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China National Cyber Security Strategy, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Strategic Support Forces, 國家網絡空間安全戰略

中國優先發展網絡戰略信息化戰 // China to give priority to the development of network strategy & information warfare

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中國優先發展網絡戰略信息化戰 //

China to give priority to the development of network strategy & information warfare

Cyberspace has become the national comprehensive security of the door. Network warfare reality, the network battlefield globalization, network confrontation normalization, the network attack heart white hot, the network to build the army of the general trend, no one can block. Give priority to the development of network strategy, and actively seize the commanding heights of network strategy, for my army building is of great significance.

　　The main features of network strategy

Network strategic strength refers to the ability to achieve the desired results through cyberspace. From the current development and possible future trends, mainly with the following characteristics.

Composed of multiple. In recent years, the major network events in the world have shown that the strategic power of the military network is the main force of cyberspace competition. The strategic power of the government departments and the private sector is an important part of the cyberspace competition. The “cyber warrior” An important addition.

Strong professionalism. Network strategy strength has a strong latent and difficult to predict, and the speed of light, instantaneous effect, monitoring and early warning is difficult; once the action is effective, damage effect superimposed magnification or non-linear step, with a typical “butterfly effect.” In 2010, the “shock net” virus attacked the centrifuges of the Iranian Bushehr nuclear power plant and the Natanz uranium enrichment plant, resulting in nearly a thousand centrifuge scrapped, forcing Iran’s nuclear capacity building to delay 2 to 3 years, opened the network attack soft means Destroy the national hard facilities.

Destructive. The strategic power of the network is no less than the weapons of mass destruction. Russia and Georgia in 2008, “the five-day war”, the Russian military to Georgia’s television media, government websites and transportation systems as the goal, to carry out a comprehensive “bee group” type of network paralysis attacks, leading to grid government agencies operating chaos, Logistics and communication system collapse, much-needed war materials can not be delivered in a timely manner, the potential of the war has been seriously weakened, a direct impact on the grid of social order, operational command and troop scheduling. The Russian military doctrine has identified cybercrime as a weapon of mass destruction and has retained the right to use weapons of mass destruction or nuclear weapons to counterattack.

Advanced technology and phase. Network strategy strength development speed, replacement fast, technical materialization for the equipment cycle is short. At present, the speed of the microprocessor doubles every 18 months, the backbone bandwidth doubled every six months, a variety of new electronic information equipment after another, all kinds of application software dizzying. Cyber ​​space confrontation is the field of information in the field of offensive and defensive struggle, the use of network strategy forces in the confrontation of the phase with grams, constantly renovated. The development of the firewall and the information monitoring technology makes the software of the anti-wall software upgrade continuously. The development of the firewall and the information monitoring technology has led to the development of the firewall. , Can be described as “a foot high, magic high ten feet.”

　　The Developing Trend of Network Strategic

From the subordinate force to the development of key forces. In the past, the network strategic power is mainly for other forces to provide information security, in a subordinate position; with the development of network information technology, network system control of other rights, network strategic forces from subordinate status to the dominant position to accelerate into, to maintain the country The key to safety. There is no network security there is no sovereign security, “no net” to become a new law of war, the world’s major countries around the network space development rights, dominance and control of a new round of competition, especially the United States and Russia adhere to the practice In the use and continue to develop.

From the maintenance of force to the development of specialized forces. In the past, the network strategy is mainly to maintain the network information system and all kinds of network transmission system, network attack and defense attributes are not clear. At present, all areas of the network space in depth, the world’s major countries are hard to build cyberspace offensive and defensive capabilities, the main military power of the network strategy has become a network of reconnaissance, network attacks, network defense and other clear division of labor, professional regular military forces. The United States has so far built the world’s most complete and powerful network of the army, and held a series of “network storm” series of exercises. The new “cyberspace strategy” in the United States, the first public to cyberspace combat as one of the tactical options for future military conflict, clearly proposed to improve the US military in the cyberspace of deterrence and offensive capability. In order to adapt to the new strategy, the US Department of Defense proposed 2018 to build a offensive and defensive, flexible form, with full combat capability of the network forces construction goals.

From the military to the integration of military and civilian development. The development of the strategic power of the military network started relatively late compared with the civil field, and because of the confidentiality of military confrontation and the specificity of the operational objectives, it is often developed independently. With the development of network technology, the military’s own network strategic strength is difficult to meet the needs of diversified tasks, we must learn from local folk technical means, integrate local network resources, realize the integration of military and civilian development. Network space capacity building on the talent, intelligence, experience and other software environment is extremely high, coupled with the local convergence of a wealth of network resources, military and civilian forces to promote the development of cyberspace capabilities become the strong tone of the times.

From a single model to the “network integration” development. At present, the network includes both the computer IP system network and the non-computer IP system network including a large number of complex early warning detection network, satellite communication network and tactical data link. The traditional single network confrontation model is difficult to meet the challenge of cyberspace. With the development of information technology, especially the Internet of Things technology, the relationship between the network and the power of the battlefield network more and more closely, which for the “network integration” in the technical means to provide the possibility. The use of electronic warfare and network warfare means, for different systems around the open bow, broken chain broken network, to achieve complementary advantages, system damage, as the latest guidance on the construction of network space. Data show that the US military typical network of integrated attack equipment “Shu special” system has been from the “Shu-1” to the current development of “Shu-5”. According to reports, “Shute” system through the enemy radar antenna, microwave relay station, network processing nodes to invade the enemy air defense network system, real-time monitoring of enemy radar detection results, even as a system administrator to take over the enemy network, Control of the sensor.

From non-state actors to state actors. At present, the network attack has developed from a single hacker behavior for the national, political, military confrontation, the attack object has been developed from the personal website to the country, the army’s important information system, attack “unit” has grown from stand-alone to tens of thousands Hundreds of thousands of terminals, and can instantly release the amazing attack energy. Although many of the intentions of malicious acts of non-State actors are non-state, the consequences are national, whether they are espionage, political opinions, or personal discontent, or terrorist activities , Have a direct impact on social stability, disrupt the economic order, endanger the stability of state power. Once the relevant reaction is made, the subject of the act must be the state and the army, and not the non-state actors themselves.

　　The Construction of Network Strategic Strength

Strengthen strategic planning. Cyberspace competition is the first strategic battle of the contest. From the national level, the network strategy of the power of the main function is to reduce the risk of cyberspace, maintaining the normal operation of the country. We must understand the extreme importance and realistic urgency of cyberspace security from the perspective of national security, raise the focus of cyberspace capacity building to the strategic level, and try to reduce the national cyberspace security while trying to solve the problem of how to make good use of cyberspace Risk, so that cyberspace security has become an important support for national prosperity and security. From the military level, the network strategy is mainly to seize the system of network power. We must expand the military vision, the cyberspace as an important area of ​​action, to seize the system as the core, change the military ideas and ideas, adjust the structure and composition of armed forces, the development of weapons and equipment and take a new tactics.

Speed ​​up the construction of the power system. Maintain cyberspace security in the final analysis depends on the strength. We must base ourselves on the characteristics and laws of cyberspace capacity building, focus on the core elements of network capability system and the overall layout of network strategy, and systematically design the system structure which conforms to the law and characteristics of cyberspace confrontation in our country, and perfect the system of leadership and command Functional tasks, straighten out the relationship between command and management. We should take the network strategic power as an important new combat force, from the organization construction, personnel training, equipment development, elements of training and other aspects, to take extraordinary measures to give priority construction, focus on protection. To normalize the national network of offensive and defensive exercises, test theory, tactics, equipment and technology effectiveness, and comprehensively enhance the comprehensive prevention of cyberspace capabilities.

Promote technological innovation. The essence of cyberspace confrontation is the competition of core technology, and it is necessary to accelerate the independent innovation of network information technology. To improve the ability of independent innovation as a strategic basis to the national innovation system as the basic support, focus on breaking the forefront of network development technology and international competitiveness of the key core technology, advanced deployment and focus on the development of information technology and information industry. To speed up the process of localization of key core technologies, strengthen the construction of safety testing and active early warning means, and gradually improve the equipment system of cyberspace in China, and comprehensively improve our network space capability. To follow the basic laws of cyberspace confrontation, in accordance with the “asymmetric checks and balances” strategy, increase the quantum technology, Internet of things and cloud computing and other new technology research and development efforts to create unique combat capability, master the initiative of cyberspace security development The

Promote the integration of military and civilian development. The integration of the military space ability of military and civilian development is not only the overall situation of national security and development strategy, the overall planning of national defense and economic and social development, but also the objective fact that cyberspace security can not be avoided. We must actively promote the deep integration of military and civilian development, to promote China’s network space capacity supporting the construction. It is necessary to formulate top-level planning in the form of policies and regulations, clarify the objectives, methods, organizational division and basic requirements of the deepening development of cyberspace in the form of policies and regulations, and make the integration of military and civilian development into law enforcement and organizational behavior; To establish a sound military coordination, demand docking, resource sharing mechanism, through a unified leadership management organization and coordination of military needs and major work, to achieve risk sharing, sharing of resources and common development of the new situation. We should pay attention to the distinction between the boundaries of military and civilian integration, clear the concept of development-oriented people and the main battle concept of the army, and actively explore the military and the people, the advantages of complementary channels.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

网络空间成为国家综合安全的命门。网络战争现实化、网络战场全球化、网络对抗常态化、网络攻心白热化、网络建军正规化的大势，无人可挡。优先发展网络战略力量，积极抢占网络战略制高点，对于我军队建设具有重要意义。

　　网络战略力量的主要特点

网络战略力量，是指通过网络空间来实现预期结果的能力。从当前发展及未来可能的走势看，主要有以下特点。

组成多元。近年来发生在全球范围内的重大网络事件表明，军队网络战略力量是网络空间竞争的主力军，政府部门、私营机构网络战略力量是网络空间竞争的重要部分，民间“网络战士”是网络空间竞争的重要补充。

专业性强。网络战略力量具有极强的潜伏性和难预测性，且以光速进行、瞬时产生效果，监测预警难度大；一旦行动奏效，损害效果叠加放大或非线性阶跃，具有典型的“蝴蝶效应”。2010年，“震网”病毒攻击了伊朗布什尔核电站和纳坦兹铀浓缩厂的离心机，造成近千台离心机报废，迫使伊朗核能力建设延迟2至3年，开启了网络攻击软手段摧毁国家硬设施的先河。

破坏性大。网络战略力量破坏力不亚于大规模杀伤性武器。2008年俄国与格鲁吉亚“五日战争”中，俄军以格方的电视媒体、政府网站和交通系统等为目标，开展全面的“蜂群”式网络阻瘫攻击，导致格政府机构运作混乱，物流和通信系统崩溃，急需的战争物资无法及时投送，战争潜力受到严重削弱，直接影响了格的社会秩序、作战指挥和部队调度。俄罗斯军事学说已将网络攻击手段定性为大规模毁灭性武器，并保留了运用大规模毁灭性武器或核武器反击的权利。

技术先进且相生相克。网络战略力量发展速度快、更新换代快，技术物化为装备的周期短。当前，微处理器的速度每18个月翻一番，主干网带宽每6个月增加一倍，各种新型电子信息设备层出不穷，各种应用软件目不暇接。网络空间对抗是信息领域的攻防斗争，网络战略力量使用的手段在对抗中相生相克、不断翻新。常规通信受干扰催生了跳、扩频通信体制，跳、扩频通信的出现又催生了频率跟踪干扰、相关信号干扰等新型电子干扰手段；防火墙、信息监控技术的发展，使翻墙软件不断升级，可谓“道高一尺，魔高一丈”。

　　网络战略力量的发展趋势

由从属性力量向关键性力量发展。以往网络战略力量主要是为其他力量提供信息保障，处于从属地位；随着网络信息技术的发展，制网权统揽其他制权，网络战略力量由从属地位向主导地位加速转进，成为维护国家安全的关键。没有网络安全就没有主权安全，“无网不胜”成为战争的新定律，世界各主要国家围绕网络空间的发展权、主导权和控制权展开了新一轮的角逐，特别是美俄坚持在实践中运用并不断发展。

由维护型力量向专业化力量发展。以往网络战略力量主要是维护网络化信息系统和各类网络传输系统，网络攻击和防御属性均不鲜明。当下各领域对网络空间深度依赖，世界主要国家无不竭力打造网络空间攻防能力，主要军事强国的网络战略力量业已成为集网络侦察、网络攻击、网络防御等分工明确、专业化的正规军事力量。美国迄今已建成全球编制最齐全、力量最庞大的网军，并多次举行“网络风暴”系列演习。美国新版《网络空间战略》，首次公开把网络空间作战作为今后军事冲突的战术选项之一，明确提出要提高美军在网络空间的威慑和进攻能力。为适应新战略，美国防部提出2018年建成一支攻防兼备、形式灵活，具备全面作战能力的网络部队的建设目标。

由军地自主向军民融合发展。军队网络战略力量的发展相对于民用领域起步较晚，且由于军事对抗的保密性和作战目标的特定性，往往自主发展。随着网络技术的发展，军队自身的网络战略力量难满足多样化任务的需要，必须学习借鉴地方民间技术手段，整合地方网络资源，实现军民融合发展。网络空间能力建设对人才、智力、经验等软件环境要求极高，加上地方汇聚了丰富的网络资源，军民联手推进网络空间能力发展成为时代的强音。

由单一模式向“网电一体”发展。现阶段，网络既包括计算机IP体制网络，更包含大量复杂的预警探测网、卫星通信网、战术数据链等非计算机IP体制网络，传统的单一网络对抗模式难以应对网络空间的挑战。随着信息技术特别是物联网技术的发展，战场网中网与电的关系越来越紧密，这为“网电一体”在技术手段上提供了可能。综合运用电子战与网络战手段，针对不同体制的网络左右开弓、断链破网，实现优势互补、体系破击，成为网络空间能力建设的最新指导。有资料显示，美军典型网电一体攻击装备“舒特”系统已从“舒特-1”发展到目前的“舒特-5”。据报道，“舒特”系统可通过敌方雷达天线、微波中继站、网络处理节点入侵敌方防空网络系统，能够实时监视敌方雷达的探测结果，甚至以系统管理员身份接管敌方网络，实现对传感器的控制。

由非国家行为体向国家行为体发展。目前，网络攻击已从单个的黑客行为发展为国家、政治、军事上的对抗行为，攻击对象已从个人网站发展到国家、军队的重要信息系统，攻击“单元”已从单机发展到数万乃至数十万台终端，且能在瞬时释放惊人的攻击能量。尽管非国家行为体的恶意网络行为目的许多是非国家的，但由此所造成的后果却是国家的，无论是进行间谍活动，还是发表政治主张，或是发泄个人不满情绪，或是进行恐怖活动，都直接影响社会稳定、扰乱经济秩序、危及国家政权稳固。一旦因之作出相关反应，其行为主体一定是国家和军队，而不再是非国家行为体本身。

　　网络战略力量的建设指向

加强战略统筹谋划。网络空间竞争首先是战略运筹的较量。从国家层面看，网络战略力量的职能主要是降低网络空间的风险，维护国家正常运转。必须从国家安全的视角认清网络空间安全的极端重要性和现实紧迫性，将网络空间能力建设的着眼点上升到战略层面，在着力解决如何利用好网络空间的同时，努力降低国家网络空间安全风险，使网络空间安全成为国家繁荣与安全的重要支撑。从军队层面看，网络战略力量主要是夺取制网权。必须拓展军事视野，把网络空间作为制权行动的一个重要领域，以夺取制网权为核心，变革军事思想和观念，调整武装力量结构与构成，发展武器装备并采取新的战法。

加快力量体系构建。维护网络空间安全说到底要靠实力。必须立足于网络空间能力建设的特点、规律，围绕我国网络能力体系核心要素和网络战略力量建设总体布局，以系统思维设计符合我国网络空间对抗规律和特点的体系架构，健全领导指挥体制机制，明确职能任务，理顺指挥管理关系。要把网络战略力量作为重要的新型作战力量突出出来，从组织建设、人才培养、装备发展、要素演训等各方面，采取超常举措，给予重点建设、重点保障。要常态化开展国家级网络攻防演练，检验理论、战法、装备及技术的有效性，全面提升网络空间综合防范能力。

推进技术自主创新。网络空间对抗的实质是核心技术的比拼，必须加快推进网络信息技术自主创新。要把提高自主创新能力作为战略基点，以国家创新体系为基本依托，集中力量突破网络发展的前沿技术和具有国际竞争力的关键核心技术，超前部署和重点发展信息技术和信息产业。要加速关键核心技术的国产化进程，加强安全测试和主动预警手段的建设，逐步完善我国网络空间的装备体系，全面提高我国网络空间能力。要遵循网络空间对抗的基本规律，按照“非对称制衡”方略，加大对量子科技、物联网和云计算等新技术的研发力度，以独创技术塑造实战能力，掌握网络空间安全发展的主动权。

推动军民融合发展。网络空间能力的军民融合式发展，既是站在国家安全与发展的战略全局，对国防和经济社会发展统筹谋划，也是网络空间安全不能回避的客观事实。必须积极推动军民深度融合发展，全力推进我国网络空间能力配套建设。要综合军民需求制定顶层规划，以政策法规的形式明确网络空间军民融合深度发展的目标任务、方法路径、组织分工和基本要求等关系全局的重大问题，变军民融合发展为执法行为、组织行为；要建立健全军地协调、需求对接、资源共享机制，通过统一的领导管理机构组织协调军地的各类需求和重大工作，达成风险共担、资源共享、共同发展的新局面。要注重军民融合的界限区分，明确以民为主的发展理念和以军为主的作战理念，积极探索军民一体、优势互补的可行性渠道。

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China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China Internet Soverignty, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Cyberspace Adminstration of China 中央網絡安全和信息勇

A Summary of China ‘s Internet Security Situation in China in 2016 // 2016年中國中國互聯網安全形勢總結

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A Summary of China ‘s Internet Security Situation in China in 2016

2016年中國中國互聯網安全形勢總結

19 APRIL 2017 BEIJING, People’s Republic of China

April 19, the National Computer Network Emergency Technology Processing Coordination Center (referred to as “National Internet Emergency Response Center”, the English referred to as “CNCERT”) released “China’s Internet security situation in 2016,” a review of China’s Internet macro security situation monitoring On the basis of the combination of network security warning and emergency response work, the paper focuses on analyzing and summarizing the Internet security situation of China in 2016 and predicting the hotspot of network security in 2017.

Analysis of Internet Security Monitoring Data in China in 2016

CNCs continued to monitor the macroeconomic situation of China’s cybersecurity. In 2016, the number of mobile Internet malicious programs was captured, the number of backdoor attacks and the number of security vulnerabilities were increased compared with 2015, and the number of Trojans and botnets was denied. Quantity, phishing and page tampering the number of pages have declined.

According to the sampling monitoring, about 70,000 Trojans and botnet control servers in 2016 control 1699 million hosts in our country, the number of control servers decreased by 8.0% compared with 2015, the number of domestic infection host decreased by 14.1% compared with 2015. The Among them, about 48,000 from outside the control server control of China’s 1499 million units in the host, from the United States the number of control servers in the first place, followed by Hong Kong, China and Japan.

In the botnet found in the detection of malicious programs and the formation of botnets, the size of more than 100 hosts in the number of botnets 4896, of which the size of more than 100,000 units in the number of botnets 52. According to the quantitative analysis of the distribution of Trojans and botnets in China, the top three were Guangdong Province (13.4% of the total number of infections in China), Jiangsu Province (9.2%) and Shandong Province (8.3 %). In order to effectively control the damage caused by the host of Trojans and botnets, in 2016, under the guidance of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, under the guidance of “Trojan and botnet monitoring and disposal mechanism”, CNCERT organization basic telecommunications companies, domain name service agencies, etc. successfully closed 1011 Control the larger botnets.

In 2016, CNCERT received more than 205 million mobile Internet malpractions through autonomous capture and vendor switching, an increase of 39.0% over 2015, and continued to maintain rapid growth in the past seven years. According to their malicious behavior classification, the top three were hooliganism, malicious deductions and tariff consumption class 1, accounting for 61.1%, respectively, 18.2% and 13.6%. CNCERT found that mobile Internet malicious program download links nearly 670,000, an increase of nearly 1.2 times compared with 2015, involving more than 22 million source of the source, IP address of more than 30,000, the number of malicious programs spread to 124 million times.

In 2016, CNCERT focused on the “album” category 2 Andrews and malicious pornographic software with malicious deductions and maliciously disseminated attributes that were spread by SMS and had malicious behavior such as stealing user messages and correspondence, and coordinated work The A total of 47,316 cases of such malicious programs were found in the year, and more than 1.01 million were collected, and 6045 domain names were used to disseminate malicious programs. 7645 malicious mailbox accounts for receiving user’s text messages and contacts were used to receive user text messages Malicious mobile phone number 6616, leaked users SMS and address book mail 222 million, seriously endangering the user’s personal information security and property security. Under the guidance of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, according to the “mobile Internet malicious program monitoring and disposal mechanism”, CNCERT organization of e-mail service providers, domain name registrar and other active coordination work to find the malicious mailbox account, malicious domain name, etc. Dispose of.

Second, 2016 China’s Internet security situation

In recent years, with China’s network security laws and regulations, management system of continuous improvement, China’s network security technology strength, personnel, international cooperation, and achieved remarkable results. In 2016, China’s Internet security situation is generally stable, the rapid development of network security industry, network security and protection capabilities have been improved, international cooperation to further strengthen the network security. But with cyberspace strategically

The increasing number of countries, the world’s major countries have set up cyberspace attack capability, the growing national network conflict, China’s cyberspace security challenges facing increasingly complex.

Domain name system security in good condition, anti-attack ability increased significantly. In 2016, China’s domain name service system security in good condition, no major security incidents. According to the sampling monitoring, 2016 years for China’s domain name system traffic scale of more than 1Gpbs DDoS attacks on the daily average of about 32 cases, did not affect the domain name resolution services in China, the basic telecommunications companies have not seriously affected the success rate of analysis Attack events, mainly with the domain name system to strengthen security measures, anti-DDoS attack ability significantly improved related. In June 2016, there were large-scale DDoS attacks against the global root domain name servers and their mirrors. Most of the root domain servers were affected to varying degrees. The domain name mirroring servers in China also suffered large-scale network traffic attacks at the same time. Due to emergency treatment in a timely manner, and the root zone top-level domain cache expiration time is often more than 1 day, the attack did not affect the domain name system network security.

For the industrial control system of network security attacks increasing, many important industrial control system security incidents should pay attention. In 2016, the world occurred more than the major areas of industrial accidents worthy of our country wake up. In August, Kaspersky Security Laboratories exposed the “ghoul” network attack against the industrial sector, which focused on the Middle East and other countries’ Industrial enterprises launched a targeted network intrusion; in December, the Ukrainian power grid once again experienced a power supply failure, according to the analysis of the origin of this malpractice “dark forces” variants.

China’s industrial control system is huge, security vulnerabilities, malicious detection, etc. to our industrial control system to bring some security risks. As of the end of 2016, CNVD included 1036 industrial malpractices, of which 173 were included in 2016, an increase of 38.4% over 2015. Industrial control system mainly exists buffer overflow, lack of access control mechanism, weak password, directory traversal and other loopholes risk. Through the analysis of network traffic, 2016 CNCERT cumulative monitoring to the network of industrial equipment fingerprint detection event more than 880,000 times, and found 60 countries from outside the 1610 IP address of China’s network of industrial equipment for fingerprint detection.

High-level persistent threat normalization, China’s attack is particularly serious threat. As of the end of 2016, domestic enterprises issued a senior Sustainability Threat (APT) study reported a total of 43 APT organizations, including targeted targets for China’s APT organizations have 36 4. From the attack to achieve the point of view, more APT attacks using engineering to achieve, that is, relying on commercial attack platform and the Internet black industry

Chain data and other mature resources to achieve APT attacks. This kind of attack not only reduces the technical and resource threshold of initiating APT attack, but also increases the difficulty of traceability analysis. In 2016, many of the important information system for the implementation of the APT attacks were exposed, including “white elephant action 5”, “Man Linghua attack action”, mainly in China’s education, energy, military and scientific research as the main target The In August 2016, the hacker organization “Shadow Brokers” published the Formula Organization 6 frequently used toolkits, including various firewall exploits, hacking tools and scripts involving Juniper, Flying Tower, Cisco, and Financial letter, Huawei and other manufacturers products. CNCERT released 11 software vulnerabilities (there are four suspected 0day vulnerability) for census analysis and found that the world has about 120,000 IP addresses carrying the relevant products of network equipment, of which China’s IP address of about 33,000, accounting for 27.8% of all IP addresses poses a serious potential threat to cyberspace security in China. In November 2016, the hacker organization “shadow broker” also announced a group has been attacked by the National Security Agency network control and IP address and domain name data, China is the most attacked countries, involving at least nine universities in China, 12 Energy, aviation, telecommunications and other important information systems departments and two government information centers.

A large number of networked smart devices were attacked by malicious programs to form botnets, which were used to initiate large traffic DDoS attacks. In recent years, with the intelligent wearable equipment, intelligent home, intelligent routers and other terminal equipment and network equipment, the rapid development and popularization, for the Internet of intelligent devices, the proportion of network attacks increased, the attackers use the Internet of things intelligent device vulnerabilities Access to device control rights, or other hacker underground transactions for user information data theft, network traffic hijacking, or for controlling the formation of large-scale botnets. CNCERT on-line monitoring of vehicle network security system analysis and found that some car network information service providers and related products, security vulnerabilities can lead to vehicle, location and vehicle owners information disclosure and vehicle remote control and other security risks. At the end of 2016, Mirai malicious programs were widely watched as a result of large-scale off-site events on the east coast of the United States and a large number of users of Deutsche Telekom visited Internet anomalies. Mirai is a typical use of Internet of things intelligent device vulnerabilities to penetrate infiltration to achieve the control of the device malicious code, the number of charged devices accumulated to a certain extent will form a huge “botnet”, known as “Mirai botnet.” And because of Internet of things intelligent devices are generally 24 hours online, infected with malicious programs are not easily perceived by the user, forming a “stable” attack source. CNC inspections of the Mirai botnet show that by the end of 2016, a total of 2526 control servers were deployed to control 125.4 million devices, which posed a serious potential security threat to the stable operation of the Internet. In addition, CNCERT also analyzed the Gafgyt botnet sampling analysis. In the fourth quarter of 2016, a total of 817 control servers were selected to control 425,000 devices, and more than 18,000 DDoS attacks were initiated, with peak traffic 5Gpbs more than 72 times the number of attacks.

Web site data and personal information leak is not uncommon, “derivative disaster” serious. Due to the disappearance of the traditional boundaries of the Internet, all kinds of data spread across the terminal, network, mobile phone and cloud, coupled with the interests of the Internet black industry chain driven by data leakage threats are increasing. In 2016, the domestic and international website data and personal information leakage incidents frequently, the political, economic and social impact gradually deepened, and even personal life safety has also been violated. In the United States, the United States election candidate Hillary’s mail leak, directly affect the US election process; Yahoo two account information disclosure involving about 1.5 billion personal accounts, resulting in US telecom operators Verizon $ 4.8 billion acquisition of Yahoo plans to shelve May even be canceled. In the country, China’s immune planning system network was malicious invasion, 200,000 children’s information was stolen and publicly sold online; information leakage led to frequent fraud cases, college entrance examination information leaks to take away the university students will soon enter the life of Xu Yuyu ; 2016 public security organs were detected more than 1,800 cases of infringement of personal information, seized 30 million pieces of personal information of various types of citizens. In addition, according to the news media reported that Russia, Mexico, Turkey, the Philippines, Syria, Kenya and other countries of the government website data leaked.

