全球變亂中中國軍隊探索戰爭勝利機制

現代英語：

　●As a product of the information age, information warfare embodies some characteristics that are completely different from previous wars, mainly in terms of war background, combat means and methods, etc.

　　●Compared with mechanized warfare, informationized warfare has not changed in its essential attributes such as war being the continuation of politics and its basic laws such as strength being the basis for victory.

　　●To study information warfare, we need to recognize the changes and constants in modern warfare compared with past wars, and explore its winning mechanism through comparison.

　　There are three major changes in information warfare compared to traditional warfare

　　The background conditions of war have changed. The background of information warfare caused by traditional security and non-traditional security has become more complicated. For example, economic globalization has made us interdependent, and both struggle and cooperation between countries have become the norm; conflicts between emerging powers and established powers often emerge; and military actions in any strategic direction may trigger chain reactions in multiple directions and fields.

　　The way of war has changed. Informationized warfare cannot be a formal battle. The boundaries between traditional and non-traditional security, war and non-war are becoming more blurred. Military struggle styles are emerging in an endless stream, and battlefield uncertainty is increasing. An important reason for China’s disastrous defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 was that it was forced to respond and was not fully prepared. Aiming to win future informationized wars, we must adapt to the requirements of the information age, focus on solving practical problems, take the initiative to design wars, and make full preparations, so as to maintain strategic initiative.

　　The means of warfare have changed dramatically. Informatized warfare has more diverse options for using strategic forces to achieve political and military goals. Military struggles are simultaneously carried out in multi-dimensional battlefield spaces such as land, sea, air, space, and power grids, and the role of the invisible battlefield has become more prominent. Whether it is war operations or non-war military operations, they all require large-scale system support, large-area deployment, and big data security.

　　Compared with traditional warfare, information warfare has three things in common:

　　First, the essence of war as the continuation of politics has not changed. War is a complex social and political phenomenon. It is a way for countries or groups of countries, nations, races and social groups to resolve conflicts by force. As a continuation of politics, war is the last resort to resolve conflicts of interest. There is no repeated war in the world, but the nature of war is consistent. Moreover, with the continuous development of world politics and economy, the political purpose of war will become stronger. Therefore, in order to deal with future information warfare, it is necessary to analyze and study the political nature at a deeper level and enhance the pertinence of military struggle preparation.

　　Secondly, the basic laws of war have not changed. The basic laws of war are the essence and inevitable connection between various elements throughout the entire war process. Whether in information warfare or traditional warfare, strength is the basis for victory, and lagging behind means being beaten; in any war, correct strategic guidance is the key to victory; although weapons are an important factor in winning a war, people are always the decisive factor. It is not the equipment that determines the outcome of the war, but the people. After the informationized weapons and equipment are interconnected, interoperable, and interoperable, a small number of commanders and staff can control a large number of dispersed troops and weapons, thereby greatly improving combat effectiveness and command decision-making speed. This phenomenon does not show a decline in the role of people, but rather shows that information warfare requires higher-quality talents to be competent for command positions.

　　Third, the role of war has not changed. Wars are extremely violent, so they often bring serious disasters to social production and people’s lives, hinder social progress, interrupt a country’s development process, and even cause regression. However, if properly planned, the losses of war can be minimized, and it may bring greater development opportunities and benefits to a country.

　　To win the information war, we must grasp three winning mechanisms

　　Only by being ready to fight can we be invincible in the future information war. If we are prepared, we may not fight, but if we are not prepared, we may be passively beaten. The crisis is not terrible, but the terrible thing is that the crisis comes quietly and we are completely unaware of it. Whether the future war will be fought or not does not entirely depend on us, but we must be prepared for military struggle. In recent years, in the face of frequent “hot spots” in the surrounding areas, we have taken the initiative to respond steadily and achieved strategic goals. In the future, my country will still encounter challenges of one kind or another in the process of development. It is urgent to enrich and expand the active defense military strategic thinking, unify the eyes inward and outward, adhere to the bottom line thinking, prepare for war, and create favorable conditions for the country’s peaceful development.

