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國外軍事家看中國特色的信息戰 // Chinese Characteristics of Information Warfare: Foreign Military Observations

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國外軍事家看中國特色的信息戰 //

Chinese Characteristics of Information Warfare: Foreign Military Observations

In recent years, information warfare has become a hot spot all over the world.China’s military strategists have not neglected their importance as a tool of war, and are accelerating the development of information warfare theory. They are not only exploring theoretical issues, but also training troops.

Information warfare with Chinese characteristics

Chinese military theorists believe that information warfare can give Mao Zedong’s people’s war ideas into the omission. This view by the Chinese information warfare expert Wang Pufeng (transliteration) generals in 1995 for the first time. Some people think that electronics, computer and information engineering experts, like the past soldiers on the battlefield, can become the main force in the new people’s war. Obviously they want to use the people’s war ideas to fight the information war – a war with a home computer, when necessary to mobilize thousands of people, attack foreign computer systems. China has a number of outstanding software experts, in the field of information war has great potential. The question is how to seek greater information space and equipment for the huge population.

“The whole society will replace the traditional battlefield,” said Shen Weiguang, an information warfare expert. “Different classes and social groups will participate in political activities in their own country or other countries.” He advocates the establishment of a scientist, police, Other experts to form the information protection forces to defend the security of the national information field, to counter the invasion of information launched by other countries.

The idea of ​​combining the people’s war with the information war is being carried out in China’s 1.5 million strong reserve army. The People’s Liberation Army is turning the reserve forces of certain military sub-divisions into small-scale information warfare. In Hubei, a military division, the People’s Armed Forces Department has 20 towns of the armed forces to form a reserve / militia information warfare. The Department has a network of war camps, electronic war camps, intelligence and psychological camps, and 35 technical units (classes to camp). The department has also established the first training base for information services that can accommodate 500 people.

The above-mentioned military division is not the only military division of the organization’s reserve and militia for information warfare. “Liberation Army Daily” has reported that in December 1999 a city along the southeast coast held a meeting of the reserve and militia forces, during the electronic interference, network attack and defense and radar reconnaissance and other red. There are also reports of information warfare activities organized by the People’s Armed Forces and the Armed Forces in other regions.

In the information war era, China is also affected by another important tactics, that is, China’s “thirty-six dollars.” About 300 years ago, an unnamed scholar collected 36 Chinese tactics, and compiled a book, named “thirty-six dollars.” The book focuses on deception as a military art that achieves military goals. In the information age, due to the unknown uncertainty of the attacker’s origin (the program’s listening to the source of the virus and the presence of the back door increases the vulnerability of the system), some tactics may be reusable, thirty-six may find new Meaning and new use.

Some critics argue that in today’s high-tech era, these ancient strategies are hard to do. However, just look at a few of them, then it is another situation: the first plan “deceive”, meaning by resorting to deceit and camouflage means to hide their true intentions, in order to achieve the purpose of loosening the enemy vigilance. Applying to information wartime is the use of regular e-mail and commercial lines on the Internet to cover the purpose of sending dangerous code and viruses. The fourth meter “to wait and see”. Meaning that when fighting their own recharge your batteries, until the enemy fatigue chaos, take the opportunity to win. Application to the information wartime is the use of people’s war theory, extensive mobilization of the masses to attack, until all the Western computer to meet the difficulty of self-propelled when the implementation of large-scale attack.

At present, China is considering the establishment of future high-tech operations of the “network army.” It will protect the network sovereignty, network warfare and technology and knowledge-intensive operations. Network technology will include: can decipher the password, steal data and restore data browsing technology; can attack on the network and attack counterattack technology; can fake fake identity from the network to steal the license of camouflage technology; to avoid attacks, Prevent internal leaks, and defensive techniques that prevent random action like electronic police.

Definition of information warfare

China’s famous author of the issue of information warfare at home and abroad is Dr. Shen Weiguang, Major General Wang Pufeng, Wang Baoji University and Yuan Bangji General (both sound Ze). In 1996, Dr. Shen first proposed the definition of information warfare: information war is a two sides through the control of information and intelligence to try to master the battlefield initiative of the war. As the United States defined, Dr. Shen stressed that “save yourself, fight against the enemy” into “to protect themselves, control the enemy.” Wang generals also believe that the key to information warfare is to control the information.
In 1997, Wang Baoji University from the perspective of China’s military science and Marxism-Leninism to elaborate on the word information warfare. This article covers the form, nature, hierarchy, characteristics, characteristics and principles of information warfare. He believes that the form of information warfare is divided into normal, crisis and wartime three; nature is attack and defense of the contest; level is divided into national, strategic, theater and tactical four; features include command and control warfare, intelligence war Such as electronic warfare, psychological warfare, space control warfare, hacking warfare, virtual warfare, economic warfare, strategic and precise contest, etc .; features complex, transparent, limited target, short duration, small damage, large combat space, Comprehensive, strong command capability, etc .; in principle, to take cut, blinded, transparent, fast melon and improve the viability and other measures. His office and analysis of information warfare help people gain a deeper understanding of China’s information warfare.

Another author of China’s definition of information war is the General Staff of the PLA General Staff, he wrote in the 1999 book that: “Information war is a capture and maintain the control of information and struggle between the hostile parties Compete for access to control and use of information initiative, they use and protect their own information and resources and information systems at the same time, will use and destroy the enemy’s information resources, information systems and information-based weapons systems.

In 2000, General Wang Pufeng made a more thorough and thorough explanation of the “information warfare” than he used to be “information war”. Wang believes that the information war refers to a war and a war mode; information warfare refers to a kind of combat and a combat mode. The new mode of action refers to the action that is carried out in the computer network. Information warfare includes information detection systems, information transmission systems, information and weapons attack systems, and information processing and application systems. Information warfare contains information warfare, which combines information and ability to use information networks based on the battlefield as their place of activity.

Information warfare training

In February 1999, an interesting article on information warfare training defined information warfare as a knowledge war, a special contest for the power of high intelligence. The definition stems from the fact that high-tech warfare requires commanders and operators to have a high level of knowledge, strong mental, command and operational skills.
Chinese military leaders, after recognizing the gap between the above and the more developed countries, decided to carry out training activities at all levels. The staff will be divided into three categories by age:

The first category for the support of talent, the main goal is more than 40 years of age at all levels of leading cadres. The aim is to eliminate their blind spots by training (from mechanization concepts to simulated computer fights) to change their minds and apply them to future wars. Training content includes: information technology foundation, information warfare theory, information warfare weapons universal knowledge. Training methods of color training courses and other auxiliary methods.

The second category is a transitional talent, training goal is 30-40 year old cadres. As the future leaders of the Chinese army, they must focus on improving the commanding ability in the information warfare environment.

The third category for the regeneration of talent, training for the 30-year-old cadres. These people have long been adapted to the information society, with a good foundation of modern information technology theory, focusing on improving their commanding ability and skills.

The training of various age groups includes: basic theory (computer foundation and application, communication network technology, information highway, digital force); electronic warfare; radar technology; information war rules and rules; information strategy and tactics; theater and strategic information warfare Information systems (including the collection of letters, processing, information and use of information warfare); monitoring, decision-making and control systems; information weapons (soft and hard destruction of the concept and principles, how to use information weapons, analog information warfare); information system protection; Computer virus attack and defense, as well as communication network interference and anti-interference.

The article shows that China is preparing a first-class information warfare course. However, subsequent reports indicate that this is not the case. In July 1999, a “Liberation Army Daily” pointed out: “training content, system and structure of the rationality of the information warfare training can not really become the mainstream of our military training.Currently, information warfare training in a state of arbitrary. System, operation is not standardized, the lack of assessment standards and management regulations.

Information warfare

Over the past three years, China has held several major information warfare military exercises, every time it is important, because it is a test of information war theory. The first “special war” (information warfare) exercise was conducted in October 1997; a military army in a military area was subjected to a computer attack aimed at paralyzing its system, and the group’s military antivirus software was defended. The exercise is called “invasion and anti-intrusion exercise”. The exercise used ground logistics, medical and air forces.

In October 1998, China held a high-tech comprehensive exercise with several national military zones. The first use of the “military information superhighway” was used for joint defense operations. The information network subsystem in the command automation system is composed of digital, dialing, command network and secret channel. The other parts of the command automation system are subsystems such as command warfare, audio and graphics processing, control and data encryption. Military information highway in addition to the trend map, but also send graphics, characters and audio data.

In October 1999, the People’s Liberation Army for the first time between the two groups of war-level computer online confrontation exercise. Conducted reconnaissance and anti-reconnaissance, interference and anti-interference, blockade and anti-blockade, air strikes and anti-air raid and other subjects. In the software environment, resource sharing, combat command, situation display, auxiliary evaluation, signal transmission and intelligence warfare and other six types of operations. The computer evaluation system conducts mathematical and qualitative analysis of the performance of the participant.
In July 2000, a military area in southwest China also conducted an online confrontation exercise. The three training tasks related to the exercise are: organizing and planning the campaign, seizing air power and making information, implementing breakthroughs and breaking down. There are more than 100 terminal networking involved in the exercise. Three weeks later, another military area also opened a high-tech exercise curtain, and issued to the subordinate units began to control the communication line command.

China ‘s Information Warfare Ability

Chinese military theorists have found a voluntary, very economical and obedient partner in information warfare. This partner will enable China to catch up with the West in strategic, military and international status. Which will enable China to play an important strategic role in the future Asia-Pacific region. China may gradually pay close attention to economic competitors.

China attaches great importance to the role played by the new information warfare forces, including the network forces (independent arms), the network warriors commando, the information protection forces, the information corps, the electronic police and the joint people’s war network. The latter is particularly concerned by foreign analysts because of its unique nature and potential. Chinese military theorists believe that the victory of information warfare will belong to the one who can mobilize the most computer experts to participate in the “information family war”, they will use such as cyber war strategy, trying to cut off important information nodes and contacts.

At present, China’s information warfare combines Western, Russian and Chinese ideas. However, information wars with Chinese characteristics, which are different from Russia and the West, are gradually forming. China’s information warfare should look for answers to the questions from today’s military history, such as the nature and characteristics of information warfare.

However, there are still many shortcomings in China’s information warfare methods, not just quantitative aspects. The core of the information warfare theory also involves maintaining the integrity and stability of the infrastructure. In the information age, infrastructure stability is as important as troop survivability. China’s biggest weakness is just in terms of infrastructure. At present, China is accelerating the development of electronic information industry, its purpose is nothing more than for the military and civilian information base for the use of infrastructure.

China is good at drawing lessons from others, may soon be able to set up a compelling information warfare force. Information war has forced China to cross a number of technological development stages, the use of Western technology, not only save time but also save money. However, China may not fully follow the example of others, but will take a creative or indirect information war strategy. But no matter what, China is worthy of attention is different from other countries, the power of information.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

近些年來，信息戰已經成為全世界的熱點。中國的軍事家們也沒有忽視其作為戰爭工具的重要意義，正在加速發展信息戰理論。他們不僅正在探索理論方面的課題，而且也在據此訓練部隊。

中國特色的信息戰

中國軍事理論家認為，信息戰可以給毛澤東的人民戰爭思想注入省略。此觀點由中國信息戰專家王普峰（音譯）將軍於１９９５年首次提出。有人認為，電子、計算機和信息工程專家如同過去戰場上的將士一樣，可以成為新人民戰爭中的主力軍。顯然他們是希望用人民戰爭思想打信息戰－－一種用家用微機即可進行的戰爭，需要時動員成千上萬人，攻擊外國計算機系統。中國擁有一批傑出的軟件專家，在信息戰領域有巨大潛力。問題是如何為龐大的人口尋求更大的信息空間和設備。

信息戰專家沈偉光在文章中寫道：“整個社會將取代傳統戰場。不同階層和社會團體將參與本國或其他國家的政治活動。”他主張建立一支由精通信息戰的科學家、警察、士兵和其他專家組成的信息保護部隊，以捍衛國家信息領域的安全，反擊其他國家發動的信息入侵。

將人民戰爭和信息戰相結合的思想正在貫徹到中國１５０萬強大後備軍中。人民解放軍正將某些軍分區的後備役部隊變成小型信息戰團。在湖北某軍分區，人民武裝部已將２０個城鎮的武裝部組成一個後備役／民兵信息戰團。該部擁有網絡戰營、電子戰營、情報和心理戰營，以及３５支技術分隊（班到營）。該部還建立了第一個可容納５００人的後備役信息戰訓練基地。

上述軍分區並非是組織後備役和民兵進行信息戰訓練的唯一軍分區。 《解放軍報》曾報導說，１９９９年１２月東南沿海某城市舉行了一次運用後備役和民兵部隊的會議，期間進行了電子乾擾，網絡攻防和雷達偵察等演紅。同樣還有其他地區人武部和軍分區組織信息戰活動的報導。

在信息戰時代，中國還受到另一個重要戰法的影響，即中國的“三十六計”。大約３００年前，一位無名學者蒐集到中國的３６個計謀，並彙編成書，取名為《三十六計》。該書著重將欺騙作為達成軍事目標的軍事藝術。在信息時代，因攻擊者來歷不明的情況不確定性（程序聽病毒源和存在的後門增大了系統的易損性），有些計謀可能會重新有用武之地，三十六計可能會找到新含義和新用途。

一些評論家認為，在當今的高技術時代，這些古代計策難有作為。然而，只需看看其中的幾計，則又是另一番情況：第一計“瞞天過海”，意思是通過採取欺騙和偽裝的手段隱藏自己的真實意圖，以達到鬆懈敵人警惕性的目的。應用到信息戰時就是使用互聯網上的正規電子郵件和商業線路來掩蓋發送危險代碼和病毒的目的。第四計“以逸待勞”。意思是作戰時自己養精蓄銳，待敵疲勞混亂時，乘機出擊取勝。應用到信息戰時就是利用人民戰爭理論，廣泛發動群眾進行攻擊，待所有西方計算機應爭反應小級難以自拔時再實施大規模進攻。

目前中國正考慮建立未來高科技作戰的“網絡軍”。它將保護網絡主權，進行網絡戰以及技術和知識密集型作戰。網絡技術將包括：能破譯密碼、偷取數據和恢復數據的瀏覽技術；能在網絡上發起攻擊和乾擾的反擊技術；能通過偽造假身份從網絡竊取許可權的偽裝技術；能避開攻擊、防止內部洩密以及像電子警察那樣阻止隨意行動的防禦技術。

信息戰的定義

中國探討國內外信息戰問題的著名作者是沈偉光博士、王普鋒少將、王保存大校和袁邦概將軍（均為音澤）。 １９９６年，沈博士首次提出信息戰定義：信息戰是一場雙方通過控制信息和情報輿來設法掌握戰場主動權的戰爭。正如美國界定的那樣，沈博士強調把“保存自己，打擊敵人”變為“保護自己，控制敵人”。王將軍也認為信息戰取勝的關鍵是控制信息。
１９９７年，王保存大校從中國軍事科學和馬列主義的角度精闢地闡述字信息戰問題。該文涵蓋信息戰的形式、性質、層次、特徵、特點和原則。他認為：形式上信息戰分為平時、危機時和戰時三種；性質上是攻與防的較量；層次分為國家、戰略、戰區和戰術四級；特徵包括指揮與控制戰、情報戰、電子戰、心理戰、空間控制戰、黑客戰、虛擬戰、經濟戰、戰略和精確的較量等；特點有復雜、透明、目標有限、持續時間短、毀傷小、戰鬥空間大、部隊疏散、綜合性強、指揮能力要求強等；原則上採取切斷、蒙蔽、透明、快速瓜和提高生存力等措施。他對信息戰的辦公室和分析有助於人們更深入了解中國的信息戰。

中國另一位界定信息戰的作者是解放軍總參謀部的袁將軍，他在１９９９年撰寫的書中認為：“信息戰是一場奪取和保持信息控制權而進行的鬥爭，是敵對雙方之間爭奪獲取控制和使用信息主動權的鬥爭，他們在使用和保護己方各種信息戰資源和信息系統的同時，會利用和破壞敵方的信息資源、信息系統和基於信息的武器系統。

２０００年，王普鋒將軍對“信息戰爭”作了比以往更深入透徹的解釋，以別於“信息戰”。王將軍認為，信息戰爭指的是一種戰爭和一種戰爭模式；信息戰指的是一種作戰和一種作戰模式。之種新作戰模式指的是在計算機網絡窨進行的行動。信息戰包括信息探測系統、信息傳輸系統、信息和武器攻擊系統以及信息處理和應用系統。信息戰爭包含信息戰，兩者將信息和能力融為一體，使用以信息網絡為基礎的戰場作為他們的活動場所。

信息戰訓練

１９９９年２月，一篇關於信息戰訓練的有趣文章將信息戰界定為知識型戰爭，是高智能人才之間力量的特殊較量。該定義源於這樣一個事實：高技術戰爭需要指揮員和操作員有很高的知識、很強的心理素質、指揮能力和作戰技術。
中國軍方領導人在認識到上述幾方面與較發達國家存在的差距後，決定在各級開展訓練活動。將人員按年齡分為３類：

第一類為支撐型人才，主要目標是４０多歲以上的各級領導幹部。目的是通過訓練（從機械化概念到模擬計算機戰鬥）消除他們的信息盲區，轉變他們的觀念，使其將新思維應用到未來戰爭中去。訓練內容包括：信息技術基礎、信息戰理論、信息戰武器普及知識。訓練方法彩短訓班和其他輔助方法。

第二類為過渡型人才，培養目標是３０－４０歲的干部。作為中國軍隊的未來領導者，他們必須著重提高信息戰環境下的指揮能力。

第三類為再生型人才，培養對象為３０歲以下的干部。這些人早已適應信息社會，擁有現代信息技術理論的良好根基，重點是提高他們的指揮能力和技藝。

各個年齡組的訓練包括：基礎理論（計算機基礎和應用、通信網絡技術、信息高速公路、數字化部隊）；電子對抗；雷達技術；信息戰規律與規則；信息戰略與戰術；戰區與戰略信息戰的信息系統（包括收信紙、處理、輿和使用信息戰指令）；監測、決策和控制系統；信息武器（軟、硬破壞的概念和原則、如何應用信息武器、模擬信息戰）；信息系統保護；計算機病毒攻與防，以及通信網絡的干擾與反干擾。

該文章表明中國正在編制第一流的信息戰課程。然而，後來的報導表明情況並非如此。 １９９９年７月的一份《解放軍報》指出：“訓練內容、體制和結構的無理性使信息戰訓練不能真正成為我軍訓練的主流。目前，信息戰訓練處於一種隨心所欲的狀態。內容不系統，運作不規範，缺乏評估標準和管理規章”。

信息戰演練

過去３年，中國舉行過數次重大信息戰軍事演習，每次都很重要，因為那是對信息戰理論的一次檢驗。首次“特種戰”（信息戰）演練於１９９７年１０月進行；某軍區的一個集團軍遭到旨在癱瘓其係統的計算機攻擊，該集團軍用殺毒軟件進行了防衛。該演練被稱為“入侵與反入侵演練”。演習時運用了地面後勤、醫療和空軍部隊。

１９９８年１０月，中國舉行了一場有全國數個軍區聯合進行的高科技綜合演練。聯合防禦作戰演練時首次使用了“軍事信息高速公路”。指揮自動化系統中的信息網絡子系統由數字、撥號、指揮網和保密信道組成。指揮自動化系統的其他部分是指揮作戰、音頻和圖形處理、控制和數據加密等子系統。軍事信息高速公路除傳勢圖外，還發發送圖形、字符和音頻數據。

１９９９年１０月，解放軍首次進行了兩個集團軍之間的戰役級計算機網上對抗演練。演練了偵察與反偵察、干擾與反干擾、封鎖與反封鎖、空襲與反空襲等科目。在軟件環境下進行了資源共享、作戰指揮、態勢顯示、輔助評估、信號傳輸和情報戰等６類作業。計算機評估系統對參演者的表現進行數理與質量分析。
２０００年７月，西南某軍區也進行了網上對抗演練。與此次演練有關的３項訓練任務是：組織和計劃戰役、奪取制空權和製信息權、實施突破和反突破。有１００多台終端聯網參與了演練。三週後，另一個軍區也拉開了高技術演練的帷幕，並向下屬部隊下達開始控制通信線路的命令。

中國的信息戰能力

中國軍事理論家已在信息戰方面找到一個自願、非常經濟和順從的伙伴。這個夥伴將使中國在戰略、軍事和國際地位上趕上西方。這將使中國在未來亞太地區發揮重要的戰略作用。中國可能會逐步引起經濟競爭者的密切關注。

中國異常重視新信息戰部隊所表現出的作用，這方面的各種組織包括：網絡部隊（獨立兵種）、網絡勇士突擊隊、信息保護部隊、信息兵團、電子警察和聯合的人民戰爭網絡機構。後者因其獨特的性質和潛力引起外國分析家格外關注。中國軍事理論家認為，信息戰的勝利將屬於能夠動員最多的計算機專家參加“信息家庭戰”的那一方，他們將採用諸如網點戰那樣的戰略，設法切斷重要的信息節點和接點。

目前，中國的信息戰融合了西方、俄羅斯和中國的思想，然而，有別於俄羅斯和西方的具有中國特色的信息戰詞彙正在逐步形成。中國信息戰應從中國軍事歷史中尋找解決當今問題的答案，如３６計、信息戰的性質和特點看來非常適合這些計策。

但是，中國的信息戰方法還存在許多不足，還不僅僅是數量方面的問題。信息戰作戰理論的核心還涉及到保持基礎設施的完整性和穩定性。在信息時代，基礎設施穩定性與部隊生存能力同等重要。中國的最大弱點恰恰就在基礎設施方面。目前中國正在加速發展電子信息產業，其目的不外乎是為軍民聯用的信息基礎設施打基礎。

中國善於吸取別人的前車之鑑，可能很快就可以組建一支令人刮目相看的信息戰力量。信息戰已迫使中國跨越了若干技術發展階段，利用西方的技術，不僅節省了時間而且還節省了金錢。然而，中國可能不會完全仿效別人，而將採取創造性的或間接的信息戰策略。但不管怎麼樣，中國都是值得關注的一支不同於其他國家的信息戰力量.

Original Date: 新華網 （ 2003-06-12 16:0x:xx ）

Original Source:

http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2003-06/12/content_916888.htm

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China National Cyber Security Strategy, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Hacker Methodology 中國黑客, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, 國家網絡空間安全戰略

China’s Blurred War: Trends of Future Battlefields // 中國模糊戰爭：未來戰場的發展趨勢

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China’s Blurred War: Trends of Future Battlefields //

中國模糊戰爭：未來戰場的發展趨勢

With the continuous development of information technology, changing the form, nature and scale of war, so that the combat style, combat methods, combat environment, combat conditions and other elements have been a lot of changes in the past, the future battlefield becomes more blurred, Can be summarized as the following:

War scale and level ambiguity

War in size and level, can be divided into strategies, campaigns and tactics, in the past, the difference between the three very obvious. From the three interrelationships, the strategy decides the battle, the battle determines the tactics, and the tactics reacts to the battle, the battle reacts to the strategy, which is the inherent law of the existence of the war itself. With the development of information technology, the development of high-tech war as information war, although not fundamentally change the strategic, campaign, tactical and counter-role of this dialectical relationship, but it makes the strategy, battle, tactical action scale increasingly blurred. This is because, under the conditions of information under the conditions of local war, the size and use of troops, weapons, limited duration of war, political prominence, war and strategy, battle, tactics combined very closely, tend to one. Information weapons and weapons to combat high precision, powerful, long range, with all-weather, all-weather combination of peaceful reconnaissance and combat integration capabilities for the rapid realization of the purpose of war to provide an effective means, sometimes do not use large forces can Reach the strategy, the battle target. Any combat unit, and even the individual combat operations, can get a strong information and fire support. Under their influence, tactical combat can directly achieve strategic objectives, strategic command can be involved in the tactical level is no longer a dream at any time. Thus, in the past through the local small victory gradually integrated into a strategic victory of the operational theory of the impact of the strategy, campaign, tactical three combat levels between the increasingly blurred.

With the extensive use of precision strike weapons, stealth weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, and thus through the first and second fire assault can be reached a battle or strategic objectives. In the Gulf War, the multinational force first through a large-scale strategic air raids, and then through the ground operations of the various forces reached a war purpose; US invasion of Panama, through the use of the Army to implement the five-way center of the campaign to achieve the desired purpose; In the war in Afghanistan, the US military, through the air strike and the special forces to achieve the purpose of the war; the Iraq war, the US military in the air against the cover, the US Army division through tactical action reached a war purpose. The scale of operation and the ambiguity of the level are the reflection of the essential characteristics of information warfare. In the information war, the hostile parties for the rapid completion of the established strategic objectives, will be extraordinary use of combat power, to maximize the advanced technical weapons and elite troops, and strive to destroy each other in a short time the command and control system to win the battlefield The advantage of making information right. This feature of the information warfare, so that the battle of combat and strategic purposes there is no obvious distinction between the scale of operations there is no clear battle battle difference. A battle may determine the outcome of the war, a battle may also achieve the purpose of war, thus greatly improving the strategic role of the battle battle. Especially the various precision guidance weapons, ballistic missile defense system, reconnaissance surveillance system, stealth weapon, C4ISR system and other information weapons and the extensive use of rapid reaction forces, special forces, strategic reserve and other frequently into the battlefield, making the definition of combat scale fuzzy More prominent.

Therefore, in the future information operations, the two sides will fight with the uncertainty of the scale of operations, to take over-the-line precision strike, non-programmatic “acupuncture” and structural damage and other tactics, against each other’s battlefield awareness system and information systems Quickly achieve the purpose of fighting. In this way, the special operations forces on the battlefield may be able to show their talents, that is, before the war secretly penetrate the enemy, direct attack and paralyze the enemy command and control system, so that the enemy lost control of its combat forces, and thus into the chaos of command, The Although the scale of the operation of the smaller, but for the outcome of the war can play a very important role.

Weapon equipment and functional blur

Technical decision tactics, also determines the army’s system and the composition of military and arms. For example, the emergence of weapons and equipment such as artillery, chemical weapons and radio telegraphy, laid the material foundation for the emergence of new arms such as artillery, chemical warfare, and communications. In terms of military services, due to the emergence of the aircraft, and then produced the Air Force; ship advent, gave birth to the Navy. Industrial era, the requirements of the division of labor, so refined and produced more and more professional, reflected in the composition of the army, is the division of arms and branches more and more fine; information age, requires the overall combat, the professional Close cooperation, and take the road of integrated and integrated operations. Reflected in the composition of the military trend, is the integration of combat systems. For example, many of the future weapons and equipment system will form an independent combat unit, both to complete the army requirements of the combat mission, but also to achieve the Air Force’s operational requirements, but also to achieve the purpose of naval combat. In other words, when the future combat aircraft’s infinite capacity to extend, and beyond the atmosphere combat; Army bid farewell to the “ground crawling” to achieve global arrival, global operations; the Navy to the sea to land, to the air combat capability transformation, Battle will inevitably lead to integrated forces. Integrated combat troops, generally composed of armored forces, artillery, mechanized infantry, missiles, attack and transport helicopters, naval vessels and other components, can independently combat, will realize the professional army to the professional army transition.

Future integration forces will be the main performance, will break the traditional land, sea, air, days and other military system, in accordance with the requirements of system integration, the establishment of “super-integrated” integrated combat forces. The future of information warfare is a highly integrated joint operations, the use of traditional forces of the implementation of joint operations, it is difficult to adapt to this highly integrated joint operations needs. To this end, the future composition of the military organization, will break the traditional land, sea, air, days and other military system, in accordance with the reconnaissance surveillance, command and control, precision strike and support to protect the four operational functions, built four subsystems, namely: Subsystems, command and control subsystems, precision strike and combat subsystems, and support assurance subsystems. The functions of these four subsystems are closely linked and organically linked to form an interdependent large integrated joint combat system. The army constructed in accordance with this idea will fundamentally abandon the pattern of military construction in the industrial age, eliminate the disadvantages of playing the military expertise and pursuing the interests of a single service, so that the combat forces form a “systematic system” or “system integration” Give full play to the overall power, the implementation of the true sense of “super-joint” integrated joint operations.

 

Military combat operations and the preparation of fuzzy war

Military combat forces have different targets and perform different combat missions. World War II, combat forces mainly infantry-based, basically infantry and infantry confrontation; the Second World War, due to the development of weapons and equipment, aircraft, tanks, cannons for war, arms and arms between the combat The task has a distinct distinction, usually performing a different combat mission. However, under the conditions of information in the local war, due to the development of weapons and equipment to the direction of multi-functional integration, the establishment of the army, not only the arms, as well as various services. Combat forces can perform both ground combat missions, but also the implementation of the fight against air and sea objectives and tasks, so that the boundaries between the military operations will be difficult to distinguish. For example: destroy the enemy tank weapons, may have been the Army’s tanks or anti-tank weapons, it may be the Air Force aircraft or naval submarines launched “smart” missiles. The US military plans to form four integrated forces: an integrated ground force composed of armored forces, artillery, flying warriors, attack and transport helicopters: air-to-air mechanized units with “flying tanks”; air force mixed knits composed of multiple models and A “joint task force” consisting of various military units. The Russian army intends to form a “multi-purpose mobile force”, an “aerospace force” composed of ground, air and space forces, and a “non-nuclear strategic deterrent force” composed of non-strategic nuclear forces.

In the future of localized information warfare, weapons and equipment to the multi-functional, integrated direction, the development of the trend of the trend of mixing, miniaturization. Combat, the arms and arms around the established operational objectives, each other, integrated into the organic whole. On the battlefield, the arms and services will be in the land, sea, air, days, electricity and other multi-dimensional areas, around the purpose of a unified combat, both in the activities of space is relatively independent, but also in the combat operations on a high degree of integration, making different arms and arms The task line becomes more vague.

War motives and ambiguity

The motive of the traditional war is generally the political struggle to cover up the economic interests of the dispute. In the information age, the economic interests of the dispute will continue to lead to the root causes of the war, but in addition, due to the international and domestic political forces between the various contacts increased, closely linked, which will inevitably lead to various countries, And the conflicts between the societies caused by political, diplomatic and spiritual factors have increased, so that the contradictions between religions and nationalities have increased, so that violence can be smuggled and drug trafficking and terrorist activities are internationalized. These contradictions and conflicts are not only the direct cause of the “sub-war operations”, but also one of the causes of the war. The direct cause of the Gulf War in 1991 was the convening of the United Nations Security Council immediately after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the adoption of resolution 660, condemning Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and demanding that Iraq be unconditionally withdrawn from its forces. The United States for the protection of Western oil sources and in order to establish a new order in line with the interests of the world’s new order, take the lead in the implementation of economic sanctions against Iraq, followed by the United States led the multinational force to implement the UN Security Council resolution in the name of the troops to the Gulf. Through 42 days of war, the US military reached the purpose of the war. The war in Iraq, the United States to Iraq has a weapons of mass destruction on the grounds, without the authorization of the United Nations launched an injustice war. Throughout the war, the focus of US military operations against Saddam Hussein and a handful of Iraqi high-level leaders, and to find weapons of mass destruction and launched the attack. Although the war has overthrew the Saddam regime, the United States still has not found strong evidence that Iraq has such banned weapons. In this war military purpose, the United States is also to test the new operational theory.

In recent years, the US military vigorously advocated military reform. The theory of the war in Iraq is the theory of “cyber-centric warfare” and uses the new theory of “shock and deterrence” put forward in 1996: emphasizing the use of violent firepower, shocking against opponents, regardless of frontier and depth, The enemy to combat, the use of advanced precision guidance technology, against each other’s goals when one side of the pursuit of both sides less casualties; air and ground operations at the same time, the purpose is to destroy each other’s will, so that its regime collapse, so as to achieve war and subdue The purpose of the soldiers. In the Iraq war, the US military did not carry out large-scale strategic bombing, but the use of high-tech and special forces tactics to combat, which is one of the main achievements of US military reform.

War attack and defense blur

The process of attack and defense in the past is very clear, the attacking party usually in accordance with the offensive preparation, breakthrough, shock, deep combat and other step by step attack procedures, defense side in accordance with the defense preparation, fire against the preparation, anti-impact, deep combat and other sub-combat operations Attack and defense both sides of the various stages of combat orderly. The development of high-tech weapons and equipment and information technology, the new military revolution will change the future combat procedures, combat operations will break through the fixed battlefield and position constraints in the entire operational space at all levels, all directions, all aspects of the same time. In this way, the front and rear lines in the past are blurred, the relatively stable front and fixed battlefields no longer exist, the line of offensive action and defensive action because the battlefield’s high mobility and uncertainty also become blurred and influence World military force balance. Offensive and defensive both offensive and defensive combat, especially offensive and defensive information war will become the focus of future combat art, so that every war has attack in the defense, anti-attack.

Attack and defense operations will be in the land, sea, air, days, electricity and outer space and front and depth, front and wing side, front and rear at the same time, the battlefield frequent mobility, line combat style has not adapted to the conditions of local war development Need to, instead of non-line operations, the formation of a “island-based combat base”, front and rear of the line, the enemy and the two sides of the front becomes blurred, the battlefield of the flow of non-linear or non-state state of the multi-dimensional battlefield.

Measure the outcome of the war with the standard fuzzy

In the past, the criteria for measuring the outcome of a war usually refer to how many troops are wiped out, how many weapons are seized, how many cities and territories are occupied, but in the case of local warfare, the criteria for measuring the outcome of a war are not just that. Under the conditions of information, local warfare, political purpose and war are closely integrated, war attempts often not through the invasion of each other’s territory, wiped out the enemy or the enemy completely surrendered, so as not to lead the world public opinion and the people’s strong opposition, resulting in political Passive.

One of the hallmarks of information warfare is that it minimizes casualties, in particular, collateral damage, and often uses precision-guided weapons to strike precisely, to avoid heavy assault, face-to-face fights, and fight against Libya “Surgical” operations, the implementation of air long-range maneuvers, to achieve the purpose of war; also the implementation of missiles, thousands of miles away siege warfare, but also to achieve the purpose of local war; also like the Gulf War, do not occupy its territory, Do not kill their soldiers a soldier, not seized its weapons, ammunition, the implementation of large-scale air strikes, weakened its military facilities, destroyed its regime.

The war army is blurred with the people

In previous wars, the links between the army and the society were relatively “loose” due to restrictions on information infrastructure and technology; pure war weapons and equipment also led to military organizations that were completely independent of the people. Information age, information has become a link between the military and the people, this combination, with the social and military information degree of development, integration will also continue to improve. This makes society and ordinary people no longer a spectator of war, and even not only in support and subordinate status, but with the army, from the back of the war to the front desk.

As people see, on the one hand, the purpose of modern warfare is no longer simply pursuing siege and the greatest annihilation of enemy forces, the target is no longer confined to the enemy’s heavy military and military facilities, but includes Corresponding to the survival and operation of the infrastructure, such as: financial networks, power grids, transport networks, administrative networks, communications networks. On the other hand, the war has a tendency to “civilians”. For example, information makes the “non-state” has the ability to confront national power. Any “non-state subject”, as long as there is a certain technical and information equipment, you can attack the vital goal of a country, its harm is sometimes no less than a traditional sense of the war. Such as Al Qaeda attacks on the United States launched the 9.11 attack, that is the case. Although the composition of the information warfare forces, although still have traces of the war in the past war, but in the form of form and combat quality, due to more information to join the content, in particular, more to join the information of the whole society Warfare ability, so no doubt to determine the specific role of information warfare when the thinking tends to blur, but for combat decision-making and command to bring greater difficulties. With the in-depth development of information technology, the degree of social information will be greatly improved. In this case the information war, it is more prominent military and civilian compatibility characteristics. Especially in the information warfare, many high-tech work, alone, the strength of the army is difficult to complete independently, but also the need for the whole social forces of collaboration, which makes the information warfare combat power, more into the national factors.

Combat both forces with contrast and blur

In the past, the strength of the war between the two sides, usually the number of military personnel, the number of weapons to measure the number of weapons to determine the strength of the advantages of planning and combat operations. But in the information under the conditions of local war, concentrated forces of content and methods have changed. The strength of the comparison is not only the number of considerations, but also mainly consider the quality, in particular, to consider the concentration of firepower and information, a variety of long-range strike weapons do not need to focus on deployment, you can focus on the implementation of the target surprise. To make the concentration of fire after the effective role, but also must focus on a lot of information, otherwise they can not capture, track and destroy the target. The most important weapon in military forces will no longer be a high-performance fighter, bomber, tank, warships, but a huge flood of data from the information system. Invisible information and knowledge, like armored masters, play a huge role in combat and are increasingly becoming the most important combat and power multiplier. Computing power, communication ability, reconnaissance ability, processing ability, decision-making ability, computer simulation ability, network warfare and other information and knowledge factors will become a key factor in measuring military power.

The contrast of military forces is increasingly dependent on the invisible and difficult potential of the intelligence and structural forces of the information weapons system. Therefore, in the past according to the number of combatants and tanks, aircraft, artillery, warships and other weapons and equipment performance, quantity and other static indicators to assess the strength of military strength is clearly challenged. Because of the intelligence of the information weapon system, the structural force has great potential for dynamic. The strength of the Gulf War contrast and the outcome of the war can explain this problem. Before the war, Iraq and the multinational force compared to 1.6: 1, but the result of the war is the Iraqi army casualties for the multinational force 100 times. Obviously, if not a large number of multinational force weapons system to play a multiplier combat potential, there will be no such a war situation. It can be seen that the principle of force assessment of the number of static quantities will be replaced by a new force theory.

