中國軍事評論：美國空軍未來需要哪些關鍵能力？中國必須警惕

現代英語：

The U.S. Air Force Research Institute recently published a research report, “Air Force Strategic Research from 2020 to 2030”, which is to answer this question: What key capabilities does the U.S. Air Force need to have by 2030? According to current trends, in the next decade or so, the U.S. Air Force should focus its energy and resources on developing five key capabilities: force projection capability; the ability to act freely in air, space and cyberspace; global situational awareness; air force diplomacy; and the ability to provide military support to local governments. The research report also revolves around a basic theme, that is, the success of the U.S. Air Force in these areas will depend on whether it can comprehensively apply the various strengths of the United States in air, space and cyberspace.

Power Projection

In a worldwide security environment characterized by the proliferation of advanced anti-access and area-denial systems, it will become increasingly difficult for U.S. forces to establish secure bases within striking distance of their adversaries, increasing the need for long-range power projection—primarily long-range attack.

The main challenge for potential U.S. adversaries is to deny the United States access to bases and targets. In the short term, most adversaries cannot compete with the United States’ technological advantage; however, this advantage is declining. Future battlefields may look more like the network-centric war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 than like the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan.

The U.S. Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review states that “the future combat environment indicates that the U.S. military may have to conduct prolonged air and sea operations.” To meet these challenges, the U.S. Air Force must be able to defeat its opponents, even if these opponents have unprecedented military capabilities that can confront the U.S. Army and Navy. The following four suggestions may help meet the requirements of future air force power projection.

1. The U.S. Air Force must integrate air, space and cyber capabilities into current and future platforms and systems. For example, aircraft rely on GPS (Global Positioning System) and a range of network systems.

2. The Air Force must increase its flexibility in power projection. The available aircraft must include a variety of models from high-end (such as F-35 fighters) to low-end (light attack aircraft). Therefore, the Air Force should establish a “universal” force to undertake responsibilities other than traditional power projection with its allies; at the same time, it must also retain the necessary combat power to respond to major emergencies. Some examples show that in unconventional conflicts, it is not always necessary to use the best-performing aircraft.

3. Develop unmanned platforms with greater artificial intelligence that will support traditional force projection missions. Such systems could become a vital psychological warfare tool in peer competition, and adversaries could choose to cooperate with the United States because of its use of such systems.

4. Offensive and defensive cyber capabilities must be integrated into air and space platforms. As a force multiplier, cyber capabilities may soon become the best force projection tool in the Air Force’s arsenal. It is clear that several countries have cyber offensive capabilities that have caught up with or even surpassed the United States. Although the U.S. Air Force has worked hard to organize, train, and equip itself to meet the requirements of cyber warfare, it remains uncertain whether the Air Force’s cyber warfare capabilities can achieve victory.

Freedom of movement

To project power, the Air Force needs freedom of action in all domains: air, space, and cyber. Now, when discussing the importance of persistent air superiority, it is worth noting.

With the F-22 and F-35 likely to remain the Air Force’s primary air superiority platforms through at least 2030, relatively inexpensive force multipliers such as autonomous unmanned platforms, human-machine interaction technologies, and cyberattack capabilities will be key to improving the Air Force’s capabilities. Self-guided systems, cyberattack technologies, and human enhancement technologies are all likely to make progress, and here are three related suggestions:

1. Stealth, high-performance, autonomous aircraft can increase the number of fifth-generation fighters and enhance their capabilities. The old fighters will gradually be retired from service, and their role has been reduced to only supporting missions. The resulting combat power gap will be filled by advanced aircraft.

2. Human enhancement can “improve capabilities and save costs by improving manpower efficiency and reducing manpower requirements.” This is the view in the “Technology Outlook Report” released by the Office of the Chief Scientist of the US Air Force. As weapon systems become more complex and increasingly rely on advanced human-machine interfaces, human enhancement will be very useful.

3. Airborne cyber attack systems that can penetrate and disrupt the software, radars, and other systems of enemy aircraft will become a significant force multiplier for smaller fleets of air superiority aircraft. While exploiting the network is not a magic weapon to win, investments in this area will certainly pay off handsomely.