Mobile Internet malicious program more profitable, mobile Internet black industry chain has matured. In 2016, CNCERT received more than 205 million mobile Internet malpractions through autonomous capture and vendor exchange, up 39.0% from 2015 and continued to grow at a high rate in the past six years. Through malware behavior analysis, it was found that the number of applications for fraudulent, malicious deductions, lockdowns and other economic interests was 59.6% of the total number of malicious programs, nearly three times over 2015. From the spread of malicious programs found that fraudulent acts of fraudulent procedures mainly through SMS, advertising and network disk and other specific communication channels to spread, the number of infected users reached 24.93 million, causing significant economic losses. From the attack mode of malicious programs, it is found that the number of malicious programs that steal SMS verification codes is larger than that of SMS, and 10845 samples are obtained in the whole year. It shows the characteristics of simple production, fixed attack mode and huge profits. The mobile Internet industry Mature.

Extortion software raging, a serious threat to local data and intelligent equipment security. According to CNCERT monitoring found in 2016 in the traditional PC side, to capture extortion class malicious program sample of about 19,000, the number of a record high in recent years. Analysis of extortion software attack object found that extortion software has been gradually extended from the individual terminal equipment to business users, especially for high-value target blackmail situation

Heavy. For enterprise users, blackmail software exploits security vulnerabilities to attack, the enterprise database encryption and extortion, the end of 2016 open source MongoDB database was a blackmail software attacks, a large number of users affected. For personal terminal equipment, extortion software malicious behavior in the traditional PC and mobile terminals show obvious different characteristics: in the traditional PC side, mainly through the “encrypted data” to blackmail, that is, the user’s computer file encryption, stress users Purchase the decryption key; on the mobile side, mainly through the “encryption device” to blackmail, that is, remote lock the user mobile devices, so that users can not use the device, and to coerce users to pay the cost of unlocking. However, from the extortion of software transmission point of view, the traditional PC and mobile side show a common, mainly through e-mail, counterfeit normal application, QQ group, network disk, paste it, victims and other spread.

Three, 2017 worthy of attention to the hot spots

According to the analysis of the characteristics of China’s Internet security situation in 2016, CNCERT predicts that the hot spots that are worthy of attention in 2017 are as follows.

(A) cyberspace according to the law of governance more clear. On November 7, 2016, the Twenty-fourth Session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress passed the “Network Security Law” and came into effect on June 1, 2017. The Act has 7 chapters and 79 articles on cyberspace sovereignty, network products and service providers ‘security obligations, network operators’ safety obligations, personal information protection rules, critical information infrastructure security protection systems and important data cross-border transmission rules, etc. Has been clearly defined. It is expected that the departments will pay more attention to the propaganda and interpretation work of the “Network Security Law” in 2017, compile relevant supporting policies and regulations, implement various supporting measures, and make cyberspace according to law more clear.

(B) the use of Internet of things intelligent device network attacks will continue to increase. 2016 CNVD collection of intelligent networking equipment vulnerabilities 1117, mainly related to web cameras, intelligent routers, smart appliances, intelligent gateway and other equipment. The vulnerability type is mainly privilege to bypass, information disclosure, command execution, etc., which weak password (or built-in default password) vulnerability is easy to be used, the actual impact is very extensive, malicious code attack to use an important risk point. With the development of unmanned aerial vehicles, autopilot vehicles, the popularity of smart home appliances and the development of smart cities, the number of vulnerabilities in networked smart devices will increase significantly, and network attacks against or using intelligent networking devices will be more frequent.

(C) the Internet and the traditional industry integration caused by the security threat is more complex. With the deepening of China’s “Internet +” and “Made in China 2025” action plan, almost all traditional industries, traditional applications and services in China are being changed by the Internet, bringing innovation and development opportunities to various industries. In the process of integration innovation and development, the traditional industry closed mode gradually changed to open mode, but also the future of the Internet virtual network security events into real-world security threats. Internet finance, industrial Internet and other emerging industries rapid development, but triggered a new network security threats can not be ignored, the Internet financial integration of information flow and capital flow, the risk of information flow is likely to lead to loss of capital flow; industrial control system more For the intelligent, network, open Internet brings malicious sniffing behavior increased, the risk of malicious attacks continue to increase. Traditional Internet security and real-world security issues intertwined with the security threat is more complex, the consequences are more serious.

(D) personal information and important data protection will be more attention. In recent years, the development of Internet technology is extremely convenient and rich in our lives and work, online shopping, online job search, social platform, government services and other platforms are filled with a large number of personal detailed privacy information. Since 2011, China’s serious personal information on the leak of the event, especially in recent years, the case of network fraud, the victim’s details have been grasped by fraud, to social stability and serious harm. 2013 “Snowdon incident” and the follow-up of the US government has been a large-scale monitoring of the project, to stimulate countries to strengthen the protection of important data measures, strict norms of Internet data collection, use, storage and so on. China in the “Network Security Law” on the personal information protection rules, important data cross-border transmission has been clearly defined, is expected on personal information and important data protection of the detailed regulatory documents will be enacted, and effectively implement the protection measures.

(5) Network security threats Information sharing has attracted the attention of all parties. Timely comprehensive access to and analysis of network security threats, ahead of network security early warning and deployment of emergency response measures, fully embodies a national network security comprehensive defense capabilities. Through the network security threat information sharing, the use of collective knowledge and technical ability, is to achieve a comprehensive grasp of the network security threats an effective way. The United States as early as 1998 in the Clinton administration signed a presidential decree to encourage the government and enterprises to carry out network security information sharing, to the Obama administration is the network security information sharing is written into the government bill. In recent years, China attaches great importance to the work of network security information sharing, in the “Network Security Law” clearly put forward to promote the relevant departments, key information infrastructure operators and the relevant research institutions, network security services and other network security information sharing The However, in the face of complex and multi-dimensional data source information, how to carry out sharing and in-depth analysis efficiently, we need to establish a set of information security standards for network security threats based on large data analysis. At present, many organizations in our country have been engaged in the exploration and practice of information sharing of network security threats. The relevant national standards and industry standards have been formulated. CNCERT has also established a network security threat information sharing platform for sharing in the communication industry and security industry. jobs.

(6) the background of the network disputes will continue to heat up the degree of concern. At present, China’s Internet penetration rate has reached 53.2% 7, the public through the Internet to get the news more and more fast and convenient, people concerned about the global political hot spots are also rising. 2016 US presidential election “mail door” incident, the Russian hacker exposure of the World Anti-Doping Agency scandal, etc., allow netizens to feel organized, purposeful careful network attacks can have a serious impact on the politics of other countries, Will have a national background of the network disputes from the perspective of industry concerns extended to all Internet users. With a large number of countries continue to strengthen the network space military capacity building, there are national background of the network dispute event will be hot, the crisis frequently, the trend of popular discussion will continue to heat up.

(7) based on artificial intelligence network security technology research in full swing. In the third World Internet Conference, “World Internet leading technology results release activities” site, Microsoft, IBM, Google three major international technology giants show machine learning based on artificial intelligence technology, for us to describe a beautiful future of artificial intelligence. At present, the network attack events are endless, the means are complex, the purpose is complex, the shortage of network security personnel is difficult to cope with the rapid changes in the network security situation, and machine learning in the field of data analysis outstanding performance, artificial intelligence is considered in the network security will “Great as”. There are statistical agencies found that the 2016 “network security” and “artificial intelligence” co-appeared in the article the frequency of rapid rise, indicating that more and more discussions will be linked together with the two together. Based on the large data related to network security, artificial intelligence technology such as machine learning can make breakthrough progress in unknown threat discovery, network behavior analysis and network security warning.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

4月19日消息，國家計算機網絡應急技術處理協調中心（簡稱“國家互聯網應急中心”，英文簡稱“CNCERT”)發布《2016年我國互聯網網絡安全態勢綜述》，在對我國互聯網宏觀安全態勢監測的基礎上，結合網絡安全預警通報、應急處置工作實踐成果，著重分析和總結了2016年我國互聯網網絡安全狀況，並預測2017年網絡安全熱點問題。
一、2016年我國互聯網網絡安全監測數據分析
CNCERT持續對我國網絡安全宏觀狀況開展抽樣監測，2016年，移動互聯網惡意程序捕獲數量、網站後門攻擊數量以及安全漏洞收錄數量較2015年有所上升，而木馬和殭屍網絡感染數量、拒絕服務攻擊事件數量、網頁仿冒和網頁篡改頁面數量等均有所下降。
據抽樣監測，2016年約9.7萬個木馬和殭屍網絡控制服務器控制了我國境內1699萬餘台主機，控制服務器數量較2015年下降8.0%，境內感染主機數量較2015年下降了14.1%。 。其中，來自境外的約4.8萬個控制服務器控制了我國境內1499萬餘台主機，來自美國的控制服務器數量居首位，其次是中國香港和日本。
在監測發現的因感染惡意程序而形成的殭屍網絡中，規模在100台主機以上的殭屍網絡數量4896個，其中規模在10萬台以上的殭屍網絡數量52個。從我國境內感染木馬和殭屍網絡主機按地區分佈數量分析來看，排名前三位的分別是廣東省（占我國境內感染數量的13.4%）、江蘇省（佔9.2%）和山東省（佔8.3 %）。為有效控制木馬和殭屍網絡感染主機引發的危害，2016年，在工業和信息化部指導下，根據《木馬和殭屍網絡監測與處置機制》，CNCERT組織基礎電信企業、域名服務機構等成功關閉1011個控制規模較大的殭屍網絡。
2016年，CNCERT通過自主捕獲和廠商交換獲得移動互聯網惡意程序數量205萬餘個，較2015年增長39.0%，近7年來持續保持高速增長趨勢。按其惡意行為進行分類，前三位分別是流氓行為類、惡意扣費類和資費消耗類1，佔比分別為61.1%、18.2%和13.6%。 CNCERT發現移動互聯網惡意程序下載鏈接近67萬條，較2015年增長近1.2倍，涉及的傳播源域名22萬餘個、IP地址3萬餘個，惡意程序傳播次數達1.24億次。
2016年，CNCERT重點對通過短信傳播，且具有竊取用戶短信和通信錄等惡意行為的“相冊”類2安卓惡意程序及具有惡意扣費、惡意傳播屬性的色情軟件進行監測，並開展協調處置工作。全年共發現此類惡意程序47316個，累計感染用戶超過101萬人，用於傳播惡意程序的域名6045個，用於接收用戶短信和通訊錄的惡意郵箱賬戶7645個，用於接收用戶短信的惡意手機號6616個，洩露用戶短信和通訊錄的郵件222萬封，嚴重危害用戶個人信息安全和財產安全。在工業和信息化部指導下，根據《移動互聯網惡意程序監測與處置機制》，CNCERT組織郵箱服務商、域名註冊商等積極開展協調處置工作，對發現的惡意郵箱賬號、惡意域名等進行關停處置。
二、2016年我國互聯網網絡安全狀況
近年來，隨著我國網絡安全法律法規、管理制度的不斷完善，我國在網絡安全技術實力、人才隊伍、國際合作等方面取得了明顯的成效。 2016年，我國互聯網網絡安全狀況總體平穩，網絡安全產業快速發展，網絡安全防護能力得到提升，網絡安全國際合作進一步加強。但隨著網絡空間戰略地
位的日益提升，世界主要國家紛紛建立網絡空間攻擊能力，國家級網絡衝突日益增多，我國網絡空間面臨的安全挑戰日益複雜。
域名系統安全狀況良好，防攻擊能力明顯上升。 2016年，我國域名服務系統安全狀況良好，無重大安全事件發生。據抽樣監測，2016年針對我國域名系統的流量規模達1Gpbs以上的DDoS攻擊事件日均約32起，均未對我國域名解析服務造成影響，在基礎電信企業側也未發生嚴重影響解析成功率的攻擊事件，主要與域名系統普遍加強安全防護措施，抗DDoS攻擊能力顯著提升相關。 2016年6月，發生針對全球根域名服務器及其鏡像的大規模DDoS攻擊，大部分根域名服務器受到不同程度的影響，位於我國的域名根鏡像服務器也在同時段遭受大規模網絡流量攻擊。因應急處置及時，且根區頂級域緩存過期時間往往超過1天，此次攻擊未對我國域名系統網絡安全造成影響。
針對工業控制系統的網絡安全攻擊日益增多，多起重要工控系統安全事件應引起重視。 2016年，全球發生的多起工控領域重大事件值得我國警醒。 3月，美國紐約鮑曼水壩的一個小型防洪控制系統遭攻擊；8月，卡巴斯基安全實驗室揭露了針對工控行業的“食屍鬼”網絡攻擊活動，該攻擊主要對中東和其他國家的工業企業發起定向網絡入侵；12月，烏克蘭電網再一次經歷了供電故障，據分析本次故障緣起惡意程序“黑暗勢力”的變種。
我國工控系統規模巨大，安全漏洞、惡意探測等均給我國工控系統帶來一定安全隱患。截至2016年年底，CNVD共收錄工控漏洞1036條，其中2016年收錄了173個，較2015年增長了38.4%。工控系統主要存在緩衝區溢出、缺乏訪問控制機制、弱口令、目錄遍歷等漏洞風險。通過對網絡流量分析發現，2016年度CNCERT累計監測到聯網工控設備指紋探測事件88萬餘次，並發現來自境外60個國家的1610個IP地址對我國聯網工控設備進行了指紋探測。
高級持續性威脅常態化，我國面臨的攻擊威脅尤為嚴重。截止到2016年底，國內企業發布高級持續性威脅（APT）研究報告共提及43個APT組織，其中針對我國境內目標發動攻擊的APT組織有36個4。從攻擊實現方式來看，更多APT攻擊採用工程化實現，即依托商業攻擊平台和互聯網黑色產業
鏈數據等成熟資源實現 APT攻擊。這類攻擊不僅降低了發起APT攻擊的技術和資源門檻，而且加大了受害方溯源分析的難度。 2016年，多起針對我國重要信息系統實施的APT攻擊事件被曝光，包括“白象行動5”、“蔓靈花攻擊行動”等，主要以我國教育、能源、軍事和科研領域為主要攻擊目標。 2016年8月，黑客組織“影子經紀人（Shadow Brokers）”公佈了方程式組織6經常使用的工具包，包含各種防火牆的漏洞利用代碼、黑客工具和腳本，涉及Juniper、飛塔、思科、天融信、華為等廠商產品。 CNCERT對公佈的11個產品漏洞（有4個疑似為0day漏洞）進行普查分析，發現全球有約12萬個IP地址承載了相關產品的網絡設備，其中我國境內IP地址有約3.3萬個，佔全部IP地址的27.8%，對我國網絡空間安全造成嚴重的潛在威脅。 2016年11月，黑客組織“影子經紀人”又公佈一組曾受美國國家安全局網絡攻擊與控制的IP地址和域名數據，中國是被攻擊最多的國家，涉及我國至少9所高校，12家能源、航空、電信等重要信息系統部門和2個政府部門信息中心。
大量聯網智能設備遭惡意程序攻擊形成殭屍網絡，被用於發起大流量DDoS攻擊。近年來，隨著智能可穿戴設備、智能家居、智能路由器等終端設備和網絡設備的迅速發展和普及利用，針對物聯網智能設備的網絡攻擊事件比例呈上升趨勢，攻擊者利用物聯網智能設備漏洞可獲取設備控制權限，或用於用戶信息數據竊取、網絡流量劫持等其他黑客地下產業交易，或用於被控制形成大規模殭屍網絡。 CNCERT對車聯網系統安全性進行在線監測分析，發現部分車聯網信息服務商及相關產品存在安全漏洞，可導致車輛、位置及車主信息洩露和車輛被遠程控制等安全風險。 2016年底，因美國東海岸大規模斷網事件和德國電信大量用戶訪問網絡異常事件，Mirai惡意程序受到廣泛關注。 Mirai是一款典型的利用物聯網智能設備漏洞進行入侵滲透以實現對設備控制的惡意代碼，被控設備數量積累到一定程度將形成一個龐大的“殭屍網絡”，稱為“Mirai殭屍網絡”。又因物聯網智能設備普遍是24小時在線，感染惡意程序後也不易被用戶察覺，形成了“穩定”的攻擊源。 CNCERT對Mirai殭屍網絡進行抽樣監測顯示，截至2016年年底，共發現2526台控制服務器控制了125.4萬餘台物聯網智能設備，對互聯網的穩定運行形成了嚴重的潛在安全威脅。此外，CNCERT還對Gafgyt殭屍網絡進行抽樣檢測分析，在2016年第四季度，共發現817台控制服務器控制了42.5萬台物聯網智能設備，累計發起超過1.8萬次的DDoS攻擊，其中峰值流量在5Gpbs以上的攻擊次數高達72次。
網站數據和個人信息洩露屢見不鮮，“衍生災害”嚴重。由於互聯網傳統邊界的消失，各種數據遍布終端、網絡、手機和雲上，加上互聯網黑色產業鏈的利益驅動，數據洩露威脅日益加劇。 2016年，國內外網站數據和個人信息洩露事件頻發，對政治、經濟、社會的影響逐步加深，甚至個人生命安全也受到侵犯。在國外，美國大選候選人希拉里的郵件洩露，直接影響到美國大選的進程；雅虎兩次賬戶信息洩露涉及約15億的個人賬戶，致使美國電信運營商威瑞森48億美元收購雅虎計劃擱置甚至可能取消。在國內，我國免疫規劃系統網絡被惡意入侵，20萬兒童信息被竊取並在網上公開售賣；信息洩露導致精準詐騙案件頻發，高考考生信息洩露間接奪去即將步入大學的女學生徐玉玉的生命；2016年公安機關共偵破侵犯個人信息案件1800餘起，查獲各類公民個人信息300億餘條。此外，據新聞媒體報導，俄羅斯、墨西哥、土耳其、菲律賓、敘利亞、肯尼亞等多個國家政府的網站數據發生了洩漏。
移動互聯網惡意程序趨利性更加明確，移動互聯網黑色產業鏈已經成熟。 2016年，CNCERT通過自主捕獲和廠商交換獲得移動互聯網惡意程序數量205萬餘個，較2015年增長39.0%，近6年來持續保持高速增長趨勢。通過惡意程序行為分析發現，以誘騙欺詐、惡意扣費、鎖屏勒索等攫取經濟利益為目的的應用程序驟增，佔惡意程序總數的59.6%，較2015年增長了近三倍。從惡意程序傳播途徑發現，誘騙欺詐行為的惡意程序主要通過短信、廣告和網盤等特定傳播渠道進行傳播，感染用戶數達到2493萬人，造成重大經濟損失。從惡意程序的攻擊模式發現，通過短信方式傳播竊取短信驗證碼的惡意程序數量佔比較大，全年獲得相關樣本10845個，表現出製作簡單、攻擊模式固定、暴利等特點，移動互聯網黑色產業鏈已經成熟。
敲詐勒索軟件肆虐，嚴重威脅本地數據和智能設備安全。根據CNCERT監測發現，2016年在傳統PC端，捕獲敲詐勒索類惡意程序樣本約1.9萬個，數量創近年來新高。對敲詐勒索軟件攻擊對象分析發現，勒索軟件已逐漸由針對個人終端設備延伸至企業用戶，特別是針對高價值目標的勒索情況嚴
重。針對企業用戶方面，勒索軟件利用安全漏洞發起攻擊，對企業數據庫進行加密勒索，2016年底開源MongoDB數據庫遭一輪勒索軟件攻擊，大量的用戶受到影響。針對個人終端設備方面，敲詐勒索軟件惡意行為在傳統PC端和移動端表現出明顯的不同特點：在傳統PC端，主要通過“加密數據”進行勒索，即對用戶電腦中的文件加密，脅迫用戶購買解密密鑰；在移動端，主要通過“加密設備”進行勒索，即遠程鎖住用戶移動設備，使用戶無法正常使用設備，並以此脅迫用戶支付解鎖費用。但從敲詐勒索軟件傳播方式來看，傳統PC端和移動端表現出共性，主要是通過郵件、仿冒正常應用、QQ群、網盤、貼吧、受害者等傳播。
三、2017年值得關注的熱點
根據對2016年我國互聯網網絡安全形勢特點的分析，CNCERT預測2017年值得關注的熱點方向主要如下。
（一）網絡空間依法治理脈絡更為清晰。 2016年11月7日第十二屆全國人大常委會第二十四次會議表決通過《網絡安全法》，並將於2017年6月1日起施行。該法有7章79條，對網絡空間主權、網絡產品和服務提供者的安全義務、網絡運營者的安全義務、個人信息保護規則、關鍵信息基礎設施安全保護製度和重要數據跨境傳輸規則等進行了明確規定。預計2017年各部門將更加重視《網絡安全法》的宣傳和解讀工作，編制出台相關配套政策法規，落實各項配套措施，網絡空間依法治理脈絡將更為清晰。
（二）利用物聯網智能設備的網絡攻擊事件將繼續增多。 2016年CNVD收錄物聯網智能設備漏洞1117個，

（三）互聯網與傳統產業融合引發的安全威脅更為複雜。隨著我國“互聯網＋”、“中國製造2025”行動計劃的深入推進，我國幾乎所有的傳統行業、傳統應用與服務都在被互聯網改變，給各個行業帶來了創新和發展機會。在融合創新發展的過程中，傳統產業封閉的模式逐漸轉變為開放模式，也將以往互聯網上虛擬的網絡安全事件轉變為現實世界安全威脅。互聯網金融、工業互聯網等融合的新興行業快速發展，但引發的新的網絡安全威脅也不容忽略，互聯網金融整合了信息流和資金流，信息流的風險很可能引發資金流損失；工業控制系統更為智能化、網絡化，開放互聯帶來的惡意嗅探行為增多，被惡意攻擊的風險不斷加大。傳統互聯網安全與現實世界安全問題相交織引發的安全威脅更為複雜，產生的後果也更為嚴重。
（四）個人信息和重要數據保護將更受重視。近年來，互聯網技術的發展極大的方便和豐富了我們的生活和工作，網上購物、網上求職、社交平台、政府服務等平台上充斥著大量的個人詳細隱私信息。自2011年以來我國關於嚴重個人信息洩露的事件不絕於耳，特別是近年來的網絡詐騙案件中，受害人的詳細信息都被詐騙分子所掌握，給社會安定帶來嚴重危害。 2013年 “斯諾登事件”及後續相繼爆出的美國政府大範圍監聽項目，刺激著各國加強重要數據的保護措施，嚴格規範互聯網數據的收集、使用、存儲等。我國在《網絡安全法》中對個人信息保護規則、重要數據跨境傳輸進行了明確規定，預計關於個人信息和重要數據信息保護的詳細規範性文件將製定出台，切實落實保護措施。
（五）網絡安全威脅信息共享工作備受各方關注。及時全面獲取和分析網絡安全威脅，提前做好網絡安全預警和部署應急響應措施，充分體現了一個國家網絡安全綜合防禦能力。通過網絡安全威脅信息共享，利用集體的知識和技術能力，是實現全面掌握網絡安全威脅情況的有效途徑。美國早在1998年的克林頓政府時期就簽署了總統令，鼓勵政府與企業開展網絡安全信息共享，到奧巴馬政府時期更是將網絡安全信息共享寫入了政府法案。近年來，我國高度重視網絡安全信息共享工作，在《網絡安全法》中明確提出了促進有關部門、關鍵信息基礎設施的運營者以及有關研究機構、網絡安全服務機構等之間的網絡安全信息共享。但面對紛繁複雜的、多維度的數據源信息，如何高效地開展共享和深入分析，需建立一套基於大數據分析的網絡安全威脅信息共享標準。目前，我國很多機構已經在開展網絡安全威脅信息共享的探索與實踐，相關國家標準和行業標準已在製定中，CNCERT也建立了網絡安全威脅信息共享平台，在通信行業和安全行業內進行相關共享工作。
（六）有國家背景的網絡爭端受關注度將繼續升溫。目前，我國互聯網普及率已經達到53.2%7，民眾通過互聯網獲得的新聞資訊越來越快捷方便，民眾關注全球政治熱點的熱度也不斷高漲。 2016年美國總統大選“郵件門”事件、俄羅斯黑客曝光世界反興奮劑機構醜聞事件等，都讓網民真切感受到有組織、有目的的一場縝密的網絡攻擊可以對他國政治產生嚴重的影響，將有國家背景的網絡爭端從行業領域關注視角延伸到了全體網民。隨著大量的國家不斷強化網絡空間軍事能力建設，有國家背景的網絡爭端事件將會熱點不斷、危機頻出，全民討論的趨勢將會持續升溫。
（七）基於人工智能的網絡安全技術研究全面鋪開。在第三屆世界互聯網大會“世界互聯網領先科技成果發布活動”現場，微軟、IBM、谷歌三大國際科技巨頭展示了基於機器學習的人工智能技術，為我們描繪了人工智能美好的未來。目前，網絡攻擊事件層出不窮、手段多樣、目的複雜，較為短缺的網絡安全人才難以應對變化過快的網絡安全形勢，而機器學習在數據分析領域的出色表現，人工智能被認為在網絡安全方面將會“大有作為”。有研究機構8統計發現，2016年“網絡安全”與“人工智能”兩詞共同出現在文章中的頻率快速上升，表明越來越多的討論將二者聯繫在一起共同關注。以網絡安全相關的大數據為基礎，利用機器學習等人工智能技術，能夠在未知威脅發現、網絡行為分析、網絡安全預警等方面取得突破性進展。

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Hacker Methodology 中國黑客, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀

中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

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中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

Who is responsible for configuring the information resources owned by the United States? Who is responsible for assigning these resources to use the priority order? What measures have we taken to ensure that the Global Information Grid (GIG), the Independent Joint Service System, and the GCCs: Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) and Global Network Associations (GCCs), which rely on information from them, Trojans (JTF-GNO: Joint Task Force-Global NetOps) security? In recent years, the entire network combat system on the discussion of these issues has not been suspended, the focus of debate is the theater operations in the network operations should play what role.

The US military has announced the deployment of the war command for each theater, and also announced that it would reduce military support in the cross-border areas. For each theater combat command, how to configure the information infrastructure to support the war in the theater has become very important. The enemy may be infiltrated into the critical network system area responsible for military power dispatch, which is often underestimated and even treated as an accident or incidental event, but these intrusion is virtually Made a connection request to block the normal operation of the commercial website, and even led to some of the military logistics business logistics company was marked as invalid. The theater warfare command should ensure that the information conditions of its zone are not affected by external invasions. Countless viruses are destroying the Internet, the Department of Defense system began to be attacked. It is now under discussion whether the Global Network Joint Task Force should be disconnected from the military network on the Internet, but the military is concerned that with the cooperation of commercial suppliers alone, the Department of Defense can not guarantee that all logistical support operations will continue without error To go on. Each theater combat command is not sure about the state of the theater itself, and they are skeptical about the security of the global information grid itself, and they are concerned about their ability to carry out the tasks assigned to it.

(STRATCOM) and the global network of joint contingents in the network operations in the dominant ideology of the impact of the theater operations headquarters of its command and control of the zone has a more global network of operations control institutions to strengthen the United States Strategic Command Weakened. The focus on the operational information grid to the global information grid has also affected, to a certain extent, the battlefield operations command of the global information grid is how to support the theater of the specific behavior of the understanding. This article will introduce the existing command relationship, the war between the theater operations command, the direct relationship between command and combat, the old and emerging joint operational principles of a special case analysis, and finally will be the theater combat command In the network operations should play the role of the proposed recommendations.

Network combat environment

The command and control in cyber warfare is a concept that appeared ten years ago, and its connotation has been evolving. Each of the relevant departments, the theater operations headquarters and the global network of joint contingents have carried out some organizational structure and work focus on the adjustment, but ultimately did not solve their respective roles should play this issue. To really understand why the role of theater warfare in cyber operations will be a problem, it is necessary to clarify the question: where is cyber warfare, what is real cyber warfare, and every What is the organizational structure and command and control structure of the department?

The first thing to explain is, what is the global information grid? According to the definition of Ministry of Defense No. 8100.1, it includes “global interconnection, terminal-to-terminal information transmission capability and joint processing capability.” Ability to collect, process, store, transmit and manage information according to the needs of warriors and policy makers ” This covers government and leased communications information systems and services, as well as other software, security and service support required for global information grids, as well as the Clinger- The National Security System, as defined in Section 5142 of the Cohen Act. According to this definition, the global information grid contains all levels of information systems from the Department of Defense and the national security system, from the tactical level to the strategic level, as well as the interconnected communication system.

