia is in a state of passive response, and as a result, Ukraine continues to create topics and continuously attacks, which puts it in a disadvantageous position.

In terms of mobility and flexibility, the Ukrainian army is very familiar with the characteristics of modern media communication. For example, in the cognitive warfare against the “beheading” of Admiral Sokolov, the Ukrainian army took advantage of the characteristics of modern media’s fast communication speed and decentralized communication mode, released the “primer” in a semi-official form, and let netizens “reinforce” it (in fact, it is the self-growth of information), and finally the more authoritative official media came out to “finalize the final word”.

In terms of “focusing on participation”, the Ukrainian army is better at creating a sense of participation of ordinary netizens in specific topics. For example, after the Bucha incident and the Battle of Mariupol, Ukraine immediately launched a set of websites called “The Executioner’s Book”. Anyone can log in to these websites or network plug-ins at will and register the so-called “Russian army’s atrocities” or Russian army movements. The United States immediately responded and opened the “Observation Post” project belonging to the US State Department in response to the “Executioner’s Book” project, which is used to record the “atrocities” of the Russian army in the conflict. These public topics are set up quite cleverly, making the outside world feel that they are highly involved, while the specific content is true and false, which is different from the false information indoctrination of traditional information warfare. In the cognitive warfare of the Ukrainian army, these highly involved projects once made the entire network trend one-sided.

Compared with the propaganda and operation of the Ukrainian army in the field of cognitive warfare, the Russian army is far behind in the field of cognitive warfare. For example, in response to Ukraine’s formation of a combat mode that emphasizes mass participation and mass experience in the cognitive field, Russia is still using the old method – announcing ambiguous combat conditions in the form of daily combat reports, with only Major General Konashenko “acting as an emotionless reading machine” in front of the camera. As a result, most combat observers do not take his combat reports seriously. Another example is the tactics of Ukraine frequently setting topics and carrying out cognitive shaping in steps, and Russia can only defend itself. Every time Ukraine creates topics, Russia responds passively, and then Ukraine continues to create new topics based on Russia’s response, leaving Russia in a state of exhaustion. From this perspective, the Russian army’s cognitive warfare against the Ukrainian side’s “beheading” of Admiral Sokolov, and the sudden arrangement of the rumor-busting “face-slapping”, is just a tactical “flash of inspiration”, and the effect does not seem to be very good. It has not completely changed the basic power comparison between the Russian and Ukrainian armies in the field of cognitive warfare. Ukraine’s “cognitive warfare advantage” over Russia will continue.

  1. How do we deal with cognitive warfare in the new combat form?

In terms of definition, “cognitive warfare” can be traced back to the concept of “network-centric warfare” proposed by the US military in military reform at the beginning of this century. After years of development, by 2017, related discussions began to frequently appear in the speeches of senior NATO generals. For example, on August 14, 2017, Stewart, director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, clearly put forward the assertion that “the fifth-generation war is cognitive warfare” at the 2017 Defense Intelligence Information System Annual Conference. On September 17, 2017, Goldfein, then Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, also clearly put forward the concept of “cognitive warfare” at the annual meeting of the US Air Force Association. Soon, NATO comprehensively developed this novel operational concept. In March 2020, NATO released the concept book “Operation 2040”, which clearly stated that “information and cognitive warfare” will play an important role in future operations. In June, NATO appointed François du Creuse, former French colonel and head of the NATO Innovation Center, to study cognitive warfare, and produced a detailed report on “Cognitive Warfare” in January 2021. In June 2021, NATO held a scientific conference on cognitive warfare and released a special report on “Cognitive Warfare: Cognition Dominates the Future”, thus forming a more systematic and complete cognitive warfare theory.

Compared with traditional information warfare and propaganda warfare, the biggest feature of cognitive warfare is that it is based on the working principle of the human brain, that is, the process of acquiring, perceiving, understanding, processing, inferring, evaluating, judging, calculating, and making decisions on external information. In short, cognitive warfare is superior in terms of operational characteristics. It is not a unilateral indoctrination, but a good use of people’s cognitive process to “reshape” everyone’s worldview, values, ideology, and even cognitive and understanding processes in an all-round way, so as to fully rebuild the individual’s interpretation and response to information and interfere with the individual’s ideology and value orientation. The final result is not only to use various false information to disrupt the opponent, but more importantly to reshape the opponent’s social psychology, thereby affecting the opponent’s strategic decision-making, “defeating the enemy without fighting.” This determines that cognitive warfare is a new generation of propaganda warfare and information warfare. Compared with the traditional information warfare that focuses on the tactical level, the role of cognitive warfare can be further improved to the strategic level, which may affect the direction or outcome of the war.

So, facing a new type of combat form such as cognitive warfare, referring to the current situation in which Russia has been at a disadvantage in the field of cognitive warfare with Ukraine in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict, how should we respond to future cognitive warfare?

From a strategic perspective, we should realize that in the field of cognitive warfare, pure passive response is the most unreliable and inefficient form of combat. For example, Russia’s passive response to Ukraine’s agenda setting is equivalent to passively being beaten. Of course, compared with firepower warfare or mobile warfare, cognitive warfare is a thorough “open conspiracy” without too much feint and deception. It mainly relies on the ideological superiority and media skills of the West, and relies on the legal rights of the Western media in the field of the “fourth power”. Since we are temporarily at a disadvantage in the field of media compared with Western countries, it is actually a relatively difficult thing to implement cognitive confrontation with them in the whole system and at all levels. Therefore, even if we also adopt the strategy of strategic offensive in cognitive warfare, its implementation effect may not be as good as that of the other party. One way may be to firmly grasp our basic plate strategically and form a “you fight yours, I fight mine” pattern.

In the field of tactics, we should fully learn from the experience and lessons of both sides in cognitive warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Judging from the cognitive warfare strategy implemented by the Ukrainian army, in areas such as topic shaping, it mainly exploits the loopholes of information asymmetry. Then, our possible response strategy is to disclose some information in a timely manner and change the original concept that “military operations must be kept confidential and not disclosed to the outside world.” In fact, public information itself is a process of cognitive shaping. Both sides can carry out a lot of cognitive warfare confrontation around the timing, content, and timing of information disclosure. For example, in the field of setting topics, we can “take the initiative” and first seek the ability to set topics and carry out cognitive shaping in countries such as the Belt and Road, BRICS or Shanghai Cooperation Organization countries, at least to ensure that the people of our country and some friendly countries can offset the influence of the Western cognitive warfare. For another example, in response to the “cognitive warfare” implemented by the other party against different groups in multiple dimensions and levels, or the rumors created step by step, we can make extensive use of the influence of KOL (Key Opinion Leader) and the platform to form a “cognition against cognition” combat pattern.

In short, cognitive warfare, as a new combat style that has been studied by NATO for many years, appeared in large numbers in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict and played a certain role, deserves further research to ensure that it is invincible in future military operations.

This articleThe article on cognitive warfare is just an appetizer, and there will be a main course later. This studio took about a year to complete the “Research on Cognitive Warfare in the United States and Other Western Countries”, which has a text of more than 40,000 words (excluding more than 7,000 words of notes), which is much richer and more in-depth. The report will be officially launched and introduced the day after tomorrow, so stay tuned.

現代國語：

據稱，9月22日烏克蘭空軍使用「風暴陰影」巡航飛彈襲擊塞瓦斯托波爾黑海艦隊司令部。此後，關於黑海艦隊司令維克托.索科洛夫上將的生死一直是外界關注的議題。經過幾天暗流湧動後，9月25日，烏克蘭特戰司令部（SOF）對外宣布，他們成功「擊斃」黑海艦隊司令索科洛夫上將及以下數十名軍官，甚至俄軍札波羅熱集群司令羅曼丘克上將也被烏軍擊傷。

沒想到，烏克蘭的消息剛放出來不到一天就慘遭「打臉」——9月26日，俄羅斯國防部召開國防委員會會議，國防部高級領導人、各軍區司令、各軍兵種司令等以現場出席或視訊連線的方式參會，會上赫然出現了被烏軍官宣「擊斃」的黑海艦隊司令索科洛夫上將。消息放出後，烏方極為尷尬，只好宣布他們要收集更多資訊。但隨後又有人宣稱說參會的索科洛夫上將“只是照片”，不是真人。

儘管如此，從這次俄烏兩軍圍繞索科洛夫上將的生死問題展開的鬥法，可以被看做是俄烏軍事衝突中關於認知戰的一個經典案例，既值得我們就這一案例進行專門剖析，更值得我們從這個案例中“說開去”，談一談俄烏軍事衝突中俄烏兩軍在認知戰領域展開的較量。

一、索科洛夫上將“被斬首”，並非孤例？

關於「斬首」俄軍將領，烏克蘭宣傳部門栽進坑裡已經不是第一次了。例如今年6月中，烏克蘭軍隊造謠稱車臣副總統、車臣國民近衛軍中將、小卡德羅夫左膀右臂德里姆哈諾夫被烏軍海馬火箭砲「擊斃」。

從整個認知戰的實施過程看，無論是6月那次德里姆哈諾夫被“斬首”，還是這次索科洛夫上將被“斬首”，整個過程大同小異：

第一步：烏克蘭宣傳部門有意「製造議題」。所謂“製造議題”，在認知戰中可以被視為一個“引子”，作用是引發輿論熱議。這種「引子」往往不一定由官方放出，可能是由一些半官方的管道或與官方關係比較緊密的管道放出。例如德里姆哈諾夫中將被烏軍的「海馬」火箭炮「打死」一事，最早據說是從烏克蘭武裝部隊的一個電報群組裡放出來的，而且說法模稜兩可。這次索科洛夫上將被“斬首”，最早的消息來源經過追溯則是俄羅斯的某個電報群組。這種電報群組的消息魚龍混雜，有些消息則可信度很低，但有些消息卻出奇準確。將認知戰的「引子」透過這些群組放出，某種意義上說甚至比官方消息更容易引發輿論關注和討論。

第二步可以被視為輿論的「補強」。認知戰的第一步即「引子資訊」對一個完整的新聞來說往往缺乏細節，但不要緊。從當前社會訊息傳播的效率和特徵來看，一個缺乏細節、但容易引起大家興趣、卻又因某種因素出現信息壁壘的“引子信息”，在傳播過程中，大家自然會對其進行“細節補充」。無論是索科洛夫上將被“擊斃”還是德里姆哈諾夫被“斬首”，都是如此。資訊缺乏細節，但對傳媒來說偏偏又是非常重要的「Breaking News」（突發新聞），同時基於軍事機密的因素，想穿越資訊壁壘及時獲取更多的資訊也不可能。因此，這必然會使傳媒導向一個結果——輿論“補強”，而且是大家一起上，在口耳相傳的過程中不斷把一個引子信息細節化、“真實”化。例如德里姆哈諾夫被「斬首」在傳播過程中，先後彌補上了他被斬首的「時間」、「地點」（甚至由於傳播管道不同，這些時間和地點要素也各不相同），時而出現在克雷緬納亞，時而出現在戈爾洛夫卡。索科洛夫上將被「擊斃」同樣如此，訊息在傳播過程中，被先後腦補出一整套「黑海艦隊週五開例會，烏軍抓住機會實施打擊」、「兩發飛彈一發擊中了司令部辦公室，另一發飛彈在救援人員進去救人的時候實施了補充打擊」這種細節。正是在這種「去中心化」的口耳相傳，這兩名高級將領被「斬首」的「事實」被不斷強化，消息來源的缺失甚至更有利對普通信息受眾進行認知塑造。

經過數天發酵之後，認知戰來到第三步－「一錘定音」。德里姆哈諾夫被“斬首”一事並沒有輪到烏克蘭官方“一錘定音”，小卡德羅夫先坐不住了，很快放出了自己和德里姆哈諾夫坐在一起吃飯野餐的視頻，甚至當場拿出手機展示拍攝時間，進行「打臉」。索科洛夫上將則是烏軍特戰司令部、烏克蘭國防部這樣的大部門出面完成「一錘定音」。按照認知戰的過程，這種官方媒體“一錘定音”應該起到在認知戰領域完成認知塑造過程的作用，也就是完成一個從放出“引子”，到外界“猜測補強”，最後官方「蓋章確認」的完整邏輯閉環。但俄軍居然後發製人，表演了一出“當場打臉”，不僅讓烏軍前面的所有信息傳播都變成了無用功，還讓烏克蘭的兩個要害單位特戰司令部甚至國防部變成了小丑。

二、俄烏衝突中的認知戰，烏軍來勢洶洶？

對於烏軍認知戰宣傳部門親自上陣、造謠車臣副總統德里姆哈諾夫或索科洛夫上將被烏軍“擊斃”，很多人可能大惑不解：如果俄羅斯方面迅速反應，把這些高級將領拉出來亮個相，自我確認一下“我還活著”，那麼烏方認知戰的謠言不就不攻自破了嗎？

看似有理，但俄軍並沒有被造謠一次就照上面的辦法澄清一次。為什麼？因為事情沒有那麼簡單。

其一，從戰術角度來說，如果烏軍每製造一個關於高級將領的謠言，俄軍就安排將領出面闢謠，最直接的後果就是對高級將領的日常作戰指揮造成不必要的干擾和麻煩。在作戰行動中，將官以上的高級軍官時間非常寶貴，每天工作量極高，對腦力消耗極大，根本不可能有那麼多時間沒完沒了地現身闢謠。如果烏軍每造一個謠俄軍就闢一個謠，那這些高級將領平時啥也別幹了，就天天拍視頻闢謠吧。

其二，對於進入認知塑造循環的訊息來說，某些情況下，「闢謠」不僅沒用，還會進一步製造出更多謠言。例如索科洛夫上將被“斬首”一事，儘管俄軍已經安排了闢謠，但一些烏克蘭群組依然在“挑刺死磕”，認為索科洛夫上將在鏡頭前沒有動，索科洛夫上將在受訪時看不出時間和地點，因此只是俄方安排的「資訊反制」。甚至對一些去年曾經被烏克蘭方面「官方宣布」「斬首」、但隨後又在某些場合露面的俄軍將官，比如第41集團軍參謀長格拉西莫夫少將，目前依然有烏克蘭支持者宣稱“此人已死”，唯一的原因就是這人在露面之後居然沒有再度露面！

所以，在認知戰領域，很多事沒有想的那麼簡單。

話又說回來，在戰略層面上，俄軍在俄烏軍事衝突的認知戰領域相比烏軍確實存在較大差距。烏軍非常善於製造議題，而且機動靈活，注重參與。

製造議題方面，幾乎每次認知戰都是烏克蘭主動製造議題，從一開始的馬裡烏波爾大劇院事件，到後來的布查事件，再到魯別日諾耶的化學物質爆炸事件，還有後來的札波羅熱核電廠事件和新卡霍夫卡水力發電廠大壩爆破事件，幾乎每次都是烏克蘭「先聲奪人」。俄羅斯則處於被動應對的狀態，結果被烏克蘭繼續製造議題連續攻訐，處於不利地位。

機動彈性方面，烏軍對現代傳媒的傳播特徵非常熟稔，例如對索科洛夫上將被「斬首」展開的認知戰，烏軍利用了現代傳媒傳播速度快、傳播模式去中心化的特點，以半官方形式放出“引子”，放任網民對其進行“補強”（事實上就是信息的自生長），最後再由比較權威的官方媒體下場“一錘定音”。

「注重參與」方面，烏軍更善於營造普通網民對特定議題的參與感。例如布查事件和馬裡烏波爾戰役之後，烏克蘭方面立即上線了一套名叫「劊子手之書」的網站，任何人都可以隨意登陸這些網站或者網絡插件，在裡面登記所謂的「俄羅斯軍隊的暴行」或俄軍動向。美國立即回應，針對「劊子手之書」項目，開通了屬於美國國務院的「觀察站」項目，從而用於記錄俄軍在衝突中的「暴行」。這些公共議題設定相當巧妙，令外界群眾感受到的參與度極高，而在具體內容上則真真假假，不同於傳統資訊戰的假訊息灌輸。在烏克蘭軍隊的認知戰中，這些參與度極高的計畫一度讓整個網路風向呈現一面倒的趨勢。

和烏軍在認知戰領域的宣傳和操作相比，俄軍在認知戰領域差太遠。例如針對烏克蘭方面在認知領域塑造極為強調群眾參與、群眾體驗的作戰模式，俄羅斯方面依然在沿用著老辦法——以每日戰情通報的形式對外公佈模棱兩可的戰況，只有一個科納申科少將在鏡頭前“當一個沒有感情的讀稿機器”，結果絕大多數戰況觀察者都不太把他的戰況通報當回事。又如對烏克蘭方面頻繁設置議題、依照步驟進行認知塑造的戰法，俄羅斯方面更是只有招架之功。每次都是烏克蘭製造議題，俄羅斯方面被動應對，然後烏克蘭方面根據俄羅斯的應對情況繼續製造新的議題，使俄羅斯處於疲於奔命的狀態。從這個角度來看，俄軍此次針對索科洛夫上將被“斬首”的烏方認知戰塑造，突然安排闢謠“打臉”，只是戰術上“靈光乍現”而已，而且效果似乎也沒多好，也沒有徹底改變目前俄烏兩軍在認知戰領域的基本力量對比，烏克蘭對俄羅斯的「認知戰優勢」還會持續下去。

三、新型作戰形式認知戰，我們如何因應？

從定義上來說，「認知戰」最早可追溯到本世紀初美軍在軍事改革中提出的「網路中心戰」概念，經過多年的發展，到2017年，相關論述開始頻頻見於北約高級將領的言論集中，譬如2017年8月14日，美國國防情報局局長史都華在國防情報資訊系統2017年會上就明確提出了「第五代戰爭是認知戰」這一論點。到了2017年9月17日，時任美國空軍參謀長戈德費恩在美國空軍協會年會上同樣明確地提出了「認知戰」這個概念。很快，北約就對這個新穎的作戰概念進行了全面發展。 2020年3月，北約發布《作戰2040》概念書，明確提出「資訊與認知戰」將在未來作戰中扮演重要角色。 6月，北約又指派前法軍上校、北約創新中心負責人弗朗索瓦.杜.克魯澤專題研究認知戰，並在2021年1月拿出了《認知戰》的詳細報告書。 2021年6月，北約召開了認知戰科學會議，並發布了《認知戰：認知主導未來》專題報告，從而形成了較有系統、完整的認知戰作戰理論。

