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Chinese Military Development Trends & Governance Strategies of Weaponizing Artificial Intelligence

中國軍事發展趨勢與人工智能武器化治理策略

現代英語:

The weaponization of artificial intelligence (AI) is an inevitable trend in the new round of military revolution. Recent local wars have further spurred relevant countries to advance their AI weaponization strategies in order to seize the high ground in future warfare. The potential risks of AI weaponization cannot be ignored. It may intensify the arms race and disrupt the strategic balance; empower operational processes and increase conflict risks; increase accountability and collateral damage; and lower the proliferation threshold, leading to misuse and abuse. To address this, it is necessary to strengthen international strategic communication to ensure consensus and cooperation among countries on the military applications of AI; promote dialogue and coordination in the development of laws and regulations to form a unified and standardized legal framework; strengthen ethical constraints on AI to ensure that technological development conforms to ethical standards; and actively participate in global security governance cooperation to jointly maintain peace and stability in the international community.

    [Keywords] Artificial intelligence, military applications, security risks, security governance [Chinese Library Classification Number] F113 [Document Code] A

    The weaponization of artificial intelligence (AI) refers to the application of AI-related technologies, platforms, and services to the military field, making them a crucial driving force for military operations and thereby enhancing their efficiency, precision, and autonomy. With the widespread application of AI technology in the military, major powers and military leaders have increased their strategic and resource investment, accelerating research and application. The frequent regional conflicts in recent years have further stimulated the battlefield application of AI, profoundly shaping the nature of warfare and the future direction of military transformation.

    It cannot be ignored that artificial intelligence, as a rapidly developing technology, inherently carries potential risks due to its immature technology, inaccurate scenario matching, and incomplete supporting conditions. Furthermore, human misuse, abuse, or even malicious use can easily bring various risks and challenges to the military and even international security fields. To earnestly implement the global security initiatives proposed by General Secretary Xi Jinping, we must directly confront the global trend of weaponizing artificial intelligence, deeply analyze the potential security risks arising from the weaponization of AI, and consider scientifically feasible governance approaches and measures.

    Current trend of weaponization of artificial intelligence

    In recent years, the application of artificial intelligence in the military field is fundamentally reshaping the future form of warfare, changing future combat systems, and influencing the future direction of military transformation. Major military powers have regarded artificial intelligence as a disruptive key technology that will change the rules of future warfare, and have invested heavily in the research and development and application of AI weapons.

    The weaponization of artificial intelligence is an inevitable trend in military transformation.

    With the rapid development of science and technology, the necessity and urgency of military transformation are becoming increasingly prominent. Artificial intelligence, by simulating human thought processes, extends human mental and physical capabilities, enabling rapid information processing, analysis, and decision-making. It can also develop increasingly complex unmanned weapon system platforms, thereby providing unprecedented intelligent support for military operations.

    First, it provides intelligent support for military intelligence reconnaissance and analysis. Traditional intelligence reconnaissance methods are constrained by multiple factors such as manpower and time, making it difficult to effectively cope with the demands of large-scale, high-speed, and highly complex intelligence processing. The introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) technology has brought innovation and breakthroughs to the field of intelligence reconnaissance. In military infrastructure, the application of AI technology can build intelligent monitoring systems, providing high-precision, real-time intelligence perception services. In the field of intelligence reconnaissance, AI technology has the ability to process multiple “information streams” in real time, thereby greatly improving analysis efficiency. ① By using technologies such as deep learning, it is also possible to “see through the phenomena to the essence,” uncovering the deep-seated connections and causal relationships within various fragmented intelligence information, rapidly transforming massive amounts of fragmented data into usable intelligence, thereby improving the quality and efficiency of intelligence analysis.

    Secondly, it provides data support for combat command and decision-making. Artificial intelligence provides strong support for combat command and military decision-making in terms of battlefield situational awareness. Its advantage lies in its ability to perform key tasks such as data mining, data fusion, and predictive analysis. In informationized and intelligent warfare, the battlefield environment changes rapidly, and the amount of intelligence information is enormous, requiring rapid and accurate decision-making responses. Therefore, advanced computer systems have become important tools to assist commanders in managing intelligence data, assessing the enemy situation, proposing operational plans, and formulating plans and orders. For example, the US military’s ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Identification and Tracking) system, developed by Raytheon Technologies Corporation, encompasses intelligence gathering, surveillance, target identification, and tracking functions. It can aggregate data from diverse information sources such as satellites, ships, aircraft, and ground stations, and perform in-depth analysis and processing. This not only significantly improves the speed at which commanders acquire information but also provides data support through intelligent analysis systems, making decision-making faster, more efficient, and more accurate.

    Third, it provides crucial support for unmanned combat systems. Unmanned combat systems are a new type of weapon system capable of independently completing military missions without direct human control. They primarily consist of intelligent unmanned combat platforms, intelligent munitions, and intelligent combat command and control systems, possessing significant autonomy and intelligence. As a technological equipment leading the transformation of future warfare, unmanned combat systems have become a crucial bargaining chip in inter-state military competition. This system achieves adaptability to different battlefield environments and operational spaces by utilizing key technologies such as autonomous navigation, target recognition, and path planning. With the help of advanced algorithms such as deep learning and reinforcement learning, unmanned combat systems can independently complete navigation tasks and achieve precise target strikes. The design philosophy of this system is “unmanned platform, manned system,” essentially an intelligent extension of manned combat systems. For example, the MQM-57 Falconer unmanned aerial vehicle developed by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) employs advanced artificial intelligence technology and possesses highly autonomous target recognition and tracking capabilities.

    Fourth, it provides technical support for military logistics and equipment support. In the context of information warfare, the pace of war has accelerated, mobility has increased, and combat consumption has significantly risen. The traditional “overstocking” support model is no longer adequate to meet the rapidly changing needs of the modern battlefield. Therefore, higher demands are placed on combat troops to provide timely, location-appropriate, demand-based, and precise rapid and precise logistical support. Artificial intelligence, as a technology with spillover and cross-integration characteristics, is merging with cutting-edge technologies such as the Internet of Things, big data, and cloud computing. This has enabled AI knowledge, technology, and industry clusters to fully penetrate the military logistics field, significantly enhancing logistical equipment support capabilities.

    Major countries are actively developing military applications of artificial intelligence.

    To enhance their global competitiveness in the field of artificial intelligence, major powers such as the United States, Russia, and Japan are accelerating their strategic deployments for the military applications of AI. First, they are updating and adjusting their top-level strategic plans in the field of AI to provide clear guidance for future development. Second, in response to the needs of future warfare, they are accelerating the deep integration of AI technology with the military field, promoting the intelligent, autonomous, and unmanned development of equipment systems. Furthermore, they are actively innovating operational concepts to drive innovation in combat forces, thereby enhancing combat effectiveness and competitive advantage.

    First, strategic planning is being developed. Driven by a strategic obsession with pursuing military, political, and economic hegemony through technological dominance, the United States is accelerating its military intelligence process. In November 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense released the “Data, Analytics, and Artificial Intelligence Adoption Strategy,” aiming to expand the advanced capabilities of the entire Department of Defense system to gain a lasting military decision-making advantage. The Russian military issued what is known as “Version 3.0,” the “Russian Armaments Development Program for 2024-2033,” designed to guide weapons development over the next decade. The program emphasizes continued advancement in nuclear and conventional weapons development, with a focus on research into artificial intelligence and robotics, hypersonic weapons, and other strike weapons based on new physical principles.

    Second, the development of advanced equipment systems. Since 2005, the U.S. military has released a “Roadmap for Unmanned Systems” every few years to envision and design unmanned system platforms in various fields, including air, ground, and surface/underwater, connecting the development chain of unmanned weapons and equipment from research and development to production, testing, training, combat, and support. Currently, more than 70 countries worldwide are capable of developing unmanned system platforms, and various types of drones, unmanned vehicles, unmanned boats (vessels), and unmanned underwater vehicles are emerging rapidly. On July 15, 2024, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley stated in an interview with *Defense News* that by 2039, one-third of the U.S. military force will be composed of robots. The Russian military’s Platform-M combat robot, the “Lancet” suicide drone, and the S-70 “Hunter” heavy drone have already been deployed in combat.

    Third, innovate future operational concepts. Operational concepts are forward-looking studies of future warfare styles and methods, often guiding new force organization and leapfrog development of weaponry. In recent years, the US military has proposed operational concepts such as “distributed lethality,” “multi-domain warfare,” and “mosaic warfare,” attempting to guide the direction of military transformation. Taking “mosaic warfare” as an example, this concept treats various sensors, communication networks, command and control systems, and weapon platforms as “mosaic fragments.” These “fragment” units, empowered by artificial intelligence technology, can be dynamically linked, autonomously planned, and collaboratively combined through network information systems, forming an on-demand integrated, highly flexible, and mobile lethality network. In March 2022, the US Department of Defense released the “Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) Strategic Implementation Plan,” which aims to expand multi-domain operations to an all-domain operations concept, connecting sensors from various services to a unified “Internet of Things” and using artificial intelligence algorithms to help improve operational command decisions. ③

    War and conflict have spurred the weaponization of artificial intelligence.

    In recent years, local conflicts such as the Libyan conflict, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Ukraine crisis, and the Kazakh-Israeli conflict have continued, further stimulating the development of the weaponization of artificial intelligence.

    In the Libyan conflict, both sides employed various types of drones for reconnaissance and combat missions. A report by the UN Group of Experts on Libya noted that the Turkish-made Kargu-2 drone conducted a “pursuit and long-range engagement” operation in Libya in 2020, autonomously attacking retreating enemy soldiers. This event marked the first use of a lethal autonomous weapon system in actual combat. As American scholar Zachary Callenburn stated, if anyone were to die in such an autonomous attack, it would likely be the first known instance of an AI-powered autonomous weapon being used for killing. In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan successfully penetrated Armenian air defenses using a formation of Turkish-made TB2 “Standard” drones and Israeli-made Harop drones, gaining air superiority and the initiative. The significant success of Azerbaijani drone warfare largely stemmed from the Armenian army’s underestimation of the enemy’s capabilities and insufficient understanding of the importance and threat posed by drones in modern warfare. Secondly, from the perspective of offensive strategy, the Azerbaijani army has made bold innovations in drone warfare. They have flexibly utilized advanced equipment such as reconnaissance and strike drones and loitering munitions, which has not only improved combat efficiency but also greatly enhanced the surprise and lethality of the battles. ⑤

    During the 2022 Ukraine crisis, both Russia and Ukraine extensively used military-grade and commercial drones for reconnaissance, surveillance, artillery targeting, and strike missions. The Ukrainian army, through the use of the TB2 “Standard” drone and the US-supplied “Switchblade” series of suicide drones, conducted precision strikes and achieved high kill rates, becoming a notorious “battlefield killer.” In the Israeli-Kazakhstan conflict, the Israeli military was accused of using an artificial intelligence system called “Lavender” to identify and lock onto bombing targets in Gaza, marking as many as 37,000 Palestinians in Gaza as suspected “militants” and identifying them as targets for direct assassination. This Israeli military action drew widespread international attention and condemnation.

    Security risks arising from the weaponization of artificial intelligence

    From automated command systems to intelligent unmanned combat platforms, and then to intelligent decision-making systems in cyber defense, the application of artificial intelligence (AI) technology in the military field is becoming increasingly widespread and has become an indispensable part of modern warfare. However, with the trend of weaponizing AI, its misuse, abuse, and even malicious use will also bring significant risks and challenges to international security.

    It intensifies the arms race and disrupts the strategic balance.

