[中國國防]建立正確的意識，以遏制中國並進行認知戰爭行動

現代英語：

As the world continued to actively combat the COVID-19 pandemic, the British newspaper The Guardian reported in late May 2021 that Fazze, a public relations and marketing agency with close ties to Russian officials, was accused of providing funding to influential YouTubers, bloggers, and other opinion leaders in France, Germany, and other European countries to spread false information claiming that vaccines like Pfizer (BNT) and AstraZeneca (AZ) had caused hundreds of deaths. The false information also criticized the EU vaccine procurement system for harming public health in European countries, with the goal of sowing public distrust of Western vaccines and shifting public acceptance toward Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine. This is the most significant example of “perception warfare” in recent international history.

 In fact, human society has always adhered to the principle of “conquering the enemy without fighting” as the guiding principle for optimal military operations. While traditional warfare still primarily takes place in physical space, victory requires the physical capture of cities and territories, as well as the destruction of enemy forces. However, as humanity’s understanding of the nature of war deepens, the use of information technology has become a new trend in warfare, enabling the achievement of traditional combat effectiveness without the need for physical engagement. Given the increasing attention paid to “information warfare” and “hybrid warfare,” this article discusses the closely related concept of “cognitive warfare,” exploring the emerging threats facing our country and our national defense response strategy.

 Whether it’s what the US calls “hybrid warfare” or what Russia calls “information warfare,” the implications are quite similar: centered on the cognitive realm, the use of information to influence and manipulate targets, encompassing both peacetime public opinion and wartime decision-making. The rise of Nazi Germany after World War I was arguably the first modern regime to master the use of information to shape perceptions within its own country and even abroad. Its successful use of propaganda and lies, delivered through various communication technologies, was highly successful. Principles such as “repetition is power” and “negative information is more easily accepted and remembered than positive information” would later profoundly influence authoritarian governments, including Russia.

 Using information capabilities to subvert national regimes

 At the beginning of the 21st century, Russia began to pay attention to the situation where international discourse power was completely controlled by Western countries. It successively put forward theories such as “Information Warfare Theory” and “Sixth Generation Warfare Theory”, arguing that the sixth generation of warfare is a non-contact war that uses precision weapons and information warfare to traverse the battlefield. The purpose of war is no longer a devastating global war, but to achieve effects that cannot be achieved through traditional warfare by exploiting the enemy’s information capabilities to exploit its weaknesses, including changing social and cultural orientations and values, and thus subverting national regimes.

 In 2005, Russia established the international news channel “Russia Today.” Initially focused on soft power propaganda, it shifted its focus after the 2008 Georgian War to attacking negative aspects of Western society and fostering conspiracy theories. The 2014 Ukraine crisis became a training ground for Russian information warfare forces. Using electronic jamming and cyber theft, they intercepted Ukrainian communications, inferring subsequent Ukrainian actions and releasing damaging information at critical moments. They also targeted sensitive issues in eastern Ukraine, including the status of ethnic Russians and economic downturn, distributing a large amount of carefully selected, targeted information to resonate with the public, influencing their perceptions and behavior and gaining control of media opinion. In terms of “cognitive warfare,” Russia’s approach has been successful, and has become a model for the Chinese Communist Party.

 Manipulating “brain control” to control the public

 In 2014, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) proposed the cognitive operational concept of “brain control,” building on its past “three warfares” of psychological warfare, legal warfare, and public opinion warfare, as well as Russia’s theoretical framework of “information warfare.” It states that a nation’s cognitive space is composed of the superposition of countless individuals, and that “brain control” uses national languages, propaganda media, and cultural products as weapons to comprehensively infiltrate and control the cognition, emotions, and consciousness of the general public and national elites, ultimately distorting, disintegrating, and reshaping their national spirit, values, ideology, history, and culture, thereby achieving the strategic goal of winning without fighting.

 Therefore, the CCP’s “cognitive operations” fall under the broad category of psychological warfare. In the era of information globalization, it integrates information warfare, psychological warfare, and public opinion warfare, becoming the core of the CCP’s overall strategy. Since the 2016 military reform, it has been led by the newly formed “Strategic Support Force” and implemented at all political and military levels. On the one hand, the PLA has adopted American operational thinking in the field of “cognitive operations,” using units such as the 311 Base, the National University of Defense Technology, and the Academy of Military Sciences to develop tactics such as “psychological operations,” “ideological operations,” “consciousness manipulation,” and “strategic communication” to strengthen the “cognitive operations” capabilities jointly constructed by military-civilian integration and joint combat systems. On the other hand, it uses professional personnel to operate media platforms, shape the public opinion environment, and introduce “cognitive operations” into the actual combat application stage.