相較於傳統的資訊戰和宣傳戰，認知戰的最大特徵是基於人的大腦運作原理，也就是對外在資訊的獲取、感知、理解、加工、推論、評估、判斷、計算、決策的過程。總之，認知戰在作戰特質上可謂更勝一籌，不是進行單方面灌輸，而是要善於利用人們的認知過程，對每個人的世界觀、價值觀、意識形態，甚至認知、理解過程進行全方位“重塑”，從而全面重建個人對訊息的解讀和反應，干涉個人的意識形態和價值取向，最終的結果不僅是要利用各種假訊息擾亂對手，更重要的是重塑對手的社會心理，從而對對手的戰略決策產生影響，「不戰而屈人之兵」。這決定了認知戰是新一代的宣傳戰和資訊戰，相對於傳統的專注於戰術層面上的資訊戰，認知戰的角色可以進一步提高到戰略層面上，可能會影響戰爭的走向或結局。

那麼，面對認知戰這樣一種新型的作戰形式，參考俄烏軍事衝突中俄羅斯在和烏克蘭的認知戰領域長期處於下風的現狀，我們對未來的認知戰究竟該如何應對呢？

從戰略角度來看，我們應當認識到，在認知戰領域，單純的被動應對是最不可靠、效率最低的作戰形式，如俄羅斯在烏克蘭的議題設定面前被動應對等於被動挨打。當然，認知戰相比於火力戰戰或機動戰，是徹底的“陽謀”，並沒有太多佯動和詭詐，依託的主要是西方的意識形態優勢地位和傳媒功力，靠的是西方媒體「第四權」領域的法權。由於我方相比西方國家在傳媒領域暫時處於下風，要在全系統、全層面上與其實施認知對抗作戰其實是一件相對困難的事情。因此，即使我們在認知戰上同樣採取戰略進攻的策略，其實施效果可能也不如對手。辦法之一或許是從策略上牢牢把握住我們的基本盤，形成「你打你的，我打我的」格局。

而在戰術領域，要充分借鏡俄烏衝突中雙方在認知作戰上的經驗教訓。從烏克蘭軍隊實施的認知戰策略來看，在議題塑造等領域，主要鑽了資訊不對稱的空子。那麼，我方可能的因應策略是及時公開部分訊息，要改變原有的「軍事行動必須保密、不要對外界公開」的觀念。事實上，公開資訊本身就是認知塑造的過程，雙方圍繞著資訊公開的時機、內容、時序上，可以展開大量的認知戰對抗。如在設置議題領域，我方可以“先發製人”，先求得在諸如一帶一路沿線國家、金磚國家或上海合作組織國家內設置議題、展開認知塑造的能力，起碼確保本國群眾和一些友好國家能夠對沖西方認知戰領域的影響。再如，針對對方在多維度、多層次上針對不同人群實施的「認知戰」或步步為營塑造出的謠言，我方可廣泛利用KOL（Key Opinion Leader，即意見領袖）及平台的影響力，形成以「認知對認知」的作戰模式。

總之，認知戰作為一種被北約研究多年、在俄烏軍事衝突中大量出現且起到一定作用的新型作戰樣式，值得進一步進行研究，以確保在未來的軍事行動中立於不敗之地。

這篇關於認知戰的文章只是“開胃菜”，隨後還有“正餐硬菜”——本工作室歷時約一年完成了《美國等西方國家的認知作戰研究》，正文4萬多字(不含註7千多字)，要豐富和深入得多。該報告將於後天正式推出並進行介紹，敬請關注。

中國原創軍事資源：https://www.163.com/dy/article/IGEFT5CB0515NAKC888.html

#Information Support Force, Asymmetric Warfare, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Artificial Intelligence, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Future Wars, Chinese Military Informatization, Chinese Military Use of Cognitive Confrontation within the Combat Domain, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Cognitive Confrontation, Cognitive Domain Warfare, Combat Planning, Command information Systems, Dissipative Warfare, Intelligent Warfare, Mosaic Warfare, Multi-Domain Operations, National Defense and Military Modernization, 中國解放軍敘事戰爭, 認知戰

Comprehensively Promote Modernization of Chinese Military’s Organizational Form｜How Chinese Military Services Implement Building Construction for War

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全面推進軍隊組織形態現代化｜中國軍隊如何實施戰爭建設

現代英語：

A brief analysis of how the military implements the principle of “building for war”

■ Wang Xueping, Xu Yan, Zhu Xiaomeng

Introduction

To implement the general principle of “the Military Commission is in charge of the overall situation, the theater is responsible for war, and the military is responsible for construction”, the military forces need to accurately grasp the interactive rules of war and construction, strengthen the connection with the theater, form a work pattern with clear rights and responsibilities, positive interaction, smooth and efficient, and focus the main tasks, main responsibilities, and main energy on building and managing the troops. Always adhere to the principle of leading construction with war, building for war, managing for war, and promoting war with construction, comprehensively improve the practical level of military training, and provide high-quality combat forces for the theater.

Get the coordinates of building for war

The coordinates are the epochal orientation of building for war. Only when the orientation is clear can construction be accelerated on track. Entering the new era, the firepower intensity, maneuvering speed, striking accuracy and intelligence of weapons and equipment have greatly increased, the battlefield space has been continuously expanded, the coupling of combat actions has become closer, and the battlefield situation has changed more rapidly. Wars have gradually shown the characteristics of platform combat, system support, tactical actions, and strategic support. In particular, the use of intelligent, stealth, and unmanned combat, as well as aerospace forces, new concept weapons, and high-efficiency destructive ammunition have fundamentally changed the concept of war time and space. The war form has accelerated the evolution from mechanized informationization to informationized intelligence, and intelligent warfare has begun to emerge. The military should focus on building the combat power of informationized warfare with intelligent characteristics, rather than the combat power of mechanized warfare. When the armed forces are building for war, they must focus on information warfare with intelligent characteristics, turn their attention to intelligent military reform, fully imagine the future war form, scale, intensity, spatial region, etc., and use the concept beyond the times to lead the vision of construction forward again and again; they must deeply study the winning mechanism, scientifically judge, and build the troops needed to win the future war, so as to be targeted.

Find the target of building for war

The target is not only a beacon of construction and development, but also a scale to test combat effectiveness. Only by setting the correct target can the armed forces be targeted when building for war, and lead the innovative development of weapons and equipment, system organization and combat theory without deformation or distortion. When the armed forces are building for war, they are not fighting ordinary opponents, but strong enemies in the world military game. This requires the military to build for war, and must lock on to strong enemies, insist on focusing all their attention on defeating strong enemies, and exert their efforts in all work to defeat strong enemies. Closely aiming at world-class standards, the focus should be on firmly grasping the characteristics of future combat systems and system confrontations, exploring standardized and modular construction issues, and forming an integrated and coordinated system combat capability; centering on the requirements of all-domain combat, focusing on tackling practical issues such as rapid response, long-range delivery, and integrated support, and strengthening rapid and mobile cross-domain action capabilities. Grasp the key of balancing powerful enemies, strengthen targeted research on powerful enemies, insist on focusing on what the enemy fears, develop what can balance powerful enemies, and prepare more, strive to have a chance of winning in war, have bargaining chips, and have confidence, focus on solving bottlenecks such as the construction of new military forces, the use of high-tech equipment, and information intelligence integration, and build a world-class military in an all-round way.

Innovation and construction as the forerunner of war

Theory is the forerunner of practice, and scientific military theory is combat effectiveness. Whoever can grasp the development pulse of future wars and possess superb war design capabilities can win the initiative in war and even the final victory. The military should not build for war, but should place war research and construction in a strategic position, carry out forward-looking, targeted, and reserve-oriented innovative research, propose new concepts, seek new breakthroughs, and form innovative theories that are contemporary, leading, and unique. The military should build for war, and must focus on the current practice and future development of war, clarify the vertical evolution axis, focus on shaping the future battlefield, changing the future combat rules, and promote the reshaping of concepts and the reconstruction of systems as soon as possible; focus on cutting-edge technology fields and future intelligent war design, and make efforts to achieve major breakthroughs in new technologies and new forms of war; focus on the continuous development of new concepts such as combat thinking, action patterns, and capability requirements, and form forward-looking thinking on future combat actions. At the same time, the new theories and concepts should be systematized and concretized, and become a “roadmap” for planning and designing force system construction, weapons and equipment development, military training transformation, and combat talent training. It is necessary to form a closed loop from practice to theory and then from theory to practice, so that military theoretical research can draw rich nutrients from practice, and advanced and mature theoretical results can enter the military decision-making and practice links to achieve a benign interaction between theory and practice.

Build a hard core for war

Science and technology are the most revolutionary force. Scientific and technological innovation has always been a race with time and speed. If you don’t work hard to innovate, you will fall behind and be beaten. If you innovate slowly, you will also fall behind and be beaten. Today, scientific and technological innovation has become the core strategy for many countries and militaries to seek advantages. The armed forces must pay close attention to the leading role of science and technology in building for war, integrate the most cutting-edge and even imagined future science and technology into the overall planning of construction, guide the basic direction of construction and development, and actively explore the path of scientific and technological innovation to fight a future war with future enemies with our future army; we must implement the strategy of strengthening the military with science and technology, demand combat effectiveness from scientific and technological innovation, vigorously cultivate new scientific and technological growth points, and focus on improving the contribution rate of scientific and technological innovation to the development of the military’s combat effectiveness; we must face the world’s scientific and technological frontiers, the main battlefields of the future, and the major needs of combat, accelerate the pace of innovation, and launch one project after planning and justifying it, especially to let disruptive technologies run ahead, strive to run at an accelerated pace, and win new advantages. Obviously, talent is the key to building a hard core of “grasping construction for war”. Talent is the most difficult preparation. Whoever has more high-quality new military talents can gain or gain more opportunities to win on the future battlefield. We must accurately grasp the characteristics and laws of modern warfare and the requirements of military transformation and construction, and cultivate what talents are needed for war and give priority to what talents are most in short supply, so that the supply side of talent training can be accurately matched with the needs of the future battlefield.

Lay a solid foundation for grasping construction for war

Fight hard and train hard. The root of “war” lies in “construction”, and the foundation of “construction” lies in “training”. Military training, as a regular and central task of the troops, is not only the basic way to generate and improve combat effectiveness, but also the most direct preparation for military struggle. In the new era, the war situation is accelerating towards informationization and intelligence, the military’s missions and tasks are constantly expanding, the level of informationization and intelligence of weapons and equipment is gradually improving, and the training support conditions are gradually improving. It is urgent for the military forces to consider the interaction of multiple fields such as the war situation, combat methods, weapons and equipment, and personnel quality, and analyze the impact of many factors such as known and unknown, possible and impossible, and possible and impossible, so as to comprehensively upgrade their actual combat capabilities. To build for war, we must focus on training troops against strong enemies, practice reconnaissance, coordination, equipment, and support around the development of the real enemy situation, practice real force deployment, practice fast battlefield construction, practice real equipment data, and practice strong support; we must aim at the latest enemy situation in multiple fields such as land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace, and carry out real, difficult, rigorous, and practical full-element training in scenario re-enactment, “fight” with strong enemies, and let the troops gain real skills and strengthen their strength in real confrontation; we must pursue extreme training, constantly challenge the limits of people and equipment, so that the physiological and psychological limits of officers and soldiers, the performance limits of equipment, and the combat effectiveness limits of the combination of people and weapons can be fully unleashed. Only by using “extremely difficult and extremely difficult” training to present all shortcomings and weaknesses and overcome them can we cope with the most brutal battlefield. Some tactics and strategies trained beyond the limit are often the key move and fatal blow to defeat the enemy in actual combat.

Do a good job in coupling construction for war

The fundamental purpose of war and construction is to be able to fight and win. It is necessary to accelerate the realization of functional coupling under the new system and work together to accelerate the generation of combat power. Building an army that adapts to future combat needs is, in the final analysis, to build a force that can complete future combat tasks and has corresponding combat capabilities. Combat requirements are the concrete manifestation of such mission requirements and capabilities. Building for war should be based on the needs of fulfilling missions and tasks, and should be designed in advance according to future combat military needs. Military construction should be guided by military needs, and combat needs should be continuously refined and dynamically adjusted to promote the coupling of war and construction. By strengthening the argumentation and research of future combat requirements and doing a good job in top-level planning, we can grasp the direction and focus of military construction in general, consider the comprehensive development of military weapons and equipment and personnel quality from a strategic height and long-term development, clarify the focus, adhere to the principle of doing what we should do and not doing what we should not do, concentrate on developing strategic and key projects, give priority to emergency operations, correctly handle the primary and secondary, urgent and slow, light and heavy aspects of military construction, firmly grasp the main and key ones, and promote coordinated and complementary military construction, scientific and reasonable, standardized and orderly, and sustainable development. Scientific combat effectiveness assessment can not only scientifically and specifically understand the composition and strength of one’s own combat effectiveness, but also help to take targeted measures to promote the coupling of building for war, timely discover and correct deficiencies in construction, truly realize the scientific development of military construction, intensive and efficient, and promote the advancement of combat effectiveness construction.

Strictly grasp the test of building for war

Whether a unit is well built and whether it has the ability to win a battle, it must ultimately be tested through military practice. After a comprehensive test of military practice, it is inevitable that the problems in the construction of the unit will be exposed, thereby promoting the army to make corresponding adjustments in the content, focus, and direction of construction. Through repeated tests of military practice, new requirements and new goals are constantly put forward for the construction of the troops, thus leading the construction of the troops to a higher stage. Make good use of network simulated confrontation tests. The informatization and intelligence of network simulated confrontation make the cognition, decision-making, feedback, correction, and action of simulated confrontation more close to actual combat, and revolutionize the process of military activities, thereby producing positive effects on weapons and equipment, command and control, force organization and other fields, thereby promoting the continuous leap of the combat effectiveness of the troops, and even giving birth to new war styles and changing the mechanism of winning wars. Make good use of on-site live-fire exercises. As a pre-practice for future wars, live-fire exercises can not only effectively test the actual combat capabilities of the troops, but more importantly, they can discover some weak links in the construction of the troops, optimize and improve them in a targeted manner, and obtain the maximum combat effectiveness return. Make good use of the test of war practice. The leading role of war practice in the construction of the troops is irreplaceable. Strict war practice can truly test which aspects of the construction of the troops are suitable and which are not suitable for future wars, and then correct the deviations and mistakes in many aspects such as construction guidance, construction priorities, and construction methods, so as to prepare for winning the next war.

現代國語：

淺析軍種如何落實抓建為戰

■王雪平　 許炎 朱小萌

引言

貫徹「軍委管總、戰區主戰、軍種主建」總原則，軍種部隊需要準確把握戰與建互動規律，加強同戰區對接，形成權責清晰、正向互動、順暢高效的工作格局，把主要任務、主要職責、主要精力放在建設、管理部隊上，始終堅持以戰領建、抓建為戰、抓管為戰、以建促戰，全面提高軍事訓練實戰化水平，為戰區提供優質作戰力量。

把準抓建為戰的坐標

坐標是抓建為戰的時代方位，只有方位明晰，建設才能依軌加速。進入新時代，武器裝備的火力強度、機動速度、打擊精度、智慧化程度大幅躍升，戰場空間不斷拓展，作戰行動耦合更加緊密，戰場態勢變換更加迅速，戰爭逐漸呈現出平台作戰、體系支撐，戰術行動、戰略保障等特點，特別是智能化、隱身化、無人化作戰以及空天力量、新概念武器、高效毀傷彈藥的運用，從根本上改變了戰爭時空概念，戰爭形態加速由機械化信息化向資訊化智能化演變，智能化戰爭初見端倪。軍種主建，建的應是具有智慧化特徵的資訊化戰爭的戰鬥力，而不是機械化戰爭的戰鬥力。軍種抓建為戰，必須聚焦具有智慧化特徵的資訊化戰爭，把目光投向智能化軍事變革，充分設想未來戰爭形態、規模、強度、空間地域等，用超越時代的理念，引領建設視野向前再向前；必須深研製勝機理，科學研判，打贏未來戰爭需要什麼部隊就建設什麼部隊，做到有的放矢。

找準抓建為戰的靶標

靶標既是建設發展的燈塔，也是檢驗戰鬥力的天秤。只有樹立正確靶標，軍種抓建為戰才能有的放矢，不變形、不走樣地牽引武器裝備、體制編制和作戰理論創新發展。軍種抓建為戰，戰的不是一般對手，而是世界軍事賽場上的強敵。這就要求軍種抓建為戰，必然要鎖定強敵，堅持全部心思向打敗強敵聚焦、各項工作向戰勝強敵用勁。緊緊瞄準世界一流標準，重點要牢牢把握未來作戰體係與體系對抗的特徵，探索標準化、模塊化建設問題，形成一體聯動的體係作戰能力；圍繞全局作戰要求，聚力攻關快速反應、遠程投送、融合保障等現實課題，建強快速機動跨域行動能力。抓住制衡強敵這個關鍵，加強對強敵的針對性研究，堅持敵人怕什麼就重點建什麼，發展什麼能製衡強敵就多備幾手，力求做到戰有勝算、談有籌碼、懾有底氣，著力解決軍種新型力量建設、高新裝備運用、資訊智慧整合等瓶頸問題，全面建成世界一流軍隊。