    In the information and intelligent era, the disruptive potential of artificial intelligence is irresistible to major military powers, who are all focusing on the development and application of AI military capabilities, fearing that falling behind in this field will result in missing strategic opportunities. Deepening the military application of artificial intelligence can achieve “asymmetric advantages” in a lower cost and with higher efficiency.

    First, countries are vying for “first-mover advantage.” When a country achieves a technological lead in the development of intelligent weapon systems, it signifies that the country possesses more advanced artificial intelligence and related application capabilities, giving it a first-mover advantage in weapon system development, control, and contingency response. This advantage includes higher autonomy, intelligence, and adaptability, thereby increasing the country’s military strength and strategic competitive advantage. At the same time, the military advantage of a first-mover can become a security threat to competitors, leading to a competitive race among countries to advance the military application of advanced technologies. ⑦ In August 2023, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks announced the “Replicator initiative,” which aims to deploy thousands of “autonomous weapon systems” in the Indo-Pacific region in less than two years. ⑧

    Secondly, the lack of transparency in the development of AI-based military equipment by various countries may exacerbate the arms race. This is mainly due to two reasons: First, AI technology is an “enabling technology” that can be used to design a variety of applications. This means that verifying the specific military applications of AI is extremely difficult, unlike nuclear weapons, where monitoring uranium, centrifuges, and weapon and delivery systems can help determine whether a country is developing or deploying nuclear weapons. The differences between semi-autonomous and fully autonomous weapon systems are primarily due to differences in computer software algorithms, making it difficult to verify treaty compliance through physical means. Second, to maintain their strategic advantage, countries often keep details of the military applications of advanced technologies secret, preventing adversaries from discerning their strategic intentions. In the current international environment, this lack of transparency not only intensifies the arms race but also sows the seeds for future escalation of conflict.

    Third, the uncertainty of national strategic intentions also exacerbates the arms race. The impact of artificial intelligence on strategic stability, nuclear deterrence, and the escalation of war largely depends on other countries’ perception of its capabilities, rather than its actual capabilities. As American scholar Thomas Schelling pointed out, international relations often feature risk competition, testing courage more than force. The relationship between major adversaries is determined by which side is ultimately willing to invest more power, or to make it appear as if it is about to invest more power.⁹ An actor’s perception of the capabilities of others, whether true or false, significantly influences the progress of the arms race. If a country vigorously develops intelligent weapon systems, competitors, uncertain of the other’s intentions, will become suspicious of the competitor’s military capabilities and the intentions behind their military development, often taking reciprocal measures, namely, developing their own military to meet their own security needs. It is this ambiguity of intention that stimulates technological accumulation, exacerbates the instability of weapons deployment, and ultimately leads to a vicious cycle.

    Empowering operational processes increases the risk of conflict.

    Empowered by big data and artificial intelligence technologies, traditional combat processes will undergo intelligent restructuring, shifting from “situational awareness—command and decision-making—offensive and defensive coordination—comprehensive support” to “intelligent situational awareness across the entire domain—human-machine integrated hybrid decision-making—manned/unmanned autonomous coordination—proactive and on-demand precise support.” However, while this intelligent restructuring of combat processes improves operational efficiency and accuracy, it also increases the risk of conflict and miscalculation.

    First, wars that break out at “machine speed” will increase the risk of hasty action. Artificial intelligence weapon systems demonstrate formidable capabilities in precision and reaction speed, making future wars likely to erupt at “machine speed.”⑩ However, excessively rapid warfare will also increase the risk of conflict. In areas that emphasize autonomy and reaction speed, such as missile defense, autonomous weapon systems, and cyberspace, faster reaction times will bring significant strategic advantages. At the same time, they will drastically reduce the time window for the defending side to react to military actions, placing commanders and decision-makers under immense “time pressure,” exacerbating the risk of “hasty action,” and increasing the possibility of unexpected escalation of the crisis.

    Second, relying on system autonomy may increase the probability of misjudgment under pressure. The U.S. Department of Defense believes that “highly autonomous artificial intelligence systems can autonomously select and execute corresponding operations based on dynamic changes in mission parameters, efficiently achieving human-preset goals. Increased autonomy not only significantly reduces reliance on human labor and improves overall operational efficiency, but is also regarded by defense planners as a key element in maintaining tactical leadership and ensuring battlefield advantage.” ⑪ However, because human commanders cannot react quickly enough, they may gradually delegate control to autonomous systems, increasing the probability of misjudgment. In March 2003, the U.S. Patriot missile system mistakenly identified a friendly Tornado fighter jet as an anti-radiation missile. Under pressure with only a few seconds to react, the commanders chose to launch the missile, resulting in the deaths of two pilots.⑫

    Third, it weakens the effectiveness of crisis termination mechanisms. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union spearheaded a series of restrictive measures to curb the escalation of crises and prevent them from evolving into large-scale nuclear war. In these measures, humans played a crucial “monitoring” role, able to initiate termination measures within sufficient time to avert large-scale humanitarian catastrophes should a risk of spiraling out of control. However, with the increasing computing power of artificial intelligence systems and their deep integration with machine learning, combat responses have become more rapid, precise, and destructive, potentially weakening human intervention mechanisms for crisis termination.

    Accountability for war is difficult, and collateral damage is increased.

    Artificial intelligence weapon systems make it more difficult to define responsibility in war. In traditional warfare, weapon systems are controlled by humans, and if errors or crises occur, the human operator or the developer of the operating system bears the corresponding responsibility. Artificial intelligence technology itself weakens human agency and control, making the attribution of responsibility for technical actions unclear.

    First, there’s the “black box” problem of artificial intelligence. While AI has significant advantages in processing and analyzing data, its internal operating principles and causal logic are often difficult for humans to understand and explain. This makes it challenging for programmers to correct erroneous algorithms, a problem often referred to as the “black box” of algorithmic models. If an AI-powered weapon system poses a security threat, the “algorithm black box” could become a convenient excuse for those responsible to shirk accountability. Those seeking accountability would face generalized blame-shifting and deflection, ultimately pointing the finger at the AI ​​weapon system. In practice, the inability to understand and explain the decision-making process of AI can lead to a series of problems, such as decision-making errors, trust crises, and information misuse.

    Secondly, there is the issue of delineating human-machine responsibility in military operations. When an AI system malfunctions or makes a decision-making error, should it be treated as an independent entity and held responsible? Or should it be considered a tool, with human operators bearing all or part of the responsibility? The complexity of this responsibility delineation lies not only in the technical aspects but also in the ethical and legal ones. On the one hand, although AI systems can make autonomous decisions, their decision-making process is still limited by human-preset programs and algorithms, therefore their responsibility cannot be completely independent of humans. On the other hand, in certain situations, AI systems may exceed the pre-set limits of humans and make independent decisions; how to define their responsibility in such cases also becomes a difficult problem in the field of arms control.

    Thirdly, there is the issue of the allocation of decision-making power between humans and AI weapon systems. Depending on the level of machine autonomy, AI systems can execute tasks in three decision-making and control modes: semi-autonomous, supervised autonomy, and fully autonomous. In semi-autonomous systems, human decision-making power rests with the user; in supervised autonomy, humans supervise and intervene when necessary; in fully autonomous operations, humans do not participate in the process. As the military application of AI deepens, the role of humans in combat systems is gradually shifting from the traditional “human-in-the-loop” model to “human-on-the-loop,” evolving from direct controllers within the system to external supervisors. However, this shift also raises new questions. How to ensure that AI weapon systems adhere to human ethics and values ​​while operating independently is a major challenge currently facing the field of AI weapon development.

    Lowering the threshold for dissemination leads to misuse and abuse.

    Traditional strategic competition typically involves large-scale weapons system development and procurement, requiring substantial financial and technological support. With the maturation and diffusion of artificial intelligence (AI) technology, its accessibility and low cost make it possible for even small and medium-sized countries to develop advanced intelligent weapons systems. Currently, strategic competition in the field of military AI is primarily concentrated among major military powers such as the US and Russia. However, in the long run, the proliferation of AI technology will broaden the scope of strategic competition, posing a disruptive threat to the existing strategic balance. Once smaller countries possessing AI technology achieve relatively strong competitiveness, their willingness to confront threats from major powers may increase.

    First, artificial intelligence (AI) facilitates the development of lightweight and agile combat methods, encouraging smaller states and non-state actors to engage in small-scale, opportunistic military adventures to achieve their strategic objectives at a lower cost and with more diverse means. Second, the rapid development of AI has led to the increasing prominence of new forms of warfare such as cyber warfare and electronic warfare. In a highly competitive battlefield environment, malicious third-party actors can manipulate information to influence military planning and strategic deterrence, leading to escalation. The 2022 Ukraine crisis saw numerous instances of online disinformation used to confuse the public. Third, the widespread application of AI technology has also reduced strategic transparency. Traditional military strategies often rely on extensive intelligence gathering, analysis, and prediction; however, with the assistance of AI, operational planning and decision-making processes become more complex and unpredictable. This lack of transparency can lead to misunderstandings and misjudgments, thereby increasing the risk of conflict escalation.

    Governance Path of Artificial Intelligence Weaponization Security Risks

    To ensure the safe development of artificial intelligence and avoid the potential harm caused by its weaponization, we should strengthen international communication on governance strategies, seek consensus and cooperation among countries on the military applications of artificial intelligence, promote dialogue and coordination on laws and regulations to form a unified and standardized legal framework, strengthen ethical constraints on artificial intelligence to ensure that technological development conforms to ethical standards, and actively participate in global security governance cooperation to jointly safeguard the peace and stability of the international community.

    We attach great importance to strategic communication at the international level.

    Artificial intelligence governance is a global issue that requires concerted efforts from all countries to resolve. On the international stage, the interests of nations are intertwined yet conflicting; therefore, addressing global issues through effective communication channels is crucial for maintaining world peace and development.

    On the one hand, it is essential to accurately grasp the challenges of international governance of artificial intelligence. This involves understanding the consensus among nations on the weaponization of AI, while also closely monitoring policy differences among countries regarding the security governance of AI weaponized applications. Through consultation and cooperation, relevant initiatives should be aligned with the UN agenda to effectively prevent the misuse of AI for military purposes and promote its peaceful application.

    On the other hand, it is crucial to encourage governments to reach relevant agreements and build strategic mutual trust through official or semi-official dialogues. Compared to the “Track 1 dialogue” at the government level, “Track 1.5 dialogue” refers to dialogues involving both government officials and civilians, while “Track 2 dialogue” is a non-official dialogue conducted by academics, retired officials, and others. These two forms of dialogue offer greater flexibility and serve as important supplements and auxiliary means to official intergovernmental dialogues. Through diverse dialogue methods, officials and civilians can broadly discuss possible paths to arms control, share experiences and expertise, and avoid escalating the arms race and worsening tensions. These dialogue mechanisms will provide countries with a continuous platform for communication and cooperation, helping to enhance mutual understanding, strengthen strategic mutual trust, and jointly address the challenges posed by the militarization of artificial intelligence.

    Scientifically formulate laws and ethical guidelines for artificial intelligence.

    Artificial intelligence (AI) technology itself is neither right nor wrong, good nor evil. However, there are certainly distinctions of good and evil intentions in the design, research and development, manufacturing, use, operation, and maintenance of AI. The weaponization of AI has sparked widespread ethical concerns. Under the framework of international law, can autonomous weapon systems accurately distinguish between combatants and civilians on complex battlefields? Furthermore, if AI weapon systems cause unintended harm, how should liability be determined? Is entrusting life-or-death decision-making power to machines in accordance with ethical standards? These concerns highlight the necessity of strengthening ethical constraints on AI.