Battlefield information is true and false

Because of the development of information technology, and widely used in future war, so that a large amount of modern war information, processing information has been very difficult. Such as: the US Strategic Air Force Command, an average of more than 815,000 per month to deal with military information, almost 26,500 copies per day. In the Gulf War, the multinational force in the 42 days of combat, dealing with up to millions of military information. Only the US Army logistics will handle 10,700 copies of military information every day. After the military, weapons and equipment and the battlefield are digitized, the military information highway will cover the entire combat space, the information is true and false, there are new and old, heavy and light, there is real, there are thick and so on, information Like the tide to the red and blue both sides of the command came. In such a fast-paced, fighter fleeting, information massive battlefield environment, to the red and blue commander of a brief decision-making time, forcing both commanders in the complex battlefield information forging discrimination, analysis and judgment, quick decision-making , Through the phenomenon to seize the essence, improve the command ability.

Battlefield space and scope is blurred

Battlefield is the enemy of the two sides of the interaction between combat forces and combat forces and firepower to kill the maximum distance. In the past war, due to the level of weapons and equipment constraints, cold weapons era battlefield space, basically confined to the war between the two sides of the visual distance; hot weapons and mechanized war era, battlefield space by the firearms and the two sides of the maneuverability And the battlefield space is expanding, and from a single land battlefield, to the development of the marine battlefield and air battlefield; combat distance from the visual distance to the development of remote and ultra-long-range , The depth and dimension of the battlefield continue to expand. After entering the information warfare, with the development of military weapons and equipment and structure changes, modern warfare space from the traditional land, sea and air to space, computer space, especially information, psychology, electromagnetic, cognitive and other virtual space expansion , In addition to the range of modern weapons and equipment and a substantial increase in mobility, the future battlefield in front and rear become increasingly blurred, in addition to the solid space in the solid before and after the exception, in the dynamic action space has no difference. Fighting may start from the front, it may start from the depth. Especially the establishment of digital forces, so that the army choose the way of combat operations, with greater freedom and flexibility. At the same time, but also to accurately determine the other side of the operational space and the exact location of the space, increasing the complexity. First, information weapons greatly improve the military’s ability to war, so that the military battlefield combat more flexible way. Second, information weapons greatly enhance the military’s full-time, all-round rapid mobility, so that information warfare warfare areas to expand.

Military aerospace capacity and long-range air transport capacity, the extensive use of armed helicopters, to achieve long-range rapid maneuver provides a good material basis. Future information warfare, or in three-dimensional space or in four-dimensional space, generally difficult to accurately grasp. And only when the other side of the combat operations to a certain size, it is possible to make a relatively accurate judgments, which to some extent increased the difficulty of command and control. The ambiguity of combat space is also manifested in the fuzzy scope of combat operations. As the future of information operations will break through the frontier to the depth of the gradual advance of the pattern, in a multi-dimensional space within the full range, full depth of the war, so that the scope of combat operations increased, combat space has become elusive. The uncertainty of the scale of combat operations in the information warfare determines the diversity of combat space. This also makes it possible to judge the space of the other combat operations, become blurred, and show the characteristics of difficult to predict and control.

Combat methods and methods are blurred

Advanced information technology, not only to achieve the real-time reconnaissance intelligence and digital battlefield, greatly improving the combat effectiveness of the army, more importantly, there have been many new means of warfare: such as information warfare momentum and power to make enemies Information deterrence; to disperse, conceal and open the information channel of the information shielding; on the enemy battlefield awareness system and information system implementation of information attacks; through the information system hidden false information fraud and information cut, computer virus attacks , Special operations, psychological warfare, non-contact operations, non-fatal attacks, structural damage warfare, these combat methods used in information warfare, completely changed the past offensive and defensive procedures clear and coherent characteristics, so that the use of combat means Order, combat form of non-model and other characteristics of more and more prominent, and then led to the information warfare, the use of the enemy means of warfare, timing and methods, become more difficult to guess. In the process of the combination of fuzzy, that is, in the course of the war, due to the enemy due to the appropriate choice of means of attack, and flexible combination, so that the enemy can not determine what the other side will take the means of combat, can not effectively take the appropriate protective measures. In the use of the timing of the fuzzy, that is, according to the intention of war and combat purposes, for different stages of combat and different areas of combat, to take different means of attack, reduce the enemy resistance will make it in trouble. In the fight against the ambiguity of the target, that is, the use of information warfare means of diversification, for the needs of information operations, both sound East West, but also the East and East, the flexibility to combat the enemy command center, communication center or radar station, air defense system , Logistical support systems and other key nodes, so that the enemy is difficult to use the means of my war to make accurate predictions.
原文網址：https://read01.com/j7m0M8.html

Original Mandarin Chinese:

隨著信息技術的不斷發展，改變了戰爭的形態、性質和規模，使作戰樣式、作戰方法、作戰環境、作戰條件等諸要素已較以往發生了諸多變化，未來戰場變得更加模糊不清，可歸納為以下幾種：

戰爭規模與層次模糊

戰爭在規模和層次上，可劃分為戰略、戰役和戰術，在以往戰爭中三者之間的區別十分明顯。從三者相互關係上，戰略決定戰役，戰役決定戰術，而且戰術反作用於戰役，戰役又反作用於戰略，這是戰爭本身存在的內在規律。隨著信息技術的發展，高技術戰爭發展為信息化戰爭，雖然未從根本上改變戰略、戰役、戰術這種作用與反作用的辯證關係，但是卻使戰略、戰役、戰術行動規模的日益模糊。這是因為，信息化條件下局部戰爭目的、規模和使用兵力、兵器有限，戰爭持續時間短，政治性突出，戰爭與戰略、戰役、戰術結合得十分緊密，趨於一體。信息化武器和兵器打擊精度高、威力大、射程遠，具有全天候、全時空的平戰結合的偵察與打擊一體化能力，為迅速達成戰爭目的提供了有效手段，有時不動用大部隊也能達成戰略、戰役目標。任何一個作戰單元，甚至是單兵的戰鬥行動，都能得到強大的信息和火力支援。在它們的作用下，戰術打擊可以直接達成戰略目的，戰略指揮可以隨時介入戰術層次已不再是夢想。由此可見，以往通過局部小勝逐步匯集成戰略性勝利的作戰理論受到衝擊，戰略、戰役、戰術三個作戰層次間的界線日益模糊。

隨著大量使用精確打擊兵器、隱形兵器、無人機，因而通過一、二次火力突擊就可達成戰役或戰略目標。海灣戰爭中，多國部隊首先是通過大規模的戰略空襲行動，爾後通過地面諸軍種聯合作戰達成了戰爭目的；美軍入侵巴拿馬，是通過動用陸軍實施五路重心攻擊的戰役行動達成了預期目的；阿富汗戰爭中，美軍主要通過空中精確打擊和特種部隊搜剿達成了戰爭目的；伊拉克戰爭中，美軍在空中打擊掩護下，美國陸軍師通過戰術行動達成了戰爭目的。作戰規模、層次的模糊性，是信息戰本質特徵的反映。在信息戰中，敵對雙方為迅速達成既定的戰略目的，將會超常使用作戰力量，最大限度地投入先進的技術兵器和精銳部隊，力求在短時間內摧毀對方的指揮控制系統，以奪取戰場上制信息權的優勢。信息戰的這一特點，使戰役戰鬥與戰略目的沒有明顯的區分，作戰規模也沒有明確的戰役戰鬥的區別。一次戰役既可能決定戰爭的勝負，一次戰鬥也可能實現戰爭的目的，從而大幅度地提高了戰役戰鬥的戰略作用。特別是各種精確制導武器、彈道飛彈防禦系統、偵察監視系統、隱形武器、C4ISR系統等信息化兵器的廣泛運用和快速反應部隊、特種部隊、戰略預備隊等頻繁投入戰場，使得作戰規模的界定模糊性更加突出。

因此，在未來信息作戰中，作戰雙方都將以不確定的作戰規模，採取超視距精確打擊、非程式化「點穴」和結構破壞等戰法，打擊對方的戰場感知系統與信息系統，以便迅速地達成作戰目的。這樣，戰場上的特種作戰部隊就可能大顯身手，即在戰前秘密地深入敵後，直接攻擊和癱瘓敵指揮控制系統，使敵失去對其作戰力量的控制，從而陷入指揮混亂、協調無序的困境。這種規模的作戰雖然較小，但對於作戰的勝負卻能起到極其重要的作用。

武器裝備與功能模糊

技術決定戰術，同樣也決定著軍隊的編制體制和軍兵種構成。例如，火炮、化學武器、無線電報機等武器裝備的出現，為炮兵、防化兵、通信兵等新兵種的出現奠定了物質基礎。就軍種而言，由於飛機的出現，進而產生了空軍；船舶的問世，催生出了海軍。工業時代，要求的是分工合作，所以細化和產生的專業越來越多，體現在軍隊的構成上，就是軍兵種劃分得越來越細；資訊時代，要求的是整體作戰，各專業之間密切協同，走集成一體化聯合作戰之路。反映在軍隊的構成趨勢上，就是作戰系統的一體化。比如，未來許多武器裝備系統將形成一個獨立的作戰單元，既可完成陸軍要求的作戰任務，也可實現空軍的作戰要求，還可達到海軍的作戰目的。換句話說，當未來作戰飛機的續航能力無限延長，並超越大氣層作戰；陸軍告別「地面爬行」，實現全球抵達、全球作戰；海軍實現由海到陸、到空的作戰能力轉化之時，一體化作戰必然催生一體化部隊。一體化作戰部隊，一般由裝甲兵、炮兵、機械化步兵、飛彈、攻擊和運輸直升機、海軍艦艇等組成，能獨立作戰，將實現專業軍隊向職業化軍隊過渡。

未來一體化部隊將主要表現為，將打破傳統的陸、海、空、天等軍種體制，按照系統集成的要求，建立「超聯合」的一體化作戰部隊。未來信息化戰爭是高度一體化聯合作戰，使用傳統的諸軍種力量實施聯合作戰，已難以適應這種高度一體化聯合作戰的需要。為此，未來軍隊組織的編成，將打破傳統的陸、海、空、天等軍種體制，按照偵察監視、指揮控制、精確打擊和支援保障四大作戰職能，建成四個子系統，即：探測預警子系統、指揮控制子系統、精確打擊與作戰子系統和支援保障子系統。這四個子系統的功能緊密銜接，有機聯繫，構成一個相互依存龐大的一體化聯合作戰系統。按照這個思路構建的軍隊，將從根本上拋棄工業化時代軍隊建設的模式，革除偏重發揮軍種專長和追求單一軍種利益的弊端，使作戰力量形成「系統的系統」或「系統的集成」，從而能夠充分發揮整體威力，實施真正意義上「超聯合」的一體化聯合作戰。

軍兵種作戰任務與編制模糊

軍兵種作戰力量具有不同的打擊目標和執行不同作戰任務。第一次世界大戰，作戰力量主要以步兵為主，基本上是步兵與步兵的對抗；第二次世界大戰，由於武器裝備的發展，飛機、坦克、大炮用於戰爭，軍兵種之間的作戰任務有了明顯區分，通常執行不同的作戰任務。但是在信息化條件下局部戰爭中，由於武器裝備向多功能一體化方向上發展，部隊的編制內，不僅有各兵種，還有各軍種。作戰部隊既能執行地面作戰任務，又能執行打擊空中和海上目標任務，使軍種間作戰的界線將不易區分。例如：摧毀敵方坦克的兵器，可能是已方陸軍的坦克或反坦克兵器，也可能是空軍的飛機或海軍潛艇發射的「智能」型飛彈。美軍計劃組建四種一體化部隊：由裝甲兵、炮兵、飛彈兵、攻擊與運輸直升機組成的一體化地面部隊：編有「飛行坦克」的陸空機械化部隊；由多機種組成的空軍混編聯隊和中隊；由各軍種部隊組成的「聯合特遣部隊」。俄軍擬組建集各軍兵種於一體的「多用途機動部隊」，由地面、空中和太空兵力組成的「航空航天部隊」，以及由各軍種非戰略核力量組成的「非核戰略威懾部隊」。

在未來信息化局部戰爭中，武器裝備向多功能、一體化方向發展，部隊的編制趨向混合化、小型化。作戰中，各軍兵種圍繞既定的作戰目標，彼此依存，融為有機的整體。在戰場上，各軍兵種將在陸、海、空、天、電等多維領域，圍繞統一的作戰目的，既在活動空間上相對獨立，又在作戰行動上高度融合，使得不同軍兵種所執行的任務界線變得更加模糊。

戰爭動因與目的模糊

傳統戰爭的動因一般是政治鬥爭掩蓋下的經濟利益之爭。在資訊時代，經濟利益之爭仍將是導致戰爭的根本原因，但除此之外，由於各國之間、國際國內各派政治力量之間交往增多，聯繫密切，這就必然導致各個國家、民族、社團之間由政治、外交、精神等因素引發的衝突增多，使宗教、民族矛盾上升，使暴力活動、走私販毒、恐怖活動國際化。這些矛盾與衝突不僅是「亞戰爭行動」的直接根源，也是導致戰爭的動因之一。1991年海灣戰爭直接動因，是1990年8月2日伊拉克入侵科威特之後，聯合國安理會立即召開會議，通過了660號決議，譴責伊拉克入侵科威特，要求伊拉克無條件從科撤軍。美國出於保護西方石油來源和為建立符合其利益的世界新秩序的目的，乘虛而入帶頭對伊拉克實施經濟制裁，隨後以美國為首的多國部隊以執行聯合國安理會決議為名，出兵海灣。通過42天的交戰，美軍達到了戰爭目的。伊拉克戰爭，美國以伊拉克擁有大規模殺傷性武器為由，沒有經過聯合國授權而發動的一場非正義戰爭。整個戰爭中，美軍作戰的重心是針對薩達姆等少數伊拉克高層領導人，並以尋找大規模殺傷性武器而展開的攻擊行動。雖然戰爭已經推翻了薩達姆政權，但是美國至今仍然沒有找到伊拉克擁有這種違禁武器的有力證據。在這場戰爭軍事目的上，美國也是為了試驗新的作戰理論。

近幾年，美軍大力倡導軍事變革。指導伊拉克戰爭的理論是「網絡中心戰」理論，並運用1996年提出的「震撼與威懾」的新理論：強調運用猛烈的火力，震撼性打擊對手，不分前沿和縱深，全方位迅速地對敵人進行打擊，運用先進的精確制導技術，打擊對方目標時片面追求雙方較少的傷亡；空中與地面行動同時展開，目的是摧毀對方的意志，使其政權崩潰，從而達到不戰而屈人之兵的目的。伊拉克戰爭中，美軍沒有進行大規模的戰略轟炸，而是利用高技術加特種兵的戰術進行作戰，這是美軍軍事變革的主要成果之一。

戰爭進攻與防禦模糊

以往攻防作戰的程序十分明，進攻一方通常按照進攻準備、突破、衝擊、縱深作戰等步步進攻程序進行，防禦一方按照防禦準備、火力反準備、反衝擊、縱深抗擊等分段抗擊作戰程序進行，攻防雙方各個作戰階段展開有序。而高技術武器裝備和信息技術的發展，新軍事革命將改變未來作戰程序，作戰行動將突破固定的戰場和陣地的限制，在整個作戰空間的各個層次、各個方向、各個方面同時進行。這樣一來，以往戰爭中的前後方界線模糊，相對穩定的正面和固定的戰場不復存在，進攻行動和防禦行動的界線因為戰場的高度流動性和不確定性也變得模糊不清並影響世界軍事力量平衡。攻防兼備、攻防一體作戰尤其是攻防一體的信息戰將成為今後作戰藝術的焦點，使每一次戰爭都有攻中有防、防中有攻。

攻防作戰將在陸、海、空、天、電以及外層空間和前沿與縱深、正面與翼側、前方與後方同時展開，戰場機動頻繁，線式作戰樣式已不適應信息化條件下局部戰爭發展的需要，取而代之的是非線式作戰，形成一種「島嶼式作戰基點」，前方與後方的界線、敵我雙方的戰線變得模糊，戰場呈現流動的非線性或無戰線狀態的多維立體戰場。

衡量戰爭勝負與標準模糊

以往衡量一場戰爭勝負的標準通常指的是殲滅對方多少兵力，繳獲多少武器，占領多少城鎮和領土，然而在未來信息化條件下局部戰爭中，衡量一場戰爭勝負的標準已不只是這些。信息化條件下的局部戰爭，政治目的與戰爭結合得緊密，戰爭企圖往往不通過侵入對方領土，全殲敵軍或使敵方徹底投降，以免引發世界輿論的和民眾的強烈反對，造成政治上的被動。

信息化戰爭的一大特點是，將使傷亡、破壞，特別是附帶性破壞減少到最低限度，通常使用精確制導武器精確打擊，避免重兵集結進行面對面的拼殺，打一場像美軍懲罰利比亞發動的「外科手術式」作戰，實施空中遠程機動空襲，達成戰爭目的；也可實施飛彈，進行遠隔千里的攻城戰，也能達成局部戰爭的目的；也可像海灣戰爭那樣，不占領其國土，不殺傷其一兵一卒，不繳獲其武器、彈藥，實施的大規模的空襲戰，削弱其軍事設施，搗毀其國政權。

戰爭軍隊與民眾模糊

以往的戰爭，由於受信息基礎設施和技術的限制，軍隊與社會的聯繫相對「鬆散」；純戰爭的武器裝備亦導致完全獨立於民間之外的軍事組織。資訊時代，信息成為軍民結合的紐帶，這種結合，隨著社會和軍隊的信息化程度的發展，融合程度也將不斷提高。這就使得社會和普通民眾不再是戰爭的旁觀者，甚至也不僅處於支援和從屬地位，而是與軍隊一樣，從戰爭的幕後走向了前台。

正如人們看到的，一方面，現代戰爭的目的已不再單純地追求攻城掠地和最大限度地殲滅敵有生力量，打擊目標亦不再局限於敵方的重兵集團和軍事設施，而是包括對應賴以生存和運轉的基礎設施，如：金融網、電力網、交通網、行政網、通信網等。另一方面，戰爭有向「平民化」發展的趨勢。比如，信息化使得「非國家主體」具備了與國家力量進行對抗的能力。任何一個「非國家主體」，只要具備一定的技術和信息設備，就可以對一個國家的要害目標進行攻擊，其危害有時並不亞於一場傳統意義上的戰爭。比如基地組織對美發動的9·11襲擊，就是如此。信息戰力量的構成，雖然仍具有以往戰爭全民參戰的痕跡，但是在構成的形式和作戰的質量上，由於較多地加入了信息化的含量，特別是較多地加入了全社會民眾的信息戰能力，所以無疑使判斷信息戰具體參與力量時的思維趨於模糊，而為作戰決策與指揮帶來較大的困難。隨著信息技術深入發展，社會民眾的信息化程度也將極大地提高。在這種情況下的信息戰，就更加突出軍民兼容的特徵。特別在信息戰中，許多高技術工作，僅靠軍隊的力量難以獨立完成，還需要全社會力量的協作，這就使信息戰的作戰力量，較多地融入了全民皆兵的因素。

作戰雙方力量對比與能力模糊

以往交戰雙方力量對比，通常以軍隊人員數量多少、各種武器多少的比數來衡量力量優勢，進行籌劃攻防作戰。但在信息化條件下局部戰爭中，集中兵力的內容和方式有所改變。力量的對比不只是考慮數量多少，更主要是考慮質量，尤其是要考慮集中火力和信息，各種遠程打擊兵器不需要集中部署，就可對目標實施集中突擊。要使集中後的火力有效地發揮作用，還必須集中大量信息，否則就無法捕捉、跟蹤和摧毀目標。軍事力量中最重要的武器將不再是高性能的戰鬥機、轟炸機、坦克、戰艦，而是由信息系統湧現的巨大數據洪流。無形的信息和知識像裝甲雄師一般，在作戰中發揮巨大的作用，並日益成為最重要的戰鬥力和力量倍增器。計算能力、通信能力、偵察能力、處理能力、決策能力、計算機模擬能力、網絡戰等信息和知識因素都將成為衡量軍事力量的關鍵因素。

軍事力量的對比，越來越多地取決於信息武器系統的智力和結構力所帶來的無形的、難以量化的巨大潛力。因此，以往根據作戰人數和坦克、飛機、大炮、軍艦等武器裝備的性能、數量等靜態指標評定軍事力量強弱的方法顯然受到了挑戰。因為信息武器系統的智力、結構力具有巨大的動態潛力。海灣戰爭的兵力對比和戰爭結局就可說明這個問題。戰前，伊拉克與多國部隊的兵力對比是1．６：１，但戰爭結果是伊軍的傷亡為多國部隊的100倍。顯然，如果不是多國部隊的大量信息武器系統發揮出成倍的作戰潛力，是不會有如此戰局。可見，靜態數質量指標的力量評估原則將會被一種全新的力量理論所取代。

戰場信息真與假模糊

由於信息技術的發展，並廣泛運用於未來戰爭，使現代戰爭信息量很大，處理信息已經十分困難。如：美國戰略空軍司令部，平均每月要處理軍事信息815000多份，差不多每天處理26500份。在海灣戰爭中，多國部隊在42 天作戰中，處理軍事信息多達數百萬份。僅美國陸軍後勤每天就要處理軍事信息10700份。在軍隊、武器裝備和戰場都實現數字化以後，軍事信息高速公路將覆蓋整個作戰空間，這些信息有真有假、有新有舊、有重有輕、有虛有實、有粗有細等，信息像潮水般地向紅藍雙方指揮所湧來。在這樣快節奏、戰機稍縱即逝、信息海量戰場環境中，給紅藍雙方指揮員短暫決策處理時間，逼著雙方指揮員在錯綜複雜的戰場信息中鍛鍊辨別力、分析判斷力、快速決策力，透過現象抓住本質，提高指揮能力。

戰場空間與範圍模糊

戰場是指敵對雙方作戰力量相互作用並加上作戰力量機動和火力殺傷的最大距離。以往戰爭中，由於受武器裝備水平的限制，冷兵器時代的戰場空間，基本局限在交戰雙方的目視距離之內；熱兵器和機械化戰爭時代，戰場空間由火器的射程和雙方兵力的機動能力所決定，並隨著火器(炮)射程和兵力機動能力的不斷提高，戰場空間日漸擴大，並由單一的陸地戰場，發展到海洋戰場和空中戰場；作戰距離則由目視距離發展到遠程和超遠程，戰場的縱深和維度不斷拓展。進入信息化作戰後，隨著軍隊武器裝備和結構的發展變化，現代戰爭的作戰空間又從傳統的陸、海、空向太空、計算機空間，特別是信息、心理、電磁、認知等虛擬空間拓展，加之現代武器裝備的射程及機動能力大幅提高，未來戰場的前方和後方變得日漸模糊，除了在固態的地理空間上有前後之分外，在動態的行動空間上已無先後之別。戰鬥既可能從前方打響，也可能從縱深開始。特別是數字化部隊的建立，使軍隊選擇作戰行動的方式，具備了更大的自由度和靈活性。同時，也為準確地判斷對方作戰行動空間的具體範圍和準確位置，增加了複雜度。一是信息化武器大大提高了軍隊的遠戰能力，使軍隊的戰場打擊方式更加靈活。二是信息化武器大大增強了軍隊的全時空、全方位快速機動能力，使信息戰的交戰區域更加擴大。

軍事航天能力和遠程空運能力的提高，武裝直升機的廣泛運用，為實現遠距離快速機動提供了良好的物質基礎。未來信息戰，或在三維空間或在四維空間進行，一般不易準確把握。而只有當對方的作戰行動達到一定規模時，才有可能作出相對準確的判斷，這在一定程度上增加了指揮和控制的難度。作戰空間的模糊性，還表現在作戰行動範圍的模糊。由於未來信息作戰將打破由前沿向縱深逐次推進的格局，在多維的空間內進行全方位、全縱深的交戰，就使作戰行動的範圍增大，作戰空間變得難以捉摸。信息戰所具有的作戰行動規模的不確定性，決定了作戰空間的多樣性。這也使判斷對方作戰行動的空間，變得模糊起來，而呈現出不易預測和控制的特點。

作戰手段與方法模糊

先進的信息技術，不僅實現了偵察情報的實時化和戰場數字化，極大地提高了軍隊的戰鬥效能，更重要的是出現了許多嶄新的作戰手段：如以信息戰的聲勢和威力使敵懾服的信息威懾；以分散、隱蔽和廣開信息通道的方法進行的信息屏蔽；對敵戰場認識系統和信息系統實施的信息攻擊；通過信息系統隱真示假行動的信息欺騙以及信息割斷、計算機病毒襲擊、特種作戰、心理戰、非接觸作戰、非致命攻擊、結構破壞戰等，這些作戰手段運用於信息戰，完全改變了以往攻防作戰程序清晰、連貫性強的特點，使作戰手段運用的非有序性、作戰形式的非模式化等特點越來越突出，進而導致了在信息戰中，對敵方作戰手段運用的規律、時機和方法，變得更加難以揣度。在手段組合上的模糊，即在作戰過程中，因勢因敵恰當地選擇打擊手段，並靈活地進行組合，使敵無法判斷對方將要採取何種作戰手段，無法有效地採取相應的防護措施。在運用時機上的模糊，即根據作戰的意圖和作戰目的，針對不同的作戰階段和不同的作戰領域，採取不同的打擊手段，降低敵抵抗意志，使之陷入困境。在打擊目標上的模糊，即利用信息戰作戰手段多樣化的特點，針對信息作戰的需要，既可聲東擊西，亦可聲東擊東，靈活地打擊敵指揮中心、通信中心或雷達站、防空系統、後勤保障系統等關鍵節點，使敵難以對我作戰手段的運用作出準確的預測。
原文網址：https://read01.com/j7m0M8.html

Original Source: https://read01.com/j7m0M8.html

 

China National Cyber Security Strategy, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Strategic Support Forces, 國家網絡空間安全戰略

中國優先發展網絡戰略信息化戰 // China to give priority to the development of network strategy & information warfare

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中國優先發展網絡戰略信息化戰 //

China to give priority to the development of network strategy & information warfare

Cyberspace has become the national comprehensive security of the door. Network warfare reality, the network battlefield globalization, network confrontation normalization, the network attack heart white hot, the network to build the army of the general trend, no one can block. Give priority to the development of network strategy, and actively seize the commanding heights of network strategy, for my army building is of great significance.

　　The main features of network strategy

Network strategic strength refers to the ability to achieve the desired results through cyberspace. From the current development and possible future trends, mainly with the following characteristics.

Composed of multiple. In recent years, the major network events in the world have shown that the strategic power of the military network is the main force of cyberspace competition. The strategic power of the government departments and the private sector is an important part of the cyberspace competition. The “cyber warrior” An important addition.

Strong professionalism. Network strategy strength has a strong latent and difficult to predict, and the speed of light, instantaneous effect, monitoring and early warning is difficult; once the action is effective, damage effect superimposed magnification or non-linear step, with a typical “butterfly effect.” In 2010, the “shock net” virus attacked the centrifuges of the Iranian Bushehr nuclear power plant and the Natanz uranium enrichment plant, resulting in nearly a thousand centrifuge scrapped, forcing Iran’s nuclear capacity building to delay 2 to 3 years, opened the network attack soft means Destroy the national hard facilities.

Destructive. The strategic power of the network is no less than the weapons of mass destruction. Russia and Georgia in 2008, “the five-day war”, the Russian military to Georgia’s television media, government websites and transportation systems as the goal, to carry out a comprehensive “bee group” type of network paralysis attacks, leading to grid government agencies operating chaos, Logistics and communication system collapse, much-needed war materials can not be delivered in a timely manner, the potential of the war has been seriously weakened, a direct impact on the grid of social order, operational command and troop scheduling. The Russian military doctrine has identified cybercrime as a weapon of mass destruction and has retained the right to use weapons of mass destruction or nuclear weapons to counterattack.

Advanced technology and phase. Network strategy strength development speed, replacement fast, technical materialization for the equipment cycle is short. At present, the speed of the microprocessor doubles every 18 months, the backbone bandwidth doubled every six months, a variety of new electronic information equipment after another, all kinds of application software dizzying. Cyber ​​space confrontation is the field of information in the field of offensive and defensive struggle, the use of network strategy forces in the confrontation of the phase with grams, constantly renovated. The development of the firewall and the information monitoring technology makes the software of the anti-wall software upgrade continuously. The development of the firewall and the information monitoring technology has led to the development of the firewall. , Can be described as “a foot high, magic high ten feet.”

　　The Developing Trend of Network Strategic

From the subordinate force to the development of key forces. In the past, the network strategic power is mainly for other forces to provide information security, in a subordinate position; with the development of network information technology, network system control of other rights, network strategic forces from subordinate status to the dominant position to accelerate into, to maintain the country The key to safety. There is no network security there is no sovereign security, “no net” to become a new law of war, the world’s major countries around the network space development rights, dominance and control of a new round of competition, especially the United States and Russia adhere to the practice In the use and continue to develop.

From the maintenance of force to the development of specialized forces. In the past, the network strategy is mainly to maintain the network information system and all kinds of network transmission system, network attack and defense attributes are not clear. At present, all areas of the network space in depth, the world’s major countries are hard to build cyberspace offensive and defensive capabilities, the main military power of the network strategy has become a network of reconnaissance, network attacks, network defense and other clear division of labor, professional regular military forces. The United States has so far built the world’s most complete and powerful network of the army, and held a series of “network storm” series of exercises. The new “cyberspace strategy” in the United States, the first public to cyberspace combat as one of the tactical options for future military conflict, clearly proposed to improve the US military in the cyberspace of deterrence and offensive capability. In order to adapt to the new strategy, the US Department of Defense proposed 2018 to build a offensive and defensive, flexible form, with full combat capability of the network forces construction goals.

From the military to the integration of military and civilian development. The development of the strategic power of the military network started relatively late compared with the civil field, and because of the confidentiality of military confrontation and the specificity of the operational objectives, it is often developed independently. With the development of network technology, the military’s own network strategic strength is difficult to meet the needs of diversified tasks, we must learn from local folk technical means, integrate local network resources, realize the integration of military and civilian development. Network space capacity building on the talent, intelligence, experience and other software environment is extremely high, coupled with the local convergence of a wealth of network resources, military and civilian forces to promote the development of cyberspace capabilities become the strong tone of the times.

From a single model to the “network integration” development. At present, the network includes both the computer IP system network and the non-computer IP system network including a large number of complex early warning detection network, satellite communication network and tactical data link. The traditional single network confrontation model is difficult to meet the challenge of cyberspace. With the development of information technology, especially the Internet of Things technology, the relationship between the network and the power of the battlefield network more and more closely, which for the “network integration” in the technical means to provide the possibility. The use of electronic warfare and network warfare means, for different systems around the open bow, broken chain broken network, to achieve complementary advantages, system damage, as the latest guidance on the construction of network space. Data show that the US military typical network of integrated attack equipment “Shu special” system has been from the “Shu-1” to the current development of “Shu-5”. According to reports, “Shute” system through the enemy radar antenna, microwave relay station, network processing nodes to invade the enemy air defense network system, real-time monitoring of enemy radar detection results, even as a system administrator to take over the enemy network, Control of the sensor.

From non-state actors to state actors. At present, the network attack has developed from a single hacker behavior for the national, political, military confrontation, the attack object has been developed from the personal website to the country, the army’s important information system, attack “unit” has grown from stand-alone to tens of thousands Hundreds of thousands of terminals, and can instantly release the amazing attack energy. Although many of the intentions of malicious acts of non-State actors are non-state, the consequences are national, whether they are espionage, political opinions, or personal discontent, or terrorist activities , Have a direct impact on social stability, disrupt the economic order, endanger the stability of state power. Once the relevant reaction is made, the subject of the act must be the state and the army, and not the non-state actors themselves.

　　The Construction of Network Strategic Strength

Strengthen strategic planning. Cyberspace competition is the first strategic battle of the contest. From the national level, the network strategy of the power of the main function is to reduce the risk of cyberspace, maintaining the normal operation of the country. We must understand the extreme importance and realistic urgency of cyberspace security from the perspective of national security, raise the focus of cyberspace capacity building to the strategic level, and try to reduce the national cyberspace security while trying to solve the problem of how to make good use of cyberspace Risk, so that cyberspace security has become an important support for national prosperity and security. From the military level, the network strategy is mainly to seize the system of network power. We must expand the military vision, the cyberspace as an important area of ​​action, to seize the system as the core, change the military ideas and ideas, adjust the structure and composition of armed forces, the development of weapons and equipment and take a new tactics.

Speed ​​up the construction of the power system. Maintain cyberspace security in the final analysis depends on the strength. We must base ourselves on the characteristics and laws of cyberspace capacity building, focus on the core elements of network capability system and the overall layout of network strategy, and systematically design the system structure which conforms to the law and characteristics of cyberspace confrontation in our country, and perfect the system of leadership and command Functional tasks, straighten out the relationship between command and management. We should take the network strategic power as an important new combat force, from the organization construction, personnel training, equipment development, elements of training and other aspects, to take extraordinary measures to give priority construction, focus on protection. To normalize the national network of offensive and defensive exercises, test theory, tactics, equipment and technology effectiveness, and comprehensively enhance the comprehensive prevention of cyberspace capabilities.