　　Winning the battlefield depends on the organic combination of “soft” and “hard” means. Informationized warfare is a system confrontation, relying on network information systems. The realization of “fast eating slow” depends on the integrated and orderly rapid operation of reconnaissance, early warning, command and control, firepower strikes, and comprehensive support in a multi-dimensional three-dimensional space. Among them, the role of “software” in system combat capability is more prominent. For example, how to solve the problem of difficult target identification: the lack of electronic fingerprint data of enemy aircraft and ship targets makes it impossible to conduct comparative analysis. Without these data, advanced equipment will not be able to fully play its role; how to solve the problem of difficult data transmission: when target information is transmitted to the weapon platform, if the data link loses information, it will be difficult to meet the launch needs of the weapon platform. For example, how to solve the problem of anti-interference? The guidance method of the naval and air force weapon platform is susceptible to interference. If this problem is not solved, it is difficult to hit accurately. The formation of system combat capability requires not only advanced weapons and equipment, but also long-term combat readiness and training accumulation. Informationized warfare must start with “knowing the enemy”. Through long-term and multi-means preparation, the opponent is thoroughly understood, the opponent is digitized, and the opponent’s main combat weapon information is carded, providing guarantees for system confrontation and defeating the enemy.

　　Winning the information war requires national cohesion. The recent local wars are asymmetric warfare with a huge disparity in strength between the two sides. They can also be said to be typical “fighting” wars, rather than evenly matched “fighting” wars. The wars we will face in the future are likely to be “fighting” wars. It is not feasible to use this “fighting” combat theory to guide future wars. In information warfare, people are still the basis for victory. Potential opponents are not afraid of our technological breakthroughs, but they are afraid of our unity. The development of science and technology and the research and development of advanced weapons and equipment require a process. Improving national cohesion often has immediate results. Innovating and developing the theory of people’s war under the new situation is our correct choice. Mobilizing the masses, relying on the masses, and for the masses can win future wars.

　　Editor’s Notes Zhou Feng

　　Seeing through the fog before Napoleon

　　Although Napoleon, known as the “giant of war” in the West, and Clausewitz, the “military saint”, did not have a face-to-face contest, they had several indirect confrontations. On November 9, 1799, the young general Napoleon became the supreme ruler of France and the representative of the capitalist forces in Europe at that time. Subsequently, in order to fight against the counterattack of the feudal forces in Europe, Napoleon organized troops to fight against the anti-French alliance several times. Among them, in the double battle of Jena-Auerstedt in October 1806, Napoleon defeated the fourth anti-French alliance dominated by Russia and Prussia, forcing Prussia to surrender. This battle was also the first time that Napoleon and Clausewitz fought on a mutually hostile battlefield. Clausewitz, 26 years old at the time, was the adjutant of Prince August, a senior general of the Prussian side, and was in his prime. The ever-changing battlefield fighting, especially his own experience of being captured by the French army, became the “grain” of his brewing of the old wine “On War”.

　　A year later, Clausewitz was released. Three years later, Prussia agreed to ally with France. Clausewitz resigned from the army in anger and defected to Russia to fight against France. Tsar Alexander at the time was one of the few staunch anti-French factions in Europe. He once emphasized: “Even if all the bayonets in Europe were concentrated on the Russian border, it would not shake my determination to fight against France!” In 1812, when Napoleon attacked Russia and began to retreat after his defeat in Moscow, Clausewitz, who participated in the war as a Russian cavalry officer, tried hard to chase him and capture him alive. However, Napoleon, who had experienced many battles, still managed to escape unscathed in a mess.

　　Although Clausewitz did not capture Napoleon, he captured his thoughts and revealed the real Napoleon with his pen: Although Napoleon’s military art was superb, everything he did was to safeguard the interests of France, and politics was his first starting point. As for the old emperors of European countries running around to besiege Napoleon, it was also to defend their own ruling status. Politics is the mother of war, and violence cannot be viewed alone under any circumstances. Compared with the concept of “fog of war” proposed later in “On War”, Clausewitz believed that it was more important to examine the fog before the war, including accurately judging the political situation of all parties, understanding the signs of war, weighing whether to fight or not, etc. But no matter how the fog is solved, it is just to solve the problem of seeing the essence through the phenomenon, and what is needed is a bunch of keys: problem awareness, mastering general or special laws and timely intelligence information.