    On the one hand, it is essential to prioritize ethics and integrate the concept of “intelligent for good” from the very source of technology. In the design of AI military systems, values ​​such as human-centeredness and intelligent for good should be embedded within the system. The aim is to prevent potential indiscriminate killing and harm caused by AI at the source, control its excessive destructive power, and prevent accidental damage, thereby limiting the extent of damage caused by AI weapon systems to the smallest possible range. Currently, nearly a hundred institutions and government departments both domestically and internationally have published various AI ethics principles documents, and the academic and industrial communities have reached a consensus on basic AI ethical principles. In 2022, China’s “Position Paper on Strengthening Ethical Governance of Artificial Intelligence,” submitted to the United Nations, provided an important reference for the development of global AI ethics regulation. The document explicitly emphasizes that AI ethics regulation should be promoted through measures such as institutional construction, risk management, and collaborative governance.

    On the other hand, it is necessary to improve relevant laws and regulations and clarify the boundaries of rights and responsibilities of artificial intelligence entities. Strict technical review standards should be established to ensure the safety and reliability of AI systems. Comprehensive testing should be conducted before AI systems are deployed to ensure they do not negatively impact human life and social order. The legal responsibilities of developers, users, maintainers, and other parties throughout the entire lifecycle of AI systems should be clearly defined, and corresponding accountability mechanisms should be established.

    We will pragmatically participate in international cooperation on artificial intelligence security governance.

    The strategic risks posed by the military applications of artificial intelligence further highlight the importance of pragmatic international security cooperation. It is recommended to focus on three key areas:

    First, we should promote the formulation of guidelines for the application of artificial intelligence in the military field. Developing codes of conduct for the military application of artificial intelligence is an important responsibility of all countries in regulating its military use, and a necessary measure to promote international consensus and comply with international regulations. In 2021, the Chinese government submitted its “Position Paper on Regulating the Military Application of Artificial Intelligence” to the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Conference, and in 2023, it released the “Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative,” both of which provide constructive references for improving the codes of conduct for regulating the military application of artificial intelligence.

    Second, it is essential to establish a suitable regulatory framework. The dual-use nature of artificial intelligence (AI) involves numerous stakeholders, making the role of non-state actors such as NGOs, technical communities, and technology companies increasingly prominent in the global governance of AI, thus becoming a crucial force in building a regulatory framework for the military application of AI. Technical regulatory measures that countries can adopt include: clarifying the scope of AI technology use, responsible parties, and penalties for violations; strengthening technological research and development to improve the security and controllability of the technology; and establishing regulatory mechanisms to monitor the entire process of technology research and development and application, promptly identifying and resolving problems.

    Third, we will jointly develop technologies and solutions for AI security. We encourage the inclusion of bilateral or multilateral negotiations between governments and militaries in the dialogue options for military AI applications, and promote extensive exchanges on military AI security technologies, operating procedures, and practical experience. We will also promote the sharing and reference of relevant risk management technical standards and usage norms, and continuously inject new stabilizing factors into the international security and mutual trust mechanism in the context of the militarization of AI.

    (The author is the director and researcher of the National Defense Science and Technology Strategy Research Think Tank at the National University of Defense Technology, and a doctoral supervisor; Liu Hujun, a master’s student at the School of Foreign Languages ​​of the National University of Defense Technology, also contributed to this article.)

現代國語:

朱啟超
《人民論壇》(2025年02月05日 第 02版)

【摘要】人工智能武器化是新一輪軍事變革的必然趨勢,近年來的局部戰爭衝突進一步刺激相關國家推進人工智能武器化戰略部署,搶占未來戰爭制高點。人工智能武器化的潛在風險不容忽視,將可能加劇軍備競賽,打破戰略平衡;賦能作戰流程,加大衝突風險;提升問責難度,增加附帶傷亡;降低擴散門檻,導致誤用濫用。對此,應加強國際間戰略溝通,確保各國在人工智能軍事應用上的共識與協作;推進法律法規建設的對話與協調,以形成統一規範的法律框架;加強人工智能倫理約束,確保技術發展符合道德標準;積極參與全球安全治理合作,共同維護國際社會的和平與穩定。

【關鍵詞】人工智能 軍事應用 安全風險 安全治理 【中圖分類號】F113 【文獻標識碼】A

人工智能武器化,是將人工智能相關技術、平台與服務應用到軍事領域,使其成為賦能軍事行動的重要驅動力量,進而提升軍事行動的效率、精準度和自主性。隨著人工智能技術在軍事領域的廣泛應用,各主要大國和軍事強國紛紛加大戰略與資源投入,加快研發應用步伐。近年來頻發的地區戰爭衝突也進一步刺激了人工智能的戰場運用,並深刻形塑戰爭形態以及軍事變革的未來走向。

不容忽視的是,人工智能作為一類快速發展中的技術,其本身由於內在技術的不成熟、場景匹配的不准確、支持條件的不完備,可能存在潛在風險,而由於人為的誤用、濫用甚至惡意使用,也容易給軍事領域乃至國際安全領域帶來多種風險挑戰。認真貫徹落實習近平總書記提出的全球安全倡議,必須直面世界範圍內人工智能武器化的發展趨勢,深入分析人工智能武器化應用可能帶來的安全風險,並思考科學可行的治理思路與舉措。

當前人工智能武器化的發展趨勢

近年來,人工智能在軍事領域的應用,正在從根本上重塑未來戰爭形態、改變未來作戰體系,影響軍事變革的未來走向。主要軍事大國已將人工智能視為改變未來戰爭規則的顛覆性關鍵技術,紛紛挹注大量資源,推進人工智能武器的研發與應用。

人工智能武器化是軍事變革的必然趨勢。

隨著科學技術的飛速發展,軍事變革的必要性與緊迫性愈發凸顯。人工智能通過模擬人類的思維過程,延展人類的腦力與體力,可實現信息快速處理、分析和決策,可研發日益複雜的無人化武器系統平台,從而為軍事行動提供前所未有的智能化支持。

一是為軍事情報偵察與分析提供智能支持。傳統的情報偵察方式受到人力和時間等多重因素制約,難以有效應對大規模、高速度和高複雜度的情報處理需求。人工智能技術的引入,為情報偵察領域帶來革新和突破。在軍事基礎設施中,應用人工智能技術,可構建智能監測系統,提供高精度實時的情報感知服務。在情報偵察領域,人工智能技術具備對多個“信息流”進行實時處理的能力,從而極大地提高分析效率。 ①通過使用深度學習等技術工具,還可以“透過現像看本質”,挖掘出各類碎片化情報信息中的深層脈絡與因果聯繫,將海量碎片化數據快速轉變為可以利用的情報,從而提升情報分析的質效。

二是為作戰指揮與決策提供數據支持。人工智能在戰場態勢感知方面為作戰指揮和軍事決策提供有力支持。 ②其優勢在於能夠進行數據挖掘、數據融合以及預測分析等關鍵任務。在信息化智能化戰爭中,戰場環境瞬息萬變,情報信息量龐大,要求決策響應迅速且準確。因此,先進的計算機系統就成為協助指揮人員管理情報數據、進行敵情判斷、提出作戰方案建議以及擬制計劃與命令的重要工具。以美軍為例,美國雷神技術公司(Raytheon Technologies Corporation)研製的ISTAR(情報、監視、目標識別和跟踪)系統,涵蓋了情報採集、監視、目標識別及跟踪功能,可匯聚來自衛星、艦船、飛機及地面站等多元信息源的數據,並對其進行深度分析與處理。這不僅顯著提高了指揮官獲取信息的速度,而且可藉助智能分析系統提供數據支持,使決策更加快速、高效和精準。

三是為無人作戰系統提供重要支撐。無人作戰系統是一種無需人類直接操縱,便可獨立完成軍事任務的新型武器裝備系統,主要包括智能化無人作戰平台、智能化彈藥和智能化作戰指揮控制系統等組成部分,具備顯著的自主性和智能化特徵。無人作戰系統,作為引領未來戰爭形態變革的技術裝備,已成為國家間軍事競爭的重要籌碼。該系統通過運用自主導航、目標識別、路徑規劃等關鍵技術,實現了不同戰場環境及作戰空間的適應能力。借助深度學習、強化學習等先進算法,無人作戰系統能夠獨立完成導航任務,並實現精準打擊目標。這種系統的設計理念是“平台無人,系統有人”,其本質是對有人作戰系統的智能化延伸。例如,美國國防部高級研究計劃局(DARPA)研發的“MQM-57獵鷹者”無人機,就採用了先進的人工智能技術,具備高度自主的目標識別和追踪功能。

四是為軍事後勤與裝備保障提供技術支持。在信息化戰爭的背景下,戰爭進程加快、機動性提升、作戰消耗顯著增加。傳統的“超量預儲”保障模式已無法適應現代戰場快速變化的需求,因此,對作戰部隊進行適時、適地、適需、適量的快速精確後裝保障提出了更高的要求。人工智能作為一種具有溢出帶動和交叉融合特性的技術,與物聯網、大數據、雲計算等前沿技術相互融合,使得人工智能知識群、技術群和產業群全面滲透到軍事後裝領域,顯著提升了後勤裝備保障能力。

主要國家紛紛佈局人工智能軍事應用。

為增強在人工智能領域的全球競爭力,美國、俄羅斯、日本等主要大國加緊對人工智能軍事應用的戰略佈局。首先,通過更新和調整人工智能領域的頂層戰略規劃,為未來的發展提供明確指導;其次,針對未來戰爭需求,加快人工智能技術與軍事領域的深度融合,推動裝備系統的智能化、自主化和無人化發展;此外,積極創新作戰概念,以驅動作戰力量創新,進而提升作戰效能和競爭優勢。

一是製定戰略規劃。基於技術霸權追求軍事霸權、政治霸權、經濟霸權的戰略偏執,美國正加快自身軍事智能化進程。 2023年11月,美國國防部發布《數據、分析與人工智能採用戰略》,旨在擴展整個國防部體系的先進能力,以獲得持久的軍事決策優勢。俄軍頒布被稱為“3.0版本”的《2024年至2033年俄羅斯武器裝備發展綱要》,旨在為未來10年武器裝備發展提供指導,綱要強調繼續推進核武器和常規武器建設,並重點研究人工智能和機器人技術、高超音速武器和其他基於新物理原理的打擊兵器。

二是研發先進裝備系統。美軍自2005年開始每隔幾年都會發布一版“無人系統路線圖”,以展望並設計空中、地面、水面/水下等各領域無人系統平台,貫通研發—生產—測試—訓練—作戰—保障等無人化武器裝備發展鏈路。目前,世界上已有70多個國家可以研發無人化系統平台,各種類型的無人機、無人車、無人船(艇)、無人潛航器如雨後春筍般不斷出現。 2024年7月15日,美軍參聯會前主席馬克·米利接受《美國防務新聞》採訪時稱,到2039年,三分之一的美軍部隊將由機器人組成。俄軍研發的平台-M作戰機器人、“柳葉刀”自殺式無人機和S70“獵人”重型無人機等,已投入實戰檢驗。

三是創新未來作戰概念。作戰概念是對未來戰爭樣式與作戰方式進行的前瞻性研究,往往可牽引新的作戰力量編組及武器裝備跨越發展。美軍近年來先後提出“分佈式殺傷”“多域戰”“馬賽克戰”等作戰概念,試圖引領軍事變革的發展方向。以“馬賽克戰”為例,該作戰概念將各種傳感器、通信網絡、指揮控制系統、武器平台等視為“馬賽克碎片”,這些“碎片”單元在人工智能技術賦能支持下,通過網絡信息系統可動態鏈接、自主規劃、協同組合,從而形成一個按需集成、極具彈性、靈活機動的殺傷網。 2022年3月,美國國防部發布《聯合全域指揮控制(JADC2)戰略實施計劃》,該計劃旨在將多域作戰向全域作戰概念拓展,將各軍種傳感器連接到一個統一“物聯網”中,利用人工智能算法幫助改善作戰指揮決策。 ③