Promote technological innovation. The essence of cyberspace confrontation is the competition of core technology, and it is necessary to accelerate the independent innovation of network information technology. To improve the ability of independent innovation as a strategic basis to the national innovation system as the basic support, focus on breaking the forefront of network development technology and international competitiveness of the key core technology, advanced deployment and focus on the development of information technology and information industry. To speed up the process of localization of key core technologies, strengthen the construction of safety testing and active early warning means, and gradually improve the equipment system of cyberspace in China, and comprehensively improve our network space capability. To follow the basic laws of cyberspace confrontation, in accordance with the “asymmetric checks and balances” strategy, increase the quantum technology, Internet of things and cloud computing and other new technology research and development efforts to create unique combat capability, master the initiative of cyberspace security development The

Promote the integration of military and civilian development. The integration of the military space ability of military and civilian development is not only the overall situation of national security and development strategy, the overall planning of national defense and economic and social development, but also the objective fact that cyberspace security can not be avoided. We must actively promote the deep integration of military and civilian development, to promote China’s network space capacity supporting the construction. It is necessary to formulate top-level planning in the form of policies and regulations, clarify the objectives, methods, organizational division and basic requirements of the deepening development of cyberspace in the form of policies and regulations, and make the integration of military and civilian development into law enforcement and organizational behavior; To establish a sound military coordination, demand docking, resource sharing mechanism, through a unified leadership management organization and coordination of military needs and major work, to achieve risk sharing, sharing of resources and common development of the new situation. We should pay attention to the distinction between the boundaries of military and civilian integration, clear the concept of development-oriented people and the main battle concept of the army, and actively explore the military and the people, the advantages of complementary channels.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

网络空间成为国家综合安全的命门。网络战争现实化、网络战场全球化、网络对抗常态化、网络攻心白热化、网络建军正规化的大势，无人可挡。优先发展网络战略力量，积极抢占网络战略制高点，对于我军队建设具有重要意义。

　　网络战略力量的主要特点

网络战略力量，是指通过网络空间来实现预期结果的能力。从当前发展及未来可能的走势看，主要有以下特点。

组成多元。近年来发生在全球范围内的重大网络事件表明，军队网络战略力量是网络空间竞争的主力军，政府部门、私营机构网络战略力量是网络空间竞争的重要部分，民间“网络战士”是网络空间竞争的重要补充。

专业性强。网络战略力量具有极强的潜伏性和难预测性，且以光速进行、瞬时产生效果，监测预警难度大；一旦行动奏效，损害效果叠加放大或非线性阶跃，具有典型的“蝴蝶效应”。2010年，“震网”病毒攻击了伊朗布什尔核电站和纳坦兹铀浓缩厂的离心机，造成近千台离心机报废，迫使伊朗核能力建设延迟2至3年，开启了网络攻击软手段摧毁国家硬设施的先河。

破坏性大。网络战略力量破坏力不亚于大规模杀伤性武器。2008年俄国与格鲁吉亚“五日战争”中，俄军以格方的电视媒体、政府网站和交通系统等为目标，开展全面的“蜂群”式网络阻瘫攻击，导致格政府机构运作混乱，物流和通信系统崩溃，急需的战争物资无法及时投送，战争潜力受到严重削弱，直接影响了格的社会秩序、作战指挥和部队调度。俄罗斯军事学说已将网络攻击手段定性为大规模毁灭性武器，并保留了运用大规模毁灭性武器或核武器反击的权利。

技术先进且相生相克。网络战略力量发展速度快、更新换代快，技术物化为装备的周期短。当前，微处理器的速度每18个月翻一番，主干网带宽每6个月增加一倍，各种新型电子信息设备层出不穷，各种应用软件目不暇接。网络空间对抗是信息领域的攻防斗争，网络战略力量使用的手段在对抗中相生相克、不断翻新。常规通信受干扰催生了跳、扩频通信体制，跳、扩频通信的出现又催生了频率跟踪干扰、相关信号干扰等新型电子干扰手段；防火墙、信息监控技术的发展，使翻墙软件不断升级，可谓“道高一尺，魔高一丈”。

　　网络战略力量的发展趋势

由从属性力量向关键性力量发展。以往网络战略力量主要是为其他力量提供信息保障，处于从属地位；随着网络信息技术的发展，制网权统揽其他制权，网络战略力量由从属地位向主导地位加速转进，成为维护国家安全的关键。没有网络安全就没有主权安全，“无网不胜”成为战争的新定律，世界各主要国家围绕网络空间的发展权、主导权和控制权展开了新一轮的角逐，特别是美俄坚持在实践中运用并不断发展。

由维护型力量向专业化力量发展。以往网络战略力量主要是维护网络化信息系统和各类网络传输系统，网络攻击和防御属性均不鲜明。当下各领域对网络空间深度依赖，世界主要国家无不竭力打造网络空间攻防能力，主要军事强国的网络战略力量业已成为集网络侦察、网络攻击、网络防御等分工明确、专业化的正规军事力量。美国迄今已建成全球编制最齐全、力量最庞大的网军，并多次举行“网络风暴”系列演习。美国新版《网络空间战略》，首次公开把网络空间作战作为今后军事冲突的战术选项之一，明确提出要提高美军在网络空间的威慑和进攻能力。为适应新战略，美国防部提出2018年建成一支攻防兼备、形式灵活，具备全面作战能力的网络部队的建设目标。

由军地自主向军民融合发展。军队网络战略力量的发展相对于民用领域起步较晚，且由于军事对抗的保密性和作战目标的特定性，往往自主发展。随着网络技术的发展，军队自身的网络战略力量难满足多样化任务的需要，必须学习借鉴地方民间技术手段，整合地方网络资源，实现军民融合发展。网络空间能力建设对人才、智力、经验等软件环境要求极高，加上地方汇聚了丰富的网络资源，军民联手推进网络空间能力发展成为时代的强音。

由单一模式向“网电一体”发展。现阶段，网络既包括计算机IP体制网络，更包含大量复杂的预警探测网、卫星通信网、战术数据链等非计算机IP体制网络，传统的单一网络对抗模式难以应对网络空间的挑战。随着信息技术特别是物联网技术的发展，战场网中网与电的关系越来越紧密，这为“网电一体”在技术手段上提供了可能。综合运用电子战与网络战手段，针对不同体制的网络左右开弓、断链破网，实现优势互补、体系破击，成为网络空间能力建设的最新指导。有资料显示，美军典型网电一体攻击装备“舒特”系统已从“舒特-1”发展到目前的“舒特-5”。据报道，“舒特”系统可通过敌方雷达天线、微波中继站、网络处理节点入侵敌方防空网络系统，能够实时监视敌方雷达的探测结果，甚至以系统管理员身份接管敌方网络，实现对传感器的控制。

由非国家行为体向国家行为体发展。目前，网络攻击已从单个的黑客行为发展为国家、政治、军事上的对抗行为，攻击对象已从个人网站发展到国家、军队的重要信息系统，攻击“单元”已从单机发展到数万乃至数十万台终端，且能在瞬时释放惊人的攻击能量。尽管非国家行为体的恶意网络行为目的许多是非国家的，但由此所造成的后果却是国家的，无论是进行间谍活动，还是发表政治主张，或是发泄个人不满情绪，或是进行恐怖活动，都直接影响社会稳定、扰乱经济秩序、危及国家政权稳固。一旦因之作出相关反应，其行为主体一定是国家和军队，而不再是非国家行为体本身。

　　网络战略力量的建设指向

加强战略统筹谋划。网络空间竞争首先是战略运筹的较量。从国家层面看，网络战略力量的职能主要是降低网络空间的风险，维护国家正常运转。必须从国家安全的视角认清网络空间安全的极端重要性和现实紧迫性，将网络空间能力建设的着眼点上升到战略层面，在着力解决如何利用好网络空间的同时，努力降低国家网络空间安全风险，使网络空间安全成为国家繁荣与安全的重要支撑。从军队层面看，网络战略力量主要是夺取制网权。必须拓展军事视野，把网络空间作为制权行动的一个重要领域，以夺取制网权为核心，变革军事思想和观念，调整武装力量结构与构成，发展武器装备并采取新的战法。

加快力量体系构建。维护网络空间安全说到底要靠实力。必须立足于网络空间能力建设的特点、规律，围绕我国网络能力体系核心要素和网络战略力量建设总体布局，以系统思维设计符合我国网络空间对抗规律和特点的体系架构，健全领导指挥体制机制，明确职能任务，理顺指挥管理关系。要把网络战略力量作为重要的新型作战力量突出出来，从组织建设、人才培养、装备发展、要素演训等各方面，采取超常举措，给予重点建设、重点保障。要常态化开展国家级网络攻防演练，检验理论、战法、装备及技术的有效性，全面提升网络空间综合防范能力。

推进技术自主创新。网络空间对抗的实质是核心技术的比拼，必须加快推进网络信息技术自主创新。要把提高自主创新能力作为战略基点，以国家创新体系为基本依托，集中力量突破网络发展的前沿技术和具有国际竞争力的关键核心技术，超前部署和重点发展信息技术和信息产业。要加速关键核心技术的国产化进程，加强安全测试和主动预警手段的建设，逐步完善我国网络空间的装备体系，全面提高我国网络空间能力。要遵循网络空间对抗的基本规律，按照“非对称制衡”方略，加大对量子科技、物联网和云计算等新技术的研发力度，以独创技术塑造实战能力，掌握网络空间安全发展的主动权。

推动军民融合发展。网络空间能力的军民融合式发展，既是站在国家安全与发展的战略全局，对国防和经济社会发展统筹谋划，也是网络空间安全不能回避的客观事实。必须积极推动军民深度融合发展，全力推进我国网络空间能力配套建设。要综合军民需求制定顶层规划，以政策法规的形式明确网络空间军民融合深度发展的目标任务、方法路径、组织分工和基本要求等关系全局的重大问题，变军民融合发展为执法行为、组织行为；要建立健全军地协调、需求对接、资源共享机制，通过统一的领导管理机构组织协调军地的各类需求和重大工作，达成风险共担、资源共享、共同发展的新局面。要注重军民融合的界限区分，明确以民为主的发展理念和以军为主的作战理念，积极探索军民一体、优势互补的可行性渠道。

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China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China Internet Soverignty, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Cyberspace Adminstration of China 中央網絡安全和信息勇

A Summary of China ‘s Internet Security Situation in China in 2016 // 2016年中國中國互聯網安全形勢總結

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A Summary of China ‘s Internet Security Situation in China in 2016

2016年中國中國互聯網安全形勢總結

19 APRIL 2017 BEIJING, People’s Republic of China

April 19, the National Computer Network Emergency Technology Processing Coordination Center (referred to as “National Internet Emergency Response Center”, the English referred to as “CNCERT”) released “China’s Internet security situation in 2016,” a review of China’s Internet macro security situation monitoring On the basis of the combination of network security warning and emergency response work, the paper focuses on analyzing and summarizing the Internet security situation of China in 2016 and predicting the hotspot of network security in 2017.

Analysis of Internet Security Monitoring Data in China in 2016

CNCs continued to monitor the macroeconomic situation of China’s cybersecurity. In 2016, the number of mobile Internet malicious programs was captured, the number of backdoor attacks and the number of security vulnerabilities were increased compared with 2015, and the number of Trojans and botnets was denied. Quantity, phishing and page tampering the number of pages have declined.

According to the sampling monitoring, about 70,000 Trojans and botnet control servers in 2016 control 1699 million hosts in our country, the number of control servers decreased by 8.0% compared with 2015, the number of domestic infection host decreased by 14.1% compared with 2015. The Among them, about 48,000 from outside the control server control of China’s 1499 million units in the host, from the United States the number of control servers in the first place, followed by Hong Kong, China and Japan.

In the botnet found in the detection of malicious programs and the formation of botnets, the size of more than 100 hosts in the number of botnets 4896, of which the size of more than 100,000 units in the number of botnets 52. According to the quantitative analysis of the distribution of Trojans and botnets in China, the top three were Guangdong Province (13.4% of the total number of infections in China), Jiangsu Province (9.2%) and Shandong Province (8.3 %). In order to effectively control the damage caused by the host of Trojans and botnets, in 2016, under the guidance of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, under the guidance of “Trojan and botnet monitoring and disposal mechanism”, CNCERT organization basic telecommunications companies, domain name service agencies, etc. successfully closed 1011 Control the larger botnets.

In 2016, CNCERT received more than 205 million mobile Internet malpractions through autonomous capture and vendor switching, an increase of 39.0% over 2015, and continued to maintain rapid growth in the past seven years. According to their malicious behavior classification, the top three were hooliganism, malicious deductions and tariff consumption class 1, accounting for 61.1%, respectively, 18.2% and 13.6%. CNCERT found that mobile Internet malicious program download links nearly 670,000, an increase of nearly 1.2 times compared with 2015, involving more than 22 million source of the source, IP address of more than 30,000, the number of malicious programs spread to 124 million times.

In 2016, CNCERT focused on the “album” category 2 Andrews and malicious pornographic software with malicious deductions and maliciously disseminated attributes that were spread by SMS and had malicious behavior such as stealing user messages and correspondence, and coordinated work The A total of 47,316 cases of such malicious programs were found in the year, and more than 1.01 million were collected, and 6045 domain names were used to disseminate malicious programs. 7645 malicious mailbox accounts for receiving user’s text messages and contacts were used to receive user text messages Malicious mobile phone number 6616, leaked users SMS and address book mail 222 million, seriously endangering the user’s personal information security and property security. Under the guidance of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, according to the “mobile Internet malicious program monitoring and disposal mechanism”, CNCERT organization of e-mail service providers, domain name registrar and other active coordination work to find the malicious mailbox account, malicious domain name, etc. Dispose of.

Second, 2016 China’s Internet security situation

In recent years, with China’s network security laws and regulations, management system of continuous improvement, China’s network security technology strength, personnel, international cooperation, and achieved remarkable results. In 2016, China’s Internet security situation is generally stable, the rapid development of network security industry, network security and protection capabilities have been improved, international cooperation to further strengthen the network security. But with cyberspace strategically

The increasing number of countries, the world’s major countries have set up cyberspace attack capability, the growing national network conflict, China’s cyberspace security challenges facing increasingly complex.

Domain name system security in good condition, anti-attack ability increased significantly. In 2016, China’s domain name service system security in good condition, no major security incidents. According to the sampling monitoring, 2016 years for China’s domain name system traffic scale of more than 1Gpbs DDoS attacks on the daily average of about 32 cases, did not affect the domain name resolution services in China, the basic telecommunications companies have not seriously affected the success rate of analysis Attack events, mainly with the domain name system to strengthen security measures, anti-DDoS attack ability significantly improved related. In June 2016, there were large-scale DDoS attacks against the global root domain name servers and their mirrors. Most of the root domain servers were affected to varying degrees. The domain name mirroring servers in China also suffered large-scale network traffic attacks at the same time. Due to emergency treatment in a timely manner, and the root zone top-level domain cache expiration time is often more than 1 day, the attack did not affect the domain name system network security.

For the industrial control system of network security attacks increasing, many important industrial control system security incidents should pay attention. In 2016, the world occurred more than the major areas of industrial accidents worthy of our country wake up. In August, Kaspersky Security Laboratories exposed the “ghoul” network attack against the industrial sector, which focused on the Middle East and other countries’ Industrial enterprises launched a targeted network intrusion; in December, the Ukrainian power grid once again experienced a power supply failure, according to the analysis of the origin of this malpractice “dark forces” variants.

China’s industrial control system is huge, security vulnerabilities, malicious detection, etc. to our industrial control system to bring some security risks. As of the end of 2016, CNVD included 1036 industrial malpractices, of which 173 were included in 2016, an increase of 38.4% over 2015. Industrial control system mainly exists buffer overflow, lack of access control mechanism, weak password, directory traversal and other loopholes risk. Through the analysis of network traffic, 2016 CNCERT cumulative monitoring to the network of industrial equipment fingerprint detection event more than 880,000 times, and found 60 countries from outside the 1610 IP address of China’s network of industrial equipment for fingerprint detection.

High-level persistent threat normalization, China’s attack is particularly serious threat. As of the end of 2016, domestic enterprises issued a senior Sustainability Threat (APT) study reported a total of 43 APT organizations, including targeted targets for China’s APT organizations have 36 4. From the attack to achieve the point of view, more APT attacks using engineering to achieve, that is, relying on commercial attack platform and the Internet black industry

Chain data and other mature resources to achieve APT attacks. This kind of attack not only reduces the technical and resource threshold of initiating APT attack, but also increases the difficulty of traceability analysis. In 2016, many of the important information system for the implementation of the APT attacks were exposed, including “white elephant action 5”, “Man Linghua attack action”, mainly in China’s education, energy, military and scientific research as the main target The In August 2016, the hacker organization “Shadow Brokers” published the Formula Organization 6 frequently used toolkits, including various firewall exploits, hacking tools and scripts involving Juniper, Flying Tower, Cisco, and Financial letter, Huawei and other manufacturers products. CNCERT released 11 software vulnerabilities (there are four suspected 0day vulnerability) for census analysis and found that the world has about 120,000 IP addresses carrying the relevant products of network equipment, of which China’s IP address of about 33,000, accounting for 27.8% of all IP addresses poses a serious potential threat to cyberspace security in China. In November 2016, the hacker organization “shadow broker” also announced a group has been attacked by the National Security Agency network control and IP address and domain name data, China is the most attacked countries, involving at least nine universities in China, 12 Energy, aviation, telecommunications and other important information systems departments and two government information centers.

A large number of networked smart devices were attacked by malicious programs to form botnets, which were used to initiate large traffic DDoS attacks. In recent years, with the intelligent wearable equipment, intelligent home, intelligent routers and other terminal equipment and network equipment, the rapid development and popularization, for the Internet of intelligent devices, the proportion of network attacks increased, the attackers use the Internet of things intelligent device vulnerabilities Access to device control rights, or other hacker underground transactions for user information data theft, network traffic hijacking, or for controlling the formation of large-scale botnets. CNCERT on-line monitoring of vehicle network security system analysis and found that some car network information service providers and related products, security vulnerabilities can lead to vehicle, location and vehicle owners information disclosure and vehicle remote control and other security risks. At the end of 2016, Mirai malicious programs were widely watched as a result of large-scale off-site events on the east coast of the United States and a large number of users of Deutsche Telekom visited Internet anomalies. Mirai is a typical use of Internet of things intelligent device vulnerabilities to penetrate infiltration to achieve the control of the device malicious code, the number of charged devices accumulated to a certain extent will form a huge “botnet”, known as “Mirai botnet.” And because of Internet of things intelligent devices are generally 24 hours online, infected with malicious programs are not easily perceived by the user, forming a “stable” attack source. CNC inspections of the Mirai botnet show that by the end of 2016, a total of 2526 control servers were deployed to control 125.4 million devices, which posed a serious potential security threat to the stable operation of the Internet. In addition, CNCERT also analyzed the Gafgyt botnet sampling analysis. In the fourth quarter of 2016, a total of 817 control servers were selected to control 425,000 devices, and more than 18,000 DDoS attacks were initiated, with peak traffic 5Gpbs more than 72 times the number of attacks.

Web site data and personal information leak is not uncommon, “derivative disaster” serious. Due to the disappearance of the traditional boundaries of the Internet, all kinds of data spread across the terminal, network, mobile phone and cloud, coupled with the interests of the Internet black industry chain driven by data leakage threats are increasing. In 2016, the domestic and international website data and personal information leakage incidents frequently, the political, economic and social impact gradually deepened, and even personal life safety has also been violated. In the United States, the United States election candidate Hillary’s mail leak, directly affect the US election process; Yahoo two account information disclosure involving about 1.5 billion personal accounts, resulting in US telecom operators Verizon $ 4.8 billion acquisition of Yahoo plans to shelve May even be canceled. In the country, China’s immune planning system network was malicious invasion, 200,000 children’s information was stolen and publicly sold online; information leakage led to frequent fraud cases, college entrance examination information leaks to take away the university students will soon enter the life of Xu Yuyu ; 2016 public security organs were detected more than 1,800 cases of infringement of personal information, seized 30 million pieces of personal information of various types of citizens. In addition, according to the news media reported that Russia, Mexico, Turkey, the Philippines, Syria, Kenya and other countries of the government website data leaked.

Mobile Internet malicious program more profitable, mobile Internet black industry chain has matured. In 2016, CNCERT received more than 205 million mobile Internet malpractions through autonomous capture and vendor exchange, up 39.0% from 2015 and continued to grow at a high rate in the past six years. Through malware behavior analysis, it was found that the number of applications for fraudulent, malicious deductions, lockdowns and other economic interests was 59.6% of the total number of malicious programs, nearly three times over 2015. From the spread of malicious programs found that fraudulent acts of fraudulent procedures mainly through SMS, advertising and network disk and other specific communication channels to spread, the number of infected users reached 24.93 million, causing significant economic losses. From the attack mode of malicious programs, it is found that the number of malicious programs that steal SMS verification codes is larger than that of SMS, and 10845 samples are obtained in the whole year. It shows the characteristics of simple production, fixed attack mode and huge profits. The mobile Internet industry Mature.

Extortion software raging, a serious threat to local data and intelligent equipment security. According to CNCERT monitoring found in 2016 in the traditional PC side, to capture extortion class malicious program sample of about 19,000, the number of a record high in recent years. Analysis of extortion software attack object found that extortion software has been gradually extended from the individual terminal equipment to business users, especially for high-value target blackmail situation

Heavy. For enterprise users, blackmail software exploits security vulnerabilities to attack, the enterprise database encryption and extortion, the end of 2016 open source MongoDB database was a blackmail software attacks, a large number of users affected. For personal terminal equipment, extortion software malicious behavior in the traditional PC and mobile terminals show obvious different characteristics: in the traditional PC side, mainly through the “encrypted data” to blackmail, that is, the user’s computer file encryption, stress users Purchase the decryption key; on the mobile side, mainly through the “encryption device” to blackmail, that is, remote lock the user mobile devices, so that users can not use the device, and to coerce users to pay the cost of unlocking. However, from the extortion of software transmission point of view, the traditional PC and mobile side show a common, mainly through e-mail, counterfeit normal application, QQ group, network disk, paste it, victims and other spread.

Three, 2017 worthy of attention to the hot spots

According to the analysis of the characteristics of China’s Internet security situation in 2016, CNCERT predicts that the hot spots that are worthy of attention in 2017 are as follows.

(A) cyberspace according to the law of governance more clear. On November 7, 2016, the Twenty-fourth Session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress passed the “Network Security Law” and came into effect on June 1, 2017. The Act has 7 chapters and 79 articles on cyberspace sovereignty, network products and service providers ‘security obligations, network operators’ safety obligations, personal information protection rules, critical information infrastructure security protection systems and important data cross-border transmission rules, etc. Has been clearly defined. It is expected that the departments will pay more attention to the propaganda and interpretation work of the “Network Security Law” in 2017, compile relevant supporting policies and regulations, implement various supporting measures, and make cyberspace according to law more clear.

(B) the use of Internet of things intelligent device network attacks will continue to increase. 2016 CNVD collection of intelligent networking equipment vulnerabilities 1117, mainly related to web cameras, intelligent routers, smart appliances, intelligent gateway and other equipment. The vulnerability type is mainly privilege to bypass, information disclosure, command execution, etc., which weak password (or built-in default password) vulnerability is easy to be used, the actual impact is very extensive, malicious code attack to use an important risk point. With the development of unmanned aerial vehicles, autopilot vehicles, the popularity of smart home appliances and the development of smart cities, the number of vulnerabilities in networked smart devices will increase significantly, and network attacks against or using intelligent networking devices will be more frequent.

(C) the Internet and the traditional industry integration caused by the security threat is more complex. With the deepening of China’s “Internet +” and “Made in China 2025” action plan, almost all traditional industries, traditional applications and services in China are being changed by the Internet, bringing innovation and development opportunities to various industries. In the process of integration innovation and development, the traditional industry closed mode gradually changed to open mode, but also the future of the Internet virtual network security events into real-world security threats. Internet finance, industrial Internet and other emerging industries rapid development, but triggered a new network security threats can not be ignored, the Internet financial integration of information flow and capital flow, the risk of information flow is likely to lead to loss of capital flow; industrial control system more For the intelligent, network, open Internet brings malicious sniffing behavior increased, the risk of malicious attacks continue to increase. Traditional Internet security and real-world security issues intertwined with the security threat is more complex, the consequences are more serious.

(D) personal information and important data protection will be more attention. In recent years, the development of Internet technology is extremely convenient and rich in our lives and work, online shopping, online job search, social platform, government services and other platforms are filled with a large number of personal detailed privacy information. Since 2011, China’s serious personal information on the leak of the event, especially in recent years, the case of network fraud, the victim’s details have been grasped by fraud, to social stability and serious harm. 2013 “Snowdon incident” and the follow-up of the US government has been a large-scale monitoring of the project, to stimulate countries to strengthen the protection of important data measures, strict norms of Internet data collection, use, storage and so on. China in the “Network Security Law” on the personal information protection rules, important data cross-border transmission has been clearly defined, is expected on personal information and important data protection of the detailed regulatory documents will be enacted, and effectively implement the protection measures.

(5) Network security threats Information sharing has attracted the attention of all parties. Timely comprehensive access to and analysis of network security threats, ahead of network security early warning and deployment of emergency response measures, fully embodies a national network security comprehensive defense capabilities. Through the network security threat information sharing, the use of collective knowledge and technical ability, is to achieve a comprehensive grasp of the network security threats an effective way. The United States as early as 1998 in the Clinton administration signed a presidential decree to encourage the government and enterprises to carry out network security information sharing, to the Obama administration is the network security information sharing is written into the government bill. In recent years, China attaches great importance to the work of network security information sharing, in the “Network Security Law” clearly put forward to promote the relevant departments, key information infrastructure operators and the relevant research institutions, network security services and other network security information sharing The However, in the face of complex and multi-dimensional data source information, how to carry out sharing and in-depth analysis efficiently, we need to establish a set of information security standards for network security threats based on large data analysis. At present, many organizations in our country have been engaged in the exploration and practice of information sharing of network security threats. The relevant national standards and industry standards have been formulated. CNCERT has also established a network security threat information sharing platform for sharing in the communication industry and security industry. jobs.

(6) the background of the network disputes will continue to heat up the degree of concern. At present, China’s Internet penetration rate has reached 53.2% 7, the public through the Internet to get the news more and more fast and convenient, people concerned about the global political hot spots are also rising. 2016 US presidential election “mail door” incident, the Russian hacker exposure of the World Anti-Doping Agency scandal, etc., allow netizens to feel organized, purposeful careful network attacks can have a serious impact on the politics of other countries, Will have a national background of the network disputes from the perspective of industry concerns extended to all Internet users. With a large number of countries continue to strengthen the network space military capacity building, there are national background of the network dispute event will be hot, the crisis frequently, the trend of popular discussion will continue to heat up.

(7) based on artificial intelligence network security technology research in full swing. In the third World Internet Conference, “World Internet leading technology results release activities” site, Microsoft, IBM, Google three major international technology giants show machine learning based on artificial intelligence technology, for us to describe a beautiful future of artificial intelligence. At present, the network attack events are endless, the means are complex, the purpose is complex, the shortage of network security personnel is difficult to cope with the rapid changes in the network security situation, and machine learning in the field of data analysis outstanding performance, artificial intelligence is considered in the network security will “Great as”. There are statistical agencies found that the 2016 “network security” and “artificial intelligence” co-appeared in the article the frequency of rapid rise, indicating that more and more discussions will be linked together with the two together. Based on the large data related to network security, artificial intelligence technology such as machine learning can make breakthrough progress in unknown threat discovery, network behavior analysis and network security warning.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

4月19日消息，國家計算機網絡應急技術處理協調中心（簡稱“國家互聯網應急中心”，英文簡稱“CNCERT”)發布《2016年我國互聯網網絡安全態勢綜述》，在對我國互聯網宏觀安全態勢監測的基礎上，結合網絡安全預警通報、應急處置工作實踐成果，著重分析和總結了2016年我國互聯網網絡安全狀況，並預測2017年網絡安全熱點問題。
一、2016年我國互聯網網絡安全監測數據分析
CNCERT持續對我國網絡安全宏觀狀況開展抽樣監測，2016年，移動互聯網惡意程序捕獲數量、網站後門攻擊數量以及安全漏洞收錄數量較2015年有所上升，而木馬和殭屍網絡感染數量、拒絕服務攻擊事件數量、網頁仿冒和網頁篡改頁面數量等均有所下降。
據抽樣監測，2016年約9.7萬個木馬和殭屍網絡控制服務器控制了我國境內1699萬餘台主機，控制服務器數量較2015年下降8.0%，境內感染主機數量較2015年下降了14.1%。 。其中，來自境外的約4.8萬個控制服務器控制了我國境內1499萬餘台主機，來自美國的控制服務器數量居首位，其次是中國香港和日本。
在監測發現的因感染惡意程序而形成的殭屍網絡中，規模在100台主機以上的殭屍網絡數量4896個，其中規模在10萬台以上的殭屍網絡數量52個。從我國境內感染木馬和殭屍網絡主機按地區分佈數量分析來看，排名前三位的分別是廣東省（占我國境內感染數量的13.4%）、江蘇省（佔9.2%）和山東省（佔8.3 %）。為有效控制木馬和殭屍網絡感染主機引發的危害，2016年，在工業和信息化部指導下，根據《木馬和殭屍網絡監測與處置機制》，CNCERT組織基礎電信企業、域名服務機構等成功關閉1011個控制規模較大的殭屍網絡。
2016年，CNCERT通過自主捕獲和廠商交換獲得移動互聯網惡意程序數量205萬餘個，較2015年增長39.0%，近7年來持續保持高速增長趨勢。按其惡意行為進行分類，前三位分別是流氓行為類、惡意扣費類和資費消耗類1，佔比分別為61.1%、18.2%和13.6%。 CNCERT發現移動互聯網惡意程序下載鏈接近67萬條，較2015年增長近1.2倍，涉及的傳播源域名22萬餘個、IP地址3萬餘個，惡意程序傳播次數達1.24億次。
2016年，CNCERT重點對通過短信傳播，且具有竊取用戶短信和通信錄等惡意行為的“相冊”類2安卓惡意程序及具有惡意扣費、惡意傳播屬性的色情軟件進行監測，並開展協調處置工作。全年共發現此類惡意程序47316個，累計感染用戶超過101萬人，用於傳播惡意程序的域名6045個，用於接收用戶短信和通訊錄的惡意郵箱賬戶7645個，用於接收用戶短信的惡意手機號6616個，洩露用戶短信和通訊錄的郵件222萬封，嚴重危害用戶個人信息安全和財產安全。在工業和信息化部指導下，根據《移動互聯網惡意程序監測與處置機制》，CNCERT組織郵箱服務商、域名註冊商等積極開展協調處置工作，對發現的惡意郵箱賬號、惡意域名等進行關停處置。
二、2016年我國互聯網網絡安全狀況
近年來，隨著我國網絡安全法律法規、管理制度的不斷完善，我國在網絡安全技術實力、人才隊伍、國際合作等方面取得了明顯的成效。 2016年，我國互聯網網絡安全狀況總體平穩，網絡安全產業快速發展，網絡安全防護能力得到提升，網絡安全國際合作進一步加強。但隨著網絡空間戰略地
位的日益提升，世界主要國家紛紛建立網絡空間攻擊能力，國家級網絡衝突日益增多，我國網絡空間面臨的安全挑戰日益複雜。
域名系統安全狀況良好，防攻擊能力明顯上升。 2016年，我國域名服務系統安全狀況良好，無重大安全事件發生。據抽樣監測，2016年針對我國域名系統的流量規模達1Gpbs以上的DDoS攻擊事件日均約32起，均未對我國域名解析服務造成影響，在基礎電信企業側也未發生嚴重影響解析成功率的攻擊事件，主要與域名系統普遍加強安全防護措施，抗DDoS攻擊能力顯著提升相關。 2016年6月，發生針對全球根域名服務器及其鏡像的大規模DDoS攻擊，大部分根域名服務器受到不同程度的影響，位於我國的域名根鏡像服務器也在同時段遭受大規模網絡流量攻擊。因應急處置及時，且根區頂級域緩存過期時間往往超過1天，此次攻擊未對我國域名系統網絡安全造成影響。
針對工業控制系統的網絡安全攻擊日益增多，多起重要工控系統安全事件應引起重視。 2016年，全球發生的多起工控領域重大事件值得我國警醒。 3月，美國紐約鮑曼水壩的一個小型防洪控制系統遭攻擊；8月，卡巴斯基安全實驗室揭露了針對工控行業的“食屍鬼”網絡攻擊活動，該攻擊主要對中東和其他國家的工業企業發起定向網絡入侵；12月，烏克蘭電網再一次經歷了供電故障，據分析本次故障緣起惡意程序“黑暗勢力”的變種。
我國工控系統規模巨大，安全漏洞、惡意探測等均給我國工控系統帶來一定安全隱患。截至2016年年底，CNVD共收錄工控漏洞1036條，其中2016年收錄了173個，較2015年增長了38.4%。工控系統主要存在緩衝區溢出、缺乏訪問控制機制、弱口令、目錄遍歷等漏洞風險。通過對網絡流量分析發現，2016年度CNCERT累計監測到聯網工控設備指紋探測事件88萬餘次，並發現來自境外60個國家的1610個IP地址對我國聯網工控設備進行了指紋探測。
高級持續性威脅常態化，我國面臨的攻擊威脅尤為嚴重。截止到2016年底，國內企業發布高級持續性威脅（APT）研究報告共提及43個APT組織，其中針對我國境內目標發動攻擊的APT組織有36個4。從攻擊實現方式來看，更多APT攻擊採用工程化實現，即依托商業攻擊平台和互聯網黑色產業
鏈數據等成熟資源實現 APT攻擊。這類攻擊不僅降低了發起APT攻擊的技術和資源門檻，而且加大了受害方溯源分析的難度。 2016年，多起針對我國重要信息系統實施的APT攻擊事件被曝光，包括“白象行動5”、“蔓靈花攻擊行動”等，主要以我國教育、能源、軍事和科研領域為主要攻擊目標。 2016年8月，黑客組織“影子經紀人（Shadow Brokers）”公佈了方程式組織6經常使用的工具包，包含各種防火牆的漏洞利用代碼、黑客工具和腳本，涉及Juniper、飛塔、思科、天融信、華為等廠商產品。 CNCERT對公佈的11個產品漏洞（有4個疑似為0day漏洞）進行普查分析，發現全球有約12萬個IP地址承載了相關產品的網絡設備，其中我國境內IP地址有約3.3萬個，佔全部IP地址的27.8%，對我國網絡空間安全造成嚴重的潛在威脅。 2016年11月，黑客組織“影子經紀人”又公佈一組曾受美國國家安全局網絡攻擊與控制的IP地址和域名數據，中國是被攻擊最多的國家，涉及我國至少9所高校，12家能源、航空、電信等重要信息系統部門和2個政府部門信息中心。
大量聯網智能設備遭惡意程序攻擊形成殭屍網絡，被用於發起大流量DDoS攻擊。近年來，隨著智能可穿戴設備、智能家居、智能路由器等終端設備和網絡設備的迅速發展和普及利用，針對物聯網智能設備的網絡攻擊事件比例呈上升趨勢，攻擊者利用物聯網智能設備漏洞可獲取設備控制權限，或用於用戶信息數據竊取、網絡流量劫持等其他黑客地下產業交易，或用於被控制形成大規模殭屍網絡。 CNCERT對車聯網系統安全性進行在線監測分析，發現部分車聯網信息服務商及相關產品存在安全漏洞，可導致車輛、位置及車主信息洩露和車輛被遠程控制等安全風險。 2016年底，因美國東海岸大規模斷網事件和德國電信大量用戶訪問網絡異常事件，Mirai惡意程序受到廣泛關注。 Mirai是一款典型的利用物聯網智能設備漏洞進行入侵滲透以實現對設備控制的惡意代碼，被控設備數量積累到一定程度將形成一個龐大的“殭屍網絡”，稱為“Mirai殭屍網絡”。又因物聯網智能設備普遍是24小時在線，感染惡意程序後也不易被用戶察覺，形成了“穩定”的攻擊源。 CNCERT對Mirai殭屍網絡進行抽樣監測顯示，截至2016年年底，共發現2526台控制服務器控制了125.4萬餘台物聯網智能設備，對互聯網的穩定運行形成了嚴重的潛在安全威脅。此外，CNCERT還對Gafgyt殭屍網絡進行抽樣檢測分析，在2016年第四季度，共發現817台控制服務器控制了42.5萬台物聯網智能設備，累計發起超過1.8萬次的DDoS攻擊，其中峰值流量在5Gpbs以上的攻擊次數高達72次。
網站數據和個人信息洩露屢見不鮮，“衍生災害”嚴重。由於互聯網傳統邊界的消失，各種數據遍布終端、網絡、手機和雲上，加上互聯網黑色產業鏈的利益驅動，數據洩露威脅日益加劇。 2016年，國內外網站數據和個人信息洩露事件頻發，對政治、經濟、社會的影響逐步加深，甚至個人生命安全也受到侵犯。在國外，美國大選候選人希拉里的郵件洩露，直接影響到美國大選的進程；雅虎兩次賬戶信息洩露涉及約15億的個人賬戶，致使美國電信運營商威瑞森48億美元收購雅虎計劃擱置甚至可能取消。在國內，我國免疫規劃系統網絡被惡意入侵，20萬兒童信息被竊取並在網上公開售賣；信息洩露導致精準詐騙案件頻發，高考考生信息洩露間接奪去即將步入大學的女學生徐玉玉的生命；2016年公安機關共偵破侵犯個人信息案件1800餘起，查獲各類公民個人信息300億餘條。此外，據新聞媒體報導，俄羅斯、墨西哥、土耳其、菲律賓、敘利亞、肯尼亞等多個國家政府的網站數據發生了洩漏。
移動互聯網惡意程序趨利性更加明確，移動互聯網黑色產業鏈已經成熟。 2016年，CNCERT通過自主捕獲和廠商交換獲得移動互聯網惡意程序數量205萬餘個，較2015年增長39.0%，近6年來持續保持高速增長趨勢。通過惡意程序行為分析發現，以誘騙欺詐、惡意扣費、鎖屏勒索等攫取經濟利益為目的的應用程序驟增，佔惡意程序總數的59.6%，較2015年增長了近三倍。從惡意程序傳播途徑發現，誘騙欺詐行為的惡意程序主要通過短信、廣告和網盤等特定傳播渠道進行傳播，感染用戶數達到2493萬人，造成重大經濟損失。從惡意程序的攻擊模式發現，通過短信方式傳播竊取短信驗證碼的惡意程序數量佔比較大，全年獲得相關樣本10845個，表現出製作簡單、攻擊模式固定、暴利等特點，移動互聯網黑色產業鏈已經成熟。
敲詐勒索軟件肆虐，嚴重威脅本地數據和智能設備安全。根據CNCERT監測發現，2016年在傳統PC端，捕獲敲詐勒索類惡意程序樣本約1.9萬個，數量創近年來新高。對敲詐勒索軟件攻擊對象分析發現，勒索軟件已逐漸由針對個人終端設備延伸至企業用戶，特別是針對高價值目標的勒索情況嚴
重。針對企業用戶方面，勒索軟件利用安全漏洞發起攻擊，對企業數據庫進行加密勒索，2016年底開源MongoDB數據庫遭一輪勒索軟件攻擊，大量的用戶受到影響。針對個人終端設備方面，敲詐勒索軟件惡意行為在傳統PC端和移動端表現出明顯的不同特點：在傳統PC端，主要通過“加密數據”進行勒索，即對用戶電腦中的文件加密，脅迫用戶購買解密密鑰；在移動端，主要通過“加密設備”進行勒索，即遠程鎖住用戶移動設備，使用戶無法正常使用設備，並以此脅迫用戶支付解鎖費用。但從敲詐勒索軟件傳播方式來看，傳統PC端和移動端表現出共性，主要是通過郵件、仿冒正常應用、QQ群、網盤、貼吧、受害者等傳播。
三、2017年值得關注的熱點
根據對2016年我國互聯網網絡安全形勢特點的分析，CNCERT預測2017年值得關注的熱點方向主要如下。
（一）網絡空間依法治理脈絡更為清晰。 2016年11月7日第十二屆全國人大常委會第二十四次會議表決通過《網絡安全法》，並將於2017年6月1日起施行。該法有7章79條，對網絡空間主權、網絡產品和服務提供者的安全義務、網絡運營者的安全義務、個人信息保護規則、關鍵信息基礎設施安全保護製度和重要數據跨境傳輸規則等進行了明確規定。預計2017年各部門將更加重視《網絡安全法》的宣傳和解讀工作，編制出台相關配套政策法規，落實各項配套措施，網絡空間依法治理脈絡將更為清晰。
（二）利用物聯網智能設備的網絡攻擊事件將繼續增多。 2016年CNVD收錄物聯網智能設備漏洞1117個，

（三）互聯網與傳統產業融合引發的安全威脅更為複雜。隨著我國“互聯網＋”、“中國製造2025”行動計劃的深入推進，我國幾乎所有的傳統行業、傳統應用與服務都在被互聯網改變，給各個行業帶來了創新和發展機會。在融合創新發展的過程中，傳統產業封閉的模式逐漸轉變為開放模式，也將以往互聯網上虛擬的網絡安全事件轉變為現實世界安全威脅。互聯網金融、工業互聯網等融合的新興行業快速發展，但引發的新的網絡安全威脅也不容忽略，互聯網金融整合了信息流和資金流，信息流的風險很可能引發資金流損失；工業控制系統更為智能化、網絡化，開放互聯帶來的惡意嗅探行為增多，被惡意攻擊的風險不斷加大。傳統互聯網安全與現實世界安全問題相交織引發的安全威脅更為複雜，產生的後果也更為嚴重。
（四）個人信息和重要數據保護將更受重視。近年來，互聯網技術的發展極大的方便和豐富了我們的生活和工作，網上購物、網上求職、社交平台、政府服務等平台上充斥著大量的個人詳細隱私信息。自2011年以來我國關於嚴重個人信息洩露的事件不絕於耳，特別是近年來的網絡詐騙案件中，受害人的詳細信息都被詐騙分子所掌握，給社會安定帶來嚴重危害。 2013年 “斯諾登事件”及後續相繼爆出的美國政府大範圍監聽項目，刺激著各國加強重要數據的保護措施，嚴格規範互聯網數據的收集、使用、存儲等。我國在《網絡安全法》中對個人信息保護規則、重要數據跨境傳輸進行了明確規定，預計關於個人信息和重要數據信息保護的詳細規範性文件將製定出台，切實落實保護措施。
（五）網絡安全威脅信息共享工作備受各方關注。及時全面獲取和分析網絡安全威脅，提前做好網絡安全預警和部署應急響應措施，充分體現了一個國家網絡安全綜合防禦能力。通過網絡安全威脅信息共享，利用集體的知識和技術能力，是實現全面掌握網絡安全威脅情況的有效途徑。美國早在1998年的克林頓政府時期就簽署了總統令，鼓勵政府與企業開展網絡安全信息共享，到奧巴馬政府時期更是將網絡安全信息共享寫入了政府法案。近年來，我國高度重視網絡安全信息共享工作，在《網絡安全法》中明確提出了促進有關部門、關鍵信息基礎設施的運營者以及有關研究機構、網絡安全服務機構等之間的網絡安全信息共享。但面對紛繁複雜的、多維度的數據源信息，如何高效地開展共享和深入分析，需建立一套基於大數據分析的網絡安全威脅信息共享標準。目前，我國很多機構已經在開展網絡安全威脅信息共享的探索與實踐，相關國家標準和行業標準已在製定中，CNCERT也建立了網絡安全威脅信息共享平台，在通信行業和安全行業內進行相關共享工作。
（六）有國家背景的網絡爭端受關注度將繼續升溫。目前，我國互聯網普及率已經達到53.2%7，民眾通過互聯網獲得的新聞資訊越來越快捷方便，民眾關注全球政治熱點的熱度也不斷高漲。 2016年美國總統大選“郵件門”事件、俄羅斯黑客曝光世界反興奮劑機構醜聞事件等，都讓網民真切感受到有組織、有目的的一場縝密的網絡攻擊可以對他國政治產生嚴重的影響，將有國家背景的網絡爭端從行業領域關注視角延伸到了全體網民。隨著大量的國家不斷強化網絡空間軍事能力建設，有國家背景的網絡爭端事件將會熱點不斷、危機頻出，全民討論的趨勢將會持續升溫。
（七）基於人工智能的網絡安全技術研究全面鋪開。在第三屆世界互聯網大會“世界互聯網領先科技成果發布活動”現場，微軟、IBM、谷歌三大國際科技巨頭展示了基於機器學習的人工智能技術，為我們描繪了人工智能美好的未來。目前，網絡攻擊事件層出不窮、手段多樣、目的複雜，較為短缺的網絡安全人才難以應對變化過快的網絡安全形勢，而機器學習在數據分析領域的出色表現，人工智能被認為在網絡安全方面將會“大有作為”。有研究機構8統計發現，2016年“網絡安全”與“人工智能”兩詞共同出現在文章中的頻率快速上升，表明越來越多的討論將二者聯繫在一起共同關注。以網絡安全相關的大數據為基礎，利用機器學習等人工智能技術，能夠在未知威脅發現、網絡行為分析、網絡安全預警等方面取得突破性進展。

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Hacker Methodology 中國黑客, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀

中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

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中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

Who is responsible for configuring the information resources owned by the United States? Who is responsible for assigning these resources to use the priority order? What measures have we taken to ensure that the Global Information Grid (GIG), the Independent Joint Service System, and the GCCs: Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) and Global Network Associations (GCCs), which rely on information from them, Trojans (JTF-GNO: Joint Task Force-Global NetOps) security? In recent years, the entire network combat system on the discussion of these issues has not been suspended, the focus of debate is the theater operations in the network operations should play what role.