創新抓建為戰的先導

理論是實踐的先導​​，科學的軍事理論就是戰鬥力。誰能把準未來戰爭的發展脈搏、擁有高超的戰爭設計能力，誰就能贏得戰爭的主動權甚至最後的勝利。軍種抓建為戰，不能走到哪算哪，要把研戰謀建擺在戰略位置，開展前瞻性、針對性、儲備性創新研究，提出新概念、尋找新突破，形成具有時代性、引領性、獨特性的創新理論。軍種抓建為戰，必須著眼於戰爭當前實踐和未來發展，理清縱向演進軸線，把重點放在塑造未來戰場、改變未來作戰規則研究上，盡快推動觀念重塑、體系重構；放在聚焦前沿技術領域、未來智慧化戰爭設計上，下氣力在戰爭新技術、新形態方面實現重大突破；放在持續推進作戰思想、行動樣式、能力需求等新概念的開發上，形成對未來作戰行動的前瞻性性思考。同時把新理論新概念體系化、具體化，成為規劃設計力量體系建構、武器裝備發展、軍事訓練轉變、作戰人才培養的「路線圖」。要形成從實踐到理論、再從理論到實踐的閉環迴路，讓軍事理論研究從實踐中汲取豐厚養分，讓先進成熟的理論成果進入軍事決策和實踐環節，實現理論和實踐良性互動。

打造抓建為戰的硬核

科技是最具革命性的力量。科技創新歷來是與時間與速度的賽跑。不努力創新就會落後挨打，創新速度慢了也同樣會落後挨打。今天，科技創新已成為許多國家和軍隊謀求優勢的核心戰略。軍種抓建為戰，必須高度關注科技引領作用的發揮，通過把當前最前沿甚至是設想中的未來科學技術融入建設整體規劃之中，引領建設發展的基本方向，積極探索用未來的我軍與未來的敵人打一場未來戰爭的科技創新路徑；必須落實科技強軍戰略，向科技創新要戰鬥力，大力培育新的科技增長點，著力提高科技創新對軍種戰鬥力發展的貢獻率；必鬚麵向世界科技前沿、面向未來主要戰場、面向作戰重大需求，加快創新速度，規劃論證好一項就要上馬一項，特別是要讓顛覆性技術跑在前面，力爭跑出加速度，贏得新優勢。顯然，打造抓建為戰的硬核，人才是關鍵。人才是最艱難的準備，誰擁有更多高素質新型軍事人才，誰就能在未來戰場上早獲得或多獲得一些致勝先機。要準確把握現代戰爭特點規律和軍種轉型建設要求，做到打仗需要什麼人才就培養什麼人才、什麼人才最緊缺就優先鍛造什麼人才，使人才培養供給側同未來戰場需求側精準對接。

夯實抓建為戰的根基

打仗硬碰硬，訓練實打實。 「戰」的根本在於「建」，「建」的基礎在於「練」。軍事訓練作為部隊的經常性中心工作，既是產生和提高戰鬥力的基本途徑，也是最直接的軍事鬥爭準備。新時代，戰爭形態加速向資訊化智能化發展，軍隊使命任務不斷拓展，武器裝備資訊化智能化水平逐步提高，訓練保障條件逐步改善，迫切需要軍種部隊從考慮戰爭形態、作戰方法、武器裝備、人員素質等多個領域的互動，到分析已知與未知、可能與不可能、可為與不可為等諸多因素的影響，全面升級實戰能力。抓建為戰，必須聚焦強敵練兵，圍繞真實敵情的進展，練偵察、練協同、練裝備、練保障，練實力量布勢、練快戰場建設、練真裝備數據、練強保障支撐；必須瞄準陸海空及太空、網絡空間等多領域最新敵情，在情景重現中開展真、難、嚴、實的全要素訓練，與強敵“過招”，讓部隊在真刀真槍對抗中礪實功、強實力；必須追求極限訓練，不斷向人和裝備極限沖擊，使官兵的生理心理極限、裝備的性能極限、人與武器結合的戰鬥力極限全面迸發。唯有用「逼到絕境、難到極致」的訓練呈現所有短板弱項，並加以克服，才能應對最殘酷的戰場。一些超越極限訓出的戰術戰法，往往是實戰中勝敵的關鍵一招、致命一擊。

搞好抓建為戰的耦合

戰與建，根本目的都是為了能打仗、打勝仗，必須在新體制下加速實現功能耦合，為加速戰鬥力生成共同發力。建設適應未來作戰需求的軍隊，說到底是建設能完成未來作戰任務、具備相應作戰能力的部隊，作戰需求就是這種任務需求和能力的具體體現。抓建為戰應根據履行使命任務需要，針對未來作戰軍事需求超前設計，以軍事需求牽引軍隊各項建設，不斷細化和動態化調整作戰需求促進戰建耦合。透過加強未來作戰需求論證研究搞好頂層規劃，從總體上把握軍隊建設的方向和重點，從戰略高度和長遠發展考慮軍隊武器裝備、人員素質的全面發展，明確重點，堅持有所為有所不為，集中力量發展戰略性、關鍵性項目，優先保障應急作戰，正確處理軍隊建設的主與次、急與緩、輕與重，緊緊抓住主要的、關鍵的，推動軍隊建設協調配套，科學合理，規範有序，持續發展。科學的戰鬥力評估不僅能夠科學具體地認識己方戰鬥力的組成及其強弱，還有利於採取針對性措施促進抓建為戰的耦合，及時發現並糾正建設中的不足，真正實現軍隊建設的科學發展、集約高效，促進戰鬥力建設上台階。

嚴格抓建為戰的檢驗

一支部隊建設得好不好，是不是已經具備打勝仗的能力，最終還是要通過軍事實踐來檢驗。經過軍事實踐的全面檢驗，必然揭露部隊建設上存在的問題，從而推動軍隊在建設內容、重點、方向上做出相應的調整。通過這樣一次次軍事實踐的反復檢驗，不斷地給部隊建設提出新要求新目標，由此引領部隊建設向著更高的階段發展。用好網絡模擬對抗檢驗。網絡模擬對抗資訊化智慧化，使得模擬對抗的認知、決策、回饋、修正、行動等更趨於實戰，革命性地改造軍事活動流程，進而對武器裝備、指揮控制、力量編組等多個領域產生積極作用，由此促進部隊戰鬥力不斷躍升，甚至催生新的戰爭樣式、改變戰爭制勝機理。用好現地實兵演習檢驗。作為未來戰爭的預實踐，實兵演習不僅能有效檢驗部隊的實戰能力，更為重要的，是能發現部隊建設中存在的一些薄弱環節，有針對性地加以優化改進，獲得最大限度的戰鬥力回報。用好戰爭實踐檢驗。戰爭實踐對部隊建設的引領作用不可取代。嚴酷的戰爭實踐，可以真正檢驗部隊建設哪些適合、哪些不適合未來戰爭，進而修正在建設指導、建設重點、建設方法等諸多方面的偏差和失誤，為打贏下一場戰爭做好準備。

中國原創軍事資源：https://www.81.cn/ll_208543/9904888.html

#Information Support Force, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Artificial Intelligence, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations

Chinese Military Changing Trend of Command and Control from the Perspective of Complexity Science

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複雜性科學視野下的中國軍隊指揮控制變革趨勢

現代英語：

Hu Xiaofeng

Introduction

In recent years, with the evolution of war forms, the epistemology under the traditional scientific system has become increasingly difficult to meet the needs of the development of war practice. Complexity science has provided new possibilities for understanding war and guiding war practice. In the field of command and control, complexity can be used as a weapon to make the opponent’s decision-making more complicated, while the opponent can easily deal with it. The key to achieving this effect is to break the original traditional decision-making method and reshape the opponent’s decision-making process.

Understanding the Principle of Complexity in War

To discuss “how complexity becomes a weapon”, we first need to understand where the complexity of war comes from and the nature and characteristics of complex systems.

Traditional thinking methods believe that the world is deterministic and people are rational. Humans can use methods such as “decomposition + cognition + synthesis” to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the world and a precise grasp of the nature and operating laws of all things. However, there are still many complex systems in the world. These systems have holistic properties. Systems such as the human body, society, economy, and war all belong to this category. Complex systems have variable structures and are characterized by adaptability, uncertainty, emergence, and nonlinearity. Moreover, the results are not repeated and difficult to predict. Society, economy, cities, including intelligent systems, these systems related to people have these characteristics, in fact, they are all typical complex systems.

War is a typical complex system. People often say “randomness in war”, “unrepeatable results of war”, “fog in war”, “no constant situation of soldiers, no constant shape of water”, etc., in fact, they are all describing the characteristics of war complexity.

The root cause of war or social complexity lies in people’s “cognition”. People are not chaotic particles without thoughts, nor are they low-level creatures with only simple life logic. Therefore, the use of simple physical statistical methods will produce great deviations. Moreover, human behavior is not just “pure rationality” at work. Emotional factors such as personality, emotions, and attitudes may affect changes in human behavior.

Recognizing that war is a complex system is a huge progress. Only in this way can we better understand the phenomenon of war complexity and find ways and means to solve problems. Instead of simply adopting reductionist methods or simply transplanting physical methods to study war.

How to create complexity

The earliest idea of ​​making complexity a weapon was the US military’s “decision-making center war”. It advocates that with the support of advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, the upgrading and transformation of combat platforms and distributed deployment can achieve diversified tactics, while ensuring its own tactical selection advantages, it can impose high complexity on the opponent to interfere with its command and decision-making capabilities, and occupy an overwhelming advantage in the new dimension.

In future wars, due to the increasingly large combat system, the interweaving of people and machines in decision-making at all levels, especially the widespread use of intelligent combat platforms, the battlefield management problem has become unprecedentedly prominent. If there are defects in the opponent’s information system, it may be subject to the complexity of its own system. The US military believes that complexity as a weapon is to make the opponent feel complex in one direction, while it can easily deal with it. The key is to break the original traditional decision-making method and reshape the opponent’s decision-making process.

Traditional decision-making is only a change in decision-making parameters, not a change in decision-making process, so the decision complexity is constant. If the decision is still made according to inherent factors and processes, only the size of the variable is adjusted, and the original causal relationship is not changed. For example, the self-side adopts camouflage, reinforcement and other means to enhance the survivability of the base and force the opponent to change the original decision. But doing so does not increase the complexity of the enemy’s decision-making, because the causal relationship has not changed. If complexity methods are introduced, the opponent’s decision-making process can be reshaped, forcing the opponent to introduce new parameters, resulting in increased decision-making complexity. For example, the camouflage effect of one’s own side exceeds the opponent’s existing reconnaissance capability, forcing it to find new reconnaissance and positioning methods, thereby prompting it to change its decision-making process and make the decision more complicated. So, how to create complexity? It is generally believed that there are four main methods.

Limit intelligence capabilities. By creating uncertainty to enhance complexity, reduce the opponent’s situational awareness, so that the opponent can only take action with the support of limited information. Specific methods include: giving incomplete information or false information, which is what we often call hiding the truth and showing the false; creating deep uncertainty, that is, creating “black swan” events, putting the opponent in an “unknown unknown” state. For example, electronic countermeasures make it impossible for the opponent to understand the system principles, resulting in an inability to understand the situation. The most typical case is the “unknown air situation” in the past. Although it can be seen from the radar signal, it is unknown why such a signal is generated, which makes the opponent always confused.

Weaken response capabilities. By using adaptive characteristics to create complexity, the opponent’s action response capability is weakened. It can also be understood that changing the environment faster creates complexity, forcing the opponent to reduce its adaptability and hindering its timely feedback. Combat confrontation can be seen as who can adapt to changes in the opponent, battlefield and environment faster. The adaptability depends on the command and control system structure, process and decision-making method, as well as the reaction speed of the troops. Without this ability, it is often passive. Adopting flexible command methods, making adequate plans, and having distributed decision-making mechanisms can enhance the adaptability of the troops. The traditional centralized control method will be difficult to adapt to the needs of future wars, and the dispatch-type command and control mode with resource distribution and service distribution similar to online car-hailing may be better adapted to the changing battlefield environment and respond faster.

Create border chaos. Create chaos and complexity by crossing boundaries to form new emergent effects. Between military services and between different support systems, etc., can all be regarded as boundaries. In future operations, cross-service and cross-system command boundaries often become system vulnerabilities, forming more complex network cascade effects. Therefore, how to create complexity across organizational boundaries will become the key to future operations. For example, creating all kinds of chaos between different combat domains, different troops, and different systems, while ensuring the orderly operation of one’s own system, making the opponent’s system entangled and inefficient, thus causing its system to be divided or collapsed.

Promote critical point conversion. Push the opponent to the critical point and create complexity, resulting in nonlinear conversion. Small changes in complex systems may be amplified and transmitted step by step, and emerge with effects that seriously affect the war situation, and this phenomenon often occurs at the critical point. The most common practices are “overload” and “promote collapse”. The so-called overload is to force the opponent to be in an overloaded state frequently, resulting in a significant reduction in its performance. For example, the command information system may perform very well at ordinary times, but once it is under high overload during wartime, its performance will decline significantly and it will often be in a low-efficiency state. The so-called collapse is to force the enemy system to collapse at the critical point. For example, the commander collapses under high pressure during wartime and makes a wrong judgment, even if he may only be at a slight disadvantage. In this case, the firmness of the commander’s will often determines the final result.

“Fight complexity with complexity”

Almost all changes in war can be seen as cognitive upgrades and complications. Clausewitz believed that “uncertainty” and “fear” are the two keys to studying war, and the commonality between the two is actually cognition.

The key to “decision-centered warfare” is to accelerate cognition to adapt to complexity. To deal with complex weapons, we need to “fight complexity with complexity” and start with basic work. First, we need to understand the principles of war complexity and actively create complexity to seize the initiative on the battlefield. For ourselves, we need to manage our own complexity; for our opponents, we need to impose more complexity on them. Secondly, we need to understand the changes in the mechanism of war, which requires us to focus on the key point of “command and control”. The most important of these is the perception, control and management of complex battlefields, as well as the understanding, modeling and simulation of intelligent cognition.

As we all know, command and control has two sides. Its “rational” side is the standardization of command decisions, which is reflected in the command mechanism, combat process, regulations, plans and planning. That is, “when you know how to do it”, you can use efficient scientific methods to make it, such as operational planning. The “emotional” side is reflected in the creative content of command decisions, that is, the art of command. The art of command depends on the inspiration, intuition, knowledge and experience, and even personality of the commander. That is, when “I don’t know what to do”, I can find a way to solve the problem, such as trial and error. In fact, the former is only the result of intelligence, and the latter determines the generation of intelligence. Therefore, from a rational point of view, traditional systems hope that everything that will happen in the future is known in advance; from a perceptual point of view, intelligent systems hope that surprises will emerge in the future, that is, innovation. Therefore, it can be considered that command is art and control is science; command is “intelligence” and control is “skill”, which is the difference between “strategy” and “technology”. How to solve these two problems is the trend and direction of future changes in the field of command and control.

The first trend: control management is moved down, and intelligent decision-making is continuously mechanized. Under the conditions of future informationized and intelligentized warfare, the independent operation of unmanned systems, the adaptive organization of military organizations, and the autonomous combat methods based on big data, cloud computing and network information systems have put forward higher requirements for the command and control mode. To adapt to this change, it is necessary to give combat units more autonomy and shorten the chain of command; introduce intelligent decision-making assistance and analysis tools, and use people “on the loop” or “outside the loop” to effectively accelerate the decision-making process and improve decision-making efficiency.

The second trend: command decisions are moved up and become more complex with intelligent assistance. From a strategic perspective, first, we should focus on cognitive confrontation, fully understand complex system problems such as “the more complex the system is, the more complex it is”, “yesterday’s rules are different from today’s”, and “the future is unpredictable”, and find ways to deal with them; second, we should confront complexity with complexity. “Strategic simplicity” cannot replace “the complexity of battlefield and tactical control”, and we cannot ostrich-like “respond to changes with the same”. Third, to create complex asymmetry, combat personnel need to use “command art + decision-making intelligent tools”. The stronger the artistry of decision-making, the higher the complexity. To fight against artificial intelligence, we need to rely on artificial intelligence, but we cannot rely on artificial intelligence alone.

The third trend: build a combat network and command and control network system around intelligent machines. First, we need to redefine the platform type and no longer simply distinguish between combat platforms of different space types such as aircraft and submarines. Second, we need to change the traditional combat force use mode and adopt an “order-based” combat mode. Focusing on combat resources and services, we provide battlefield links, command, management and scheduling through cloud platforms. The third is to improve the adaptability of complex systems, so that the command and control and combat systems can bear high overload situations, and cannot perform “excellently” in simple situations, but seriously decline in complex situations, leading to complex disasters.

The fourth trend: Human-machine hybrid command and control will become the mainstream. In the future, with the support of big data, combat cloud, machine assistance and shared combat maps, artificial intelligence will form a combat ecosystem with humans. It should be noted that the decision-making application of artificial intelligence is not to replace “people”, but to make good use of “people”, and achieve better results through human-machine collaboration. Specifically, one is to combine human creativity with the “tirelessness” of machines based on hybrid intelligence, so as to give full play to their respective strengths and avoid the dilemma that decision-making intelligence technology has been difficult to break through for a long time. The second is to solve the problem of human-machine hybrid. The inconsistency of cognitive space, the difficulty of forming a collaborative system, and the distrust of people in machines all need to be solved, which may be the focus of future command and control system design.