Most of the discussion on the command and control of the Global Information Grid Network Operations Center focuses on the defense capabilities of the system, but the content of the network operations is far more than that. The tasks to be accomplished by the network operations include three: departmental management, Content management and network defense, whose purpose is to provide a lack of central support across the boundaries of strategic, tactical and operational concepts, and to support the Department of Defense’s full range of combat, intelligence and mission tasks.

1. Sector management is one of the specific tasks of the global information grid, which is the technology, process and policy management of systems and networks that make up the global information grid, including public sector management, systems management, network management, satellite communications management and Electromagnetic spectrum management of these aspects.

2. Content management refers to managing the information itself in the global information grid. It ensures that information is available to users, operators, and decision makers in real time. Content management includes the search, access, transmission, storage and integration of specific information content of the global information grid.

3. Network defense is the global information grid all the information, including additional information to protect, it mainly includes a number of policies, processes, projects and operations. If necessary, the task can be requested through cross-agency cooperation to complete. It is responsible for the global information grid information security, computer network defense, computer defense response capabilities and critical infrastructure protection.

Now we have learned about the basic organizational structure of the cyber warfare, the next step in the various organizations in the network operations and how they are performing the tasks, which are mainly composed of troops, theater warfare headquarters and global network joint contingents, all of which are With the changes in the battlefield requirements to improve their organizational structure.

The change in the organizational structure of the force is mainly to meet the requirements of the global information grid for information transmission, access, control and protection. Ten years ago, the troops had some changes to regional control in order to adapt to cyber warfare, but those measures eventually developed into centralized controls, and these measures were not preserved. Now it is necessary to understand the composition of the forces in order to better understand why the network operations command and control will become so full of controversy.

GEM: GIG Enterprise Management GCM: GIG Content Management GND: GIG network defense

Army ‘s network operations command and control

The army is the least of all the reforms in the service. The Army continues to hold the previous commander, now known as the Theater Network Operations and Security Centers (TNOSC), which is directly responsible for the various theater war operations. The Army maintains an independent global network operations and security center (GNOSC: Global NetOps and Security Center), all of the battlefield network operations and security centers are its affiliates. The Global Network Operations and Security Center has technical control over the Battlefield Network Operations and Security Center, but the Battlefield Operations and Security Center is also part of the Theater Command and is also managed by the Theater Network Command. A typical example is the Army’s battlefield signal The brigade is managed by the Army Service Component Command.

The Global Network Operations and Security Center provides technical guidance to the network operations forces in each theater. The US Army Network Command and the 9th Signal Command are responsible for the technical and management of the Global Network Operations and Security Center. But in wartime, the Global Network Operations and Security Center was also commanded by the Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as Army Element.

ACERT: Army Computer Emergency Response Unit

AGNOSC: Army Global Network and Security Center

ASCC: Army Army Command

ARSTRAT: Army Strategic Command (Missile Defense and Strategy)

CIO: Chief Information Officer

GCC: Theater Combat Command (Regional Joint Command, Six of the US Army’s Top Ten Command)

INSCOM: Intelligence and Security Command (one of the Army’s reporting units)

JTF-GNO: Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NETCOM: Army Network War Command

RCERT: Regional Computer Emergency Response Team

STRATCOM: US Strategic Command

TNCC: Theater Network Operations Control Center

TNOCC: Theater Network Operations and Security Center

G6: Army Command Department of Communications

G2 Army Command Information Department

Installation Network Provider

COMMAND – Strategic level operational command

OPCON: Battle (Battle) Command

TACON: tactical control

GS: Global Strike

TECHCON: echelon

ADCON: management control

Air Force ‘s Network Operations Command Control

The Air Force has chosen a different organizational approach to move the focus from the former headquarters of the Network Operations and Security Center (MAJCOM NOSCs) to the Integrated Network Operations and Security Centers (I-NOSCs: Integrated NetOps and Security Centers). Unlike the Army’s Battlefield Network Operations and Security Center, which is managed by the Theater Operations Command, the Air Force’s Integrated Network Operations and Security Center is not affiliated with any theater war command, but only by the Air Force Operations Center (AFNOC : Air Force NetOps Center), which is similar to the Army’s Global Network Operations and Security Center. The Air Force realizes that the Theater Command must have the power to direct direct operations in its zone, and it is necessary to establish a general support relationship between the Air Force Operations Center and the Theater Operations Command, establishing a dedicated link between the two departments unit. In addition, the Air Force has given a command to the establishment of a communications control center in their respective theater areas. These control centers can be used as a shortcut between the Air Force Operations Center and their respective theater operations.

ACC: Air Warfare Center

AFCHQ: Air Force Command

AFNETOPS: Air Force Network Operations Command

ARSTRAT: Air Force Strategic Command Theater Network Operations Control Center

CIO: Chief Information Officer

I-NOSC: Integrated Network Operations and Security Center

GCC: Ibid., Regional Joint Command

JFCC-NW: Network War Joint Function Composition Command

JTF-GNO: Ibid., Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NCC: Network Control Center

STRATCOM: Ibid., Strategic Command

TNOS: Ibid., Theater Network Operations and Security Center

Naval network operations command control

The Navy and the Air Force, no longer regard the theater as a unit of command. In order to better support global operations, they assisted two existing theater naval warfare centers (RNOSCs) affiliated with the Naval Global Network Operations and Security Center (NAVGNOSC) to assist the original two naval schools in Naples and Bahrain Communication master station (NCTMS: Navy Computer and Telecommunications Master Station). In addition, since most of the Navy’s cyber operations were carried out at sea, they also established Fleet NetOps Centers (FNOCs: Fleet NetOps Centers), echoing the theater and cyber warfare centers located in the United States. The fleet network operations center is the tactical entry point for the fleet to conduct cyber operations, providing network services for audio, video and data for the fleet of the zone, and can be provided when the fleet goes from another area of ​​the fleet network operations center into another area Smooth information transitions. Most unclassified networks are contracted by the US Navy Marine Corps Internet or the US Overseas Overseas Navy Enterprise Network (ONENET: Outside of CONUS Navy Enterprise Network). In order to meet the needs of the battlefield, the Navy established the Overseas Marine Corps Intranet Global Network Operations and Security Center to provide global combat support, as well as the establishment of a war zone network combat and security center of the theater network security center on each Specific battlefield support. There is no subordinate relationship between the Theater Network Operations and Security Center and the theater operations headquarters in the theater.

Fleet NOC: Fleet Network Operations Center

GCC: Ibid., Regional Joint Command

INSCON: Ibid., Army Intelligence and Security Command

JTF-GNO: Ibid., Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NAVGNOSC: Navy Global Network Operations and Security Center

NAVSOC: Navy Satellite Operations Center

NCC MHQ: Navy Network Operations Information Operations and Space Warfare Center

NMCI GNOC: Maritime Network Global Network Operations Center

RNOSC: ibid, regional network operations center

STRATCOM: Ibid., Strategic Command

TNCC: Ibid., Theater Network Operations Control Center

Navy Global Network Operations and Security Center (NAVGNOSC) and the East and West Regional Network Operations and Security Center (East and West RNOSCs), which support the most basic organization of global naval operations. The Naval Global Network Operations and Security Center brings together information from the Theater Network Operations and Security Center, the Overseas Marine Corps Intranet and the Naval Satellite Operations Center to provide global command and control information for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force. Unlike the Navy and the Army, they did not maintain a body belonging to the Theater Command. The support relationship between the forces established by the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations and the Theater Warfare Command did not give the theater war command the power to command the Naval Department’s global information grid. All command requests of the Theater Warfare Command must be approved by the Navy’s Global Network Operations and Security Center.

Command and Control of Theater Combat Command

Although each theater combat command in their respective jurisdictions for network operations are not the same way, but they have a common feature, that is, have established a theater network operations control center and a subordinate to the defense information system (DISA: Defense Information Systems Agency) of the theater network operations center. (CENTCOM) will be the theater network operations control center and the Defense Information Systems Agency’s theater network operations center known as the Central Theater Network Operations Center (Central Region Theater NetOps), the Central Commander of the Central Theater, Center, and the European Command (EUCOM) has established a Theater Communication Control Center (Theater Communication Control Center). Although there are some differences in the organization, but all the theater network operations control center are basically used by the theater combat command for the area of ​​the global information grid command control (area of ​​the global information grid is also known as the theater Information Grid TIG: Theater Information Grid).

The Theater Operations Command has optimized the configuration and control of the information resources of the global information grid through the Theater Network Operations Control Center to enable them to better serve the battle, while the Theater Network Operations Control Center is also connected to the Defense Information Systems Authority, the regular forces and the global Joint Operations of the Network Operations Joint Task Force. They collaborated with the Theater Network Warfare Center, the Theater Network Operations and Security Center to monitor the status of the theater information grid, to decide on the proposed global operations of the Joint Operations Task Force, and to assess the impact of its actions. The Theater Network Warfare Control Center has the right to decide on the reduction and termination of combat operations and to adjust the priority of operations through the Theater Network Operations Center and the Theater Network Operations and Security Center. If there is no theater network operations and security center in the theater, the theater network operations control center under the Global Network Operations and Security Center tie is responsible for completing the mission required by the Theater Operations Command.

The North North Command (NORTHCOM) is a rather special sector, although it is a theater warfare command with a clear zone, but most of its troops in the zone – including cyber combat troops – are not affiliated with the commander , But belong to the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM: Join Forces Command). This deployment is intended to facilitate the global management of the force. The North Command, like several other theater warfare commanders, also set up a theater network operations control center, but did not establish a theater network operations and security center, which makes the North Command must rely on network operations and security centers and other departments for its Provide general support. In this case, the role of the North Command is to be responsible for the operations within its jurisdiction, but also the lack of understanding of the corresponding battlefield information grid, and no direct control of its power.

Strategic Command Network Operations Command Control

With the troops fighting command on the network combat structure to adjust the same, the Ministry of Defense departments are also undergoing reform. Over the years, the Department of Defense has not had a centralized control of the network operations. But in 1997 when the Department of Defense conducted this attempt to find some of the weaknesses of the network at that time, also came to the “combat command – troops – defense agencies,” this network mode of operation is not suitable for modern battlefield situation The That attempt has led to the formation of a Defense Force (IAA) bureau, which is part of today’s Global Network Operations Joint Task Force, which is responsible for the operation and defense of global information grids.

Global Network Operations Joint Task Force network operations command and control mechanism is also constantly evolving. Prior to the advent of the existing UCP: Unified Command Plan, the command and control of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force was under the responsibility of the Theater Operations Command, but it proved that it was not conducive to managing all the components in the network, It is also difficult to provide enough information for the global information grid information. The original version of the operational concept of cyber warfare emphasizes the control of the theater operations of the theater in the theater, which was described as follows: “The combat command has the power to command the troops assigned to its zone, Is conducive to the completion of the task, when the combat command feel appropriate, or even adjust the priority of the global information grid.All of these activities should be through the theater network operations center to achieve. “In fact, even the global Event, the initial version of the network combat concept document also provides that the global network operations Joint Task Force needs to be in the theater combat command of the theater network operations control center under the command of combat.

The follow-up version of the operational concept has been adapted to this principle. The control of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force was moved to a more global command and control structure, through which the overall role of the strategic headquarters, the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force and other forces involved in the network operations Has been strengthened. The operational concept of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force is subdivided into three environmental operational concepts: global, theater and non-global. What kind of environmental concepts apply to different events depends on the actual impact of the events and the impact of the theater. This form of command and control structure is more suitable for the current network combat diversity characteristics, for different levels of events, theater combat command can take a more flexible response measures, and even at the same time to support and supportive action. In this system, sometimes the process of dealing with the event to go through a complete command system chain, and sometimes you can skip some steps.

Global events

Global events refer to activities or events that clearly affect the preparedness of the entire global information grid, which often requires the concordation of multiple theater combatants to be resolved. Commander of the Strategic Command must have the ability to quickly identify global events and to be able to determine which theater combat operations or other agencies of the Department of Defense will be affected. Global events include fast-spreading network malicious code attacks, satellite communications attacks, and enterprise application attacks that are not limited to single-theater network events.

The Global Strategic Command is a reliable command center with command and command for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force and the Theater Command. The Global Network Operations Joint Task Force uses its own resources to execute the instructions of the Strategic Command, which can be quickly sent to troops around the world. It is noteworthy that this order is not in the event of transmission to the theater of combat operations.

Although the notion of operational concept conferred the command of the commander of the strategic command worldwide, it did not completely deny the right of the theater war command to be commanded by the assigned joint command. While the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force performs the operational command of the Strategic Command, the Theater Operations Command can also deploy its troops to carry out the corresponding activities. Of course, in accordance with the requirements of the operational concept, the forces under the leadership of the theater operations command must be consistent with the action guidelines of the Joint Operations Task Force under the leadership of the Strategic Command. In fact, according to the historical action log of the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations, most of the cyber operations began at the beginning of a small theater, and the Theater Command was always the first unit to deal with these incidents, and If they are handled properly, these theater-level events will not develop into global events.

Theater events

Theater events are those that occur in a battlefield area, and its foreseeable range of influence does not go beyond the theater, and the biggest difference between theater and global events is that. In the event of such incidents, the theater operations headquarters played a leading role, while the strategic headquarters only take the support role. The Global Network Operations Joint Task Force can provide support to the Theater Command by its Theater Network Operations and Security Center. If the local forces do not have a theater network operations and security center, it can also provide general support for the Theater Network Operations Control Center through the Global Network Operations and Security Center. The Command of the Theater Combat Command to the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force is subordinate to the subordinate command, that is to say there is no right to direct the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force through its Global Network Operations and Security Center to operate in its area.

Non-global event

A non-global event is an event that only affects the functional warfare headquarters and a particular defense agency. Since such institutions do not have a clear zone, these events can neither be regarded as global nor can they be seen as theater. In dealing with non-global events, the Strategic Command plays the role of auxiliary command, and the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force provides general support for the operational operational warfare headquarters involved. Most of the non-global events generally occur in the northern command zone, since many of the relevant functional departments are subordinate to the Northern Command. In the case of command and control procedures, non-global events and global events are the same.

Contradictory command and control requirements

Tactical technical requirements

Although the positioning of the various forces are not the same, but in the pursuit of efficient network operations, reasonable combat methods are their common theme. Different forces shoulder different responsibilities, they established an independent combat network, application facilities and auxiliary tools to meet their own and global information grid to maintain connectivity needs. Each unit is responsible for operating part of the global information grid, which to some extent the need for combat operations between the various departments of the centralized management, so as to get the desired combat efficiency and return on investment.

The focus of the discussion on centralized control of global information grids is the global nature of cyber warfare. The only way for the Department of Defense to achieve a network-centric commanding mechanism, to enhance the Force’s awareness of the situation and to significantly shorten the decision-making cycle, is to integrate the network and the forces horizontally, which is a centralized control mechanism The The latest “four-year defense assessment report” mentioned in the “to simplify the current ‘chimney’ system structure, to achieve a network-centric command mechanism.”

In order to make better use of scarce resources, the Department of Defense must consider when and where to allocate resources from a global perspective. The allocation of essential resources for network operations such as satellite transmission bands, standard tactical entry network sites and bandwidth must have clear mission objectives and easy to understand global significance. From the perspective of the force, the centralized command is, to some extent, a reshuffle of the existing force institutions and operations, defense networks.

The combat operations led by the theater war command will no longer be strictly limited to its zone. Ground forces are re-starting to use aircraft (including unmanned aerial vehicles) to routinely fly in the United States to support their operations. With the development of the PGS: Prompt Global Strike project, the commander has the power to call for conventional strike assistance from weapons systems outside the theater.

On the Navy, they pointed out that one of the essential characteristics of the maritime forces was global mobility, and the naval forces were constantly interspersed between the various theater warheads. Especially as aircraft carrier battle group such units, once deployed, it can not stay in a small battlefield. In addition, even the theater-level operations taken by the theater war command may have a global impact. The adjustment of the network defensive posture may have a huge financial burden on the Internet sector, and the combat command may not be able to understand the specific details of the adjustment behavior.

For the Department of Defense’s network system, all attacks are essentially global in nature. The enemy can not easily from the other side of the Earth to the United States to attack the physical objectives, but in the field of computer network technology, such things happen often. Once such an attack is detected, the information about it must be communicated to all relevant departments in the shortest possible time to ensure that such attacks are identified from anywhere to protect the security of the global information grid. Every time a network intrusion – even if it does not seem to fail the invasion – is likely to give the global information grid content a huge potential harm, because they invade the system behind the back door will be in the future Attack to play a role. The outbreak of the virus is an undisputed global event, and if we do not realize this, we will suffer more losses.

The Navy emphasizes that the impact of no events will be limited to a theater area, and that all efforts to combat cyber operations must be global. Their defense is that there is no theater boundaries, the Department of Defense every battlefield combat headquarters are facing the same potential threat, in order to obtain information on the advantages of the Department of Defense must make full use of its large coverage of the network resources , Quickly share all useful information on a global basis.

In addition, the Air Force and the Navy have pointed out that their cyber warfare forces are not deployed by the Theater Warfare Command. The Air Force and the Navy have their own cyber warfare organizations (such as the Theater Network Operations and Security Center) in each zone of the Theater Command, and the Air Force and Navy’s cyber warfare forces are usually defender in the theater. Finally, the Air Force and the Navy believe that the Strategic Command is responsible for the Global Information Grid through the Theater Operations Command, based on the description of the official documents available for reference.

Theater war command

There are two issues that need to be concerned about the command and control of cyber warfare against the Theater Command. One is the need for timely control of the battlefield information grid, the second is the need to turn the network into a weapon system, so that commanders can be the same as the conventional weapon system to use the same network resources, the use of the full range of network advantages to conduct a comprehensive battle.

Those forces that have been assigned specific responsibilities have already deployed their own unique solutions, each of which is involved in a network operation or each institution believes that it already has the most effective allocation of scarce resources. But the global information grid is not exclusive to a particular department, but a joint structure. “Chimney” type system and the existing deployment of the troops is actually to reduce the efficiency of the battlefield information grid efficiency. For example, the Army developed a secure IP telephony solution before other departments in the Department of Defense to communicate with the secret voice. For security reasons, other departments usually do not use this program, but their own development of a set of the same function of the solution. So there will be two sets of independent, confidential IP voice schemes in the zone of the Combat Command, which can not be connected to each other. The theater warfare command had to be screened, leaving only a set of programs to ensure that all departments in their zones could cooperate with each other. But the solution is eliminated by the party can no longer with the theater outside the brother forces for confidential contact.

Some of the resources in the combat command zone can serve multiple forces and the public sector. However, there are many examples of the use of duplication of work for the establishment of their own can not be linked to each other independent systems, such as satellite terminals and some technical control equipment. Sometimes, to send a message, you need to send the signal back to the United States, and then sent from the local distance from the initial sender only two miles of the recipient there. All kinds of fibers are arranged one by one on the same route, but the data between them can not be exchanged directly because they belong to different forces or public departments. The theater operations command must take measures to address the interconnection between the troops or the civil service in the zone.

To solve this problem, you can use centralized control approach. The centralized command of the cyber warfare forces requires the theater war command to make some adjustments to its own organization, but at the same time it does not affect its power to direct action when there is a need for combat. Relevant forces must accept orders for multiple combat orders and effectively optimize and feedback battlefield information. At present, the troops sent to the front are becoming more and more independent, and through the help of the global information grid they can cross the border of the theater combat command back and forth, and the theater warfare command has been compromised by the support and confrontation of the cyber warfare , After the implementation of centralized command, the troops can not or do not want to respond to the requirements of the theater combat command.

The Pacific Command (PACOM: Pacific Command) first adopted a “joint attempt” approach in humanitarian aid operations when it participated in the Indonesian tsunami relief work in 2004. The Pacific Command issued instructions to the assigned troops to carry out special network defenses under the framework of the entire action plan. Many naval forces and Marine Corps units have established relatively direct network defenses under the centralized command of the Navy’s Global Network Operations Center, which goes beyond the mandate of the Pacific Command to the Navy and Marine Corps, which Posing a potential risk factor for the global operations of the Pacific Command.

The Combat Command is concerned that the idea of ​​centralizing control of global information grids will always reduce their grip on information and control of the global information grid. Under the existing command system, a unit will carry out training or perform other tasks under the command of its troops, and participate in the battle under the command of the theater combat command, and the rules of command and control are very clear. The command and control of the forces in the field of information is as important as their command and control in the air, land, sea and space fields. For the C3S system (control, communications and computer systems), under its command to combat and responsible for the protection of its forces are often in a double or even triple the report chain, the results can not tell who is responsible for the final battle. In a global or non-global event, the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force often conducts direct operations around the theater operations headquarters. Although the operational concept of joint cyber warfare specifically emphasizes the need for coordinated operations with the theater combat command, this requirement has become almost in the context of modern combat rapid changes. Information Security Weakness Alert System, Computer Task Sequence, and Information Condition Adjustment System Problems outside the jurisdiction of the Combat Command are typical examples of this requirement failure. These events directly affect the command of the Theater Command in the battlefield, when the troops want to directly use these mechanisms from the management level to strengthen their own control, they can not determine when and how in the implementation of these Operation, and do not know what impact this will have on the command of the theater combat command, because under current conditions, only the theater combat command has the ability to carry out these operations. When a threat event requires the Air Force’s Space Command to seek the cooperation of the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations with Air Force forces, it would bring to the command of the North Command if it did not notify or obtain cooperation with the Northern Command Big trouble.

In the Central Command, due to the lack of adequate control of the network combat forces, resulting in the commander sometimes can not determine whether the network resources are available. The Navy is responsible for operating a large number of battlefield information grids. Navy network combat forces in the operational area are not responsible for the Central Command of the Navy, who only need to report to the Theater Network Operations and Security Center. The central theater’s central theater theater operations center, whose duty is to maintain and direct all the combat operations of the theater operations, but it is not in the naval network combat force report chain, so it is often impossible to get all the battlefield information grid Of the state of affairs, there are already alternatives to deal with this problem, but this can not be said to be a formal solution.

For the North Command, because of the lack of cyber warfare control, they encountered great trouble in the rescue work of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In that operation, the troops’ equipment was transported to the joint warfare zone without permission. Which makes the North Command can not grasp and guide the transfer of materials, but can not coordinate the actions of various forces, which is a multi-directional management and operational issues.

As the various forces advocate the implementation of a centralized command framework centered on the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the theater commanders are reluctant to see such changes, Some of them are responsible for the strategic headquarters, with the global information grid operating rights and defense rights mechanism. The presence of the Strategic Command has been instrumental in maintaining the command of the theater combat command in combat operations in theater and global events and in enhancing communication between the theater combat command and the Joint Staff.

Combat headquarters and troops want to focus on the network operations from the level of joint operations, but there are several issues that need to be discussed:

Who is responsible for the first leadership?

2. Network operations to focus on what the specific direction of the command to be reflected, the global level, the theater level or what other level?

3. What is the change brought about by this adjustment only when a part of the theater combat command sends a request to the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force or is the theater commander’s complete command and priority in the theater?

Finally, the Theater Command is the body that is ultimately responsible for the President’s mission to complete the military mission in the area, and the troops dispatched to the theater combat command need to complete their respective tasks under their jurisdiction. It is unquestionable that they will still be under the command of the strategic command when the troops advocate the implementation of a global centralized command. But the current global information grid is a key part of the command and control capability of the theater combat command and the commander’s ability to guide the troops. Without a global information grid, the plane can not fly, the ground forces can not move, the ships can not sail, even the satellite can not provide the signal. Commanders need to get the status of the global information grid and control, just as they need to master the position and status of the troops as important. They must grasp the scope, ability and status of the battlefield information grid, and must know how the situation outside the theater will affect the battlefield information grid in the area where the troops are located and must be able to command and optimize the troops to support operations. If we really believe that the speculation of the centralized command will have a better effect, it can not be ignored for the theater war command to retain the appropriate command and control.

Also, as long as the structure of the Theater Command is still preserved, all military missions, including those directed by the Functional Command Command, will inevitably occur in the theater of the Theater Command, as all networks Combat missions must be carried out by an entity unit. At the same time, centralized command is necessary to achieve a network-centric command model and to more effectively defend against attacks. The concept of this centralized command and the command of the theater war command to master and optimize the battlefield information grid is not mutually exclusive.

The way forward

To develop a viable network combat command and control framework, it is necessary to avoid extremes, taking into account the needs of theater warfare headquarters and the need to establish centralized control of global information grids. In the process of the development of the operational concept of joint network operations and the transformation process of network combat forces, the principle of organization needs to play the role of adjusting the interests of all parties. In order to achieve this goal, the Department of Defense should do the following:

1. Create a simple, clear network combat command chain, to ensure that the strategic headquarters of all network operations can be directed. This can solve the problem just mentioned “who is responsible for the first leadership”. Only when the event occurred in a rapidly changing environment, the theater command and control agencies began to play a role. Simple command chain can ensure that troops involved in network operations know who should listen to who should report to whom, in this command chain, must include the theater combat command.

2. The command of the theater war command in its zone can be given:

– to amend the Joint Command plan to clarify the responsibilities of the Theater Operations Command to operate the network in its zone.

– Revise the existing global information grid network operational concept, detailing that those outside the theater network operations and security centers can obtain direct assistance from the World Network Operations and Security Center of the Theater Operations Command.

– All orders for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force shall be enforced through the Theater Operations Command.

These adjustments ensure that all units in the theater are acting under a single command chain, which is responsible for the strategic headquarters through the Theater Operations Command. This can also solve the North Command should be responsible for the area but did not command the power of the network fighting the embarrassing situation.

3. In each theater combat command, a joint network operations center under the jurisdiction of the Central Command shall be established to integrate the Theater Network Operations Control Center of the Theater Command Command and the Theater Network Operations Center of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force. As a result, each theater war command will have a joint operations command in the field of computer space, just as in the battlefield of land, sea and air. Any troops outside the Theater Network Operations and Security Center can obtain direct assistance from the Global Network Operations and Security Center of the Joint Network Operations Center.

4. To consolidate the status of the global information grid, the highest control to the strategic headquarters. The development of centralized command is now focused on the command of the forces involved in the network operations, which runs counter to the network-centric command concept. The force-centric “chimney” command system is not conducive to the transmission and processing of information, let us from the “all users to provide the latest and most accurate information” goal farther and farther. In the previous “Goldwater Nichols Defense Ministry Reconstruction Law” report has made it clear that the organization and management and command and control should be controlled by a joint agency.

Concluding remarks

The current centralized command of network operations is an urgent need. Optimizing the network operational command mechanism can help the Department of Defense to improve efficiency, save costs and better allocate scarce resources. More importantly, this allows network combat troops to provide information more quickly and accurately to commanders, which is important in large-scale network operations. The process of centralized command can not affect the efficiency of network combat command and control. This depends on whether the global information grid can provide enough information for all participating units and whether the commander makes full use of the theater information grid to help command operations.