The US military has announced the deployment of the war command for each theater, and also announced that it would reduce military support in the cross-border areas. For each theater combat command, how to configure the information infrastructure to support the war in the theater has become very important. The enemy may be infiltrated into the critical network system area responsible for military power dispatch, which is often underestimated and even treated as an accident or incidental event, but these intrusion is virtually Made a connection request to block the normal operation of the commercial website, and even led to some of the military logistics business logistics company was marked as invalid. The theater warfare command should ensure that the information conditions of its zone are not affected by external invasions. Countless viruses are destroying the Internet, the Department of Defense system began to be attacked. It is now under discussion whether the Global Network Joint Task Force should be disconnected from the military network on the Internet, but the military is concerned that with the cooperation of commercial suppliers alone, the Department of Defense can not guarantee that all logistical support operations will continue without error To go on. Each theater combat command is not sure about the state of the theater itself, and they are skeptical about the security of the global information grid itself, and they are concerned about their ability to carry out the tasks assigned to it.

(STRATCOM) and the global network of joint contingents in the network operations in the dominant ideology of the impact of the theater operations headquarters of its command and control of the zone has a more global network of operations control institutions to strengthen the United States Strategic Command Weakened. The focus on the operational information grid to the global information grid has also affected, to a certain extent, the battlefield operations command of the global information grid is how to support the theater of the specific behavior of the understanding. This article will introduce the existing command relationship, the war between the theater operations command, the direct relationship between command and combat, the old and emerging joint operational principles of a special case analysis, and finally will be the theater combat command In the network operations should play the role of the proposed recommendations.

Network combat environment

The command and control in cyber warfare is a concept that appeared ten years ago, and its connotation has been evolving. Each of the relevant departments, the theater operations headquarters and the global network of joint contingents have carried out some organizational structure and work focus on the adjustment, but ultimately did not solve their respective roles should play this issue. To really understand why the role of theater warfare in cyber operations will be a problem, it is necessary to clarify the question: where is cyber warfare, what is real cyber warfare, and every What is the organizational structure and command and control structure of the department?

The first thing to explain is, what is the global information grid? According to the definition of Ministry of Defense No. 8100.1, it includes “global interconnection, terminal-to-terminal information transmission capability and joint processing capability.” Ability to collect, process, store, transmit and manage information according to the needs of warriors and policy makers ” This covers government and leased communications information systems and services, as well as other software, security and service support required for global information grids, as well as the Clinger- The National Security System, as defined in Section 5142 of the Cohen Act. According to this definition, the global information grid contains all levels of information systems from the Department of Defense and the national security system, from the tactical level to the strategic level, as well as the interconnected communication system.

Most of the discussion on the command and control of the Global Information Grid Network Operations Center focuses on the defense capabilities of the system, but the content of the network operations is far more than that. The tasks to be accomplished by the network operations include three: departmental management, Content management and network defense, whose purpose is to provide a lack of central support across the boundaries of strategic, tactical and operational concepts, and to support the Department of Defense’s full range of combat, intelligence and mission tasks.

1. Sector management is one of the specific tasks of the global information grid, which is the technology, process and policy management of systems and networks that make up the global information grid, including public sector management, systems management, network management, satellite communications management and Electromagnetic spectrum management of these aspects.

2. Content management refers to managing the information itself in the global information grid. It ensures that information is available to users, operators, and decision makers in real time. Content management includes the search, access, transmission, storage and integration of specific information content of the global information grid.

3. Network defense is the global information grid all the information, including additional information to protect, it mainly includes a number of policies, processes, projects and operations. If necessary, the task can be requested through cross-agency cooperation to complete. It is responsible for the global information grid information security, computer network defense, computer defense response capabilities and critical infrastructure protection.

Now we have learned about the basic organizational structure of the cyber warfare, the next step in the various organizations in the network operations and how they are performing the tasks, which are mainly composed of troops, theater warfare headquarters and global network joint contingents, all of which are With the changes in the battlefield requirements to improve their organizational structure.

The change in the organizational structure of the force is mainly to meet the requirements of the global information grid for information transmission, access, control and protection. Ten years ago, the troops had some changes to regional control in order to adapt to cyber warfare, but those measures eventually developed into centralized controls, and these measures were not preserved. Now it is necessary to understand the composition of the forces in order to better understand why the network operations command and control will become so full of controversy.

GEM: GIG Enterprise Management GCM: GIG Content Management GND: GIG network defense

Army ‘s network operations command and control

The army is the least of all the reforms in the service. The Army continues to hold the previous commander, now known as the Theater Network Operations and Security Centers (TNOSC), which is directly responsible for the various theater war operations. The Army maintains an independent global network operations and security center (GNOSC: Global NetOps and Security Center), all of the battlefield network operations and security centers are its affiliates. The Global Network Operations and Security Center has technical control over the Battlefield Network Operations and Security Center, but the Battlefield Operations and Security Center is also part of the Theater Command and is also managed by the Theater Network Command. A typical example is the Army’s battlefield signal The brigade is managed by the Army Service Component Command.

The Global Network Operations and Security Center provides technical guidance to the network operations forces in each theater. The US Army Network Command and the 9th Signal Command are responsible for the technical and management of the Global Network Operations and Security Center. But in wartime, the Global Network Operations and Security Center was also commanded by the Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as Army Element.

ACERT: Army Computer Emergency Response Unit

AGNOSC: Army Global Network and Security Center

ASCC: Army Army Command

ARSTRAT: Army Strategic Command (Missile Defense and Strategy)

CIO: Chief Information Officer

GCC: Theater Combat Command (Regional Joint Command, Six of the US Army’s Top Ten Command)

INSCOM: Intelligence and Security Command (one of the Army’s reporting units)

JTF-GNO: Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NETCOM: Army Network War Command

RCERT: Regional Computer Emergency Response Team

STRATCOM: US Strategic Command

TNCC: Theater Network Operations Control Center

TNOCC: Theater Network Operations and Security Center

G6: Army Command Department of Communications

G2 Army Command Information Department

Installation Network Provider

COMMAND – Strategic level operational command

OPCON: Battle (Battle) Command

TACON: tactical control

GS: Global Strike

TECHCON: echelon

ADCON: management control

Air Force ‘s Network Operations Command Control

The Air Force has chosen a different organizational approach to move the focus from the former headquarters of the Network Operations and Security Center (MAJCOM NOSCs) to the Integrated Network Operations and Security Centers (I-NOSCs: Integrated NetOps and Security Centers). Unlike the Army’s Battlefield Network Operations and Security Center, which is managed by the Theater Operations Command, the Air Force’s Integrated Network Operations and Security Center is not affiliated with any theater war command, but only by the Air Force Operations Center (AFNOC : Air Force NetOps Center), which is similar to the Army’s Global Network Operations and Security Center. The Air Force realizes that the Theater Command must have the power to direct direct operations in its zone, and it is necessary to establish a general support relationship between the Air Force Operations Center and the Theater Operations Command, establishing a dedicated link between the two departments unit. In addition, the Air Force has given a command to the establishment of a communications control center in their respective theater areas. These control centers can be used as a shortcut between the Air Force Operations Center and their respective theater operations.

ACC: Air Warfare Center

AFCHQ: Air Force Command

AFNETOPS: Air Force Network Operations Command

ARSTRAT: Air Force Strategic Command Theater Network Operations Control Center

CIO: Chief Information Officer

I-NOSC: Integrated Network Operations and Security Center

GCC: Ibid., Regional Joint Command

JFCC-NW: Network War Joint Function Composition Command

JTF-GNO: Ibid., Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NCC: Network Control Center

STRATCOM: Ibid., Strategic Command

TNOS: Ibid., Theater Network Operations and Security Center

Naval network operations command control

The Navy and the Air Force, no longer regard the theater as a unit of command. In order to better support global operations, they assisted two existing theater naval warfare centers (RNOSCs) affiliated with the Naval Global Network Operations and Security Center (NAVGNOSC) to assist the original two naval schools in Naples and Bahrain Communication master station (NCTMS: Navy Computer and Telecommunications Master Station). In addition, since most of the Navy’s cyber operations were carried out at sea, they also established Fleet NetOps Centers (FNOCs: Fleet NetOps Centers), echoing the theater and cyber warfare centers located in the United States. The fleet network operations center is the tactical entry point for the fleet to conduct cyber operations, providing network services for audio, video and data for the fleet of the zone, and can be provided when the fleet goes from another area of ​​the fleet network operations center into another area Smooth information transitions. Most unclassified networks are contracted by the US Navy Marine Corps Internet or the US Overseas Overseas Navy Enterprise Network (ONENET: Outside of CONUS Navy Enterprise Network). In order to meet the needs of the battlefield, the Navy established the Overseas Marine Corps Intranet Global Network Operations and Security Center to provide global combat support, as well as the establishment of a war zone network combat and security center of the theater network security center on each Specific battlefield support. There is no subordinate relationship between the Theater Network Operations and Security Center and the theater operations headquarters in the theater.

Fleet NOC: Fleet Network Operations Center

GCC: Ibid., Regional Joint Command

INSCON: Ibid., Army Intelligence and Security Command

JTF-GNO: Ibid., Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NAVGNOSC: Navy Global Network Operations and Security Center

NAVSOC: Navy Satellite Operations Center

NCC MHQ: Navy Network Operations Information Operations and Space Warfare Center

NMCI GNOC: Maritime Network Global Network Operations Center

RNOSC: ibid, regional network operations center

STRATCOM: Ibid., Strategic Command

TNCC: Ibid., Theater Network Operations Control Center

Navy Global Network Operations and Security Center (NAVGNOSC) and the East and West Regional Network Operations and Security Center (East and West RNOSCs), which support the most basic organization of global naval operations. The Naval Global Network Operations and Security Center brings together information from the Theater Network Operations and Security Center, the Overseas Marine Corps Intranet and the Naval Satellite Operations Center to provide global command and control information for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force. Unlike the Navy and the Army, they did not maintain a body belonging to the Theater Command. The support relationship between the forces established by the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations and the Theater Warfare Command did not give the theater war command the power to command the Naval Department’s global information grid. All command requests of the Theater Warfare Command must be approved by the Navy’s Global Network Operations and Security Center.

Command and Control of Theater Combat Command

Although each theater combat command in their respective jurisdictions for network operations are not the same way, but they have a common feature, that is, have established a theater network operations control center and a subordinate to the defense information system (DISA: Defense Information Systems Agency) of the theater network operations center. (CENTCOM) will be the theater network operations control center and the Defense Information Systems Agency’s theater network operations center known as the Central Theater Network Operations Center (Central Region Theater NetOps), the Central Commander of the Central Theater, Center, and the European Command (EUCOM) has established a Theater Communication Control Center (Theater Communication Control Center). Although there are some differences in the organization, but all the theater network operations control center are basically used by the theater combat command for the area of ​​the global information grid command control (area of ​​the global information grid is also known as the theater Information Grid TIG: Theater Information Grid).

The Theater Operations Command has optimized the configuration and control of the information resources of the global information grid through the Theater Network Operations Control Center to enable them to better serve the battle, while the Theater Network Operations Control Center is also connected to the Defense Information Systems Authority, the regular forces and the global Joint Operations of the Network Operations Joint Task Force. They collaborated with the Theater Network Warfare Center, the Theater Network Operations and Security Center to monitor the status of the theater information grid, to decide on the proposed global operations of the Joint Operations Task Force, and to assess the impact of its actions. The Theater Network Warfare Control Center has the right to decide on the reduction and termination of combat operations and to adjust the priority of operations through the Theater Network Operations Center and the Theater Network Operations and Security Center. If there is no theater network operations and security center in the theater, the theater network operations control center under the Global Network Operations and Security Center tie is responsible for completing the mission required by the Theater Operations Command.

The North North Command (NORTHCOM) is a rather special sector, although it is a theater warfare command with a clear zone, but most of its troops in the zone – including cyber combat troops – are not affiliated with the commander , But belong to the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM: Join Forces Command). This deployment is intended to facilitate the global management of the force. The North Command, like several other theater warfare commanders, also set up a theater network operations control center, but did not establish a theater network operations and security center, which makes the North Command must rely on network operations and security centers and other departments for its Provide general support. In this case, the role of the North Command is to be responsible for the operations within its jurisdiction, but also the lack of understanding of the corresponding battlefield information grid, and no direct control of its power.

Strategic Command Network Operations Command Control

With the troops fighting command on the network combat structure to adjust the same, the Ministry of Defense departments are also undergoing reform. Over the years, the Department of Defense has not had a centralized control of the network operations. But in 1997 when the Department of Defense conducted this attempt to find some of the weaknesses of the network at that time, also came to the “combat command – troops – defense agencies,” this network mode of operation is not suitable for modern battlefield situation The That attempt has led to the formation of a Defense Force (IAA) bureau, which is part of today’s Global Network Operations Joint Task Force, which is responsible for the operation and defense of global information grids.

Global Network Operations Joint Task Force network operations command and control mechanism is also constantly evolving. Prior to the advent of the existing UCP: Unified Command Plan, the command and control of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force was under the responsibility of the Theater Operations Command, but it proved that it was not conducive to managing all the components in the network, It is also difficult to provide enough information for the global information grid information. The original version of the operational concept of cyber warfare emphasizes the control of the theater operations of the theater in the theater, which was described as follows: “The combat command has the power to command the troops assigned to its zone, Is conducive to the completion of the task, when the combat command feel appropriate, or even adjust the priority of the global information grid.All of these activities should be through the theater network operations center to achieve. “In fact, even the global Event, the initial version of the network combat concept document also provides that the global network operations Joint Task Force needs to be in the theater combat command of the theater network operations control center under the command of combat.

The follow-up version of the operational concept has been adapted to this principle. The control of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force was moved to a more global command and control structure, through which the overall role of the strategic headquarters, the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force and other forces involved in the network operations Has been strengthened. The operational concept of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force is subdivided into three environmental operational concepts: global, theater and non-global. What kind of environmental concepts apply to different events depends on the actual impact of the events and the impact of the theater. This form of command and control structure is more suitable for the current network combat diversity characteristics, for different levels of events, theater combat command can take a more flexible response measures, and even at the same time to support and supportive action. In this system, sometimes the process of dealing with the event to go through a complete command system chain, and sometimes you can skip some steps.

Global events

Global events refer to activities or events that clearly affect the preparedness of the entire global information grid, which often requires the concordation of multiple theater combatants to be resolved. Commander of the Strategic Command must have the ability to quickly identify global events and to be able to determine which theater combat operations or other agencies of the Department of Defense will be affected. Global events include fast-spreading network malicious code attacks, satellite communications attacks, and enterprise application attacks that are not limited to single-theater network events.

The Global Strategic Command is a reliable command center with command and command for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force and the Theater Command. The Global Network Operations Joint Task Force uses its own resources to execute the instructions of the Strategic Command, which can be quickly sent to troops around the world. It is noteworthy that this order is not in the event of transmission to the theater of combat operations.

Although the notion of operational concept conferred the command of the commander of the strategic command worldwide, it did not completely deny the right of the theater war command to be commanded by the assigned joint command. While the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force performs the operational command of the Strategic Command, the Theater Operations Command can also deploy its troops to carry out the corresponding activities. Of course, in accordance with the requirements of the operational concept, the forces under the leadership of the theater operations command must be consistent with the action guidelines of the Joint Operations Task Force under the leadership of the Strategic Command. In fact, according to the historical action log of the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations, most of the cyber operations began at the beginning of a small theater, and the Theater Command was always the first unit to deal with these incidents, and If they are handled properly, these theater-level events will not develop into global events.

Theater events

Theater events are those that occur in a battlefield area, and its foreseeable range of influence does not go beyond the theater, and the biggest difference between theater and global events is that. In the event of such incidents, the theater operations headquarters played a leading role, while the strategic headquarters only take the support role. The Global Network Operations Joint Task Force can provide support to the Theater Command by its Theater Network Operations and Security Center. If the local forces do not have a theater network operations and security center, it can also provide general support for the Theater Network Operations Control Center through the Global Network Operations and Security Center. The Command of the Theater Combat Command to the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force is subordinate to the subordinate command, that is to say there is no right to direct the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force through its Global Network Operations and Security Center to operate in its area.

Non-global event

A non-global event is an event that only affects the functional warfare headquarters and a particular defense agency. Since such institutions do not have a clear zone, these events can neither be regarded as global nor can they be seen as theater. In dealing with non-global events, the Strategic Command plays the role of auxiliary command, and the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force provides general support for the operational operational warfare headquarters involved. Most of the non-global events generally occur in the northern command zone, since many of the relevant functional departments are subordinate to the Northern Command. In the case of command and control procedures, non-global events and global events are the same.

Contradictory command and control requirements

Tactical technical requirements

Although the positioning of the various forces are not the same, but in the pursuit of efficient network operations, reasonable combat methods are their common theme. Different forces shoulder different responsibilities, they established an independent combat network, application facilities and auxiliary tools to meet their own and global information grid to maintain connectivity needs. Each unit is responsible for operating part of the global information grid, which to some extent the need for combat operations between the various departments of the centralized management, so as to get the desired combat efficiency and return on investment.

The focus of the discussion on centralized control of global information grids is the global nature of cyber warfare. The only way for the Department of Defense to achieve a network-centric commanding mechanism, to enhance the Force’s awareness of the situation and to significantly shorten the decision-making cycle, is to integrate the network and the forces horizontally, which is a centralized control mechanism The The latest “four-year defense assessment report” mentioned in the “to simplify the current ‘chimney’ system structure, to achieve a network-centric command mechanism.”

In order to make better use of scarce resources, the Department of Defense must consider when and where to allocate resources from a global perspective. The allocation of essential resources for network operations such as satellite transmission bands, standard tactical entry network sites and bandwidth must have clear mission objectives and easy to understand global significance. From the perspective of the force, the centralized command is, to some extent, a reshuffle of the existing force institutions and operations, defense networks.

The combat operations led by the theater war command will no longer be strictly limited to its zone. Ground forces are re-starting to use aircraft (including unmanned aerial vehicles) to routinely fly in the United States to support their operations. With the development of the PGS: Prompt Global Strike project, the commander has the power to call for conventional strike assistance from weapons systems outside the theater.

On the Navy, they pointed out that one of the essential characteristics of the maritime forces was global mobility, and the naval forces were constantly interspersed between the various theater warheads. Especially as aircraft carrier battle group such units, once deployed, it can not stay in a small battlefield. In addition, even the theater-level operations taken by the theater war command may have a global impact. The adjustment of the network defensive posture may have a huge financial burden on the Internet sector, and the combat command may not be able to understand the specific details of the adjustment behavior.

For the Department of Defense’s network system, all attacks are essentially global in nature. The enemy can not easily from the other side of the Earth to the United States to attack the physical objectives, but in the field of computer network technology, such things happen often. Once such an attack is detected, the information about it must be communicated to all relevant departments in the shortest possible time to ensure that such attacks are identified from anywhere to protect the security of the global information grid. Every time a network intrusion – even if it does not seem to fail the invasion – is likely to give the global information grid content a huge potential harm, because they invade the system behind the back door will be in the future Attack to play a role. The outbreak of the virus is an undisputed global event, and if we do not realize this, we will suffer more losses.

The Navy emphasizes that the impact of no events will be limited to a theater area, and that all efforts to combat cyber operations must be global. Their defense is that there is no theater boundaries, the Department of Defense every battlefield combat headquarters are facing the same potential threat, in order to obtain information on the advantages of the Department of Defense must make full use of its large coverage of the network resources , Quickly share all useful information on a global basis.

In addition, the Air Force and the Navy have pointed out that their cyber warfare forces are not deployed by the Theater Warfare Command. The Air Force and the Navy have their own cyber warfare organizations (such as the Theater Network Operations and Security Center) in each zone of the Theater Command, and the Air Force and Navy’s cyber warfare forces are usually defender in the theater. Finally, the Air Force and the Navy believe that the Strategic Command is responsible for the Global Information Grid through the Theater Operations Command, based on the description of the official documents available for reference.

Theater war command

There are two issues that need to be concerned about the command and control of cyber warfare against the Theater Command. One is the need for timely control of the battlefield information grid, the second is the need to turn the network into a weapon system, so that commanders can be the same as the conventional weapon system to use the same network resources, the use of the full range of network advantages to conduct a comprehensive battle.

Those forces that have been assigned specific responsibilities have already deployed their own unique solutions, each of which is involved in a network operation or each institution believes that it already has the most effective allocation of scarce resources. But the global information grid is not exclusive to a particular department, but a joint structure. “Chimney” type system and the existing deployment of the troops is actually to reduce the efficiency of the battlefield information grid efficiency. For example, the Army developed a secure IP telephony solution before other departments in the Department of Defense to communicate with the secret voice. For security reasons, other departments usually do not use this program, but their own development of a set of the same function of the solution. So there will be two sets of independent, confidential IP voice schemes in the zone of the Combat Command, which can not be connected to each other. The theater warfare command had to be screened, leaving only a set of programs to ensure that all departments in their zones could cooperate with each other. But the solution is eliminated by the party can no longer with the theater outside the brother forces for confidential contact.

Some of the resources in the combat command zone can serve multiple forces and the public sector. However, there are many examples of the use of duplication of work for the establishment of their own can not be linked to each other independent systems, such as satellite terminals and some technical control equipment. Sometimes, to send a message, you need to send the signal back to the United States, and then sent from the local distance from the initial sender only two miles of the recipient there. All kinds of fibers are arranged one by one on the same route, but the data between them can not be exchanged directly because they belong to different forces or public departments. The theater operations command must take measures to address the interconnection between the troops or the civil service in the zone.

To solve this problem, you can use centralized control approach. The centralized command of the cyber warfare forces requires the theater war command to make some adjustments to its own organization, but at the same time it does not affect its power to direct action when there is a need for combat. Relevant forces must accept orders for multiple combat orders and effectively optimize and feedback battlefield information. At present, the troops sent to the front are becoming more and more independent, and through the help of the global information grid they can cross the border of the theater combat command back and forth, and the theater warfare command has been compromised by the support and confrontation of the cyber warfare , After the implementation of centralized command, the troops can not or do not want to respond to the requirements of the theater combat command.

The Pacific Command (PACOM: Pacific Command) first adopted a “joint attempt” approach in humanitarian aid operations when it participated in the Indonesian tsunami relief work in 2004. The Pacific Command issued instructions to the assigned troops to carry out special network defenses under the framework of the entire action plan. Many naval forces and Marine Corps units have established relatively direct network defenses under the centralized command of the Navy’s Global Network Operations Center, which goes beyond the mandate of the Pacific Command to the Navy and Marine Corps, which Posing a potential risk factor for the global operations of the Pacific Command.

The Combat Command is concerned that the idea of ​​centralizing control of global information grids will always reduce their grip on information and control of the global information grid. Under the existing command system, a unit will carry out training or perform other tasks under the command of its troops, and participate in the battle under the command of the theater combat command, and the rules of command and control are very clear. The command and control of the forces in the field of information is as important as their command and control in the air, land, sea and space fields. For the C3S system (control, communications and computer systems), under its command to combat and responsible for the protection of its forces are often in a double or even triple the report chain, the results can not tell who is responsible for the final battle. In a global or non-global event, the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force often conducts direct operations around the theater operations headquarters. Although the operational concept of joint cyber warfare specifically emphasizes the need for coordinated operations with the theater combat command, this requirement has become almost in the context of modern combat rapid changes. Information Security Weakness Alert System, Computer Task Sequence, and Information Condition Adjustment System Problems outside the jurisdiction of the Combat Command are typical examples of this requirement failure. These events directly affect the command of the Theater Command in the battlefield, when the troops want to directly use these mechanisms from the management level to strengthen their own control, they can not determine when and how in the implementation of these Operation, and do not know what impact this will have on the command of the theater combat command, because under current conditions, only the theater combat command has the ability to carry out these operations. When a threat event requires the Air Force’s Space Command to seek the cooperation of the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations with Air Force forces, it would bring to the command of the North Command if it did not notify or obtain cooperation with the Northern Command Big trouble.

In the Central Command, due to the lack of adequate control of the network combat forces, resulting in the commander sometimes can not determine whether the network resources are available. The Navy is responsible for operating a large number of battlefield information grids. Navy network combat forces in the operational area are not responsible for the Central Command of the Navy, who only need to report to the Theater Network Operations and Security Center. The central theater’s central theater theater operations center, whose duty is to maintain and direct all the combat operations of the theater operations, but it is not in the naval network combat force report chain, so it is often impossible to get all the battlefield information grid Of the state of affairs, there are already alternatives to deal with this problem, but this can not be said to be a formal solution.

For the North Command, because of the lack of cyber warfare control, they encountered great trouble in the rescue work of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In that operation, the troops’ equipment was transported to the joint warfare zone without permission. Which makes the North Command can not grasp and guide the transfer of materials, but can not coordinate the actions of various forces, which is a multi-directional management and operational issues.

As the various forces advocate the implementation of a centralized command framework centered on the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the theater commanders are reluctant to see such changes, Some of them are responsible for the strategic headquarters, with the global information grid operating rights and defense rights mechanism. The presence of the Strategic Command has been instrumental in maintaining the command of the theater combat command in combat operations in theater and global events and in enhancing communication between the theater combat command and the Joint Staff.

Combat headquarters and troops want to focus on the network operations from the level of joint operations, but there are several issues that need to be discussed:

Who is responsible for the first leadership?

2. Network operations to focus on what the specific direction of the command to be reflected, the global level, the theater level or what other level?

3. What is the change brought about by this adjustment only when a part of the theater combat command sends a request to the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force or is the theater commander’s complete command and priority in the theater?

Finally, the Theater Command is the body that is ultimately responsible for the President’s mission to complete the military mission in the area, and the troops dispatched to the theater combat command need to complete their respective tasks under their jurisdiction. It is unquestionable that they will still be under the command of the strategic command when the troops advocate the implementation of a global centralized command. But the current global information grid is a key part of the command and control capability of the theater combat command and the commander’s ability to guide the troops. Without a global information grid, the plane can not fly, the ground forces can not move, the ships can not sail, even the satellite can not provide the signal. Commanders need to get the status of the global information grid and control, just as they need to master the position and status of the troops as important. They must grasp the scope, ability and status of the battlefield information grid, and must know how the situation outside the theater will affect the battlefield information grid in the area where the troops are located and must be able to command and optimize the troops to support operations. If we really believe that the speculation of the centralized command will have a better effect, it can not be ignored for the theater war command to retain the appropriate command and control.

Also, as long as the structure of the Theater Command is still preserved, all military missions, including those directed by the Functional Command Command, will inevitably occur in the theater of the Theater Command, as all networks Combat missions must be carried out by an entity unit. At the same time, centralized command is necessary to achieve a network-centric command model and to more effectively defend against attacks. The concept of this centralized command and the command of the theater war command to master and optimize the battlefield information grid is not mutually exclusive.

The way forward

To develop a viable network combat command and control framework, it is necessary to avoid extremes, taking into account the needs of theater warfare headquarters and the need to establish centralized control of global information grids. In the process of the development of the operational concept of joint network operations and the transformation process of network combat forces, the principle of organization needs to play the role of adjusting the interests of all parties. In order to achieve this goal, the Department of Defense should do the following:

1. Create a simple, clear network combat command chain, to ensure that the strategic headquarters of all network operations can be directed. This can solve the problem just mentioned “who is responsible for the first leadership”. Only when the event occurred in a rapidly changing environment, the theater command and control agencies began to play a role. Simple command chain can ensure that troops involved in network operations know who should listen to who should report to whom, in this command chain, must include the theater combat command.

2. The command of the theater war command in its zone can be given:

– to amend the Joint Command plan to clarify the responsibilities of the Theater Operations Command to operate the network in its zone.

– Revise the existing global information grid network operational concept, detailing that those outside the theater network operations and security centers can obtain direct assistance from the World Network Operations and Security Center of the Theater Operations Command.

– All orders for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force shall be enforced through the Theater Operations Command.

These adjustments ensure that all units in the theater are acting under a single command chain, which is responsible for the strategic headquarters through the Theater Operations Command. This can also solve the North Command should be responsible for the area but did not command the power of the network fighting the embarrassing situation.

3. In each theater combat command, a joint network operations center under the jurisdiction of the Central Command shall be established to integrate the Theater Network Operations Control Center of the Theater Command Command and the Theater Network Operations Center of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force. As a result, each theater war command will have a joint operations command in the field of computer space, just as in the battlefield of land, sea and air. Any troops outside the Theater Network Operations and Security Center can obtain direct assistance from the Global Network Operations and Security Center of the Joint Network Operations Center.

4. To consolidate the status of the global information grid, the highest control to the strategic headquarters. The development of centralized command is now focused on the command of the forces involved in the network operations, which runs counter to the network-centric command concept. The force-centric “chimney” command system is not conducive to the transmission and processing of information, let us from the “all users to provide the latest and most accurate information” goal farther and farther. In the previous “Goldwater Nichols Defense Ministry Reconstruction Law” report has made it clear that the organization and management and command and control should be controlled by a joint agency.

Concluding remarks

The current centralized command of network operations is an urgent need. Optimizing the network operational command mechanism can help the Department of Defense to improve efficiency, save costs and better allocate scarce resources. More importantly, this allows network combat troops to provide information more quickly and accurately to commanders, which is important in large-scale network operations. The process of centralized command can not affect the efficiency of network combat command and control. This depends on whether the global information grid can provide enough information for all participating units and whether the commander makes full use of the theater information grid to help command operations.