現代國語：

胡曉峰

引言

近年來，隨著戰爭形態的演變，傳統科學體系下的知識論越來越難以滿足戰爭實踐發展的需要，複雜性科學為認識戰爭、指導戰爭實踐提供了新的可能性。在指揮控制領域，複雜性可以作為一種武器，使對手決策變得更加複雜，而自己則可以輕鬆應對。要達到這效果的關鍵在於，打破原有傳統決策的方式，重塑對手的決策流程。

認識戰爭複雜原理

討論“複雜性怎樣成為武器”，我們首先需要認識一下，戰爭的複雜性由何而來，以及複雜系統的性質和特徵。

傳統思維方法認為，世界是確定性的、人是理性的，人類可以採用「分解+認識+綜合」等方法，實現對世界的全面認識、對萬事萬物的性質和運作規律的精準把握。但世界上還存在著許多複雜系統，這些系統存在著整體性質，像是人體、社會、經濟、戰爭等，都屬於這一類。複雜系統結構可變，具有適應性、不確定性、湧現性、非線性等特點，且結果不重複，也難以預測。社會、經濟、城市包括智慧系統，這些與人有關的系統都有這些特點，其實它們都是典型的複雜系統。

戰爭就是典型的複雜系統。人們常說的「戰爭中的偶然性」「戰爭結果的不可重複性」「戰爭中的迷霧」「兵無常勢，水無常形」等等，其實都是在描述戰爭複雜性的特徵。

戰爭或社會複雜性產生的根源，在於人的「認知」。人不是雜亂無章、沒有思想的粒子，也不是只有簡單生命邏輯的低等生物，因而採用簡單的物理統計方法就會產生很大的偏差。而且，人的行為也不會只是「純理性」在起作用，性格、情緒、態度等感性因素都有可能影響人類行為的改變。

認識到戰爭是複雜系統，是一個巨大進步。唯有如此，才能更能理解戰爭複雜性現象，找到解決問題的方法和途徑。而不是簡單地採用還原論方法，或簡單​​地移植物理學方法來研究戰爭。

如何製造複雜性

讓複雜性成為武器，最早是美軍「決策中心戰」的設想。其主張在人工智慧等先進技術的支撐下，透過對作戰平台的升級改造以及分散式部署實現多樣化戰術，在保障自身戰術選擇優勢的同時，向對手施加高複雜度，以乾擾其指揮決策能力，在新維度上佔據壓倒性優勢。

未來戰爭，由於作戰體系越來越龐大，各級決策中人與機器混雜交織，尤其是智慧化作戰平台的廣泛運用，導致戰場管理問題空前突出。如若對手資訊系統上有缺陷，可能將受制於自己體系的複雜性。美軍認為，複雜性作為武器，就是要讓對手單向感到複雜，而自己則可以輕鬆應付。其關鍵在於打破原有傳統決策的方式，重塑對手的決策流程。

傳統決策只是決策參量的改變，而非決策流程的改變，所以決策複雜度恆定。如若仍依固有因素和流程決策，調整的只是變數的大小，並未改變原先的因果關係。例如，己方透過採取偽裝、加強等手段，增強基地的生存能力，迫使對手改變原有決策。但這樣做並沒有增加敵方的決策複雜度，因為因果關係並沒有改變。如果引入複雜性方法，則可以重塑對手的決策流程，逼迫對手引入新參量，導致決策複雜性增加。例如，使己方偽裝效果超過對手現有的偵察能力，迫使其必須尋找新的偵察定位方法，促使其改變決策流程，使決策變得更加複雜。那麼，如何製造複雜性呢？一般認為，主要有以下四種方法。

限制情報能力。透過製造不確定性以增強複雜性，降低對手的態勢感知能力，使得對手只能在有限資訊的支撐下實施行動。具體的方法包括：給予不完整的資訊或虛假訊息，也就是我們常說的隱真示假；製造深度不確定性，也就是製造「黑天鵝」事件，讓對手處於「未知的未知」狀態。例如，電子對抗戰法使對手無法理解系統原理，導致無法理解態勢。最典型的案例莫過於過去的“不明空情”，雖然可以從雷達信號上看到，但不知道為何會產生出這種信號，使對手始終處於迷茫狀態。

削弱反應能力。透過利用適應性特徵來製造複雜性，削弱對手的行動反應能力。也可以理解為，更快變換環境製造複雜性，迫使對手降低適應能力，並阻礙其及時回饋。作戰對抗可以看作是敵我雙方誰能更快地適應對手、戰場和環境的變化，適應能力取決於指控系統結構、流程和決策方式，以及部隊的反應速度。沒有這方面的能力，往往就會陷入被動。採用靈活的指揮方式，做好充分預案，具有分散式決策機制等，都可以增強部隊的適應性。傳統意義上的集中控制方式將難以適應未來戰爭的需要，而類似於叫車那樣的資源分佈、服務分佈的派單式指揮控制模式，或許才能更好地適應多變的戰場環境，並能做出更快的反應。

製造交界混亂。透過跨越邊界製造混亂、創造複雜性，形成新的湧現效果。軍兵種之間、不同保障系統之間等，都可以看成是邊界。未來作戰中跨軍種、跨體系的指揮邊界往往成為體系脆弱點，形成更複雜的網路級聯效應。因而如何在跨組織邊界製造複雜性，將成為未來作戰的關鍵。例如在不同作戰域、不同部隊、不同系統之間製造各種混亂，在確保己方體系運作有序的同時，使對手體系相互纏繞低效，從而導致其體系分割或坍塌。

促進臨界點轉換。將對手逼到臨界點並製造複雜性，造成非線性的轉換。複雜系統中的微小變化，都可能經過逐級放大傳導，湧現出嚴重影響戰局的效果，而這個現象經常出現在臨界點處。最常見的做法是「超負荷」「促進崩潰」兩種。所謂超負荷，就是促使對手經常處於超負荷狀態，導致其性能大幅降低。例如，指揮資訊系統平時可能表現很優秀，但在戰時一旦處於高過載情況下，表現卻會大幅下滑，常常處於低效能狀態。所謂促崩潰，就是促使敵方系統在臨界處崩潰。例如指揮在戰時高壓力下崩潰作出錯誤判斷，就算其可能只是處於微小劣勢之下。在這種情況下，指揮官意志的堅定程度，往往決定了最終的結果。

“以複雜對抗複雜”

戰爭中幾乎所有的變化，都可以看成是認知的升級和複雜化。克勞塞維茲就認為，「不確定性」和「恐懼」是研究戰爭的兩個關鍵，這兩者的共通點其實就是認知。

「決策中心戰」的關鍵就在於加速認知，以適應複雜性。應對複雜性武器需要“以複雜對抗複雜”，從基礎工作做起。首先，需要理解戰爭複雜性原理，主動製造複雜性來掌握戰場主動權。對自己來說，需要管理自身的複雜性；對對手來說，需要對對手施加更多的複雜性。其次，需要了解戰爭機理發生的改變，這就需要瞄準「指揮與控制」這個重點。其中最重要的是對複雜戰場的感知、控制和管理，以及對智慧認知的理解、建模和模擬。

眾所周知，指揮控制具有兩面性。它「理性」的一面，就是指揮決策的規範化，體現在指揮機制、作戰流程、條令條例、計畫規劃等內容。也就是「知道怎麼做時」可以用高效率的科學方法做出來，例如運籌規劃。 「感性」的一面則體現在指揮決策的創意內容，也就是指揮藝術。指揮藝術取決於指揮人員的靈感直覺、知識經驗，甚至是性格。也就是在「不知道怎麼做時」能找到解決問題的方法，例如試誤選擇。事實上，前者只是智能結果，後者才決定智能的產生。所以，從理性角度來看，傳統系統希望未來發生的一切都是事先知道的；而從感性角度來看，智慧系統卻希望未來能夠湧現出驚喜，也就是創新。所以可以認為，指揮是藝術，控制是科學；指揮是“智能”，而控制是“技能”，這也就是“謀略”和“技術”的區別。而如何解決好這兩個問題，是未來在指揮控制領域變革的趨勢與方向。

第一個趨勢：控制管理下移，並將智慧決策不斷機器化。在未來資訊化智慧化戰爭條件下，無人系統獨立運作、軍隊組織自適應編組以及基於大數據、雲端運算和網路資訊系統的自主作戰方式等，對指揮控制模式提出了更高的要求。適應這種變化，需要賦予作戰單元更多自主權，縮短指揮鏈；引入智慧化輔助決策與分析工具，以人在「迴路」或「迴路外」等方式，切實加速決策過程，提高決策效率等。

第二個趨勢：指揮決策上移，在智慧輔助下更為複雜。從謀略角度講，一是要以認知對抗為中心，充分理解「複雜系統越認識越複雜」「昨天規律與今天不同」「未來不可預測」等複雜系統問題，找到應對之道；二是以複雜對抗複雜。 “戰略的簡潔性”並不能取代“戰場和戰術控制的複雜性”，不能鴕鳥式的“以不變應萬變”。第三是創造複雜的非對稱性，需要作戰人員藉助「指揮藝術+決策智慧工具」。決策的藝術性越強，複雜度越高，對抗人工智慧需要依賴人工智慧，但不能只靠人工智慧。

第三個趨勢：圍繞智慧機器，建構作戰網和指控網體系。一是需要重新定義平台類型，不再簡單區分飛機、潛水艇等不同空間類型的作戰平台。二是需要改變傳統作戰力量使用模式，採取「訂單式」作戰模式，圍繞作戰資源與服務，透過雲端平台提供戰場連結、指揮、管理與調度。第三是提高複雜系統適應能力，指揮控制與作戰體系能夠承擔高過載情況，不能遇到簡單情況表現“優秀”，但在復雜情況下卻嚴重下滑，導致複雜性災變。

第四個趨勢：人機混合的指揮控制將成為主流。未來的指揮控制，在大數據、作戰雲、機器輔助和共用作戰圖的支援下，人工智慧將和人一起形成作戰生態系統。要注意的是，人工智慧的決策運用，不是要取代“人”，而是要用好“人”，人機協同，實現更好的效果。具體來說，一是基於混合智能，將人的創造性與機器的「不知疲倦」結合起來，既發揮各自的長處，又規避決策智能技術長時期難以突破的窘境。二是解決人機混合的難題。認知空間的不一致、協同體系的難形成、人對機器的不信任等，都需要解決，或許是未來指控係統設計的重點。

中國原創軍事資源：https://www.81.cn/ll_208543/16277688.html

#Information Support Force, Asymmetric Warfare, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Artificial Intelligence, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Informatization, Chinese Military Use of Cognitive Confrontation within the Combat Domain, Dissipative Warfare, 中國解放軍敘事戰爭, 認知域戰, 認知戰

Chinese Military Research on Typical Operational Styles of Intelligent Warfare

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中國軍隊智能戰爭典型作戰方式研究

現代英語：

Intelligent warfare is a new form of warfare that has gradually developed with the continuous advancement of science and technology. It widely uses intelligent technology to achieve all-round informatization, digitization and intelligence of war. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict can be seen as a microcosm of intelligent warfare, from which we can see the transformation and application of high-tech in actual warfare in the past decade, as well as the astonishing military effectiveness it has produced.

In recent years, major military countries around the world have listed artificial intelligence, big data and other emerging technologies as priority development, and analyzed their military applications and impact on modern warfare based on theoretical research, combat experiments and other methods. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has become an important window and key testing ground for its perspective on actual combat effectiveness. After this actual combat test, countries around the world have been inspired to accelerate war preparations to cope with the upcoming era of comprehensive intelligent warfare. A new round of AI arms race has quietly begun!

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02

Characteristics of intelligent warfare

Different from traditional warfare forms, the characteristics of intelligent warfare are: with artificial intelligence and big data as the core, through advanced artificial intelligence algorithms and large-scale data sets, to achieve rapid information acquisition, processing and sharing, and provide more comprehensive and accurate information support. Based on network information, on a highly networked information warfare platform, comprehensive information control and efficient transmission are achieved, and each combat unit can share and coordinate actions in real time to improve command efficiency, combat coordination and flexibility. Command and control is the key, and through intelligent command and control systems, intelligent decision-making systems and autonomous combat systems, the combat situation is monitored throughout the process, and combat operations are efficiently coordinated and accurately controlled. High-quality talents are needed to support it, and talents with high-level intelligent technology can better use intelligent technology. Promote the transformation of combat styles. With the development of intelligent technology, combat styles are constantly innovating, and tactical response requirements are constantly changing. Networked combat, intelligent reconnaissance and strike, unmanned combat, cognitive domain combat, etc. are more typical combat styles in intelligent warfare.

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03

Essential characteristics, application scenarios and tactical response requirements of typical combat styles of intelligent warfare

(I) Networked combat

  1. Essential points

Networked combat is to build a networked combat platform through a series of information technology, communication technology, network technology and computer technology, interconnect various combat units, combat systems, etc., realize information acquisition, processing, sharing and coordinated actions, and achieve the purpose of comprehensive control of battlefield information, efficient decision-making and coordinated combat. Its essence emphasizes sharing and coordination.

  1. Application scenarios

Networked combat covers multiple application scenarios such as command and control, intelligence collection, combat coordination and logistics support: ① In terms of command and control, networking connects various command and control systems, sensors and weapons and equipment, so that commanders can grasp the battlefield situation in real time, improve decision-making ability and accuracy, and realize efficient command and control and coordinated processing. ② In terms of intelligence collection and analysis, networking realizes information sharing and collaborative analysis between various intelligence collection equipment, systems and personnel, enabling intelligence departments to obtain and analyze intelligence more comprehensively, accurately and timely, and provide more reliable data support for decision-making. ③ In terms of combat force coordination, networked connections enable information sharing and coordinated actions between various units, equipment and resources, and achieve more accurate combat operations. ④ In terms of logistics support, networking enables efficient logistics support through intelligent support systems, improves the efficiency and accuracy of logistics support, and achieves optimal allocation and efficient scheduling of logistics resources.

Figure 1 Schematic diagram of networked operations

  1. Tactical response requirements

Networked operations require tactical response: First, information reliability. In networked operations, information is an important factor in leading operations. All combat units and systems must fully understand the importance of accurate information and provide reliable data support for decision-making. Second, network globality. Networked operations are not just the behavior of individual combat units, but the global behavior of the entire combat system, which requires coordination and cooperation from the perspective of the entire combat system. Third, high coordination. All combat units and systems must have a high degree of coordination capabilities, be able to quickly respond to various combat tasks, and achieve accurate combat operations. Fourth, technological advancement. All combat units and systems must have advanced technical capabilities, be able to master and apply various information technologies and equipment proficiently, and ensure the smooth progress of networked operations. Fifth, security and stability. It is necessary to ensure information security and network system stability, take security measures and technical means to prevent network attacks and data leakage, establish a strong network security protection system, adopt encryption technology and protocols, implement data management and access control, regularly detect and repair security vulnerabilities, adopt backup and fault-tolerant mechanisms, and avoid equipment failure or network interruption affecting combat effectiveness.

(II) Intelligent reconnaissance and strike

  1. Essential points

Intelligent reconnaissance and strike is to achieve accurate reconnaissance and efficient strikes on enemy targets through intelligent technology, quickly and accurately discover combat targets, and reduce combat losses. Its essence emphasizes: high precision, using high-resolution sensors, high-precision positioning technology, image recognition technology, etc. to achieve high-precision reconnaissance and positioning of targets; high speed, using advanced missile technology, artillery technology and drone technology, etc. to achieve high-speed strikes and destruction of targets; intelligent decision-making, using artificial intelligence technology, big data technology and cloud computing technology, etc. to achieve automatic identification and decision-making of targets, and improve damage effectiveness and efficiency.

  1. Application scenarios

Intelligent reconnaissance and strike are widely used in various combat fields: ① In ground warfare, use intelligent equipment such as satellites, drones and ground robots for reconnaissance, obtain high-precision image data of enemy positions, analyze enemy force deployment, weapons and equipment, and action patterns; use intelligent shells to achieve comprehensive coverage and strikes on enemy areas by accurately calculating shooting elements. ② In naval warfare, use intelligent reconnaissance equipment to identify and track targets at sea, grasp the dynamics of enemy ships in real time, and provide accurate coordinate information for strikes; through real-time perception and tracking, guide intelligent missiles to achieve long-range precision strikes on mobile targets. ③ In special combat environments, such as urban street fighting, use intelligent reconnaissance equipment to conduct reconnaissance inside buildings, and achieve precision strikes inside buildings through high-precision sensors and strike algorithms; in mountain warfare, use intelligent reconnaissance equipment to conduct reconnaissance and analysis of mountain terrain to provide accurate terrain information support for troops’ marching and combat.

Figure 2 “Reconnaissance and Strike” Wheeled Reconnaissance Robot

  1. Tactical Response Requirements

Comprehensive, accurate and efficient intelligent support and guarantee services are the key to supporting the effectiveness of this combat style, mainly as follows: First, realize all-round highly intelligent intelligence collection and analysis. Use advanced intelligent equipment (such as satellites, drones, etc.) and technologies (such as machine learning, big data, cloud computing, etc.) to conduct highly automated reconnaissance and intelligence collection, and automatically analyze and process the massive heterogeneous data obtained, so as to achieve comprehensive perception, monitoring and deep mining of battlefield conditions, and provide comprehensive, accurate and fresh data guarantee services for target indication and strike. Second, intelligent command, control and strike. On the basis of intelligent, efficient and accurate collection, reconnaissance and analysis of battlefield data, it is also necessary to use artificial intelligence technology and automation systems to conduct highly automated command and control, identify and track enemy targets, make decisions quickly and guide weapon systems to carry out precise strikes. Third, formulate accurate emergency plans. The battlefield situation changes rapidly, and emergency response capabilities are crucial. Use intelligent technology to analyze battlefield situations in real time, predict possible emergencies or prejudge the actions of mobile targets, formulate emergency plans or strike ideas in advance, and ensure that rapid response and strike response can be made when emergencies occur.

(III) Unmanned combat

  1. Essential points

Unmanned combat is the use of unmanned technology to realize the combat use of unmanned equipment. Its advantage is to reduce casualties and perform combat tasks in some high-risk and complex environments. The key point is the development of unmanned equipment, such as drones, unmanned vehicles, and unmanned boats. These equipment can achieve high-precision and high-speed reconnaissance, strike and other combat operations in combat.

  1. Application scenarios

Unmanned combat has a variety of combat scenarios, including but not limited to: ① Drones can be used in ground warfare. Use drones to conduct high-altitude reconnaissance and surveillance outside the enemy’s air defense system to obtain high-definition image data; they can also be equipped with weapon systems to accurately strike and destroy enemy targets. ② Unmanned vehicles can be used in urban combat. Unmanned vehicles equipped with high-precision sensors and weapon systems can be used to replace human soldiers to perform reconnaissance, patrol, attack and defense tasks in urban streets to avoid casualties. ③ Unmanned boats can be used in maritime operations. Unmanned boats equipped with a variety of sensors and weapon systems can be used to perform maritime reconnaissance, patrol, anti-submarine warfare, attack and anti-piracy tasks.