“We have to change the network combat problem discussion and thinking mode, we are in the network” combat “rather than the network” management “, all participating units must ensure that they are ready to war every time to ensure that the network system A decisive weapon system. ” Network operations are a key part of our country’s ability to win war, it can help us provide command and control, shorten the decision-making cycle and adjust the resources of the theater. The Strategic Command has taken a big step in strengthening the concept of cyber warfare, and these efforts need to be continued. The theater warfare command must be an important part of the control and protection of the global information grid to ensure that we can continue to win the network.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

是誰在負責配置美國所擁有的信息資源？誰在負責分配這些資源利用時的優先級順序？我們採取了哪些措施來保證全球信息柵格（GIG：Global Information Grid）、獨立聯合服務系統以及依靠從它們身上獲取信息來開展工作的戰區作戰司令部（GCCs：Geographic Combatant Commanders）和全球網絡聯合特遣部隊（JTF-GNO：Joint Task Force-Global NetOps）的安全？最近幾年以來，整個網絡作戰系統對這些問題的討論一直沒有停息過，人們爭論的焦點就是戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中應該扮演什麼樣的角色。

美國軍方公佈了對每個戰區作戰司令部的部署，同時還宣布將會減少跨戰區的軍事支持行動。對每個戰區作戰司令部來說，如何配置支持本戰區作戰的信息基礎設施就變得非常重要了。敵人有可能會滲透進負責軍事力量調度的關鍵網絡系統區域進行破壞，這些入侵的危害常常被低估，甚至被當作意外事件或者偶發事件輕描淡寫地處理掉，但是這些入侵行為實際上完全有可能濫發連接請求來阻塞商業網站的正常運行，甚至導致一些承擔軍隊後勤業務的物流公司被標為無效狀態。戰區作戰司令部應該保證其防區的信息條件不受外部入侵的影響。不計其數的病毒正在破壞著互聯網，國防部的系統也開始遭到攻擊。現在有人在討論是否應該讓全球網絡聯合特遣隊斷開互聯網上的軍事入網點，但軍方又擔心僅靠和商業供應商的合作，國防部不能保證所有的後勤支持行動都能繼續無差錯地進行下去。每個戰區作戰司令部對各自的戰區網絡狀態都不太確定，他們對全球信息柵格本身的安全持有懷疑態度，他們擔心其是否有能力執行分配給它的任務。

受到建立一個更全球化的網絡作戰控制機構、加強美國戰略司令部（STRATCOM）和全球網絡聯合特遣隊在網絡作戰中的主導地位思想的影響，戰區作戰司令部對其防區的指揮控制權有所削弱。將作戰信息集中到全球信息柵格的做法也在一定程度上影響了戰區作戰司令部對全球信息柵格是如何支持該戰區的作戰的具體行為的了解。本文將會介紹現有的指揮關係、戰區作戰司令部的職責、指揮和作戰之間的線性關係、舊有的和新興的聯合作戰原則一級特殊戰例分析，最後還將會對戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中所應扮演的角色提出建議。

網絡作戰的環境

網絡作戰中的指揮控制是一個在十年以前就出現了的概念，之後它的內涵一直處在演變之中。每個相關部門、戰區作戰司令部和全球網絡聯合特遣隊都為此進行過一些組織結構和工作重心上的調整，但是最終都沒有解決好各自應該扮演的角色這個問題。要想真正明白為什麼戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中的角色會成為一個難題，就必須先弄清楚這幾個問題：網絡作戰是在哪兒發生的、什麼是真正的網絡作戰、網絡作戰中的每個部門的組織結構和指揮控制結構是怎樣的。

首先需要解釋的是，什麼是全球信息柵格？按照國防部第8100.1號文件的定義，它包括“全球互聯的、終端到終端的信息傳輸能力和聯合處理能力。按照戰士、決策者的需要來進行信息採集、處理、儲存、傳播和管理的能力”。這就涵蓋了政府的和租用的通信信息系統及服務，以及全球信息柵格所需的其他軟件、安全和服務支持，還包括1996年3月頒布的《克林格-科恩法》（Clinger- Cohen Act）第5142節所定義的國家安全系統（National Security System）。按照這個定義，全球信息柵格包含了國防部和國家安全系統的所有級別的信息系統，從戰術層次到戰略層次，以及互聯通信系統。

大多數關於全球信息柵格網絡作戰中心的指揮控制的討論都在著重強調該系統的防禦能力，但是網絡作戰包含的內容其實遠不止這點，網絡作戰要完成的任務包括三項：部門管理、內容管理和網絡防禦，其工作目的是提供跨越戰略、戰術和作戰概念邊界的無中心式支持，為國防部的全方位的戰鬥、情報和考察任務提供支持。

1.部門管理是全球信息柵格的具體任務之一，它是對構成全球信息柵格的系統和網絡的技術、過程和政策管理，包括公務部門管理、系統管理、網絡管理、衛星通信管理和電磁光譜管理這幾個方面。

2.內容管理指的是管理全球信息柵格里的信息本身。它用即時的方式保證信息對使用者、操作者和決策者都是可用的。內容管理包括對全球信息柵格的具體信息內容的查找、訪問、傳輸、儲存和一體化。

3.網絡防禦就是對全球信息柵格所有的信息包括附加信息進行保護，它主要包括一些政策、過程、項目和操作。如果有必要的話，該任務可以請求通過跨機構合作來完成。它負責的是全球信息柵格的信息安全、計算機網絡防禦、計算機防衛反應能力和關鍵性基礎設施保護。

現在已經了解了網絡作戰的基本組織結構，下一步介紹網絡作戰中的各個組織和他們是如何執行任務的，需要介紹的主要是部隊、戰區作戰司令部和全球網絡聯合特遣隊，它們都在隨著戰場要求的變化而改進著各自的組織結構。

部隊在組織結構上的改變主要是為了滿足全球信息柵格對信息傳輸、訪問、控制和保護能力的要求。十年之前，部隊為了適應網絡作戰曾針對區域控制進行過一些變革，但那些措施最終發展成了集中化的控制，這些措施也沒有保留下來。現在我們有必要了解一下部隊的組織構成，以便更好地理解為什麼網絡作戰的指揮控制會變得如此充滿爭議。
GEM：GIG企業管理 GCM：GIG內容管理 GND:GIG網絡防禦
陸軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

陸軍是所有軍種中改革措施最少的。陸軍繼續保持著以前的指揮機構，現在叫做戰場網絡作戰與安全中心（TNOSC：Theater NetOps and Security Centers），該組織直接對各個戰區作戰司令部負責。陸軍維持著一個獨立的全球網絡作戰與安全中心（GNOSC：Global NetOps and Security Center），所有的戰場網絡作戰與安全中心都是其下屬機構。全球網絡作戰與安全中心對戰場網絡作戰與安全中心進行技術控制，但是戰場網絡作戰與安全中心同時又隸屬於戰區作戰司令部，也受到戰區網絡司令部的管理，典型的例子就是陸軍的戰場信號旅受陸軍服務組件指揮部的管理。

全球網絡作戰與安全中心對各個戰區的網絡作戰部隊提供技術指導。美國陸軍網絡司令部暨第9信號司令部對全球網絡作戰與安全中心的技術和管理負責。但是在戰時，全球網絡作戰與安全中心又作為陸軍的元素受戰略司令部（STRATCOM）的指揮。
ACERT：陸軍計算機應急響應分隊
AGNOSC：陸軍全球網絡和安全中心

ASCC：陸軍軍種組成司令部

ARSTRAT：陸軍戰略司令部（導彈防禦與戰略）

CIO：首席信息官

GCC：戰區作戰司令部（地區性聯合司令部，美軍十大司令部中的六個）

INSCOM：情報和安全司令部（陸軍直屬報告單位之一）

JTF-GNO：聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NETCOM：陸軍網絡戰爭司令部

RCERT：地區性計算機應急響應分隊

STRATCOM：美軍戰略司令部

TNCC：戰區網絡作戰控制中心

TNOCC：戰區網絡作戰和安全中心

G6：陸軍司令部通信部門

G2陸軍司令部情報部門

Installation Network Provider網絡施設提供商

COMMAND—戰略層面作戰指揮

OPCON:作戰（戰役）指揮

TACON：戰術控制

GS：全球打擊

TECHCON：梯隊

ADCON：管理控制

空軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

空軍選擇了一條不同的組織途徑，把重點從以前的一級司令部網絡作戰和安全中心（MAJCOM NOSCs）轉移到了一體化網絡作戰和安全中心（I-NOSCs：Integrated NetOps and Security Centers）。與陸軍的戰場網絡作戰與安全中心受戰區作戰司令部的管理不同的是，空軍的一體化網絡作戰和安全中心並不隸屬於任何一個戰區作戰司令部，而是只受空軍網絡作戰中心（AFNOC ：Air Force NetOps Center）的管理，該中心與陸軍的全球網絡作戰和安全中心性質類似。空軍意識到了戰區作戰司令部必須擁有在其防區直接指揮網絡作戰行動的權力，有必要在空軍網絡作戰中心和戰區作戰司令部之間建立起一般支持的關係，建立兩個部門之間的專用聯絡單元。另外空軍方面還賦予了一級司令部在各自的戰區建立通信控制中心的自主權，這些控制中心可以當作空軍網絡作戰中心與各自戰區作戰司令部相互聯繫的快捷通道。
ACC：空戰中心
AFCHQ：空軍組成司令部

AFNETOPS：空軍網絡作戰司令部

ARSTRAT：空軍戰略司令部戰區網絡作戰控制中心

CIO：首席信息官

I-NOSC：集成網絡作戰和安全中心

GCC：同上，地區性聯合司令部

JFCC-NW：網絡戰聯合職能組成司令部

JTF-GNO：同上，聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NCC：網絡控制中心

STRATCOM：同上，戰略司令部

TNOS：同上，戰區網絡作戰與安全中心

海軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

海軍和空軍一樣，不再把戰區當作指揮的單位。為了更好地支持全球作戰，他們用隸屬於海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心（NAVGNOSC）的兩個戰區網絡戰安全中心（RNOSCs）來協助原有的位於那不勒斯和巴林島的兩個戰區海軍計算機與通信主站（NCTMS：Navy Computer and Telecommunications Master Station）。另外，由於海軍的大多數網絡作戰是在海上進行，所以他們還建立了艦隊網絡作戰中心（FNOCs：Fleet NetOps Centers），與位於美國本土的戰區網絡戰安全中心互為呼應。艦隊網絡作戰中心是艦隊進行網絡作戰的戰術切入點，可以為本防區的艦隊提供音頻、視頻和數據等網絡服務，並且可以在艦隊從一個艦隊網絡作戰中心的轄區駛入另一個轄區的時候提供平滑的信息過渡。多數未分類的網絡都是由美國本土的海軍陸戰隊內聯網（NMCI：Navy Marine Corps Internet）或者美國海外的海外海軍企業網絡（ONENET：Outside of CONUS Navy Enterprise Network）負責承包運營的。為了適應戰場的需求，海軍建立了海外海軍陸戰隊內聯網全球網絡作戰與安全中心來提供全球性的作戰支持，同時也建立了隸屬於戰區網絡作戰與安全中心的戰區網絡戰安全中心對各個具體戰場提供支持。戰區網絡作戰與安全中心與所在戰區的戰區作戰司令部並沒有從屬關係。
Fleet NOC:艦隊網絡作戰中心
GCC：同上，地區性聯合司令部

INSCON：同上，陸軍情報和安全司令部

JTF-GNO：同上，聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NAVGNOSC：海軍全球網絡作戰和安全中心

NAVSOC：海軍衛星作戰中心

NCC MHQ：海軍網絡作戰信息作戰和太空戰中心

NMCI GNOC：海軍陸戰隊網全球網絡作戰中心

RNOSC：同上，地區性網絡作戰中心

STRATCOM：同上，戰略司令部

TNCC：同上，戰區網絡作戰控制中心

支持全球海軍作戰的最基本的組織的海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心（NAVGNOSC）和東西部戰區網絡作戰與安全中心（East and West RNOSCs）。海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心匯集了來自戰區網絡作戰與安全中心、海外海軍陸戰隊內聯網和海軍衛星作戰中心的信息，為全球網絡行動聯合特遣部隊提供全球性的指揮控制信息。海軍和陸軍不同的是，他們沒有維持一個隸屬於戰區作戰司令部的機構。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊建立的部隊與戰區作戰司令部之間的支持關係並沒有賦予戰區作戰司令部在海軍部負責的全球信息柵格範圍內進行指揮的權力。戰區作戰司令部的所有指揮請求都必須先經過海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心的批准。

戰區作戰司令部的網絡作戰指揮控制

儘管每個戰區作戰司令部在各自的轄區內針對網絡作戰的組織方式都不盡相同，但是他們卻有一個共同的特點，那就是都建立了一個戰區網絡作戰控制中心和一個隸屬於國防信息系統局（DISA：Defense Information Systems Agency）的戰區網絡作戰中心。各個戰區網絡作戰控制中心的組織結構並不完全相同，美國中央司令部（CENTCOM）將戰區網絡作戰控制中心和國防信息系統局的戰區網絡作戰中心合稱為中央戰區網絡作戰中心（Central Region Theater NetOps Center），而歐洲司令部（EUCOM）則建立了一個戰區通信控制中心（Theater Communication Control Center）。雖然在組織上有些差異，但是所有的戰區網絡作戰控制中心基本上都是被戰區作戰司令部用來對轄區內的全球信息柵格進行指揮控制（轄區內的全球信息柵格也被稱為戰區信息柵格TIG：Theater Information Grid）。

戰區作戰司令部通過戰區網絡作戰控制中心來優化配置和控制全球信息柵格的信息資源，以使它們更好地為戰鬥服務，同時戰區網絡作戰控制中心也是連接國防信息系統局、常規部隊和全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的戰區接口。他們與戰區網絡戰中心、戰區網絡作戰和安全中心合作來監控戰區信息柵格的狀態，對被提議的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊相關行動作出決定，並評估其行動的影響。戰區網絡戰控制中心對作戰行動力度的減小和終止有決定權，並且通過戰區網絡作戰中心和戰區網絡作戰與安全中心來調整作戰的優先級。如果該戰區沒有戰區網絡作戰與安全中心，那麼就由全球網絡作戰與安全中心領帶下的戰區網絡作戰控制中心來負責完成戰區作戰司令部所要求的任務。

美國的北方司令部（NORTHCOM）是一個比較特別的部門，雖然它是一個有著明確防區的戰區作戰司令部，但是其防區內的大部分部隊——包括網絡作戰部隊——都不隸屬於該司令部，而是屬於美國聯合部隊司令部（JFCOM：Join Forces Command）。這樣的部署是為了便於部隊的全球性管理。北方司令部和其他幾個戰區作戰司令部一樣，也設立了戰區網絡作戰控制中心，但是卻沒有建立戰區網絡作戰與安全中心，這就使得北方司令部必須依靠網絡作戰與安全中心等部門為其提供一般支持。在這種情況下，北方司令部所扮演的角色就是需要負責其轄區內的作戰行動，但是又對相應的戰場信息柵格缺乏了解，更沒有直接控制它的權力。

戰略司令部網絡作戰指揮控制

與部隊戰鬥司令部對網絡作戰結構進行調整一樣，國防部的相關部門也在進行著改革。多年以來，國防部一直沒有一個集中控制的網絡作戰部。但是在1997年的時候國防部進行過這方面的嘗試，發現了一些當時網絡的弱點，也得出了“作戰司令部-部隊-國防機構”這種網絡作戰的模式已經不適合現代的戰場情況。那次嘗試促成了國防信息系統局最終組建了一支實體部隊，也就是今天的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊來負責全球信息柵格的操作和防禦。

全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的網絡作戰指揮控制機制同樣也在不斷發展。在現有的聯合司令部計劃（UCP：Unified Command Plan）出現之前，全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的指揮控制都是由戰區作戰司令部負責，但是事實證明這不利於管理網絡中的所有組件，也難以為全球信息柵格提供足夠的事態感知信息。最初版本的網絡作戰的作戰概念比較強調戰區作戰司令部對其防區的網絡作戰的控制，當時對處理戰區問題的描述是這樣的：“作戰司令部有權指揮被指派到其防區的部隊，只要是利於任務的完成，在作戰司令部覺得合適的時候，甚至可以調整全球信息柵格的優先級。所有的這些活動，都應該通過戰區網絡作戰中心來實現。”事實上，即使是全球性的事件，最初版本的網絡作戰概念文件也規定全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊需要在戰區作戰司令部的戰區網絡作戰控制中心指揮下進行作戰。
作戰概念的後續版本對這項原則進行了調整。對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的控制被移到了一個更加全球化的指揮控制架構中，通過這樣的調整，戰略司令部、全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊和其他參與網絡作戰的部隊的整體角色都得到了加強。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的作戰概念被細分成了三個環境作戰概念：全球性的、戰區性的和非全局性的。不同的事件適用何種環境概念取決於事件造成的實際影響和戰區影響。這種形式的指揮控制結構更加適用於目前網絡作戰多樣性特性，針對不同級別的事件，戰區作戰司令部可以採取更加靈活的應對措施，甚至可以同時展開支持性的和輔助性的行動。在這種制度下，有時候處理事件的過程要經過完整的指揮系統鏈，有時候可以跳過一些步驟。

全球性事件

全球性事件是指那些顯而易見會影響整個全球信息柵格的備戰度的活動或事件，這類事件通常需要多個戰區作戰司令部的協同處理才能得到解決。戰略司令部的指揮官必須要具備快速鑑別全球性事件的能力，並要能具體判斷出有哪些戰區作戰司令部或者國防部的其他機構會受到影響。全球性事件包括快速傳播的網絡惡意代碼攻擊、衛星通信攻擊、企業應用攻擊等不僅僅局限於單個戰區的網絡事件。

全球戰略司令部是一個可靠的指揮中心，它對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊和戰區作戰司令部都有命令和指揮權。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊利用自己的資源來執行戰略司令部的指示，作戰命令可以很快地發送到在全球各地的部隊中。值得注意的是，這種命令在傳遞時不經過事件發生地的戰區作戰司令部。

雖然作戰概念的原則賦予了戰略司令部指揮官全球範圍內的指揮權，但是這也並沒有完全否定戰區作戰司令部可以通過分配的聯合司令部計劃來進行指揮的權利。在全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊執行戰略司令部的作戰命令的同時，戰區作戰司令部也可以調遣其麾下的部隊進行相應的活動。當然，按照作戰概念的要求，戰區作戰司令部領導下的部隊的行動必須與戰略司令部領導下的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的行動方針保持一致。事實上，據全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的歷史行動日誌記載，大多數的網絡作戰一開始都是在小範圍戰區開始出現的，戰區作戰司令部總是著手處理這些事件的第一單位，而且如果處理得適當的話，這些戰區級別的事件就不會發展成全球性事件。

戰區性事件

戰區性事件是指那些發生在某個戰場區域，其可預見的影響範圍不會超出該戰區的事件，戰區性事件與全球性事件的最大區別也就在於此。在處理這類事件的時候，戰區作戰司令部起著主導作用，而戰略司令部只承擔輔助的支持作用。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊可以通過其戰區網絡作戰與安全中心對戰區作戰司令部提供支援。如果當地的部隊沒有戰區網絡作戰與安全中心，那也可以通過全球網絡作戰與安全中心為戰區網絡作戰控制中心提供一般支持。戰區作戰司令部對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的指揮屬於次級指揮，也就是說沒有權利通過全球網絡作戰與安全中心來直接調動全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊到其所轄區域進行作戰。

非全局性事件

非全局性事件是指只對職能作戰司令部和特定的國防機構造成影響的事件。由於這類機構沒有明確的防區，所以這些事件既不能被看成全球性的也不能被看成戰區性的。在處理非全局性事件時，戰略司令部扮演輔助指揮的角色，全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊對所涉及到的職能作戰司令部提供一般支持。大多數的非全局性事件一般都發生在北方司令部的防區，因為很多相關的職能部門都隸屬於北方司令部。在指揮控制的程序方面，非全局性事件和全球性事件是相同的。

相互矛盾的指揮控制要求

戰術技術的要求

儘管各個部隊的定位不盡相同，但是在網絡作戰中追求高效、合理的作戰方法是他們共同的主題。不同的部隊肩負著不同的職責，他們建立了獨立的作戰網絡、應用設施和輔助工具來滿足自身與全球信息柵格保持聯通的需求。每支部隊都要負責操作一部分全球信息柵格，這在一定程度上需要各部隊間作戰鏈的集中化管理，這樣才能獲得所期待的作戰效率和投入回報率。

關於對全球信息柵格進行集中化控制討論的焦點是網絡作戰的全球性特質。國防部想要實現以網絡為中心的指揮機制、增強部隊的事態感知能力和顯著縮短決策週期的目標的話，唯一的方法就是將網絡和部隊進行橫向的融合，這是一種集中化的控制機制。最新的一份《四年防務評估報告》裡就提到過“要簡化目前的‘煙囪式’系統結構，實現以網絡為中心的指揮機制”。

為了更好地利用緊缺資源，國防部必須從全球性的角度來考慮何時何地調撥何種資源。對衛星傳輸波段、標準戰術入口網絡站點和帶寬等網絡作戰必需資源的分配必須要有明確的任務目標和易於理解的全球性意義。從部隊的角度來看，集中化指揮在某種程度上是對現有部隊機構和作戰、防禦網絡的一次重新洗牌。

由戰區作戰司令部領導的作戰行動將不再嚴格地限於其防區內。地面部隊重新開始利用飛機（包括無人機）例行地在美國本土飛行來支持他們的作戰。隨著快速全球打擊（PGS：Prompt Global Strike）項目的發展，指揮官已經有權力呼叫從戰區以外的武器系統發出常規打擊援助。

在海軍方面，他們指出海上部隊的一個本質性特點就是全球流動性，海軍部隊作戰時會不斷地在各個戰區作戰司令部之間穿插。尤其是像航母戰鬥群這樣的單位，一旦被部署出發，就不可能一直呆在一塊小範圍的戰場。另外，即使是戰區作戰司令部所採取的戰區級別的行動，也有可能產生全球性的影響。網絡防禦姿態的調整可能對互聯網部門帶來巨大的經濟負擔，而且作戰司令部還有可能無法了解到調整行為的具體細節結果。

對國防部的網絡系統來說，所有的攻擊本質上同樣都是全球性的。敵人不可能輕易地從地球的另一端對美國本土的實體目標進行攻擊，但是在計算機網絡科技領域，這樣的事情經常發生。一旦檢測到這種攻擊，關於它的信息必須要在最短的時間內傳遍全球所有的相關部門，以保證從任何地方都能識別出這樣的攻擊方式，從而保護全球信息柵格的安全。每一次網絡入侵——哪怕是看起來無關緊要的失敗的入侵——都有可能給全球信息柵格的內容帶來巨大的潛在危害，因為它們入侵時在系統中留下的後門會在以後的攻擊中發揮作用。病毒的爆發是毫無爭議的全球性事件，如果認識不到這一點的話，我們將會受到更大的損失。

海軍強調沒有任何事件的影響會僅限於某個戰區範圍，所有關於網絡作戰的努力都必須是全球性的。他們的理由是網絡作戰是沒有戰區界限的，國防部的每個戰區作戰司令部所面臨的潛在威脅都是相同的，為了獲得信息上的優勢，國防部必須要充分利用其大覆蓋面的網絡資源，快速地在全球範圍內分享所有的有用信息。

此外，空軍和海軍方面指出，他們的網絡作戰部隊都不是由戰區作戰司令部來負責部署的。在每個戰區作戰司令部的防區內，空軍和海軍都有自己的網絡作戰組織（例如戰區網絡作戰與安全中心），而且空軍和海軍的網絡作戰部隊在戰區內通常是扮演維護者的角色。最後一點，空軍和海軍都認為，根據可供參考的官方文件的描述，戰略司令部通過戰區作戰司令部對全球信息柵格負責。

戰區作戰司令部的要求

對戰區作戰司令部來說，在網絡作戰的指揮控制方面有兩個需要關心的問題。一是需要對戰場信息柵格進行及時的控制，二是需要把網絡變成一個武器系統，讓指揮官們可以像對常規的武器系統一樣共同利用網絡資源，利用網絡全方位的優勢來進行全面的戰鬥。

那些被分配了特定職責的部隊，已經部署好了各自唯一的解決方案，參與到網絡作戰中的每支部隊或者每個機構都相信自己已經擁有了最有效分配緊缺資源的辦法。但是全球信息柵格並不是專屬於某一個部門的，而是一個聯合結構。 “煙囪”式系統和現有的部隊部署方式實際上是降低了戰場信息柵格的利用效率。舉個例子來說，陸軍在國防部的其他部門之前研發出了一套安全的IP電話解決方案，可以進行保密語音的聯絡。出於安全考慮，其他部門通常不會再採用這套方案，而是自己再開發一套功能相同的解決方案。這樣在作戰司令部的防區內就有了兩套獨立的保密IP語音方案，它們相互之間不能進行聯通。戰區作戰司令部只得進行篩選，只保留一套方案，以保證在其防區內所有部門可以進行彼此協作。但是解決方案被淘汰的一方就不能再與該戰區以外的兄弟部隊進行保密聯絡了。

作戰司令部防區內的有些資源可以為多個部隊和公務部門服務。但是也有很多例子是使用者進行重複勞動為各自建立了不能相互聯絡的獨立系統，比如衛星終端和一些技術控制設備。有些時候，要傳遞一個信息的話，需要先把信號發回美國本土，然後再從本土發到距離初始發送者只有兩英里的接收者那裡。各種各樣的光纖一條挨一條地按照相同的路線排列著，但是它們之間的數據卻不能進行直接交換，因為它們分屬於不同的部隊或者公務部門。戰區作戰司令部必須採取措施來解決防區內的部隊或者公務部門之間的互聯性問題。

要解決這個問題，可以採用集中化控制的辦法。對網絡作戰部隊的集中化指揮需要戰區作戰司令部對自身的組織機構進行一定的調整，但是同時又不能影響其在有作戰需要時指揮行動的權力。相關部隊必須接受多個作戰司令部的命令，並且有效地優化和反饋戰場信息。目前，派往前線的部隊獨立性越來越高，通過全球信息柵格的幫助他們可以來回地越過戰區作戰司令部的邊界，戰區作戰司令部對網絡作戰的輔助和對抗作用因此而受到了損害，施行集中化指揮以後，部隊就不能或者說不願意響應戰區作戰司令部的要求了。

在2004年參與印尼海嘯救助工作的時候，太平洋司令部（PACOM：Pacific Command）首次在人道援助行動中採取了“聯合嘗試”的方式。太平洋司令部向被分派有任務的部隊發出指令，讓他們在整個行動計劃的框架之下進行特別的網絡防禦工作。很多海軍部隊和海軍陸戰隊的部隊在海軍全球網絡作戰中心的集中化指揮下，建立了一些相對直接的網絡防禦措施，這些措施超越了太平洋司令部給海軍和海軍陸戰隊分配的任務範圍，這就給太平洋司令部的全球網絡作戰帶來了潛在的危險因素。

作戰司令部很關心總是強調的對全球信息柵格進行集中化控制的思想會降低他們對全球信息柵格的信息掌握度和控制力度。在現有的指揮制度下，一個單位會在其所在部隊的指揮權下進行訓練或者執行其他任務，在戰區作戰司令部的指揮權下參加戰鬥，指揮控制的條理非常清晰。對部隊在信息領域的指揮控制與對其在空中、陸上、海上和空間領域的指揮控制同等重要。對C3S系統（control, communications and computer systems）來說，在其指揮下進行作戰並負責保護它的部隊常常要處於雙重甚至三重的報告鏈中，結果最後分不清到底是誰在負責指揮戰鬥。在全球性或者非全局性事件中，全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊經常繞開戰區作戰司令部直接展開行動。儘管聯合網絡作戰的作戰概念專門強調了與戰區作戰司令部進行協調作戰的要求，但是在現代作戰快速變化的環境中，這條要求幾乎成了擺設。信息保障弱點警報系統、計算機任務序列和信息條件調整系統在作戰司令部的轄區之外出現問題就是這條要求失效的典型例子。這些事件直接影響了戰區作戰司令部在戰場上的指揮，當部隊想要直接利用這些機制從管理級上加強自身的控制的時候，他們不能判斷應該在何時、以什麼樣的方式在執行這些操作，也不知道這樣做會對戰區作戰司令部的指揮產生什麼影響，因為在目前的條件下，只有戰區作戰司令部才有能力來進行這些操作。當一個威脅事件需要空軍太空司令部向空軍部隊尋求全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的協同配合的時候，如果不通知或者取得與北方司令部的合作的話，將會給北方司令部的指揮帶來極大的麻煩。

在中央司令部，由於對網絡作戰部隊缺乏足夠的控制，導致指揮官有時候也不能確定網絡資源是否可用。海軍負責操作大量的戰場信息柵格，在作戰區域的海軍網絡作戰部隊並不用對中央司令部的海軍部負責，他們只需要向戰區網絡作戰與安全中心報告。中央司令部的中央戰區戰區網絡作戰中心，其職責是維持和指揮所有戰區作戰司令部的網絡作戰，但是它也不在海軍網絡作戰部隊的報告鏈當中，所以也常常不能獲得所有戰場信息柵格上的事態感知，目前已經有替代辦法來處理這個問題了，不過這還不能說是正式的解決辦法。

