Chinese Military Analysis of Japan’s Space and Cyberspace Deterrence Strategy

中國對日本太空和網路空間威懾戰略的軍事分析

現代英語:

The development of new military forces is changing the style of warfare. After years of development, space (also known as outer space) and cyberspace (hereinafter referred to as cyberspace) forces have transformed from conceptual forces to real forces. How to use these two new forces has become a key research topic for major powers in the world. In March 2024, the Security Research Group of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation of Japan released a research report entitled “War 3.0: Fundamental Changes in War” (hereinafter referred to as the “Report”), which explored how to use space and cyberspace to achieve strategic deterrence from the perspective of maintaining Japan’s national security. It also proposed a typical scenario of cyberspace confrontation against the background of an emergency in the Taiwan Strait, showing Japan’s thinking on the use of combat forces in emerging fields. The main contents are summarized as follows for readers.

1

War 3.0 is coming

The report believes that during the Cold War, the boundaries between civilians, the state and the military were clear, and the economic dependence between the two sides was low. This was the era of War 1.0. After the Cold War, globalization accelerated, and in 2001, the era of the war on terror began. The main body of the confrontation became state and non-state actors, which was the era of War 2.0. Around 2010, the confrontation between major powers reappeared. Due to the high degree of economic globalization, “war” occurred more in dimensions other than military. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine shows that in modern warfare, other means are becoming as important as military means. At the same time, commercial companies are also more involved in the research and development and use of emerging military technologies, and the government’s control over military power has been weakened. Since then, a new concept can be used to describe modern warfare, namely War 3.0.

As long as war occurs in the context of globalization, the characteristics of War 3.0 will appear. In the era of War 3.0, the target of deterrence is mainly state actors, but the specific form of conflict may be similar to hybrid warfare or conventional warfare. When formulating deterrence strategies in the space and cyberspace domains, both types of conflict should be taken into account. It is necessary to recognize that emerging domain capabilities are multipliers of traditional capabilities. The significance of competing for control in emerging domains lies in enhancing one’s own physical forces such as land, sea, and air forces or weakening the physical forces of opponents.

The report points out that using emerging field forces to carry out attacks can cause no tangible physical damage, is conducive to conflict management, and is the best tool for gray zone operations. Japan currently faces two main problems. One is that the emerging field forces owned by law enforcement agencies are not in line with mission requirements. The other is that it needs to consider how to use emerging field forces to achieve effective conflict management.

2

Strategic Deterrence in Emerging Fields

The report uses traditional deterrence theory for analysis and concludes that space and cyberspace have five common characteristics: difficult situational awareness, high defense difficulty, low attack threshold, mixed actors, and lack of international codes of conduct. Easy to attack and difficult to defend are the common characteristics of these two fields, so it is difficult to achieve effective strategic deterrence. In this regard, action should be taken in four aspects: First, improve situational awareness capabilities so that when problems occur, the cause of the failure can be quickly determined, the attacker can be identified, and the damage effect can be evaluated when counterattacked. Second, improve resilience to ensure that the loss of some functions will not cause the entire system to become disabled. Third, strengthen offensive capabilities, which can be used to attack in a certain field, or to use means in other fields to conduct cross-domain attacks. Fourth, achieve arms control cooperation between countries and build trust, formulate codes of conduct, etc.

3

Strengthening deterrence in air and space

1. The connotation of air and space control continues to be enriched

The report believes that the air and space can control the entire battlefield. In order to compete for air and space dominance, various types of equipment are constantly updated, combat systems are becoming more and more complex, and the scope of operations is becoming wider and wider. In combat, both sides often focus on the “find, locate, track, decide, engage, and assess (Find Fix Track Targeting Engage Assess, F2T2EA)” full kill chain, and simultaneously confront in emerging fields such as space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic space, which greatly expands the connotation of traditional dominance. In future high-end wars, the side with a higher level of space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic space capabilities may have an overwhelming advantage in overall combat capabilities.