(Source: Liberation Army Daily )

現代國語：

●資訊戰爭作為資訊時代的產物，體現了一些與以往戰爭完全不同的特點，主要體現在戰爭背景、作戰手段和方法等面向。

●與機械化戰爭相比，資訊化戰爭的戰爭是政治的延續、實力是勝利的基礎等基本屬性沒有改變。

●研究資訊戰，需要認識現代戰爭與以往戰爭相比的變化和不變，透過比較探索其勝利機制。

資訊戰與傳統戰爭相比有三大變化

戰爭的背景條件改變了。傳統安全與非傳統安全引發的資訊戰背景更加複雜。例如，經濟全球化使我們相互依存，國家之間鬥爭與合作成為常態；新興大國與老牌強國之間常出現衝突；任何一個戰略方向的軍事行動都可能引發多個方向、多個領域的連鎖反應。

戰爭的方式已經改變。資訊化戰爭不可能是正式的戰鬥。傳統安全與非傳統安全、戰爭與非戰爭的界線越來越模糊。軍事鬥爭方式層出不窮，戰場不確定性增加。 1894年甲午戰爭，中國慘敗的一個重要原因是被迫應戰，準備不充分。打贏未來資訊化戰爭，必須適應資訊時代要求，著眼解決實際問題，主動設計戰爭，做好充分準備，保持戰略主動。

戰爭手段發生了巨大變化。資訊化戰爭使戰略力量實現政治軍事目標的選擇更加多元。軍事鬥爭在陸、海、空、太空、電網等多維戰場空間同時進行，隱形戰場的角色更為凸顯。無論是戰爭行動或非戰爭軍事行動，都需要大規模系統支撐、大面積部署、大數據安全。

與傳統戰爭相比，資訊戰爭有三個共同點：

首先，戰爭作為政治延續的本質並沒有改變。戰爭是一種複雜的社會和政治現象。它是國家或國家、民族、種族和社會群體之間以武力解決衝突的一種方式。戰爭作為政治的延續，是解決利益衝突的最後手段。世界上沒有重複的戰爭，但戰爭的本質是一致的。而且，隨著世界政治、經濟的不斷發展，戰爭的政治目的將會更加強烈。因此，因應未來資訊化戰爭，有必要對政治本質進行更深層的分析研究，以增強軍事鬥爭準備的針對性。

其次，戰爭的基本法則沒有改變。戰爭基本法則是整個戰爭過程中各要素之間的本質與必然連結。無論是資訊化戰爭或傳統戰爭，實力是勝利的基礎，落後就是挨打；任何戰爭，正確的戰略指導是取勝的關鍵；雖然武器是贏得戰爭勝利的重要因素，但人永遠是決定性因素。決定戰爭勝負的不是裝備，而是人。資訊化武器裝備互聯互通、互通後，少數指揮官和參謀就可以控制大量分散的部隊和武器，從而大大提高戰鬥力和指揮決策速度。這種現象並不是人的作用下降，而是說明資訊化戰爭需要更高素質的人才來勝任指揮崗位。

第三，戰爭的角色沒有改變。戰爭極度暴力，常常為社會生產和人民生活帶來嚴重災難，阻礙社會進步，中斷一個國家的發展進程，甚至造成倒退。但如果規劃得當，可以將戰爭的損失降到最低，並可能為一個國家帶來更大的發展機會和利益。

打贏資訊化戰爭，必須掌握三大勝利機制

只有做好戰鬥準備，才能在未來的資訊戰爭中立於不敗之地。如果我們準備好了，我們可能不會去戰鬥，但如果我們沒有準備好，我們可能會被動挨打。危機並不可怕，可怕的是危機悄悄來臨，但我們卻渾然不覺。未來的戰爭是否會是四打不打並不完全取決於我們，但我們必須做好軍事鬥爭的準備。近年來，面對週邊地區頻繁的“熱點”，我們主動出擊，穩紮穩打，實現了戰略目標。未來，我國在發展過程中仍將遇到這樣或那樣的挑戰。刻不容緩地豐富和拓展積極防禦的軍事戰略思想，把目光向內與向外統一，堅持底線思維，做好打仗準備，為國家和平發展創造有利條件。