對北方司令部來說，因為網絡作戰部隊的控制權的缺乏，他們在2005年“卡特琳娜”颶風的救援工作中遇到了極大的麻煩。在那次行動中，部隊的設備在未經許可的情況下就被運送到了聯合作戰區域。這使得北方司令部無法掌握和引導物資的調動情況，更無法協同各個部隊的行動，這是個多方位的管理和操作問題。

在各個部隊都主張施行在以全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊為中心的集中化指揮構架的時候，我們有必要強調一個事實，那就是戰區司令部並不願意看到這樣的變化，他們想保持原有的他們對戰略司令部負責，擁有全球信息柵格的操作權和防禦權的機制。戰略司令部的存在對保持戰區作戰司令部在戰區和全球性事件的作戰行動中的指揮地位以及增強戰區作戰司令部與聯合參謀部的溝通都有很大的幫助。

作戰司令部和部隊方面都想從聯合作戰的層面上對網絡作戰進行集中化指揮，但是其中有幾個問題還需要討論：

1.誰負第一領導責任？

2.網絡作戰進行集中化指揮具體在哪個層面上得到體現，全球層面、戰區層面還是其他什麼層面？

3.這種調整帶來的改變是僅僅體現在戰區作戰司令部的某個部門向全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊發出請求時還是戰區作戰司令部獲得戰區內的完全指揮權和優先權？

最後，戰區作戰司令部是最終對總統負責的以完成轄區內的軍事任務為目標的機構，被派遣到戰區作戰司令部的部隊需要在其管轄權之下完成各自的任務。因此在部隊方面主張實施全球性的集中指揮的時候，他們仍然會處於戰略司令部的指揮之下這一點是不容置疑的。但是目前全球信息柵格是影響戰區作戰司令部的指揮控制能力和指揮官對部隊的指導能力的關鍵一環。沒有全球信息柵格的話，飛機不能飛行、地面部隊無法移動、艦艇不能航行，連衛星都不能提供信號。指揮官們需要獲取全球信息柵格的狀態並進行控制，就像他們需要掌握部隊的方位和狀態一樣重要。他們必須要掌握戰場信息柵格的範圍、能力和狀態，必須知道戰區以外的情況會如何影響部隊所在區域的戰場信息柵格，還必須能夠指揮和優化部隊配置以支持作戰。如果我們真的相信被描述得天花亂墜的集中化指揮會有更好的效果，那也不能忽視為戰區作戰司令部保留適當的指揮和控制權。

還有，只要戰區作戰司令部這種結構還保留著，那麼所有的軍事任務，包括那些由職能作戰司令部指揮的作戰，都必然還是會發生在戰區作戰司令部的防區內，因為所有的網絡作戰任務都必定要由一個實體單位來執行。同時，集中化指揮對於實現以網絡為中心的指揮模式以及更加有效地防禦攻擊、傳遞信息都是必要的。這種集中化指揮的概念與戰區作戰司令部要求掌握和優化戰場信息柵格的願望是不互斥的。

前進之路

要想制定出一套可行的網絡作戰指揮控制框架，必須要避免走極端，既要考慮戰區作戰司令部的需要，也要考慮建立對全球信息柵格的集中化控制的需要。在目前聯合網絡作戰的作戰概念的發展過程和網絡作戰部隊的轉型過程中，組織原則需要發揮調整各方利益的槓桿作用。為了達到這樣的目標，國防部應該做到以下幾點：

1.創建一個簡單、明確的網絡作戰指揮鏈，保證戰略司令部可以對所有的網絡作戰行動進行指揮。這就可以解決剛才提到的“誰負第一領導責任”的問題。只有當事件發生在快速變化的環境中的時候，戰區指揮控制機構才開始發揮作用。簡潔的指揮鏈可以保證參加網絡作戰的部隊知道自己應該聽從誰的指揮、應該向誰報告，在這條指揮鏈中，必須包括戰區作戰司令部。

2.可以賦予戰區作戰司令部在其防區內的指揮權：

——修正聯合司令部計劃以明確戰區作戰司令部在其防區內對網絡作戰的職責。

——修正已有的全球信息柵格網絡作戰概念，詳細說明那些處在戰區網絡作戰與安全中心之外的部隊可以從戰區作戰司令部的全球網絡作戰與安全中心獲得直接援助。

——規定全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的所有命令都要通過戰區作戰司令部來執行。

這些調整可以保證戰區中的所有單位都在唯一的一條指揮鏈下行動，那就是通過戰區作戰司令部對戰略司令部負責。這也可以解決北方司令部應該對轄區負責但是又沒有指揮網絡作戰的權力的尷尬境地。

3.在每個戰區作戰司令部建立一個由中央司令部管轄的聯合網絡作戰中心，將戰區作戰司令部的戰區網絡作戰控制中心和全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的戰區網絡作戰中心進行融合。這樣一來，每個戰區作戰司令部都將有一個在計算機空間領域的聯合作戰司令部，就像在海陸空的實體戰場上一樣。任何處在戰區網絡作戰與安全中心之外的部隊都可以從聯合網絡作戰中心的全球網絡作戰與安全中心獲得直接援助。

4.鞏固全球信息柵格的地位，將最高控制權交給戰略司令部。目前集中化指揮的發展偏重於對參與網絡作戰的部隊的指揮，這與以網絡為中心的指揮概念背道而馳。以部隊為中心的“煙囪”式指揮系統不利於信息的傳遞和處理，讓我們離“為所有使用者提供最新、最準確的信息”的目標越來越遠。在之前的《戈德華特·尼科爾斯國防部重構法》報告中已經明確提到，組織管理和指揮控制應該由一個聯合的機構來掌控。

結束語

目前對網絡作戰的集中化指揮是一個迫切的需要。優化網絡作戰指揮機制可以幫助國防部提高效率、節約成本以及更好地分配緊缺資源。更重要的是，這樣可以讓網絡作戰部隊更加快速、準確地為指揮官提供信息，這在大規模的網絡作戰中非常重要。集中化指揮的進程不能影響到網絡作戰指揮控制的效率。這取決於全球信息柵格能否為所有參戰的單位提供足夠的信息以及指揮官是否充分利用戰區信息柵格來幫助指揮作戰。

“我們必須改變對網絡作戰問題的討論和思考模式，我們是在進行網絡“作戰”而不是網絡“管理”，所有的參戰單位必須保證自己每時每刻都準備著開戰，以保證網絡系統這一決定性的武器系統的安全”。網絡作戰是我們國家能夠贏得戰爭的關鍵一環，它可以幫助我們提供指揮和控制、縮短決策週期以及調整各戰區的資源配備。戰略司令部已經在強化網絡作戰概念方面邁出了很大的一步，這些努力還需要繼續進行下去。戰區作戰司令部必須是掌控和防護全球信息柵格的重要一環，以保證我們可以繼續取得網絡作戰的勝利。

Reference URL:  http://www.china.com.cn/military

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China Internet Soverignty, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces

美國陸軍網空作戰力量演變與歷史 – US Army cyberspace combat force evolution & history

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美國陸軍網空作戰力量演變與歷史 –

US Army cyberspace combat force evolution & history

With the rapid development of the global information grid system of the US military, the conceptual research based on the information technology system is becoming more and more thorough. Finally, the American combat theory establishes the cyberspace as a combat domain with land, sea, air and sky. In this context, the US Army will be the construction of cyberspace as a key factor in promoting the process of modernization of the army, determined to follow the formal militarization of the organization’s standards and structure of high-quality network combat forces. Since the establishment of the Army Network Command in 2010, the US Army has established a comprehensive network of operational forces based on the goal of combating the military forces of cyberspace through new means such as new construction, adjustment, transformation and integration.

The basic organizational structure under the guidance of the concept of network operations

From the 90s of the 20th century, in order to ensure the US military information grid system in the army part of the efficient and safe operation, the US Army under the guidance of the joint army, around the concept of network operations carried out a series of organizational restructuring, the dissolution of the information system commander And has set up the Army Signal Command and the network enterprise technology command and other institutions, and gradually formed based on technology, defense, focusing on the basic network of emergency operations organizational structure.

In 2005, the US Strategic Command issued the “Global Information Grid Collaborative Combat Concept”, which elaborated on the organizational structure of the US Army’s cyberspace forces during this period, dividing the Army’s network operations system into three Level: At the first level, under the command of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Strategic Command, the Army’s Global Network Operations and Security Center is responsible for situational awareness and command coordination as the only governing body for Army operations, In the US Army Joint Force Network Power System, the agency functions as a global network of operations and security centers. At the second level, the Theater Network Operations and Security Center is the supporting element of the operational headquarters, which is responsible for “guiding network operations, managing and defending the global information grid elements that are part of the Army’s jurisdiction.” The regional network operations and security centers in the theater constitute the third dimension of the Army’s network operations system. In addition, the Army Computer Emergency Response Unit is the disposal of the network emergency response, in the emergency can accept the global network operations task force tactical control, each theater network operations and security center also established a computer emergency response unit.

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Set up Army Network Command

With the US military for the degree of dependence on cyberspace, control and weaken the threat of the Internet has continued to become the focus of US military tasks, the establishment of an independent network of space operations command of the voice of the growing US military. In 2008, “Yankee deer bomb action” directly under the impetus, the US military decided to end the unit of independent decentralization of the development of network combat capability of the situation, through the withdrawal, transfer, change and other measures to reorganize the relevant institutions, the establishment of a comprehensive network Space operations of the joint command agencies, the US Army network power organization construction has entered a stage of rapid development.

Through the global deployment of decentralized development of the formation of cyberspace combat organization of the backbone. As the awareness of the network operations will have a far-reaching impact on the military field, the US Army in the combat force level into a lot of resources, and gradually establish the backbone of the network operations. For example, the Army launched its first cyber warfare in July 2008, which provides tactical support, brigade combatant support, and strategic support to other service units, joint forces and even cross-agency partners; the Army also operates on cyber operations The upper-level command system to implement the adjustment, so that the relevant action to be appropriate authority to monitor. During this period, the Army’s future network combat forces were integrated in the form of units in the military and joint forces within the combat unit, including from the Defense Information Systems Agency, the global network operations joint contingent, the National Security Agency to the brigade combat team and other Level of strategic and tactical institutions.
The new core coordination agencies, straighten out the headquarters to the unit level of the command relationship. In June 2009, the US Department of Defense announced the establishment of the US Internet Command in the form of a memorandum to consolidate and promote the construction of cyberspace military forces through a dedicated subordinate joint command. At the same time, as a transitional measure for the formation of the Army Force Network Command in the future, the Army decided to retain the organizational structure of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Strategic Command and rename it as Army Force Network Command. February 2010, the US Army announced on this basis, the formal formation of the Army Network Force Command, its formation and initial construction phase of the work mainly around the three tasks: to achieve cyber space military forces combat, increase the Army network combat power Capacity and scale, the development of the Army network space professionals team. As the previous command system was disrupted, the newly established Army Network Space Operations and Integration Center under the Cyber ​​Command actually played a central role in command control and coordinated synchronization. The agency is similar to the previous Army Global Network Operations and Security Center, but in addition to “providing clear, concise and timely guidance in the implementation of full spectrum cyberspace operations,” the organization is also responsible for “with the Army’s other headquarters, Other units in the same type of institutions, the United States cyberspace joint operations center to share information. ” At the beginning of the establishment of the organization, some members of the cyberspace operations and integration center also joined the US Department of Network Command staff to better promote the unity of command and operation of the joint force and service units.

US Army Network Space Force Organizational Structure, 2005

The transformation of combat forces functions, to promote the traditional ability to network space combat capability development. At the level of the combat force construction, the field signal force as the main body of the network Enterprise Technology Command / 9 signal command to the Army Network Force Command, the Army Intelligence and Security Command of the cyberspace combat forces combat command by the army Network command. Through this organizational adjustment, the Army Network Command for the first time mastered the forefront of the deployment of combat forces, to form a global presence and have the expedition, you can combat commander to provide more comprehensive combat support capabilities. It is noteworthy that the network enterprise technology command and the intelligence and security commander in the Army Network Command as deputy commander, respectively, responsible for different types of network operations mission, the basic formation of the original signal forces in charge of network defense, the original military Intelligence forces in charge of the network attack mode, which will be previously discrete deployment, loosely combined network space related organizations into a complete army network strength. In addition, the Army Network Command in 2011 was also given the task of carrying out information operations, master the first information combat command of the operational command, intelligence and security headquarters under the 780 military intelligence brigade will also be transformed into Army Network Command Direct command of the network brigade.

Continuously optimize the Army cyberspace forces

After the establishment of the Army Network Command, cyber space military forces combat is always the center of its work, which in the Army Network Power Organization continue to optimize the integration process has been highlighted. For the current network operations have been formed, electronic warfare, information operations, military intelligence and even space combat capability, the US Army in the network of military organizational structure design also reflects the integration of a variety of capacity trends. The US Army is also actively promoting the overall military model in the construction of network forces, highlighting the development of the national guards and reserve forces. After years of construction, the US Army network power organization has been basically formed.
Army Network Combat Force Organizational Structure, 2011

Optimize the combat strength of the organizational structure, to adapt to operational support needs. At the headquarters level, in order to further improve the command and implementation of cyberspace operations, the Army approved the Network Command in March 2014 as the headquarters of the Army Force, and designated the 2nd Army as its immediate unit, and the network enterprise technology Command to become the second army direct command of the network combat troops, network enterprise technology command commander of the second group army deputy commander. And the previous year, the network command has been under the guidance of the US Internet Command and Army headquarters began to form a joint force network headquarters, which will be the implementation of the network space combat command command, and have direct support to the combat command of the network combat capability The At the combat forces and theater levels, the network command is trying to improve the global network defense situation through regional network centers. Based on the strength of the original Theater Network Operations and Security Center and Regional Computer Emergency Response Center, these regional cybersecurity centers streamline the operational plan of the network operations, and can play a strong planning, coordination and synchronization function to more effectively support geography Operation of the Combat Command.

To determine the development of the responsible institutions, improve the network to build military theory guidance. As the US Army Network Command merged with the original network operations, information operations and the strength of the signal forces, a large number of signal forces combat theory urgent need to be revised and translated into the network combat theory, in order to achieve a unified operational capability development model, to avoid the concept of guidance On the chaos. In March 2014, the US Training and Command Command, on the basis of the Center for Excellence, integrated other relevant professional elements to form the Army Network Center of Excellence, with the goal of providing guidance, network and signal The full ability of training. The cyberspace promotion office under the Cyber ​​Command is also incorporated into the Network Excellence Center to further enhance the advantages of the Network Excellence Center in summing up lessons learned from the construction of network forces. Through the implementation of the Ordinance to publish the project, the Network Excellence Center tried to merge the original signal and electronic warfare forces regulations, according to the Army “2015 order system” related requirements to develop new cyberspace operations, electronic warfare and signal forces regulations. At present, the Army has completed the revision of the field command FM6-02 “signal force support operations” to guide the signal forces to the network forces for functional transformation; the first release of the field order FM3-38 “network electromagnetic action”, clear “Army in the unified ground action to integrate the overall principles of network electromagnetic activity, tactics and procedures”; as the Army network army building a basic guidance document, field command FM3-12 “cyberspace combat” also basically completed the final approval process, Officially distributed within the Army in 2015. With the above documents as the main body, the Network Excellence Center will continue to improve the publication of dozens of related military ordinances publications, build a complete Army cyber space combat technology, tactics and procedures for the Army network forces to provide comprehensive theoretical guidance.
Army Network Combat Force Organizational Structure, 2015

Integration of cyberspace education and training strength, and promote the regular development of network forces. The US Army will promote the development of formal training as a fundamental way to improve the level of network operations and combat readiness. In the Army Network Center of excellence at the same time, the Army Network School as its affiliated institutions in the original electronic warfare school set up on the basis of the Army Signal School is also under the network center of excellence will continue to be retained, the Army on the regularization of the construction of cyberspace “Regulations – Organization – Training – Resources – Leadership and Education – Personnel – Facilities” model has been further refined. With the establishment of the Army Network Arsenal (“17-Series” Career Management), the Army requested new staff members to enter the network career field to complete the school’s school training program, from signal, intelligence and information operations forces and other units to the Corresponding to a large number of network operations staff also need to carry out new vocational education and training, the two schools will jointly set up the new Army network arms units officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers for individual personnel skills training. For example, the Army Leadership Foundation Training Program was officially launched at the online school in August 2015, and the 14-week Senior Officer Training Program was implemented in May 2016. For the first batch of network combatants recruited by the Army in October 2015, the senior personal training program that must be attended by the Army began in February 2016. As the cyberspace operations essentially have the characteristics of joint operations, the first phase of the 22-week training program will be the Naval Joint Network Analyst Course, the second phase of training for the same 22 weeks, training venues from the Navy The facility is transferred to the Army Network School.

Attention to the National Guard and reserve network strength, highlighting the support and coordination functions. In view of the development of the network combat force, the Army believes that the reserve department can assist the active forces to share some of the tasks and be able to provide reinforcements with high levels of training as quickly as necessary. Because of its unique dual legal position, the Army National Guard can play the role of state and federal government agencies, civil and military organizations, private and public sector convergence, “with the development of cyberspace capabilities of the natural advantages.” Therefore, the Army in the development of network combat forces also pay attention to the construction of the relevant reserve organizations. For example, the First Information Operations Command also includes four reserve forces theater information operations brigade, which has the ability to provide information operations and cyberspace planning, analysis and technical support. According to a memorandum signed by the Army National Guard in June 2014 with the Army Network Command, the Army National Guard transferred one of its network defenses in the previous year to the Army Network Command / 2nd Army. The cyber force, known as the 1636th Network Defense Unit, will be in Service No. 10 of the United States Code, which is a full-time service and will receive the same standard training with other active forces of the Army Network Command and jointly All types of tasks.

This article from the “Military Digest” December Editor: Zhang Chuanliang

Original Mandarin Chinese:

伴隨著美軍全球信息柵格系統的高速發展，基於信息技術系統作戰的概念研究不斷走向深入，最終美軍作戰理論將網絡空間確立為一種與陸、海、空、天並列的作戰域。在這種背景下，美國陸軍將網絡空間力量建設作為推進陸軍現代化進程的關鍵因素，決心按照正規軍事化組織的標準和結構高質量建設網絡作戰部隊。自陸軍網絡司令部於2010年成立以來，美國陸軍圍繞網絡空間軍事力量作戰化的目標，通過新建、調整、轉型和融合等手段逐步建立起完善的網絡作戰力量組織結構。

網絡作戰概念指導下的基本組織結構

從20世紀90年代開始，為確保美軍全球信息柵格系統中的陸軍部分高效安全運行，美國陸軍在聯合軍隊的指導下，圍繞網絡作戰行動概念進行了一系列組織結構調整，解散了信息系統司令部，並先後組建了陸軍信號司令部以及網絡企業技術司令部等機構，逐步形成基於技術、防禦為主、重在應急的網絡作戰基本組織架構。

2005年，美國戰略司令部發布了《全球信息柵格網絡作戰聯合作戰概念》，對這一時期美國陸軍網絡空間力量建設的組織結構進行了詳細說明，將陸軍網絡作戰體系組織架構劃分為三個層次：在第一個層面，在陸軍太空和導彈防禦司令部/陸軍戰略司令部的指揮下，作為陸軍網絡作戰行動唯一的領導機構，陸軍全球網絡行動和安全中心負責態勢感知和指揮協調工作，在美軍聯合部隊網絡力量體系中，該機構發揮軍種全球網絡作戰與安全中心的功能。在第二個層面，戰區網絡行動和安全中心是各作戰司令部的支持元素，負責“指導網絡作戰行動，管理和防禦屬於陸軍管轄的全球信息柵格元素”。戰區內各地區網絡行動和安全中心構成了陸軍網絡作戰體系的第三個層面。此外，陸軍計算機應急響應分隊是應對網絡突發事件的處置力量，在緊急情況下可以接受全球網絡作戰特遣部隊的戰術控制，每個戰區網絡行動和安全中心也都建立了計算機應急響應分隊。

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成立陸軍網絡司令部

隨著美軍對於網絡空間依賴程度的加深，控制和削弱網絡威脅持續成為美軍關注的重點任務，組建獨立負責網絡空間作戰指揮機構的呼聲在美軍內部日益高漲。在2008年“揚基鹿彈行動”的直接推動下，美軍決定結束軍種單位獨立分散發展網絡作戰能力的局面，通過並、撤、轉、改等措施對相關機構進行結構重組，成立全面負責網絡空間作戰的聯合指揮機構，美國陸軍網絡力量組織建設也進入快速發展階段。

通過全球部署分散發展的方式形成網絡空間作戰組織的基幹力量。由於意識到網絡作戰行動將對軍事領域產生更加深遠的影響，美國陸軍在作戰部隊層面投入大量資源，逐步建立起網絡作戰行動的基幹力量。例如，陸軍在2008年7月啟動了第一支網絡戰營，其能夠提供戰術支持、旅戰鬥隊支援以及向其他軍種單位、聯合部隊甚至跨機構夥伴提供戰略支援；陸軍還對網絡作戰行動的上層指揮體系實施調整，從而使相關行動得到適度權限的監管。在這個時期，陸軍未來網絡作戰力量都以分隊形式整合在軍種和聯合部隊架構下作戰單位的內部，包括從國防信息系統局、全球網絡作戰聯合特遣隊、國家安全局到旅戰鬥隊等各個級別的戰略和戰術機構。
新建核心協調機構，理順總部到分隊層面的指揮關係。 2009年6月，美國國防部通過發表備忘錄的形式宣佈建立美國網絡司令部，旨在通過一個專門的次級聯合司令部集中統籌和推進網絡空間軍事力量建設。與此同時，作為日後組建陸軍部隊網絡司令部的過渡性措施，陸軍決定保留陸軍太空和導彈防禦司令部/陸軍戰略司令部的組織架構，並將其重新命名為陸軍部隊網絡司令部。 2010年2月，美國陸軍宣佈在此基礎上正式組建陸軍網絡部隊司令部，其在組建和初始建設階段的工作主要圍繞三項任務展開：實現網絡空間軍事力量作戰化、增加陸軍網絡作戰力量的能力和規模、發展陸軍網絡空間專業人才隊伍。由於以往的指揮體係被打亂，網絡司令部下新成立的陸軍網絡空間作戰與整合中心實際上發揮了指揮控制和協調同步的核心作用。該機構與此前的陸軍全球網絡行動和安全中心功能類似，但是除了“在執行全譜網絡空間作戰行動過程中提供清晰、簡潔、及時的指導”以外，該組織還負責“與陸軍其他司令部、其他軍種單位中的同類機構、美國網絡空間聯合作戰中心共享信息”。在機構建立之初，網絡空間作戰與整合中心的部分人員還直接加入美國網絡司令部參謀機構，從而更好地促進實現聯合部隊與軍種單位網絡作戰行動的指揮統一。

美國陸軍網絡空間力量組織結構，2005年

轉型作戰部隊職能，促進傳統能力向網絡空間作戰能力發展。在作戰部隊建設層面，以野戰信號部隊為主體的網絡企業技術司令部/第9信號司令部轉隸陸軍網絡部隊司令部，陸軍情報和安全司令部所屬網絡空間作戰部隊的作戰指揮權也由陸軍網絡司令部掌握。通過這種組織調整，陸軍網絡司令部第一次掌握了前沿部署作戰力量，能夠形成全球存在態勢並具備遠征能力，可以向作戰指揮官提供更加全面的戰鬥支援能力。值得注意的是，網絡企業技術司令部以及情報和安全司令部指揮官都在陸軍網絡司令部擔任副司令，分別負責不同類型的網絡作戰行動任務，基本形成了原信號部隊主管網絡防禦、原軍事情報部隊主管網絡進攻的模式，從而將此前離散部署、鬆散聯合的網絡空間相關組織整合為一支完備的陸軍網絡力量。此外，陸軍網絡司令部在2011年還被賦予執行信息作戰的任務，掌握第1信息作戰司令部的作戰指揮權，情報和安全司令部下屬的第780軍事情報旅也將轉型為陸軍網絡司令部直接指揮的網絡旅。

持續優化陸軍網絡空間部隊

陸軍網絡司令部成立後，網絡空間軍事力量作戰化始終是其中心工作，這一點在陸軍網絡力量組織不斷優化整合的過程中得到突出體現。對於當前已經形成的網絡作戰、電子戰、信息作戰、軍事情報甚至太空作戰能力，美軍陸軍在進行網絡軍隊組織結構設計時也體現出融合多種能力的趨勢。美國陸軍還在網絡部隊建設中積極推進整體型軍隊模式，突出國民警衛隊和預備役網絡力量的發展。經過多年建設，美國陸軍網絡力量組織結構已經基本形成。
陸軍網絡作戰力量組織結構，2011年

優化戰鬥力量組織結構，適應作戰行動支援需求。在總部機構層面，為了進一步完善網絡空間作戰行動的指揮程序並實現意圖統一，陸軍在2014年3月批准網絡司令部為陸軍部隊組成總部，同時指定第2集團軍為其直屬單位，而網絡企業技術司令部成為第2集團軍直接指揮的網絡作戰部隊，網絡企業技術司令部指揮官兼任第2集團軍副軍長。而且在前一年，網絡司令部已經在美國網絡司令部和陸軍總部的指導下開始組建聯合部隊網絡總部，其將對網絡空間作戰部隊實施任務指揮，並且具備直接支持作戰司令部的網絡作戰能力。在作戰部隊和戰區層面，網絡司令部試圖通過地區網絡中心改善全球網絡防禦態勢。在原有戰區網絡作戰和安全中心、地區計算機應急響應中心力量基礎上，這些地區網絡安全中心對網絡作戰行動指揮程序進行精簡，能夠發揮較強的計劃、協調和同步功能，從而更加高效地支援地理作戰司令部的行動。

確定條令開發負責機構，完善網絡建軍理論指導。由於美國陸軍網絡司令部合併了原網絡作戰、信息作戰和信號部隊的力量，信號部隊的大量作戰理論迫切需要修訂並轉化為網絡作戰理論，從而實現協調統一的作戰能力發展模式，避免出現概念指導上的混亂。 2014年3月，美國訓練和條令司令部在原信號卓越中心的基礎上，整合其他相關專業力量元素，組建了陸軍網絡卓越中心，目標在2015年10月使其具備指導網絡、信號和電子戰部隊訓練的全面能力。網絡司令部下屬的網絡空間促進辦公室也被合併入網絡卓越中心，從而進一步增強網絡卓越中心在總結網絡部隊建設經驗教訓方面的優勢。通過實施條令出版項目，網絡卓越中心試圖合併原有的信號和電子戰部隊條令，根據陸軍“2015條令體系”的相關要求開發全新的網絡空間作戰、電子戰以及信號部隊條令。目前，陸軍已經完成了對野戰條令FM6-02《信號部隊支持作戰行動》的修訂，指導信號部隊向網絡部隊進行職能轉型；第一次發布了野戰條令FM3-38《網絡電磁行動》，明確了“陸軍在統一地面行動中整合網絡電磁活動的總體原則、戰術和規程”；作為陸軍網絡軍隊建設的根本性指導文件，野戰條令FM3-12《網絡空間作戰》也基本完成了最後的批准程序，於2015年正式在陸軍內部發行。以上述條令文件為主體，網絡卓越中心將繼續完善數十種相關陸軍條令出版物的編撰發布工作，構建完整的陸軍網絡空間作戰技術、戰術和規程體系，為陸軍網絡部隊建設提供全面理論指導。
陸軍網絡作戰力量組織結構，2015年

整合網絡空間教育訓練力量，促進網絡部隊正規化發展。美國陸軍將推進網絡訓練正規化發展視為提高網絡作戰和戰備水平的根本途徑。在陸軍網絡卓越中心組建的同時，陸軍網絡學校作為其下屬機構在原電子戰學校的基礎上成立，而且陸軍信號學校也在網絡卓越中心的建制下繼續得以保留，陸軍關於網絡空間力量正規化建設的“條令-組織-訓練-資源-領導力和教育-人員-設施”模型得到進一步完善。隨著陸軍網絡兵種（“17-系列”職業管理領域）的設立，陸軍要求進入網絡職業領域的新任職人員必須完成網絡學校的駐校訓練項目，從信號、情報和信息作戰部隊等單位調動到相應網絡作戰崗位的大量人員也需要進行新的職業教育訓練，上述兩所學校將共同對新成立的陸軍網絡兵種單位的軍官、準尉和士官進行單個人員技能訓練。例如，軍官領導力基礎訓練課程於2015年8月在網絡學校正式啟動，為期14週的準尉軍官高級訓練項目則在2016年5月開始實施。對於陸軍在2015年10月徵募的第一批網絡作戰士兵，其必須參加的高級個人訓練項目則在2016年2月開始。由於網絡空間作戰行動本質上具有聯合作戰的屬性，高級個人訓練項目為期22週的第一階段訓練內容將是海軍聯合網絡分析師課程，第二階段訓練同樣持續22週，訓練場地也會從海軍設施轉移到陸軍網絡學校。

重視國民警衛隊和預備役網絡力量，突出支援和協調功能。針對網絡作戰力量的發展問題，陸軍認為預備役部門可以協助現役部隊分擔部分任務，能夠在必要時迅速提供具備較高訓練水平的增援力量。因其獨特的雙重法律定位，陸軍國民警衛隊可以發揮各州與聯邦政府機構、民事與軍事組織、私營與公共部門之間的銜接作用，“具備發展網絡空間能力的天然優勢”。因此，陸軍在網絡作戰力量發展過程中也注重相關預備役組織的建設。例如，第1信息作戰司令部還包含4支預備役部隊戰區信息作戰大隊，其都具備提供信息作戰和網絡空間計劃、分析、技術支持能力。根據陸軍國民警衛隊2014年6月與陸軍網絡司令部簽署的一份備忘錄，陸軍國民警衛隊將其在此前一年組建的1支網絡防禦分隊轉隸於陸軍網絡司令部/第2集團軍。這支被稱為第1636網絡防禦分隊的網絡部隊將處於《美國法典》第10卷服役狀態，即全時服役狀態，將與陸軍網絡司令部其他現役部隊共同接受同等標準的訓練，並共同執行所有類型的任務。

本文轉自《軍事文摘》12月刊 責任編輯：張傳良

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China Internet Soverignty, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces

中國軍隊戰略層面的網絡空間特種作戰 China’s Strategic Level of Cyberspace Special Operations

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战略层面的网络空间特种作战 –

China’s Strategic level of Cyberspace Special Operations

Editor’s Note: US Army Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Mitchell Dugen at the US Army War College during the fourth quarter of 2015, “Joint Force Quarterly” published “strategic level of cyberspace special operations,” a paper, the article was Chairman of the Association of the United Nations in 2008 Strategic Papers Competition Strategy Research Award.