2. How to exert the deterrent function of space power

The report emphasizes that space systems play an important role in intelligence collection, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), communications, positioning, navigation and timing (PNT), missile warning, environmental monitoring, etc., and also provide increasingly important support for the use of nuclear and conventional forces. In order to form a strong space deterrence, first, we must possess and demonstrate the corresponding capabilities, mainly the resilience, defense, counter-retaliation and situational awareness capabilities of the space system. Second, we must show the enemy our determination to use retaliatory capabilities. Third, we must form a cross-domain deterrence to ensure the security of the entire space system. In addition, systems in other fields such as land, sea and air must be able to supplement some of the functions of the space system. In the face of enemy attacks on our satellites, we must retaliate not only from space, but also through land, sea, air and cyberspace.

As space systems play an increasingly important role in Japan’s national defense, we will further enhance our deterrence against hostile offensive actions. While improving the resilience of space assets, we will attach great importance to the effective use of commercial space services.

3. How to enhance the deterrent effect of Japan’s aerospace power

The report points out that Japan should attach importance to cross-domain coordination of sea, land, air and space forces, especially to strengthen cooperation with the United States. It is necessary to closely monitor the surrounding airspace, use aircraft to perform denial missions when the situation escalates, and take active defense measures to prevent missile attacks. It is necessary to strengthen the construction of Self-Defense Force bases and realize the mutual use of air bases between Japan and the United States. Japan is surrounded by the sea, and it is necessary to attach importance to developing the ability to use air means to strike maritime targets to ensure the security of the homeland.

Faced with the vast Indo-Pacific region, it is difficult for Japan to accurately grasp the regional situation by relying solely on its own aerospace power. It is necessary to share intelligence information through multilateral cooperation and build a Common Operational Picture (COP) in the Indo-Pacific region to accurately and comprehensively grasp the regional situation and have a deterrent effect on potential enemies. It is necessary to strengthen cooperation with countries other than the United States, especially Australia. Japan, the United States and Australia should establish joint ammunition and fuel depots in their respective countries. In the field of space, Japan will expand cooperation in hosting payloads. If it can cooperate with European countries, then future attacks on Japanese satellites can be regarded as attacks on multiple countries. It is becoming increasingly important to make full use of the power of allies and use their aerospace power to achieve deterrence goals.

4

Strengthening Deterrence in Cyberspace

1. Characteristics of Cyberspace Operations

The report believes that cyberspace has an increasing impact on the course of war, and cyberspace combat capabilities can even deter the occurrence of an entire conflict. Cyberspace security plays an important role in protecting various systems from cyber attacks, ensuring that confidential information is not leaked, and ensuring the normal operation of other systems such as critical infrastructure. It is also of great significance for cognitive domain protection.

There are two main characteristics of cyberspace at present. First, the boundary between military and civilian is blurred. The potential of military application of Internet is constantly emerging. In the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the artillery combat management system (GIS Art for Artillery, GIS ARTA) used by Ukraine is to send data through drones and smartphones to determine the target location and launch attacks, which is very effective. Second, the security concept based on closed system is outdated. Even with physical isolation, it is impossible to completely prevent attacks. Cyberspace is easy to attack but difficult to defend, and the offense and defense are asymmetric. In addition, cyberspace operations can control the rhythm of conflict escalation in a low-intensity form, and can also be upgraded to a powerful weapon with high-intensity offensiveness after the official outbreak of military conflict.

2. Developing emerging technologies to enhance cyber warfare capabilities

The report points out that the development of emerging technologies will continue to change the rules of warfare, and the Japanese Ministry of Defense has begun to study the use of cloud computing to build a basic computing environment. It plans to build a diversified network environment, use Starlink satellites and 5G networks to provide Internet services, and consider enabling the new Internet communication protocol QUIC (Quick UDP Internet Connection). The first quantum computer has been developed, and related research on anti-quantum cryptography has been carried out. At the same time, it also pays close attention to the specific ways of combining artificial intelligence with cyber warfare.