America’s adversaries are continually developing new ways to challenge U.S. air superiority. Preventing their success requires the United States to continually update systems and change tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Space advantage

The U.S. Air Force must achieve space superiority. The Air Force’s main goal for the next decade or so is to control space and make the concept of space superiority a reality. In the short term, kinetic attacks in the space domain are unlikely, however, if the U.S. advantage is challenged, space weapons may eventually be deployed. Damage to space systems will greatly weaken the United States’ civil and military capabilities in all domains. If other countries attack the United States’ space communications, navigation, or detection systems, it may prompt the American public to support space weapons. To successfully delay such attacks and maintain the United States’ freedom of action in space, the United States needs to use its diplomatic, information, military, and economic power to develop a multi-layered space operations system. The following four suggestions will help the Air Force gain sustainable space superiority.

1. The U.S. Air Force must continue to strengthen space surveillance. The Air Force has taken the first step in this direction: On September 25, 2010, the Air Force launched the Pathfinder satellite, the first satellite of the planned space-based space surveillance system. The role of this system is to improve the Department of Defense’s ability to detect and track objects in orbit. In order to maximize the use of this capability, the Air Force must accelerate the deployment of the space-based space surveillance system or a satellite system similar to it.

2. The U.S. Air Force must ensure its ability to enter space while reducing production and operating costs. The space launch tools currently used mainly include improved launch vehicles such as the Delta 4 rocket developed by Boeing and the Atlas 5 rocket developed by Lockheed Martin. The purpose of using such launch vehicles is to standardize and improve the operability of space launches, reduce government involvement in the launch process, and plan to reduce the cost of the new system by 25% compared to the previous launch system. However, further cost reduction is needed.

3. Strengthening cooperation with private enterprises will help the Air Force achieve its goal of gaining space superiority. The former Obama administration once made some decisions on space activities, shifting investment from government departments to private enterprises, which means that the US space policy may change significantly.

4. To prevent adversaries from exploiting vulnerabilities in U.S. space systems, the United States must make its satellite systems more resilient. As space competition evolves, space systems must become more responsive and less vulnerable to meet the needs of combat forces.

Network Challenges

The establishment of the Cyber ​​Command and the 24th Air Force, whose mission is to operate, expand and protect the Air Force information network and protect mission-critical systems, clearly demonstrates the importance of cyberspace. The Air Force has transformed communications and information majors into cyberspace operations and support majors and established undergraduate courses in cyberspace, which shows the importance the Air Force attaches to cyberspace. The challenge facing the US Air Force is to always be at the forefront of cyber technology.

If cyber remains a tool that can reduce the gap between countries, groups and individuals, cyber superiority will be difficult to achieve and maintain. Therefore, the U.S. Air Force must be at the forefront. Unfortunately, the number of American computer science and engineering graduates is decreasing, while the number of foreign graduates of the same major is increasing. The U.S. Air Force’s cyber education cannot provide enough cyber experts and trained and motivated attackers, which is a very unfavorable situation. The success or failure of the U.S. military depends on an area where it does not dominate. But in the cyber field, this is the case.

Cyber ​​will continue to evolve as a weapon of choice, replacing many of the current kinetic weapons. The U.S. Air Force will have fewer aircraft and operate over larger areas, especially in the Pacific. This makes cyberspace a critical domain of Air Force operations. Adversaries will have the ability to disrupt the software of U.S. aircraft and suppress U.S. air defenses, which will become reality, not science fiction.

To prepare for this future, the Air Force needs to radically change the way it approaches the network. It is not enough to put a firewall on the network. The Air Force should take a more proactive approach to developing the network into a key operational capability. This requires the Air Force to work hard to do the following two things:

1. The U.S. Air Force must assume responsibility for cyber activities in accordance with relevant provisions of the United States Code. As the service most dependent on cyber, the Air Force must develop cyber capabilities independently. To achieve this goal, the Air Force must establish a cyberspace department that can conduct both offensive and defensive cyber activities, have sound laws and regulations to regulate it, and its activities should be interoperable and joint.

2. The Air Force must train a large number of experts in computer science and computer engineering. Without the right talent, it will be difficult for the Air Force to maintain a network-savvy workforce, and every mission of the Air Force may be threatened.