In this paper, by reviewing the cyberspace special operations cases, this paper analyzes the potential power of using network tools in asymmetric conflicts, and points out that cyberspace special operations have become an effective strategic tool to achieve national goals. Become a regional power to avoid the US military dominance and to ensure that their strategic interests of the unconventional path. The author proposes three new options for integrating emerging technologies and special operations: “cloud-driven” foreign defense, network counter-insurgency and unconventional cyber warfare advance team. Designed to maintain the US network technology advantages, and to build an important partnership, shaping the full spectrum of the conflict environment has a revolutionary impact. Iran and Russia and other regional forces of cyberspace special combat readiness why more than the United States? How does Iran and Russia strengthen its power at the tactical level while the United States has assembled its network and network capabilities at the strategic level? The United States in more than 20 years ago issued a network of special operations related documents, but why the network of special operations policies, departments and regulations are still not mature enough? For the US military, the most basic question is: how will the United States build a strategic level of network special combat capability?

As early as 1993, Internet technology theorists John Achilla and David Lennfield in his book “cyber war is coming” a book has predicted the recent Iran and Russia to implement the cyberspace special operations. “A large number of scattered small groups around the use of the latest communications technology coordinated” control network, to obtain the decisive advantage of the opponent. In reality this scene has been staged again and again. “We are using the information and the more information we have, and the less demand for traditional weapons,” says Achilla and Lunfield. US military executives have also realized that with asymmetric network tools, unconventional tactics and a large number of false information armed, a small amount of special combatants can form a certain strategic impact. There is news that both Iran and Russia have succeeded in using cyberspace special operations as a strategic tool to achieve their national goals. Both countries have an integrated network of special operations forces that know how to exploit the potential power of network tools in asymmetric conflicts. The asymmetric approach of the two countries has become a strong and unconventional path for regional powers to circumvent US military superiority and to ensure their strategic interests. Low price Of the network of high-tech allows potential rivals can develop a strong network warfare capabilities. Therefore, the United States urgently need to make strategic choices, the development of cyberspace special operations, as a tool for the protection and projection of national interests.

Low-cost network of high-tech technology allows potential rivals to develop a strong network warfare capabilities In February 2013, the Russian chief of staff Grazimov in the Russian “military messenger” magazine published “science in the forecast value” article. In the paper, Gracimov predicted a new generation of war that could “change the rules of the game”, whose strategic value would exceed “the effectiveness of weapon forces.” He called for universal asymmetric action to counter the enemy’s strengths and create a permanent frontier in the territory of the enemy through “special forces and internal confrontation and continuous improvement of information operations, equipment and means.” In the spring of 2014, Western media reported that in the eastern part of Ukraine, a casual special operations squad from Russia through the Ukrainian border, occupation of government buildings and arsenal and transferred to the separatist armed. At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities claim that their digital, telephone and cyber communications are cut off, interfered or attacked. The Ukrainian government attributed the cyber attacks on information and logistics infrastructure, including Internet servers and railroad control systems, to the destruction of Russia, and argued that the implementation of information fraud in Russia was costly in important social media, blogs, and News website published 50 pro-Russian comments every day, inside and outside Ukraine to form a large number of false information flow, on the one hand to cover up its non-traditional military operations in cyberspace, on the other hand to create a political illusion. “Russia is not doing the usual information warfare about false information, lies, leaks or cyber sabotage, it reshapes reality, creates public illusions, and then translates them into political action,” said senior government officials. To this end, in September 2014 at the NATO security summit, the NATO Allied Supreme Commander, US Air Force Admiral Philip Bride Leaf pointed out that Russia in East Ukraine to implement the “mixed” non-traditional operations on behalf of the war The most amazing information in history is Blitzkrieg. Bride Leaf urges the Allies to immediately develop the ability to counter the Russian non-traditional warfare, propaganda and cyber attacks. Russia’s use of the “non-traditional Western as a war” non-traditional means to achieve its political purpose, which makes the Western and NATO countries by surprise. Russia is not a fragmented way to use special forces, information operations or network capabilities.

On the contrary, as General Glashimov said, “the war does not need to be publicly announced, when the special forces with advanced technology and a lot of information for the traditional forces in the maintenance of peace and crisis under the cover of strategic objectives to create good conditions, the war on “Cybercrime deception and cyber attacks are special forces in” war and peace ”

Network information spoofing and cyber attack action for special combat forces in the “war and peace” between the implementation of non-traditional warfare to win the time and space lessons learned from the Russian case can draw four major experience, for the United States special operations Action and network capacity integration to provide a viable theoretical framework. First, there are tactical and strategic differences in the offensive network tools used by the Russian Special Forces, targeting tactical “closed networks”, such as local communications, social media, regional networks and logistics infrastructure, while retaining Its more advanced open network tools as a backup. Second, the network special operations are primarily an agent behavior, emphasizing the minimization of the source tracking. As Gracimov described, “the long-distance, non-contact action against the enemy is becoming the primary means of the tactical battle.” Network special operations usually avoid direct contact with people, but in peace and war in the gray area to start action. Third, information and communication technology, network attacks and information operations in the network to form a non-conventional warfare play an important role. As long as the appropriate implementation, the traditional special operations can go far beyond its original function, “which involves the comprehensive application of a wide range of capabilities to achieve policy objectives.” To be effective, it must also be integrated to synchronize other areas of expertise. Fourth, the network special operations can both deter the conflict, can also be used to deal with the whole spectrum of conflict, because “it is suitable for all stages of action, from shaping the environment to the intense war to post-war reconstruction.” Although the network war to destroy the original intention, but also has a constructive side. The widespread dissemination of low-cost information and communication technologies is conducive to strengthening the security of partner countries and thus helping to prevent the occurrence of conflicts.

“‘Foreign help defense’ (FID) under ‘cloud drive’ is both a concept of cloud computing and a metaphorical description of partnering and trust through virtual means. “The concept of” cloud-driven “FID” has not yet been clearly defined, but it can be integrated into an interdisciplinary field to better understand people, geography and virtual worlds and to act together on related goals. Technically, the “cloud-driven” FID “strengthens the partnership, consolidates data through the federated facilities, enhances automation, and disseminates the analysis process. “Cloud-driven” is flexible and can be developed in private, public, community, or mixed form, using different software, platforms, and infrastructure. Security personnel use intelligent technology to drive confidential mobile applications, analyze tools and share data through “cloud-driven” FIDs. Although the data associated with the virtual cloud, but its real value is to make the timely dissemination of information to the hands of tactics. “The cloud-driven” FID “can also be likened to a persistent, active partnership, the data never stops, the network has been busy. Technology is only a tool to drive deeper, extensive socio-cultural, political and historical factors that are often prone to conflict. “Cloud-driven” FID “can build more sustainable competencies and trust with partner countries. “The cloud-driven” FID “lay a virtual foundation for the future establishment of various institutions, centers and laboratories to bridge the benefits of inter-agency across the United States. From the strategic point of view of the US government, “cloud-driven” FID “is a pragmatic” partnership-centered approach designed to target the core interests of partner countries rather than to Way to change the partner country “. “The cloud-driven” FID “is also a prudent strategic move to” prevent the US partner countries from becoming a public relations crisis due to domestic political problems. ” “The cloud drive ‘FID’ also offers other opportunities. The technology and networks it forms can react quickly to emergencies, such as humanitarian relief or relief operations, prevent mass killings, or evacuate personnel from non-combatants. This saves time, money and manpower by providing information for the decision-making process. For the construction of the partnership, the cloud-driven FID can store local non-US social media information, rich social network analysis, social network maps, and behavioral and opinion trends analysis. Most importantly, the “cloud drive ‘FID” builds trust in an innovative and extremely powerful way to build lasting influence on allies and partners.

Today’s global environment drives the United States to use cyber special operations as a strategic tool network for national military strategies Anti-riot counterintelligence network Anti-riot operations (CNCOIN) aims to use social media networks to achieve the purpose of rebellion. To break the asymmetric information superiority of the enemy, CNCOIN uses non-technical means to combat the relevant crowd and control its perception, behavior and action. It adds a military color to the cyber space’s ubiquitous anti-social network. Although these means are not clearly defined, this article believes that it actually refers to the manipulation of social media, cover up the true identity, to achieve ulterior motives. While social media provides a wide range of opportunities for anti-social networks, such as malicious use, intentional misconduct, but from the military point of view, social media provides a wealth of information resources to affect the psychological vulnerability, but also an ideal attack platform. There are several technologies that contribute to its implementation in each functional category. The scope of action includes, but is not limited to, cyber-pseudo operation and cyber-herding operation. Network fraud is a classic counter-insurgency strategy, “government forces and technical staff will pretend to be insurgents, into the enemy network after the use of advanced intelligence technology in the network within the implementation of the destruction.” Internet expulsion means that “individuals, groups, or organizations deport other individuals, groups, or organizations to the default network area.” The magic of the two technologies is the expulsion of insurgents in the virtual network by exploiting the inherent flaws of the communication technology and communication platform. The two tactics are aimed at rebel activist online communities, manipulating or disrupting them, and ultimately providing more opportunities for cyberbullying. The virtual world magnifies the environmental factors, because the characters in the network are more difficult to determine their authenticity. Planning command control, communication frequency and equipment platform and other elements will become the key to the implementation of network fraud or network expulsion operations to manipulate, mislead or expel the target group to the desired results. The scope of information includes, but is not limited to, Crowdsourcing and Social Networking Analysis, SNA). Crowdsourcing is the use of large-scale knowledge base, provided by the participants voluntarily, to solve the problem to provide new ideas, services or observation, you can quickly expand the organizers of the field of vision. Social network analysis depicts and measures the relationships, strengths, and cores of social links in a visual way to illustrate the social network structure. Social network visualization or social networking maps can provide a unique window for assessing, depicting and even predicting the intensity, time, space, and relationship dimensions of relationship events. In September 2013, during the crisis in the Philippines, the anti-government armed Moro National Liberation Front (hereinafter referred to as “the dismount”) was dissatisfied with the situation of national reconciliation, hijacked more than 200 civilians as hostages, attacked commercial shops and burned urban buildings. Throughout the crisis, crowdsourcing and social network analysis are very successful non-traditional tactical means. The Philippine security forces use crowdsourcing tactics to encourage Zamboang residents to discover and report on the “melodic” members of the hiding place. FEI security forces, together with crowdsourcing information and intelligence analysis, provide information for security operations and humanitarian operations. The use of social network analysis to assess the “Mobility” of the public support, and in the social media against the “interpretation” declaration, to ban the violation of social media user agreement propaganda site, but also the use of crowds of information blockade ” Troops, attacking their temporary command post. The Philippine security forces used solid media to track the key information and lead the use of social media, and then use the solid forces to defeat the “interpretation” of the asymmetric advantage. The information warfare category includes but is not limited to cyber intrusion (cyber Aggression, forum vest (sock-puppeting), astro-turfing and so on. Three tactics are anonymous use of social media to implement misleading, false information to manipulate behavior, public opinion and action. The cyber-invasion is proposed by Teanna Felmyr, which refers to “an electronic or online act that is intended to cause psychological harm to others or damage its reputation by using e-mail, instant messaging, cell phones, digital information, chat rooms

As well as social media, video, game sites, etc. “. It is much broader than the range of ordinary cyber-aggressive behavior. Its anonymity may cause substantial psychological harm and negative consequences, as the relevant information will be repeatedly sent to the target or published in the social media. Its value to CNCOIN is that it can use sensitive digital information to humiliate, defame or hurt the target, causing psychological barriers. This powerful cyber-invading action can reduce the credibility, influence and power of the target, and ultimately lose the power of the target or other insurgents. The other two tactics, the forum vest and the fake are all fictitious online propaganda tools used to spread distorted views to create a wider range of support or opposition to the illusion. In fact, with the forum vest is the same concept, but more complex, more organized, larger. Both tactics use virtual characters to distribute false information in cyberspace, with the aim of initiating group reactions or actions. Combining massive amounts of text, images, and video with a planned misleading network activity will significantly enhance the effectiveness of CNCOIN’s action. The third way to advance the US network’s special operations is the unconventional cyber warfare team (cyber-UW Pilot Team, using social media networks to shape the physical environment, the establishment of regional mechanisms, in the implementation of non – conventional war before the regional connectivity. The core of the unconventional network warfare team is the special forces, with a number of professional organizations to provide technical support, its task is in the field of network security for the preparation of unconventional operations. The penetration of the traditional advance team is the target of enemy territory, military facilities and other entities, rather than the conventional advance team is through the virtual means of infiltration, and then into the sensitive, hostile or refused to area. Through the virtual means, can reduce the United States and partner countries armed forces in time, risk, equipment and other aspects of the loss and risk. Conceptually, unconventional cyber warfare teams use web tools and advanced technology to build people, entities, intelligence, and information infrastructures on social media. While deepening understanding of the local human terrain, the team can strengthen its local language and cultural skills, as well as identify resistance leaders, assess motivation and resistance, and overall support for US government goals, while at the same time understanding Informal hierarchical distribution, psychology and behavior. In addition, you can also incorporate the Internet’s white noise into the social media network to “improve the cultural understanding of potential collaborators in the United States and the local situation before action.” While the US national security strategy has long recognized the strategy of cyber warfare Role, but this understanding is not fully translated into a clear strategic level of thinking and combat capability. For example, the US Department of Defense cyberspace action strategy did not give much solution or specific measures, only from five aspects of the previous repeated network ideas. Lack of clear ideas lead to our network strategy is flawed, making the United States advanced network technology advantages to hand over to the potential rival risk. In contrast, Iran and Russia’s asymmetric innovation modeled other regions and global forces, trying to circumvent the US military advantage by unconventional means to ensure their strategic interests. Cyberspace special operations are a must to fill the strategic level of the blank. Obviously, the United States must actively seek a tactical level of unconventional combat into the cyber space operations in the form of special operations. Rand’s recent study of special operations concluded that “the United States needs to use a more advanced form of special operations to ensure national interests, taking into account the recent US and its interests facing the security threat situation, special operations

Become the most appropriate form of ensuring national interests “. In an increasingly interconnected global environment, the physical infrastructure is quickly allocated Internet protocol addresses, accessory networking. By 2020, there will be 50 billion “machine-to-machine” equipment (currently 1 3 billion units) will be through the “embedded computer, sensor and Internet capabilities” access to network space. Cyberspace special operations Unicom virtual and reality, through the modern information network and with the traditional face-to-face combination of special operations partnership. Today’s global environment has prompted the United States to use cyber special operations as a strategic tool for national military strategies. Potential rivals combine offensive network capabilities with unconventional tactics to set a terrible example for other enemies in the United States, and they will follow suit quickly. This paper presents three new options for integrating emerging technologies and special operations: foreign-assisted defense under “cloud-driven”, anti-riot operations in the network, and non-conventional cyber warfare advance teams. Full play of these three tactics will not only maintain the advantages of the US network technology, but also to build an important partnership, shaping the whole spectrum of combat environment have a revolutionary impact. If successful implementation, network special operations will become the United States a strong new strategic options

Original Mandarin Chinese:

编者按：美国陆军中校帕特里克·米歇尔·杜根在美陆军战争学院就读期间，于2015年第4季度《联合部队季刊》发表《战略层面的网络空间特种作战》一文，该文曾获得2015年度参联会主席战略论文竞赛战略研究类奖。本文通过回顾网络空间特种作战案例，分析了在非对称性冲突中利用网络工具的潜在力量，指出网络空间特种作战已经成为达成国家目标的有效战略工具。成为地区强国用以规避美国军事主导权以及确保本国战略利益的非常规性路径。作者提出了融合新兴技术与特种作战的三种新选项：“云驱动”下的国外协助防御，网络反暴乱平叛行动与非常规网络战先遣队。旨在维持美国的网络技术优势，并对构建重要伙伴关系、塑造全频谱冲突环境产生革命性影响。伊朗和俄罗斯等地区力量的网络空间特种作战战备为何比美国更为充分？

美国在战略层面集结其网络部门和网络能力的同时，伊朗和俄罗斯又是如何在战术层面强化其力量的呢？美国在20多年前就发布了网络特种作战的相关文件，但为何其网络特种作战的政策、部门和条令仍然不够成熟呢？对于美军而言，最基本的问题是：美国将如何打造战略层面的网络特种作战能力？早在1993年，互联网技术理论家约翰·阿奇拉和大卫·伦菲尔德在其著作《网络战争即将来临》一书中就已经预言了最近伊朗和俄罗斯所实施的网络空间特种作战行动。“大量分散各地的小规模团体利用最新的通信技术协调一致”控制网络，取得对对手的决定性优势。现实中这一情景一再上演。阿奇拉和伦菲尔德认为，“战争中我们投向敌人的不再是质量和能量；如今我们使用的是信息，掌握的信息越多，对传统武器的需求就越少”。

美军高层也已经意识到，有了非对称性网络工具、非常规战术以及大量虚假信息的武装，少量的特种作战人员就可以形成一定的战略影响。目前有消息表明，伊朗和俄罗斯均已成功地将网络空间特种作战作为一种战略工具来达成其国家目标。两国都拥有一体化的网络特种作战部队，知道如何在非对称性冲突中利用网络工具的潜在力量。两国的非对称性手段成为地区强国用以规避美国军事优势以及确保本国战略利益的强大非常规性路径。价格低廉的网络高新技术使得潜在对手可以发展出强大的网络战能力。因此，美国亟需做出战略选择，发展网络空间特种作战，作为保护和投射国家利益的工具。

价格低廉的网络高新技术使得潜在对手可以发展出强大的网络战能力2013年2月，俄罗斯总参谋长格拉西莫夫在俄《军工信使》杂志发表了《科学在预测中的价值》一文。文中，格拉西莫夫预测了能够“改变游戏规则”的新一代战争，其战略价值将超过“武器力量的效能”。他号召普遍开展非对称性行动，以抵消敌方的优势，通过“特种作战力量和内部对抗以及不断完善的信息行动、装备和手段，在敌国的领土中创造一个永久活动的前线”。2014年春，有西方媒体报道，在乌克兰东部的乱局中，一支便装的特种作战小分队从俄罗斯境内穿越乌克兰边界，占领政府建筑和武器库并转交给分裂主义武装。与此同时，乌克兰当局声称，其全境的数字、电话及网络通信均遭到切断、干扰或攻击活动。乌克兰政府将信息和物流基础设施（包括互联网服务器和铁路控制系统）遭受的网络攻击归因于俄方的破坏，同时还认为，俄罗斯实施信息欺骗行动，花费巨资在重要的社交媒体、博客以及新闻网站每天发布50条亲俄评论，在乌克兰内外形成大量的虚假信息流，一方面掩盖其在网络空间的非传统军事行动，另一方面制造了政治假象。乌政府高级官员表示，“俄罗斯所做的并不是通常的信息作战所涉及的虚假信息、谎言、泄漏机密或网络破坏活动，它重新塑造现实，造成大众幻象，然后将之转化为政治行动”。为此，在2014年9月召开的北约安全峰会上，北约盟军最高司令、美国空军上将菲利普·布里德莱弗指出，俄罗斯在东乌克兰实施的“混合型”非传统作战代表了战争史上最惊人的信息闪电战。布里德莱弗敦促盟军立即发展相应的能力以反制俄罗斯的非传统战、宣传战及网络攻击行动。俄罗斯使用“根本不被西方视为战争的”非传统手段达成其政治目的，这使得西方及北约国家措手不及。俄罗斯并不是以碎片化的方式来使用特种力量、信息作战或网络能力。相反，正如格拉西莫夫将军所言，“发动战争不再需要公开宣布，当配备先进技术和大量信息的特种力量为传统部队在维持和平与危机的掩护下达成战略目标创造好条件，战争就发生了。”言外之意，网络信息欺骗和网络攻击行动为特种作战力量在“战争与和平之间”实施非传统战赢得了时间和空间。俄罗斯的网络赋能非传统战极为成功，不仅是其网络特种力量的混成，而且还成功地侵入欧盟成员国，甚至没有引起西方有效的军事反应。

网络信息欺骗和网络攻击行动为特种作战力量在“战争与和平之间”实施非传统战赢得了时间和空间 经验教训从俄罗斯的案例中可以得出四个方面的主要经验，可为美国特种作战行动与网络能力整合提供一个可行的理论框架。第一，俄罗斯特种部队所使用的进攻性网络工具存在战术和战略层面的差别，主要以战术层面的“封闭网络”为目标，如本地通讯、社交媒体、区域网络和后勤基础设施等，同时保留其更为先进的开放网络工具作为备用。第二，网络特种作战主要是一种代理人行为，强调最小化的来源跟踪。正如格拉西莫夫所描述的那样，“对敌方的远距离、无接触行动正在成为战术战役目标的主要手段”。网络特种作战通常避免人员的直接接触，而是在和平与战争的灰色地带展开行动。第三，信息与通信技术、网络攻击及信息作战等在网络赋能的非常规战中发挥着重要作用。只要恰当的实施，传统的特种作战可以远远超出其原有的功能，“这涉及到对广泛能力的综合运用，以达成政策目标”。要发挥效能，还必须整合同步其他领域的专门知识。第四，网络特种作战既可以慑止冲突，也可用于应对全频谱冲突，因为“它适合行动的各个阶段，从塑造环境到剧烈战争再到战后重建等”。虽然网络战以破坏为初衷，但也具有建设性的一面。低成本的信息和通信技术的广泛传播有利于强化伙伴国安全，从而有助于阻止冲突的发生。

网络空间特种作战是一种必须填补的战略层面的能力空白，美国必须积极寻求一种在战术层面的非常规作战中融入网络空间作战的特种作战形式 “‘云驱动’下的‘国外协助防御’（FID）”既是一种云计算概念，也是通过虚拟手段增强伙伴能力和信任的一种比喻性描述。“‘云驱动’FID”概念虽然还未经明确界定，但是它却可以联接整合跨学科领域，以更好地理解人员、地理及虚拟世界，并对相关目标展开共同行动。从技术上而言，“‘云驱动’FID”可以强化伙伴关系，通过联合设施，实时共享数据，增强自动化，传播分析过程。“云驱动”是灵活多变的，能够以私人、公共、社区或混合形式出现，各自使用不同的软件、平台和基础设施等。安全人员通过“‘云驱动’FID”使用智能技术驱动保密的移动应用软件、分析工具和共享数据。虽然数据与虚拟云相联，但其真正价值在于使信息及时传播到战术人员手中。“‘云驱动’FID”也可比喻为一种持续的、活跃的伙伴关系，数据永不停止，网络一直忙碌。技术仅仅是一种工具，用以驱动更深入、广泛的社会文化、政治和历史因素的理解，这些往往是容易造成冲突的因素。“‘云驱动’FID”可以与伙伴国构建更具持续性的能力和信任。“‘云驱动’FID”为未来建立各种机构、中心和实验室弥合美国各跨机构间的利益打下一个虚拟的基础。从美国政府的战略视角而言，“‘云驱动’FID”是一种实用主义的“以伙伴国为中心的方式，旨在围绕伙伴国的核心利益设计行动，而不是寄希望于以短视的方式来改变伙伴国”。“‘云驱动’FID”还是一种审慎的战略举措，“以防美国的伙伴国由于国内政治问题出现公共关系危机”。“‘云驱动’FID”也提供了其他的机会。它所形成的技术和关系网络可以迅速对紧急事件做出反应，如人道主义救援或救灾行动、阻止大规模屠杀，或者非战斗人员撤离任务等。这样可以通过为决策过程提供信息而节约时间、金钱和人力等。对于伙伴关系的构建而言，“‘云驱动’FID”可以存储当地的非美国社交媒体信息、丰富的社交网络分析、社会网络地图以及行为和舆论趋势分析等信息。最为重要的是，“‘云驱动’FID”以富有创新性和极为有力的方式构建信任，打造对盟友及伙伴国的持久影响力。