3. Ways to strengthen cyber deterrence

The report emphasizes that the development of artificial intelligence technology and the adjustment of the network component supply chain are two uncertain factors. Japan should focus on improving its cyber warfare capabilities from the following aspects: (1) vigorously promote intelligence information sharing; (2) build active defense systems; (3) introduce zero trust and risk management frameworks; (4) establish the ability to attack adversary networks; (5) accelerate legislation in the field of cybersecurity; (6) expand the scale of talent training and increase support for commercial enterprises. By carrying out the above work, Japan can achieve early detection and response to cyber attacks. Even if it encounters a cyber attack, it can be discovered, processed and recovered at an early stage to ensure the resilience of the system to continue to operate. In addition, when Japan is attacked, it should coordinate actions with the US military. In peacetime, joint training should be strengthened so that it can carry out joint operations with the Cyber ​​Mission Force (CMF) composed of relevant forces of the US Cyber ​​Command.

Responsible for directing, coordinating and conducting cyber operations

5

Conception of cyberspace combat scenarios

The report describes a basic scenario of cyber warfare between the Red and Blue sides, with the Taiwan Strait incident as the background, and puts forward the following important viewpoints: First, when the Blue side has an absolute advantage, the Blue side should focus on taking defensive actions to achieve deterrence. When the forces of the two sides tend to be balanced, the Blue side should actively take offensive actions to seize the initiative. Second, the Blue side can launch cyber attacks around the Red side’s observation, adjustment, decision-making, and action (OODA) links to weaken the Red side’s military capabilities, especially its maritime and landing combat capabilities, and carry out “anti-military cyber attack missions.” When necessary, strike the Red side’s social infrastructure to weaken its overall strength. At the same time, take cyber attacks to induce and divide public opinion, weaken the Red side’s willingness to take action, and carry out “anti-value cyber attack missions.” Third, in the anti-military cyber attack mission, the Blue side can attack the Red side’s aircraft, and can also take measures such as data pollution, deception cloud, and communication network interruption to attack the Red side’s command and control system. In the action of attacking the civilian network system, cyber attacks can be carried out on key entities of railway and ship operations in the Red coastal areas and key infrastructure such as the power grid in coastal metropolises that support social and economic systems. There are also options for attacking Red Team financial systems, media servers, and water and gas supply networks.

In order to deal with possible cyber attacks from the Red side in the event of an emergency in the Taiwan Strait, Japan should do the following: First, adopt an active defense strategy, require commercial operators to share information with the government, and introduce artificial intelligence to improve cyber situational awareness and network resilience. Second, introduce a large-scale data forensics platform to identify the authenticity of massive image data and counter false information. Third, give priority to countermeasures against domestic cyber attacks, effectively defend the networks of defense, government departments, law enforcement agencies and private enterprises through various active cyber defense measures, and deal with cognitive domain actions against the Japanese public.

6

Conclusion

The report proposed the concept of War 3.0 and launched a series of discussions on achieving cyberspace and space deterrence. While suggesting strengthening its own relevant capacity building, it repeatedly emphasized the need to strengthen cooperation with the United States, especially with countries related to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and AUKUS. With Japan’s application to join AUKUS on April 25, 2024, the Asia-Pacific version of the “mini-NATO” alliance has taken shape, and regional peace and stability will be severely impacted.

Disclaimer: This article is reprinted from Military High-Tech Online, the original author is Shi Honglin. The content of the article is the original author’s personal opinion. This public account is translated/reprinted only for sharing and conveying different opinions. If you have any objections, please contact us!

Reprinted from Military High-Tech Online

Author: Shi Honglin

Introduction to the Institute

The International Institute of Technology and Economics (IITE) was established in November 1985. It is a non-profit research institution affiliated to the Development Research Center of the State Council. Its main functions are to study major policy, strategic and forward-looking issues in my country’s economic, scientific and technological social development, track and analyze the development trends of world science and technology and economy, and provide decision-making consulting services to the central government and relevant ministries. “Global Technology Map” is the official WeChat account of the International Institute of Technology and Economics, dedicated to delivering cutting-edge technology information and technological innovation insights to the public.