戰爭衝突刺激人工智能武器化進程。

近年來,利比亞衝突、納卡衝突、烏克蘭危機、哈以沖突等局部衝突不斷,進一步刺激了人工智能武器化的發展進程。

在利比亞衝突中,交戰雙方採用多種型號無人機執行偵察和作戰任務。據聯合國利比亞問題專家小組發布的報告指出,土耳其製造的“卡古-2”(Kargu-2)無人機2020年在利比亞執行了“追捕並遠程交戰”行動,可自主攻擊撤退中的敵方士兵。這一事件標誌著致命性自主武器系統在實戰中的首次運用。如美國學者扎卡里·卡倫伯恩所述,若有人在此類自主攻擊中不幸喪生,這極有可能是歷史上首個已知的人工智能自主武器被用於殺戮的例子。在2020年納卡衝突中,阿塞拜疆運用土耳其生產的“旗手”TB2無人機編隊和以色列生產的“哈洛普”無人機成功突破了亞美尼亞防空系統,掌握了戰場製空權和主動權。 ④ 阿塞拜疆軍隊無人機作戰的顯著成效,在很大程度上源於亞美尼亞軍隊的“輕敵”心態,對無人機在現代戰爭中的重要性和威脅性認識不足。其次,從進攻策略的角度來看,阿塞拜疆軍隊在無人機戰法上進行了大膽的創新。他們靈活運用察打一體無人機和巡飛彈等先進裝備,不僅提升了作戰效率,也大大增強了戰鬥的突然性和致命性。 ⑤

在2022年爆發的烏克蘭危機中,俄羅斯和烏克蘭都廣泛使用軍用級和商用無人機執行偵察監視、火砲瞄準和打擊任務。烏克蘭軍隊通過使用“旗手”TB2無人機以及美國援助的“彈簧刀”系列自殺式無人機,實施精確打擊和高效殺傷,成為令世界矚目的“戰場殺手”。在哈以沖突中,以色列軍方被指控使用名為“薰衣草”(Lavender)的人工智能係統來識別並鎖定加沙境內的轟炸目標,曾將多達3.7萬名加沙巴勒斯坦人標記為“武裝分子”嫌疑對象,並將其認定為可直接“暗殺”的目標,以軍行動引發了國際社會廣泛關注和譴責。 ⑥

人工智能武器化帶來的​​安全風險

從自動化指揮系統到智能無人作戰平台,再到網絡防禦中的智能決策系統,人工智能技術在軍事領域的應用正變得愈發普遍,已成為現代戰爭不可或缺的一部分。然而,人工智能武器化的趨勢下,其誤用、濫用甚至惡意使用,也將給國際安全帶來不可忽視的風險挑戰。

加劇軍備競賽,打破戰略平衡。

在信息化智能化時代,人工智能所具有的顛覆性潛力讓軍事大國都難以抗拒,紛紛聚焦人工智能軍事能力的開發和運用,唯恐在這一領域落後而喪失戰略機遇。深化人工智能軍事應用,則能夠以更低成本、更高效率的方式獲得“非對稱優勢”。

一是各國紛紛搶抓“先行者優勢”。當一個國家在智能武器系統開發領域取得技術領先地位時,意味著該國具備更高級的人工智能和相關應用能力,使其在武器系統開發、控制和應急響應等方面具有先發優勢。這種優勢包括更高的自主性、智能化程度和自適應能力,從而增加了該國的軍事實力和戰略競爭優勢。與此同時,先行者的軍事優勢可能會成為競爭對手的安全威脅,導致各國在先進技術的軍事應用上呈現出你爭我趕的態勢。 ⑦ 2023年8月,美國國防部副部長凱瑟琳·希克斯宣布了“複製者計劃”(Replicator initiative),該倡議力求在不到兩年的時間內在印太地區部署數千個“自主武器系統”。 ⑧

二是各國人工智能軍備建設的不透明性可能加劇軍備競賽。這主要有兩個方面的原因:一是人工智能技術是一種可用於設計多種應用的“使能技術”,這意味著人工智能軍事應用具體情況核查難度較高,難以像核武器可以通過對鈾、離心機以及武器和運載系統的監測來判斷一個國家是否在進行核武器的開發或部署。半自主、完全自主武器系統之間的差別主要是由於計算機軟件算法不同導致的,很難通過物理核查手段來對各國的條約執行情況進行核查。二是各國為了保持己方的戰略優勢,往往對先進技術的軍事應用相關細節採取保密措施,從而使對手無法探知其戰略意圖。在當前國際環境中,這種不透明性不僅僅加劇了軍備競賽,更為未來衝突升級埋下了伏筆。

三是各國戰略意圖的不確定性也會加劇軍備競賽。人工智能對於戰略穩定、核威懾和戰爭升級的影響,很大程度上取決於他國對於其能力的感知,而非其實質能力。正如美國學者托馬斯·謝林指出,國際關係常常具有風險競爭的特徵,更多的是對勇氣而不是武力的考驗,主要對手之間的關係是由哪一方最終願意投入更大的力量,或者使之看起來即將投入更大的力量來決定的。 ⑨ 一個行為體對於他者能力的感知,無論真假,都會在很大程度上影響軍備競賽進程。如果一個國家大力發展智能武器系統,競爭對手在不確定對方意圖的情況下,會對競爭對手的軍備能力及發展軍備的意圖產生猜忌,往往採取對等措施,即通過發展軍備來滿足自身安全需求。正是這種意圖的模糊性刺激了技術積累,加劇武器部署的不穩定性,最終導致惡性循環。

賦能作戰流程,加大衝突風險。

在大數據和人工智能技術賦能下,傳統作戰流程將實現智能化再造,即由“態勢感知—指揮決策—攻防協同—綜合保障”向“全域態勢智能認知—人機一體混合決策—有人/無人自主協同—主動按需精准保障”轉變。然而,作戰流程的智能化再造雖然提高了作戰的效率和精確性,但也提升了衝突和誤判的風險。

一是以“機器速度”爆發的戰爭將增加倉促行動的風險。人工智能武器系統在精確度和反應速度上表現出強大的能力,使得未來戰爭將以“機器速度”爆發。 ⑩ 但戰爭速度過快也將升高衝突風險。在導彈防禦、自主武器系統和網絡空間等重視自主性以及反應速度的領域,更快的反應速度將帶來巨大的戰略優勢,同時也極大地壓縮了防禦方對軍事行動作出反應的時間窗口,導致作戰指揮員和決策者置身於巨大的“時間壓力”之下,加劇了“倉促行動”的風險,並增加了危機意外升級的可能性。

二是依賴系統自主性可能增加壓力下的誤判機率。美國國防部認為,“高度自主化的人工智能係統,能夠根據任務參數的動態變化,自主選擇並執行相應操作,高效實現人類預設的目標。自主性的增加不僅大幅減少了對人力的依賴,提高了整體操作效率,更被國防規劃者視為保持戰術領先、確保戰場優勢的關鍵要素。”⑪然而,由於人類指揮官無法作出足夠快的反應,可能逐漸將控制權下放給自主系統,增加誤判機率。 2003年3月,美國“愛國者”導彈系統曾錯誤地將友軍的“龍捲風”戰鬥機標記為反輻射導彈,指揮人員在只有幾秒鐘反應時間的壓力狀態下,選擇發射導彈,造成了兩名飛行員的死亡。 ⑫

三是削弱了危機終止機制的有效性。冷戰時期,美蘇主導構建了一系列限制性措施來遏制危機的升級,避免其演化為大規模的核戰爭。在這些措施中,人類扮演著至關重要的“監督者”角色,在可能出現風險失控時,能夠在充足的時間內啟動終止措施,避免大規模人道主義災難發生。但是,隨著人工智能係統運算能力的提升及其與機器學習的深度融合,作戰響應變得更為迅捷、精確和具有破壞性,人類對於危機的終止干預機制將可能被削弱。

戰爭問責困難,增加附帶傷亡。

人工智能武器系統使得戰爭責任更難界定。在傳統作戰模式下,由人類控制武器系統,一旦造成失誤或危機,人類操作員或者操作系統的研發者將承擔相應的責任。人工智能技術本身弱化了人類的能動性和控制能力,致使技術性行為的責任歸屬變得模糊不清。

一是人工智能“黑箱”問題。儘管人工智能在處理和分析數據方面有著顯著優勢,但是其內部運行規律和因果邏輯卻常常難以被人類理解和解釋,這使得程序員難以對錯誤算法進行糾偏除誤,這一問題常常被稱為算法模型的“黑箱”。一旦人工智能武器系統產生安全危害,“算法黑箱”可能成為相關責任方推卸責任的合理化藉口,追責者只能面臨泛化的卸責與推諉,並將責任矛頭指向人工智能武器系統。在實踐中,如果無法理解並解釋人工智能的決策過程,可能會引發一系列的問題,如決策失誤、信任危機、信息濫用等。

二是軍事行動中人機責任劃分問題。當人工智能係統出現故障或者決策失誤時,是否應將其視為一種獨立的實體來承擔責任?或者,是否應該將其視為一種工具,由人類操作者承擔全部或部分責任?這種責任劃分的複雜性不僅在於技術層面,更在於倫理和法律層面。一方面,人工智能係統雖然能夠自主決策,但其決策過程仍然受到人類預設的程序和算法限制,因此其責任不能完全獨立於人類。另一方面,人工智能係統在某些情況下可能會超越人類的預設範圍,作出獨立的決策,此時其責任又該如何界定,也成為軍控領域的難題。

三是人與人工智能武器系統的決策權分配問題。按照機器自主權限的不同,人工智能係統能夠以半自主、有監督式自主以及完全自主三種決策與控制方式執行任務。在半自主系統中,行動的決策權由人類掌控;在有監督式自主行動中,人類實施監督並在必要時干預;在完全自主行動中,人類不參與行動過程。隨著人工智能軍事應用程度的逐漸加深,人在作戰系統中的角色正經歷由傳統的“人在迴路內”模式逐步向“人在迴路上”轉變,人類從系統內部的直接操控者演化為系統外部的監督者。然而,這一轉變也引發了新的問題。如何確保人工智能武器系統在獨立運作時仍能遵循人類倫理和價值觀,這是當前人工智能武器研發領域面臨的重大挑戰。

降低擴散門檻,導致誤用濫用。

傳統的戰略競爭通常涉及大規模的武器系統研發和採購,需要大量資金和技術支持。人工智能技術成熟擴散後,具有易獲取且價格低廉等優勢,即便是中小國家也可能具備開發先進智能武器系統的能力。當前,軍用人工智能領域的戰略競爭主要集中在美俄等軍事大國之間。但長遠來看,人工智能技術的擴散將擴大戰略競爭的範圍,對現有的戰略平衡構成破壞性威脅。一旦掌握人工智能技術的較小規模國家擁有相對較強的競爭力,這些國家在面臨大國威脅時發起對抗的意願可能就會增強。