当今的全球环境促使美国采用网络特种作战作为国家军事战略的战略性工具 网络反暴乱平叛行动网络反暴乱平叛行动（CNCOIN）旨在利用社交媒体网络达成平叛的目的。为打破敌人的非对称性信息优势，CNCOIN使用非技术手段打击相关人群，控制其感知、行为和行动。它为网络空间无处不在的反社交网络手段增添了军事色彩。虽然这些手段没有明确界定，本文认为，它实际上就是指操纵社交媒体，掩盖真实身份，达成不可告人的目的。虽然社交媒体为反社交网络提供了广泛的机会，如恶意利用、有意误导等，但从军事角度而言，社交媒体提供了丰富的信息资源以影响心理脆弱性，也是一个理想的攻击平台。每种功能性范畴中都有几种有助于其实施的技术。行动范畴包括但不局限于网络欺骗行动（cyber-pseudo operation）和网络驱逐行动（cyber-herding operation）。网络欺骗行动是一种经典的平叛策略，“政府军和技术人员将自己假扮为叛乱分子，渗入敌方网络后使用先进的谍报技术在该网络内部实施破坏”。网络驱逐行动就是指，“个人、团体或组织把其他的个人、团体或组织驱逐到预设的网络区域”。两种技术的奇妙之处在于，通过利用通信技术与通信平台的内在缺陷来驱逐虚拟网络中的叛乱分子。两种战术以叛乱分子活跃的网络社群为目标，对其进行操控或者瓦解，最终为网络平叛提供更多的机会。虚拟世界放大了环境因素，因为网络中的人物更难确定其真实性。规划指挥控制、通信频率以及设备平台等要素将成为网络欺骗行动或网络驱逐行动实施的关键点，用以操纵、误导或者驱逐目标群走向预想的结果。情报范畴包括但不局限于众包（Crowdsourcing）和社交网络分析技术（Social Networking Analysis， SNA）。众包就是利用大规模的知识库，由参与者自愿提供的，为解决问题提供新思路、服务或观察，可以迅速扩展组织者的视野。社交网络分析以可视的方式描绘和测量社交链接的关系、强度及核心性以说明社会网络结构。社交网络可视化或者社网图可以提供独特的窗口用以评估、描绘甚至预测关系事件的强度、时间、空间和关系维度。2013年9月，菲律宾三宝颜危机期间，反政府武装摩洛民族解放阵线（以下简称“摩解”）对民族和解状况感到不满，挟持200多名平民为人质，袭击商业店铺，烧毁城市建筑。整个危机期间，众包和社交网络分析都是非常成功的非传统战术手段。菲律宾安全部队使用众包战术鼓励三宝颜居民发现并报告“摩解”成员的藏身地点。菲安全部队结合众包信息和情报分析，为安全行动和人道主义行动提供信息。使用社交网络分析来评估“摩解”的民众支持度，并在社交媒体上反制“摩解”宣言，封禁违反社交媒体用户协议的宣传网站，还使用众包信息封锁“摩解”小股部队，攻击其临时指挥哨所。菲安全部队通过使用社交媒体跟踪关键信息和领导节点，随后使用实体部队挫败了“摩解”的非对称性优势。信息作战范畴包括但不局限于网络入侵（cyber aggression）、论坛马甲（袜子手偶sock-puppeting）、以假乱真（Astro-turfing）等。三种战术都是匿名利用社交媒体实施误导、假信息等来操纵行为、舆论及行动。网络入侵是由蒂安娜·菲尔姆利提出，是指“一种电子或在线行为，旨在对他人实施心理伤害或损毁其名誉，通过使用电子邮件、即时信息、手机、数字信息、聊天室以及社交媒体、视频、游戏网站等”。它比普通的网络攻击性行为的范围要广泛得多。它的匿名性可能会引起实质性的心理伤害和负面后果，因为相关信息会被重复发送给目标或者在社交媒体发布。它对CNCOIN的价值在于，可以利用敏感的数字信息来羞辱、诽谤或伤害目标，造成心理障碍行为。这种强大的网络入侵行动可以降低目标的可信度、影响力和权力，最终使目标或其它叛乱分子丧失实力。其它两种战术，论坛马甲和以假乱真都是虚构的在线宣传工具，用来散布扭曲的观点，以制造更广范围的支持或者反对的假象。以假乱真实际上跟论坛马甲是同一个概念，只不过更为复杂、更有组织、规模更大。两种战术都使用虚拟人物在网络空间散布虚假信息，目的是引发群体反应或行动。以假乱真的网络信息作战行动包含海量文字、图片和视频，与有计划的误导性网络活动相结合，将显著增强CNCOIN行动的效果。 非常规网络战先遣队推进美国网络特种作战的第三种方式是非常规网络战先遣队（cyber-UW Pilot Team），利用社交媒体网络塑造实体环境，建立区域机制，在实施非常规战之前将各区域联通起来。非常规网络战先遣队的核心是特种部队，拥有多个专业机构提供的技术支持，其任务是在网络安全领域进行非常规作战的准备。传统先遣队的渗透目标是敌方领土、军事设施等实体目标，而非常规先遣队则是通过虚拟手段进行渗透，再潜入敏感、敌对或拒止区域。通过虚拟手段，可以减少美国及伙伴国武装力量在时间、风险、装备等方面的损失和风险。从概念上讲，非常规网络战先遣队利用网络工具和先进技术在社交媒体上打造人员、实体、情报以及信息基础设施。在加深对当地人文地形理解的同时，小组可以强化其本地语言和文化技能，还可识别抵抗活动领导者、评估动机和抵抗能力以及对美国政府目标的总体支持度，与此同时，还可以了解非正式的层级分布、心理及行为等。此外，还可以通过接入社交媒体网络混入互联网白噪音，以“提高美国对潜在合作者的文化理解以及在采取行动之前的当地形势。”虽然美国国家安全战略中早就承认了网络作战的战略作用，但是这种认识并没有完全转化成明晰的战略层面的思维和作战能力。例如，美国《国防部网络空间行动战略》中并没有给出多少解决方案或具体措施，仅仅从五个方面重复了先前的网络思路。缺乏明确的思路导致我们的网络战略存在缺陷，使得美国先进的网络技术优势有拱手让给潜在对手的风险。对比之下，伊朗和俄罗斯的非对称性创新为其他地区和全球力量树立了模仿的样板，都试图以非常规手段规避美国的军事优势，确保各自的战略利益。网络空间特种作战是一种必须填补的战略层面的能力空白。很显然，美国必须积极寻求一种在战术层面的非常规作战中融入网络空间作战的特种作战形式。兰德公司最近的一份研究特种作战的报告得出结论，称“美国需要运用一种更为先进的特种作战形式来确保国家利益，考虑到近来美国及其利益面临的安全威胁形势，特种作战成为确保国家利益的最合适的形式”。在一个日益互联的全球环境中，实体性基础设施快速被分配互联网协议地址，接入物联网。到2020年，将有500亿台“机器对机器”设备（目前为130亿台）会通过“嵌入计算机、传感器和互联网能力”接入网络空间。网络空间特种作战联通了虚拟与现实，通过现代的信息网络并与传统的面对面的特种作战伙伴关系相结合。当今的全球环境促使美国采用网络特种作战作为国家军事战略的战略性工具。潜在对手将进攻性网络能力与非常规战术相结合为美国的其他敌人树立了可怕的榜样，他们必将快速跟进。本文提出了融合新兴技术与特种作战的三种新选项：“云驱动”下的国外协助防御、网络反暴乱平叛行动以及非常规网络战先遣队。充分发挥这三种战术将不仅仅能维持美国的网络技术优势，还可对构建重要伙伴关系、塑造全频谱作战环境产生革命性影响。如果能成功实施，网络特种作战必将成为美国强有力的新战略选项。

 

2016-08-22 17:42现代军事

China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, Chinese Hacker Methodology 中國黑客, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀

中國軍隊信息戰裝備的作戰運用 – Chinese Military Operation of Information Warfare Equipment

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中國軍隊信息戰裝備的作戰運用

Chinese Military Operation of Information Warfare Equipment

Information warfare is the C4ISR system and C4ISR system of confrontation, is the advantage of information contention, the main purpose is to ensure that their own information system to run properly, from the enemy use, paralysis and destruction; the same time, trying to use, paralyzed and destroy the enemy’s information system, So that in a paralyzed, confused state. Information warfare includes two parts: strategic information warfare and battlefield information warfare.

Strategic information warfare and information warfare battlefield

strategic information warfare is mainly characterized by a wide range of sectors covering all key political, economic, technological, and military and other special areas; special way, relates to psychological warfare, media warfare, deception warfare, media warfare and other special Means that the target is special, mainly through the decadence war, psychological warfare, information deterrence attack the enemy’s understanding system and thinking system; great harm, can make the whole country’s economic, political or military paralyzed, and even make it happen alternately; Personnel special, the war is not necessarily military personnel, computer experts, international criminal groups, ulterior motives of hackers or terrorist organizations and so may become war personnel.

Battlefield information warfare is the information warfare in the battle space, refers to the preparation and conduct of a campaign, the integrated use of information technology and a variety of information technology weapons, information combat platform and C4ISR system, in reconnaissance detection and early warning, information processing and Transmission, weapons control and guidance, operational command and control, camouflage deception and interference, as well as military strategy and other aspects of the comprehensive confrontation and struggle. Battlefield information warfare is through the interference or disrupting the enemy decision-making process, so that the enemy can not effectively take concerted action. Therefore, we must first affect the enemy decision-making, and then affect its actions, that is, to win the air electromagnetic advantage, and then made the air superiority, and finally the use of conventional forces to take combat operations. To seize the right to information system, to seize the initiative to fight the space, but also for the fight for land rights, air supremacy, sea power and the system of the right to lay a good foundation and necessary conditions.

A The basic combat forces and means are digital forces and information weapons equipment, the main contents include combat confidentiality, military deception, electronic warfare, psychological warfare and fire destroyed, the core purpose is to compete for the battle space information access , Control and use rights. Battlefield information warfare is the confrontation of the information system, it directly affects the entire battle space, the whole process of war and success or failure. Battlefield information warfare The main combat style is the electronic warfare and cyber warfare. Electronic warfare is an important part of the battlefield information warfare, mainly for the enemy communications, radar and other electromagnetic radiation source for the lure, interference, destruction and destruction activities. In the Gulf War, the electronic warfare was not only for the first time on a large scale, but also as a campaign stage and a specific campaign in war. In the Kosovo war, NATO used a lot of electronic warfare equipment, and the first use of electromagnetic pulse bombs and the first time a network war. Network warfare is a cyber-confrontational activity in computer cyberspace, using the Internet, and is being used for the first time in the Kosovo war. NATO network warfare measures include: network advertising; hacker attacks; attacks on financial networks. The main feature of the network war in the Southern Alliance is the people’s war mode, fans, computer fans and computer enthusiasts spontaneously carried out a large number of network operations, such as online publicity, attack NATO website, the use of network transmission of information.

Information warfare equipment in war equipment electronic warfare equipment the trend of electronic warfare equipment increasingly integrated and universal, under the conditions of information technology in the local war, the battlefield of the electromagnetic environment is increasingly complex, the past that the separation of each other, a single function of electronic warfare equipment is far from Adapt to combat needs. Integration and generalization has become the focus of the development of electronic warfare equipment and future electronic warfare equipment overall development direction. In order to deal more effectively with the complex and volatile electromagnetic threat in the information warfare, the future of the new generation of electronic warfare equipment, will be widely used advanced computer technology, greatly improve the automation of the entire system to have better real-time capabilities, since Adaptability and full power management capability. Electronic warfare equipment, work areas continue to widen, increasing the transmission power, millimeter-wave technology and the development of optical technology, the modern electronic warfare equipment, the frequency of continuous development to a wider band. On the whole, the future range of electronic warfare equipment will be extended to the entire electromagnetic spectrum. GPS interference and anti-interference will be concerned about the practice of war has shown that if the loss of GPS support, it will greatly weaken the information advantage, so that command, control, reconnaissance, combat, military and other military aspects are facing severe tests, Combat effectiveness. Focusing on the development of anti-radiation and new electronic warfare jets, attention to the development of new, special electronic warfare technology and equipment, such as anti-satellite laser weapons, high-energy particle beam weapons, and meteor communication, neutrino communication and so on.

Computer virus weapon <a In the military information system, the battlefield information acquisition, transmission, processing and other functions need to complete the computer and network, computer network is the basis and pioneer of information warfare. The use of software-driven sniffers and hardware magnetic sniffers and other sniffing network is an important way to attack the network. These sniffing tools were originally a test device used to diagnose and assist in repairing the network, so it was a powerful tool for network management personnel to manage the network, but it was a terrible computer virus weapon in information warfare. It can make the network “service denied”, “information tampering”, information “halfway steal” and so on. In addition, will also focus on design “portal trap”. “Portal trap”, also known as “back door”, is a computer system designer in the system in advance of a structure, in the application appears or operating system, the programmer to insert some debugging agencies. System programmers in order to achieve the purpose of the attack system, deliberately left a small number of portal traps for familiar with the system staff to go beyond the normal system protection and sneak into the system. Network is an important infrastructure for information warfare, network-based warfare is mainly based on the network and the network is reliable to determine the outcome of the war. Therefore, to strengthen the network of offensive and defensive combat research, to win the future of information war is essential. 　　Electromagnetic pulse bombs

Iraq war, the US military used a lot of electronic warfare equipment, and the use of electromagnetic pulse bombs attacked the Iraqi radio and television system and the Iraqi military various types of electronic radiation source. Electromagnetic pulse bomb, also known as microwave pulse bomb, is through the micro-beam into electromagnetic energy, damage to each other’s electronic facilities and personnel of a new directional energy weapons. Its working principle is: high-power microwave through the antenna gathered into a very narrow, very strong electromagnetic waves fired at each other, relying on this beam of electromagnetic waves generated by high temperature, ionization, radiation and other integrated effects in the target internal electronic circuit to produce fatal voltage And the current, breakdown or burn the sensitive components, damage to the computer stored in the data, so that the other side of the weapons and command system paralyzed, loss of combat effectiveness. According to the test, a briefcase size of the microwave bomb, can produce power of 300 million watts of pulse waves. Will be more than one connection, it can become an adjustable radiation source, resulting in more than 2 billion watts of pulse waves. This pulse wave is somewhat similar to the nuclear pulse generated when the nuclear explosion can easily from the power and communication pipes into the underground bunker, which rely on radio, radar, computers, power grids and telephone modern weapons systems, chemical and biological arsenal and its production The shop was paralyzed in an instant.

GPS interference device <a I = 13> Iraq war, the Iraqi military use of GPS interferometer on the Tomahawk cruise missiles for effective interference, which is the first time in combat in the GPS guidance system interference. GPS signal is very weak, very easy to interfere. A Russian company offers a 4-watt power handheld GPS jammers that can be bought for less than $ 4,000. If you buy parts from a retail e-store, spend $ 400 to create a GPS jammer with a radius of 16 km or more. Before the war in Iraq, the United States had expected the Iraqi side to interfere with GPS signals. The United States has already been equipped with anti-jamming technology for its GPS bombs and missiles so that these GPS-guided weapons can continue to use GPS signals in the event of interference; even if the GPS signal is lost, these weapons can also use their own other guidance system Such as inertial navigation, laser guidance, etc., so that they reach the target. Nevertheless, the early Iraq war, the US military more than a dozen Tomahawk cruise missiles or because of interference from the scheduled route, falling in Turkey, Syria and Iran. Small GPS jitter problem alerted the US government, Powell personally come forward to investigate the source of Iraqi GPS jammers, Russia and other countries imposed no small pressure.

Gulf War, GPS navigator as a trial for the first time issued to the use of desert combat personnel, the effect is obvious. At that time, including cruise missiles, including all the weapons are not using GPS navigation device. During the war in Iraq, we saw almost all of the combat platforms, and every soldier, almost all of the missiles and bombs used this kind of navigation device, so that the tanks, planes, ships were more mobile so that the missiles and bombs were The probability error is reduced to 1-3 m, within a maximum of 10 m. <A I = 15> everything has a disadvantage. GPS navigation defects and information technology weapons and equipment of the drawbacks is the same, that is, electronic interference. From the perspective of the development of weapons and equipment, the purchase of a cruise missile needs more than 100 million dollars, and manufacturing a GPS jammers only a few hundred dollars, as a strategic defense side, if a large number of development and development of GPS jammers, not only for US missiles And bombs are a threat to their tanks, planes, ships and personnel navigation and positioning will also have a huge impact. Of course, you should also see the US military fight, further, after the end of the war in Iraq will be based on the lessons of the war to improve the GPS system. Is expected to be improved in three areas: First, GPS satellites, mainly to enhance the satellite launch signal, and as much as possible to launch GPS satellites; Second, improve the guidance system, mainly to increase the composite guidance device, after the GPS guidance is disturbed, Automatic recovery or transfer to inertia and other navigation methods to ensure the normal operation of the platform and weapons; Third, GPS anti-interference, mainly to improve the GPS receiver anti-jamming capability, the development of new GPS receiver, Machine and jamming machine for electronic suppression and interference.

 

Original Mandarin Chinese:

信息戰是C4ISR系統與C4ISR系統的對抗，是信息優勢的爭奪，主要目的是確保己方信息系統正常運行，免遭敵方利用、癱瘓和破壞﹔同時，設法利用、癱瘓和破壞敵人的信息系統，使之處於癱瘓、迷茫狀態。信息戰包括戰略信息戰和戰場信息戰兩大部分。

戰略信息戰和戰場信息戰

戰略信息戰主要特征是范圍廣泛，涉及國家政治、經濟、科技、軍事等各個要害部門和特殊領域﹔方式特殊，涉及心理戰、輿論戰、欺騙戰、媒體戰等特殊手段﹔目標特殊，主要是通過誘騙戰、心理戰、信息威懾等攻擊敵人的認識體系和思維體系﹔危害巨大，能使整個國家的經濟、政治或軍事陷入癱瘓，甚至能使其發生政權交替﹔人員特殊，參戰人員不一定軍人，計算機專家、國際犯罪集團、別有用心的黑客或恐怖組織等都可能成為參戰人員。

戰場信息戰是發生在戰斗空間內的信息戰，是指為准備和進行一場戰役，綜合運用信息技術手段和各種信息化武器、信息化作戰平台和C4ISR系統，在偵察探測及預警、信息處理與傳遞、武器控制和制導、作戰指揮與控制、偽裝欺騙與干擾以及軍事謀略等方面展開的全面對抗和斗爭。戰場信息戰是通過干擾或打亂敵方決策程序，使敵方無法有效採取協調一致的行動。因此，要先影響敵人決策，然后再影響其行動，即先贏得空中電磁優勢，再取得空中優勢，最后使用常規部隊採取作戰行動。奪取了制信息權，就奪取了戰斗空間的主動權，而且為爭奪制陸權、制空權、制海權和制天權奠定一個良好基礎和必要條件。

戰場信息戰的基本作戰力量和手段是數字化部隊及信息化武器裝備，主要內容包括作戰保密、軍事欺騙、電子戰、心理戰和火力摧毀，核心目的是爭奪戰斗空間的信息獲取權、控制權和使用權。戰場信息戰是信息體系的對抗，它直接影響到整個戰斗空間、整場戰爭的進程和成敗。戰場信息戰的主要作戰樣式是電子戰和網絡戰。電子戰是戰場信息戰的一個重要組成部分，主要是針對敵人通信、雷達等電磁輻射源進行的誘騙、干擾、破壞和摧毀活動。海灣戰爭中，電子戰不僅首次大規模使用，而且正式作為戰爭中的一個戰役階段和特定戰役行動。科索沃戰爭中，北約使用了大量電子戰裝備，並首次使用了電磁脈沖炸彈並首次進行了網絡戰。網絡戰是在計算機網絡空間，利用因特網進行的一種網絡對抗活動，並在科索沃戰爭中首次使用。北約網絡戰的措施包括：網絡宣傳﹔黑客攻擊﹔襲擊金融網絡等。南聯盟網絡戰的主要特征是人民戰爭模式，網迷、電腦迷和計算機愛好者自發地進行了大量網絡作戰行動，如開展網上宣傳、攻擊北約網站、利用網絡傳遞情報等。

戰爭中的信息戰裝備

電子戰裝備

電子戰裝備的發展趨勢日趨一體化和通用化，信息化條件下的局部戰爭中，戰場上的電磁環境日益復雜，以往那種彼此分立、功能單一的電子戰裝備已遠遠不能適應作戰需要了。一體化和通用化已成為當前電子戰裝備發展的重點和未來電子戰裝備總的發展方向。為了更有效地對付信息化戰爭中復雜多變的電磁威脅，未來新一代的電子對抗裝備，將廣泛採用先進的計算機技術，大幅度提高整個系統的自動化程度，以具備更好的實時能力、自適應能力和全功率管理能力。電子戰裝備的工作頻段不斷拓寬，發射功率不斷增大，毫米波技術和光電技術的發展，使現代電子戰裝備的工作頻率不斷向更寬的頻段發展。從整體上看，未來電子戰裝備的工作范圍必將擴展到整個電磁波頻譜。GPS干擾與反干擾將受到關注，戰爭實踐已經表明，如果失去GPS的支持，就會極大地削弱信息優勢，使指揮、控制、偵察、打擊、部隊機動等各個軍事環節都面臨嚴峻考驗，嚴重降低戰斗力。重點發展反輻射和新型電子戰干擾機，重視發展新型、特殊的電子戰技術裝備，如用於反衛星的激光武器、高能粒子束武器，以及流星余跡通信、中微子通信等等。

計算機病毒武器

在軍事信息系統中，戰場信息的獲取、傳遞、處理等功能需要計算機及網絡來完成，計算機網絡是進行信息戰的基礎和先鋒。利用軟件驅動嗅探器和硬件磁感應嗅探器等對網絡進行嗅探是進攻網絡的重要方法。這些嗅探工具原本是一種測試設備，用來診斷和協助修理網絡，因此它是網管人員管理網絡的一種得力工具，但在信息戰中卻是一種可怕的計算機病毒武器。它能使網絡“服務否認”、“信息篡改”、信息“中途竊取”等。另外，也將重視設計“門戶陷阱”。“門戶陷阱”又稱“后門”，是計算機系統設計者預先在系統中構造的一種機構，在應用出現或操作系統期間，程序員插入一些調試機構。系統程序員為了達到攻擊系統的目的，特意留下少數門戶陷阱，供熟悉系統的人員用以超越對方正常的系統保護而潛入系統。網絡是信息化戰爭的重要基礎設施，網絡中心戰主要是基於網絡而進行的，網絡是否可靠決定戰爭的勝負。因此，加強網絡攻防作戰的研究，對於贏得未來信息化戰爭至關重要。

電磁脈沖炸彈

伊拉克戰爭中，美軍使用了大量電子戰裝備，並使用電磁脈沖炸彈襲擊了伊拉克廣播電視系統及伊軍各類電子輻射源。電磁脈沖炸彈也稱微波脈沖炸彈，是通過把微波束轉化為電磁能，毀傷對方電子設施和人員的一種新型定向能武器。其工作原理是：高功率微波經過天線聚集成一束很窄、很強的電磁波射向對方，依靠這束電磁波產生的高溫、電離、輻射等綜合效應，在目標內部的電子線路中產生致命的電壓和電流，擊穿或燒毀其中的敏感元器件，毀損電腦中存貯的數據，從而使對方的武器和指揮系統陷於癱瘓，喪失戰斗力。據測試，一枚公文包大小的微波炸彈，可產生功率達3億瓦的脈沖波。將其多個聯接后，則能成為可調整的輻射源，產生20億瓦以上的脈沖波。這種脈沖波有點類似核爆炸時產生的電磁脈沖，可以輕易地從電力和通訊管道進入地下掩體，使其中依賴無線電、雷達、計算機、電網和電話等的現代化武器系統、生化武器庫及其生產車間在瞬間癱瘓。

GPS干擾設備

伊拉克戰爭中，伊軍利用GPS干擾儀對戰斧巡航導彈進行了有效的干擾，這是第一次在實戰中對GPS制導系統進行干擾。GPS信號很弱，很易於干擾。一家俄羅斯公司提供的一種4瓦功率的手持GPS干擾機，不到4000美元就能買到。如果從零售電子商店購買部件組裝，花400美元就可以制造一個干擾半徑16公裡以上的GPS干擾機。伊拉克戰爭開戰之前，美國就已經預料到伊拉克方面會干擾GPS信號。美國其實早已經給其GPS炸彈和導彈裝載了抗干擾技術，使這些GPS導引的武器能夠在干擾的情況下繼續使用GPS信號﹔即使GPS信號丟失，這些武器還可以使用自身的其他導引系統如慣性導航、激光制導等，使自己到達目標。盡管如此，伊拉克戰爭初期，美軍十幾枚戰斧式巡航導彈還是因受干擾偏離預定航線，落在土耳其、敘利亞和伊朗境內。小小的GPS干擾機問題驚動了美國朝野，鮑威爾親自出面調查伊拉克GPS干擾機的來源，對俄羅斯等國施加了不小的壓力。

海灣戰爭中，GPS導航儀作為試用品首次發放給沙漠作戰人員使用，效果明顯。當時，包括巡航導彈在內的所有武器都沒有採用GPS導航裝置。伊拉克戰爭中，我們看到幾乎所有的作戰平台，每一個單兵，幾乎全部的導彈和炸彈都採用了這種導航裝置，從而使坦克、飛機、艦艇的機動更加精確，使導彈和炸彈的原概率誤差縮小到1—3米，最大10米范圍之內。

凡事有一利必有一弊。GPS導航的弊端與信息化武器裝備的弊端是一樣的，就是電子干擾問題。從武器裝備發展角度來看，購買一枚巡航導彈需要100多萬美元，而制造一部GPS干擾機才幾百美元，作為戰略防御一方，如果能夠大量發展和研制GPS干擾機，不僅對於美軍導彈和炸彈是一種威脅，對其坦克、飛機、艦艇和人員的導航定位也將產生巨大影響。當然，也應看到美軍打一仗、進一步，伊拉克戰爭結束后必將根據戰爭中的教訓，改進GPS系統。預計將在三個方面進行改進：一是GPS衛星，主要是增強衛星發射信號，並盡可能多的發射GPS衛星﹔二是改進制導系統，主要是增加復合制導裝置，在GPS指導受到干擾之后，自動恢復或轉入慣性等其他導航方式，以保証平台和武器的正常運行﹔三是GPS反干擾，主要是提高GPS接收機抗干擾能力，研制新型GPS接收機，在戰區對地方軍民用GPS接收機和干擾機進行電子壓制和干擾等。

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀

China’s Analysis of US Army Network Operations Conceptual Concept Conception: To fight for information dominance

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US Army Network Operations Conceptual Concept Conception: To fight for information dominance

The US Army Training and Command Command assesses the future combat environment, clearly emphasizing the importance of obtaining information on all relevant aspects of future battlefields. Army forces in the color of people such as action in the face, with a new, network-based, technology-based threats. These threats use emerging technologies to build and maintain a cultural and social advantage; and make full use of these new capabilities for command and control, staff recruitment, logistics coordination, fundraising and dissemination of information. To take action in this new environment, the Army must re-adjust its message “focus”. Army leaders and soldiers must have an in-depth understanding of how to use information-based capabilities to capture and maintain situational awareness. In the future battlefield, know how to fight for information and give full play to information, while denying the opponent’s ability to win more and more important.

The assessment shows that the Army’s existing vocabulary, including, for example, computer network operations (CNO), electronic warfare (EW) and information operations (IO), will become increasingly difficult to meet demand. In order to meet these challenges, the full spectrum of military operations (FSO) should have three interrelated dimensions, each of which has its own set of causal logic and needs to focus on the development of the program:

The first dimension is the confrontation with the psychological will of enemies, hostile factions, criminal gangs and potential opponents.

The second dimension is a strategic alliance, including maintaining a friend in the country, getting ally in a foreign country, and obtaining their support or identity for the task.

The third dimension is the network power confrontation, including the acquisition, maintenance and use of a technical advantage.

The first dimension and the second dimension emphasize how commanders and staff officers should carefully plan and use information to fulfill their mission. The third dimension emphasizes gaining and maintaining an advantage in increasingly converged cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) media. The advantages of the Army’s access to advantages, protection advantages and opponents’ inferiority are included in these three dimensions; and contribute to the achievement of those actions that must be achieved through tactical, operational and strategic levels of unified action. The current combat action makes us more convinced that each dimension needs to have its own corresponding concepts and capabilities.

Information operations (IO) contain all three dimensions, but the word is increasingly becoming a generic term that can be used for any form of information. Computer network operations and electronic warfare itself is not enough to describe the full range of network confrontation. To this end, we are carrying out a comprehensive description of each dimension of the comprehensive research activities. The first two dimensions (Confrontation and Strategic Alliances of Will) will be presented in a conceptual plan to be developed separately, followed by a competency-based assessment.