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Tel: 010-82635522

繁體中文國語:

新領域軍事力量的發展正在改變戰爭樣式,其中太空(也稱為外層空間)和網路空間(以下簡稱網空)力量經過多年的發展,已由概念力量轉變為現實力量。如何利用這兩種新質力量,已成為世界各主要強國重點研究的內容。 2024年3月日本笹川和平財團安全研究小組發布研究報告《戰爭3.0:戰爭的根本變化》(以下簡稱《報告》),從維護日本國家安全的角度出發,探討如何利用太空和網空實現戰略威懾等問題,並以台海突發事件為背景,提出了一個網空對抗的典型場景,展示了日本在運用新興領域作戰力量上的思考。現將其主要內容整理如下,以颯讀者。

01

戰爭3.0時代到來

《報告》認為,在冷戰時期,平民、國家和軍隊之間的界線很清晰,對峙雙方經濟依賴度較低,此時是戰爭1.0時代。冷戰後全球化加速發展,2001年進入反恐戰爭時代,對抗的主體變成國家與非國家行為體,此時是戰爭2.0時代。 2010年前後大國對抗再次出現,由於經濟全球化發展程度較高,「戰爭」較多發生在軍事以外的維度。俄烏衝突顯示在現代戰爭中,其他手段正變得與軍事手段同等重要。同時,商業公司也更參與新興軍事技術的研發和使用,政府對軍事力量的控製程度受到了削弱。自此可以用一個新的概念來描述現代戰爭,即戰爭3.0。

只要戰爭在全球化背景下發生,就會出現戰爭3.0所包含的特徵。進入戰爭3.0時代,威懾的目標主要是國家行為體,但具體衝突形式可能類似混合戰爭,也可能是常規戰爭。在製定太空和網空領域威懾戰略時,要同時考慮這兩類衝突形式。要體認到新興領域能力是傳統能力的倍增器,爭奪新興領域制權的意義,在於提升己方陸、海、空軍等實體力量或削弱對手的實體力量。

《報告》指出,運用新興領域力量實施攻擊,可以不造成有形的物理破壞,有利於管控衝突,是在灰色地帶行動的最佳工具。日本當前主要面臨兩個問題,一是執法機構擁有的新興領域力量和任務需求不相適應。二是需要考慮具體如何運用新興領域力量,以達到衝突的有效管控。

02

新興領域的戰略威懾

《報告》利用傳統威懾理論進行分析,得出太空和網空具有五個共同特徵:態勢感知難、防禦難度大、攻擊門檻低、行動主體混雜、缺乏國際行為準則。易攻難守是這兩個領域的共同特點,因此較難實現有效的戰略威懾。對此,應從四個方面採取行動:一是提高態勢感知能力,以便在出現問題後,能夠迅速確定故障原因,識別攻擊者,並在反擊時評估毀傷效果。二是提升復原力,確保喪失部分功能不會導致整個系統失能。三是強化進攻能力,可在某一領域進行攻擊,也可利用其他領域手段進行跨域攻擊。四是實現國家間軍備控制合作並建立信任,制定行為準則等。

03

加強空中和太空的威懾

(一)空天制權的內涵不斷豐富

《報告》認為,空中和太空可以瞰整個戰場,為爭奪空天制權,各類裝備不斷更新,作戰系統越來越複雜,作戰範圍也越來越寬廣。在作戰中,雙方往往會圍繞「發現、定位、追蹤、決策、交戰、評估(Find Fix Track Targeting Engage Assess,F2T2EA)」全殺傷鏈各環節,在太空、網空、電磁空間等新興領域同時進行對抗,大大拓展了傳統制權的內涵。在未來高端戰爭中,利用太空、網空和電磁空間能力水準較高的一方,可能會在整體作戰能力上擁有壓倒性的優勢。
(二)如何發揮太空力量的嚇阻功能