 The CCP’s recent “cognitive warfare” offensive against Taiwan reveals its methods and tactics. First, the CCP primarily uses the internet to collect personal data from Taiwanese citizens, using big data databases to categorize information by target group, based on political leanings, age, occupation, and other factors. Second, it leverages intelligence gathering to launch targeted cognitive attacks on specific social media platforms, influencing the psychology of the targeted groups, particularly by releasing disinformation to weaken and distract Taiwanese society. Third, it employs online virtual organizations to set up fake social media accounts, infiltrate online communities, and disguise themselves as whistleblowers, deliberately spreading fabricated information to create confusion. Cybertroopers then massively repost and discuss this information, manipulating audience perceptions and creating a cycle of disrupting information retention, manipulating cognitive psychology, and altering thinking patterns.

 Identify fake news and fight back together

 At this stage, the CCP’s campaign for “brain control” over Taiwan aims to influence Taiwanese society’s cognition, distorting public opinion, devaluing democratic values, intensifying opposition, disrupting political conditions, and undermining public trust in the government. The following preventive measures can be taken within the national defense system:

 1. Strengthening educational functions

 Through national defense education in schools, institutions, and society, we will raise the public’s awareness of the threat posed by the CCP’s “cognitive warfare” and their ability to identify false information, and cultivate the habit of rationality, verification, and calmness.

 2. Follow the constraints

 Although there are currently no internationally accepted legal rules that can clearly define the extent to which cognitive warfare constitutes an act of war, making it even more difficult to hold people accountable, media platforms can still strengthen the review of their own reporting content in accordance with existing regulations, and the public can also refrain from spreading suspicious information and following the trend of tennis melee, so as to facilitate the establishment of information verification measures and mechanisms.

 3. Combining Military and Civilian Strength

 Incorporate information and communication-related institutions and industries into the national defense mobilization mechanism, coordinate in peacetime the review, analysis, and disposal of fake news, strengthen talent training and research cooperation, and enhance the capabilities of professional units of the government and the national army; in wartime, cooperate with the overall national actions and carry out countermeasures.

 Currently, Taiwan already has the National Security Bureau’s National Security Operations Center responsible for responding to controversial information from hostile foreign forces. There’s also the non-profit Taiwan Fact-Checking Center. Facing the challenges of cognitive warfare, we must continue to integrate various sectors, strive for international intelligence exchange and experience sharing, optimize the media environment, collaborate across multiple channels, and instantly identify the authenticity and source of information, jointly building our offensive capacity to respond to cognitive warfare.

 Conclusion

 In reality, all countries around the world face threats related to cognitive warfare and information-based psychological warfare. However, democratic and free societies are by no means vulnerable to cognitive warfare attacks and must instead rely on diverse strategies and methods to protect them. We aim to establish a more comprehensive and substantive framework, build a powerful counterforce, and enhance the quality and discernment of our citizens, thereby gaining immunity from the CCP’s cognitive warfare campaign to seize control of our minds.

(The author is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Tamkang University)

現代國語：

在全球持續積極對抗新冠疫情之際，英國《衛報》2021年5月下旬報道，與俄羅斯官員關係密切的公關和營銷機構Fazze被指控向法國、德國和其他歐洲國家頗具影響力的YouTube用戶、博主和其他意見領袖提供資金，用於傳播虛假信息，聲稱輝瑞（BNTAZ）和阿斯特利康（BNTAZ）和阿斯特疫苗已導致數百人死亡。這些假訊息也批評歐盟疫苗採購體系損害了歐洲國家的公共衛生，目的是挑起大眾對西方疫苗的不信任，並促使大眾接受俄羅斯的Sputnik V疫苗。這是近代國際史上最顯著的「感知戰」案例。

事實上，人類社會自古以來，均以「不戰而屈人之兵」作為最佳軍事行動指導原則，儘管傳統戰爭主要仍在物理空間進行，需透過實際攻城掠地、消滅敵有生力量，才能獲得勝利。然隨人類對戰爭本質認知深化，利用資訊科技，於不需實體短兵相接的情況下，卻能達到傳統戰爭效果，已成為新型態戰爭趨勢。鑑於「資訊戰」、「混合戰」日益受重視，謹就與其密切相關的「認知作戰」概念進行論述，並探討我國所面臨的新型威脅及全民國防因應策略。

無論是美國所稱的「混合戰」，或俄國所說的「資訊戰」，其實指涉意涵很相似，即以認知領域為核心，利用訊息影響、操控對象目標涵蓋承平時期輿論及戰時決策的認知功能。一戰後，逐漸興起的納粹德國，可謂當代首個擅長運用資訊形塑本國，甚至外國民眾認知的政權，其透過各種傳播技術的政治宣傳與謊言包裝，相當成功；而所謂「重複是一種力量」、「負面訊息總是比正面訊息，更容易讓人接受和印象深刻」等實踐原則，日後更深刻影響專制極權政府與現在的俄羅斯。

藉資訊能力 顛覆國家政權

俄國於進入21世紀初，開始注意國際話語權遭西方國家完全掌控的情形，陸續提出「資訊戰理論」、「第6代戰爭理論」等論述，主張第6代戰爭是以精確武器及資訊戰，縱橫戰場的非接觸式戰爭，戰爭目的不再是毀滅性的全球大戰，而是藉利用敵方弱點的資訊能力，達成傳統戰爭無法實現的效果，包括改變社會文化取向、價值觀，進而顛覆國家政權等。