Situational Awareness

The United States’ situational awareness agencies are basically located domestically, and surveillance and reconnaissance missions will become remote activities. In longer-distance surveillance and reconnaissance, space and network resources are more valuable and can play an increasingly important role in obtaining situational awareness in distant areas. The U.S. Air Force Intelligence Department must become a well-organized and dynamic force that can make timely adjustments to achieve global and local coverage. To this end, the following three suggestions are put forward:

1. The Air Force must work more closely with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) when planning and building space capabilities. Space-based reconnaissance is becoming increasingly important, so the Air Force must exert greater influence on the NRO’s resource request process. Currently, Air Force positions in the NRO are sometimes vacant, which leaves the Air Force, as an end user, without a full say in satellite design and development.

2. We should plan the surveillance and reconnaissance system after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, so that the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) is ready to take on global tasks. In future wars, the role of the Distributed Common Ground System will shift from taking on tactical tasks to processing and disseminating national intelligence products and intelligence products of allies, so we must seriously think about the corresponding theories, tactics, technologies and procedures.

3. The Air Force must improve data analysis using new automation technologies so that analysts can take on the most advanced tasks. Accelerating the development of translation software, artificial intelligence, and electronic processing of raw data (signals and electronic intelligence) is the most practical way to manage large amounts of data and should be a priority for funding.

The strategic challenges facing the United States are increasingly global in nature. Without major reforms to address these characteristics, the U.S. Air Force’s global situational awareness department will not be able to fully realize its potential. At present, the United States’ opponents are gradually undermining the United States’ strategic advantages, so it is necessary to understand the situation of the opponents.

Air Force Diplomacy

Air diplomacy is the non-combat missions that the Air Force performs to defend national interests. It is a supporting function. Defined in this way, air diplomacy provides many soft power resources to national diplomacy. The Air Force carries out a range of diplomatic missions as set out in the Security Cooperation Strategy. The Air Force currently uses air power to achieve soft power goals, but air diplomacy activities have not yet reached their full potential. If the Air Force integrates its various soft power missions into a unified air diplomacy strategy, the Air Force will be able to use these capabilities more effectively to defend national interests. Air diplomacy is likely to become increasingly important over the next decade. When decision makers face a tough fiscal environment, they may place more emphasis on air power because of its long range, high speed and strong flexibility. If air diplomacy is used before combat operations are necessary, it will help the United States prevent more costly conflicts. Permanent overseas bases or large-scale military deployments may cause anti-American sentiment, and air diplomacy can help to eliminate anti-American sentiment. Of course, air diplomacy will not always succeed.

Although the U.S. Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy has laid a useful foundation for the Air Force’s diplomatic strategy, there is still much work to be done. A complete Air Force diplomatic strategy should focus on three core goals: 1. Coordinate and strengthen different diplomatic missions; 2. Actively engage with allies, neutral parties and adversaries; 3. Use existing means to achieve strategic goals.

The Air Force should also streamline processes based on existing strategic guidance and programs. Any strategy must develop a set of criteria to measure its success or failure. An effective Air Force diplomacy strategy backed by a reliable power projection capability helps protect national interests.

Military support for local governments

With the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, advanced missile technology, and cyber attack technology, military support for local governments has become increasingly important. Air Force Instruction 10-802: Military Support to Local Governments states that “the Air National Guard has the primary responsibility for providing military assistance to state and local governments in the event of a civil emergency.” In short, the Air National Guard can not only respond long before the federal military takes any action, but should do so according to the instructions. Except for man-made disasters involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials, active duty troops are generally not required. However, if a disaster causes a major disaster, the state or local government department may be unable to cope with it, and the governor will need to apply for federal support.

If technological innovations allow adversaries to attack closer to the U.S. homeland, the American public will want the military to focus on homeland defense and disaster relief. For the Air Force and the Air National Guard, this means providing civil support capabilities such as airlift, medical care, and situational awareness.

The Air Force has a guiding role in the development of the Air National Guard, so Air Force leadership should take effective measures to promote civil support capabilities as a key capability. Developing a dual-design combat capability statement, especially for the Air National Guard, will help clarify the mission of each unit in civil support and wartime.

Based on the interconnected missions of the Air Force and the Air National Guard in the military support of local governments, the following three recommendations can enable the Air Force and the Air National Guard to resolve complex legal, political, and command and control issues and improve emergency response and disaster relief capabilities.