“We have to change the network combat problem discussion and thinking mode, we are in the network” combat “rather than the network” management “, all participating units must ensure that they are ready to war every time to ensure that the network system A decisive weapon system. ” Network operations are a key part of our country’s ability to win war, it can help us provide command and control, shorten the decision-making cycle and adjust the resources of the theater. The Strategic Command has taken a big step in strengthening the concept of cyber warfare, and these efforts need to be continued. The theater warfare command must be an important part of the control and protection of the global information grid to ensure that we can continue to win the network.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

是誰在負責配置美國所擁有的信息資源？誰在負責分配這些資源利用時的優先級順序？我們採取了哪些措施來保證全球信息柵格（GIG：Global Information Grid）、獨立聯合服務系統以及依靠從它們身上獲取信息來開展工作的戰區作戰司令部（GCCs：Geographic Combatant Commanders）和全球網絡聯合特遣部隊（JTF-GNO：Joint Task Force-Global NetOps）的安全？最近幾年以來，整個網絡作戰系統對這些問題的討論一直沒有停息過，人們爭論的焦點就是戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中應該扮演什麼樣的角色。

美國軍方公佈了對每個戰區作戰司令部的部署，同時還宣布將會減少跨戰區的軍事支持行動。對每個戰區作戰司令部來說，如何配置支持本戰區作戰的信息基礎設施就變得非常重要了。敵人有可能會滲透進負責軍事力量調度的關鍵網絡系統區域進行破壞，這些入侵的危害常常被低估，甚至被當作意外事件或者偶發事件輕描淡寫地處理掉，但是這些入侵行為實際上完全有可能濫發連接請求來阻塞商業網站的正常運行，甚至導致一些承擔軍隊後勤業務的物流公司被標為無效狀態。戰區作戰司令部應該保證其防區的信息條件不受外部入侵的影響。不計其數的病毒正在破壞著互聯網，國防部的系統也開始遭到攻擊。現在有人在討論是否應該讓全球網絡聯合特遣隊斷開互聯網上的軍事入網點，但軍方又擔心僅靠和商業供應商的合作，國防部不能保證所有的後勤支持行動都能繼續無差錯地進行下去。每個戰區作戰司令部對各自的戰區網絡狀態都不太確定，他們對全球信息柵格本身的安全持有懷疑態度，他們擔心其是否有能力執行分配給它的任務。

受到建立一個更全球化的網絡作戰控制機構、加強美國戰略司令部（STRATCOM）和全球網絡聯合特遣隊在網絡作戰中的主導地位思想的影響，戰區作戰司令部對其防區的指揮控制權有所削弱。將作戰信息集中到全球信息柵格的做法也在一定程度上影響了戰區作戰司令部對全球信息柵格是如何支持該戰區的作戰的具體行為的了解。本文將會介紹現有的指揮關係、戰區作戰司令部的職責、指揮和作戰之間的線性關係、舊有的和新興的聯合作戰原則一級特殊戰例分析，最後還將會對戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中所應扮演的角色提出建議。

網絡作戰的環境

網絡作戰中的指揮控制是一個在十年以前就出現了的概念，之後它的內涵一直處在演變之中。每個相關部門、戰區作戰司令部和全球網絡聯合特遣隊都為此進行過一些組織結構和工作重心上的調整，但是最終都沒有解決好各自應該扮演的角色這個問題。要想真正明白為什麼戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中的角色會成為一個難題，就必須先弄清楚這幾個問題：網絡作戰是在哪兒發生的、什麼是真正的網絡作戰、網絡作戰中的每個部門的組織結構和指揮控制結構是怎樣的。

首先需要解釋的是，什麼是全球信息柵格？按照國防部第8100.1號文件的定義，它包括“全球互聯的、終端到終端的信息傳輸能力和聯合處理能力。按照戰士、決策者的需要來進行信息採集、處理、儲存、傳播和管理的能力”。這就涵蓋了政府的和租用的通信信息系統及服務，以及全球信息柵格所需的其他軟件、安全和服務支持，還包括1996年3月頒布的《克林格-科恩法》（Clinger- Cohen Act）第5142節所定義的國家安全系統（National Security System）。按照這個定義，全球信息柵格包含了國防部和國家安全系統的所有級別的信息系統，從戰術層次到戰略層次，以及互聯通信系統。

大多數關於全球信息柵格網絡作戰中心的指揮控制的討論都在著重強調該系統的防禦能力，但是網絡作戰包含的內容其實遠不止這點，網絡作戰要完成的任務包括三項：部門管理、內容管理和網絡防禦，其工作目的是提供跨越戰略、戰術和作戰概念邊界的無中心式支持，為國防部的全方位的戰鬥、情報和考察任務提供支持。

1.部門管理是全球信息柵格的具體任務之一，它是對構成全球信息柵格的系統和網絡的技術、過程和政策管理，包括公務部門管理、系統管理、網絡管理、衛星通信管理和電磁光譜管理這幾個方面。

2.內容管理指的是管理全球信息柵格里的信息本身。它用即時的方式保證信息對使用者、操作者和決策者都是可用的。內容管理包括對全球信息柵格的具體信息內容的查找、訪問、傳輸、儲存和一體化。

3.網絡防禦就是對全球信息柵格所有的信息包括附加信息進行保護，它主要包括一些政策、過程、項目和操作。如果有必要的話，該任務可以請求通過跨機構合作來完成。它負責的是全球信息柵格的信息安全、計算機網絡防禦、計算機防衛反應能力和關鍵性基礎設施保護。

現在已經了解了網絡作戰的基本組織結構，下一步介紹網絡作戰中的各個組織和他們是如何執行任務的，需要介紹的主要是部隊、戰區作戰司令部和全球網絡聯合特遣隊，它們都在隨著戰場要求的變化而改進著各自的組織結構。

部隊在組織結構上的改變主要是為了滿足全球信息柵格對信息傳輸、訪問、控制和保護能力的要求。十年之前，部隊為了適應網絡作戰曾針對區域控制進行過一些變革，但那些措施最終發展成了集中化的控制，這些措施也沒有保留下來。現在我們有必要了解一下部隊的組織構成，以便更好地理解為什麼網絡作戰的指揮控制會變得如此充滿爭議。
GEM：GIG企業管理 GCM：GIG內容管理 GND:GIG網絡防禦
陸軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

陸軍是所有軍種中改革措施最少的。陸軍繼續保持著以前的指揮機構，現在叫做戰場網絡作戰與安全中心（TNOSC：Theater NetOps and Security Centers），該組織直接對各個戰區作戰司令部負責。陸軍維持著一個獨立的全球網絡作戰與安全中心（GNOSC：Global NetOps and Security Center），所有的戰場網絡作戰與安全中心都是其下屬機構。全球網絡作戰與安全中心對戰場網絡作戰與安全中心進行技術控制，但是戰場網絡作戰與安全中心同時又隸屬於戰區作戰司令部，也受到戰區網絡司令部的管理，典型的例子就是陸軍的戰場信號旅受陸軍服務組件指揮部的管理。

全球網絡作戰與安全中心對各個戰區的網絡作戰部隊提供技術指導。美國陸軍網絡司令部暨第9信號司令部對全球網絡作戰與安全中心的技術和管理負責。但是在戰時，全球網絡作戰與安全中心又作為陸軍的元素受戰略司令部（STRATCOM）的指揮。
ACERT：陸軍計算機應急響應分隊
AGNOSC：陸軍全球網絡和安全中心

ASCC：陸軍軍種組成司令部

ARSTRAT：陸軍戰略司令部（導彈防禦與戰略）

CIO：首席信息官

GCC：戰區作戰司令部（地區性聯合司令部，美軍十大司令部中的六個）

INSCOM：情報和安全司令部（陸軍直屬報告單位之一）

JTF-GNO：聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NETCOM：陸軍網絡戰爭司令部

RCERT：地區性計算機應急響應分隊

STRATCOM：美軍戰略司令部

TNCC：戰區網絡作戰控制中心

TNOCC：戰區網絡作戰和安全中心

G6：陸軍司令部通信部門

G2陸軍司令部情報部門

Installation Network Provider網絡施設提供商

COMMAND—戰略層面作戰指揮

OPCON:作戰（戰役）指揮

TACON：戰術控制

GS：全球打擊

TECHCON：梯隊

ADCON：管理控制

空軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

空軍選擇了一條不同的組織途徑，把重點從以前的一級司令部網絡作戰和安全中心（MAJCOM NOSCs）轉移到了一體化網絡作戰和安全中心（I-NOSCs：Integrated NetOps and Security Centers）。與陸軍的戰場網絡作戰與安全中心受戰區作戰司令部的管理不同的是，空軍的一體化網絡作戰和安全中心並不隸屬於任何一個戰區作戰司令部，而是只受空軍網絡作戰中心（AFNOC ：Air Force NetOps Center）的管理，該中心與陸軍的全球網絡作戰和安全中心性質類似。空軍意識到了戰區作戰司令部必須擁有在其防區直接指揮網絡作戰行動的權力，有必要在空軍網絡作戰中心和戰區作戰司令部之間建立起一般支持的關係，建立兩個部門之間的專用聯絡單元。另外空軍方面還賦予了一級司令部在各自的戰區建立通信控制中心的自主權，這些控制中心可以當作空軍網絡作戰中心與各自戰區作戰司令部相互聯繫的快捷通道。
ACC：空戰中心
AFCHQ：空軍組成司令部

AFNETOPS：空軍網絡作戰司令部

ARSTRAT：空軍戰略司令部戰區網絡作戰控制中心

CIO：首席信息官

I-NOSC：集成網絡作戰和安全中心

GCC：同上，地區性聯合司令部

JFCC-NW：網絡戰聯合職能組成司令部

JTF-GNO：同上，聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NCC：網絡控制中心

STRATCOM：同上，戰略司令部

TNOS：同上，戰區網絡作戰與安全中心

海軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

海軍和空軍一樣，不再把戰區當作指揮的單位。為了更好地支持全球作戰，他們用隸屬於海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心（NAVGNOSC）的兩個戰區網絡戰安全中心（RNOSCs）來協助原有的位於那不勒斯和巴林島的兩個戰區海軍計算機與通信主站（NCTMS：Navy Computer and Telecommunications Master Station）。另外，由於海軍的大多數網絡作戰是在海上進行，所以他們還建立了艦隊網絡作戰中心（FNOCs：Fleet NetOps Centers），與位於美國本土的戰區網絡戰安全中心互為呼應。艦隊網絡作戰中心是艦隊進行網絡作戰的戰術切入點，可以為本防區的艦隊提供音頻、視頻和數據等網絡服務，並且可以在艦隊從一個艦隊網絡作戰中心的轄區駛入另一個轄區的時候提供平滑的信息過渡。多數未分類的網絡都是由美國本土的海軍陸戰隊內聯網（NMCI：Navy Marine Corps Internet）或者美國海外的海外海軍企業網絡（ONENET：Outside of CONUS Navy Enterprise Network）負責承包運營的。為了適應戰場的需求，海軍建立了海外海軍陸戰隊內聯網全球網絡作戰與安全中心來提供全球性的作戰支持，同時也建立了隸屬於戰區網絡作戰與安全中心的戰區網絡戰安全中心對各個具體戰場提供支持。戰區網絡作戰與安全中心與所在戰區的戰區作戰司令部並沒有從屬關係。
Fleet NOC:艦隊網絡作戰中心
GCC：同上，地區性聯合司令部

INSCON：同上，陸軍情報和安全司令部

JTF-GNO：同上，聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NAVGNOSC：海軍全球網絡作戰和安全中心

NAVSOC：海軍衛星作戰中心

NCC MHQ：海軍網絡作戰信息作戰和太空戰中心

NMCI GNOC：海軍陸戰隊網全球網絡作戰中心

RNOSC：同上，地區性網絡作戰中心

STRATCOM：同上，戰略司令部

TNCC：同上，戰區網絡作戰控制中心

支持全球海軍作戰的最基本的組織的海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心（NAVGNOSC）和東西部戰區網絡作戰與安全中心（East and West RNOSCs）。海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心匯集了來自戰區網絡作戰與安全中心、海外海軍陸戰隊內聯網和海軍衛星作戰中心的信息，為全球網絡行動聯合特遣部隊提供全球性的指揮控制信息。海軍和陸軍不同的是，他們沒有維持一個隸屬於戰區作戰司令部的機構。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊建立的部隊與戰區作戰司令部之間的支持關係並沒有賦予戰區作戰司令部在海軍部負責的全球信息柵格範圍內進行指揮的權力。戰區作戰司令部的所有指揮請求都必須先經過海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心的批准。

戰區作戰司令部的網絡作戰指揮控制

儘管每個戰區作戰司令部在各自的轄區內針對網絡作戰的組織方式都不盡相同，但是他們卻有一個共同的特點，那就是都建立了一個戰區網絡作戰控制中心和一個隸屬於國防信息系統局（DISA：Defense Information Systems Agency）的戰區網絡作戰中心。各個戰區網絡作戰控制中心的組織結構並不完全相同，美國中央司令部（CENTCOM）將戰區網絡作戰控制中心和國防信息系統局的戰區網絡作戰中心合稱為中央戰區網絡作戰中心（Central Region Theater NetOps Center），而歐洲司令部（EUCOM）則建立了一個戰區通信控制中心（Theater Communication Control Center）。雖然在組織上有些差異，但是所有的戰區網絡作戰控制中心基本上都是被戰區作戰司令部用來對轄區內的全球信息柵格進行指揮控制（轄區內的全球信息柵格也被稱為戰區信息柵格TIG：Theater Information Grid）。

戰區作戰司令部通過戰區網絡作戰控制中心來優化配置和控制全球信息柵格的信息資源，以使它們更好地為戰鬥服務，同時戰區網絡作戰控制中心也是連接國防信息系統局、常規部隊和全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的戰區接口。他們與戰區網絡戰中心、戰區網絡作戰和安全中心合作來監控戰區信息柵格的狀態，對被提議的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊相關行動作出決定，並評估其行動的影響。戰區網絡戰控制中心對作戰行動力度的減小和終止有決定權，並且通過戰區網絡作戰中心和戰區網絡作戰與安全中心來調整作戰的優先級。如果該戰區沒有戰區網絡作戰與安全中心，那麼就由全球網絡作戰與安全中心領帶下的戰區網絡作戰控制中心來負責完成戰區作戰司令部所要求的任務。

美國的北方司令部（NORTHCOM）是一個比較特別的部門，雖然它是一個有著明確防區的戰區作戰司令部，但是其防區內的大部分部隊——包括網絡作戰部隊——都不隸屬於該司令部，而是屬於美國聯合部隊司令部（JFCOM：Join Forces Command）。這樣的部署是為了便於部隊的全球性管理。北方司令部和其他幾個戰區作戰司令部一樣，也設立了戰區網絡作戰控制中心，但是卻沒有建立戰區網絡作戰與安全中心，這就使得北方司令部必須依靠網絡作戰與安全中心等部門為其提供一般支持。在這種情況下，北方司令部所扮演的角色就是需要負責其轄區內的作戰行動，但是又對相應的戰場信息柵格缺乏了解，更沒有直接控制它的權力。

戰略司令部網絡作戰指揮控制

與部隊戰鬥司令部對網絡作戰結構進行調整一樣，國防部的相關部門也在進行著改革。多年以來，國防部一直沒有一個集中控制的網絡作戰部。但是在1997年的時候國防部進行過這方面的嘗試，發現了一些當時網絡的弱點，也得出了“作戰司令部-部隊-國防機構”這種網絡作戰的模式已經不適合現代的戰場情況。那次嘗試促成了國防信息系統局最終組建了一支實體部隊，也就是今天的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊來負責全球信息柵格的操作和防禦。

全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的網絡作戰指揮控制機制同樣也在不斷發展。在現有的聯合司令部計劃（UCP：Unified Command Plan）出現之前，全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的指揮控制都是由戰區作戰司令部負責，但是事實證明這不利於管理網絡中的所有組件，也難以為全球信息柵格提供足夠的事態感知信息。最初版本的網絡作戰的作戰概念比較強調戰區作戰司令部對其防區的網絡作戰的控制，當時對處理戰區問題的描述是這樣的：“作戰司令部有權指揮被指派到其防區的部隊，只要是利於任務的完成，在作戰司令部覺得合適的時候，甚至可以調整全球信息柵格的優先級。所有的這些活動，都應該通過戰區網絡作戰中心來實現。”事實上，即使是全球性的事件，最初版本的網絡作戰概念文件也規定全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊需要在戰區作戰司令部的戰區網絡作戰控制中心指揮下進行作戰。
作戰概念的後續版本對這項原則進行了調整。對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的控制被移到了一個更加全球化的指揮控制架構中，通過這樣的調整，戰略司令部、全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊和其他參與網絡作戰的部隊的整體角色都得到了加強。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的作戰概念被細分成了三個環境作戰概念：全球性的、戰區性的和非全局性的。不同的事件適用何種環境概念取決於事件造成的實際影響和戰區影響。這種形式的指揮控制結構更加適用於目前網絡作戰多樣性特性，針對不同級別的事件，戰區作戰司令部可以採取更加靈活的應對措施，甚至可以同時展開支持性的和輔助性的行動。在這種制度下，有時候處理事件的過程要經過完整的指揮系統鏈，有時候可以跳過一些步驟。

全球性事件

全球性事件是指那些顯而易見會影響整個全球信息柵格的備戰度的活動或事件，這類事件通常需要多個戰區作戰司令部的協同處理才能得到解決。戰略司令部的指揮官必須要具備快速鑑別全球性事件的能力，並要能具體判斷出有哪些戰區作戰司令部或者國防部的其他機構會受到影響。全球性事件包括快速傳播的網絡惡意代碼攻擊、衛星通信攻擊、企業應用攻擊等不僅僅局限於單個戰區的網絡事件。

全球戰略司令部是一個可靠的指揮中心，它對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊和戰區作戰司令部都有命令和指揮權。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊利用自己的資源來執行戰略司令部的指示，作戰命令可以很快地發送到在全球各地的部隊中。值得注意的是，這種命令在傳遞時不經過事件發生地的戰區作戰司令部。

雖然作戰概念的原則賦予了戰略司令部指揮官全球範圍內的指揮權，但是這也並沒有完全否定戰區作戰司令部可以通過分配的聯合司令部計劃來進行指揮的權利。在全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊執行戰略司令部的作戰命令的同時，戰區作戰司令部也可以調遣其麾下的部隊進行相應的活動。當然，按照作戰概念的要求，戰區作戰司令部領導下的部隊的行動必須與戰略司令部領導下的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的行動方針保持一致。事實上，據全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的歷史行動日誌記載，大多數的網絡作戰一開始都是在小範圍戰區開始出現的，戰區作戰司令部總是著手處理這些事件的第一單位，而且如果處理得適當的話，這些戰區級別的事件就不會發展成全球性事件。

戰區性事件

戰區性事件是指那些發生在某個戰場區域，其可預見的影響範圍不會超出該戰區的事件，戰區性事件與全球性事件的最大區別也就在於此。在處理這類事件的時候，戰區作戰司令部起著主導作用，而戰略司令部只承擔輔助的支持作用。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊可以通過其戰區網絡作戰與安全中心對戰區作戰司令部提供支援。如果當地的部隊沒有戰區網絡作戰與安全中心，那也可以通過全球網絡作戰與安全中心為戰區網絡作戰控制中心提供一般支持。戰區作戰司令部對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的指揮屬於次級指揮，也就是說沒有權利通過全球網絡作戰與安全中心來直接調動全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊到其所轄區域進行作戰。

非全局性事件

非全局性事件是指只對職能作戰司令部和特定的國防機構造成影響的事件。由於這類機構沒有明確的防區，所以這些事件既不能被看成全球性的也不能被看成戰區性的。在處理非全局性事件時，戰略司令部扮演輔助指揮的角色，全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊對所涉及到的職能作戰司令部提供一般支持。大多數的非全局性事件一般都發生在北方司令部的防區，因為很多相關的職能部門都隸屬於北方司令部。在指揮控制的程序方面，非全局性事件和全球性事件是相同的。

相互矛盾的指揮控制要求

戰術技術的要求

儘管各個部隊的定位不盡相同，但是在網絡作戰中追求高效、合理的作戰方法是他們共同的主題。不同的部隊肩負著不同的職責，他們建立了獨立的作戰網絡、應用設施和輔助工具來滿足自身與全球信息柵格保持聯通的需求。每支部隊都要負責操作一部分全球信息柵格，這在一定程度上需要各部隊間作戰鏈的集中化管理，這樣才能獲得所期待的作戰效率和投入回報率。

關於對全球信息柵格進行集中化控制討論的焦點是網絡作戰的全球性特質。國防部想要實現以網絡為中心的指揮機制、增強部隊的事態感知能力和顯著縮短決策週期的目標的話，唯一的方法就是將網絡和部隊進行橫向的融合，這是一種集中化的控制機制。最新的一份《四年防務評估報告》裡就提到過“要簡化目前的‘煙囪式’系統結構，實現以網絡為中心的指揮機制”。

為了更好地利用緊缺資源，國防部必須從全球性的角度來考慮何時何地調撥何種資源。對衛星傳輸波段、標準戰術入口網絡站點和帶寬等網絡作戰必需資源的分配必須要有明確的任務目標和易於理解的全球性意義。從部隊的角度來看，集中化指揮在某種程度上是對現有部隊機構和作戰、防禦網絡的一次重新洗牌。

由戰區作戰司令部領導的作戰行動將不再嚴格地限於其防區內。地面部隊重新開始利用飛機（包括無人機）例行地在美國本土飛行來支持他們的作戰。隨著快速全球打擊（PGS：Prompt Global Strike）項目的發展，指揮官已經有權力呼叫從戰區以外的武器系統發出常規打擊援助。

在海軍方面，他們指出海上部隊的一個本質性特點就是全球流動性，海軍部隊作戰時會不斷地在各個戰區作戰司令部之間穿插。尤其是像航母戰鬥群這樣的單位，一旦被部署出發，就不可能一直呆在一塊小範圍的戰場。另外，即使是戰區作戰司令部所採取的戰區級別的行動，也有可能產生全球性的影響。網絡防禦姿態的調整可能對互聯網部門帶來巨大的經濟負擔，而且作戰司令部還有可能無法了解到調整行為的具體細節結果。

對國防部的網絡系統來說，所有的攻擊本質上同樣都是全球性的。敵人不可能輕易地從地球的另一端對美國本土的實體目標進行攻擊，但是在計算機網絡科技領域，這樣的事情經常發生。一旦檢測到這種攻擊，關於它的信息必須要在最短的時間內傳遍全球所有的相關部門，以保證從任何地方都能識別出這樣的攻擊方式，從而保護全球信息柵格的安全。每一次網絡入侵——哪怕是看起來無關緊要的失敗的入侵——都有可能給全球信息柵格的內容帶來巨大的潛在危害，因為它們入侵時在系統中留下的後門會在以後的攻擊中發揮作用。病毒的爆發是毫無爭議的全球性事件，如果認識不到這一點的話，我們將會受到更大的損失。

海軍強調沒有任何事件的影響會僅限於某個戰區範圍，所有關於網絡作戰的努力都必須是全球性的。他們的理由是網絡作戰是沒有戰區界限的，國防部的每個戰區作戰司令部所面臨的潛在威脅都是相同的，為了獲得信息上的優勢，國防部必須要充分利用其大覆蓋面的網絡資源，快速地在全球範圍內分享所有的有用信息。

此外，空軍和海軍方面指出，他們的網絡作戰部隊都不是由戰區作戰司令部來負責部署的。在每個戰區作戰司令部的防區內，空軍和海軍都有自己的網絡作戰組織（例如戰區網絡作戰與安全中心），而且空軍和海軍的網絡作戰部隊在戰區內通常是扮演維護者的角色。最後一點，空軍和海軍都認為，根據可供參考的官方文件的描述，戰略司令部通過戰區作戰司令部對全球信息柵格負責。

戰區作戰司令部的要求

對戰區作戰司令部來說，在網絡作戰的指揮控制方面有兩個需要關心的問題。一是需要對戰場信息柵格進行及時的控制，二是需要把網絡變成一個武器系統，讓指揮官們可以像對常規的武器系統一樣共同利用網絡資源，利用網絡全方位的優勢來進行全面的戰鬥。

那些被分配了特定職責的部隊，已經部署好了各自唯一的解決方案，參與到網絡作戰中的每支部隊或者每個機構都相信自己已經擁有了最有效分配緊缺資源的辦法。但是全球信息柵格並不是專屬於某一個部門的，而是一個聯合結構。 “煙囪”式系統和現有的部隊部署方式實際上是降低了戰場信息柵格的利用效率。舉個例子來說，陸軍在國防部的其他部門之前研發出了一套安全的IP電話解決方案，可以進行保密語音的聯絡。出於安全考慮，其他部門通常不會再採用這套方案，而是自己再開發一套功能相同的解決方案。這樣在作戰司令部的防區內就有了兩套獨立的保密IP語音方案，它們相互之間不能進行聯通。戰區作戰司令部只得進行篩選，只保留一套方案，以保證在其防區內所有部門可以進行彼此協作。但是解決方案被淘汰的一方就不能再與該戰區以外的兄弟部隊進行保密聯絡了。

作戰司令部防區內的有些資源可以為多個部隊和公務部門服務。但是也有很多例子是使用者進行重複勞動為各自建立了不能相互聯絡的獨立系統，比如衛星終端和一些技術控制設備。有些時候，要傳遞一個信息的話，需要先把信號發回美國本土，然後再從本土發到距離初始發送者只有兩英里的接收者那裡。各種各樣的光纖一條挨一條地按照相同的路線排列著，但是它們之間的數據卻不能進行直接交換，因為它們分屬於不同的部隊或者公務部門。戰區作戰司令部必須採取措施來解決防區內的部隊或者公務部門之間的互聯性問題。

要解決這個問題，可以採用集中化控制的辦法。對網絡作戰部隊的集中化指揮需要戰區作戰司令部對自身的組織機構進行一定的調整，但是同時又不能影響其在有作戰需要時指揮行動的權力。相關部隊必須接受多個作戰司令部的命令，並且有效地優化和反饋戰場信息。目前，派往前線的部隊獨立性越來越高，通過全球信息柵格的幫助他們可以來回地越過戰區作戰司令部的邊界，戰區作戰司令部對網絡作戰的輔助和對抗作用因此而受到了損害，施行集中化指揮以後，部隊就不能或者說不願意響應戰區作戰司令部的要求了。

在2004年參與印尼海嘯救助工作的時候，太平洋司令部（PACOM：Pacific Command）首次在人道援助行動中採取了“聯合嘗試”的方式。太平洋司令部向被分派有任務的部隊發出指令，讓他們在整個行動計劃的框架之下進行特別的網絡防禦工作。很多海軍部隊和海軍陸戰隊的部隊在海軍全球網絡作戰中心的集中化指揮下，建立了一些相對直接的網絡防禦措施，這些措施超越了太平洋司令部給海軍和海軍陸戰隊分配的任務範圍，這就給太平洋司令部的全球網絡作戰帶來了潛在的危險因素。

作戰司令部很關心總是強調的對全球信息柵格進行集中化控制的思想會降低他們對全球信息柵格的信息掌握度和控制力度。在現有的指揮制度下，一個單位會在其所在部隊的指揮權下進行訓練或者執行其他任務，在戰區作戰司令部的指揮權下參加戰鬥，指揮控制的條理非常清晰。對部隊在信息領域的指揮控制與對其在空中、陸上、海上和空間領域的指揮控制同等重要。對C3S系統（control, communications and computer systems）來說，在其指揮下進行作戰並負責保護它的部隊常常要處於雙重甚至三重的報告鏈中，結果最後分不清到底是誰在負責指揮戰鬥。在全球性或者非全局性事件中，全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊經常繞開戰區作戰司令部直接展開行動。儘管聯合網絡作戰的作戰概念專門強調了與戰區作戰司令部進行協調作戰的要求，但是在現代作戰快速變化的環境中，這條要求幾乎成了擺設。信息保障弱點警報系統、計算機任務序列和信息條件調整系統在作戰司令部的轄區之外出現問題就是這條要求失效的典型例子。這些事件直接影響了戰區作戰司令部在戰場上的指揮，當部隊想要直接利用這些機制從管理級上加強自身的控制的時候，他們不能判斷應該在何時、以什麼樣的方式在執行這些操作，也不知道這樣做會對戰區作戰司令部的指揮產生什麼影響，因為在目前的條件下，只有戰區作戰司令部才有能力來進行這些操作。當一個威脅事件需要空軍太空司令部向空軍部隊尋求全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的協同配合的時候，如果不通知或者取得與北方司令部的合作的話，將會給北方司令部的指揮帶來極大的麻煩。

在中央司令部，由於對網絡作戰部隊缺乏足夠的控制，導致指揮官有時候也不能確定網絡資源是否可用。海軍負責操作大量的戰場信息柵格，在作戰區域的海軍網絡作戰部隊並不用對中央司令部的海軍部負責，他們只需要向戰區網絡作戰與安全中心報告。中央司令部的中央戰區戰區網絡作戰中心，其職責是維持和指揮所有戰區作戰司令部的網絡作戰，但是它也不在海軍網絡作戰部隊的報告鏈當中，所以也常常不能獲得所有戰場信息柵格上的事態感知，目前已經有替代辦法來處理這個問題了，不過這還不能說是正式的解決辦法。

對北方司令部來說，因為網絡作戰部隊的控制權的缺乏，他們在2005年“卡特琳娜”颶風的救援工作中遇到了極大的麻煩。在那次行動中，部隊的設備在未經許可的情況下就被運送到了聯合作戰區域。這使得北方司令部無法掌握和引導物資的調動情況，更無法協同各個部隊的行動，這是個多方位的管理和操作問題。

在各個部隊都主張施行在以全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊為中心的集中化指揮構架的時候，我們有必要強調一個事實，那就是戰區司令部並不願意看到這樣的變化，他們想保持原有的他們對戰略司令部負責，擁有全球信息柵格的操作權和防禦權的機制。戰略司令部的存在對保持戰區作戰司令部在戰區和全球性事件的作戰行動中的指揮地位以及增強戰區作戰司令部與聯合參謀部的溝通都有很大的幫助。

作戰司令部和部隊方面都想從聯合作戰的層面上對網絡作戰進行集中化指揮，但是其中有幾個問題還需要討論：

1.誰負第一領導責任？

2.網絡作戰進行集中化指揮具體在哪個層面上得到體現，全球層面、戰區層面還是其他什麼層面？

3.這種調整帶來的改變是僅僅體現在戰區作戰司令部的某個部門向全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊發出請求時還是戰區作戰司令部獲得戰區內的完全指揮權和優先權？

最後，戰區作戰司令部是最終對總統負責的以完成轄區內的軍事任務為目標的機構，被派遣到戰區作戰司令部的部隊需要在其管轄權之下完成各自的任務。因此在部隊方面主張實施全球性的集中指揮的時候，他們仍然會處於戰略司令部的指揮之下這一點是不容置疑的。但是目前全球信息柵格是影響戰區作戰司令部的指揮控制能力和指揮官對部隊的指導能力的關鍵一環。沒有全球信息柵格的話，飛機不能飛行、地面部隊無法移動、艦艇不能航行，連衛星都不能提供信號。指揮官們需要獲取全球信息柵格的狀態並進行控制，就像他們需要掌握部隊的方位和狀態一樣重要。他們必須要掌握戰場信息柵格的範圍、能力和狀態，必須知道戰區以外的情況會如何影響部隊所在區域的戰場信息柵格，還必須能夠指揮和優化部隊配置以支持作戰。如果我們真的相信被描述得天花亂墜的集中化指揮會有更好的效果，那也不能忽視為戰區作戰司令部保留適當的指揮和控制權。

還有，只要戰區作戰司令部這種結構還保留著，那麼所有的軍事任務，包括那些由職能作戰司令部指揮的作戰，都必然還是會發生在戰區作戰司令部的防區內，因為所有的網絡作戰任務都必定要由一個實體單位來執行。同時，集中化指揮對於實現以網絡為中心的指揮模式以及更加有效地防禦攻擊、傳遞信息都是必要的。這種集中化指揮的概念與戰區作戰司令部要求掌握和優化戰場信息柵格的願望是不互斥的。

前進之路

要想制定出一套可行的網絡作戰指揮控制框架，必須要避免走極端，既要考慮戰區作戰司令部的需要，也要考慮建立對全球信息柵格的集中化控制的需要。在目前聯合網絡作戰的作戰概念的發展過程和網絡作戰部隊的轉型過程中，組織原則需要發揮調整各方利益的槓桿作用。為了達到這樣的目標，國防部應該做到以下幾點：

1.創建一個簡單、明確的網絡作戰指揮鏈，保證戰略司令部可以對所有的網絡作戰行動進行指揮。這就可以解決剛才提到的“誰負第一領導責任”的問題。只有當事件發生在快速變化的環境中的時候，戰區指揮控制機構才開始發揮作用。簡潔的指揮鏈可以保證參加網絡作戰的部隊知道自己應該聽從誰的指揮、應該向誰報告，在這條指揮鏈中，必須包括戰區作戰司令部。

2.可以賦予戰區作戰司令部在其防區內的指揮權：

——修正聯合司令部計劃以明確戰區作戰司令部在其防區內對網絡作戰的職責。

——修正已有的全球信息柵格網絡作戰概念，詳細說明那些處在戰區網絡作戰與安全中心之外的部隊可以從戰區作戰司令部的全球網絡作戰與安全中心獲得直接援助。

——規定全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的所有命令都要通過戰區作戰司令部來執行。

這些調整可以保證戰區中的所有單位都在唯一的一條指揮鏈下行動，那就是通過戰區作戰司令部對戰略司令部負責。這也可以解決北方司令部應該對轄區負責但是又沒有指揮網絡作戰的權力的尷尬境地。

3.在每個戰區作戰司令部建立一個由中央司令部管轄的聯合網絡作戰中心，將戰區作戰司令部的戰區網絡作戰控制中心和全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的戰區網絡作戰中心進行融合。這樣一來，每個戰區作戰司令部都將有一個在計算機空間領域的聯合作戰司令部，就像在海陸空的實體戰場上一樣。任何處在戰區網絡作戰與安全中心之外的部隊都可以從聯合網絡作戰中心的全球網絡作戰與安全中心獲得直接援助。

4.鞏固全球信息柵格的地位，將最高控制權交給戰略司令部。目前集中化指揮的發展偏重於對參與網絡作戰的部隊的指揮，這與以網絡為中心的指揮概念背道而馳。以部隊為中心的“煙囪”式指揮系統不利於信息的傳遞和處理，讓我們離“為所有使用者提供最新、最準確的信息”的目標越來越遠。在之前的《戈德華特·尼科爾斯國防部重構法》報告中已經明確提到，組織管理和指揮控制應該由一個聯合的機構來掌控。

結束語

目前對網絡作戰的集中化指揮是一個迫切的需要。優化網絡作戰指揮機制可以幫助國防部提高效率、節約成本以及更好地分配緊缺資源。更重要的是，這樣可以讓網絡作戰部隊更加快速、準確地為指揮官提供信息，這在大規模的網絡作戰中非常重要。集中化指揮的進程不能影響到網絡作戰指揮控制的效率。這取決於全球信息柵格能否為所有參戰的單位提供足夠的信息以及指揮官是否充分利用戰區信息柵格來幫助指揮作戰。

“我們必須改變對網絡作戰問題的討論和思考模式，我們是在進行網絡“作戰”而不是網絡“管理”，所有的參戰單位必須保證自己每時每刻都準備著開戰，以保證網絡系統這一決定性的武器系統的安全”。網絡作戰是我們國家能夠贏得戰爭的關鍵一環，它可以幫助我們提供指揮和控制、縮短決策週期以及調整各戰區的資源配備。戰略司令部已經在強化網絡作戰概念方面邁出了很大的一步，這些努力還需要繼續進行下去。戰區作戰司令部必須是掌控和防護全球信息柵格的重要一環，以保證我們可以繼續取得網絡作戰的勝利。

Reference URL:  http://www.china.com.cn/military

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China Internet Soverignty, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces

美國陸軍網空作戰力量演變與歷史 – US Army cyberspace combat force evolution & history

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美國陸軍網空作戰力量演變與歷史 –

US Army cyberspace combat force evolution & history

With the rapid development of the global information grid system of the US military, the conceptual research based on the information technology system is becoming more and more thorough. Finally, the American combat theory establishes the cyberspace as a combat domain with land, sea, air and sky. In this context, the US Army will be the construction of cyberspace as a key factor in promoting the process of modernization of the army, determined to follow the formal militarization of the organization’s standards and structure of high-quality network combat forces. Since the establishment of the Army Network Command in 2010, the US Army has established a comprehensive network of operational forces based on the goal of combating the military forces of cyberspace through new means such as new construction, adjustment, transformation and integration.

The basic organizational structure under the guidance of the concept of network operations

From the 90s of the 20th century, in order to ensure the US military information grid system in the army part of the efficient and safe operation, the US Army under the guidance of the joint army, around the concept of network operations carried out a series of organizational restructuring, the dissolution of the information system commander And has set up the Army Signal Command and the network enterprise technology command and other institutions, and gradually formed based on technology, defense, focusing on the basic network of emergency operations organizational structure.

In 2005, the US Strategic Command issued the “Global Information Grid Collaborative Combat Concept”, which elaborated on the organizational structure of the US Army’s cyberspace forces during this period, dividing the Army’s network operations system into three Level: At the first level, under the command of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Strategic Command, the Army’s Global Network Operations and Security Center is responsible for situational awareness and command coordination as the only governing body for Army operations, In the US Army Joint Force Network Power System, the agency functions as a global network of operations and security centers. At the second level, the Theater Network Operations and Security Center is the supporting element of the operational headquarters, which is responsible for “guiding network operations, managing and defending the global information grid elements that are part of the Army’s jurisdiction.” The regional network operations and security centers in the theater constitute the third dimension of the Army’s network operations system. In addition, the Army Computer Emergency Response Unit is the disposal of the network emergency response, in the emergency can accept the global network operations task force tactical control, each theater network operations and security center also established a computer emergency response unit.

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Set up Army Network Command

With the US military for the degree of dependence on cyberspace, control and weaken the threat of the Internet has continued to become the focus of US military tasks, the establishment of an independent network of space operations command of the voice of the growing US military. In 2008, “Yankee deer bomb action” directly under the impetus, the US military decided to end the unit of independent decentralization of the development of network combat capability of the situation, through the withdrawal, transfer, change and other measures to reorganize the relevant institutions, the establishment of a comprehensive network Space operations of the joint command agencies, the US Army network power organization construction has entered a stage of rapid development.

Through the global deployment of decentralized development of the formation of cyberspace combat organization of the backbone. As the awareness of the network operations will have a far-reaching impact on the military field, the US Army in the combat force level into a lot of resources, and gradually establish the backbone of the network operations. For example, the Army launched its first cyber warfare in July 2008, which provides tactical support, brigade combatant support, and strategic support to other service units, joint forces and even cross-agency partners; the Army also operates on cyber operations The upper-level command system to implement the adjustment, so that the relevant action to be appropriate authority to monitor. During this period, the Army’s future network combat forces were integrated in the form of units in the military and joint forces within the combat unit, including from the Defense Information Systems Agency, the global network operations joint contingent, the National Security Agency to the brigade combat team and other Level of strategic and tactical institutions.
The new core coordination agencies, straighten out the headquarters to the unit level of the command relationship. In June 2009, the US Department of Defense announced the establishment of the US Internet Command in the form of a memorandum to consolidate and promote the construction of cyberspace military forces through a dedicated subordinate joint command. At the same time, as a transitional measure for the formation of the Army Force Network Command in the future, the Army decided to retain the organizational structure of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Strategic Command and rename it as Army Force Network Command. February 2010, the US Army announced on this basis, the formal formation of the Army Network Force Command, its formation and initial construction phase of the work mainly around the three tasks: to achieve cyber space military forces combat, increase the Army network combat power Capacity and scale, the development of the Army network space professionals team. As the previous command system was disrupted, the newly established Army Network Space Operations and Integration Center under the Cyber ​​Command actually played a central role in command control and coordinated synchronization. The agency is similar to the previous Army Global Network Operations and Security Center, but in addition to “providing clear, concise and timely guidance in the implementation of full spectrum cyberspace operations,” the organization is also responsible for “with the Army’s other headquarters, Other units in the same type of institutions, the United States cyberspace joint operations center to share information. ” At the beginning of the establishment of the organization, some members of the cyberspace operations and integration center also joined the US Department of Network Command staff to better promote the unity of command and operation of the joint force and service units.

US Army Network Space Force Organizational Structure, 2005

The transformation of combat forces functions, to promote the traditional ability to network space combat capability development. At the level of the combat force construction, the field signal force as the main body of the network Enterprise Technology Command / 9 signal command to the Army Network Force Command, the Army Intelligence and Security Command of the cyberspace combat forces combat command by the army Network command. Through this organizational adjustment, the Army Network Command for the first time mastered the forefront of the deployment of combat forces, to form a global presence and have the expedition, you can combat commander to provide more comprehensive combat support capabilities. It is noteworthy that the network enterprise technology command and the intelligence and security commander in the Army Network Command as deputy commander, respectively, responsible for different types of network operations mission, the basic formation of the original signal forces in charge of network defense, the original military Intelligence forces in charge of the network attack mode, which will be previously discrete deployment, loosely combined network space related organizations into a complete army network strength. In addition, the Army Network Command in 2011 was also given the task of carrying out information operations, master the first information combat command of the operational command, intelligence and security headquarters under the 780 military intelligence brigade will also be transformed into Army Network Command Direct command of the network brigade.

Continuously optimize the Army cyberspace forces

After the establishment of the Army Network Command, cyber space military forces combat is always the center of its work, which in the Army Network Power Organization continue to optimize the integration process has been highlighted. For the current network operations have been formed, electronic warfare, information operations, military intelligence and even space combat capability, the US Army in the network of military organizational structure design also reflects the integration of a variety of capacity trends. The US Army is also actively promoting the overall military model in the construction of network forces, highlighting the development of the national guards and reserve forces. After years of construction, the US Army network power organization has been basically formed.
Army Network Combat Force Organizational Structure, 2011

Optimize the combat strength of the organizational structure, to adapt to operational support needs. At the headquarters level, in order to further improve the command and implementation of cyberspace operations, the Army approved the Network Command in March 2014 as the headquarters of the Army Force, and designated the 2nd Army as its immediate unit, and the network enterprise technology Command to become the second army direct command of the network combat troops, network enterprise technology command commander of the second group army deputy commander. And the previous year, the network command has been under the guidance of the US Internet Command and Army headquarters began to form a joint force network headquarters, which will be the implementation of the network space combat command command, and have direct support to the combat command of the network combat capability The At the combat forces and theater levels, the network command is trying to improve the global network defense situation through regional network centers. Based on the strength of the original Theater Network Operations and Security Center and Regional Computer Emergency Response Center, these regional cybersecurity centers streamline the operational plan of the network operations, and can play a strong planning, coordination and synchronization function to more effectively support geography Operation of the Combat Command.