2005年，俄國成立國際新聞頻道「Russia Today」，起初主要是軟實力宣傳，2008年「喬治亞戰爭」後，轉為攻擊西方社會負面問題與製造陰謀論；2014年「烏克蘭危機」，成為俄軍資訊戰部隊的練兵場，透過電子干擾、網路竊密等手段，截收烏國對外通聯訊息，依此推判烏方後續舉動，並選擇在關鍵時機，釋放對烏國政府不利消息；另選定烏東地區敏感議題，包括俄裔民族地位、經濟不振等，投放大量經篩選的特定資訊，引發民眾共鳴，從而影響烏東人民認知與行為，取得媒體輿論主動權。就「認知作戰」言，俄國作法是成功的，更成為中共的效法對象。

操弄「制腦權」 控制社會大眾

中共2014年於過去心理戰、法律戰、輿論戰等「三戰」基礎，以及俄國「資訊戰」理論架構上，提出「制腦權」認知操作概念，指國家認知空間係由無數個體疊加而成，「制腦」是以民族語言、宣傳媒體、文化產品為武器，全面滲透、控制社會大眾與國家精英之認知、情感與意識，最終扭曲、瓦解、重塑其民族精神、價值觀念、意識形態、歷史文化等，達致不戰而勝的戰略目標。

是以，中共「認知作戰」屬於廣義心理戰範疇，是資訊全球化時代，融合資訊戰、心理戰及輿論戰的戰法，成為中共整體戰略主軸，並自2016年「軍改」後，由新組建的「戰略支援部隊」操盤，在各政略、軍事層次開展執行。一方面，共軍擷取美國在「認知作戰」領域的操作思維，以311基地、國防科技大學、軍事科學院等單位研提「心理作戰」、「思想作戰」、「意識操縱」、「戰略傳播」等戰法，以加強軍民融合及聯戰體系共同建構的「認知作戰」能力；另一方面，則以專業人員操作媒體平臺，形塑輿論環境，將「認知作戰」導入實戰運用階段。

從近年中共對臺進行的「認知作戰」攻勢，可拆解其途徑與手段。首先，中共主要係以網路蒐集國人個資，透過大數據資料庫，劃分政治傾向、年齡、職業等不同目標族群資訊；其次，配合情報偵蒐，針對個別社群媒體展開認知精準打擊，影響目標群眾心理，尤其釋放假訊息，以削弱、分散臺灣社會注意力；再次，則運用網路虛擬組織設置社群媒體假帳號，打入網路族群，偽裝成揭密者、吹哨者，刻意傳散變造資訊，製造混亂，再由網軍大量轉傳、討論，操弄受眾認知，進入阻斷資訊記憶、操縱認知心理、改變思考模式的運作循環。

識別假訊息 全民齊反制

基於現階段，中共對臺「制腦權」作戰，影響臺灣社會認知的目的，在於扭曲輿論、貶低民主價值、激化對立、擾亂政情、減損民眾對政府信任等，於全民國防體系可採取的防制辦法包括：

一、強化教育功能

分別透過全民國防之學校教育、機關教育、社會教育途徑，提高公眾對中共「認知作戰」威脅的認識，與對假訊息識別能力，養成理性、查證、冷靜習慣。

二、遵循約束規範

儘管目前尚無國際通用的法律規則，可明確定義何種程度的認知作戰已構成戰爭行為，更難以究責；然各媒體平臺仍可按既有規範，對自身報導內容加強審查，民眾也可做到不傳播可疑訊息、不跟風網壇混戰，俾利訊息查證措施與機制建立。

三、結合軍民力量

將資訊與傳播相關機構、產業，納入全民防衛動員機制，平時協調因應假訊息審查、分析、處置，加強人才培訓、研究合作，提升政府、國軍專業單位能力；戰時則配合國家整體作為，執行反制任務。

目前我國已有國安局「國家安全作業中心」執行對境外敵對勢力爭議訊息應處有關工作，民間亦有非營利組織成立的「臺灣事實查核中心」。面對「認知作戰」挑戰，仍應持續整合各界力量，爭取國際情報交流與經驗共享，優化媒體環境，多管道合作，即時辨識訊息真偽與來源，共同建設應處「認知作戰」攻勢能量。

結語

事實上，世界各國都同樣面臨「認知作戰」、「資訊心理戰」等相關威脅，然民主自由的社會環境，絕非易受「認知作戰」攻擊的溫床，更需仰賴多元策略與方式守護。期以更完善周全的實質架構，建構強而有力的反制力量，並提升我國公民素質及識別能力，於中共奪取「制腦權」的認知作戰中，獲得免疫。

（作者為淡江大學戰略研究所博士）

中國原創軍事資源：https://www.ydn.com.tw/news/newsInsidePage?chapterID=1431550