1. The Air National Guard’s primary equipment should be transport aircraft. Emergency air transport is a critical capability that should be provided by the Air National Guard. Each Air National Guard air transport unit must have an air port function to ensure that the unit can be assembled and transported for subsequent operations. The transportation of medical support units is also an important part of air transport because no matter what disaster occurs, medical assistance is the first thing needed, and medical assistance will be needed for a long time after the disaster.

2. Air National Guard airlift units should be deployed to 10 federal emergency management regions. This will help airlift units work with state and local emergency responders in disaster relief exercises and establish close ties before disasters occur.

3. State and local government officials will rely primarily on Air National Guard imagery analysts for support, advice, and imagery interpretation. Understanding the scope and extent of a disaster is a critical step in disaster response. To provide emergency responders with better situational awareness, Air National Guard analysts working in the Distributed Common Ground System should provide real-time imagery support during a disaster.

The future is full of uncertainty, the increase in defense budgets will stagnate, and threats will come not only from high-intensity conflicts, but also from low-intensity conflicts. Therefore, the U.S. Air Force must be prepared to deal with increasingly complex situations and should not take it for granted that it will be able to win in the future environment. In short, the U.S. Air Force’s time, resources, and strategic thinking should focus on the five key capabilities described above. (Translated from the U.S. “Armed Forces Magazine” 10641 (US) Adam Lowther (Professor of the U.S. Air Force Research Institute) Translated by Li Youguan)

(Editors: Wang Lu (intern), Yan Jiaqi)

現代國語：

美國空軍研究所不久前發表一份研究報告－《2020年至2030年空軍戰略研究》，其內容是回答這個問題：到2030年，美國空軍需要哪些關鍵能力？根據目前的趨勢，在未來十多年內，美國空軍應該集中精力和資源發展五種關鍵能力：力量投送能力﹔空中、太空和網絡空間自由行動的能力﹔全球態勢感知能力﹔空軍外交能力﹔對地方政府提供軍事支援的能力。研究報告也圍繞著一個基本主題，即美國空軍在這些領域的成功將取決於能否綜合應用美國的空中、太空以及網路空間的各種實力。

力量投送

全世界安全環境的明顯特徵是，先進的反介入和區域封鎖系統不斷擴散。在這種環境下，美國軍隊將越來越難以在敵人的攻擊距離之內建立安全的基地，這增加了對遠距離力量投送——主要是遠距離攻擊的需要。

美國潛在對手的主要挑戰是，如何使美國無法獲取基地和接觸目標。在短期內，大多數對手都無法與美國的技術優勢競爭﹔然而，美國的這種優勢正在下降。未來的戰場可能更像2008年發生的俄羅斯與格魯吉亞的網絡中心化戰爭，而不是像伊拉克戰爭或阿富汗戰爭。

美國國防部的《四年防務評估報告》指出，「未來的作戰環境預示，美國軍隊可能要進行長時間的空中作戰和海上作戰。」為了應對這些挑戰，美國空軍必須能夠戰勝對手，即使這些對手具有前所未有的軍事能力，能夠對抗美國的陸軍和海軍。以下4項建議，可能有助於滿足未來空軍力量投送的要求。

1、美國空軍必須將空中、太空與網路能力整合到當前以及未來的平台和系統中。例如，飛機依賴GPS（全球衛星定位系統）和一系列網路系統。

2、空軍必須提高其力量投射的靈活性。可供選擇的飛機必須包括從高端（例如F-35型戰鬥機）到低端（輕型攻擊機）的各種機型。因此，空軍應建立「通用型」部隊，以便和盟友一起承擔除了傳統力量投送以外的職責﹔同時也要保留必要的作戰力量，來應對重大的突發事件。一些實例表明，在非常規的沖突中，並不總是必要使用性能最好的飛機。

3.發展具有更強人工智慧的無人平台，這將支援傳統力量投送任務。這樣的系統可能會成為同儕競爭中至關重要的心理戰工具，對手可能會因為美國使用這類系統而選擇與美國合作。