To determine the development of the responsible institutions, improve the network to build military theory guidance. As the US Army Network Command merged with the original network operations, information operations and the strength of the signal forces, a large number of signal forces combat theory urgent need to be revised and translated into the network combat theory, in order to achieve a unified operational capability development model, to avoid the concept of guidance On the chaos. In March 2014, the US Training and Command Command, on the basis of the Center for Excellence, integrated other relevant professional elements to form the Army Network Center of Excellence, with the goal of providing guidance, network and signal The full ability of training. The cyberspace promotion office under the Cyber ​​Command is also incorporated into the Network Excellence Center to further enhance the advantages of the Network Excellence Center in summing up lessons learned from the construction of network forces. Through the implementation of the Ordinance to publish the project, the Network Excellence Center tried to merge the original signal and electronic warfare forces regulations, according to the Army “2015 order system” related requirements to develop new cyberspace operations, electronic warfare and signal forces regulations. At present, the Army has completed the revision of the field command FM6-02 “signal force support operations” to guide the signal forces to the network forces for functional transformation; the first release of the field order FM3-38 “network electromagnetic action”, clear “Army in the unified ground action to integrate the overall principles of network electromagnetic activity, tactics and procedures”; as the Army network army building a basic guidance document, field command FM3-12 “cyberspace combat” also basically completed the final approval process, Officially distributed within the Army in 2015. With the above documents as the main body, the Network Excellence Center will continue to improve the publication of dozens of related military ordinances publications, build a complete Army cyber space combat technology, tactics and procedures for the Army network forces to provide comprehensive theoretical guidance.
Army Network Combat Force Organizational Structure, 2015

Integration of cyberspace education and training strength, and promote the regular development of network forces. The US Army will promote the development of formal training as a fundamental way to improve the level of network operations and combat readiness. In the Army Network Center of excellence at the same time, the Army Network School as its affiliated institutions in the original electronic warfare school set up on the basis of the Army Signal School is also under the network center of excellence will continue to be retained, the Army on the regularization of the construction of cyberspace “Regulations – Organization – Training – Resources – Leadership and Education – Personnel – Facilities” model has been further refined. With the establishment of the Army Network Arsenal (“17-Series” Career Management), the Army requested new staff members to enter the network career field to complete the school’s school training program, from signal, intelligence and information operations forces and other units to the Corresponding to a large number of network operations staff also need to carry out new vocational education and training, the two schools will jointly set up the new Army network arms units officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers for individual personnel skills training. For example, the Army Leadership Foundation Training Program was officially launched at the online school in August 2015, and the 14-week Senior Officer Training Program was implemented in May 2016. For the first batch of network combatants recruited by the Army in October 2015, the senior personal training program that must be attended by the Army began in February 2016. As the cyberspace operations essentially have the characteristics of joint operations, the first phase of the 22-week training program will be the Naval Joint Network Analyst Course, the second phase of training for the same 22 weeks, training venues from the Navy The facility is transferred to the Army Network School.

Attention to the National Guard and reserve network strength, highlighting the support and coordination functions. In view of the development of the network combat force, the Army believes that the reserve department can assist the active forces to share some of the tasks and be able to provide reinforcements with high levels of training as quickly as necessary. Because of its unique dual legal position, the Army National Guard can play the role of state and federal government agencies, civil and military organizations, private and public sector convergence, “with the development of cyberspace capabilities of the natural advantages.” Therefore, the Army in the development of network combat forces also pay attention to the construction of the relevant reserve organizations. For example, the First Information Operations Command also includes four reserve forces theater information operations brigade, which has the ability to provide information operations and cyberspace planning, analysis and technical support. According to a memorandum signed by the Army National Guard in June 2014 with the Army Network Command, the Army National Guard transferred one of its network defenses in the previous year to the Army Network Command / 2nd Army. The cyber force, known as the 1636th Network Defense Unit, will be in Service No. 10 of the United States Code, which is a full-time service and will receive the same standard training with other active forces of the Army Network Command and jointly All types of tasks.

This article from the “Military Digest” December Editor: Zhang Chuanliang

Original Mandarin Chinese:

伴隨著美軍全球信息柵格系統的高速發展，基於信息技術系統作戰的概念研究不斷走向深入，最終美軍作戰理論將網絡空間確立為一種與陸、海、空、天並列的作戰域。在這種背景下，美國陸軍將網絡空間力量建設作為推進陸軍現代化進程的關鍵因素，決心按照正規軍事化組織的標準和結構高質量建設網絡作戰部隊。自陸軍網絡司令部於2010年成立以來，美國陸軍圍繞網絡空間軍事力量作戰化的目標，通過新建、調整、轉型和融合等手段逐步建立起完善的網絡作戰力量組織結構。

網絡作戰概念指導下的基本組織結構

從20世紀90年代開始，為確保美軍全球信息柵格系統中的陸軍部分高效安全運行，美國陸軍在聯合軍隊的指導下，圍繞網絡作戰行動概念進行了一系列組織結構調整，解散了信息系統司令部，並先後組建了陸軍信號司令部以及網絡企業技術司令部等機構，逐步形成基於技術、防禦為主、重在應急的網絡作戰基本組織架構。

2005年，美國戰略司令部發布了《全球信息柵格網絡作戰聯合作戰概念》，對這一時期美國陸軍網絡空間力量建設的組織結構進行了詳細說明，將陸軍網絡作戰體系組織架構劃分為三個層次：在第一個層面，在陸軍太空和導彈防禦司令部/陸軍戰略司令部的指揮下，作為陸軍網絡作戰行動唯一的領導機構，陸軍全球網絡行動和安全中心負責態勢感知和指揮協調工作，在美軍聯合部隊網絡力量體系中，該機構發揮軍種全球網絡作戰與安全中心的功能。在第二個層面，戰區網絡行動和安全中心是各作戰司令部的支持元素，負責“指導網絡作戰行動，管理和防禦屬於陸軍管轄的全球信息柵格元素”。戰區內各地區網絡行動和安全中心構成了陸軍網絡作戰體系的第三個層面。此外，陸軍計算機應急響應分隊是應對網絡突發事件的處置力量，在緊急情況下可以接受全球網絡作戰特遣部隊的戰術控制，每個戰區網絡行動和安全中心也都建立了計算機應急響應分隊。

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成立陸軍網絡司令部

隨著美軍對於網絡空間依賴程度的加深，控制和削弱網絡威脅持續成為美軍關注的重點任務，組建獨立負責網絡空間作戰指揮機構的呼聲在美軍內部日益高漲。在2008年“揚基鹿彈行動”的直接推動下，美軍決定結束軍種單位獨立分散發展網絡作戰能力的局面，通過並、撤、轉、改等措施對相關機構進行結構重組，成立全面負責網絡空間作戰的聯合指揮機構，美國陸軍網絡力量組織建設也進入快速發展階段。

通過全球部署分散發展的方式形成網絡空間作戰組織的基幹力量。由於意識到網絡作戰行動將對軍事領域產生更加深遠的影響，美國陸軍在作戰部隊層面投入大量資源，逐步建立起網絡作戰行動的基幹力量。例如，陸軍在2008年7月啟動了第一支網絡戰營，其能夠提供戰術支持、旅戰鬥隊支援以及向其他軍種單位、聯合部隊甚至跨機構夥伴提供戰略支援；陸軍還對網絡作戰行動的上層指揮體系實施調整，從而使相關行動得到適度權限的監管。在這個時期，陸軍未來網絡作戰力量都以分隊形式整合在軍種和聯合部隊架構下作戰單位的內部，包括從國防信息系統局、全球網絡作戰聯合特遣隊、國家安全局到旅戰鬥隊等各個級別的戰略和戰術機構。
新建核心協調機構，理順總部到分隊層面的指揮關係。 2009年6月，美國國防部通過發表備忘錄的形式宣佈建立美國網絡司令部，旨在通過一個專門的次級聯合司令部集中統籌和推進網絡空間軍事力量建設。與此同時，作為日後組建陸軍部隊網絡司令部的過渡性措施，陸軍決定保留陸軍太空和導彈防禦司令部/陸軍戰略司令部的組織架構，並將其重新命名為陸軍部隊網絡司令部。 2010年2月，美國陸軍宣佈在此基礎上正式組建陸軍網絡部隊司令部，其在組建和初始建設階段的工作主要圍繞三項任務展開：實現網絡空間軍事力量作戰化、增加陸軍網絡作戰力量的能力和規模、發展陸軍網絡空間專業人才隊伍。由於以往的指揮體係被打亂，網絡司令部下新成立的陸軍網絡空間作戰與整合中心實際上發揮了指揮控制和協調同步的核心作用。該機構與此前的陸軍全球網絡行動和安全中心功能類似，但是除了“在執行全譜網絡空間作戰行動過程中提供清晰、簡潔、及時的指導”以外，該組織還負責“與陸軍其他司令部、其他軍種單位中的同類機構、美國網絡空間聯合作戰中心共享信息”。在機構建立之初，網絡空間作戰與整合中心的部分人員還直接加入美國網絡司令部參謀機構，從而更好地促進實現聯合部隊與軍種單位網絡作戰行動的指揮統一。

美國陸軍網絡空間力量組織結構，2005年

轉型作戰部隊職能，促進傳統能力向網絡空間作戰能力發展。在作戰部隊建設層面，以野戰信號部隊為主體的網絡企業技術司令部/第9信號司令部轉隸陸軍網絡部隊司令部，陸軍情報和安全司令部所屬網絡空間作戰部隊的作戰指揮權也由陸軍網絡司令部掌握。通過這種組織調整，陸軍網絡司令部第一次掌握了前沿部署作戰力量，能夠形成全球存在態勢並具備遠征能力，可以向作戰指揮官提供更加全面的戰鬥支援能力。值得注意的是，網絡企業技術司令部以及情報和安全司令部指揮官都在陸軍網絡司令部擔任副司令，分別負責不同類型的網絡作戰行動任務，基本形成了原信號部隊主管網絡防禦、原軍事情報部隊主管網絡進攻的模式，從而將此前離散部署、鬆散聯合的網絡空間相關組織整合為一支完備的陸軍網絡力量。此外，陸軍網絡司令部在2011年還被賦予執行信息作戰的任務，掌握第1信息作戰司令部的作戰指揮權，情報和安全司令部下屬的第780軍事情報旅也將轉型為陸軍網絡司令部直接指揮的網絡旅。

持續優化陸軍網絡空間部隊

陸軍網絡司令部成立後，網絡空間軍事力量作戰化始終是其中心工作，這一點在陸軍網絡力量組織不斷優化整合的過程中得到突出體現。對於當前已經形成的網絡作戰、電子戰、信息作戰、軍事情報甚至太空作戰能力，美軍陸軍在進行網絡軍隊組織結構設計時也體現出融合多種能力的趨勢。美國陸軍還在網絡部隊建設中積極推進整體型軍隊模式，突出國民警衛隊和預備役網絡力量的發展。經過多年建設，美國陸軍網絡力量組織結構已經基本形成。
陸軍網絡作戰力量組織結構，2011年

優化戰鬥力量組織結構，適應作戰行動支援需求。在總部機構層面，為了進一步完善網絡空間作戰行動的指揮程序並實現意圖統一，陸軍在2014年3月批准網絡司令部為陸軍部隊組成總部，同時指定第2集團軍為其直屬單位，而網絡企業技術司令部成為第2集團軍直接指揮的網絡作戰部隊，網絡企業技術司令部指揮官兼任第2集團軍副軍長。而且在前一年，網絡司令部已經在美國網絡司令部和陸軍總部的指導下開始組建聯合部隊網絡總部，其將對網絡空間作戰部隊實施任務指揮，並且具備直接支持作戰司令部的網絡作戰能力。在作戰部隊和戰區層面，網絡司令部試圖通過地區網絡中心改善全球網絡防禦態勢。在原有戰區網絡作戰和安全中心、地區計算機應急響應中心力量基礎上，這些地區網絡安全中心對網絡作戰行動指揮程序進行精簡，能夠發揮較強的計劃、協調和同步功能，從而更加高效地支援地理作戰司令部的行動。

確定條令開發負責機構，完善網絡建軍理論指導。由於美國陸軍網絡司令部合併了原網絡作戰、信息作戰和信號部隊的力量，信號部隊的大量作戰理論迫切需要修訂並轉化為網絡作戰理論，從而實現協調統一的作戰能力發展模式，避免出現概念指導上的混亂。 2014年3月，美國訓練和條令司令部在原信號卓越中心的基礎上，整合其他相關專業力量元素，組建了陸軍網絡卓越中心，目標在2015年10月使其具備指導網絡、信號和電子戰部隊訓練的全面能力。網絡司令部下屬的網絡空間促進辦公室也被合併入網絡卓越中心，從而進一步增強網絡卓越中心在總結網絡部隊建設經驗教訓方面的優勢。通過實施條令出版項目，網絡卓越中心試圖合併原有的信號和電子戰部隊條令，根據陸軍“2015條令體系”的相關要求開發全新的網絡空間作戰、電子戰以及信號部隊條令。目前，陸軍已經完成了對野戰條令FM6-02《信號部隊支持作戰行動》的修訂，指導信號部隊向網絡部隊進行職能轉型；第一次發布了野戰條令FM3-38《網絡電磁行動》，明確了“陸軍在統一地面行動中整合網絡電磁活動的總體原則、戰術和規程”；作為陸軍網絡軍隊建設的根本性指導文件，野戰條令FM3-12《網絡空間作戰》也基本完成了最後的批准程序，於2015年正式在陸軍內部發行。以上述條令文件為主體，網絡卓越中心將繼續完善數十種相關陸軍條令出版物的編撰發布工作，構建完整的陸軍網絡空間作戰技術、戰術和規程體系，為陸軍網絡部隊建設提供全面理論指導。
陸軍網絡作戰力量組織結構，2015年

整合網絡空間教育訓練力量，促進網絡部隊正規化發展。美國陸軍將推進網絡訓練正規化發展視為提高網絡作戰和戰備水平的根本途徑。在陸軍網絡卓越中心組建的同時，陸軍網絡學校作為其下屬機構在原電子戰學校的基礎上成立，而且陸軍信號學校也在網絡卓越中心的建制下繼續得以保留，陸軍關於網絡空間力量正規化建設的“條令-組織-訓練-資源-領導力和教育-人員-設施”模型得到進一步完善。隨著陸軍網絡兵種（“17-系列”職業管理領域）的設立，陸軍要求進入網絡職業領域的新任職人員必須完成網絡學校的駐校訓練項目，從信號、情報和信息作戰部隊等單位調動到相應網絡作戰崗位的大量人員也需要進行新的職業教育訓練，上述兩所學校將共同對新成立的陸軍網絡兵種單位的軍官、準尉和士官進行單個人員技能訓練。例如，軍官領導力基礎訓練課程於2015年8月在網絡學校正式啟動，為期14週的準尉軍官高級訓練項目則在2016年5月開始實施。對於陸軍在2015年10月徵募的第一批網絡作戰士兵，其必須參加的高級個人訓練項目則在2016年2月開始。由於網絡空間作戰行動本質上具有聯合作戰的屬性，高級個人訓練項目為期22週的第一階段訓練內容將是海軍聯合網絡分析師課程，第二階段訓練同樣持續22週，訓練場地也會從海軍設施轉移到陸軍網絡學校。

重視國民警衛隊和預備役網絡力量，突出支援和協調功能。針對網絡作戰力量的發展問題，陸軍認為預備役部門可以協助現役部隊分擔部分任務，能夠在必要時迅速提供具備較高訓練水平的增援力量。因其獨特的雙重法律定位，陸軍國民警衛隊可以發揮各州與聯邦政府機構、民事與軍事組織、私營與公共部門之間的銜接作用，“具備發展網絡空間能力的天然優勢”。因此，陸軍在網絡作戰力量發展過程中也注重相關預備役組織的建設。例如，第1信息作戰司令部還包含4支預備役部隊戰區信息作戰大隊，其都具備提供信息作戰和網絡空間計劃、分析、技術支持能力。根據陸軍國民警衛隊2014年6月與陸軍網絡司令部簽署的一份備忘錄，陸軍國民警衛隊將其在此前一年組建的1支網絡防禦分隊轉隸於陸軍網絡司令部/第2集團軍。這支被稱為第1636網絡防禦分隊的網絡部隊將處於《美國法典》第10卷服役狀態，即全時服役狀態，將與陸軍網絡司令部其他現役部隊共同接受同等標準的訓練，並共同執行所有類型的任務。

本文轉自《軍事文摘》12月刊 責任編輯：張傳良

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China Internet Soverignty, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces

中國軍隊戰略層面的網絡空間特種作戰 China’s Strategic Level of Cyberspace Special Operations

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战略层面的网络空间特种作战 –

China’s Strategic level of Cyberspace Special Operations

Editor’s Note: US Army Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Mitchell Dugen at the US Army War College during the fourth quarter of 2015, “Joint Force Quarterly” published “strategic level of cyberspace special operations,” a paper, the article was Chairman of the Association of the United Nations in 2008 Strategic Papers Competition Strategy Research Award.

In this paper, by reviewing the cyberspace special operations cases, this paper analyzes the potential power of using network tools in asymmetric conflicts, and points out that cyberspace special operations have become an effective strategic tool to achieve national goals. Become a regional power to avoid the US military dominance and to ensure that their strategic interests of the unconventional path. The author proposes three new options for integrating emerging technologies and special operations: “cloud-driven” foreign defense, network counter-insurgency and unconventional cyber warfare advance team. Designed to maintain the US network technology advantages, and to build an important partnership, shaping the full spectrum of the conflict environment has a revolutionary impact. Iran and Russia and other regional forces of cyberspace special combat readiness why more than the United States? How does Iran and Russia strengthen its power at the tactical level while the United States has assembled its network and network capabilities at the strategic level? The United States in more than 20 years ago issued a network of special operations related documents, but why the network of special operations policies, departments and regulations are still not mature enough? For the US military, the most basic question is: how will the United States build a strategic level of network special combat capability?

As early as 1993, Internet technology theorists John Achilla and David Lennfield in his book “cyber war is coming” a book has predicted the recent Iran and Russia to implement the cyberspace special operations. “A large number of scattered small groups around the use of the latest communications technology coordinated” control network, to obtain the decisive advantage of the opponent. In reality this scene has been staged again and again. “We are using the information and the more information we have, and the less demand for traditional weapons,” says Achilla and Lunfield. US military executives have also realized that with asymmetric network tools, unconventional tactics and a large number of false information armed, a small amount of special combatants can form a certain strategic impact. There is news that both Iran and Russia have succeeded in using cyberspace special operations as a strategic tool to achieve their national goals. Both countries have an integrated network of special operations forces that know how to exploit the potential power of network tools in asymmetric conflicts. The asymmetric approach of the two countries has become a strong and unconventional path for regional powers to circumvent US military superiority and to ensure their strategic interests. Low price Of the network of high-tech allows potential rivals can develop a strong network warfare capabilities. Therefore, the United States urgently need to make strategic choices, the development of cyberspace special operations, as a tool for the protection and projection of national interests.

Low-cost network of high-tech technology allows potential rivals to develop a strong network warfare capabilities In February 2013, the Russian chief of staff Grazimov in the Russian “military messenger” magazine published “science in the forecast value” article. In the paper, Gracimov predicted a new generation of war that could “change the rules of the game”, whose strategic value would exceed “the effectiveness of weapon forces.” He called for universal asymmetric action to counter the enemy’s strengths and create a permanent frontier in the territory of the enemy through “special forces and internal confrontation and continuous improvement of information operations, equipment and means.” In the spring of 2014, Western media reported that in the eastern part of Ukraine, a casual special operations squad from Russia through the Ukrainian border, occupation of government buildings and arsenal and transferred to the separatist armed. At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities claim that their digital, telephone and cyber communications are cut off, interfered or attacked. The Ukrainian government attributed the cyber attacks on information and logistics infrastructure, including Internet servers and railroad control systems, to the destruction of Russia, and argued that the implementation of information fraud in Russia was costly in important social media, blogs, and News website published 50 pro-Russian comments every day, inside and outside Ukraine to form a large number of false information flow, on the one hand to cover up its non-traditional military operations in cyberspace, on the other hand to create a political illusion. “Russia is not doing the usual information warfare about false information, lies, leaks or cyber sabotage, it reshapes reality, creates public illusions, and then translates them into political action,” said senior government officials. To this end, in September 2014 at the NATO security summit, the NATO Allied Supreme Commander, US Air Force Admiral Philip Bride Leaf pointed out that Russia in East Ukraine to implement the “mixed” non-traditional operations on behalf of the war The most amazing information in history is Blitzkrieg. Bride Leaf urges the Allies to immediately develop the ability to counter the Russian non-traditional warfare, propaganda and cyber attacks. Russia’s use of the “non-traditional Western as a war” non-traditional means to achieve its political purpose, which makes the Western and NATO countries by surprise. Russia is not a fragmented way to use special forces, information operations or network capabilities.

On the contrary, as General Glashimov said, “the war does not need to be publicly announced, when the special forces with advanced technology and a lot of information for the traditional forces in the maintenance of peace and crisis under the cover of strategic objectives to create good conditions, the war on “Cybercrime deception and cyber attacks are special forces in” war and peace ”

Network information spoofing and cyber attack action for special combat forces in the “war and peace” between the implementation of non-traditional warfare to win the time and space lessons learned from the Russian case can draw four major experience, for the United States special operations Action and network capacity integration to provide a viable theoretical framework. First, there are tactical and strategic differences in the offensive network tools used by the Russian Special Forces, targeting tactical “closed networks”, such as local communications, social media, regional networks and logistics infrastructure, while retaining Its more advanced open network tools as a backup. Second, the network special operations are primarily an agent behavior, emphasizing the minimization of the source tracking. As Gracimov described, “the long-distance, non-contact action against the enemy is becoming the primary means of the tactical battle.” Network special operations usually avoid direct contact with people, but in peace and war in the gray area to start action. Third, information and communication technology, network attacks and information operations in the network to form a non-conventional warfare play an important role. As long as the appropriate implementation, the traditional special operations can go far beyond its original function, “which involves the comprehensive application of a wide range of capabilities to achieve policy objectives.” To be effective, it must also be integrated to synchronize other areas of expertise. Fourth, the network special operations can both deter the conflict, can also be used to deal with the whole spectrum of conflict, because “it is suitable for all stages of action, from shaping the environment to the intense war to post-war reconstruction.” Although the network war to destroy the original intention, but also has a constructive side. The widespread dissemination of low-cost information and communication technologies is conducive to strengthening the security of partner countries and thus helping to prevent the occurrence of conflicts.

“‘Foreign help defense’ (FID) under ‘cloud drive’ is both a concept of cloud computing and a metaphorical description of partnering and trust through virtual means. “The concept of” cloud-driven “FID” has not yet been clearly defined, but it can be integrated into an interdisciplinary field to better understand people, geography and virtual worlds and to act together on related goals. Technically, the “cloud-driven” FID “strengthens the partnership, consolidates data through the federated facilities, enhances automation, and disseminates the analysis process. “Cloud-driven” is flexible and can be developed in private, public, community, or mixed form, using different software, platforms, and infrastructure. Security personnel use intelligent technology to drive confidential mobile applications, analyze tools and share data through “cloud-driven” FIDs. Although the data associated with the virtual cloud, but its real value is to make the timely dissemination of information to the hands of tactics. “The cloud-driven” FID “can also be likened to a persistent, active partnership, the data never stops, the network has been busy. Technology is only a tool to drive deeper, extensive socio-cultural, political and historical factors that are often prone to conflict. “Cloud-driven” FID “can build more sustainable competencies and trust with partner countries. “The cloud-driven” FID “lay a virtual foundation for the future establishment of various institutions, centers and laboratories to bridge the benefits of inter-agency across the United States. From the strategic point of view of the US government, “cloud-driven” FID “is a pragmatic” partnership-centered approach designed to target the core interests of partner countries rather than to Way to change the partner country “. “The cloud-driven” FID “is also a prudent strategic move to” prevent the US partner countries from becoming a public relations crisis due to domestic political problems. ” “The cloud drive ‘FID’ also offers other opportunities. The technology and networks it forms can react quickly to emergencies, such as humanitarian relief or relief operations, prevent mass killings, or evacuate personnel from non-combatants. This saves time, money and manpower by providing information for the decision-making process. For the construction of the partnership, the cloud-driven FID can store local non-US social media information, rich social network analysis, social network maps, and behavioral and opinion trends analysis. Most importantly, the “cloud drive ‘FID” builds trust in an innovative and extremely powerful way to build lasting influence on allies and partners.

Today’s global environment drives the United States to use cyber special operations as a strategic tool network for national military strategies Anti-riot counterintelligence network Anti-riot operations (CNCOIN) aims to use social media networks to achieve the purpose of rebellion. To break the asymmetric information superiority of the enemy, CNCOIN uses non-technical means to combat the relevant crowd and control its perception, behavior and action. It adds a military color to the cyber space’s ubiquitous anti-social network. Although these means are not clearly defined, this article believes that it actually refers to the manipulation of social media, cover up the true identity, to achieve ulterior motives. While social media provides a wide range of opportunities for anti-social networks, such as malicious use, intentional misconduct, but from the military point of view, social media provides a wealth of information resources to affect the psychological vulnerability, but also an ideal attack platform. There are several technologies that contribute to its implementation in each functional category. The scope of action includes, but is not limited to, cyber-pseudo operation and cyber-herding operation. Network fraud is a classic counter-insurgency strategy, “government forces and technical staff will pretend to be insurgents, into the enemy network after the use of advanced intelligence technology in the network within the implementation of the destruction.” Internet expulsion means that “individuals, groups, or organizations deport other individuals, groups, or organizations to the default network area.” The magic of the two technologies is the expulsion of insurgents in the virtual network by exploiting the inherent flaws of the communication technology and communication platform. The two tactics are aimed at rebel activist online communities, manipulating or disrupting them, and ultimately providing more opportunities for cyberbullying. The virtual world magnifies the environmental factors, because the characters in the network are more difficult to determine their authenticity. Planning command control, communication frequency and equipment platform and other elements will become the key to the implementation of network fraud or network expulsion operations to manipulate, mislead or expel the target group to the desired results. The scope of information includes, but is not limited to, Crowdsourcing and Social Networking Analysis, SNA). Crowdsourcing is the use of large-scale knowledge base, provided by the participants voluntarily, to solve the problem to provide new ideas, services or observation, you can quickly expand the organizers of the field of vision. Social network analysis depicts and measures the relationships, strengths, and cores of social links in a visual way to illustrate the social network structure. Social network visualization or social networking maps can provide a unique window for assessing, depicting and even predicting the intensity, time, space, and relationship dimensions of relationship events. In September 2013, during the crisis in the Philippines, the anti-government armed Moro National Liberation Front (hereinafter referred to as “the dismount”) was dissatisfied with the situation of national reconciliation, hijacked more than 200 civilians as hostages, attacked commercial shops and burned urban buildings. Throughout the crisis, crowdsourcing and social network analysis are very successful non-traditional tactical means. The Philippine security forces use crowdsourcing tactics to encourage Zamboang residents to discover and report on the “melodic” members of the hiding place. FEI security forces, together with crowdsourcing information and intelligence analysis, provide information for security operations and humanitarian operations. The use of social network analysis to assess the “Mobility” of the public support, and in the social media against the “interpretation” declaration, to ban the violation of social media user agreement propaganda site, but also the use of crowds of information blockade ” Troops, attacking their temporary command post. The Philippine security forces used solid media to track the key information and lead the use of social media, and then use the solid forces to defeat the “interpretation” of the asymmetric advantage. The information warfare category includes but is not limited to cyber intrusion (cyber Aggression, forum vest (sock-puppeting), astro-turfing and so on. Three tactics are anonymous use of social media to implement misleading, false information to manipulate behavior, public opinion and action. The cyber-invasion is proposed by Teanna Felmyr, which refers to “an electronic or online act that is intended to cause psychological harm to others or damage its reputation by using e-mail, instant messaging, cell phones, digital information, chat rooms

As well as social media, video, game sites, etc. “. It is much broader than the range of ordinary cyber-aggressive behavior. Its anonymity may cause substantial psychological harm and negative consequences, as the relevant information will be repeatedly sent to the target or published in the social media. Its value to CNCOIN is that it can use sensitive digital information to humiliate, defame or hurt the target, causing psychological barriers. This powerful cyber-invading action can reduce the credibility, influence and power of the target, and ultimately lose the power of the target or other insurgents. The other two tactics, the forum vest and the fake are all fictitious online propaganda tools used to spread distorted views to create a wider range of support or opposition to the illusion. In fact, with the forum vest is the same concept, but more complex, more organized, larger. Both tactics use virtual characters to distribute false information in cyberspace, with the aim of initiating group reactions or actions. Combining massive amounts of text, images, and video with a planned misleading network activity will significantly enhance the effectiveness of CNCOIN’s action. The third way to advance the US network’s special operations is the unconventional cyber warfare team (cyber-UW Pilot Team, using social media networks to shape the physical environment, the establishment of regional mechanisms, in the implementation of non – conventional war before the regional connectivity. The core of the unconventional network warfare team is the special forces, with a number of professional organizations to provide technical support, its task is in the field of network security for the preparation of unconventional operations. The penetration of the traditional advance team is the target of enemy territory, military facilities and other entities, rather than the conventional advance team is through the virtual means of infiltration, and then into the sensitive, hostile or refused to area. Through the virtual means, can reduce the United States and partner countries armed forces in time, risk, equipment and other aspects of the loss and risk. Conceptually, unconventional cyber warfare teams use web tools and advanced technology to build people, entities, intelligence, and information infrastructures on social media. While deepening understanding of the local human terrain, the team can strengthen its local language and cultural skills, as well as identify resistance leaders, assess motivation and resistance, and overall support for US government goals, while at the same time understanding Informal hierarchical distribution, psychology and behavior. In addition, you can also incorporate the Internet’s white noise into the social media network to “improve the cultural understanding of potential collaborators in the United States and the local situation before action.” While the US national security strategy has long recognized the strategy of cyber warfare Role, but this understanding is not fully translated into a clear strategic level of thinking and combat capability. For example, the US Department of Defense cyberspace action strategy did not give much solution or specific measures, only from five aspects of the previous repeated network ideas. Lack of clear ideas lead to our network strategy is flawed, making the United States advanced network technology advantages to hand over to the potential rival risk. In contrast, Iran and Russia’s asymmetric innovation modeled other regions and global forces, trying to circumvent the US military advantage by unconventional means to ensure their strategic interests. Cyberspace special operations are a must to fill the strategic level of the blank. Obviously, the United States must actively seek a tactical level of unconventional combat into the cyber space operations in the form of special operations. Rand’s recent study of special operations concluded that “the United States needs to use a more advanced form of special operations to ensure national interests, taking into account the recent US and its interests facing the security threat situation, special operations

Become the most appropriate form of ensuring national interests “. In an increasingly interconnected global environment, the physical infrastructure is quickly allocated Internet protocol addresses, accessory networking. By 2020, there will be 50 billion “machine-to-machine” equipment (currently 1 3 billion units) will be through the “embedded computer, sensor and Internet capabilities” access to network space. Cyberspace special operations Unicom virtual and reality, through the modern information network and with the traditional face-to-face combination of special operations partnership. Today’s global environment has prompted the United States to use cyber special operations as a strategic tool for national military strategies. Potential rivals combine offensive network capabilities with unconventional tactics to set a terrible example for other enemies in the United States, and they will follow suit quickly. This paper presents three new options for integrating emerging technologies and special operations: foreign-assisted defense under “cloud-driven”, anti-riot operations in the network, and non-conventional cyber warfare advance teams. Full play of these three tactics will not only maintain the advantages of the US network technology, but also to build an important partnership, shaping the whole spectrum of combat environment have a revolutionary impact. If successful implementation, network special operations will become the United States a strong new strategic options

Original Mandarin Chinese:

编者按：美国陆军中校帕特里克·米歇尔·杜根在美陆军战争学院就读期间，于2015年第4季度《联合部队季刊》发表《战略层面的网络空间特种作战》一文，该文曾获得2015年度参联会主席战略论文竞赛战略研究类奖。本文通过回顾网络空间特种作战案例，分析了在非对称性冲突中利用网络工具的潜在力量，指出网络空间特种作战已经成为达成国家目标的有效战略工具。成为地区强国用以规避美国军事主导权以及确保本国战略利益的非常规性路径。作者提出了融合新兴技术与特种作战的三种新选项：“云驱动”下的国外协助防御，网络反暴乱平叛行动与非常规网络战先遣队。旨在维持美国的网络技术优势，并对构建重要伙伴关系、塑造全频谱冲突环境产生革命性影响。伊朗和俄罗斯等地区力量的网络空间特种作战战备为何比美国更为充分？

美国在战略层面集结其网络部门和网络能力的同时，伊朗和俄罗斯又是如何在战术层面强化其力量的呢？美国在20多年前就发布了网络特种作战的相关文件，但为何其网络特种作战的政策、部门和条令仍然不够成熟呢？对于美军而言，最基本的问题是：美国将如何打造战略层面的网络特种作战能力？早在1993年，互联网技术理论家约翰·阿奇拉和大卫·伦菲尔德在其著作《网络战争即将来临》一书中就已经预言了最近伊朗和俄罗斯所实施的网络空间特种作战行动。“大量分散各地的小规模团体利用最新的通信技术协调一致”控制网络，取得对对手的决定性优势。现实中这一情景一再上演。阿奇拉和伦菲尔德认为，“战争中我们投向敌人的不再是质量和能量；如今我们使用的是信息，掌握的信息越多，对传统武器的需求就越少”。

美军高层也已经意识到，有了非对称性网络工具、非常规战术以及大量虚假信息的武装，少量的特种作战人员就可以形成一定的战略影响。目前有消息表明，伊朗和俄罗斯均已成功地将网络空间特种作战作为一种战略工具来达成其国家目标。两国都拥有一体化的网络特种作战部队，知道如何在非对称性冲突中利用网络工具的潜在力量。两国的非对称性手段成为地区强国用以规避美国军事优势以及确保本国战略利益的强大非常规性路径。价格低廉的网络高新技术使得潜在对手可以发展出强大的网络战能力。因此，美国亟需做出战略选择，发展网络空间特种作战，作为保护和投射国家利益的工具。

价格低廉的网络高新技术使得潜在对手可以发展出强大的网络战能力2013年2月，俄罗斯总参谋长格拉西莫夫在俄《军工信使》杂志发表了《科学在预测中的价值》一文。文中，格拉西莫夫预测了能够“改变游戏规则”的新一代战争，其战略价值将超过“武器力量的效能”。他号召普遍开展非对称性行动，以抵消敌方的优势，通过“特种作战力量和内部对抗以及不断完善的信息行动、装备和手段，在敌国的领土中创造一个永久活动的前线”。2014年春，有西方媒体报道，在乌克兰东部的乱局中，一支便装的特种作战小分队从俄罗斯境内穿越乌克兰边界，占领政府建筑和武器库并转交给分裂主义武装。与此同时，乌克兰当局声称，其全境的数字、电话及网络通信均遭到切断、干扰或攻击活动。乌克兰政府将信息和物流基础设施（包括互联网服务器和铁路控制系统）遭受的网络攻击归因于俄方的破坏，同时还认为，俄罗斯实施信息欺骗行动，花费巨资在重要的社交媒体、博客以及新闻网站每天发布50条亲俄评论，在乌克兰内外形成大量的虚假信息流，一方面掩盖其在网络空间的非传统军事行动，另一方面制造了政治假象。乌政府高级官员表示，“俄罗斯所做的并不是通常的信息作战所涉及的虚假信息、谎言、泄漏机密或网络破坏活动，它重新塑造现实，造成大众幻象，然后将之转化为政治行动”。为此，在2014年9月召开的北约安全峰会上，北约盟军最高司令、美国空军上将菲利普·布里德莱弗指出，俄罗斯在东乌克兰实施的“混合型”非传统作战代表了战争史上最惊人的信息闪电战。布里德莱弗敦促盟军立即发展相应的能力以反制俄罗斯的非传统战、宣传战及网络攻击行动。俄罗斯使用“根本不被西方视为战争的”非传统手段达成其政治目的，这使得西方及北约国家措手不及。俄罗斯并不是以碎片化的方式来使用特种力量、信息作战或网络能力。相反，正如格拉西莫夫将军所言，“发动战争不再需要公开宣布，当配备先进技术和大量信息的特种力量为传统部队在维持和平与危机的掩护下达成战略目标创造好条件，战争就发生了。”言外之意，网络信息欺骗和网络攻击行动为特种作战力量在“战争与和平之间”实施非传统战赢得了时间和空间。俄罗斯的网络赋能非传统战极为成功，不仅是其网络特种力量的混成，而且还成功地侵入欧盟成员国，甚至没有引起西方有效的军事反应。

网络信息欺骗和网络攻击行动为特种作战力量在“战争与和平之间”实施非传统战赢得了时间和空间 经验教训从俄罗斯的案例中可以得出四个方面的主要经验，可为美国特种作战行动与网络能力整合提供一个可行的理论框架。第一，俄罗斯特种部队所使用的进攻性网络工具存在战术和战略层面的差别，主要以战术层面的“封闭网络”为目标，如本地通讯、社交媒体、区域网络和后勤基础设施等，同时保留其更为先进的开放网络工具作为备用。第二，网络特种作战主要是一种代理人行为，强调最小化的来源跟踪。正如格拉西莫夫所描述的那样，“对敌方的远距离、无接触行动正在成为战术战役目标的主要手段”。网络特种作战通常避免人员的直接接触，而是在和平与战争的灰色地带展开行动。第三，信息与通信技术、网络攻击及信息作战等在网络赋能的非常规战中发挥着重要作用。只要恰当的实施，传统的特种作战可以远远超出其原有的功能，“这涉及到对广泛能力的综合运用，以达成政策目标”。要发挥效能，还必须整合同步其他领域的专门知识。第四，网络特种作战既可以慑止冲突，也可用于应对全频谱冲突，因为“它适合行动的各个阶段，从塑造环境到剧烈战争再到战后重建等”。虽然网络战以破坏为初衷，但也具有建设性的一面。低成本的信息和通信技术的广泛传播有利于强化伙伴国安全，从而有助于阻止冲突的发生。