Figure 3 UAVs equipped with ammunition on the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield

  1. Tactical response requirements

Unmanned combat requires the following tactical requirements: First, autonomy and intelligence are at the core. Unmanned combat systems need to have a certain level of autonomy and intelligence, and be able to complete combat tasks autonomously without human intervention. The system needs to have advanced autonomous action control technology, intelligent perception technology and decision-making planning capabilities. Second, target recognition and decision-making speed must be fast. The timeliness requirements for unmanned combat systems to quickly identify targets and make decisions require high-precision sensors and efficient image processing capabilities, as well as real-time data analysis capabilities and powerful decision-making algorithms. Third, information sharing and collaboration are very necessary. Unmanned combat systems need to share information and collaborate with other systems. The system needs to have efficient information transmission capabilities and powerful collaborative combat algorithms to achieve functions such as task allocation, action coordination and information sharing. Fourth, safety and stability are the bottom line. Unmanned combat systems need to be safe and stable and able to operate stably in complex battlefield environments. The system needs to have advanced security assurance technology and stability control capabilities to cope with various emergencies and dangerous situations.

The above requirements are the key to achieving efficient, accurate and reliable unmanned combat, and are also important considerations for the development and deployment of unmanned combat system equipment.

(IV) Cognitive domain combat

  1. Essential characteristics

Cognitive domain combat is the use of theories of relevant disciplines such as cognitive science, system science, communication, linguistics, social culture, and social behavior, with multiple information carriers such as text, pictures, sound, and video, and the comprehensive use of various combat methods and technical means to compete for the spirit, thought, thinking, and thinking of the target object, to achieve cognitive influence, cognitive shaping, cognitive control, and cognitive manipulation of the target object, and promote the formation of a cognitive situation that is beneficial to oneself.

  1. Application scenarios

Cognitive domain combat is not a unique combat style of intelligent warfare. Its ideas are reflected in military tactics and strategies in ancient and modern times, both at home and abroad. With the promotion and empowerment of artificial intelligence technology in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, social robots, deep fake videos, etc. are widely used in online media, influencing social public opinion, manipulating public cognition, and exerting power efficiently and accurately, making cognitive warfare a “brain battle” for global digital communication. Its application scenarios are: ① Military fraud. Through propaganda, psychological suggestion, induction and other deception and fraud methods, try to make the enemy misjudge the situation, affect their cognition, emotions and behavior, and thus disintegrate their morale and fighting will. For example, during World War II, the Soviet Union used large-scale propaganda activities to promote the strength of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Germany to German soldiers, thereby affecting the morale and fighting will of German soldiers. ② Media propaganda. Information dissemination through television, radio, the Internet, etc., affects the public’s views and attitudes on specific issues. For example, in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Ukrainian politicians and ordinary people intensively spoke on social platforms such as Twitter, gaining widespread attention and sympathy from the international community, and creating a cognitive situation that is beneficial to Ukraine in the international public opinion field. ③ Long-term consciousness infiltration. Through the long-term cultivation of concepts, culture, religion, ideology, etc., people’s cognition and values ​​are unconsciously influenced. This is a very covert and effective combat strategy.

Figure 4 Cognitive Domain Operations

  1. Tactical Response Requirements

Cognitive domain operations have the following tactical requirements: First, accurately locate the target object, formulate different strategies according to different target objects, understand their cognitive characteristics, needs, values, etc., and formulate more targeted strategies. Second, multi-dimensional information dissemination, and comprehensive use of multiple information carriers and dissemination channels for dissemination. Third, use psychological principles and master psychological knowledge and skills, such as suggestion, induction, group effect, etc., to better manipulate cognition. Fourth, flexibly respond to protective measures, and adjust strategies in time through information detection and counterattack, network tracking and attack, etc., to ensure its effectiveness and safety. Fifth, emphasize effect feedback evaluation in order to adjust strategies and means, and continuously optimize and improve tactics.

(V) Other combat styles

Some other new combat styles have also emerged in intelligent warfare. These combat styles have their own characteristics and advantages, and play an important role in improving combat effectiveness: Directed energy weapon combat is a combat method that uses high-energy beams to attack. This weapon can destroy enemy targets at a long distance, and has the characteristics of high precision, high speed and high destructive power. Directed energy weapons include laser weapons, particle beam weapons and microwave weapons, which can be used in various combat fields such as air, ground and sea. Cross-domain combat refers to leapfrogging attacks and defenses between different fields such as space, cyberspace and land, sea and air battlefields, using intelligent technology to achieve leapfrogging actions between different fields to achieve a surprising victory. For example, air power can be used to strike enemy ground targets, and ground power can be used to strike enemy sea targets. Stealth combat is to use various technologies and means to hide and disguise oneself on the battlefield, avoid enemy reconnaissance and attack, and improve one’s own survivability and attack effect. For example, in air and sea combat environments, stealth fighters and stealth submarines use their installed stealth materials and stealth technology to avoid enemy radar, infrared, sonar and other detection.

Figure 5 Directed energy weapons

Figure 6 Cross-domain combat

Figure 7 US “B-2 Spirit” stealth bomber

In short, there are many new combat styles in intelligent warfare, all of which are innovative to improve combat effectiveness. As technology continues to advance and develop, more new combat methods and innovative applications will emerge, providing more support and guarantees for winning intelligent wars.

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04

Comprehensive analysis of typical combat styles

Comprehensive analysis of typical combat styles shows that: (1) “Controlling energy with intelligence”, “Gathering energy over a wide area” and “Precisely releasing energy” are its fundamental strategic ideas, achieving maximum war benefits at the lowest cost. Networked combat and cross-domain combat realize battlefield information perception, monitoring and coordination in all fields and dimensions, such as air, land, sea and network, and cross-domain integration enhances strength; intelligent reconnaissance and strike realize accurate intelligence analysis and precise target positioning and strike, reducing damage to surrounding evasion facilities and ordinary people; unmanned combat emphasizes reducing casualties of one’s own manpower, and autonomously carrying out combat missions through unmanned equipment systems; cognitive domain combat uses intelligence to control invisible competition, achieving the goal of defeating the enemy without fighting. (2) Highly dependent on technology, coordination and intelligence, with algorithm computing power as the underlying support. All combat styles, without exception, rely on information, network, communication and other technical support to achieve the coordination of various combat forces and weapons and equipment, and have the ability to execute tasks and make decisions intelligently and autonomously. As its underlying support, algorithms dominate the operation and decision-making of intelligent weapons, and computing power provides faster response speed, more accurate decision-making and more efficient execution capabilities, which directly affects combat effectiveness and victory or defeat. (3) Combat effectiveness increases geometrically. Through high-speed, high-precision and high-efficiency human-machine collaboration, decentralized, fast and flexible tactical actions are used to form a non-linear, non-contact and asymmetric combat method to quickly achieve combat objectives. Compared with traditional combat, the combat effectiveness it releases is exponentially increasing.

Disclaimer: This article is transferred from Shigao Technology Online, the original author is Kou Jingxing, Yang Pei and Li Qingqing. The content of the article is the personal opinion of the original author. This public account is compiled/reprinted only for sharing and conveying different opinions. If you have any objections, please contact us!

Transferred from | Kou Jingxing, Yang Pei and Li Qingqing

Author | Shigao Technology Online

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現代國語：

智慧化戰爭是隨著科技的不斷進步而逐漸發展起來的一種新型戰爭形態，其廣泛運用智慧化技術實現戰爭全方位的資訊化、數位化和智慧化。俄烏衝突可視為智慧化戰爭縮影，從中看到近十年高新科技在實際戰爭中的轉化運用，以及產生的令人瞠目的軍事效能。

近年來，全球主要軍事國家都將人工智慧、大數據等列為優先發展的新興技術，依托理論研究、作戰實驗等方法分析其軍事應用及對現代戰爭影響。俄烏衝突便成為其透視實際作戰效果的重要窗口和關鍵試驗場。經此實戰檢驗，世界各國從中獲得啟發，必須加速推進戰爭準備，以因應即將到來的全面智慧化戰爭時代。新一輪的AI軍備競賽悄悄開啟！

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02

智慧化戰爭特徵

與傳統戰爭形態不同，智慧化戰爭其特徵體現：以人工智慧和大數據為核心，透過先進人工智慧演算法和大規模資料集，實現資訊快速獲取、處理和共享，提供更全面且準確的資訊支援。以網路資訊為基礎，在高度網路化資訊作戰平台上，實現資訊全面掌控、高效傳遞，各作戰單元能即時共享和協同行動，提升指揮效率、作戰協同性和彈性。以指揮控制為關鍵，透過智慧化指揮控制系統、智慧決策系統及自主作戰系統等，全程監控作戰狀況、有效率協調並精確控製作戰行動。需高素質人才支持，具備高水準智慧化技術的人才能更好地運用智慧化技術。推動作戰樣式變革，隨著智慧化技術發展，作戰樣式不斷創新，戰術反應需求不斷變化。網路化作戰、智慧偵察與打擊、無人化作戰、認知域作戰等是智慧化戰爭中較為典型的作戰樣式。

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03

智慧化戰爭典型作戰樣式本質特徵、應用場景及戰術反應要求

（一）網路化作戰

1.本質要點

網路化作戰是透過一系列資訊科技、通訊技術、網路技術和電腦科技等，建構形成網路化作戰平台，將各個作戰單位、作戰系統等相互聯通，實現資訊取得、處理、共享及協同行動，達到全面掌控戰場資訊、高效決策與協同作戰目的，其本質強調共享及協同。

2.應用場景

網路化作戰涵蓋指揮控制、情報收集、作戰協同和後勤保障等多個應用場景：①指揮控制方面，網路化將各種指揮控制系統、感測器和武器裝備進行連接，指揮官可即時掌握戰場態勢，提高決策能力與準確度，實現高效指揮控制及協同處理。 ②情報收集和分析方面，網路化實現各種情報收集設備、系統和人員之間的資訊共享和協同分析，使情報部門更加全面、準確、及時獲取和分析情報，為決策提供更可靠的數據支持。 ③作戰力量協同方面，網路化連結實現各部隊、裝備和資源之間的資訊共享和協同行動，實現更精準的作戰行動。 ④後勤保障方面，網路化透過智慧化保障系統實現高效率後勤保障，提升後勤支援效率與精確度，實現後勤資源最佳化配置與高效調度。

圖1 網路化作戰示意圖

3.戰術反應要求

網路化作戰對戰術反應需求：一是資訊可靠性。在網路化作戰中，資訊是主導作戰的重要因素，各作戰單位和系統要充分認識準確資訊的重要性，為決策提供可靠的數據支援。二是網路全局性。網路化作戰不只是個別作戰單位行為，而是整個作戰系統全局性的行為，需從整個作戰系統的角度出發進行協同配合。三是高度協同性。各作戰單位和系統要具備高度的協同能力，能夠快速回應各種作戰任務，實現精準作戰行動。四是技術先進性。各作戰單位及系統要具備先進技術能力，能熟練及應用各種資訊技術及裝備，並保障網路化作戰順利進行。五是安全穩定性。必須保障資訊安全和網路系統穩定，採取安全措施和技術手段，防範網路攻擊和資料洩露，建立強大的網路安全防護體系，採用加密技術和協議，實施資料管理和存取控制，定期偵測和修復安全漏洞，採取備份和容錯機制，避免設備故障或網路中斷影響作戰效果。

（二）智能偵察與打擊

1.本質要點

智慧偵察與打擊是透過智慧化技術實現對敵方目標精準偵察和高效打擊，快速準確發現作戰目標，減少作戰損失，其本質強調：高精度，利用高解析度感測器、高精度定位技術和影像識別技術等，實現對於目標高精度偵察和定位；高速度，利用先進飛彈技術、砲彈技術和無人機技術等，實現對於目標高速度打擊和摧毀；智慧化決策，利用人工智慧技術、大數據技術和雲端運算技術等，實現對於目標自動辨識與決策，提高毀傷效能和效率。

2.應用場景

智慧偵察與打擊在多種作戰領域廣泛應用：①在地面戰爭中，利用衛星、無人機和地面機器人等智慧型設備進行偵察，取得敵方陣地高精度影像數據，分析敵方兵力部署、武器裝備和行動規律等資訊；透過精確計算射擊諸元，利用智慧砲彈實現對敵方區域全面覆蓋和打擊。 ②在海上戰爭中，利用智慧偵察設備對海上目標進行識別和跟踪，實時掌握敵方艦船動態，為打擊提供精準坐標信息；通過實時感知和跟踪，引導智能導彈實現對移動目標遠程精準打擊。 ③在特殊作戰環境下，如城市巷戰中，利用智慧偵察設備對建築物內部進行偵察，透過高精度感測器和打擊演算法，實現對建築物內部精準打擊；山地作戰中，利用智慧偵察設備對山區地形進行偵察分析，為部隊行軍作戰提供精準的地形資訊支援。

圖2 「察打一體」輪式偵察機器人

3.戰術反應要求

全面、精準、高效率的智慧化支援與保障服務，是支撐此作戰樣式取得成效關鍵，主要為：一是實現全方位高智慧化情報收集與分析。利用先進智慧型設備（如衛星、無人機等）和技術（如機器學習、大數據、雲端運算等），進行高度自動化偵察和情報蒐集，並對獲取的海量異源資料進行自動化分析處理，實現對戰場狀況全面感知、監控以及深度挖掘，為目標指示與打擊提供全面、精準、新鮮的資料保障服務。二是智能化指揮控制與打擊。在對戰場資料進行智慧高效準確地蒐集、偵察及分析基礎上，還需利用人工智慧技術和自動化系統，進行高度自動化指揮控制，對敵方目標進行識別和追踪，快速做出決策並引導武器系統進行精確打擊。三是製定精準的緊急應變計畫。戰場態勢瞬息萬變，緊急應變能力至關重要。利用智慧技術對戰場情況進行即時分析，預測可能出現的突發情況或對移動目標行動進行預判，提前製定應急預案或打擊思路，確保能夠在突發事件發生時迅速做出快速響應處置和打擊反應。

（三）無人化作戰

1.本質要點

無人化作戰是利用無人化技術，實現無人化裝備的作戰運用。其優勢在於減少人員傷亡，可執行一些高風險和複雜環境下的作戰任務。其要點是無人化裝備的發展，如無人機、無人車、無人艇等。這些裝備可以在作戰中實現高精準度、高速度的偵察、打擊等作戰行動。

2.應用場景

無人化作戰有多種作戰場景，包括但不限於：①無人機可應用於地面戰爭。利用無人機在敵方防空系統之外進行高空偵察與監視，取得高清晰度影像資料；亦可裝填武器系統，對敵方目標進行精確打擊與摧毀。 ②無人車可應用於都市作戰。利用無人車搭載高精準度感測器和武器系統，取代人類士兵在城市街道進行偵察巡邏、攻擊和防禦等任務，避免傷亡。 ③無人艇可應用於海上作戰。利用無人艇搭載多種感測器和武器系統，進行海上偵察巡邏、反潛作戰攻擊和反海盜等任務。

圖3 俄烏戰場上的配彈無人機

3.戰術反應要求

無人化作戰在戰術上要求：一是自主化和智慧化為其核心。無人化作戰系統需要具備一定自主化和智慧化水平，能夠在沒有人為幹預情況下自主完成作戰任務，需要係統具備先進自主行動控制技術、智慧感知技術和決策規劃能力。二是目標識別和決策速度要快。無人化作戰系統快速識別目標並做出決策的時效要求，需要依靠高精度感測器和高效影像處理能力，以及即時數據分析能力和強大決策演算法。三是資訊共享與協同非常必要。無人化作戰系統要與其他系統分享資訊和協同作戰，需要係統具有高效資訊傳輸能力和強大協同作戰演算法，能夠實現任務分配、行動協調和資訊共享等功能。四是安全穩定為保底。無人化作戰系統需要安全性和穩定性，能夠在複雜戰場環境中穩定運作。需要係統具有先進的安全保障技術和穩定性控制能力，能夠應付各種突發事件和危險情況。

以上要求是實現高效、精準和可靠的無人化作戰關鍵，也是無人化作戰系統裝備開發和部署的重要考量。

（四）認知域作戰

1.本質特點

認知域作戰是運用認知科學、系統科學、傳播學、語言學、社會文化學、社會行為學等相關學科理論，以文本、圖片、聲音、視頻等多重資訊載體，綜合運用多種作戰方式和技術手段，對目標對象進行精神、思想、思維、思考的爭奪，實現對目標對象的認知影響、認知塑造、認知控制和認知操縱，推動形成對己方有利的認知態勢。

2.應用場景

認知域作戰並非是智慧化戰爭的獨有作戰樣式，其思想在古今中外軍事兵法策略均有所體現。隨著人工智慧技術在俄烏衝突中的推動與賦能，社交機器人、深度偽造影片等大量應用在網路媒體中，影響社交輿論、操控大眾認知、高效精準發揮威力，使得認知戰成為全球數位傳播的“大腦爭奪戰”，其應用場景有：①軍事詐欺。透過宣傳、心理暗示、誘導等欺騙欺詐手段，試圖讓敵人誤判情勢，影響其認知、情緒和行為，從而瓦解其士氣和戰鬥意志。例如，在二戰期間，蘇聯透過大規模宣傳活動，向德國士兵宣傳蘇聯的強大和德國的戰敗，從而影響了德國士兵的士氣和戰鬥意志。 ②媒體宣傳。透過電視、廣播、網路等資訊傳播，影響大眾對特定議題的看法與態度。例如，在俄烏衝突中，烏克蘭政要、一般民眾在推特等社群平台上密集發聲，收穫國際社會廣泛關注和同情，在國際輿論場營造出了有利於烏方的認知態勢。 ③長期性意識滲透。透過長期培養觀念、文化、宗教、意識形態等，在不知不覺中影響人們認知和價值觀，這是一種非常隱密有效地作戰策略。