4.必須將進攻性與防禦性網絡能力融入空中平台和太空平台。作為一種力量倍增器，網絡能力可能很快就會成為空軍武器庫中最佳的力量投射工具。顯然有好幾個國家的網絡攻擊能力趕上甚至超過了美國。盡管美國空軍努力在組織、訓練和裝備方面滿足網絡戰的要求，但空軍的網絡作戰能力是否能夠取得勝利仍然不確定。

行動自由

為了力量投送，空軍需要在空中、太空和網路等所有領域都具有行動自由。現在討論空中優勢持久的重要性，那麼這一點是值得注意的。

至少到2030年，F-22型戰鬥機和F-35型戰鬥機可能一直都是美國空軍主要的空中優勢平台，這樣一來，相對低的力量倍增器，例如自主無人駕駛平台、人機互動技術和網絡攻擊能力等將是提高空軍能力的關鍵。自導系統、網路攻擊技術和增強人體機能技術都有可能取得進展，以下提出3個相關的建議：

1.隱形、高性能、自主型飛機能夠增加第五代戰鬥機的數量和增強其能力。以前的舊式戰鬥機將要逐步退出現役，其作用已下降為隻承擔支援任務，隨之產生的戰鬥力缺口，將由先進的飛機加以彌補。

2、增強人體機能可以「透過提高人力效率、減少人力需求來實現能力提高並節省成本。」這是美國空軍首席科學家辦公室發布的《科技展望報告》中的觀點。隨著武器系統越來越複雜，越來越依靠先進的人機接口，增強人體機能將非常有用。

3.能夠滲透和破壞敵方飛機的軟件系統、雷達和其它系統的機載網絡攻擊系統，將成為規模較小的空中優勢飛機機隊的重要力量倍增器。雖然利用網路並不是取勝的法寶，但在這方面的投資肯定會獲得豐厚的回報。

美國的對手在不斷地開發挑戰美國空中優勢的新方法。要防止他們成功，美國需要不斷更新系統，改變戰術、技術和程序。

太空優勢

美國空軍必須取得太空優勢。未來10多年空軍的主要目標是必須對太空加以控制，使太空優勢的概念成為現實。在短期內，太空領域不大可能發生動能攻擊，雖然如此，如果美國的優勢受到了挑戰，可能最終會部署太空武器。對太空系統的破壞將極大地削弱美國在所有領域的民事和軍事行動能力。如果其它國家對美國的太空通訊、導航或探測系統進行了攻擊，可能會促使美國公眾支持太空武器。要成功地延緩此類攻擊的發生，並保持美國在太空的行動自由，美國需要利用其外交、資訊、軍事和經濟力量，發展多層次太空行動體系。以下4項建議有助於空軍獲得可持續的太空優勢。

1.美國空軍必須繼續加強太空監視。空軍已經朝著這個方向邁出了第一步：2010年9月25日，空軍發射了「探路者」衛星，它是計畫中的天基太空監視系統的第一顆衛星。這種系統的作用是提高國防部探測和追蹤在軌物體的能力。為了最大限度地使用這種能力，空軍必須加快部署天基太空監視系統或與其類似的衛星系統。

2.美國空軍在降低生產和營運成本的同時，必須保証其具有進入太空的能力。目前使用的航太發射工具主要包括波音公司開發的德爾塔4型火箭和洛克希德•馬丁公司研製的阿特拉斯5型火箭等改進型運載火箭，使用這類運載火箭的目的是規範和改善太空發射的可操作性，減少政府參與發射過程的活動，併計劃使新系統的成本比過去的發射系統減少25%。然而，還需要進一步降低成本。

3.加強與私營企業的合作，這將有助於空軍實現獲得太空優勢的目標。前任奧巴馬政府曾經就太空活動做出了一些決策，將投資從政府部門轉移到私營企業，這意味著美國的太空政策可能會發生很大變化。

4.為了防止對手利用美國太空系統的漏洞，美國必須使其衛星系統具有更強的復原能力。隨著太空競爭的發展，太空系統必須變得反應更靈敏，漏洞更少，以滿足作戰部隊的需要。

網絡的挑戰

美國空軍成立了網絡司令部和第24航空隊，其使命是運行、擴展和保護空軍資訊網絡，保護關鍵任務系統，這清楚地表明了網絡空間的重要性。空軍將通訊和資訊專業轉變為網絡空間作戰與支援專業，並設立了網絡空間的大學本科課程，這些措施表明了空軍對網絡空間的重視。美國空軍所面臨的挑戰就是要始終處於網路技術的最前線。