网络空间特种作战是一种必须填补的战略层面的能力空白，美国必须积极寻求一种在战术层面的非常规作战中融入网络空间作战的特种作战形式 “‘云驱动’下的‘国外协助防御’（FID）”既是一种云计算概念，也是通过虚拟手段增强伙伴能力和信任的一种比喻性描述。“‘云驱动’FID”概念虽然还未经明确界定，但是它却可以联接整合跨学科领域，以更好地理解人员、地理及虚拟世界，并对相关目标展开共同行动。从技术上而言，“‘云驱动’FID”可以强化伙伴关系，通过联合设施，实时共享数据，增强自动化，传播分析过程。“云驱动”是灵活多变的，能够以私人、公共、社区或混合形式出现，各自使用不同的软件、平台和基础设施等。安全人员通过“‘云驱动’FID”使用智能技术驱动保密的移动应用软件、分析工具和共享数据。虽然数据与虚拟云相联，但其真正价值在于使信息及时传播到战术人员手中。“‘云驱动’FID”也可比喻为一种持续的、活跃的伙伴关系，数据永不停止，网络一直忙碌。技术仅仅是一种工具，用以驱动更深入、广泛的社会文化、政治和历史因素的理解，这些往往是容易造成冲突的因素。“‘云驱动’FID”可以与伙伴国构建更具持续性的能力和信任。“‘云驱动’FID”为未来建立各种机构、中心和实验室弥合美国各跨机构间的利益打下一个虚拟的基础。从美国政府的战略视角而言，“‘云驱动’FID”是一种实用主义的“以伙伴国为中心的方式，旨在围绕伙伴国的核心利益设计行动，而不是寄希望于以短视的方式来改变伙伴国”。“‘云驱动’FID”还是一种审慎的战略举措，“以防美国的伙伴国由于国内政治问题出现公共关系危机”。“‘云驱动’FID”也提供了其他的机会。它所形成的技术和关系网络可以迅速对紧急事件做出反应，如人道主义救援或救灾行动、阻止大规模屠杀，或者非战斗人员撤离任务等。这样可以通过为决策过程提供信息而节约时间、金钱和人力等。对于伙伴关系的构建而言，“‘云驱动’FID”可以存储当地的非美国社交媒体信息、丰富的社交网络分析、社会网络地图以及行为和舆论趋势分析等信息。最为重要的是，“‘云驱动’FID”以富有创新性和极为有力的方式构建信任，打造对盟友及伙伴国的持久影响力。

当今的全球环境促使美国采用网络特种作战作为国家军事战略的战略性工具 网络反暴乱平叛行动网络反暴乱平叛行动（CNCOIN）旨在利用社交媒体网络达成平叛的目的。为打破敌人的非对称性信息优势，CNCOIN使用非技术手段打击相关人群，控制其感知、行为和行动。它为网络空间无处不在的反社交网络手段增添了军事色彩。虽然这些手段没有明确界定，本文认为，它实际上就是指操纵社交媒体，掩盖真实身份，达成不可告人的目的。虽然社交媒体为反社交网络提供了广泛的机会，如恶意利用、有意误导等，但从军事角度而言，社交媒体提供了丰富的信息资源以影响心理脆弱性，也是一个理想的攻击平台。每种功能性范畴中都有几种有助于其实施的技术。行动范畴包括但不局限于网络欺骗行动（cyber-pseudo operation）和网络驱逐行动（cyber-herding operation）。网络欺骗行动是一种经典的平叛策略，“政府军和技术人员将自己假扮为叛乱分子，渗入敌方网络后使用先进的谍报技术在该网络内部实施破坏”。网络驱逐行动就是指，“个人、团体或组织把其他的个人、团体或组织驱逐到预设的网络区域”。两种技术的奇妙之处在于，通过利用通信技术与通信平台的内在缺陷来驱逐虚拟网络中的叛乱分子。两种战术以叛乱分子活跃的网络社群为目标，对其进行操控或者瓦解，最终为网络平叛提供更多的机会。虚拟世界放大了环境因素，因为网络中的人物更难确定其真实性。规划指挥控制、通信频率以及设备平台等要素将成为网络欺骗行动或网络驱逐行动实施的关键点，用以操纵、误导或者驱逐目标群走向预想的结果。情报范畴包括但不局限于众包（Crowdsourcing）和社交网络分析技术（Social Networking Analysis， SNA）。众包就是利用大规模的知识库，由参与者自愿提供的，为解决问题提供新思路、服务或观察，可以迅速扩展组织者的视野。社交网络分析以可视的方式描绘和测量社交链接的关系、强度及核心性以说明社会网络结构。社交网络可视化或者社网图可以提供独特的窗口用以评估、描绘甚至预测关系事件的强度、时间、空间和关系维度。2013年9月，菲律宾三宝颜危机期间，反政府武装摩洛民族解放阵线（以下简称“摩解”）对民族和解状况感到不满，挟持200多名平民为人质，袭击商业店铺，烧毁城市建筑。整个危机期间，众包和社交网络分析都是非常成功的非传统战术手段。菲律宾安全部队使用众包战术鼓励三宝颜居民发现并报告“摩解”成员的藏身地点。菲安全部队结合众包信息和情报分析，为安全行动和人道主义行动提供信息。使用社交网络分析来评估“摩解”的民众支持度，并在社交媒体上反制“摩解”宣言，封禁违反社交媒体用户协议的宣传网站，还使用众包信息封锁“摩解”小股部队，攻击其临时指挥哨所。菲安全部队通过使用社交媒体跟踪关键信息和领导节点，随后使用实体部队挫败了“摩解”的非对称性优势。信息作战范畴包括但不局限于网络入侵（cyber aggression）、论坛马甲（袜子手偶sock-puppeting）、以假乱真（Astro-turfing）等。三种战术都是匿名利用社交媒体实施误导、假信息等来操纵行为、舆论及行动。网络入侵是由蒂安娜·菲尔姆利提出，是指“一种电子或在线行为，旨在对他人实施心理伤害或损毁其名誉，通过使用电子邮件、即时信息、手机、数字信息、聊天室以及社交媒体、视频、游戏网站等”。它比普通的网络攻击性行为的范围要广泛得多。它的匿名性可能会引起实质性的心理伤害和负面后果，因为相关信息会被重复发送给目标或者在社交媒体发布。它对CNCOIN的价值在于，可以利用敏感的数字信息来羞辱、诽谤或伤害目标，造成心理障碍行为。这种强大的网络入侵行动可以降低目标的可信度、影响力和权力，最终使目标或其它叛乱分子丧失实力。其它两种战术，论坛马甲和以假乱真都是虚构的在线宣传工具，用来散布扭曲的观点，以制造更广范围的支持或者反对的假象。以假乱真实际上跟论坛马甲是同一个概念，只不过更为复杂、更有组织、规模更大。两种战术都使用虚拟人物在网络空间散布虚假信息，目的是引发群体反应或行动。以假乱真的网络信息作战行动包含海量文字、图片和视频，与有计划的误导性网络活动相结合，将显著增强CNCOIN行动的效果。 非常规网络战先遣队推进美国网络特种作战的第三种方式是非常规网络战先遣队（cyber-UW Pilot Team），利用社交媒体网络塑造实体环境，建立区域机制，在实施非常规战之前将各区域联通起来。非常规网络战先遣队的核心是特种部队，拥有多个专业机构提供的技术支持，其任务是在网络安全领域进行非常规作战的准备。传统先遣队的渗透目标是敌方领土、军事设施等实体目标，而非常规先遣队则是通过虚拟手段进行渗透，再潜入敏感、敌对或拒止区域。通过虚拟手段，可以减少美国及伙伴国武装力量在时间、风险、装备等方面的损失和风险。从概念上讲，非常规网络战先遣队利用网络工具和先进技术在社交媒体上打造人员、实体、情报以及信息基础设施。在加深对当地人文地形理解的同时，小组可以强化其本地语言和文化技能，还可识别抵抗活动领导者、评估动机和抵抗能力以及对美国政府目标的总体支持度，与此同时，还可以了解非正式的层级分布、心理及行为等。此外，还可以通过接入社交媒体网络混入互联网白噪音，以“提高美国对潜在合作者的文化理解以及在采取行动之前的当地形势。”虽然美国国家安全战略中早就承认了网络作战的战略作用，但是这种认识并没有完全转化成明晰的战略层面的思维和作战能力。例如，美国《国防部网络空间行动战略》中并没有给出多少解决方案或具体措施，仅仅从五个方面重复了先前的网络思路。缺乏明确的思路导致我们的网络战略存在缺陷，使得美国先进的网络技术优势有拱手让给潜在对手的风险。对比之下，伊朗和俄罗斯的非对称性创新为其他地区和全球力量树立了模仿的样板，都试图以非常规手段规避美国的军事优势，确保各自的战略利益。网络空间特种作战是一种必须填补的战略层面的能力空白。很显然，美国必须积极寻求一种在战术层面的非常规作战中融入网络空间作战的特种作战形式。兰德公司最近的一份研究特种作战的报告得出结论，称“美国需要运用一种更为先进的特种作战形式来确保国家利益，考虑到近来美国及其利益面临的安全威胁形势，特种作战成为确保国家利益的最合适的形式”。在一个日益互联的全球环境中，实体性基础设施快速被分配互联网协议地址，接入物联网。到2020年，将有500亿台“机器对机器”设备（目前为130亿台）会通过“嵌入计算机、传感器和互联网能力”接入网络空间。网络空间特种作战联通了虚拟与现实，通过现代的信息网络并与传统的面对面的特种作战伙伴关系相结合。当今的全球环境促使美国采用网络特种作战作为国家军事战略的战略性工具。潜在对手将进攻性网络能力与非常规战术相结合为美国的其他敌人树立了可怕的榜样，他们必将快速跟进。本文提出了融合新兴技术与特种作战的三种新选项：“云驱动”下的国外协助防御、网络反暴乱平叛行动以及非常规网络战先遣队。充分发挥这三种战术将不仅仅能维持美国的网络技术优势，还可对构建重要伙伴关系、塑造全频谱作战环境产生革命性影响。如果能成功实施，网络特种作战必将成为美国强有力的新战略选项。

 

2016-08-22 17:42现代军事

China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, Chinese Hacker Methodology 中國黑客, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀

中國軍隊信息戰裝備的作戰運用 – Chinese Military Operation of Information Warfare Equipment

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中國軍隊信息戰裝備的作戰運用

Chinese Military Operation of Information Warfare Equipment

Information warfare is the C4ISR system and C4ISR system of confrontation, is the advantage of information contention, the main purpose is to ensure that their own information system to run properly, from the enemy use, paralysis and destruction; the same time, trying to use, paralyzed and destroy the enemy’s information system, So that in a paralyzed, confused state. Information warfare includes two parts: strategic information warfare and battlefield information warfare.

Strategic information warfare and information warfare battlefield

strategic information warfare is mainly characterized by a wide range of sectors covering all key political, economic, technological, and military and other special areas; special way, relates to psychological warfare, media warfare, deception warfare, media warfare and other special Means that the target is special, mainly through the decadence war, psychological warfare, information deterrence attack the enemy’s understanding system and thinking system; great harm, can make the whole country’s economic, political or military paralyzed, and even make it happen alternately; Personnel special, the war is not necessarily military personnel, computer experts, international criminal groups, ulterior motives of hackers or terrorist organizations and so may become war personnel.

Battlefield information warfare is the information warfare in the battle space, refers to the preparation and conduct of a campaign, the integrated use of information technology and a variety of information technology weapons, information combat platform and C4ISR system, in reconnaissance detection and early warning, information processing and Transmission, weapons control and guidance, operational command and control, camouflage deception and interference, as well as military strategy and other aspects of the comprehensive confrontation and struggle. Battlefield information warfare is through the interference or disrupting the enemy decision-making process, so that the enemy can not effectively take concerted action. Therefore, we must first affect the enemy decision-making, and then affect its actions, that is, to win the air electromagnetic advantage, and then made the air superiority, and finally the use of conventional forces to take combat operations. To seize the right to information system, to seize the initiative to fight the space, but also for the fight for land rights, air supremacy, sea power and the system of the right to lay a good foundation and necessary conditions.

A The basic combat forces and means are digital forces and information weapons equipment, the main contents include combat confidentiality, military deception, electronic warfare, psychological warfare and fire destroyed, the core purpose is to compete for the battle space information access , Control and use rights. Battlefield information warfare is the confrontation of the information system, it directly affects the entire battle space, the whole process of war and success or failure. Battlefield information warfare The main combat style is the electronic warfare and cyber warfare. Electronic warfare is an important part of the battlefield information warfare, mainly for the enemy communications, radar and other electromagnetic radiation source for the lure, interference, destruction and destruction activities. In the Gulf War, the electronic warfare was not only for the first time on a large scale, but also as a campaign stage and a specific campaign in war. In the Kosovo war, NATO used a lot of electronic warfare equipment, and the first use of electromagnetic pulse bombs and the first time a network war. Network warfare is a cyber-confrontational activity in computer cyberspace, using the Internet, and is being used for the first time in the Kosovo war. NATO network warfare measures include: network advertising; hacker attacks; attacks on financial networks. The main feature of the network war in the Southern Alliance is the people’s war mode, fans, computer fans and computer enthusiasts spontaneously carried out a large number of network operations, such as online publicity, attack NATO website, the use of network transmission of information.

Information warfare equipment in war equipment electronic warfare equipment the trend of electronic warfare equipment increasingly integrated and universal, under the conditions of information technology in the local war, the battlefield of the electromagnetic environment is increasingly complex, the past that the separation of each other, a single function of electronic warfare equipment is far from Adapt to combat needs. Integration and generalization has become the focus of the development of electronic warfare equipment and future electronic warfare equipment overall development direction. In order to deal more effectively with the complex and volatile electromagnetic threat in the information warfare, the future of the new generation of electronic warfare equipment, will be widely used advanced computer technology, greatly improve the automation of the entire system to have better real-time capabilities, since Adaptability and full power management capability. Electronic warfare equipment, work areas continue to widen, increasing the transmission power, millimeter-wave technology and the development of optical technology, the modern electronic warfare equipment, the frequency of continuous development to a wider band. On the whole, the future range of electronic warfare equipment will be extended to the entire electromagnetic spectrum. GPS interference and anti-interference will be concerned about the practice of war has shown that if the loss of GPS support, it will greatly weaken the information advantage, so that command, control, reconnaissance, combat, military and other military aspects are facing severe tests, Combat effectiveness. Focusing on the development of anti-radiation and new electronic warfare jets, attention to the development of new, special electronic warfare technology and equipment, such as anti-satellite laser weapons, high-energy particle beam weapons, and meteor communication, neutrino communication and so on.

Computer virus weapon <a In the military information system, the battlefield information acquisition, transmission, processing and other functions need to complete the computer and network, computer network is the basis and pioneer of information warfare. The use of software-driven sniffers and hardware magnetic sniffers and other sniffing network is an important way to attack the network. These sniffing tools were originally a test device used to diagnose and assist in repairing the network, so it was a powerful tool for network management personnel to manage the network, but it was a terrible computer virus weapon in information warfare. It can make the network “service denied”, “information tampering”, information “halfway steal” and so on. In addition, will also focus on design “portal trap”. “Portal trap”, also known as “back door”, is a computer system designer in the system in advance of a structure, in the application appears or operating system, the programmer to insert some debugging agencies. System programmers in order to achieve the purpose of the attack system, deliberately left a small number of portal traps for familiar with the system staff to go beyond the normal system protection and sneak into the system. Network is an important infrastructure for information warfare, network-based warfare is mainly based on the network and the network is reliable to determine the outcome of the war. Therefore, to strengthen the network of offensive and defensive combat research, to win the future of information war is essential. 　　Electromagnetic pulse bombs

Iraq war, the US military used a lot of electronic warfare equipment, and the use of electromagnetic pulse bombs attacked the Iraqi radio and television system and the Iraqi military various types of electronic radiation source. Electromagnetic pulse bomb, also known as microwave pulse bomb, is through the micro-beam into electromagnetic energy, damage to each other’s electronic facilities and personnel of a new directional energy weapons. Its working principle is: high-power microwave through the antenna gathered into a very narrow, very strong electromagnetic waves fired at each other, relying on this beam of electromagnetic waves generated by high temperature, ionization, radiation and other integrated effects in the target internal electronic circuit to produce fatal voltage And the current, breakdown or burn the sensitive components, damage to the computer stored in the data, so that the other side of the weapons and command system paralyzed, loss of combat effectiveness. According to the test, a briefcase size of the microwave bomb, can produce power of 300 million watts of pulse waves. Will be more than one connection, it can become an adjustable radiation source, resulting in more than 2 billion watts of pulse waves. This pulse wave is somewhat similar to the nuclear pulse generated when the nuclear explosion can easily from the power and communication pipes into the underground bunker, which rely on radio, radar, computers, power grids and telephone modern weapons systems, chemical and biological arsenal and its production The shop was paralyzed in an instant.

GPS interference device <a I = 13> Iraq war, the Iraqi military use of GPS interferometer on the Tomahawk cruise missiles for effective interference, which is the first time in combat in the GPS guidance system interference. GPS signal is very weak, very easy to interfere. A Russian company offers a 4-watt power handheld GPS jammers that can be bought for less than $ 4,000. If you buy parts from a retail e-store, spend $ 400 to create a GPS jammer with a radius of 16 km or more. Before the war in Iraq, the United States had expected the Iraqi side to interfere with GPS signals. The United States has already been equipped with anti-jamming technology for its GPS bombs and missiles so that these GPS-guided weapons can continue to use GPS signals in the event of interference; even if the GPS signal is lost, these weapons can also use their own other guidance system Such as inertial navigation, laser guidance, etc., so that they reach the target. Nevertheless, the early Iraq war, the US military more than a dozen Tomahawk cruise missiles or because of interference from the scheduled route, falling in Turkey, Syria and Iran. Small GPS jitter problem alerted the US government, Powell personally come forward to investigate the source of Iraqi GPS jammers, Russia and other countries imposed no small pressure.

Gulf War, GPS navigator as a trial for the first time issued to the use of desert combat personnel, the effect is obvious. At that time, including cruise missiles, including all the weapons are not using GPS navigation device. During the war in Iraq, we saw almost all of the combat platforms, and every soldier, almost all of the missiles and bombs used this kind of navigation device, so that the tanks, planes, ships were more mobile so that the missiles and bombs were The probability error is reduced to 1-3 m, within a maximum of 10 m. <A I = 15> everything has a disadvantage. GPS navigation defects and information technology weapons and equipment of the drawbacks is the same, that is, electronic interference. From the perspective of the development of weapons and equipment, the purchase of a cruise missile needs more than 100 million dollars, and manufacturing a GPS jammers only a few hundred dollars, as a strategic defense side, if a large number of development and development of GPS jammers, not only for US missiles And bombs are a threat to their tanks, planes, ships and personnel navigation and positioning will also have a huge impact. Of course, you should also see the US military fight, further, after the end of the war in Iraq will be based on the lessons of the war to improve the GPS system. Is expected to be improved in three areas: First, GPS satellites, mainly to enhance the satellite launch signal, and as much as possible to launch GPS satellites; Second, improve the guidance system, mainly to increase the composite guidance device, after the GPS guidance is disturbed, Automatic recovery or transfer to inertia and other navigation methods to ensure the normal operation of the platform and weapons; Third, GPS anti-interference, mainly to improve the GPS receiver anti-jamming capability, the development of new GPS receiver, Machine and jamming machine for electronic suppression and interference.

 

Original Mandarin Chinese:

信息戰是C4ISR系統與C4ISR系統的對抗，是信息優勢的爭奪，主要目的是確保己方信息系統正常運行，免遭敵方利用、癱瘓和破壞﹔同時，設法利用、癱瘓和破壞敵人的信息系統，使之處於癱瘓、迷茫狀態。信息戰包括戰略信息戰和戰場信息戰兩大部分。

戰略信息戰和戰場信息戰

戰略信息戰主要特征是范圍廣泛，涉及國家政治、經濟、科技、軍事等各個要害部門和特殊領域﹔方式特殊，涉及心理戰、輿論戰、欺騙戰、媒體戰等特殊手段﹔目標特殊，主要是通過誘騙戰、心理戰、信息威懾等攻擊敵人的認識體系和思維體系﹔危害巨大，能使整個國家的經濟、政治或軍事陷入癱瘓，甚至能使其發生政權交替﹔人員特殊，參戰人員不一定軍人，計算機專家、國際犯罪集團、別有用心的黑客或恐怖組織等都可能成為參戰人員。

戰場信息戰是發生在戰斗空間內的信息戰，是指為准備和進行一場戰役，綜合運用信息技術手段和各種信息化武器、信息化作戰平台和C4ISR系統，在偵察探測及預警、信息處理與傳遞、武器控制和制導、作戰指揮與控制、偽裝欺騙與干擾以及軍事謀略等方面展開的全面對抗和斗爭。戰場信息戰是通過干擾或打亂敵方決策程序，使敵方無法有效採取協調一致的行動。因此，要先影響敵人決策，然后再影響其行動，即先贏得空中電磁優勢，再取得空中優勢，最后使用常規部隊採取作戰行動。奪取了制信息權，就奪取了戰斗空間的主動權，而且為爭奪制陸權、制空權、制海權和制天權奠定一個良好基礎和必要條件。

戰場信息戰的基本作戰力量和手段是數字化部隊及信息化武器裝備，主要內容包括作戰保密、軍事欺騙、電子戰、心理戰和火力摧毀，核心目的是爭奪戰斗空間的信息獲取權、控制權和使用權。戰場信息戰是信息體系的對抗，它直接影響到整個戰斗空間、整場戰爭的進程和成敗。戰場信息戰的主要作戰樣式是電子戰和網絡戰。電子戰是戰場信息戰的一個重要組成部分，主要是針對敵人通信、雷達等電磁輻射源進行的誘騙、干擾、破壞和摧毀活動。海灣戰爭中，電子戰不僅首次大規模使用，而且正式作為戰爭中的一個戰役階段和特定戰役行動。科索沃戰爭中，北約使用了大量電子戰裝備，並首次使用了電磁脈沖炸彈並首次進行了網絡戰。網絡戰是在計算機網絡空間，利用因特網進行的一種網絡對抗活動，並在科索沃戰爭中首次使用。北約網絡戰的措施包括：網絡宣傳﹔黑客攻擊﹔襲擊金融網絡等。南聯盟網絡戰的主要特征是人民戰爭模式，網迷、電腦迷和計算機愛好者自發地進行了大量網絡作戰行動，如開展網上宣傳、攻擊北約網站、利用網絡傳遞情報等。

戰爭中的信息戰裝備

電子戰裝備

電子戰裝備的發展趨勢日趨一體化和通用化，信息化條件下的局部戰爭中，戰場上的電磁環境日益復雜，以往那種彼此分立、功能單一的電子戰裝備已遠遠不能適應作戰需要了。一體化和通用化已成為當前電子戰裝備發展的重點和未來電子戰裝備總的發展方向。為了更有效地對付信息化戰爭中復雜多變的電磁威脅，未來新一代的電子對抗裝備，將廣泛採用先進的計算機技術，大幅度提高整個系統的自動化程度，以具備更好的實時能力、自適應能力和全功率管理能力。電子戰裝備的工作頻段不斷拓寬，發射功率不斷增大，毫米波技術和光電技術的發展，使現代電子戰裝備的工作頻率不斷向更寬的頻段發展。從整體上看，未來電子戰裝備的工作范圍必將擴展到整個電磁波頻譜。GPS干擾與反干擾將受到關注，戰爭實踐已經表明，如果失去GPS的支持，就會極大地削弱信息優勢，使指揮、控制、偵察、打擊、部隊機動等各個軍事環節都面臨嚴峻考驗，嚴重降低戰斗力。重點發展反輻射和新型電子戰干擾機，重視發展新型、特殊的電子戰技術裝備，如用於反衛星的激光武器、高能粒子束武器，以及流星余跡通信、中微子通信等等。

計算機病毒武器

在軍事信息系統中，戰場信息的獲取、傳遞、處理等功能需要計算機及網絡來完成，計算機網絡是進行信息戰的基礎和先鋒。利用軟件驅動嗅探器和硬件磁感應嗅探器等對網絡進行嗅探是進攻網絡的重要方法。這些嗅探工具原本是一種測試設備，用來診斷和協助修理網絡，因此它是網管人員管理網絡的一種得力工具，但在信息戰中卻是一種可怕的計算機病毒武器。它能使網絡“服務否認”、“信息篡改”、信息“中途竊取”等。另外，也將重視設計“門戶陷阱”。“門戶陷阱”又稱“后門”，是計算機系統設計者預先在系統中構造的一種機構，在應用出現或操作系統期間，程序員插入一些調試機構。系統程序員為了達到攻擊系統的目的，特意留下少數門戶陷阱，供熟悉系統的人員用以超越對方正常的系統保護而潛入系統。網絡是信息化戰爭的重要基礎設施，網絡中心戰主要是基於網絡而進行的，網絡是否可靠決定戰爭的勝負。因此，加強網絡攻防作戰的研究，對於贏得未來信息化戰爭至關重要。

電磁脈沖炸彈

伊拉克戰爭中，美軍使用了大量電子戰裝備，並使用電磁脈沖炸彈襲擊了伊拉克廣播電視系統及伊軍各類電子輻射源。電磁脈沖炸彈也稱微波脈沖炸彈，是通過把微波束轉化為電磁能，毀傷對方電子設施和人員的一種新型定向能武器。其工作原理是：高功率微波經過天線聚集成一束很窄、很強的電磁波射向對方，依靠這束電磁波產生的高溫、電離、輻射等綜合效應，在目標內部的電子線路中產生致命的電壓和電流，擊穿或燒毀其中的敏感元器件，毀損電腦中存貯的數據，從而使對方的武器和指揮系統陷於癱瘓，喪失戰斗力。據測試，一枚公文包大小的微波炸彈，可產生功率達3億瓦的脈沖波。將其多個聯接后，則能成為可調整的輻射源，產生20億瓦以上的脈沖波。這種脈沖波有點類似核爆炸時產生的電磁脈沖，可以輕易地從電力和通訊管道進入地下掩體，使其中依賴無線電、雷達、計算機、電網和電話等的現代化武器系統、生化武器庫及其生產車間在瞬間癱瘓。

GPS干擾設備

伊拉克戰爭中，伊軍利用GPS干擾儀對戰斧巡航導彈進行了有效的干擾，這是第一次在實戰中對GPS制導系統進行干擾。GPS信號很弱，很易於干擾。一家俄羅斯公司提供的一種4瓦功率的手持GPS干擾機，不到4000美元就能買到。如果從零售電子商店購買部件組裝，花400美元就可以制造一個干擾半徑16公裡以上的GPS干擾機。伊拉克戰爭開戰之前，美國就已經預料到伊拉克方面會干擾GPS信號。美國其實早已經給其GPS炸彈和導彈裝載了抗干擾技術，使這些GPS導引的武器能夠在干擾的情況下繼續使用GPS信號﹔即使GPS信號丟失，這些武器還可以使用自身的其他導引系統如慣性導航、激光制導等，使自己到達目標。盡管如此，伊拉克戰爭初期，美軍十幾枚戰斧式巡航導彈還是因受干擾偏離預定航線，落在土耳其、敘利亞和伊朗境內。小小的GPS干擾機問題驚動了美國朝野，鮑威爾親自出面調查伊拉克GPS干擾機的來源，對俄羅斯等國施加了不小的壓力。

海灣戰爭中，GPS導航儀作為試用品首次發放給沙漠作戰人員使用，效果明顯。當時，包括巡航導彈在內的所有武器都沒有採用GPS導航裝置。伊拉克戰爭中，我們看到幾乎所有的作戰平台，每一個單兵，幾乎全部的導彈和炸彈都採用了這種導航裝置，從而使坦克、飛機、艦艇的機動更加精確，使導彈和炸彈的原概率誤差縮小到1—3米，最大10米范圍之內。

凡事有一利必有一弊。GPS導航的弊端與信息化武器裝備的弊端是一樣的，就是電子干擾問題。從武器裝備發展角度來看，購買一枚巡航導彈需要100多萬美元，而制造一部GPS干擾機才幾百美元，作為戰略防御一方，如果能夠大量發展和研制GPS干擾機，不僅對於美軍導彈和炸彈是一種威脅，對其坦克、飛機、艦艇和人員的導航定位也將產生巨大影響。當然，也應看到美軍打一仗、進一步，伊拉克戰爭結束后必將根據戰爭中的教訓，改進GPS系統。預計將在三個方面進行改進：一是GPS衛星，主要是增強衛星發射信號，並盡可能多的發射GPS衛星﹔二是改進制導系統，主要是增加復合制導裝置，在GPS指導受到干擾之后，自動恢復或轉入慣性等其他導航方式，以保証平台和武器的正常運行﹔三是GPS反干擾，主要是提高GPS接收機抗干擾能力，研制新型GPS接收機，在戰區對地方軍民用GPS接收機和干擾機進行電子壓制和干擾等。

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Strategic Support Forces

Full Text of China Military Reform Commission //中華人民共和國軍委發布軍事改革意見全文

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Full Text of China Military Reform Commission

中華人民共和國軍委發布軍事改革意見全文

http://news.sina.com   2016年01月01日

戰略火箭軍

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, January 1 – Approved by the CMC Chairman Xi Jinping, the Central Military Commission recently issued “on deepening the reform of national defense and military advice.”

“Opinions” stressed eighteen since the party’s Central Military Commission and President Xi on the realization of strong military objectives, overall army more revolutionary, modernized and standardized, co-ordinate military construction and operation, co-ordination of economic development and national defense construction develop military strategic policy under the new situation, and proposed a series of major policies and principles, make a series of major decisions and plans. Implement the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission and President Xi major strategic planning and strategic design, we must deepen defense and military reform, full implementation of the reform and strengthening the military strategy, unswervingly take the road of Chinese characteristics, a strong army.

“Opinions” that deepen defense and military reform guiding ideology, thoroughly implement the party’s 18 and eighteenth session of the Third, Fourth, Fifth Plenum, Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, “Three represents “important thought, the scientific concept of development as guidance, thoroughly implement the important speech of President Xi series is especially important to discuss defense and army building, according to the” four comprehensive “strategic layout requirements in order to target the party strong army under the new situation is lead and implement the military strategic principle in the new situation, the full implementation of the reform strategy of strengthening the military, efforts to address the constraints of national defense and military development of the institutional barriers and structural problems, policy issues, and promote the modernization of the military organizational form, further emancipate and develop combat effectiveness, further liberation army and enhance the vitality of the construction with China’s international status commensurate with the interests of national security and development to adapt to the consolidation of national defense and powerful armed forces, to achieve “two hundred years” goal to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese dream to provide a strong assurance.

“Opinions” stressed, deepen reform of national defense and the armed forces should adhere to the following basic principles: adhere to the correct political orientation, focusing adhere to fight, persist in innovation-driven, adhere to the system design, adhere to the rule of law thinking, actively and steadily adhere to.

“Opinions” that deepen defense and military reform overall objective is to firmly grasp the principle of “total JMC tube, main battle theater, built in the main military services” to the leadership of the management system, joint operational command system reform, focusing on promoting the coordination of the scale structure , policy and institutional reform and the development of military and civilian integration depth. 2020, a breakthrough in the leadership and management system, joint operational command system, optimizing the size of the structure, improve the policy system to promote achieved important results on the integration of military and civilian aspects of the depth development of reform, efforts to build able to win the information war effectively fulfill its mission mandate Chinese characteristics of modern military system, and further improve the military system of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

“Opinions” to define the leadership and management system, joint operational command system, the size of the military structure, forces, and military personnel training, policies and systems, military and civilian integration, Wuzhuangjingcha Forces Command management system and force structure, military legal system and other aspects of major task.

“Opinions” stressed deepen defense and military reform is a holistic, revolutionary change, must always be under the unified leadership of the Central Military Commission and Chairman of the study, thoroughly implement the spirit of the Central Military Commission Reform Work Conference, adhere to strengthen education, unity Thought throughout, to strengthen the responsibility to implement the fine drop throughout to promote the law, moving steadily through to the end, the bottom line thinking, risk management and control throughout, with strong organizational leadership to ensure that the reform task is satisfactorily completed.

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CMC views on deepening the reform of national defense and army (full text)

To implement the Party Central Committee and President Xi’s strategic decisions and directions, push forward to deepen defense and military reform, made the following comments.

First, the significance of the reform of the guiding ideology and basic principles

(A) significant. Deepen defense and military reform, China is to realize a dream, the dream of a strong army requirements of the times, is the only way the army Hing strong army, the army also decided to move a key to the future. Eighteen years, the CPC Central Committee, the Central Military Commission and Chairman of the party’s study on the realization of a strong army targets, co-ordinate the army more revolutionary, modernized and standardized, co-ordinate military construction and operation, co-ordination of economic development and national defense construction, the development of the new situation military strategy proposes a series of major policies and principles, make a series of major decisions and plans. Implement the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission and President Xi major strategic planning and strategic design, we must deepen defense and military reform, full implementation of the reform and strengthening the military strategy, unswervingly take the road of Chinese characteristics, a strong army. This is to deal with in today’s world of unprecedented large change in the situation will inevitably require the effective maintenance of national security; adhere to and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics, promote the coordination necessary requirement “four comprehensive” strategic layout; the goal is to implement a strong army and military strategic policy , fulfill military missions and tasks necessary requirement. The army to fully understand the importance of deepening the reform of national defense and military necessity urgency, a high degree of historical awareness and a strong mission to play unswervingly deepen defense and military reform, efforts to hand over the party and the people a satisfactory answer.

(B) the guiding ideology. Thoroughly implement the party’s 18 and eighteenth session of the Third, Fourth, Fifth Plenum, Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of “Three Represents”, the scientific concept of development as guidance, thoroughly implement the learning Chairman of the series especially important speech of defense and army building important expositions, in accordance with the “four comprehensive” strategic layout requirements in order to target the party strong army under the new situation for the lead, must implement the military strategic principle in the new situation, the full implementation of a strong army reform strategy, efforts to address the constraints of national defense and military development of institutional barriers and structural problems, policy issues, and promote the modernization of the military organizational form, further emancipate and develop combat effectiveness, further emancipate and enhance the vitality of the armed forces, building commensurate with China’s international status, with national security and development interests compatible consolidate national defense and powerful armed forces, to achieve “two hundred years” goal to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese dream to provide a strong guarantee power.

(C) the fundamental principles

– Adhere to the correct political orientation. Consolidate and improve the party’s absolute leadership over the army’s fundamental principle and system, keeping the nature and purpose of the people’s army, and carry forward the glorious tradition and fine style of our military, the full implementation of the CMC chairman has overall responsibility to ensure that the military command of the supreme leadership of the Party Central Committee to focus on, CMC.

– To insist on focusing war. To adapt the form of war and the world development trend of the evolution of the military, fighting the only firmly established the fundamental standards, and effectively solve the preparations for military struggle to overcome difficult problems and combat heavy construction weaknesses, build integrated joint operations system, to enhance the army can fight, the ability to win the war.

– Adhere to innovation-driven. Implement through science and technology strategy, give full play to innovation in military theory, military technological innovation, military organizational innovation, management innovation traction and military role in promoting efforts to achieve military modernization construction by leaps and bounds, to seek greater military competitive advantage.

– Adhere to the system design. Grasping the reform initiatives of relevance, coupling, correctly handle the top-level design and stratification docking, long-term layout and transitional arrangements, supporting policy reform and relations, so that the reform and promote each other, complement each other to form the overall effect, best effect.

– Uphold the rule of law thinking. Give full play the leading role of the rule of law and norms of the reform, so that major reforms in the legal basis, reform and harmonize legislation, focusing on the use of curing the results of reform laws and regulations, to promote the rule of law reform on track.

– Actively and steadily adhere. Both our minds, trying to make this reform a breakthrough in the reform, and based on reality, steady hoof walked quickly grasp the rhythm of reform, the reform of control risk, take progressive, open the path of reform, to ensure high degree of stability and centralized.

Second, the overall objectives of the reform and main tasks

(1) the overall goal. Firmly grasp the principle of “total JMC tube, main battle theater, built in the main military services” to the leadership of the management system, joint operational command system reform, focusing on promoting the coordination of the scale structure, policies and systems and the development of military and civilian integration depth reform. 2020, a breakthrough in the leadership and management system, joint operational command system, optimizing the size of the structure, improve the policy system to promote achieved important results on the integration of military and civilian aspects of the depth development of reform, efforts to build able to win the information war effectively fulfill its mission mandate Chinese characteristics of modern military system, and further improve the military system of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Accordance with the overall objectives and requirements, in 2015, focused on the implementation of organizational leadership and management system, joint operational command system reform; in 2016, organizing the implementation of the military structure and the size of a combat force structure, institutions, armed forces reform, basically completed the task of reforming stage; 2017 2020, for further adjustments related areas of reform, optimize and improve, continue to promote the reform in various fields. Policy regimes and civilian integration depth development and reform, promoting a mature one.

(2) leadership and administration system. Focus on strengthening the Central Military Commission centralized and unified leadership, strengthen strategic planning JMC authorities, strategic command, strategic management functions, optimizing the CMC Organs configuration and institutional settings, improve military services and new combat forces leadership and management system, the formation of decision-making, enforcement and oversight powers both check each other and coordinate the operation of the system.

Starting from the positioning functions, according to prominent core functions, integrate similar functions and strengthen oversight functions, fulfilling the coordination function of thinking, adjustment and reform of the Central Military Commission of Organization, headquarters for the system to adjust the multi-sectoral system. JMC delegated authority to act in the military services building functions, stripped specific management functions, merge similar adjustment similar functions, reducing the level of leadership, streamlining staffing and units directly under the command make, construction, management and supervision of four link more clear, decision-making, planning, implementation , the evaluation function configuration is more reasonable.