《報告》強調,太空系統在情報收集、監視和偵察(Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,ISR),通信,定位、導航和授時(Positioning, Navigation and Timing, PNT),導彈預警,環境監測等方面發揮著重要作用,也為使用核武力量和常規力量提供越來越重要的支持。為了形成強大的太空威懾,一要擁有並展現對應能力,主要是太空系統的復原力、防禦力、反制報復能力以及態勢感知能力。二要向敵方展示使用報復能力的決心。三要形成跨域威懾以確保太空全系統安全。此外,陸海空等其他領域系統要能補充太空系統的部分功能,面對敵方對己方衛星的攻擊,不僅要從太空報復,還要透過陸海空和網空進行報復。

由於太空系統在日本國防中的作用越來越大,所以要進一步提升對敵對進攻行為的威懾。在提升太空資產復原力的同時,要高度重視商業太空服務的有效運用。

(三)如何增強日本空天肌力嚇阻效果

《報告》指出,日本應重視海陸空天力量的跨域協同,特別是加強與美國的合作。若要緊密監視週邊空域,在局勢升級時使用飛機執行拒止任務,採取主動防禦措施,防止遭遇飛彈攻擊。要加強自衛隊基地建設,實現日美兩國空軍基地的互相使用。日本四面環海,要重視發展使用空中手段打擊海上目標的能力,以確保本土安全。

面對廣袤的印太地區,日本僅靠自身的空天力量,難以準確掌握區域態勢,要透過多邊合作分享情報訊息,建構印太地區通用作戰態勢圖(Common Operational Picture, COP),以精準全面地掌握地區態勢,對潛在敵人產生嚇阻效果。要加強與美國以外的國家,特別是澳洲的合作。日本、美國和澳洲應在各自國家建立聯合彈藥和燃料庫。在太空領域,日本將拓展託管有效載荷合作,如能和歐洲國家合作,那麼未來攻擊日本衛星的行為,將可以被視為對多個國家的攻擊。要充分借助盟友力量,利用其空天力量達成威懾目的,這一點正變得越來越重要。

04

加強網空的威懾

(一)網空作戰的特點

《報告》認為,網空對戰爭進程的影響越來越大,而網空作戰能力甚至可以嚇阻整個衝突的發生。網空安全對於保護自身各類系統免受網路攻擊、確保機密資訊不會外洩、確保關鍵基礎設施等其他系統正常運作發揮重要作用,對於認知域防護也有著十分重大的意義。

目前網空主要有兩個特點,一是軍民界線模糊。網路的軍事應用潛力不斷顯現,在俄烏衝突中,烏克蘭使用的砲兵作戰管理系統(GIS Art for Artillery, GIS ARTA),就是透過無人機和智慧型手機,發送資料確定目標位置並發動攻擊,且非常有效。二是基於封閉系統的安全觀念已經過時。即便是進行物理隔離,也不可能完全防止被攻擊,網空易攻難守,攻防呈現不對稱特徵。此外,網空作戰既可以低強度形式控制衝突升級的節奏,也可以在正式爆發軍事衝突後,升級為具有高強度攻擊性的強大武器。
(二)發展新興科技提升網路戰能力

《報告》指出,新興技術的發展將持續改變作戰規則,日本防衛省已開始研究使用雲端運算建構基本運算環境。計畫建置多樣化網路環境,使用「星鏈」衛星和5G網路提供網路服務,考慮啟用新的網路通訊協定QUIC(Quick UDP Internet Connection)。已研發首台量子計算機,並進行反量子密碼的相關研究。同時,也高度關注人工智慧與網路戰結合的具體方式。