如果網絡一直是一種能夠減少國家、團體和個人之間差距的工具，那麼網絡優勢將很難實現並維持。因此美國空軍必須佔領最前沿。遺憾的是，美國計算機科學與工程學畢業生的數量正在減少，而外國同樣專業的畢業生數量正在增加。美國空軍的網絡教育無法提供數量足夠的網絡專家和訓練有素且動力十足的攻擊者，這是一種非常不利的情況。美國軍隊的成敗取決於一個其不佔主導地位的領域，美國很少遇到這種情況。但在網絡領域，就出現了這種情況。

網絡將繼續演變成為一種偏愛的武器，取代目前的許多動能武器。美國空軍的飛機數量將變得更少，而作戰範圍變得更大，特別是在太平洋地區。這使網絡空間成為空軍行動的重要領域。對手將有能力破壞美國飛機的軟件和壓制美國的防空系統，這將成為現實，而不是科幻小說，。

要準備應對這種未來形勢，美國空軍需要徹底改變其對待網絡的方式。在網路上建立防火牆是不夠的，空軍應該採取更積極的方式將網絡發展成為一種重要的作戰能力。這要求空軍努力做到下面兩點：

1.美國空軍必鬚根據《美國法典》中的有關條文，承擔起網絡活動方面的責任。空軍作為最依賴網絡的軍種，必須自力更生發展網絡能力。空軍要實現這一目標，就要建立一個網絡空間部門，可以同時進行網絡進攻和防禦活動，有健全的法律法規對其進行規範，其活動應當具有互操作性和聯合性。

2、空軍必須培養一大批計算機科學和計算機工程學的專家。沒有合適的人才，空軍就難以維持一支精通網路的人員隊伍，而空軍的每一項任務都可能面臨威脅。

態勢感知

美國的態勢感知機構基本上都設在國內，監視和偵察任務將成為遠程活動。在更遠距離的監視和偵察中，太空和網絡資源更具有價值，在獲得遙遠地區態勢感知時，太空和網絡資源能夠發揮越來越重要的作用。美國空軍情報部門必須成為一支組織嚴密和充滿活力的力量，能夠及時進行調整，以實現對全球和局部地區的覆蓋。為此提出以下3個建議：

1.美國空軍在規劃與建立太空能力時，必須與國家偵察局(簡稱NRO)進行更密切的配合。基於太空的偵察變得越來越重要，因此空軍必須對國家偵察局的資源要求過程施加更大的影響。目前，空軍在國家偵察局的職位有時是空缺的，這使得作為終端用戶的空軍在衛星設計和開發方面沒有充分的發言權。

2.現在應該規劃好阿富汗戰爭和伊拉克戰爭以後的監視與偵察體系，使分散式通用地面系統(簡稱DCGS)準備好承擔全球性任務。在未來戰爭中，分散式通用地面系統的角色將由承擔戰術任務轉為處理和傳播國家情報產品與盟國的情報產品，因此必須對相應的理論、戰術、技術和程序進行認真的思考。

3.空軍必須利用新型的自動化技術來改進數據分析工作，以便分析人員能夠承擔最高級別的任務。加速開發翻譯軟件、人工智慧以及原始數據（訊號和電子情報）的電子化處理，這是管理大量數據的最實用的方法，並且應該成為優先撥款的項目。

美國面臨的戰略挑戰越來越呈現全球化的特點，如果不針對這種特點進行重大改革，美國空軍的全球態勢感知部門將無法充分發揮其潛能。目前美國的對手正逐漸削弱美國的戰略優勢，為此必須了解對手的情況。

空軍外交

空軍外交是為了捍衛國家利益而由空軍執行非作戰任務的活動，這是一種輔助性職能。依照這種界定，空軍外交為國家外交提供了許多軟實力資源。空軍執行《安全合作戰略》中規定的一系列外交使命。空軍現在使用空中力量來實現軟實力目標，但空軍外交活動還沒有發揮出全部潛能。如果空軍將其各項軟實力使命融合到一個統一的空軍外交戰略中，空軍將能夠更有效地使用這些能力來保衛國家利益。在未來十多年，空軍外交有可能變得越來越重要。當決策者面臨嚴峻的財政環境時，可能會更加重視空中力量，因為其航程遠、速度快、靈活性強。如果在有必要進行作戰行動之前就使用空軍外交，將有助於美國防止成本更高昂的沖突。永久性海外基地或大規模軍事部署都可能引起反美情緒，而空軍外交有助於消除反美情緒。當然空軍外交並不總是能成功。