Sound armed services leadership and management system, optimize the configuration and functions of the organs of the military services institutional settings play an important role in the construction and management of the armed services and Security. Logistical support adjustment and reform leading management system, based on the existing joint logistics system, adjust and optimize the configuration and security forces leadership and command relationships and build joint operational command system to adapt, sub-system integration, through logistical support system designed two lines. Reform equipment development leadership and management system, build centralized system managed by the Central Military equipment department, armed services concrete construction and management, theater joint use of the institutional framework, the development of equipment construction to the Central Military equipment sector – the military services and equipment sector institutions, equipment management to ensure the implementation of the Central Military equipment sector – the military services and equipment sector – force security sector institutions. Strengthen the unified leadership of the national defense mobilization system.

(3) the joint operational command system. Adaptation Integrated Joint Operational Command requirements, establish and improve the Central Military Commission, the theater two joint operational command system, build peacetime one, normal operation, specially the main, capable and efficient, strategic and operational command system. Readjust the designation of the theater.

According to joint operations, joint command of the requirements, adjust the specification refers to linking the Central Military Commission, the military services, operational command functions of the Union refers to the theater and theater military services. And joint operational command system to adapt, and improve joint training system.

(4) the size of the military structure. Adhere to the road of fewer but better troops with Chinese characteristics and speeding up the army from quantity to quality and efficiency changes. Active duty military posts cut 300,000 troops gradually reduced the size of the 2.3 million 2 million. Optimize the proportion of military services, reduce non-combat institutions and personnel. Yajian officer positions.Optimization of weaponry scale structure, reduce equipment types of models, elimination of old equipment, the development of new equipment.

(5) Force compiled. Depending on the strategic direction of the security requirements and operational tasks, adjusting the structure, enhanced functions, optimize the layout, promote the composition of forces to the full, synthesis, and more energy, flexible direction. Optimize the structure of reserve forces, militia Yajian quantity, adjust the layout and strength marshalling mode.

(6) New Military Talents. Training of military personnel to follow the law, to build military educational institutions, military training practice, military personnel training system trinity of professional military education. Sound Central Military Commission, the leadership of the armed services two institutions management system, improve the early, middle and high three training system, adjust and optimize the structure of the scale institutions. Sound professional military education system, building full gamut of full-time professional military education platform. Creative Talents institutional mechanisms to strengthen the institutions and armed forces personnel were sterile.

(7) policy regimes. Military mission requirements and adapt the functions of national policy institutional innovation, further improve the military human resource policies and systems and logistics policies and systems, building reflects the characteristics of military occupation, and enhance the military sense of honor pride policy institutional system. Adjustment of military personnel classification, and gradually establish the rank-dominated hierarchy, to promote the professional military officers, military service system reform, non-commissioned officers system, civilian system. Veterans resettlement policies and improve the management mechanism.Deepening the management of funds, material procurement reform, construction and military wages, housing, health care, insurance and other systems. Full cessation of the armed forces to carry out foreign paid services.

(8) development of military and civilian integration. Full focus on the formation of elements, multi-field, high-effective civil-military integration depth development pattern, building a unified leadership, military coordination, smooth and efficient organization and management system, state-led, demand traction, market unity of the work of running the system, the system is complete, Joining a complete, effective incentive policies institutional system. Categories related fields to promote the reform and improve the regulatory system and the development of military and civilian integration of innovation and development mechanisms.

(9) Wuzhuangjingcha Forces Command management system and force structure. Strengthening the Central Military Commission of the centralized and unified leadership of the armed forces, the armed forces command to adjust the management system, optimize the structure and troop strength compiled.

(10) the system of military rule. Fully implement the Law forces strictly policy, improved army, to achieve fundamental to the administration by law fundamental shift from the way of simply relying on experience working habits and working practices from relying solely on executive order to rely on rules and regulations of the transition from assault-style, campaign-style grab a fundamental change to the way work according to rules and regulations act. Improve the legal system for the military and military Falvguwen system, reform the military justice system and mechanism innovation discipline inspection and supervision system and inspection system, improve the audit system mechanisms to improve the military legal talent management system, establish the rule of law and procedural rules improve the organization, improve national defense and army the level of the rule of law.

Third, the reform of organizational leadership

Deepen defense and military reform is a holistic, revolutionary change, big efforts to promote the wide, deep touch interests, of unprecedented scope, must always be under the unified leadership of the Central Military Commission and Chairman of the study, thoroughly implement the Central Military Commission the spirit of reform work conference, adhere to strengthen education and unity of thought throughout to strengthen the responsibility falls fine implementation throughout to promote the law, moving steadily through to the end, the bottom line thinking, risk control throughout, with strong organizational leadership to ensure that all reforms task is satisfactorily completed.

(A) strengthen the responsibility at all levels of play. Party committees at all levels should focus on reform initiatives landing capability as an important political responsibility, improve the leadership of reform, give full play to the core leadership role, mainly to be a good leader first responsibility. Investigation should run through the whole process of reform, deepen the major theoretical and practical issues research, to discover and solve new problems. To establish and improve the supervision and assessment mechanism reform, strengthen supervision and inspection of the implementation of the reform. Each institutional reform departments at all levels must closely cooperate to create synergy, the Central Military Commission to guide the working group set up to further adjust the unit to strengthen tracking guidance, specific guidance, full guidance, the Central Military Commission inspection teams launched simultaneously inspections. Reform of the Central Military Commission and the Office to improve the preparation of the relevant mechanisms play a good co-ordination, supervision, role. Four general headquarters is necessary to do their own adjustment and reform, reform of the army but also a good guide. The new Central Military Commission after the establishment of organs and departments should pay close attention to improve the operational mechanism, into the role as soon as possible, to perform their duties. Newly formed units to adjust and improve the timely establishment of Party organizations, to strengthen the organization and leadership of the reform implementation. Each institution should take responsibility for the aftermath, and properly handle all kinds of problems left.

(B) to strengthen ideological and political work. Organization officers and soldiers in-depth study President Xi series of important expositions on deepening defense and military reform, special education organizations do a good job, deepening ideological mobilization, the army unity of thought and action to the Central Military Commission and President Xi decision-making arrangements . Senior leading organs and Gaojiganbu first common understanding, lead politics, the overall situation, discipline, promoting reform, diligence, under the above rate, the army looks good.The ideological and political work throughout the entire process of reform, the ideological trend of concern at all levels, targeted to do the work, and guide all levels to strengthen political awareness, overall awareness, sense of command and guide the officers and men turn their concepts, new ideas, and consciously from the overall high level of awareness reform unified in emancipating the mind and thought, the correct treatment adjustment of interests, and actively support, support and participate in the reform. Attaches great importance to public opinion to guide online public opinion in particular, to work, take the initiative battle, spread positive energy, to promote the reform to create a good atmosphere for public opinion.

(C) improve solid adjustment of cadres placement. The reform process as a process of strengthening the construction of the contingent of cadres, cadres carry out military standards, establish the correct employment-oriented, adhere to all over the world, merit, ability and political integrity adhere to Germany first, do a good job with leadership adjustment, selecting the right with a good cadres to firmly implement strong military goals, and actively reform plan, strongly supported the reform, the courage to join in the reform of the cadres to use. The proper placement of the backbone with retention, improve the structure together, the scientific development of cadres and resettlement plan for the adjustment, reasonably determine the fate of the advance and retreat of cadres, cadres of concern and resolve practical difficulties. Cadres should promote the reform as a showcase for the best stage talent, tempered and tested in the reform, to become promoters of reform and doers. Veteran is a valuable asset of the party and the army, security services need to carefully prepare cadres continue to work.

(D) the transfer of well-organized transfer scribe. Do a good job of personnel, materials, and funds transfer work to ensure that the old system is not out of control during the transition staff, assets are not lost, all work seamlessly. Strict military land, barracks management and ensure the transfer of the camp barracks facilities to adjust and do remedial work in construction. Comprehensive verification, financial and material base. Follow organizational security of supply in a timely manner to resolve various contradictions and problems encountered in the supply, to ensure continuous supply, not for the leak. A solid job in the transfer of weapons and equipment inventory, well-organized deployment of security equipment, equipment management and strictly implement the provisions.

(E) the strict implementation of disciplinary regulations. The more critical time of reform, the more discipline and rules put in front of the very strict political discipline, organizational discipline, and personnel discipline, financial discipline, discipline, and discipline of secrecy. Strictly political discipline and political rules, resolutely oppose Ziyouzhuyi action on organizational politics. Serious organizational and personnel discipline, adhere to the principle of press policy outlaw follow procedures. Properly handle the reality of military conflicts and problems left by history. Discipline, inspection and auditing departments should strengthen supervision and discipline, and severely punish all kinds of violation of discipline problems during the adjustment and reform.

(F) do a good job overall troop readiness training management. Pay close attention to national security and social stability during the reform period, the development of a major emergency situations response plans to improve and strictly implement the provisions of Gongzuozhidu combat readiness, combat readiness duty to maintain efficient operation of the system at all levels, to ensure that if something happens to timely and effective response. Careful planning organization’s annual military training mission. Strengthen military management, the implementation of security responsibility, to discover and solve trends and tendencies problem, prevent the occurrence of major accidents and cases, maintaining stability and security forces centralized.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

戰略火箭軍

新華社北京1月1日電　經中央軍委主席習近平批准，中央軍委近日印發了《關於深化國防和軍隊改革的意見》。

《意見》強調，黨的十八大以來，黨中央、中央軍委和習主席圍繞實現強軍目標，統籌軍隊革命化、現代化、正規化建設，統籌軍事力量建設和運用，統籌經濟建設和國防建設，制定新形勢下軍事戰略方針，提出一系列重大方針原則，作出一系列重大決策部署。貫​​徹落實黨中央、中央軍委和習主席的重大戰略謀劃和戰略設計， 必須深化國防和軍隊改革，全面實施改革強軍戰略，堅定不移走中國特色強軍之路。

《意見》指出，深化國防和軍隊改革的指導思想是，深入貫徹黨的十八大和十八屆三中、四中、五中全會精神，以馬克思列寧主義、毛澤東思想、鄧小平理論、“三個代表”重要思想、科學發展觀為指導，深入貫徹習主席系列重要講話精神特別是國防和軍隊建設重要論述，按照“四個全面”戰略佈局要求，以黨在新形勢下的強軍目標為引領，貫徹新形勢下軍事戰略方針，全面實施改革強軍戰略，著力解決制約國防和軍隊發展的體制性障礙、結構性矛盾、政策性問題，推進軍隊組織形態現代化，進一步解放和發展戰鬥力，進一步解放和增強軍隊活力，建設同我國國際地位相稱、同國家安全和發展利益相適應的鞏固國防和強大軍隊，為實現“兩個一百年”奮鬥目標、實現中華民族偉大復興的中國夢提供堅強力量保證。

《意見》強調，深化國防和軍隊改革要堅持以下基本原則：堅持正確政治方向，堅持向打仗聚焦，堅持創新驅動，堅持體系設計，堅持法治思維，堅持積極穩妥。

《意見》指出，深化國防和軍隊改革總體目標是，牢牢把握“軍委管總、戰區主戰、軍種主建”的原則，以領導管理體制、聯合作戰指揮體制改革為重點，協調推進規模結構、政策制度和軍民融合深度發展改革。 2020年前，在領導管理體制、聯合作戰指揮體制改革上取得突破性進展，在優化規模結構、完善政策制度、推動軍民融合深度發展等方面改革上取得重要成果，努力構建能夠打贏信息化戰爭、有效履行使命任務的中國特色現代軍事力量體系，進一步完善中國特色社會主義軍事制度。

《意見》明確了領導管理體制、聯合作戰指揮體制、軍隊規模結構、部隊編成、新型軍事人才培養、政策制度、軍民融合發展、武裝警察部隊指揮管理體制和力量結構、軍事法治體係等方面的主要任務。

《意見》強調，深化國防和軍隊改革是一場整體性、革命性變革，必須始終在黨中央、中央軍委和習主席的統一領導下，深入貫徹中央軍委改革工作會議精神，堅持把加強教育、統一思想貫穿始終，把強化責任、落細落實貫穿始終，把依法推進、穩扎穩打貫穿始終，把底線思維、管控風險貫穿始終，以堅強有力的組織領導保證各項改革任務圓滿完成。

中央軍委關於深化國防和軍隊改革的意見（全文）

為貫徹落實黨中央、習主席的戰略部署和決策指示，紮實推進深化國防和軍隊改革，提出如下意見。

一、改革的重大意義、指導思想和基本原則

（一）重大意義。深化國防和軍隊改革，是實現中國夢、強軍夢的時代要求，是強軍興軍的必由之路，也是決定軍隊未來的關鍵一招。黨的十八大以來，黨中央、中央軍委和習主席圍繞實現強軍目標，統籌軍隊革命化、現代化、正規化建設，統籌軍事力量建設和運用，統籌經濟建設和國防建設，制定新形勢下軍事戰略方針，提出一系列重大方針原則，作出一系列重大決策部署。貫​​徹落實黨中央、中央軍委和習主席的重大戰略謀劃和戰略設計，必須深化國防和軍隊改革，全面實施改革強軍 戰略，堅定不移走中國特色強軍之路。這是應對當今世界前所未有之大變局，有效維護國家安全的必然要求；是堅持和發展中國特色社會主義，協調推進“四個全面”戰略佈局的必然要求；是貫徹落實強軍目標和軍事戰略方針，履行好軍隊使命任務的必然要求。全軍要充分認清深化國防和軍隊改革的重要性必要性緊迫性，以 高度的歷史自覺和強烈的使命擔當堅定不移深化國防和軍隊改革，努力交出黨和人民滿意的答卷。

（二）指導思想。深入貫徹黨的十八大和十八屆三中、四中、五中全會精神，以馬克思列寧主義、毛澤東思想、鄧小平理論、“三個代表”重要思想、科學發展觀為指導，深入貫徹習主席系列重要講話精神特別是國防和軍隊建設重要論述，按照“四個全面”戰略佈局要求，以黨在新形勢下的強軍目標為引領，貫徹新形勢下軍事戰略方針，全面實施改革強軍戰略，著力解決制約國防和軍隊發展的體制性障礙、結構性矛盾、政策性問題，推進軍隊組織形態現代化，進一步解放和發展戰鬥力， 進一步解放和增強軍隊活力，建設同我國國際地位相稱、同國家安全和發展利益相適應的鞏固國防和強大軍隊，為實現“兩個一百年”奮鬥目標、實現中華民族偉大復興的中國夢提供堅強力量保證。

（三）基本原則

——堅持正確政治方向。鞏固完善黨對軍隊絶對領導的根本原則和製度，保持人民軍隊的性質和宗旨，發揚我軍的光榮傳統和優良作風，全面落實軍委主席負責制，確保軍隊最高領導權指揮權​​集中於黨中央、中央軍委。

——堅持向打仗聚焦。適應戰爭形態演變和世界軍事發展趨勢，牢固確立戰鬥力這個唯一的根本的標準，切實解決和克服軍事鬥爭準備重難點問題和戰鬥力建設薄弱環節，構建一體化聯合作戰體系，全面提升我軍能打仗、打勝仗能力。

——堅持創新驅動。貫​​徹科技強軍戰略，充分發揮軍事理論創新、軍事技術創新、軍事組織創新、軍事管理創新的牽引和推動作用，努力實現我軍現代化建設跨越式發展，謀取更大軍事競爭優勢。

——堅持體系設計。科學把握改革舉措的關聯性、耦合性，正確處理頂層設計與分層對接、長期佈局與過渡安排、體制改革與政策配套的關係，使各項改革相互促進、相得益彰，形成總體效應、取得最佳效果。

——堅持法治思維。充分發揮法治對改革的引領和規範作用，做到重大改革於法有據、改革與立法相協調，注重運用法規制度固化改革成果，在法治軌道上推進改革。

——堅持積極穩妥。既解放思想、與時俱進，努力使這次改革成為突破性的改革，又立足現實、蹄疾步穩，把握改革節奏，控制改革風險，走漸進式、開放式的改革路子，確保部隊高度穩定和集中統一。

二、改革的總體目標和主要任務

（一）總體目標。牢牢把握“軍委管總、戰區主戰、軍種主建”的原則，以領導管理體制、聯合作戰指揮體制改革為重點，協調推進規模結構、政策制度和軍民融合 深度發展改革。 2020年前，在領導管理體制、聯合作戰指揮體制改革上取得突破性進展，在優化規模結構、完善政策制度、推動軍民融合深度發展等方面改革上取得重要成果，努力構建能夠打贏信息化戰爭、有效履行使命任務的中國特色現代軍事力量體系，進一步完善中國特色社會主義軍事制度。

按照總體目標要求，2015年，重點組織實施領導管理體制、聯合作戰指揮體制改革；2016年，組織實施軍隊規模結構和作戰力量體系、院校、武警部隊改革，基本完成階段性改革任務；2017年至2020年，對相關領域改革作進一步調整、優化和完善，持續推進各領域改革。政策制度和軍民融合深度發展改革， 成熟一項推進一項。

（二）領導管理體制。著眼加強軍委集中統一領導，強化軍委機關的戰略謀劃、戰略指揮、戰略管理職能，優化軍委機關職能配置和機構設置，完善軍種和新型作戰力量領導管理體制，形成決策權、執行權、監督權既相互制約又相互協調的運行體系。

從職能定位入手，按照突出核心職能、整合相近職能、加強監督職能、充實協調職能的思路，調整改革軍委機關設置，由總部製調整為多部門制。軍委機關下放代行的軍種建設職能，剝離具體管理職能，調整歸併同類相近職能，減少領導層級，精簡編製員額和直屬單位，使指揮、建設、管理、監督四條鏈路更加清晰，決策、規劃、執行、評估職能配置更加合理。

健全軍種領導管理體制，優化軍種機關職能配置和機構設置，發揮軍種在建設管理和保障中的重要作用。調整改革後勤保障領導管理體制，以現行聯勤保障體製為基 礎，調整優化保障力量配置和領導指揮關係，構建與聯合作戰指揮體制相適應，統分結合、通專兩綫的後勤保障體制。改革裝備發展領導管理體制，構建由軍委裝備部門集中統管、軍種具體建管、戰區聯合運用的體制架構，裝備發展建設實行軍委裝備部門—軍種裝備部門體制，裝備管理保障實行軍委裝備部門—軍種裝備部門— 部隊保障部門體制。加強國防動員系統的統一領導。

（三）聯合作戰指揮體制。適應一體化聯合作戰指揮要求，建立健全軍委、戰區兩級聯合作戰指揮體制，構建平戰一體、常態運行、專司主營、精幹高效的戰略戰役指揮體系。重新調整劃設戰區。

按照聯合作戰、聯合指揮的要求，調整規範軍委聯指、各軍種、戰區聯指和戰區軍種的作戰指揮職能。與聯合作戰指揮體制相適應，完善聯合訓練體制。

（四）軍隊規模結構。堅持走中國特色精兵之路，加快推進軍隊由數量規模型向質量效能型轉變。裁減軍隊現役員額30萬，軍隊規模由230萬逐步減至200 萬。優化軍種比例，減少非戰鬥機構和人員。壓減軍官崗位。優化武器裝備規模結構，減少裝備型號種類，淘汰老舊裝備，發展新型裝備。

（五）部隊編成。依據不同戰略方向安全需求和作戰任務，調整結構、強化功能、優化佈局，推動部隊編成向充實、合成、多能、靈活方向發展。優化預備役部隊結構，壓減民兵數量，調整力量佈局和編組模式。

（六）新型軍事人才培養。遵循軍事人才培養規律，構建軍隊院校教育、部隊訓練實踐、軍事職業教育三位一體的新型軍事人才培養體系。健全軍委、軍種兩級院校 領導管理體制，完善初、中、高三級培訓體系，調整優化院校規模結構。健全軍事職業教育體系，構建全員全時全域軍事職業教育平台。創新人才培養制度機制，加 強院校與部隊共育人才。

（七）政策制度。適應軍隊職能任務需求和國家政策制度創新，進一步完善軍事人力資源政策制度和後勤政策制度，構建體現軍事職業特點、增強軍人榮譽感自豪感 的政策制度體系。調整軍隊人員分類，逐步建立軍銜主導的等級制度，推進軍官職業化，改革兵役制度、士官制度、文職人員制度。完善退役軍人安置政策和管理機 構。深化經費管理、物資採購、工程建設和軍人工資、住房、醫療、保險等製度改革。全面停止軍隊開展對外有償服務。

（八）軍民融合發展。著眼形成全要素、多領域、高效益的軍民融合深度發展格局，構建統一領導、軍地協調、順暢高效的組織管理體系，國家主導、需求牽引、市場運作相統一的工作運行體系，系統完備、銜接配套、有效激勵的政策制度體系。分類推進相關領域改革，健全軍民融合發展法規制度和創新發展機制。

（九）武裝警察部隊指揮管理體制和力量結構。加強中央軍委對武裝力量的集中統一領導，調整武警部隊指揮管理體制，優化力量結構和部隊編成。

（十）軍事法治體系。全面貫徹依法治軍、從嚴治軍方針，改進治軍方式，實現從單純依靠行政命令的做法向依法行政的根本性轉變，從單純靠習慣和經驗開展工作的方式向依靠法規和製度開展工作的根本性轉變，從突擊式、運動式抓工作的方式向按條令條例辦事的根本性轉變。健全軍事法規制度體系和軍事法律顧問制度，改革軍事司法體制機制，創新紀檢監察體制和巡視制度，完善審計體制機制，改進軍事法律人才管理制度，建立健全組織法制和程序規則，全面提高國防和軍隊建設法治化水平。

三、改革的組織領導

深化國防和軍隊改革是一場整體性、革命性變革，推進力度之大、觸及利益之深、影響範圍之廣前所未有，必須始終在黨中央、中央軍委和習主席的統一領導下，深入貫徹中央軍委改革工作會議精神，堅持把加強教育、統一思想貫穿始終，把強化責任、落細落實貫穿始終，把依法推進、穩扎穩打貫穿始終，把底線思維、管控風險貫穿始終，以堅強有力的組織領導保證各項改革任務圓滿完成。

（一）強化各級責任擔當。各級黨委要把抓改革舉措落地作為重要政治責任，提高領導改革的能力，充分發揮核心領導作用，主要領導要當好第一責任人。要把調查 研究貫穿改革實施全過程，深化對重大理論和實踐問題研究，及時發現和解決新情況新問題。要建立健全改革評估和督查機制，加強對改革落實情況的督導檢查。各 級各部門各改革機構要密切配合、形成合力，軍委指導工作組要深入調整組建單位，加強跟蹤指導、具體指導、全程指導，軍委巡視組同步展開巡視工作。軍委改革 和編製辦公室要完善相關機制，發揮好統籌、協調、督促、推動作用。四總部既要做好自身調整改革，又要指導好全軍改革。新的軍委機關部門成立後，要抓緊完善 運行機制，盡快進入角色、履行職責。新調整組建的單位要及時建立健全黨組織，加強對改革實施工作的組織領導。各善後工作機構要負起責任，妥善處理各類遺留 問題。

（二）加強思想政治工作。組織全軍官兵深入學習習主席關於深化國防和軍隊改革一系列重要論述，組織抓好專題教育，深入進行思想發動，把全軍的思想和行動統一到黨中央、中央軍委和習主席決策部署上來。高層領率機關和高級幹部首先要統一認識，帶頭講政治、顧大局、守紀律、促改革、盡職責，以上率下，為全軍做好 樣子。把思想政治工作貫穿改革全過程，關注各級思想動態，有針對性地做工作，引導各級強化政治意識、大局意識、號令意識，引導官兵轉變理念、更新觀念，自覺站在全局高度認識改革，在解放思想中統一思想，正確對待利益調整，積極擁護、支持、參與改革。高度重視輿論引導特別是網上輿論工作，打好主動仗，傳播正 能量，為推進改革營造良好輿論氛圍。

（三）紮實搞好幹部調整安置。把推進改革的過程作為加強幹部隊伍建設的過程，貫徹軍隊好幹部標準，樹立正確用人導向，堅持五湖四海、任人唯賢，堅持德才兼備、以德為先，搞好領導班子調整配備，選準用好幹部，把堅定貫徹強軍目標、積極謀劃改革、堅決支持改革、勇於投身改​​革的好幹部用起來。把妥善安置同保留骨 幹、改善結構結合起來，科學制定幹部調整安置計劃方案，合理確定幹部進退去留，關心和解決幹部實際困難。廣大幹部要把推進改革作為展示才能的最好舞台，在 改革中經受鍛煉和考驗，爭做改革的促進派和實幹家。老乾部是黨和軍隊的寶貴財富，要精心做好老乾部服務保障接續工作。

（四）嚴密組織轉隸交接。認真搞好人員、物資、經費等交接工作，確保新舊體制轉換期間人員不失控，資産不流失，各項工作無縫銜接。嚴格軍用土地、營房管 理，抓好營區營房設施調整交接，做好在建工程善後工作。全面核實經費物資底數。跟進組織供應保障，及時解決供應中遇到的各種矛盾和問題，確保不斷供、不漏 供。紮實做好武器裝備清點移交，周密組織裝備調配保障，嚴格落實裝備管理各項規定。

（五）嚴格執行各項紀律規定。越是改革的關鍵時刻，越要把紀律和規矩挺在前面，嚴格政治紀律、組織紀律、人事紀律、財經紀律、群眾紀律、保密紀律。嚴守政 治紀律和政治規矩，堅決反對政治上組織上行動上的自由主義。嚴肅組織人事紀律，堅持按原則按政策按規矩按程序辦事。妥善處理軍地現實矛盾和歷史遺留問題。紀檢、巡視、審計部門要加強執紀監督，嚴肅查處調整改革期間各類違規違紀問題。

（六）統籌抓好部隊戰備訓練管理。密切關注改革期間國家安全和社會穩定，制定完善應對重大突發情況預案，嚴格落實戰備工作制度規定，保持各級戰備值班體系 高效運行，確保一旦有事能夠及時有效應對。周密籌劃組織年度軍事訓練任務。加強部隊管理，落實安全責任，及時發現和解決苗頭性、傾向性問題，防止發生重大 事故和案件，保持部隊安全穩定和集中統一。

Original Source: XinHua Military News

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China Internet Soverignty, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Strategic Support Forces

China Military Theater System Reform Era of Information Warfare //中國軍事戰區制改革信息化戰爭時代中國軍隊應對新安全形勢的重大保障

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China Military Theater System Reform Era of Information Warfare 

中國軍事戰區制改革信息化戰爭時代中國軍隊應對新安全形勢的重大保障

習近平中國軍事改革

習近平中國軍事改革

February 1, the PLA theater inaugural meeting held in Beijing. CPC Central Committee General Secretary and State President and CMC Chairman Xi Jinping granted flag to the theater and five issued a bull. Theater set up joint operations command structure, the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission in accordance with domestic major strategic decision, made ​​by the international situation changes, China will further promote the reform process in military forces, and greatly enhance the combat capability of the PLA.

Substantive reform: the military establishment system to adapt to new forms of information warfare needs

Military technology, military and military establishment system are the three basic elements of the new military revolution. Mankind has experienced a long weapon cold and hot steel age after the war and military technical thinking in the era of rapid development of mechanized warfare. The late 1970s, the Soviet Chief of Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Ogarkov Given the rapid development of military technology, forward-looking put forward the idea of ​​military technological revolution, which started a new military revolution sweeping the globe; 1997 , the US military put forward the “network-centric warfare” concepts, theories began to appear new military revolution prototype – each a full revolution in military affairs, the military establishment were to promote institutional change by a large development of military technology and weaponry – it by military personnel and weaponry so that the army can be effectively combined to form an overall combat power key.

In 1998, China put forward the “information warfare” concept, explicitly stated that mankind is the fourth military revolution of information technology revolution in military affairs, marking the technical form of human warfare into the information age warfare from mechanized war era. Against this background, the PLA is to follow the above rules, after weapons and equipment technology has made rapid progress, the military regime began vigorously to prepare a series of reforms: December 31, 2015, the armed services mechanism reform is completed, set up a new army, rocket forces, strategic support of three services – army, navy and air force combined with the previous, form a pattern of five armed services; January 11, 2016, to complete the formation of organs of the Central military Commission departments, from the previous four general headquarters, JMC became 15 functional departments; February 1, 2016, five theater adjustment is completed, the previous seven military regions, adjusted to five theater.

The main reason: “military” system become shackles China Military Revolution and the development of military

Original seven military system schematic

Original seven military system schematic

From the founding of the early century, by the comprehensive national strength and defense spending restrictions, military equipment levels remained low, failed to achieve the goal of complete mechanization construction; and, when low domestic railway, highway construction level, under difficult conditions in a nuclear war support large formation in the territory of strategic mobility. By the above two limitations, only the army at the time of partition of defense, so that each major military all have independent ability to respond to a threat of strategic direction.

Nearly 15 years, accumulated through investment in national defense and army reform, China’s transport network has been done, “accessible”, the level of military equipment have been greatly improved – Preliminary mechanization and mobility of fighting units sharply higher, with the from “area defensive shift basis “to” trans-regional mobility. “After greatly improved mobility, combat troops in wartime may implement in different zones under the command of, and therefore no longer need to implement the military management by a specific military.

Also, in the “military” system, military and navy and air force the same level, but also under the jurisdiction of the military air force, and even the fleet, in fact, is the embodiment of “Continental Army” thought, there are some drawbacks: military orders, regardless of military inefficient. This system has become the shackles of China Military Revolution and the development of the armed forces, can not effectively respond to security threats or China is likely to face.

Perimeter security situation and the international situation changes, “theater” made a timely decision.

Theater, from a geographic dimension in terms of a multi-dimensional space, including a broad front, greater depth and possible operational target, it is mainly based on strategic and operational tasks delineated strategic and operational activities of the regional corps with the leadership and command bodies, forces have on the area command, the command level is between the high command and strategic battle between the Legion.The main basis for division of the theater, including changes in the international pattern of perimeter security situation, military strategy, political, economic, military status and geographical characteristics of the country, and many other aspects.

Since the reform and opening up, China’s economic construction has made remarkable achievements in comprehensive national strength rising rapidly driven by changes in national strategy occurred; the Soviet Union, China land border security threat disappeared, and security threats from maritime direction is upward trend, originally established military regime on the basis of the Continental Army can not adapt to the new international situation and the security situation in neighboring China, thereby theater system came into being. In the People’s Liberation Army is divided into five theater, theater should correspond to the east of Japan and the East China Sea direction, corresponding to the western Central Asia and India theater direction, mainly the southern theater direction corresponding to the South China Sea, the northern war zone corresponds to the direction of Russia and Mongolia, as the central theater centered coordinate strategic reserve corps.

Officers appointed theater: Theater five display a mission and future trends

Five theater and officers appointed

Five theater and officers appointed

Officers from the theater can be seen in the appointment of some common: theater five ten military officers are “50,” so relatively young; most of them have experience working at the grassroots level, the so-called “starting in Reggie died five”, which two military officers have battlefield experience; most have received training integrated joint operations command. This shows the five main tasks entrusted to the theater and future trends:

First, combat and theater become the main task is to deter. Eastern theater commanderLiu PLA and western theater commander Zhao Zongqi are returning heroes from the battlefield, with actual combat experience, which is a valuable asset, but also the implementation of the “Military Commission to total, theater battle, armed services main building” in the implementation of the “theater of battle “organizational guarantee.

Second, the integrated joint operations will be the main model for future combat theater. The so-called “integrated joint operations” around unified combat purposes to the combat units, combat elements of highly integrated combat system as the main body, give full play to the overall combat effectiveness, in a multidimensional space combat or fight against the enemy’s fighting style. And the appointment of military officers have a theater at the National Defense University and other institutions of military education integrated joint operations experience.

Third, the theater system will be in constant development and improvement. The theater is a relatively young officers will and individual will, visionary, to accept new things, strong ability; In addition, the relatively young military officers also means working for a long time, can ensure coherence of policy implementation.

With the deepening of Chinese People’s Liberation Army to change the implementation of the system, this massive military force after the founding of foreign unbeaten mighty will rapidly improve combat effectiveness. This not only has a positive significance for peace and stability in the region and the world, but also for the new military revolution on a global scale provides a theoretical and practical aspects of the double “template.”

Original Mandarin Chinese:

习近平向五大战区授予军旗

习近平向五大战区授予军旗

2月1日，中国人民解放军战区成立大会在北京举行。中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席习近平向五大战区授予军旗并发布训令。组建战区联合作战指挥机构，是党中央和中央军委根据国内、国际形势变化做出的重大战略决策，将进一步推动中国部队军事改革进程，并大大提升中国人民解放军的作战能力。

改革实质：使军队编制体制适应信息化战争形态新需要

军事技术、军事力量和军队编制体制是新军事革命的三个基本要素。人类经历了漫长的冷兵器和热兵器时代之后，战争技术与军事思想在机械化战争时代迅猛发展。20世纪70年代末，苏军总参谋长、苏联元帅奥加尔科夫鉴于军事技术的飞速发展，富有前瞻性的提出了军事技术革命的设想，由此展开一场席卷全球的新军事革命；1997年，美军提出“网络中心战”概念，新军事革命的理论开始出现雏形——在每一场全面的军事革命中，均是由军事技术和武器装备的大发展推动军队编制体制变革——它是通过保证军队人员和武器装备有效结合从而使军队能够形成整体作战力量的关键。

1998年，中国提出“信息战”概念，直接指出人类第四次军事革命就是信息化的军事革命，标志着人类战争的技术形态从机械化战争时代迈向信息化战争时代。在此种背景下，中国人民解放军正是遵循着上述规律，在武器装备技术水平得到长足发展后，开始着手大力对军事体制编制进行一系列改革：2015年12月31日，军种改革机制完成，新组建了陆军、火箭军、战略支援部队三个军种，加上此前的海军和空军，形成5个军种的格局；2016年1月11日，军委机关各部门组建完成，从以前的四总部，变成了15个军委职能部门；2016年2月1日，五大战区调整完毕，以前的七大军区，调整为五大战区。

主要原因：“军区”制成为中国军事革命与军队发展的桎梏

原有七大军区制示意图

原有七大军区制示意图

从建国初到上世纪末，受综合国力和国防投入限制，我军装备水平始终较低，未能实现完成机械化建设的目标；并且，当时国内铁路、公路建设水平较低，难以在核战争条件下支持大兵团在境内实施战略机动。受以上两点限制，我军在当时只能进行分区防御，使每个大军区都具备独立应对一个战略方向威胁的能力。

近15年以来，通过国防投入积累和军队体制改革，我国交通网络已经做到“四通八达”，我军装备水平已经得到大幅改善——初步实现机械化，部队机动作战能力大幅高，具备了从“区域防卫型”向“全域机动型”转变的基础。在机动性大大提高之后，部队在战时可能在不同区指挥下实施作战，因此就不再需要由特定的军区实施军政管理。

并且，在“军区”制度下，军区与海空军平级，又下辖军区空军，甚至是舰队，实际上是“大陆军”思想的体现，存在一定弊端：军政军令不分导致效率低下。这种体制已经成为中国军事革命与军队发展的桎梏，不能有效应对中国正在或可能面临的安全威胁。

国际格局和周边安全形势发生变化，“战区”制应时而生

战区，从地理层面来讲是一个多维空间，包括宽阔的正面、较大的纵深和可能的作战对象，它主要是根据战略战役任务而划定的战略战役军团活动区域，设有领导指挥机构，拥有对辖区部队的指挥权，是介于统帅部与战略战役军团之间的指挥层次。划分战区的主要依据包括国际格局的变化，周边安全形势，国家的军事战略，政治、经济、军事力量状况和地理环境特征等诸多方面。

改革开放以来，我国经济建设取得了举世瞩目的成就，综合国力迅速攀升带动国家战略发生变化；苏联解体后，中国陆地边境安全威胁基本消失，而来自海洋方向的安全威胁则呈上升趋势，原先建立在大陆军基础上的军区制度已经不能适应新的国际格局和中国周边安全形势，由此，战区制度应运而生。在此次解放军划分的五大战区之中，东部战区应该对应日本和东海方向，西部战区对应中亚和印度方向，南部战区则主要对应南海方向，北部战区则对应俄罗斯和蒙古方向，中部战区则作为战略预备总队居中策应。

战区主官任命：显示五大战区肩负使命与未来发展趋势

五大战区及主官任命

五大战区及主官任命

从此次任命的各战区主官中可以看到一些共性：五大战区的十位军政主官都是“50后”，相对年轻；大多有在基层任职经历，所谓“猛将起于卒伍”，其中有两位军事主官具有战场经历；大多接受过一体化联合作战的指挥训练。由此可见五大战区肩负的主要任务与未来发展趋势：

第一，作战和是威慑成为战区主要任务。东部战区司令员刘粤军和西部战区司令员赵宗岐都是从战场凯旋的英雄，具有实战经验，这是宝贵的财富，也是落实“军委管总、战区主战、军种主建”中落实“战区主战”的组织保证。

第二，一体化联合作战将成为未来战区的主要作战模式。所谓“一体化联合作战“，是围绕统一的作战目的，以各作战单元、作战要素高度融合的作战体系为主体，充分发挥整体作战效能，在多维作战空间打击或抗击敌方的作战样式。而此次任命的战区军事主官都有在国防大学等军事院校进修一体化联合作战的经历。

第三，战区制度还将处于不断的发展和完善中。此次战区主官都是相对年轻的上将和个别中将，思维开阔、接受新事物能力强；另外，军政主官相对年轻也意味着任职时间长，可以保证政策实施的连贯性。

随着中国人民解放军军改制度的不断深入实施，这支建国后对外大规模用兵保持全胜的威武之师将会快速提高战斗力。这不仅对于地区及世界的和平与稳定具有积极意义，也为全球范围内的新军事革命提供了理论与实践方面的双重“范本”。

Original Source: China MOD