一是人工智能有助於發展一些輕便靈巧的作戰手段,從而鼓勵一些中小國家或者非國家行為體利用其開展小型的、機會主義的軍事冒險,以更低廉的成本和更豐富的途徑來達到其戰略目地。二是人工智能的快速發展使得網絡戰、電子戰等新型戰爭形態日益凸顯。在競爭激烈的戰場環境中,惡意的第三方行為體可以通過操縱信息來影響軍事規劃和戰略威懾,導致局勢升級。在2022年爆發的烏克蘭危機中,就有眾多網絡虛假信息傳播混淆視聽。三是人工智能技術的廣泛應用還降低了戰略透明度。傳統的軍事戰略往往依賴於大量的情報收集、分析和預測,而在人工智能技術的輔助下,作戰計劃和決策過程變得更加複雜和難以預測。這種不透明性可能導致誤解和誤判,從而增加了衝突升級的風險。

人工智能武器化安全風險的治理路徑

為確保人工智能安全發展,避免其武器化帶來的​​潛在危害,應加強國際間的治理戰略溝通,尋求各國在人工智能軍事應用方面的共識與協作;推進法律法規對話協調,以形成統一規範的法律框架;加強人工智能倫理的約束,確保技術發展符合道德標準;積極參與全球安全治理合作,共同維護國際社會的和平與穩定。

高度重視國際層面戰略溝通。

人工智能治理是一個全球性問題,需要各國通力合作,共同解決。在國際舞台上,各國利益交融與利益衝突並存,因此,通過有效的溝通渠道來處理全球性問題成為維護世界和平與發展的關鍵。

一方面,要準確把握人工智能國際治理挑戰。既要把握各國對人工智能武器化發展的共識,也要密切關注各國在人工智能武器化應用安全治理方面的政策差異,通過協商合作,使相關倡議與聯合國議程相協調,從而有效防止人工智能在軍事上的濫用,推動人工智能用於和平目的。

另一方面,推動各國政府通過官方或半官方對話,達成相關協議,建立戰略互信。相較於政府層面的“1軌對話”,“1.5軌對話”指的是政府官員與民間人士共同參與的對話,而“2軌對話”則是由學者、退休官員等進行的民間非官方形式的對話。這兩種對話形式具有更高的靈活性,是政府間官方對話的重要補充和輔助手段。通過多樣化的對話交流方式,官方和民間人士可以廣泛磋商軍備控制的可能實現路徑,分享經驗和專業知識,以避免軍備競賽的升級和緊張局勢的惡化。這些對話機制將為各國提供持續的溝通與合作平台,有助於增進相互理解、加強戰略互信,共同應對人工智能軍事化應用帶來的挑戰。

科學制定人工智能法律和倫理規約。

人工智能技術本身並無對錯善惡之分,但對於人工智能的設計、研發、製造、使用、運行以及維護確有善惡意圖之別。人工智能武器化引發了廣泛的倫理關注。國際法框架下,自主武器系統是否能夠在復雜戰場上精準區分戰鬥人員與平民?此外,若人工智能武器系統導致非預期的傷害,其責任歸屬如何界定?將關乎生死的決策權交付於機器,這一做法是否符合道德倫理標準?這些擔憂凸顯了加強人工智能倫理約束的必要性。

一方面,要堅持倫理先行,從技術源頭上融入“智能向善”的理念。在人工智能軍事系統的設計過程中,將以人為本、智能向善等價值觀內嵌於系統中。其目的是從源頭上杜絕人工智能可能引發的濫殺濫傷行為,控制其過度殺傷力,防範意外毀傷的發生,從而將人工智能武器系統所帶來的毀傷程度限制在盡可能小的範圍內。目前,國內外已有近百家機構或政府部門發佈各類人工智能倫理原則文件,學術界和產業界亦就人工智能基本倫理原則達成共識。 2022年,中國向聯合國遞交的《關於加強人工智能倫理治理的立場文件》為全球人工智能倫理監管的發展提供了重要參考。文件明確強調,應通過制度建設、風險管控、協同共治等多方面的措施來推進人工智能倫理監管。

另一方面,要完善相關法律法規,明確人工智能主體的權責邊界。制定嚴格的技術審核標準,確保人工智能係統的安全性和可靠性。在人工智能係統上線前進行全面的測試,確保其不會對人類生活和社會秩序造成負面影響。明確開發者、使用者、維護者等各方在人工智能係統全生命週期中的法律責任,以及建立相應的追責機制。

務實參與人工智能安全治理國際合作。

人工智能軍事應用所帶來的戰略風險,更加凸顯出國際安全務實合作的重要性。建議重點從三個方面著手:

一是推動制定人工智能在軍事領域的運用準則。制定人工智能軍事應用的行為準則,是各國規範人工智能軍事應用的重要責任,也是推動國際共識和遵守國際法規的必要舉措。中國政府2021年向聯合國《特定常規武器公約》大會提交了《中國關於規範人工智能軍事應用的立場文件》,2023年發布《全球人工智能治理倡議》,這些都為完善規範人工智能軍事應用的行為準則提供了建設性參考。

二是建立適用的監管框架。人工智能軍民兩用性使其涉及眾多利益攸關方,一些非國家行為體如非政府組織、技術社群、科技企業在人工智能全球治理進程中的作用將更加突出,成為人工智能軍事應用監管框架建設的重要力量。各國可採取的技術監管措施包括:明確人工智能技術的使用範圍、責任主體和違規處罰措施;加強技術研發,提高技術的安全性和可控性;建立監管機制,對技術的研發和應用進行全程監管,及時發現和解決問題。

三是共同研發人工智能安全防範技術和解決方案。鼓勵將政府間和軍隊間的雙邊或多邊談判納入軍用人工智能應用的對話選項,就軍用人工智能安全防範技術、操作規程及實踐經驗廣泛交流,推動相關風險管理技術標準和使用規範的分享借鑒,為人工智能軍事化背景下的國際安全互信機制不斷注入新的穩定因素。

(作者為國防科技大學國防科技戰略研究智庫主任、研究員,博導;國防科技大學外國語學院碩士研究生劉胡君對本文亦有貢獻)

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Chinese Military Exclusive Requirements for Strategies & Tactics of People’s War in The New Era

新時代中國軍隊對人民戰爭戰略戰術的獨特要求

現代英語:

Looking back on its glorious combat history, the People’s Army has consistently adhered to the absolute leadership of the Party, proposing and implementing a comprehensive set of strategies and tactics for people’s war. These strategies and tactics are a crucial weapon for the People’s Army to defeat the strong with the weak and to conquer the enemy. Over the past 98 years, with the changing times and evolving forms of warfare, the specific content and manifestations of the strategies and tactics for people’s war have continuously evolved. To confront the challenges of information-based and intelligent warfare, we must firmly grasp the essential requirements and value orientations of the strategies and tactics for people’s war amidst the rapidly evolving global trends and practices, unifying the inherently unchanging laws of conduct with the external realities of change, and continuously innovating and developing the strategies and tactics for people’s war in the new era.

President Xi Jinping emphasized that no matter how the situation develops, the magic weapon of people’s war must never be lost. However, we must grasp the new characteristics and new requirements of people’s war in the new era, innovate its content, methods and approaches, and unleash its overall power. Currently, facing profound challenges brought about by changes in science and technology, warfare, and our adversaries, we must not only inherit and carry forward the fine traditions of people’s war, but also be sensitive to changes, actively respond to them, and proactively seek change. We must accurately grasp the inherent requirements of the strategies and tactics of people’s war in the new era, consciously update our thinking and concepts, and innovate strategic guidance, so that this magic weapon of defeating the enemy can be demonstrated on future battlefields.

Adhere to relying on the people and deeply rooted

In the long practice of revolutionary war, the people are the most profound force for victory. The people are the primary force behind the strategies and tactics of people’s war, a magic weapon for victory. People’s war has its roots deeply rooted in the people, and its confidence comes from the people. Regardless of how the times change or how the war evolves, relying closely on the people and fully mobilizing them will always be the fundamental condition and the only way to carry out people’s war. Developing the strategies and tactics of people’s war in the new era requires adhering to the mass perspective of history and the fundamental requirement that soldiers and civilians are the foundation of victory. We must integrate the traditional strategic advantages of people’s war with the mass line, broaden the sources of vitality for the strategies and tactics of people’s war, draw strategic wisdom and tactical methods from the people, and develop an intellectual advantage for people’s war in the new era. We must solidly carry out national defense education throughout the nation, continuously foster a strong sense of patriotism, inspire patriotism, strengthen awareness of potential dangers, and enhance national defense awareness. We must guide the masses to actively care about and support national defense, thereby infusing powerful spiritual strength into people’s war in the new era. We must focus on promoting high-quality population development, comprehensively improve the cultural, scientific, and innovative qualities of the entire population, accelerate the development of a modern human resource base of high quality, sufficient in volume, optimized in structure, and rationally distributed, and promote the shift of the dominant force in people’s war from quantitative to qualitative. Further improve the national defense mobilization system and mechanism, promote the establishment of a rapid response system that is connected with the national emergency response mechanism and integrated with the joint combat system, fully tap and gather the unlimited war potential contained in the people, and give full play to the resource aggregation and value-added effect.

Focus on overall planning and full-area offense and defense

In the long-term practice of revolutionary warfare, the strategies and tactics of people’s war require the comprehensive mobilization of diverse forces and resources in the political, economic, cultural, diplomatic, and military sectors, and the integrated use of various forms of struggle and methods of operation. This holistic approach compensates for local deficiencies and disadvantages, ultimately defeating powerful adversaries. Modern warfare is not only a fierce confrontation in the military sphere, but also a comprehensive struggle in the political, economic, and diplomatic spheres, exhibiting the distinct characteristics of hybrid warfare. To develop the strategies and tactics of people’s war in the new era, we must establish a broad systemic mindset, relying on the national strategic system and supported by the joint operations system, explore the implementation methods of people’s war strategies and tactics, and win the total war of people’s war in the new era. We should fully leverage the advantages of the new national system, relying on the integrated national strategic system and capabilities, efficiently aggregate superior resources across the board, fully activate the country’s national defense potential, and weave various forces and resources into a network. We should integrate and plan the subsystems of people’s war, including leadership, organization, personnel, command, technology, equipment, and support, to maximize the effectiveness of holistic linkage and systemic operation, and achieve the maximum benefits of all-round effort and multiplied energy. We must strengthen comprehensive coordination across the physical, information, and social domains, focusing on seeking breakthroughs in new domains and new qualities, and making achievements in new dimensions such as unmanned warfare, human-machine collaborative warfare, network and electronic warfare, space and deep-sea warfare, and intelligent and autonomous warfare. Military and non-military means must be coordinated, integrating various forms of struggle, including political, economic, diplomatic, public opinion, and military. Comprehensive measures must be implemented to effectively wage diplomatic offensive and defensive battles, financial and trade battles, psychological defense battles, and public opinion and legal battles. We must leverage the combined effectiveness of political offensives and armed strikes to effectively fight the political and military battles.

Strengthen active defense and take the initiative

Through the long practice of revolutionary warfare, the People’s Army has developed a comprehensive strategic philosophy of active defense, emphasizing, for example, the unity of strategic defense and offensive action in campaigns and battles, the principles of defense, self-defense, and preemptive strike, and the principle of “if no one offends me, I will not offend; if someone offends me, I will certainly offend.” Active defense is fundamentally defensive, its essence lies in activeness, and its inherent characteristic is proactiveness. Currently, profound changes have taken place in the international, national, and Party, military, and political landscapes. The strategies and tactics of people’s war in the new era generally adhere to the fundamental principle of defense and are not aimed at hegemony, aggression, or oppression of other countries. Consequently, they will win the support and endorsement of the vast majority of the Chinese people, as well as the understanding and assistance of peace-loving and justice-loving countries and peoples around the world. Developing the strategies and tactics of people’s war in the new era must adapt to the times and circumstances. We must adhere to a defensive national defense policy, implement the military strategic guidelines of the new era, excel at observing and analyzing issues from a political perspective, and be adept at considering and applying strategies from regional and global perspectives to consolidate the political foundation for victory in people’s war. We must persist in neither provoking trouble nor fearing it, strengthen the regular and diversified use of military force, firmly and flexibly carry out military struggle, and while adhering to the strategic preemptive strike, we must not give up campaign and combat offensives under favorable conditions and when necessary. We must advance steadily, make progress within stability, and be proactive within stability, effectively shape the security situation, contain crises and conflicts, and firmly grasp the initiative in the struggle.