雖然美國空軍《安全合作戰略》為空軍外交戰略奠定了有益的基礎，仍需要做許多工作。一個完善的空軍外交戰略應著眼於三個核心目標：1、協調與加強不同的外交使命﹔2、積極接觸盟友、中立方和對手﹔3、利用現有手段實現戰略目標。

空軍還應在現有戰略指導和方案的基礎上簡化流程。任何戰略都必須制定一套準則來衡量其成功或失敗。一項有效的以可靠的力量投送能力為後盾的空軍外交戰略有助於保護國家利益。

對地方政府的軍事支援

隨著核武技術、先進的飛彈技術和網路攻擊技術的擴散，​​對地方政府的軍事支援顯得越來越重要。 《10-802號空軍指令：軍事支援地方政府》中規定，「在發生民事緊急情況時，空軍國民警衛隊擔負為州政府和地方政府提供軍事援助的主要責任。」簡而言之，空軍國民警衛隊不僅可以在聯邦軍隊採取任何行動之前很早就做出響應，而且按照指令應當做到這一點。除了涉及化學、生物、放射性或核子物質的人為大災難，一般不需要動用現役部隊。不過，如果一場災害引發了大災難，州政府或地方政府部門可能無力應對，就需要州長申請聯邦支援。

如果隨著科技的創新，對手的攻擊範圍更接近美國的本土，美國公眾會希望軍方重視國土的防禦和救災。對於空軍和空軍國民警衛隊來說，這意味著要提供空運、醫療和態勢感知等民事支援能力。

空軍在空軍國民警衛隊的建設中負有指導的職責，因此空軍的領導層應採取有效措施，把民事支援能力提升為一項關鍵能力。制定雙重設計作戰能力說明，特別是關於空軍國民警衛隊的，將有助於明確每支部隊在民事支援中和戰時的任務。

在軍事支援地方政府的任務中，空軍和空軍國民警衛隊的使命是相互聯繫的，根據這一點，有以下三項建議可以使空軍和空軍國民警衛隊解決復雜的法律、政治和指揮與控制的問題，提高應急救災能力。

1.空軍國民警衛隊的主要裝備應為運輸機。應急空運是一項關鍵能力，應該由空軍國民警衛隊提供。空軍國民警衛隊每支空運部隊都必須具備航空港的功能，以保障部隊集結待運，進行後續行動。醫療支援部隊的運輸也是空運的重要組成部分，因為無論發生任何災難，首先需要的就是醫療救助，而且災難發生後很長時間內都需要醫療救助。

2.空軍國民警衛隊空運部隊應該分別部署到10個聯邦應急管理區。這將有助於空運部隊在救災演練中與州政府和地方政府的應急救援人員合作，在災難發生之前就建立起緊密的聯繫。

3.州政府和地方政府官員將主要依靠空軍國民警衛隊的圖像分析人員獲得支援、建議和圖像解讀。了解一場災難的範圍和程度，是應對災難的關鍵一步。為了給應急救援人員更好的態勢感知，在發生災難時，應當由在分佈式通用地面系統中工作的空軍國民警衛隊分析人員來提供實時圖像支援。

未來形勢充滿了不確定性，國防預算的增加也將陷入停滯，威脅將不僅來自高強度沖突，也將來自低強度沖突。因此美國空軍必須準備好應對日益複雜的各種局面，不應該想當然地認為在未來環境中一定能夠取得勝利。總而言之，美國空軍的時間、資源和戰略思想都應該以上述所闡述的5個關鍵能力為重點。 （編譯自美國《武裝力量雜志》 10641 （美）亞當•勞瑟（美國空軍研究所教授） 李有觀編譯）

(責編：王璐（實習生）、閻嘉琪)

中國原創軍事資源：https://military.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2017/0401/c1011-29185809888.html