圖4 認知域作戰

3.戰術反應要求

認知域作戰在戰術上要求：一是精準定位目標對象，依照不同目標對象制定不同策略，了解其認知特徵、需求、價值觀等，制定更具針對性策略。二是多維度資訊傳播，綜合運用多種資訊載體及傳播管道進行傳播。第三是運用心理學原理，掌握心理學知識技巧，如暗示、誘導、團體效應等，更能操控認知。四是靈活應對防護措施，透過資訊偵測和反擊、網路追蹤和攻擊等，及時調整策略，確保其有效性和安全性。五是強調效果回饋評估，以便調整策略和手段，不斷優化和改進戰術。

（五）其他作戰樣式

在智慧化戰爭中也出現了一些其他新型作戰樣式，這些風格各具特點優勢，對於提升作戰效能具有重要的作用：定向能武器作戰，是一種利用高能量射線束進行攻擊的作戰方式。這種武器可以在遠距離上摧毀敵方目標，同時具有高精度、高速度和高破壞力等特徵。定向能武器包括雷射武器、粒子束武器和微波武器等，它們可以在空中、地面和海上等多種作戰領域中應用。跨域作戰，指在太空、網路空間及陸海空戰場等不同領域之間進行跨越式攻擊與防禦，利用智慧化技術實現不同領域之間跨越式行動，達到出奇制勝的效果。例如，可以利用空中力量對敵方地面目標進行打擊，利用地面力量對敵方海上目標進行打擊。隱形作戰，是利用各種技術和手段，在戰場上隱藏和偽裝自己，避免被敵方偵察和攻擊，提高己方生存能力和攻擊效果。如在空中、海上作戰環境中，隱形戰鬥機、隱形潛艇等利用其加裝的隱形材料和隱形技術，躲避敵方雷達、紅外線、聲吶等探測。

圖5 定向能武器

圖6 跨域作戰

圖7 美國「B-2幽靈」隱形轟炸機

總之，智慧化戰爭中的新型作戰樣式多元，都是為了提升作戰效能而創新。隨著科技不斷進步與發展，也將出現更多新型作戰方式與創新應用，為打贏智慧化戰爭提供更多支援與保障。

✦✦

04

典型作戰樣式綜合分析

綜合分析典型作戰樣式可看出：（1）「以智出能」「廣域聚能」「精準釋能」為其根本戰略思想，實現以最小代價獲得最大戰爭效益。網路化作戰及跨域作戰實現空、地、海、網路等全領域全維度戰場資訊感知監控與協同，跨域融合增強實力；智慧偵察與打擊實現精確情報分析與精準目標定位打擊，減少對週邊避打設施及一般民眾的傷害；無人作戰強調減少已方有生力量傷亡，透過無人裝備系統自主行動實施作戰任務；認知域作戰以智駕馭無形較量，達到不戰而屈人之兵目的。 （2）高度依賴技術、協同、智能，以演算法算力為底層支撐。各種作戰樣式無一例外都依賴資訊、網路、通訊等技術支持，實現各種作戰力量和武器裝備協同，具備智慧化自主執行任務和決策能力。作為其底層支撐，演算法主導智慧武器的運作和決策，算力提供更快反應速度、更精準決策和更有效率執行能力，直接影響作戰效果和勝負。 （3）作戰效能呈幾何倍增。透過高速度、高精度和高效率人機協同，以分散、快速、靈活的戰術行動，形成非線性、非接觸、非對稱作戰方式，迅速達成作戰目標。相較於傳統作戰，其釋放出的作戰效能呈指數級增長。

免責聲明：本文轉自事高科技在線，原作者寇靜行 楊培 李晴晴。文章內容係原作者個人觀點，本公眾號編譯/轉載僅為分享、傳達不同觀點，如有任何異議，歡迎聯絡我們！

轉自丨寇靜行 楊培 李晴晴

作者丨事高科技在線

研究所簡介

國際技術經濟研究所（IITE）成立於1985年11月，是隸屬於國務院發展研究中心的非營利研究機構，主要功能是研究我國經濟、科技社會發展中的重大政策性、策略性、前瞻性問題，追蹤分析世界科技、經濟發展態勢，為中央和相關部會提供決策諮詢服務。 「全球技術地圖」為國際技術經濟研究所官方微信帳號，致力於向大眾傳遞尖端技術資訊與科技創新洞見。

地址：北京市海淀區小南莊20號樓A座

中國原創軍事資源：https://www.163.com/dy/article/J237LVGJ0514R888.html

#Information Support Force, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Artificial Intelligence, Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, 認知域戰

Chinese Military Exploring Wasy to Win in Intelligent Warfare Amidst Change & Constancy

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中國軍隊在變中求變中探索智慧戰爭制勝之道

中國軍網 國防部網 // 2019年10月22日 星期二

現代英語：

In today’s world, artificial intelligence has made significant breakthroughs and is accelerating its transfer to the military field, which has an impact on the form of war and even a subversive impact. Faced with increasingly fierce strategic competition and rights and interests among major powers, we should use a development perspective to rationally examine and correctly understand intelligence in the thinking of the “change” and “unchange” of the law of winning wars, select the strategic commanding heights and main attack directions of future military competition, and scientifically explore the way to win intelligent warfare.

Intelligent warfare will redraw the boundaries of war, but the standard for winning wars is still to achieve political benefits, so it can be a policy of victory or defeat

The territory of intelligent warfare is expanding to new areas. Engels pointed out: “Human beings fight in the same way as they produce.” The rapid penetration of intelligent technology into the field of combat will inevitably subvert the form of combat effectiveness. Driven by new theories and technologies such as big data, supercomputing, intelligent communications, and brain science, intelligent warfare will subvert people’s inherent cognition with “unexpected” new ways and “omnipotent” new appearances. The cognitive domain has become another contest space for the warring parties after land, sea, air, space, electricity, and the Internet. The territory of human military confrontation is bound to extend from natural space, technical space, social space to cognitive space, forming three major combat latitudes: physical domain, information domain, and cognitive domain. The boundaries of war extend to deep earth, deep sea, deep space, deep network, and deep brain, showing the characteristics of extreme depth, extreme distance, extreme micro, extreme intelligence, and unmanned, invisible, silent, and boundless. Intelligent warfare will generalize the confrontation and competition, and the integration of military and non-military fields will be more obvious. The combat field will be expanded to the extreme, the boundaries between peacetime and wartime will become increasingly blurred, and the boundaries between the front and the rear will no longer be clear. Intelligence will penetrate into all elements and processes of future wars, redraw the boundaries of war, and traditional battlefields and fronts will be difficult to reproduce. The “spectrum map” of war tends to be broadened.

Achieving political benefits is the unchanging winning standard of war. As a specific complex social phenomenon, although war will present different war forms and boundaries in different historical periods and form different war cognitions, the essential attribute of war as a political continuation will not change. The standard for measuring victory in war is always to maximize political interests. Intelligent warfare has overturned traditional combat styles and means. The attack range of weapons and equipment has expanded to human cognitive space, and the battlefield space has expanded from physical space to cognitive, social, network and other intangible spaces. It can more intuitively express the characteristics of “imposing will on the opponent”, and emphasizes the dominance of seizing the will of the country, the concept of the organization, the psychology and thinking of people at the strategic, campaign and tactical levels. The winning role of intelligent warfare in winning hearts and minds is more prominent, and the means of winning hearts and minds such as political transplantation, belief attack, mental control, psychological disintegration, and cultural infiltration are more diverse. The competition and counter-competition in the tangible and intangible battlefields are more intense. The political struggle around the war is more complex and changeable, and the constraints of the people’s hearts, social opinions and public psychology on the war are more significant. The military is more obedient to politics, and the political color of intelligent warfare is stronger. In the final analysis, the military is the continuation of politics, and military victory must ensure political leadership. In the history of our army, Mao Zedong has always opposed the purely military viewpoint and insisted on the high unity of military and politics. In the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military experimented with a large number of advanced weapons and won the battles. However, from the perspective of winning the war, they won the battles but lost the wars, and fell into a moral quagmire, far from achieving the goal of winning the war. Winning the battle is not the same as winning the war. To truly win the victory of intelligent warfare, we must occupy the commanding heights of justice to ultimately dominate the victory or defeat of the war.

Intelligent warfare will reconstruct combat power, but the key factor in winning the war is still people, and it is not people who are killed

The combat power of intelligent warfare has undergone a qualitative change. Combat power is an overall description of the power system composed of people, weapons and equipment, and combat methods. It represents the development trend of military technology and combat methods. It is essentially the product of the marriage of advanced military technology and new combat ideas. Intelligent warfare is a human-machine intelligent integrated combat. It is a war form that is upgraded, replaced, and reshaped from all aspects and fields such as weapon platforms, command and control systems, combat terminals, and battlefield environments. It presents the characteristics of human-machine collaboration, intelligent dominance, cloud brain combat, and full-domain confrontation. Intelligent technology empowers the most basic elements of warfare. The combat style, time, region, space and other combat elements are changing rapidly. The composition of combat forces has undergone structural changes. People are gradually withdrawing from the front line of confrontation. Intelligent equipment will go to the battlefield in large quantities and in an organized manner. The traditional “man-to-man” war will become a “machine-to-man” or “machine-to-machine” war. Traditional support forces are transformed into main combat forces. Various civilian forces such as network practitioners, scientific and technological elites, experts in psychology, religion, law, and non-state actors will participate in the war in different ways, from the backstage to the front stage. Some new combat forces have developed from decentralized and affiliated organizational forms to increasing proportions, integrating into armies, and forming independent armies, from supporting roles to protagonists, and the military force system has undergone a revolutionary reshaping.

People are still the decisive factor in winning wars. Mao Zedong pointed out in “On Protracted War”: “Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor. The decisive factor is people, not things.” Combat power has always been the most direct and important tool for both sides of the war, and the most core condition for victory. People are always the most active factor in combat power, and also the most decisive factor in combat power. In the era of intelligence, the anthropomorphism of weapons and the weaponization of people have become an unstoppable trend. Unmanned combat systems will be deeply integrated with manned systems into an organic symbiosis. The traditional boundaries between people and weapons tend to be blurred, and the relationship between people and weapons will be rebuilt. Weapon systems have a greater degree of autonomy and initiative, which will profoundly change the way people act in war. In particular, the development of “brain control technology” will simplify the control process of weapons from the traditional “brain-nerve-hand-weapon” to “brain-weapon”, which not only means the development and upgrading of weapons and equipment, but also marks that the integration of people and weapons has reached a new level. Human-machine integration technologies such as brain-computer interfaces, exoskeleton systems, wearable devices, and human implants will comprehensively enhance the inherent abilities of people in cognition and physiology, and create “super soldiers.” Human combat thinking is more likely to be materialized in advance into intelligent weapons in the form of software and data. In war, intelligent weapons are used to implement human combat intentions and achieve predetermined combat objectives. The decisive role of humans in future wars is still the planner, organizer and implementer of wars. The greater value of intelligent technologies such as autonomous systems and brain science is to intervene in wars and play a role in assisting command and control. Behind the autonomous combat of intelligent weapons is still the contest between human combat methods, command methods and will quality. Humans are still the decisive factor in the outcome of wars. Good fighters must fully and scientifically play the active role of humans and must not fall into a passive situation controlled by weapons and equipment, so as to truly achieve the goal of killing people instead of being killed by people.

Intelligent warfare will rebuild the rules of engagement, but the basis for winning wars is still to create combat advantages. Victorious soldiers win first and then seek war

Intelligent warfare subverts traditional rules of engagement. War is an extremely complex system composed of multiple factors. The rules of engagement involve many factors such as the nature, purpose, subject, means, time and space conditions of war, as well as war forms, war actions, and war guidance. As artificial intelligence technology can dynamically perceive, reason, make decisions, evaluate and predict various actions of combat forces at all times, in all domains and in all dimensions, the combat style has evolved from “system combat” to “open source combat”, and cross-domain unconventional and asymmetric competition has become the new normal of confrontation. War has entered a stage of system autonomous confrontation and instant kill and decision in reconnaissance and attack operations. The combat style with unmanned operations as a prominent feature has rewritten the rules of engagement and reshaped the support process. Control of intelligence has replaced control of space as the focus of combat. Combat operations are carried out in the entire domain of tangible and intangible battlefields. The battlefield is holographic and transparent. The basic goal of war to destroy the enemy and preserve oneself has also changed from “based on damage” to “based on incapacitation” with the development of disruptive technologies. The killing mechanism of war has changed from chemical energy and kinetic energy to directed energy and biological energy. Traditional violent actions will evolve into hidden strikes, soft kills, and consciousness control, and silent killing has become the mainstream. The ability to “know” and “fight” evolves in an integrated direction. Through the joint actions of the physical domain, information domain and cognitive domain, the participating forces are controlled in real time and accurately. Relying on their own information advantages and decision-making advantages, they cut off and delay the opponent’s information and decision-making circuits in a decentralized battlefield, paralyze the enemy’s combat system, and achieve the effect of physically destroying the enemy and psychologically controlling the enemy.

Creating combat advantages is the unchanging basis for winning wars. Having an overwhelming advantage in deciding the time and place is the law of achieving military victory. The spatiotemporal characteristics of intelligent warfare will undergo major changes. Various combat operations can be launched in parallel in all weather, all day, and in multiple directions. The “second kill” phenomenon in war is more prominent, but the point of action of combat forces to paralyze the enemy’s system has not changed, the essence of creating combat advantages has not changed, and the winning rules of wars to seize the initiative in war, promote our strengths, and attack the enemy’s weaknesses have not changed. The battlefield of the future will become a large area of ​​”no man’s land”. To seize the initiative in war, it is necessary to take sudden, multi-dimensional integrated actions to achieve agile and flexible situational conversion between offense and defense. The offensive and defensive advantages will surpass the relative static state of the past and enter a dynamic reversal of continuous evolution. Therefore, the art of future war is to test whether the two combatants have endurance and orderliness in the continuous state of emergency, which depends on the advancement of the combat system and the war support system. Under the support of the intelligent battlefield situation, various combat personnel, equipment, facilities, and environmental elements form a giant complex adaptive confrontation system. “Cloud gathering” becomes a new combat force cohesion mechanism, and a unified energy gathering platform becomes the basis for seeking all-dimensional advantages. Intelligent advantages become decisive advantages. The idea of ​​concentrating forces in future wars will spiral upward under the promotion of intelligent technology, and cross-domain asymmetric advantages will have more strategic significance and decisive role in intelligent warfare. Designing wars in advance, planning wars in advance, shaping asymmetric advantages based on the enemy’s situation and our situation, stepping up the formation of aggregation advantages in important areas, strengthening the construction of strategic checks and balances, and comprehensively improving the country’s ability to respond to various threats and risks will become the inevitable victory of intelligent warfare.

(Author’s unit: National Defense University)

現代國語：

當今世界，人工智慧發展取得突破性重大進展，並加速向軍事領域轉移，對戰爭形態產生衝擊甚至顛覆性影響。面對日趨激烈的大國戰略競爭與權益博弈，我們應以發展的眼光，在對戰爭制勝規律「變」與「不變」的思辨中，理性審視、正確認知智能化，選準未來軍事競爭的戰略制高點與主攻方向，科學探討智慧化戰爭的勝利之道。

智慧化戰爭將重繪戰爭邊界，但戰爭制勝的標準仍是達成政治利益，故能為勝敗之政

智慧化戰爭疆域向新領域拓展。恩格斯指出：“人類以什麼樣的方式生產，就以什麼樣的方式作戰”，智能技術向作戰領域的快速滲透，必將顛覆戰鬥力的表現形式。智慧化戰爭在大數據、超級運算、智慧通訊、腦科學等新理論、新科技推動下，將以「意想不到」的新方式和「無所不能」的新面貌，顛覆人們固有的認知。認知領域成為交戰雙方繼陸、海、空、天、電、網之後的另一個較量空間，人類軍事對抗的疆域勢必從自然空間、技術空間、社會空間到認知空間，形成物理域、訊息域、認知域三大作戰緯度，戰爭邊界向深地、深海、深空、深網、深腦領域延伸，呈現出極深、極遠、極微、極智與無人、無形、無聲、無邊的特徵。智能化戰爭將泛化對抗爭奪，軍事與非軍事領域一體化特徵更加明顯，作戰領域極限拓展，平時與戰時邊界日趨模糊、前沿與後方界限不再分明，智能滲透到未來戰爭全要素全過程，重繪戰爭邊界，傳統的戰場和戰線難以再現，戰爭「頻譜圖」趨向寬泛化。

達成政治利益是戰爭不變的勝利標準。戰爭作為一種特定的複雜社會現象，儘管在不同的歷史時期會呈現出不同的戰爭形態和邊界，並形成不同的戰爭認知，但戰爭是政治繼續的本質屬性不會改變，衡量戰爭勝利的標準始終是實現政治利益最大化。智慧化戰爭顛覆了傳統的作戰樣式、作戰手段，武器裝備的打擊範圍拓展到人類的認知空間，戰場空間從物理空間拓展到認知、社會、網路等無形空間，能夠更直觀地表達「意志強加在對手身上」的特點，更強調在戰略、戰役、戰術層面奪取國家的意志、組織的觀念、人的心理與思維等主導權。智能化戰爭攻心奪志的勝利作用更為凸顯，政治移植、信仰打擊、精神控制、心理瓦解、文化滲透等攻心奪志手段也更加多元，爭奪與反爭奪在有形與無形戰場的較量更為激烈。圍繞戰爭展開的政治鬥爭更加複雜多變，民心向背、社會輿論、公眾心理對戰爭的製約力更加顯著，軍事服從政治體現得更加明顯，智能化戰爭的政治色彩更濃厚。軍事歸根到底是政治的延續，軍事上的勝利必須保證政治的領先。在我軍歷史上，毛澤東歷來反對單純軍事觀點，堅持軍事與政治的高度統一。美軍在伊拉克和阿富汗戰爭中，實驗了大量的先進武器，並取得了作戰的勝利，但從戰爭制勝的標準來看，贏得作戰卻輸掉了戰爭，陷於道義泥潭，遠未達成戰爭制勝目的。作戰制勝不等於戰爭制勝，要真正贏得智慧化戰爭的勝利，必須佔據正義制高點，才能最終主宰戰爭的勝敗。