(三)強化網空威懾的辦法

《報告》強調,人工智慧技術的發展和網路部件供應鏈的調整是兩個不確定的影響因素。日本應著重從以下幾點提升網路戰能力:(1)大力促進情報資訊共享;(2)建構主動防禦系統;(3)引入零信任和風險管理框架;(4)建立攻擊對手網路的能力; (5)加速網路安全領域立法;(6)擴大人才培育規模,增加對商業企業的支持。透過進行以上工作,日本可以實現提前發現和應對網路攻擊。即使遭遇網路攻擊,也可在早期階段發現、處理和恢復,確保系統繼續運作的彈性。此外,當日本受到攻擊時,要與美軍協調行動。平時要加強聯合訓練,以便能夠與由美國網路司令部相關部隊組成網路任務部隊(The Cyber​​ Mission Force, CMF)實施聯合行動。
負責指導、協調和執行網路行動

05

對網空作戰場景的構想

《報告》以台海突發事件為背景,描述了一個紅藍雙方網路戰的基本場景,提出了以下幾個重要觀點:一是當藍方擁有絕對優勢時,藍方應側重於採取防禦行動實現威懾。當雙方力量趨於平衡時,藍方則應積極採取攻擊行動以爭取主動權。二是藍方可以圍繞紅方觀察、調整、決策、行動(Observe Orient Decide Act, OODA)的各環節展開網絡攻擊,削弱紅方軍事能力,特別是海上作戰和登陸作戰能力,開展「反軍事網絡攻擊任務」。在必要時候打擊紅方社會基礎設施,削弱其整體實力。同時,採取網路攻擊誘導和分裂公眾輿論,削弱紅方採取行動的意願,進行「反價值網路攻擊任務」。第三是在反軍事網路攻擊任務中,藍方可以攻擊紅方飛機,還可以採取資料污染、欺騙雲以及通訊網路中斷等措施,攻擊紅方指控系統。在攻擊民用網路系統的行動中,可以對紅方沿海地區鐵路和船舶運營的關鍵實體以及支持社會和經濟系統的沿海大城市電網等關鍵基礎設施進行網路攻擊。還可以選擇攻擊紅方金融系統、媒體伺服器以及供水和天然氣供應網路。

為因應台海突發事件發生時紅方可能的網路攻擊,日本應做好以下幾點:一是採取主動防禦策略,要求商業業者要與政府分享訊息,引入人工智慧以提高網空態勢感知和網路彈性。二是引進大規模資料取證平台以辨識海量影像資料的真實性,反制假資訊。第三是優先採取針對本國網路攻擊的反制措施,透過各種積極網路防禦措施有效保衛防衛、政府部門、執法機構和私人企業的網絡,並處理針對日本公眾的認知域行動。
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結語

該報告提出了戰爭3.0的概念,圍繞實現網空和太空威懾展開了一系列論述,在建議加強自身相關能力建設的同時,多次強調要加強與美國,特別是四方安全對話(Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, QUAD)和奧庫斯(AUKUS)相關國家的合作。隨著2024年4月25日日本申請加入“奧庫斯”,亞太版的“小北約”聯盟已現雛形,地區和平穩定將受到嚴重衝擊。

免責聲明:本文轉自軍事高科技在線,原作者史宏林。文章內容係原作者個人觀點,本公眾號編譯/轉載僅為分享、傳達不同觀點,如有任何異議,歡迎聯絡我們!

轉自丨軍事高科技在線

作者丨史宏林

研究所簡介

國際技術經濟研究所(IITE)成立於1985年11月,是隸屬於國務院發展研究中心的非營利研究機構,主要功能是研究我國經濟、科技社會發展中的重大政策性、策略性、前瞻性問題,追蹤分析世界科技、經濟發展態勢,為中央和相關部會提供決策諮詢服務。 「全球技術地圖」為國際技術經濟研究所官方微信帳號,致力於向大眾傳遞尖端技術資訊與科技創新洞見。

地址:北京市海淀區小南莊20號樓A座

中文原文來源:https://www.163.com/dy/article/J5UO0ID90514R8DE.html

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