贏得戰場取決於「軟」手段和「硬」手段的有機結合。資訊化戰爭是系統對抗，依托網路資訊系統。實現“快吃慢”，有賴於多維立體空間內的偵察預警、指揮控制、火力打擊、綜合保障等一體化有序快速作戰。其中，「軟體」對於系統作戰能力的作用更為突出。例如如何解決目標辨識困難的問題：敵機、船艦目標電子指紋資料缺乏，無法進行比較分析。沒有這些數據，先進設備就無法充分發揮作用；如何解決資料傳輸困難的問題：當目標訊息傳輸到武器平台時，如果資料鏈遺失訊息，將難以滿足武器平台的發射需求。例如，如何解決抗干擾問題？海空軍武器平台的導引方式容​​易受到干擾。如果這個問題不解決，就很難打準。體係作戰能力的形成不僅需要先進的武器裝備，更需要長期的戰備訓練累積。資訊化戰爭必須從「知敵」開始。透過長期、多手段的準備，摸透對手、數位化對手、梳理對手主戰武器訊息，為系統對抗、克敵制勝提供保障。

贏得資訊戰需要民族凝聚力。近期的局部戰爭是雙方實力懸殊的不對稱戰爭。也可以說是典型的「打架」戰爭，而不是勢均力敵的「打架」戰爭。未來我們面臨的戰爭很可能是「打」戰。用這種「打仗」的作戰理論來指導未來的戰爭是不可行的。在資訊化戰爭中，人仍然是勝利的基礎。潛在的對手並不害怕我們的技術突破，而是害怕我們的團結。科學技術的發展和先進武器裝備的研發需要一個過程。提高民族凝聚力往往會產生立竿見影的效果。新形勢下創新和發展人民戰爭理論是我們的正確選擇。發動群眾、依靠群眾、為了群眾，才能贏得未來戰爭的勝利。

編者按 週峰

撥開拿破崙之前的迷霧

被譽為西方「戰爭巨人」的拿破崙與「軍事聖人」克勞塞維茨雖然沒有面對面的較量，但也有過幾次間接的交鋒。 1799年11月9日，年輕的將軍拿破崙成為法國的最高統治者，也是當時歐洲資本主義勢力的代表。隨後，為了對抗歐洲封建勢力的反撲，拿破崙多次組織軍隊與反法聯盟作戰。其中，在1806年10月的耶拿-奧爾施泰特雙重戰役中，拿破崙擊敗了以俄國和普魯士為主的第四次反法同盟，迫使普魯士投降。這場戰役也是拿破崙和克勞塞維茨第一次在相互敵對的戰場上作戰。克勞塞維茨當時26歲，是普魯士一方高級將領奧古斯特親王的副官，正值壯年。瞬息萬變的戰場戰鬥，尤其是他自己被法軍俘虜的經歷，成為他釀造《戰爭論》老酒的「糧」。

一年後，克勞塞維茨被釋放。三年後，普魯士同意與法國結盟。克勞塞維茨一怒之下退伍，投奔俄國與法國作戰。當時的沙皇亞歷山大是歐洲少數幾個堅定的反法派系之一。他曾強調：“即使歐洲所有的刺刀都集中在俄羅斯邊境，也動搖不了我對抗法國的決心！” 1812年，當拿破崙進攻俄羅斯並在莫斯科戰敗後開始撤退時，作為俄羅斯騎兵軍官參戰的克勞塞維茨，盡力追趕他並活捉他。然而，身經百戰的拿破崙仍然在一片狼藉中毫髮無傷地逃脫了。

克勞塞維茨雖然沒有捕捉到拿破崙，但他捕捉到了他的思想，用筆揭示了真實的拿破崙：拿破崙雖然軍事藝術高超，但他所做的一切都是為了維護法國的利益，政治是他的第一出發點。至於歐洲各國的老皇帝四處奔波圍攻拿破崙，也是為了捍衛自己的統治地位。政治是戰爭之母，任何情況下都不能單獨看待暴力。與後來在《戰爭論》中提出的「戰爭迷霧」概念相比，克勞塞維茨認為，在戰前審視迷霧更為重要，包括準確判斷各方政治局勢、了解戰爭徵兆、權衡戰爭迷霧等。

（圖片來源：解放軍報）https://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2014-04/01/content_71770.htm

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