智慧化戰爭將重建作戰力量，但戰爭制勝的關鍵因素仍是人，致人而不致於人

智慧化戰爭作戰力量發生質變。作戰力量是人、武器裝備及作戰方式構成的力量體系的整體描述，代表軍事技術和作戰方式的發展趨勢，本質上是先進軍事技術與新型作戰思想聯姻的產物。智慧化戰爭是人機智能一體的作戰，是從武器平台、指控體系、作戰終端、戰場環境等全方位、全領域進行升級、換代、重塑的戰爭形態，呈現人機協同、智能主導、雲腦作戰、全域對抗的特徵。智慧技術賦能改變最基礎的作戰要素，作戰樣式、時間、地域、空間等作戰要素瞬息萬變，作戰力量組成發生結構性變化，人逐漸退出對抗一線，智能化裝備將大量、成建制地走上戰場，傳統意義上「人對人」的戰爭將變成「機器對人」或「機器對決」的戰爭。傳統支援力量向主體作戰力量轉變，網路從業人員、科技菁英、心理、宗教、法律等專家和非國家行為體等多種民間力量，會以不同的方式參與到戰爭中來，從後台走向前台。一些新型作戰力量從分散化、配屬化的組織形態向增加比重、融合成軍、獨立成軍方向發展，從配角變為主角，軍事力量體系發生革命性重塑。

人依然是戰爭制勝的決定性因素。毛澤東在《論持久戰》中指出：「武器是戰爭的重要因素，但不是決定的因素，決定的因素是人不是物。」作戰力量始終是交戰雙方最直接、最重要的工具，也是最核心的致勝條件，人永遠是作戰力量中最活躍的因素，同時也是作戰力量中最具決定性的因素。智能化時代，武器的擬人化和人的武器化成為不可阻擋的趨勢，無人作戰系統將與有人系統深度融合為有機共生體，人與武器之間的傳統界限趨於模糊，重建人與武器的關係。武器系統具備更大程度的自主性和能動性，使人在戰爭中的活動方式發生深刻變化。特別是“腦控技術”的發展，對武器的控制流程將由傳統的“大腦-神經-手-武器”簡化為“大腦-武器”，這不僅僅意味著武器裝備的發展升級，而且標誌著人與武器的融合已達到新的層次。腦機介面、外骨骼系統、穿戴式裝置、人體植入等人機結合技術手段將全面提升認知、生理等人的內在能力，打造出「超級士兵」。人的作戰思想較以軟體和資料的形式被提前物化到智慧武器中，戰爭中由智慧武器來貫徹人的作戰意圖，達成預定作戰目的。人在未來戰爭中的決定作用，仍然是戰爭的計畫者、組織者和實施者。自主系統、腦科學等智慧科技更大的價值是介入戰爭，發揮協助指揮與控制的作用。智慧化武器自主作戰的背後仍是人的作戰方法、指揮方式與意志品質的較量，人依然是戰爭勝負的決定因素，善戰者必須要充分而科學地發揮人的能動作用，不可陷入為武器裝備所控的被動局面，真正做到致人而不致於人。

智慧化戰爭將重建交戰規則，但戰爭制勝的基礎仍是創造作戰優勢，勝兵先勝而後求戰

智慧化戰爭顛覆傳統交戰規則。戰爭是一個由多種因素構成的極為複雜的系統，交戰規則涉及戰爭性質、目的、主體、手段、時空條件，以及戰爭形態、戰爭行動、戰爭指導等諸多方面的因素。隨著人工智慧技術能夠全時、全域、全維度對作戰力量的各種行動進行動態感知、推理決策、評估預測，作戰樣式由「體係作戰」向「開源作戰」演進，跨域非常規、非對稱較量成為對壘新常態，戰爭進入系統自主對抗、察打行動秒殺立決的階段，以無人化為突出標誌的作戰樣式重新改寫交戰規則，重塑保障流程。制智權代替制空間權成為作戰重心，作戰行動在有形和無形戰場全局展開，戰場全息透明，消滅敵人、保存自己的戰爭基本目標也隨著顛覆性技術的發展表現為從「基於毀傷」轉變為「基於失能」。戰爭殺傷機理由化學能、動能轉變為定向能、生物能，傳統的暴力行動將向隱打擊、軟殺傷、控意識等方式演變，無聲殺傷成為主流。 「知」「戰」能力向一體化方向演進，透過物理域、資訊域與認知域的共同行動，即時精準地掌控參戰力量，憑藉己方的資訊優勢與決策優勢，在去中心化的戰場中切斷與遲滯對手的訊息與決策迴路，癱敵作戰體系，達成物理上摧毀敵人與心理上控制敵人之效。

創造作戰優勢是戰爭不變的勝利基礎。在決定時機和決定地點擁有壓倒優勢，是取得軍事勝利的規律。智慧化戰爭時空特性將發生重大變化，各種作戰行動可以全天候、全天時、多方向並行發起，戰爭中的「秒殺」現象更加突出，但作戰力量癱敵體系的作用點沒有變，創造作戰優勢的本質沒有改變，掌握戰爭主動權、揚我之長、擊敵之短的戰爭制勝法則沒有變。未來戰場將成為大面積“無人之境”，要奪取戰爭主動權，必須採取突然、多維融合的行動，在進攻與防禦之間實現敏捷、彈性的態勢轉換，進攻與防禦優勢將會超越過去的相對靜態，進入不斷演化的動態反轉，因此未來戰爭的藝術就是檢驗作戰雙方在持續不斷的突發狀態中是否具備耐力和有序性，取決於作戰體系和戰爭支撐體系的先進性。各類作戰人員、裝備、設施、環境要素在智慧化的戰場態勢支撐下，形成巨型複雜自適應對抗體系，「雲聚」成為新的作戰力量凝聚機理，統一的聚能平台成為謀求全維優勢的基礎，智能優勢成為決勝優勢。未來戰爭集中兵力的思想將在智慧科技的推動下螺旋式上升，跨域非對稱優勢在智慧化戰爭將更有戰略意義和決勝作用。提前設計戰爭、超前規劃戰爭，基於敵情我情塑造非對稱優勢，加緊在重要領域形成聚集優勢，加強戰略制衡力量建設，全面提升國家應對各類威脅風險的能力，成為智能化戰爭勝兵先勝而後求戰的必然。

（作者單位：國防大學）

中國原創軍事資源：https://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-10/22/content_245810.htm

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Providing Strategic Guidance for the Chinese Military Emphasis in the New Era In-depth study and implementation of Xi Jinping’s thoughts on strengthening the military

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為新時代中國軍事重點提供戰略指引
深入學習貫徹習近平強軍思想

中國軍網 國防部網 // 2022年9月2日 星期五

現代英語：

In July 2019, the white paper “China’s National Defense in the New Era” was published. In this comprehensive national defense white paper, for the first time, a defensive national defense policy system for China in the new era was constructed, and it was clearly stated that “implementing the military strategic policy of the new era is the strategic guidance of China’s national defense in the new era”. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Xi has always firmly grasped the fundamental focus of serving the strategic goals of the Party and the country, taking military means as the bottom line to realize the great dream and military struggle as an important aspect of the great struggle, keeping pace with the times and innovating military strategic guidance, establishing the general outline for the construction and use of military forces, and leading the national defense and military construction, reform and military struggle preparation in the new era to achieve many landmark, pioneering and historic achievements.

Giving new connotations to the active defense strategic thought

The active defense strategic thought is the basic point of our party’s military strategic thought. In the long-term practice of revolutionary war, the people’s army has formed a complete set of active defense strategic ideas. After the founding of New China, the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission made several major adjustments to the military strategic policy in accordance with the development and changes of the national security situation. Although the content of military strategic policies has changed in different periods, the basic idea of ​​active defense has never changed. We must adhere to the unity of strategic defense and offensive campaigns and battles, adhere to the principles of defense, self-defense, and post-strike, and adhere to “If no one offends me, I will not offend; if someone offends me, I will offend him.” Scientific and accurate military strategy is the greatest chance of victory. The reason why our army has been able to defeat the strong with the weak and the superior with the inferior, and has always been invincible and invincible, is that it has adhered to the strategic thinking of active defense.

In the new era, we must unswervingly adhere to the strategic thinking of active defense. President Xi pointed out that adhering to active defense is a conclusion drawn from summarizing historical experience and scientifically judging the reality and the future. It is by no means an expedient measure and must be firmly adhered to. Strategically adhering to active defense is fundamentally determined by the socialist nature of our country and the fundamental interests of the country. my country is a socialist country that follows the path of peaceful development, adheres to an independent and peaceful foreign policy, pursues a defensive national defense policy, and will not invade other countries; my country is a developing country that has always faced arduous and heavy economic construction tasks and needs a peaceful and stable external environment; the Chinese nation is a peace-loving nation, and there is no gene in the blood of the Chinese nation to invade others and dominate. The Chinese people have never bullied, oppressed, or enslaved the people of other countries, not in the past, not now, and not in the future. Under the new era conditions, we adhere to the active defense strategic thinking, fully demonstrate the position of my country’s defensive national defense policy, and show that my country will never follow the old path of “a strong country must dominate”, which is conducive to winning wider international recognition and creating a more favorable strategic environment for achieving the national development strategic goals.

The vitality of military strategic guidance lies in changing with the times and taking action in response to the situation. Since its birth, the active defense strategic thinking has always developed with the development of military practice and continuously enriched its connotation. Now, we are closer than ever to the goal of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and we have the ability and confidence to achieve this goal as never before. However, we must see that we are engaged in a great struggle with many new historical characteristics, and we will inevitably face various major challenges, major risks, major resistance, and major contradictions in the process of moving forward. President Xi Jinping has a profound understanding of the new situation of my country’s national security, scientifically judged the characteristics and trends of military struggle in the new era, and made it clear that active defense is fundamentally defense and the key is active. Emphasis is placed on enhancing the aggressiveness and initiative of military strategic guidance, focusing on the word “active”, further broadening the strategic vision, updating strategic thinking, moving the focus of guidance forward, and expanding the strategic depth of active defense; being active is not about rushing for quick results or rushing forward rashly, but the unity of strategic aggressiveness and tactical steady and steady, which is steady progress and steady action; actively adapt to the change in the basis of military struggle preparation, increase military innovation, and strive to raise military struggle preparation to a new level. These important expositions have concentrated on answering the most fundamental and critical issues of military strategy in the new era, and have clarified the direction and focus for our army to carry out diversified military tasks in a broader space. In recent years, under the strong guidance of Xi Jinping’s military strategic thinking, the focus of our military work has been increasingly corrected, the “peacetime ills” have been effectively corrected, the construction direction has been more focused on actual combat, and the innovation and development in all aspects of war, construction, and preparation have been fully leveraged. In particular, the whole army has effectively responded to external military provocations and pressures with a firm will to fight and a flexible strategy to fight, established the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, deterred the separatist activities of “Taiwan independence” with powerful actions, actively and prudently handled hot and sensitive situations in the surrounding areas, carefully organized border control and maritime rights protection operations, effectively carried out major tasks such as anti-terrorism and stability maintenance, peacekeeping and escort, promoted the historic transformation of the military struggle pattern, and effectively maintained the overall stability of the national strategy.

Innovation of our military’s war and combat guidance theory

The essence of military strategy is the strategy of war, and planning and guiding war is the core content of innovative strategic guidance. At present, a new round of scientific and technological revolution and military revolution is accelerating, and science and technology have an increasingly greater impact on military competition and modern warfare. President Xi accurately grasped the changes in science and technology, war, and opponents, established new goals and new layouts for military struggle, clarified new guidance and new strategies for the use of military forces, put forward new measures and new requirements for preparing for war, and profoundly answered the major questions of what kind of war to fight and how to fight in the future, and raised our army’s understanding of the laws of war guidance to a new level.

Deeply grasp the characteristics, laws, and winning mechanisms of modern warfare. The freedom to control war comes from the inevitability of understanding war. All laws of war guidance must develop in accordance with the development of history and the development of war. Judging from the recent local wars and military operations in the world, the degree of informatization of modern warfare is constantly improving, and intelligent characteristics are becoming increasingly apparent. Various types of unmanned combat systems have been put into actual combat in large quantities, and the concepts, elements, and methods of winning wars have undergone major changes. President Xi pointed out profoundly that these changes seem dazzling, but there are laws to follow behind them. The fundamental thing is that the winning mechanism of war has changed. For example, in terms of combat forms, it is emphasized that modern warfare is a confrontation between systems, and integrated joint operations have become the basic combat form; in terms of time and space characteristics, it is emphasized that the multi-dimensional battlefield space is integrated, and the boundaries between strategic, campaign, and tactical actions tend to be blurred; in terms of the key to victory, it is emphasized that the right to control information has become the core of seizing comprehensive control of the battlefield and the key to winning the war; in terms of organization and command, it is emphasized that the strategic, joint, timely, professional, and precise requirements of combat command are becoming higher and higher, and combat organization and management are becoming more standardized, process-oriented, and refined. These important expositions have deepened the understanding of the characteristics and laws of modern warfare, and provided important guidelines for us to grasp the laws of war in the world today and master the “swimming skills” of modern warfare.

Build a combat theory system with the characteristics of our army. War theory and combat thinking are a powerful traction for strengthening actual combat preparations and defeating strong enemies. In the revolutionary war years, our army was always one step ahead of the enemy in combat theory and tactics, which is an important reason why our army continued to move from victory to victory. Entering the new era, President Xi Jinping focused on the overall national security and development, grasped the revolutionary changes in the war form and combat methods, prospectively studied major issues of future wars, and put forward a series of innovative combat ideas. For example, he proposed to strengthen the concept of information dominance, system support, elite combat, and joint victory, integrate various combat forces, combat units, and combat elements into an organic whole, and improve the joint combat capability and full-domain combat capability based on the network information system; he proposed to adhere to flexibility, mobility, and autonomy, focus on playing our advantages and fight with what we can and what we can’t; he proposed to grasp the new characteristics and new requirements of the people’s war under the new era conditions, innovate content and methods, and give full play to the overall power of the people’s war. These important expositions adhere to and carry forward the essence of the military thought that our army has always adhered to, conform to the evolution trend of the war form, meet the actual and development requirements of combat effectiveness construction, and provide principled guidance for our army to carry out combat tasks.

Based on the most difficult and complex situations, we should promote military struggle preparation. Military struggle preparation is the basic practical activity of the army. The more fully prepared, the more proactive it will be strategically. In the summer and autumn of 2018, the Central Military Commission used three months to conduct an unannounced and surprise inspection of the various military services and armed police forces distributed in the five major war zones. The scope of the operation covered 21 provinces (autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the central government) and parts of the East China Sea and the South China Sea. This is a microcosm of the whole army’s in-depth promotion of military struggle preparation in the new era. “It is better to be prepared without fighting than to fight without preparation.” President Xi repeatedly emphasized that the whole army must establish the idea of ​​being ready for war at any time, and military struggle preparation must be firmly grasped and never relaxed. The whole army is required to persist in fighting, preparing for war, and building at the same time, coordinate the promotion of military struggle preparation in all directions and fields, and be prepared to respond to various complex and difficult situations at any time; raise daily combat readiness work to a strategic height, adhere to the integration of peace and war, and maintain a high alert posture with arrows on the string and ready to be fired; promote actual combat training, keep close to combat tasks, combat opponents, and combat environment, and strengthen targeted, testing, and confrontational training. These important expositions reflect deep strategic concerns and strong bottom-line thinking, deepen the understanding of the laws of how to prepare for war and how to train troops in a peaceful environment, and point out the methods and paths for the army to generate and improve combat effectiveness and grasp the initiative in military struggle.

Enrich and develop our party’s art of commanding military struggle

President Xi insists on using the Marxist view of war to examine war and military issues, enriches and develops our party’s military dialectical thinking, and applies it to guiding the practice of actual military struggle, showing strategic planning that takes into account the overall situation, strategic courage that is not afraid of risks, and strategic wisdom that wins by taking advantage of the enemy, opening up a new realm of strategic guidance for the people’s army in the new era.

Adhere to the military’s obedience to politics and strategy’s obedience to policy. War is the continuation of politics, and dealing with the relationship between war and politics is related to the fate of the country. Now, the connection between military and politics is closer, the relevance and integrity at the strategic level are increasing, and the influence and constraints of political factors on war are becoming more prominent. President Xi pointed out profoundly that in planning and guiding wars, we must deeply understand the political attributes of war and think about war issues from a political perspective. It is emphasized that we must maintain strategic clarity, strengthen strategic determination, and understand and plan the war issue under the great goal of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation; we must have both military and political minds, and whether to fight, when to fight, how to fight, and to what extent, must obey and serve politics. We must always obey and serve the highest interests of the country and the nation, strengthen political awareness, awareness of the overall situation, and awareness of orders, and be good at planning military actions with an eye on the overall situation of national politics and diplomacy and the overall national security strategy to ensure political and strategic initiative.

Adhere to overall planning of struggle, preparation for war, and construction. “Those who have civil affairs must have military preparations.” President Xi Jinping profoundly summarized the historical lessons of my country’s suffering from the ravages of wars by the great powers in modern times, revealed the dialectics of war and peace, and pointed out that only by being able to fight can we stop the war, and only by being prepared to fight can we avoid fighting. The less able to fight, the more likely we are to be beaten. We emphasize that we do not want to fight, but only if we are prepared, have strong military power and have the ability to win, can we strategically achieve the goal of “stopping war with force”; we must plan preparation for war and stopping war, deterrence and actual combat, war operations and the use of military power in peacetime as a whole, and give full play to the strategic function of military power. In today’s world, the shadow of Cold War mentality and power politics lingers, and traditional and non-traditional security threats emerge in an endless stream. Some countries are trying to expand military alliances to seek absolute security, coerce other countries to take sides and create camp confrontation, ignore the rights and interests of other countries and pursue self-centeredness, and forging swords into plowshares is still a good wish of people. Practice has proved that peace must be backed by strong strength. We must keep a close eye on strong enemies and opponents, step up the forging of stronger capabilities and more reliable means, better play the strategic functions of our army in shaping the situation, managing crises, containing wars, and winning wars, and resolutely defend national sovereignty, security, and development interests.