Highlight new quality dominance and technological empowerment

In the long practice of revolutionary warfare, while emphasizing that victory in war is primarily determined by people, not objects, the People’s Army has also placed great emphasis on the research and development of advanced military technology, particularly weaponry. Comrade Mao Zedong once emphasized that without modern equipment, it would be impossible to defeat the armies of imperialism. The technological content of modern warfare has undergone a qualitative leap, with advanced technologies and new weaponry such as artificial intelligence, big data, quantum computing, unmanned aerial vehicles, and brain control being widely applied in the military. While the people remain the decisive force in determining victory in war, the manifestation of this power has undergone significant changes. Science and technology are core combat power, and People’s War will place greater emphasis on the application of scientific and technological means and rely even more heavily on the wisdom and creativity of the people. Developing the strategies and tactics of People’s War in the new era should prioritize winning information-based and intelligent warfare. We should deeply study the essential characteristics, winning mechanisms, and strategies and tactics of high-end warfare, accelerate the shift from “winning by numbers” to “winning by talent,” and from “winning by manpower” to “winning by intelligence,” effectively enhance our ability to win through scientific and technological empowerment and digital intelligence, and truly unleash the crucial role of science and technology and talent in People’s War in the new era. We will accelerate the development of high-tech industries, vigorously strengthen the construction of new forces in new domains such as ocean, space, cyberspace, artificial intelligence, and quantum technology, increase military-civilian collaboration in high-tech fields, accelerate the transformation and application of new productive forces into new combat capabilities, and promote the expansion of war potential reserves into emerging fields and the focus on new forces. We will integrate and coordinate military and civilian scientific and technological advantages, shifting the focus from traditional support and guarantee elements such as human and material resources to new support and guarantee elements such as information, technology, and intelligence. We will build information, resource, and technology pools with profound foundations and rich reserves, actively cultivate capable, strong, and professional professional support units, and continuously expand the breadth and depth of people’s participation in the war and scientific and technological support.

Emphasis on flexibility, maneuverability, innovation and checks and balances

In the long-term practice of revolutionary warfare, the strategies and tactics of People’s War are highly flexible and maneuverable. Their most essential requirement is to prioritize self-reliance, attacking the enemy without being attacked by them. Based on the actual situation of both sides, we fight the battles based on our weapons, against the enemy, and at the right time and place. We identify the enemy’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities, leverage our strengths and advantages, and defeat the enemy with our own strengths, always seizing the initiative on the battlefield. Flexible and maneuverable strategies and tactics are the magic weapon for defeating an enemy with superior equipment with inferior equipment. “You fight yours, I fight mine” is a summary and generalization of the long-term experience of China’s revolutionary war and the soul and essence of the strategies and tactics of People’s War. Developing the strategies and tactics of People’s War in the new era must grasp the methodological requirements of asymmetric checks and balances, leverage innovative operational concepts, adhere to the mechanisms of victory in modern warfare, and continuously develop practical and effective tactics to defeat the enemy. We must proceed from the actual circumstances of both sides, gaining a deep understanding of operational missions, adversaries, and the evolving operational environment. We must thoroughly grasp the concepts, elements, and methods of victory, objectively analyze and study the strengths and weaknesses, advantages and disadvantages of both sides, know the enemy and ourselves, adapt to the situation, and flexibly utilize various combat forces and methods, striving to achieve maximum results at the lowest cost. We must adhere to the principle of “attacking the enemy without being attacked by them,” capitalize on strengths and avoid weaknesses, avoid the real and attack the weak, attack where the enemy is least prepared, and attack where they must be defended. We must proactively create opportunities, flexibly maneuver the enemy, and fight wherever we are most advantageous and wherever we are most skilled. We must adhere to the principle of “using what we can to defeat what we cannot,” advancing the research and application of military theory, operational guidance, tactics, and training methods in a timely manner, innovating core operational concepts, and developing new types of combat methods. We must fight against the enemy’s tactics, targeting their weaknesses, and leveraging our military’s strengths, thus creating new winning advantages in people’s war through asymmetric checks and balances.

Emphasis on accumulating small things into big things and focusing on unity of purpose

Throughout the long practice of revolutionary warfare, our army has been at an overall disadvantage for considerable periods. Therefore, the strategies and tactics of people’s war emphasize leveraging strength against weakness locally, persisting in accumulating small victories into larger ones, and concentrating forces to wage annihilation campaigns. This has become a key strategy for the people’s army to defeat powerful foes. Compared to previous eras, modern warfare often unfolds across multiple dimensions and domains, providing greater scope for implementing this strategy of “accumulating small victories into larger ones.” Developing the strategies and tactics of people’s war in the new era requires strengthening the concept of “dispersed in appearance, yet focused in spirit; dispersed in form, yet united in strength.” This involves dynamically consolidating and uniting the numerous combat forces distributed across the multidimensional battlefield. Through the fusion of capabilities and immediate optimization, we can launch rapid localized focused-energy attacks, wide-area guerrilla harassment, and deliver annihilating and destructive strikes against key enemy locations. This not only creates a hammering effect, but also continuously wears down the enemy, gradually depriving them of the initiative on the battlefield. This highly integrated distributed warfare emphasizes the wide-area dispersion of troop deployment and the discrete distribution of capabilities. Based on the needs of achieving operational intent, objectives, and missions, it prioritizes the best operational elements, units, and forces. Through the integration of operational capabilities and the accumulation of operational impacts, it aggregates optimal operational effects, unleashes maximum operational potential, maximizes operational effectiveness, and achieves optimal operational results. This distributed warfare has evolved from “geographical dispersion” to “dynamic coupling across all domains and dimensions”: no longer limited to the physical dispersion of personnel and equipment, it extends to multi-dimensional battlefields such as cyber, electromagnetic, and cognitive. Relying on data links, artificial intelligence, and distributed command systems to achieve cross-domain collaboration, it significantly enhances battlefield survivability and multiplies strike effectiveness.

現代國語:

編者按

回望輝煌戰鬥歷程,人民軍隊始終堅持在黨的絕對領導下,提出並實施了一整套人民戰爭戰略戰術,這是人民軍隊以弱勝強、克敵制勝的重要法寶。 98年來,隨著時代變遷和戰爭形態演變,人民戰爭戰略戰術的具體內容和表現形式不斷發展變化。直面資訊化智慧化戰爭挑戰,我們要在快速變化發展的世界大勢和實踐樣態中,牢牢把握人民戰爭戰略戰術的本質要求和價值取向,把內在不變的規律性特徵與外在變化的現實性特徵統一起來,不斷創新發展新時代人民戰爭戰略戰術。

習主席強調指出,無論形勢如何發展,人民戰爭這個法寶永遠不能丟,但要把握新的時代條件下人民戰爭的新特點新要求,創新內容和方式方法,充分發揮人民戰爭的整體威力。當前,面對科技之變、戰爭之變、對手之變帶來的深刻挑戰,我們既要繼承發揚人民戰爭優良傳統,也要敏銳識變、積極應變、主動求變,準確把握新時代人民戰爭戰略戰術內在要求,自覺更新思維理念,創新戰略指導,讓克敵制勝的法寶顯威未來戰場。

堅持依靠人民、深根基

在長期革命戰爭實踐中,人民群眾是戰爭勝利最深厚的偉力。人民戰爭戰略戰術,人民是構成這一制勝法寶的主體,人民戰爭的根基深植於人民、底氣來自於人民,無論時代如何發展、戰爭如何演進,緊緊依靠人民、充分動員群眾,永遠是開展人民戰爭的基礎條件和不二法門。新時代條件下發展人民戰爭戰略戰術,必須堅持群眾史觀和兵民是勝利之本的根本要求,把人民戰爭的傳統謀略優勢和群眾路線結合起來,拓展人民戰爭戰略戰術的源頭活水,從人民群眾中汲取戰略智慧和策略方法,形成新時代人民戰爭的智力優勢。札實開展全民防衛教育,不斷厚植家國情懷,激發愛國動力,強化憂患意識,增強國防觀念,引導廣大群眾主動關心國防事業、支持國防建設,為新時代人民戰爭注入強大精神力量。聚力推進人口高品質發展,全面提升全民文化素質、科技素質和創新能力,加速塑造素質優良、總量充裕、結構優化、分佈合理的現代化人力資源,推動人民戰爭主體由數量優勢向質量優勢轉變。進一步完善國防動員體制機制,推動建立與國家應急響應機制相銜接、與聯合作戰體系相融合的快速響應制度,把內含於人民群眾中的無限戰爭潛力充分挖掘出來、聚攏起來,充分發揮資源集聚增值效應。

注重整體運籌、全域攻防

在長期革命戰爭實踐中,人民戰爭戰略戰術要求整體動員政治、經濟、文化、外交、軍事等多方面的力量資源,綜合運用多種鬥爭形式和作戰方式,以整體合力彌補局部的不足和劣勢,從而戰勝強大對手。現代戰爭既是軍事領域的激烈對抗,也是政治、經濟、外交等領域的全面角力,整體呈現混合戰爭的鮮明特徵。新時代條件下發展人民戰爭戰略戰術,必須確立大體系思維模式,以國家戰略體係為依托,以聯合作戰體係為支撐,探索人民戰爭戰略戰術的實現形式,打贏新時代人民戰爭總體戰。應充分發揮新型舉國體制優勢,依託一體化國家戰略體系與能力,高效能聚合全域優勢資源,全方位激活國家國防潛力,將各種力量資源擰線成繩、結繩成網,把人民戰爭的領導要素、組織要素、人員要素、指揮要素、技術要素、裝備要素、保障要素等分系統結合起來,統合、統合方式要加強物理域、資訊域、社會域等領域全面統籌,重點在新域新質上尋求突破,在無人作戰、人機協同作戰、網電作戰、太空深海作戰、智慧自主作戰等新維度有所作為。軍事與非軍事手段相互配合,把政治、經濟、外交、輿論和軍事鬥爭等多種形式結合起來,綜合施策著力打好外交攻防戰、金融貿易戰、心理防護戰、輿論法理戰等,發揮政治攻勢和武裝打擊的綜合效能,統籌打好政治軍事仗。

強化積極防禦、主動進取

在長期革命戰爭實踐中,人民軍隊形成了一整套積極防禦戰略思想,如堅持戰略上防禦與戰役戰斗上進攻的統一,堅持防禦、自衛、後發製人的原則,堅持“人不犯我,我不犯人;人若犯我,我必犯人”,等等。積極防禦,根本在防禦、要義在積極,主動進取是其內在特質。當前,世情國情黨情軍情發生深刻變化,新時代人民戰爭的戰略戰術在總體上堅持防禦性的根本原則,不以霸道霸權和侵略欺壓他國為目的,因此也會贏得國內最廣大人民群眾擁護和支持以及世界上愛好和平與正義的國家和人民的理解和幫助。新時代條件下發展人民戰爭戰略戰術,須應時而變、應勢而動。堅持奉行防禦性國防政策,貫徹落實新時代軍事戰略方針,善於從政治高度出發觀察和分析問題,善於從地區和全球視角來思考和運用策略,夯實人民戰爭制勝的政治基礎。堅持不惹事也不怕事,加強軍事力量常態化多樣化運用,堅定靈活開展軍事鬥爭,在堅持戰略上後發製人的同時,不放棄有利條件下和必要時的戰役戰鬥進攻,穩紮穩打、穩中有進、穩中有為,有效塑造安全態勢,遏止危機沖突,牢牢把握爭鬥主動權。