Adhere to the unity of firmness in the principle of struggle and flexibility in strategy. Struggle is an art. It is about will, determination, and faith. It is about strategy, wisdom, and methods. In leading the great struggle, President Xi has always insisted on the unity of strengthening the sense of crisis and maintaining strategic determination, the unity of strategic judgment and tactical decision-making, and the unity of the struggle process and the effectiveness of the struggle. He requires our army to be brave and good at struggle. It is emphasized that we must not give in on issues of principle, we must be tit-for-tat and fight for every inch of land, and we must dare to take on all kinds of provocations, dare to attack, dare to fight and win, not bow in the face of difficulties, not retreat in the face of challenges, and not trade principles; we must be flexible and maneuverable on strategic issues, insist on being reasonable, beneficial, and moderate, and pay attention to the methods and art of struggle. Practice has proved that the more complex the struggle situation is, the more we must use the military hand in a step-by-step and strategic way. We must focus on stabilizing the overall situation and controlling risks, adhere to the combination of rigidity and flexibility, multiple measures, and comprehensive measures, strengthen the coordination and cooperation between military actions and political and diplomatic actions, and form an overall joint force for struggle.

Adhere to the combination of overall planning and highlighting key points. The key to strategic planning is to focus on the overall situation and seek opportunities. my country has a complex geostrategic environment and has the most neighboring countries among the world’s major powers. Based on the new situation facing my country’s security and development, President Xi Jinping has insisted on overall planning and ensuring the stability of the overall strategic situation in military strategic guidance, and has also focused on highlighting key points and grasping strategic hubs related to the overall situation to enhance the balance and three-dimensionality of the strategic layout. It is emphasized that according to the security threats and the strategic tasks of our army, we must build a strategic deployment and military deployment that is coordinated overall, responsible for different regions, mutually coordinated and integrated; highlight the preparation for military struggle at sea, effectively control major crises, and properly respond to chain reactions; coordinate the promotion of military struggle preparations in traditional security fields and new security fields, and actively respond to new security threats and challenges. At present, the sudden, interconnected and changeable threats facing my country’s security have greatly increased. We must grasp the direction, take the overall situation into consideration, coordinate the overall situation, firmly grasp the main contradictions and main aspects of the military struggle, ensure the stability of the overall strategic situation, and create a strategic situation that is beneficial to us.

On the new journey, we are facing a situation with complexity and severity, and a task with heaviness and difficulty that is rare in the world and history. The People’s Army must shoulder the important task of supporting the Chinese nation towards great rejuvenation. The whole army must establish the military strategic thinking of the new era, the military strategic policy of the new era, the baton of preparing for war, and the responsibility of preparing for war. We must vigorously carry forward the spirit of struggle, cultivate the fighting spirit of not fearing hardship and not fearing death, strengthen the determination and will to fight at the critical moment, and always have the character, integrity, and courage of not believing in evil, not fearing ghosts, and not being spineless. We must constantly enhance our fighting skills, focus on tempering our actual combat capabilities in arduous and rigorous training, actively innovate strategies and tactics that are one step ahead of the enemy, and step up the construction of a strong system support for joint operations, forge elite troops that can come when called, fight when they come, and win when they fight, and resolutely win future wars and resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests.

國語中文：

2019年7月，《新時代的中國國防》白皮書發表。在這部綜合型國防白皮書中，首次建構新時代中國防禦性國防政策體系，鮮明提出「貫徹落實新時代軍事戰略方針，這是新時代中國國防的戰略指導」。黨的十八大以來，習主席始終牢牢把握服務黨和國家戰略目標這個根本著眼，把軍事手段作為實現偉大夢想的保底手段、軍事鬥爭作為進行偉大斗爭的重要方面來運籌，與時俱進創新軍事戰略指導，確立了統攬軍事力量建設和運用的總綱，引領新時代國防和軍隊建設、改革和軍事鬥爭準備取得許多標誌性、開創性、歷史性重大成就。

賦予積極防禦戰略思想新的內涵

積極防禦戰略思想是我們黨軍事戰略思想的基本要點。在長期革命戰爭實踐中，人民軍隊形成了一整套積極防禦戰略思想。新中國成立後，黨中央、中央軍委根據國家安全情勢發展變化，對軍事戰略方針進行了多次重大調整。雖然各時期軍事戰略方針內容有變化，但積極防禦的基本思想始終沒有變，堅持戰略上防禦與戰役戰鬥上進攻的統一，堅持防禦、自衛、後發製人的原則，堅持「人不犯我，我不犯人；人若犯我，我必犯人」。軍事戰略科學準確，就是最大的勝算。我軍一路走來，之所以能夠以弱勝強、以劣勝優，始終攻無不克、戰無不勝，很重要的是堅持了積極防禦戰略思想。

新時代必須堅定不移堅持積極防禦戰略思想。習主席指出，堅持積極防禦，是總結歷史經驗、科學判斷現實和未來得出的結論，決不是權宜之計，要牢牢堅持住。在戰略上始終堅持積極防禦，從根本上來說是由我國社會主義性質和國家根本利益決定的。我國是社會主義國家，走和平發展道路，堅持獨立的和平外交政策，奉行防禦性國防政策，不會去侵略其他國家；我國是發展中國家，一直面對著艱鉅繁重的經濟建設任務，需要一個和平穩定的外在環境；中華民族是愛好和平的民族，中華民族血液中沒有侵略他人、稱王稱霸的基因，中國人民從來沒有欺負、壓迫、奴役過其他國家人民，過去沒有、現在沒有、將來也不會有。在新的時代條件下，我們堅持積極防禦戰略思想，充分錶明我國防禦性國防政策立場，昭示我國絕不走「國強必霸」的老路，有利於贏得更廣泛的國際認同，為實現國家發展戰略目標營造更為有利的策略環境。

軍事戰略指導的生命力在於應時而變、應勢而動。積極防禦戰略思想自誕生之日起，就始終隨著軍事實踐的發展而發展，不斷豐富其內涵。現在，我們前所未有地接近實現中華民族偉大復興的目標，前所未有地具有實現這個目標的能力和信心。但要看到，我們正在進行具有許多新的歷史特徵的偉大鬥爭，前行中必然會面對各種重大挑戰、重大風險、重大阻力、重大矛盾。習主席深刻掌握我國國家安全的新形勢，科學研判新時代軍事鬥爭的特徵和趨勢，明確積極防禦根本在防禦、要義在積極。強調增強軍事戰略指導的進取性和主動性，在「積極」二字上做文章，進一步拓寬戰略視野、更新戰略思維、前移指導重心，拓展積極防禦戰略縱深；積極不是急於求成、急躁冒進，而是戰略上進取和戰術上穩紮穩打相統一，是穩中有進、穩中有為；積極適應軍事鬥爭準備基點轉變，加大軍事創新力度，努力把軍事鬥爭準備提高到一個新水平。這些重要論述，集中回答了新時代軍事戰略最根本最要害的問題，為我軍在更加廣闊的空間遂行多樣化軍事任務明確了方向重點。這些年，在習近平軍事戰略思想的有力指引下，我軍工作重心日益歸正，「和平積弊」有力糾治，建設指向更加聚焦實戰，全方位撬動了戰、建、備各領域各方面創新發展。特別是全軍以堅定的鬥爭意志、靈活的鬥爭策略，有效應對外部軍事挑釁施壓，劃設東海防空識別區，以有力行動震懾「台獨」分裂行徑，積極穩健處置週邊熱點敏感事態，周密組織邊境管控與海上維權行動，有效遂行反恐維穩、維和護航等重大任務，推動軍事鬥爭格局實現歷史性轉變，有力維護了國家戰略全局穩定。

創新我軍戰與作戰指導理論

軍事戰略的本質是戰之方略，規劃和指導戰爭是創新戰略指導的核心內容。目前，新一輪科技革命和軍事革命正在加速發展，科技對軍事競爭和現代戰爭影響越來越大。習主席準確掌握科技之變、戰爭之變、對手之變，確立軍事鬥爭新目標新佈局，明確軍事力量運用新指導新策略，提出備戰打仗新舉措新要求，深刻回答了未來打什麼仗、怎麼打仗的重大問題，把我軍對戰爭指導的規律性認知提升到新高度。

深刻掌握現代戰爭特徵規律與致勝機理。駕馭戰爭的自由，來自於認識戰爭的必然。一切戰爭指導規律，必須依照歷史的發展而發展，並依照戰爭的發展而發展。從世界近幾場局部戰爭和軍事行動看，現代戰爭資訊化程度不斷提高，智能化特徵日益顯現，各類無人作戰系統大量投入實戰，戰爭制勝觀念、制勝要素、制勝方式發生重大變化。習主席深刻指出，這些變化看起來眼花撩亂，但背後是有規律可循的，根本的是戰爭的致勝機理變了。例如，在作戰形式上，強調現代戰爭是體系和體系的對抗，一體化聯合作戰成為基本作戰形式；在時空特性上，強調多維戰場空間融為一體，戰略、戰役、戰術行動界限趨於模糊；在製勝關鍵上，強調制資訊權成為奪取戰場綜合控制權的核心，成為贏得戰爭勝利的關鍵；在組織指揮上，強調作戰指揮戰略性、聯合性、時效性、專業性、精確性要求越來越高，作戰組織和管理日趨標準化、流程化、精細化。這些重要論述深化了對現代戰爭特徵規律的認識，為我們掌握當今世界戰爭法則、掌握現代戰爭「游泳術」提供了重要遵循。

建構具有我軍特色的作戰理論體系。戰爭理論和作戰思想，是加強實戰準備、制勝強敵對手的有力牽引。革命戰爭年代，我軍在作戰理論和戰法上始終高敵一籌，這是我軍不斷從勝利走向勝利的重要原因。進入新時代，習主席著眼於國家安全和發展全局，掌握戰爭形態和作戰方式的革命性變化，前瞻研究未來戰爭重大議題，提出了一系列創新性作戰想法。例如，提出強化資訊主導、體系支撐、精兵作戰、聯合製勝的觀念，把各種作戰力量、作戰單元、作戰要素融合為一個有機整體，提高基於網路資訊體系的聯合作戰能力、全域作戰能力；提出堅持靈活、機動、自主，著眼於發揮我們的優勢打，以能擊不能；提出把握新的時代條件下人民戰爭的新特點新要求，創新內容和方式方法，充分發揮人民戰爭的整體威力。這些重要論述，堅持和發揚我軍一貫堅持的軍事思想精髓，順應戰爭形態演變趨勢，符合戰鬥力建設實際和發展要求，為我軍遂行作戰任務提供了原則指導。

以最困難、最複雜情況推進軍事鬥爭準備。軍事鬥爭準備是軍隊的基本實踐活動，準備越充分在戰略上就越主動。 2018年夏秋，中央軍委利用3個月時間，以不打招呼、突擊檢查的方式，對分佈在5大戰區的各軍兵種和武警部隊進行整建制戰備拉動，行動範圍覆蓋21個省（自治區、直轄市）和東海、南海部分海域，這是新時代全軍上下深入推進軍事鬥爭準備的縮影。 「寧可備而不戰，不可無備而戰。」習主席一再強調，全軍要樹立隨時準備打仗的思想，軍事鬥爭準備要牢牢抓在手上，須臾不可放鬆。要求全軍堅持邊鬥爭、邊備戰、邊建設，統籌推進各方向各領域軍事鬥爭準備，做好隨時應對各種複雜困難局面的準備；把日常戰備工作提到戰略高度，堅持平戰一體，保持箭在弦上、引而待發的高度戒備態勢；推進實戰實訓，緊貼作戰任務、作戰對手、作戰環境，加強針對性、檢驗性、對抗性訓練。這些重要論述，反映了深層的戰略憂患和強烈的底線思維，深化了和平環境下如何備戰、怎麼練兵的規律性認識，為軍隊生成和提高戰鬥力、掌握軍事鬥爭主動權指明了方法路徑。

豐富發展我們黨軍事鬥爭指揮藝術

習主席堅持用馬克思主義戰爭觀審視戰爭和軍事問題，豐富發展了我們黨的軍事辯證法思想，並運用到指導現實軍事鬥爭實踐中，展現出觀照全局的戰略運籌、不畏風險的戰略魄力、因敵制勝的戰略智慧，開啟了新時代人民軍隊戰略指導的新境界。

堅持軍事服從政治、戰略服從政略。戰爭是政治的延續，處理戰爭和政治的關係，事關國家命運。現在，軍事和政治的連結更加緊密，在戰略層面上的相關性和整體性日益增強，政治因素對戰爭的影響和限制愈發突出。習主席深刻指出，規劃和指導戰爭，必須深刻認識戰爭的政治屬性，從政治高度思考戰爭問題。突顯，要保持戰略清醒，增強戰略定力，把戰爭問題放在實現中華民族偉大復興這個大目標下來認識和籌劃；既要有軍事頭腦，更要有政治頭腦，打還是不打、什麼時候打、怎麼打、打到什麼程度，都要服從和服務政治。我們必須始終服從服務於國家和民族的最高利益，強化政治意識、大局意識、號令意識，善於著眼國家政治外交大局和國家安全戰略全局規劃軍事行動，確保政治和戰略主動。

堅持整體運籌鬥爭、備戰、建設。 「有文事者，必有武備。」習主席深刻總結近代以後我國遭受列強戰爭蹂躪的歷史教訓，揭示戰爭與和平的辯證法，指出能戰方能止戰，準備打才可能不必打，越不能打越可能挨打。強調我們不希望打仗，但只有我們有準備、有強大軍事力量、有打贏能力，才能從戰略上實現不戰而屈人之兵，達到「以武止戈」的目的；要把備戰與止戰、威懾與實戰、戰爭行動與和平時期軍事力量運用作為一個整體加以運籌，發揮好軍事力量的戰略功能。當今世界，冷戰思維和強權政治陰霾不散，傳統和非傳統安全威脅層出不窮。一些國家試圖擴大軍事同盟謀求絕對安全，脅迫別國選邊站隊製造陣營對抗，漠視別國權益大搞唯我獨尊，鑄劍為犁仍然是人們的一個美好願望。實踐證明，和平必須以強大實力為後盾。我們要緊盯強敵對手，加緊鍛造更強大的能力、更可靠的手段，更好發揮我軍塑造態勢、管控危機、遏制戰爭、打贏戰爭的戰略功能，堅決捍衛國家主權、安全、發展利益。

堅持鬥爭原則的堅定性與策略的彈性相統一。鬥爭是一門藝術，拼的是意志、決心、信念，比的是策略、智慧、方法。習主席在領導進行偉大鬥爭中，始終堅持增強憂患意識和保持戰略定力相統一、戰略判斷和戰術決斷相統一、鬥爭過程和鬥爭實效相統一，要求我軍既要敢於鬥爭，又要善於鬥爭。強調在原則問題上寸步不讓，必須針鋒相對、寸土必爭，面對各種挑釁敢於接招、敢於出擊、敢戰能勝，不在困難面前低頭，不在挑戰面前退縮，不拿原則做交易；在策略問題上靈活機動，堅持有理有利有節，講求鬥爭的方式方法和藝術。實踐證明，鬥爭情勢越複雜，越要有步驟、有策略地用好軍事這一手。我們必須著眼穩控大局、管控風險，堅持剛柔並濟、多手並舉、綜合施策，加強軍事行動同政治外交行動協調配合，形成鬥爭整體合力。

堅持通盤規劃與突出重點結合。策略運籌關鍵在於全局著眼、謀勢取勢。我國地緣戰略環境複雜，在世界大國中周邊接壤國家最多。習主席立足我國安全和發展面臨的新形勢，在軍事戰略指導上既堅持通盤謀劃、確保戰略全局穩定，又著力突出重點、扭住關係全局的戰略樞紐，增強戰略佈局的平衡性、立體性。強調要根據面臨安全威脅和我軍戰略任務，建構全局統籌、分區負責，相互策應、互為一體的戰略部署和軍事布勢；突顯海上軍事鬥爭準備，有效控制重大危機，妥善應對連鎖反應；統籌推動傳統安全領域和新型安全領域軍事鬥爭準備，積極應對新的安全威脅和挑戰。目前，我國安全面臨的突發性、連動性、多變性威脅大幅增強。我們必須掌握方向、統攬大局、統籌全局，緊緊抓住軍事鬥爭的主要矛盾和矛盾的主要方面，確保戰略全局穩定，營造於我有利的戰略態勢。

新征程上，我們面臨情勢環境的複雜性和嚴峻性、肩負任務的繁重性和艱鉅性世所罕見、史所罕見，人民軍隊必須肩負起支撐中華民族走向偉大復興的時代重任。全軍要把新時代軍事戰略思想立起來，把新時代軍事戰略方針立起來，把備戰打仗指揮棒立起來，把抓備戰打仗的責任擔當立起來。要大力發揚鬥爭精神，培育一不怕苦、二不怕死的戰鬥精神，強化關鍵時刻不惜一戰的決心意志，任何時候都要有不信邪、不怕鬼、不當軟骨的風骨、氣節、膽魄。要不斷增強鬥爭本領，注重在艱苦嚴格的訓練中淬煉實戰能力，積極創新高敵一籌的策略戰法，抓緊建強聯合作戰的體系支撐，鍛造召之即來、來之能戰、戰之必勝的精兵勁旅，堅決打贏未來戰爭，堅決維護國家主權、安全、發展利益。

中國原創軍事資源：https://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-09/02/content_323888.htm