突顯新質主導、科技賦能

在長期革命戰爭實踐中,人民軍隊在強調決定戰爭勝負的主要因素是人而不是物的同時,同樣高度重視對先進軍事技術特別是武器裝備的研發。毛澤東同志就曾強調,沒有現代的裝備,要戰勝帝國主義的軍隊是不可能的。現代戰爭的科技含量發生了質的飛躍,人工智慧、大數據、量子計算、無人自主、腦控等高新技術與新型武器裝備廣泛應用於軍事領域。雖然人民群眾依然是戰爭勝負的決定性力量,但是這種力量的表現形式發生了重要變化。科技是核心戰鬥力,人民戰爭將更重視科技手段的運用,更依賴人民群眾的智慧和創造力。新時代條件下發展人民戰爭戰略戰術,應把打贏資訊化智能化戰爭作為戰爭準備的著眼點,深研高端戰爭的本質特徵、制勝機理、戰略戰法,加速推動從「人多製勝」向「人才制勝」、從「人力製勝」向「智力製勝」轉變,切實提高新科技賦能、數智者發揮勝利能力、數智性的科技人才、新人民主義中的關鍵人民發揮作用。加速推進高新產業發展,大力加強海洋、太空、網路空間、人工智慧、量子科技等新域新質力量建設,加大高新技術領域軍地協作力度,加速新質生產力向新質戰鬥力轉化運用,推動戰爭潛力儲備向新興領域拓展、向新質力量聚焦。聚合協同軍地科技優勢,由聚焦人力物力等傳統支撐保障要素向聚焦資訊、技術、智慧等新質支撐保障要素轉變,建設底蘊深厚、儲備豐富的資訊池、資源池、技術池,積極打造精幹強能、專業性強的專業支前分隊,不斷拓展人民參戰與科技支前的廣度與深度。

講究靈活機動、創新制衡

在長期革命戰爭實踐中,人民戰爭戰略戰術是高度靈活機動的戰略戰術,最本質的要求是堅持以我為主,致人而不致於人,根據敵我雙方的實際情況,有什麼武器打什麼仗,對什麼敵人打什麼仗,在什麼時間地點打什麼時間地點的仗,找準敵之弱點和軟肋,發揚我之長主動和優勢,能永遠不能掌握戰場。靈活機動的戰略戰術是以劣勢裝備戰勝優勢裝備之敵的致勝法寶。 “你打你的、我打我的”,是中國革命戰爭長期經驗的總結和概括,是人民戰爭戰略戰術的靈魂和精髓。新時代條件下發展人民戰爭戰略戰術,必須掌握非對稱制衡的方法論要求,以作戰概念創新為抓手,遵循現代戰爭制勝機理,不斷推出實用管用的克敵制勝招法。堅持一切從敵我雙方的實際情況出發,深刻洞悉作戰任務、作戰對手、作戰環境變化,深刻把握制勝觀念、制勝要素、制勝方式發展,客觀分析研究敵我雙方的強弱、優劣,知彼知己、因勢而變,靈活運用各種作戰力量和作戰方法,努力以最小代價取得最大戰果。堅持“致人而不致於人”,揚長避短、避實就虛,出其不趨、攻其必救,主動創造戰機,靈活調動敵人,怎麼有利就怎麼打,怎麼擅長就怎麼打。堅持“以能擊不能”,與時俱進推進軍事理論、作戰指導、戰法訓法研究運用,創新核心作戰概念,發展新質作戰手段,不按敵人套路打、盯著敵人軟肋打、發揮我軍優長打,在非對稱制衡中創造人民戰爭新的製勝優勢。

重視積小為大、神聚力合

在長期革命戰爭實踐中,我軍在相當長的時間內都是處於全局上的劣勢地位,所以人民戰爭戰略戰術重視局部上以強對弱,堅持積小勝為大勝,集中力量打殲滅戰,這成為人民軍隊戰勝強敵的關鍵一招。相較於以往,現代戰爭作戰往往在多維多域中展開,為實施「積小勝為大勝」提供了更加廣闊空間。新時代條件下發展人民戰爭戰略戰術,要強化「貌散而神聚,形散而力合」的理念,將分佈在多維戰場的諸多作戰力量動態集中聯合起來,通過效能融合、即時聚優,實施局部快速聚能攻擊、廣域遊擊襲擾,對敵分佈的要點實施殲這種神聚力合的分散式作戰更強調兵力部署廣域分散、能力狀態離散分佈,根據實現作戰企圖、達成作戰目的、遂行作戰任務需要,優選最佳作戰要素、單元、力量,通過作戰能力融合、行動作用累積,聚合最優作戰效應,激發最大作戰潛能,實現作戰效益最大化,達成最佳作戰效果。這種分散式作戰已經從「地理空間的分散」上升為「全局全維的動態耦合」:不再局限於人員裝備在物理空間的分散,而是拓展到網絡、電磁、認知等多維戰場;依託數據鏈、人工智能和分佈式指揮系統實現跨域協同,既極大提升了戰場生存力,又倍增了打擊效能。

中國原創軍事資源:http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-08-01&paperNumber=07&articleid=960384888

Chinese Military Research on US Army’s Network-Centric Warfare

中國軍方對美軍網路中心戰的研究

現代英語:

Several local wars in the 1990s showed that information networks play an increasingly important role in modern warfare, and the U.S. military’s combat mode began to change from platform-centric warfare to network-centric warfare. For example, in the Afghanistan War, the U.S. military’s digital and broadcast communication network connected various command posts, sensors, and shooters spread all over the country, allowing weapon platforms to play a greater role. Digital networks enable ” Predator ” drones to provide real-time target data and images to combat aircraft and guide combat aircraft to strike targets. This is a major development compared to the Kosovo War, when ” Predator ” drones were only used for information collection.

1  Overview of the US Army’s Network-Centric Warfare

1.1  Main Features of Network-Centric Warfare — Effects-Based

In the war in Afghanistan, the information network enabled an average of two targets to be attacked by one US Air Force aircraft when performing a single mission, while in the Gulf War in 1991 , an average of 10 aircraft were required to attack one target. This shows that network-centric warfare is not a platform-based operation, but an effect-based operation. Each weapon platform can attack multiple targets, rather than multiple weapon platforms attacking one target. Network-centric warfare realizes information sharing, and combat forces and their weapon platforms, including aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, ships and even individual soldiers, are integrated regardless of their positions. The networking of sensor platforms, weapon platforms and command posts enables air or ground forces to use more accurate situational awareness information to attack targets more quickly, cooperate with each other and selectively, so the effect of network-centric warfare is that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. For example, a networked fighter must be superior to an equal number of non-networked fighters of the enemy, because each pilot of a networked fighter can not only see the images captured by the aircraft’s radar on the digital cockpit display, but also the images captured by the companion aircraft’s radar. The pilot of a non-networked fighter can only see the images captured by the aircraft’s radar.

1.2  Network-centric warfare environment – Global Information Grid

The U.S. military’s Joint Vision 2020 points out that the development of the Global Information Grid (GIG) concept will provide a network-centric environment that enables information to be distributed globally. The U.S. Department of Defense has begun developing GIG as a broadband network , including the development of space-based laser communication systems and land-based multi-channel fiber-optic networks. Space-based laser communication systems can connect aircraft and ground stations to military satellites, while land-based multi-channel fiber-optic networks are suitable for 100 different network entities, such as major national or regional military commands. In the future, GIG will consist of information grids related to computers and communications, sensor / reconnaissance grids related to space-based, air-based, land-based, sea-based and cyberspace sensors , and command and control grids related to initiating and controlling operations at all levels. In the next 10 years, the U.S. military will spend $ 5-10 billion on GIG construction. It is expected that in the next two years, it will cost $ 1 billion to build a land-based GIG infrastructure, which will become the basis of network-centric warfare; it will cost billions of dollars to build a UHF satellite system, which will expand the GIG infrastructure to all parts of the world. The development of GIG involves many new technologies, such as fiber multiplexing and space laser communication. In the U.S. defense budget for fiscal year 2003 , $ 2.5 billion will be spent on space laser communication technology, which is said to have the ability to provide fiber- quality broadband secure communications to U.S. forces operating anywhere, at any time.

1.3  The main obstacle to network-centric warfare : incompatibility

The widespread incompatibility between the U.S. military’s communications equipment and the architecture of related systems of various services is the main obstacle to the realization of the concept of full network-centric warfare. The Command, Control, Communications and Computers Directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for overcoming this obstacle, one of the measures is to ensure that the systems purchased now are compatible with both the original systems and the future systems.

2  Research Progress of Network-Centric Warfare in the U.S. Military

2.1 US Navy Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) Network

The anti-jamming CEC system, centered on the Aegis ship , can connect air defense command and control systems, sensors, weapon platforms, and other nearby platforms. The CEC sensor grid provides the Navy with an overall picture of its forces. It can fuse target recognition and tracking data from a variety of airborne and shipborne sensors, greatly improving the Navy’s situational awareness and combat capabilities on the battlefield. The CEC combat grid uses fused data to locate missiles launched by air defense combat aircraft and ships, allowing them to intercept multiple incoming missiles at a safe distance from the combat group.  CEC is not only an important contribution to network-centric warfare, but also lays a good foundation for generating an integrated air picture between all theater forces. In April 2001 , the US Department of Defense approved the connection of CEC with the US Army’s Patriot air defense missile system. It is said that CEC can also be connected to the US Air Force’s early warning aircraft to provide seamless joint theater air defense capabilities. In addition, the US Navy also plans to establish a global naval Internet, an information grid that can collect, process and distribute battlefield data between naval forces around the world.

2.2  US Air Force Intelligent Tanker and Multi-mission Command and Control Aircraft

The US Air Force is implementing the Smart Tanker Program, which aims to develop the next generation of aerial refueling aircraft and make them serve as information receiving and relay nodes. Smart tankers are the best choice for realizing airborne Internet because they usually fly at high altitudes near the war zone, and this function can be realized after the installation of relevant electronic equipment. Through the information transmission device between data links, the tanker can seamlessly receive and send data between different systems, such as the Navy CEC system and the Army’s improved position determination reporting system. The smart tanker will be equipped with an electronic scanning array, thus becoming a long-range antenna for the ” Rivet ” joint electronic reconnaissance aircraft, collecting information from multiple locations in the war zone, and then forwarding the information to the ” Rivet ” joint electronic reconnaissance aircraft, which will be processed and distributed by the latter. The intelligence of the aerial refueling aircraft is mainly to install the ROBE communication terminal on the KC-135 tanker .  ROBE is an expandable modular airborne relay terminal that can be used for data relay to realize line-of-sight / beyond-line-of-sight communication between members in the network, such as communication between the commander of the air and space operations center and the commander of the war zone, or to provide important data to soldiers more quickly so as to make decisions quickly and strike time-sensitive targets. ROBE can also expand the communication range, so that all soldiers can share situational awareness information. In October 2002 , the U.S. Air Force successfully demonstrated the concept of smart tanker. A KC-135 tanker equipped with ROBE flew from Eglin Air Force Base to Hanscomo Air Force Base, successfully transmitting all tactical data from F-15 and ” Joint Star ” to the operations center of Hanscomo Air Force Base, and the staff reset the ROBE system from time to time to verify that the system can be remotely controlled from the ground.

The US Air Force is also developing a multi-mission command and control aircraft, the MC2A . It is envisioned that the MC2A is not only a sensor node, but also a decision node. In the future, it will replace the E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, the Airborne Early Warning and Control System aircraft, and other command, control, and communication aircraft, and will perform many functions of the Air Operations Center. The project is implemented in three phases: Develop the next generation of air-to-ground radar before 2010 ; Develop air search radar and advanced battlefield management system around 2015 ; Equip signal and intelligence equipment in 2020. The main technical challenge is to perform both ground moving target indication and air moving target indication tasks at the same time. In April 2002 , the MC2A-X made its first flight, mainly to check the communication equipment, including internal communication equipment, tactical common data links, and receiving and transmitting equipment for communicating with other airborne sensors and space-based sensors. The first MC2A aircraft is scheduled to be delivered in 2012 .

2.3  Network Construction of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps are developing doctrine and strategy for a ” discontinuous battlefield , ” a battlefield without front lines that will allow the Army and Marine Corps to leverage the power of smaller, more mobile, and more information-dominant forces.

The Gulf War in 1991 exposed the shortcomings of the U.S. Army’s communication system, mainly the FM radio communication system, and the lack of situational awareness and coordination capabilities of combat troops. As a result, the U.S. Army began the digitalization process and achieved satisfactory results. In a battlefield exercise in 1994 , a new network-centric mechanized infantry battalion effortlessly defeated non-network opponents. The U.S. Army expects that in a network-centric environment, each weapon system will have more functions and the number required will be less. In 2001 , the U.S. Army began to develop the Future Combat System, with the goal of equipping non-traditional weapon platforms with advanced sensors and communication equipment to make them large network-centric systems.

The Marine Corps is an integrated land, sea and air force. As early as the Gulf War in 1991 , the Marine Corps began to digitally network the force through e-mail to improve situational awareness. Currently, the Marine Corps is in the process of expanding information networks to grassroots levels such as platoons and classes, and is developing the Marine Corps Enterprise Network, which will eventually develop into a digital Internet composed of ground grids, air grids and space grids. In the war in Afghanistan, the Marine Corps conducted the first large-scale joint operation, with air and ground special forces traveling 640km inland from an amphibious sea base and immediately engaging the enemy without any disconnection. Relying on various communication networks, the special forces contacted the command posts, logistics support forces and allied forces at sea and in Bahrain to coordinate operations and logistics. This is a typical example of effects-based operations, that is, connecting various forces through the network to carry out the most powerful strike on the target.

現代國語:

90年代的幾場局部戰爭表明,資訊網路在現代戰爭中的作用越來越重要,美國部隊的作戰方式開始由平台中心戰轉變為網路中心戰。例如在阿富汗戰爭中,美軍數位與廣播通訊網路將各種不同的、遍布各地的指揮所、感測器以及射手連接起來,使武器平台發揮了更大的作用。數位網路使”掠奪者”無人機能夠向作戰飛機提供即時目標資料與影像,並導引作戰飛機打擊目標。這與科索沃戰爭中”捕食者”無人機僅用於資訊收集相比有了重大發展。

1 美軍網路中心戰概述

1.1 網路中心戰的主要特徵–以效果為基礎

在阿富汗戰爭中,資訊網路讓美空軍一架飛機在執行單獨任務時平均可攻擊兩個目標,而在1991年海灣戰爭中攻擊一個目標平均需要10架飛機。這顯示網路中心戰不是基於平台的作戰,而是基於效果的作戰,每一個武器平台可以攻擊多個目標,而非多個武器平台攻擊一個目標。網路中心戰實現了資訊共享,作戰部隊及其武器平台,包括飛機、裝甲車、火砲、艦艇甚至單兵,不管處於什麼位置,均被集為一體。感測器平台、武器平台以及指揮所的網路化使得空中或地面部隊利用更準確的態勢感知訊息,更迅速、彼此協作並有選擇地攻擊目標,所以網路中心戰的效果是整體大於部分之和。例如,連網戰鬥機一定優於敵方同等數量的非連網戰鬥機,因為連網戰鬥機的每個飛行員不但可以從數位座艙顯示器上看到本機雷達捕捉的影像,而且可以看到同伴飛機雷達捕捉的影像。而非連網戰鬥機的飛行員只能看到本機雷達捕捉的影像。

1.2 網路中心戰的環境–全球資訊柵格

美軍《聯合構想2020》指出,全球資訊柵格(GIG)概念的發展將提供網路中心環境,使資訊能夠在全球範圍內分發。美國國防部已經開始開發作為寬頻網路的GIG,包括發展天基雷射通訊系統和陸基多路光纖網路。天基雷射通訊系統可以使飛機、地面站與軍事衛星相連,陸基多路光纖網則適用於100個不同的網路實體,如國家或地區主要軍事指揮部。未來,GIG將由有關電腦與通訊的資訊柵格,有關天基、空基、陸基、海基以及網路空間感測器的感測器/偵察柵格,以及有關發起與控制各層級作戰的指揮與控制柵格組成。未來10年,美軍將耗資50-100億美元用於GIG建設。預計未來兩年將耗資10億美元建構陸基GIG基礎設施,它將成為網路中心戰的基礎;耗資數十億美元建設特高頻衛星系統,它將使GIG基礎設施擴展到世界各地。發展GIG涉及許多新技術,如光纖多路復用、空間雷射通訊等技術。在美國2003財年國防預算中,將有25億美元用於太空雷射通訊技術,據稱該技術”具有在任何時間、向在任何地方作戰的美國部隊提供光纖質量的寬頻安全通訊的能力。”

1.3 網路中心戰的主要障礙–不相容性

美國軍方的通訊設備以及各軍種有關係統體系結構間普遍存在的不相容性是實現完全網路中心戰概念的主要障礙。參聯會的指揮、控制、通訊與電腦部負責克服此障礙,措施之一是確保現在採購的系統既與原有系統相容,也與未來系統相容。

2 美國各軍種網路中心戰研究進展

2.1美海軍協同作戰能力(CEC)網

中心設在”宙斯盾”艦上的抗干擾CEC系統,能夠將防空作戰指揮與控制系統、感測器、武器平台以及附近的其它平台連接在一起。 CEC感測器柵格為海軍提供了一幅兵力整體影像,它能夠融合來自多種機載感測器與艦載感測器的目標識別與追蹤數據,極大地提高海軍對戰場的態勢感知能力以及作戰能力。 CEC作戰柵格利用融合資料定位由防空作戰飛機以及艦艇發射的飛彈,使其在離作戰群安全的距離上攔截多個來襲飛彈。 CEC不僅是對網路中心戰的一個重要貢獻,而且為在所有戰區部隊間生成一體化空中圖像奠定了良好基礎。 2001年4月,美國國防部批准將CEC與美陸軍”愛國者”防空飛彈系統連結。據稱,CEC還可與美國空軍的預警機相連,以提供無縫的聯合戰區防空能力。另外,美海軍還計劃建立全球海軍因特網,這是一個能在世界範圍內的海軍部隊之間蒐集、處理與分發戰場數據的資訊柵格。

2.2 美國空軍智慧加油機及多任務指揮與控制飛機

美空軍正在實施智慧加油機計劃,目的是發展下一代空中加油飛機,並使之兼作資訊接收與中繼節點。智慧加油機是實現空中因特網的最佳選擇,因為它們通常是在戰區附近的高空飛行,加裝有關電子設備後即可實現此功能。透過資料鏈間的資訊傳輸裝置,加油機能夠在不同系統,如海軍CEC系統與陸軍改進型位置確定報告系統之間無縫接收與發送資料。智慧加油機將安裝電子掃描陣列,從而成為”鉚釘”聯合電子偵察飛機的遠程天線,從戰區內的多個地點蒐集信息,然後將信息轉發給”鉚釘”聯合電子偵察飛機,由後者進行處理與分發。空中加油機的智慧化主要是在KC-135加油機上加裝ROBE通訊終端。 ROBE是一種可擴展的模組化機載中繼終端,可用於數據中繼,實現網絡中成員間的視距/超視距通信,如實現空中與太空作戰中心指揮人員與戰區指揮人員之間的通信,或更快地向士兵提供重要數據,以便迅速做出決策以及打擊時間敏感目標。 ROBE還能擴大通訊範圍,讓所有士兵分享態勢感知資訊。 2002年10月,美空軍成功展示了智慧加油機概念。裝備ROBE的KC -135加油機從埃格林空軍基地飛向漢斯科莫空軍基地,成功地將來自F-15以及”聯合星”的所有戰術數據傳輸到漢斯科莫空軍基地的作戰中心,而且工作人員不定期對ROBE系統進行復位,以驗證系統可以從地面進行遙控。

美空軍也正在開發多任務指揮與控制飛機,即MC2A飛機。按設想,MC2A不但是感測器節點,也是決策節點,未來將取代E -8C聯合監視目標攻擊雷達系統、機載預警與控制系統飛機以及其它指揮、控制、通信飛機,並將執行空中作戰中心的許多功能。本計畫分三個階段實施:2010年以前開發下一代空-地雷達;2015年左右開發空中搜索雷達和先進戰場管理系統;2020年裝備訊號與情報設備。主要技術挑戰是同時執行地面動目標指示與空中動目標指示兩項任務。 2002年4月,MC2A-X進行了首次飛行,目的主要是檢查通訊設備,包括內部通訊設備、戰術通用資料鏈路以及與其它機載感測器、天基感測器進行通訊的接收與發送設備。首架MC2A飛機預定2012年交付。

2.3 美陸軍與海軍陸戰隊網路建設

美陸軍與海軍陸戰隊正在發展有關”非連續戰場”的學說與策略。非連續戰場是一種沒有前線的戰場,這將使陸軍與海軍陸戰隊充分發揮更小型、更機動以及更具資訊優勢的部隊的威力。

1991年的海灣戰爭暴露了美陸軍通訊系統,主要是調頻無線電通訊系統有缺點,而且作戰部隊的態勢感知與協調能力不足。於是,美陸軍開始了數位化進程,並且取得了滿意的結果。在1994年的一次戰場演習中,一個新型的網路中心機械化步兵營毫不費力地戰勝了非網路對手。美陸軍預計,在網路中心環境中每個武器系統所具有的功能更多,所需數量將更少。 2001年,美陸軍開始開發未來戰鬥系統,目標是為非傳統武器平台裝備先進的感測器與通訊設備,使其成為網路中心化的大系統。

海軍陸戰隊是一體化的陸、海、空部隊。早在1991年海灣戰爭期間,海軍陸戰隊就開始透過電子郵件使部隊實現數位網路化,提高態勢感知能力。目前,海軍陸戰隊正處於向諸如排級、班級等基層擴大資訊網路的過程中,正在開發海軍陸戰隊企業網,該網最終將發展為由地面柵格、空中柵格和太空柵格組成的數位因特網。在阿富汗戰爭中,海軍陸戰隊實施了第一次大規模聯合作戰,空中和地面特種部隊從兩棲海上基地向內地行進長達640km,並立即與敵人交火,沒有任何脫節。依靠各種通訊網絡,特種部隊與在海上和在巴林的指揮所、後勤支援部隊以及盟軍進行聯繫,協調作戰與後勤。這是基於效果作戰的典型範例,透過網路將各種部隊連接在一起,對目標實施威力最大的打擊。

中國原創軍事資源:http://www.81it.com/2012/1127/3320888.html