This manual relates to the electronic warfare, computer network operations and cyberspace in the third dimension – networked confrontation. The Training and Command Command No. 525-7-8 is the first step towards a consensus on how the technological advances can change the operational environment, how the leaders should think about cyber operations, how to integrate their overall actions, and what they need ability. This manual provides a methodology for developing results-based, emphasis-based, and intelligent solutions that will enable the US Army to win in online confrontation. – Director of the Army – Ability Center for Lieutenant General

Executive summary

Describe the problem

The combat environment has changed significantly. The convergence and rapid development of computer and communication network technology, the global proliferation of information and communication technology (ICT) and its impact on social and social networks impact the combat environment. The use of this information revolution in the form of agents (agents) on the United States of key infrastructure and combat missions constitute a huge threat. These actors have both traditional national and non-combatants, multinational corporations, criminal organizations, terrorists, hackers, mischievous hackers and misuse of individuals. They together to create a continuous turbulence, never calm the environment. In this document, unless otherwise stated, the term “opponent” is used to describe them.

Develop a solution

Training and Order Command (TRADOC) 525-7-8, “CyberOps Concepts 2016-2028”, a comprehensive review of the 2016 to 2028 Army future forces how to make full use of cyberspace implementation of effective Network operations. The manual includes a conceptual framework for incorporating cyber operations into full spectrum operations (FSO), laying the groundwork for subsequent development of the order. This conceptual framework outlines how the commander integrates network operations to gain advantage, protect the advantages and set opponents at the disadvantage. The manual also establishes a common dictionary for the Army’s network operations, describing the relationship between cyberspace and the other four domains (earth and sea) and with the electromagnetic spectrum. Finally, it explains how the technology that continues to converge will affect full-spectrum operations and capacity development, providing strong support for Army design, development, acquisition and deployment of fully integrated network capabilities.

Program Background: Three dimensions of full spectrum combat

A, the US Army Training and Command Commander (CG) instructs the Joint Arms Center (CAC) to lead a working group to organize the mission domain for cyberspace, cyber warfare and information operations, as well as the training and commanding forces The modernization of the structure suggests a conceptual framework. On October 16, 2009, the Command and Command Command (CG) submitted a series of recommendations to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff. In his suggestion included the following:

(1) The Joint Arsenal Center believes that existing vocabularies (cyber-e-warfare) are enough at the moment, but will be increasingly insufficient to describe the challenges the Army faces in future combat environments.

(2) The joint arms center draws conclusions that should be considered from three dimensions, which run through full spectrum operations, and each dimension needs to be addressed by the design of forces and the development of orders.

(3) Thus, while the Army can now describe functions related to network and spectrum military operations as network-electronic warfare – information operations, the Joint Arms Center firmly believes that the future Army should describe them in the following ways:

The first dimension – the first dimension is the confrontation with the psychological will between the enemy, the hostile faction, the criminal gang and the potential opponent.

The second dimension, the second dimension, is a strategic alliance, including maintaining a friendly relationship with allies in the country, forming an alliance abroad, supporting or focusing on the mission of the military operations area.

The third dimension – the third dimension is the net – electromagnetic against. The continuous development of wired, wireless and optical technologies provides the conditions for convergence and cross-linking of computers and communication networks.

B, Training and Command Command No. 525-7-8 manual is mainly about how to win in this third dimension, that is, network confrontation, and put forward a concept – that is, network operations can promote the completion of the other two tasks.

Core point of view

A Win in cyber confrontation means getting progress in three ways: gaining the edge, protecting the advantage, and setting the opponent at a disadvantage.

B. The commander seeks freedom of movement in cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum while losing opponents at the time and place they are determined; thus supporting various military in cyberspace and the other four domains of cyberspace (land and sea) activity. Cyberspace military operations are included in the network confrontation to take advantage, to protect the advantages and opponents in the disadvantages to take action. Network operations itself is not the ultimate goal, more as an important component of the whole spectrum of operations, to win the network confrontation is in peacetime military confrontation in the attention of the general activities. Network operations are ongoing and confrontation takes place every day, and in most cases there is no need for other forces to participate.

Solution framework

The existing terms of the term do not fully address the scope of the relevant tasks according to the definition of the Department of Defense cyberspace and cyber warfare. As a result, the framework developed by the manual defines four major components of network operations: CyberWar, CyNetOps, CyberSpt, and Cyberas.

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1. Related background

The combat environment (OE) has changed significantly. The hostile activities in cyberspace and through cyberspace have reached unprecedented levels, threatening the basic elements of the key infrastructure, financial systems and national power of the United States. These threats come from a wide range of sources, unknowingly hackers to sovereign states, and the level of competencies varies. They together to create a continuous turbulence, never calm the environment. In this document, unless otherwise stated, the term “opponent” is used to describe them.

B. The rapid development of technology and its widespread proliferation make it increasingly difficult to win in full spectrum operations. The combination of wired, wireless and optical technology leads to the convergence of computers and telecommunications networks; handheld computing devices are growing in number and performance. The new generation of systems is emerging to form a global, mixed adaptive network that combines wired, wireless, optical, satellite communications, monitoring and data acquisition (SCADA) and other systems. In the near future, the network will provide users with ubiquitous access, so that they can be near real-time on-demand collaboration.

C. With the rapid development of technology, the ability of national opponents also increased, which makes the combat environment more complex. Who can gain, protect and exploit the advantages in competitive, crowded cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, who will master the initiative. On the contrary, if a party fails in the confrontation, or because the system was disturbed or destroyed and can not be effective action, it will give a huge advantage to the opponent.

D. Access, protection and advantage are not easy. US rivals use the commercial market as a platform for their development, making them more agile and adaptable than Army’s long research, development, testing and identification, and acquisition processes. Opponents are increasingly good at using cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum capabilities and activities that are often outside the sight of our Army’s conventional operations. In order to capture and maintain the battle and tactical advantages for these flexible opponents, the Army must make cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum the core and conventional components of its operations; and commanders also need the relevant competencies and the corresponding experts to apply them.

1.2. Purpose

The purpose of the Handbook No. 525-7-8 of the Training and Command Command is to examine how the Army’s future forces will integrate the cyberspace capabilities and cyber operations into full spectrum operations between 2016 and 2028.

1.3. Scope

The 525-7-8 Handbook of the Training and Command Command draws out how the commander can integrate cyber operations with other capabilities to gain advantage in full spectrum operations and to protect the advantages of concatenating opponents’ initial research results. The results of the study will be further refined through a competency-based assessment and development process. The manual describes how the commander seeks freedom of movement in cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum while losing opponents at the time and place they determine; thus supporting the cyberspace as well as using cyberspace in the other four domains (land and sea) Of various military activities. This manual establishes a common dictionary and framework for network operations and describes the relationship between cyberspace and air, land, sea, and domain, and electromagnetic spectrum. It also explains how the technologies that continue to converge increase the impact on full spectrum operations and capacity development; identifies the network operations and support capabilities needed to support future force modernization initiatives; and suggests the cyberspace and electromagnetic Spectrum related to research questions.

1.4 method

This manual follows the design process approved by the Training and Command Command. Chapter 2 describes the existing conditions and requirements for cyberspace in combat environments. Chapter 3 compares the existing conditions and the desired final state in the operational environment, thus establishing a plan for the formulation of the program. Chapter 4 presents frameworks, core ideas, support ideas and dictionaries. Appendix A contains the required and related references. Appendix B describes the structure of the evolving network operations. Appendix C describes how to incorporate cyber combat as an organic component into the whole process, rather than being free from the entire action, according to the commander’s intentions and objectives. Appendix D (published) and Appendix E (confidential) discuss the required capabilities. Appendix F identifies issues at the executive level throughout the process, organization, training, equipment, leadership and education, personnel, and equipment (DOTMLPF) to support subsequent cost-benefit analysis efforts.

1.5. Key Definitions

A, cyberspace is defined as “a global domain in the information environment, interconnected by information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, communications networks, computer systems and embedded processors and controllers.”

B, the network war is: “the use of cyberspace capabilities, its primary purpose is to achieve goals in cyberspace or through cyberspace, which includes computer network operations, as well as operational and defensive activities of the global information grid” The

C, the electromagnetic spectrum is from zero to infinite electromagnetic radiation frequency range. It is divided into bands numbered by 26 letters.

1.6. Relationship with the concept of union and the concept of the army

A The Manual No. 525-7-8 of the Training and Command Command is consistent with the concept of joint and the concept of the Army, which includes the concept of joint operations and the top concept of the Army. The capabilities described in this manual may be incorporated into the Joint Capability Domain (JCA) and related operational functions. The Department of Defense uses a joint capacity domain to describe how the various capabilities support the joint function. The joint competency domain establishes the foundation of the process based on the capabilities of the Department of Defense, and the network combat capability can be embedded in the combined capabilities of the first level of force use, protection, combat space perception and network center action. Similarly, the network combat capability not only strengthened the Army’s operational functions and combat elements, but also their necessary composition.

B, Training and Order Command Manual 525-3-0. The manual argues that war is the will of the will, and that in order to win, the army must try its best to play a psychological and technical influence as one of the six main ideas that support the top concept of the army. The top-level concept declares that the Army is increasingly dependent on the continuous integration of electromagnetic, computer networks and space-based capabilities, so the technical influence requires troops to prepare for a new “cyber battlefield” to fight and win. Because the technology that affects the movement of information is developing too fast, the Army must continually assess what capabilities it needs to acquire, protect and exploit advantages in high-intensity cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. This handbook supports this top-level concept by determining the capabilities required to successfully perform full-spectrum operations.

C, Training and Command Command No. 525-3-1 Handbook and Training and Command Command No. 525-3-2. These two manuals, in order to support the Army’s operational concept, define the capabilities of operational command, intelligence, fire and protection needed to carry out effective campaigns and tactical maneuvers in future combat environments. Network capabilities and the advantages of cyberspace for the future of the Army in the mobility of command and control to reduce operational risk is critical. The Training and Command Command Manual No. 525-7-8 complements the Army function concept that supports campaign mobility and tactical maneuver.

D, Training and Order Command Manual 525-7-6. With the convergence of wired, wireless and optical technologies, future force commanders will use electronic warfare and cyber warfare capabilities. The use of wired and optical technology is becoming increasingly frequent

美國陸軍網絡作戰概念能力構想:要為信息力而戰
美國陸軍訓練與條令司令部評估未來作戰環境時明確強調了獲取未來戰場全部相關方面信息的重要性。陸軍部隊要在各色人等中行動出沒，面臨著全新的、網絡化的、基於技術的各種威脅。這些威脅會利用新興技術建立並保持一種文化和社會優勢；並充分利用這些新能力進行指揮控制、人員招募、後勤協調、資金籌集及消息傳播。要在這種新的環境中有效行動，陸軍就必須重新調整其信息“著力點”。陸軍領導人和士兵們必須深入地了解如何使用基於信息的能力獲取並保持態勢感知。在未來戰場上，懂得如何為信息力而戰並充分發揮信息力，同時拒止對手的這種能力，對於取勝越來越重要。

評估表明，陸軍的現有詞彙，包括例如計算機網絡作戰(CNO)、電子戰(EW)和信息作戰(IO)等，都將越來越難以滿足需求。為了應對這些挑戰，全譜軍事作戰(FSO)應有三個相互關聯的維度，其中每個維度都有自己的一套因果邏輯，並需要集中製定方案：

第一維是與不能和解的敵人、敵對派別、犯罪團伙和潛在對手的心理意志的對抗。

第二維是戰略結盟，包括在國內維持朋友、在國外獲得盟友以及獲得他們對任務的支持或認同。

第三維是網電對抗，包括獲得、保持和利用一種技術上的優勢。

第一維和第二維強調指揮官和參謀人員應如何精心籌劃和使用信息力來履行使命。第三維則強調在日益融合的網絡空間和電磁頻譜(EMS)媒介中獲得和保持一種優勢。陸軍獲取優勢、保護優勢和置對手於劣勢的概念都包含在這三個維度中；並且有助於達成那些必須通過戰術、戰役和戰略級別的統一行動才能實現的效果。當前的作戰行動更讓我們堅信，每一維都需要有自己相應的概念和能力。

信息作戰（IO）包含所有這三維，但這個詞卻越來越成為一個對任何形式的信息使用都可以指代的泛名詞。計算機網絡作戰和電子戰本身又不足以描述網電對抗的全部範疇。為此，我們正在開展一項充分描述每一維的全面攻關活動。前兩維（意志的對抗和戰略結盟）將在即將單獨制定的概念能力規劃中進行陳述，之後還將進行基於能力的評估。

本手冊與第三維——網電對抗中的電子戰、計算機網絡作戰和網絡空間有關。訓練與條令司令部525-7-8號手冊是對以下問題形成共識的第一步，包括技術上的進步如何改變作戰環境，領導人應該怎樣思考網絡作戰，怎樣整合他們的整體行動以及需要哪些能力。本手冊提供了製定基於效果、強調集成並且充滿智慧的解決方案的方法，這些方案將使美國陸軍在網電對抗中獲勝。 —邁克爾-文恩陸軍中將 陸軍能力集成中心主任

執行概要

描述問題

作戰環境已經顯著變化。計算機與通信網絡技術的會聚和迅猛發展、信息與通信技術（ICT）的全球擴散及其對社會和社會網絡的影響衝擊著作戰環境。利用這一信息革命的形形色色的行動者（agents）對美國的關鍵基礎設施和作戰任務構成了巨大威脅。這些行動者既有傳統的民族國家，也有非戰鬥人員、跨國公司、犯罪組織、恐怖分子、黑客聯盟、惡作劇的黑客以及誤操作的個人。他們共同創造了一個持續動盪、永無平息的環境。在本文件中，除非另行說明，均採用“對手”一詞描述他們。

制定解決方案

訓練與條令司令部（TRADOC）525-7-8號手冊，“美國陸軍網絡戰（Cyber​​Ops）概念能力規劃2016-2028”，全面審視了2016到2028年陸軍未來部隊如何充分利用網絡空間實施有效的網絡作戰。該手冊包括1個把網絡作戰納入全譜作戰（FSO）的概念框架，從而為後續的條令開發工作奠定基礎。這個概念框架勾勒了指揮官如何整合網絡作戰從而獲取優勢、保護優勢並置對手於劣勢。該手冊還為陸軍網絡作戰建立了一個通用詞典，描述了網絡空間與其它四個域（陸海空天）以及與電磁頻譜之間的關係。最後，它解釋了不斷會聚的技術將如何影響全譜作戰和能力發展，從而為陸軍設計、開發、採辦和部署充分集成的網絡能力提供有力的支撐。

方案背景：全譜作戰的三個維度

a、美國陸軍訓練與條令司令部司令（CG）指示聯合兵種中心（CAC）領導一個工作組，為網絡（cyber）、電子戰和信息作戰的使命域的組織以及訓練與條令司令部有關部隊的結構現代化的建議確定一個概念框架。 2009年10月16日，訓練與條令司令部司令（CG）向陸軍副參謀長提交了一系列建議。在他的建議中包含了以下幾條：

（1）聯合兵種中心認為，現有的詞彙（網絡-電子戰-信息作戰）在目前還夠用，但將越來越不足以描述陸軍在未來作戰環境中所面臨的挑戰。

（2）聯合兵種中心得出結論，應從三個維度進行考慮，這三個維度貫穿於全譜作戰中，並且每一維都需要解決兵力設計和條令制定問題。

（3）因此，雖然陸軍現在可以把與網絡和頻譜軍事行動相關的功能描述為網絡-電子戰-信息作戰，但聯合兵種中心堅信，未來陸軍應該用以下方式來描述它們：

第一維——第一維是與不能和解的敵人、敵對派別、犯罪團伙和潛在對手之間心理意志的對抗。

第二維——第二維是戰略結盟，包括在本土保持與盟友的友好關係、在海外形成同盟、支持或關注軍事行動區域實施的任務使命。

第三維——第三維是網電-電磁對抗。有線、無線以及光學技術的不斷發展為計算機和通信網絡的會聚和交聯提供了條件。

b、訓練與條令司令部525-7-8號手冊主要是關於如何在這個第三維，即網絡對抗中獲勝，並提出一個觀念——即網絡作戰能促進另兩維中任務的完成。

核心觀點

a.在網絡對抗中獲勝意味著同時在三個方面取得進步：獲取優勢、保護優勢以及置對手於劣勢。

b.指揮官尋求在網絡空間和電磁頻譜中的行動自由，同時在他們確定的時間和地點使對手失去自由；從而支撐在網絡空間以及借助網絡空間其它四個域（陸海空天）的各種軍事活動。網絡空間軍事行動包含在網絡對抗中為獲取優勢、保護優勢以及置對手於劣勢而採取行動。網絡作戰本身並不是最終目的，更多的是作為全譜作戰的一個重要組成，贏得網絡對抗是在和平時期軍事對抗中受到關注的普遍活動。網絡作戰不斷進行，對抗行動每天發生，大多數情況下不需要其他力量的參與。

解決方案框架

現有的條令術語沒有完全解決根據國防部網絡空間和網絡作戰的定義明確相關任務的範圍。因此，該手冊所製定的框架確定了網絡作戰包括四個主要組成部分：網絡戰爭（Cyber​​War）、網絡（空間）網絡作戰（CyNetOps）、網絡支援（Cyber​​Spt）和網絡態勢感知（Cyber​​SA）。

第一章引言

1.1.相關背景

a.作戰環境（OE）已經顯著地改變了。在網絡空間以及通過網絡空間進行的敵對活動已達到空前水平，威脅到了美國的關鍵基礎設施、金融系統和國家力量的基本要素。這些威脅來源廣泛，從不知情的黑客到主權國家，能力水平參差不齊。他們共同創造了一個持續動盪、永無平息的環境。在本文件中，除非另行說明，均採用“對手”一詞描述他們。

b.技術的突飛猛進及其廣泛擴散使得在全譜作戰中獲取勝利日益困難。有線、無線和光學技術的結合導致了計算機和電信網的融合；手持計算設備在數量和性能上不斷增長。新一代系統不斷湧現，構成了一個全球性、混雜的自適應網絡，它綜合了有線、無線、光學、衛星通信、監控和數據獲取（SCADA）及其它系統。不久的將來，網絡將為用戶提供無處不在的接入，使他們能近實時地按需協作。

c.隨著技術飛速發展，國家對手的能力也隨之提高，這使作戰環境更加複雜。誰能在競爭激烈、擁擠的網絡空間和電磁頻譜中獲取、保護和利用優勢，誰就將掌握決對主動。反之，如果一方在對抗中失敗，或由於系統遭到干擾或破壞而不能有效行動，則會把巨大的優勢拱手讓給對手。

d.獲取、保護和發揮優勢並非易事。美國的對手把商業市場作為他們發展戰鬥力的平台，使他們比陸軍冗長的研究、開發、試驗與鑑定以及採辦過程更加敏捷，適應性更強。對手越來越善於利用網絡空間和電磁頻譜能力及活動，而這些能力和活動到目前為止往往還處於我們陸軍常規行動的視線之外。為了獲取並保持針對這些靈活對手的戰役和戰術優勢，陸軍必須使網絡空間和電磁頻譜成為其作戰的核心和常規組成部分；而指揮官也需要相關的能力以及相應的專家來應用它們。

1.2.目的

訓練與條令司令部的525-7-8號手冊的目的是研究2016-2028年間陸軍未來部隊如何將各種網絡空間能力和網絡作戰整合納入全譜作戰。

1.3.範圍

訓練與條令司令部的525-7-8號手冊得出了指揮官如何把網絡作戰與其它能力相整合以在全譜作戰中獲取優勢、保護優勢並置對手於劣勢的初步研究成果。該研究結果還將通過基於能力的評估和條令開發過程進一步提煉。該手冊描述了指揮官如何尋求在網絡空間和電磁頻譜中的行動自由，同時在他們確定的時間和地點使對手失去自由；從而支撐在網絡空間以及借助網絡空間在其它四個域（陸海空天）的各種軍事活動。這份手冊為網絡作戰建立了一個通用的詞典和框架並描述了網絡空間與空、陸、海、天各域以及電磁頻譜之間的關係。它還解釋了不斷會聚的各項技術如何加大對全譜作戰和能力發展的影響；確定了支持未來部隊現代化倡議所需的網絡作戰和支撐能力；並提出了適合開展試驗的網絡空間和電磁頻譜的有關研究問題。

1.4 方法

這份手冊遵循訓練與條令司令部批准的設計過程。第二章描述了作戰環境中屬於網絡空間範疇的現有條件和所需條件。第三章比較了作戰環境中的現有條件和所需最終狀態，從而為製定方案建立了想定。第四章提出了框架、核心思想、支撐觀點和詞典。附錄A包含了所需的以及相關的參考文獻。附錄B介紹了演化中的網絡作戰的結構。附錄C描述根據指揮官的意圖和目標，如何將網絡作戰作為有機組成納入到整個行動中，而不是游離在整個行動之外。附錄D（公開的）和附錄E（保密的）討論了需要的能力。附錄F指出了貫穿於條令、組織、訓練、器材、領導和教育、人員以及設備（DOTMLPF）全過程中的執行層面的問題，從而為後繼的成本效益分析工作起步提供支持。

1.5.關鍵的定義

a、網絡空間被定義為“信息環境中的一個全球域，由信息技術基礎設施互相依賴結網而成，包括了因特網、通信網絡、計算機系統和嵌入式處理器和控制器。”

b、網絡戰是：“對網絡空間能力的運用，其首要目的是在網絡空間中或借助網絡空間達成目標。這類行動包括計算機網絡作戰，以及操作和防禦全球信息柵格的各種活動” 。

c、電磁頻譜是從零到無限大的電磁輻射頻率範圍。它被劃分為以26個字母進行表示的頻段。

1.6.與聯合概念和陸軍概念的關係

a、訓練與條令司令部的525-7-8號手冊與聯合概念和陸軍概念是一致的，這些概念包括聯合作戰頂層概念和陸軍頂層概念。本手冊所描述的能力可納入聯合能力域（JCA）和相關作戰功能。國防部用聯合能力域來描述各種能力如何支持聯合功能。聯合能力域奠定了基於國防部能力的過程的根基，而網絡作戰能力可內嵌於兵力運用、防護、作戰空間感知和網絡中心行動這些第一層次的聯合能力域之中。同樣，網絡作戰能力不僅強化了陸軍各項作戰功能和戰鬥力各要素，同時也是它們的必要組成。

b、訓練與條令司令部525-3-0號手冊。該手冊認為，戰爭是意志的較量，為了獲勝，陸軍必須盡量發揮心理上和技術上的影響力，並將其作為支撐陸軍頂層概念的六個主要思想之一。頂層概念宣稱陸軍越來越依賴不斷集成的電磁、計算機網絡和天基能力，因此發揮技術影響力要求部隊準備在新出現的“網絡戰場”中作戰並打贏。因為影響信息運動方式的技術發展太快，陸軍必須不斷地評估需要哪些能力在高強度的網絡空間和電磁頻譜中獲取、保護和利用優勢。這份手冊通過確定成功遂行全譜作戰所需的能力來支持這一頂層概念。

c、訓練與條令司令部525-3-1號手冊和訓練與條令司令部525-3-2號手冊。這兩本手冊為了支撐陸軍的作戰概念，確定了在未來作戰環境中實行有效戰役和戰術機動所需的作戰指揮、情報、火力和防護方面的各種能力。網絡能力和發揮網絡空間優勢對於陸軍未來部隊在機動中實現指揮控制和降低作戰​​風險非常關鍵。訓練與條令司令部525-7-8號手冊補充了支持戰役機動和戰術機動的陸軍功能概念。

d、訓練與條令司令部525-7-6號手冊。隨著有線、無線和光學技術的會聚，未來部隊指揮官將綜合運用電子戰和網絡作戰能力。對有線和光學技術的使用日益頻繁

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Strategic Support Forces

Full Text of China Military Reform Commission //中華人民共和國軍委發布軍事改革意見全文

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Full Text of China Military Reform Commission

中華人民共和國軍委發布軍事改革意見全文

http://news.sina.com   2016年01月01日

戰略火箭軍

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, January 1 – Approved by the CMC Chairman Xi Jinping, the Central Military Commission recently issued “on deepening the reform of national defense and military advice.”

“Opinions” stressed eighteen since the party’s Central Military Commission and President Xi on the realization of strong military objectives, overall army more revolutionary, modernized and standardized, co-ordinate military construction and operation, co-ordination of economic development and national defense construction develop military strategic policy under the new situation, and proposed a series of major policies and principles, make a series of major decisions and plans. Implement the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission and President Xi major strategic planning and strategic design, we must deepen defense and military reform, full implementation of the reform and strengthening the military strategy, unswervingly take the road of Chinese characteristics, a strong army.

“Opinions” that deepen defense and military reform guiding ideology, thoroughly implement the party’s 18 and eighteenth session of the Third, Fourth, Fifth Plenum, Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, “Three represents “important thought, the scientific concept of development as guidance, thoroughly implement the important speech of President Xi series is especially important to discuss defense and army building, according to the” four comprehensive “strategic layout requirements in order to target the party strong army under the new situation is lead and implement the military strategic principle in the new situation, the full implementation of the reform strategy of strengthening the military, efforts to address the constraints of national defense and military development of the institutional barriers and structural problems, policy issues, and promote the modernization of the military organizational form, further emancipate and develop combat effectiveness, further liberation army and enhance the vitality of the construction with China’s international status commensurate with the interests of national security and development to adapt to the consolidation of national defense and powerful armed forces, to achieve “two hundred years” goal to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese dream to provide a strong assurance.

“Opinions” stressed, deepen reform of national defense and the armed forces should adhere to the following basic principles: adhere to the correct political orientation, focusing adhere to fight, persist in innovation-driven, adhere to the system design, adhere to the rule of law thinking, actively and steadily adhere to.

“Opinions” that deepen defense and military reform overall objective is to firmly grasp the principle of “total JMC tube, main battle theater, built in the main military services” to the leadership of the management system, joint operational command system reform, focusing on promoting the coordination of the scale structure , policy and institutional reform and the development of military and civilian integration depth. 2020, a breakthrough in the leadership and management system, joint operational command system, optimizing the size of the structure, improve the policy system to promote achieved important results on the integration of military and civilian aspects of the depth development of reform, efforts to build able to win the information war effectively fulfill its mission mandate Chinese characteristics of modern military system, and further improve the military system of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

“Opinions” to define the leadership and management system, joint operational command system, the size of the military structure, forces, and military personnel training, policies and systems, military and civilian integration, Wuzhuangjingcha Forces Command management system and force structure, military legal system and other aspects of major task.

“Opinions” stressed deepen defense and military reform is a holistic, revolutionary change, must always be under the unified leadership of the Central Military Commission and Chairman of the study, thoroughly implement the spirit of the Central Military Commission Reform Work Conference, adhere to strengthen education, unity Thought throughout, to strengthen the responsibility to implement the fine drop throughout to promote the law, moving steadily through to the end, the bottom line thinking, risk management and control throughout, with strong organizational leadership to ensure that the reform task is satisfactorily completed.

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CMC views on deepening the reform of national defense and army (full text)

To implement the Party Central Committee and President Xi’s strategic decisions and directions, push forward to deepen defense and military reform, made the following comments.

First, the significance of the reform of the guiding ideology and basic principles

(A) significant. Deepen defense and military reform, China is to realize a dream, the dream of a strong army requirements of the times, is the only way the army Hing strong army, the army also decided to move a key to the future. Eighteen years, the CPC Central Committee, the Central Military Commission and Chairman of the party’s study on the realization of a strong army targets, co-ordinate the army more revolutionary, modernized and standardized, co-ordinate military construction and operation, co-ordination of economic development and national defense construction, the development of the new situation military strategy proposes a series of major policies and principles, make a series of major decisions and plans. Implement the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission and President Xi major strategic planning and strategic design, we must deepen defense and military reform, full implementation of the reform and strengthening the military strategy, unswervingly take the road of Chinese characteristics, a strong army. This is to deal with in today’s world of unprecedented large change in the situation will inevitably require the effective maintenance of national security; adhere to and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics, promote the coordination necessary requirement “four comprehensive” strategic layout; the goal is to implement a strong army and military strategic policy , fulfill military missions and tasks necessary requirement. The army to fully understand the importance of deepening the reform of national defense and military necessity urgency, a high degree of historical awareness and a strong mission to play unswervingly deepen defense and military reform, efforts to hand over the party and the people a satisfactory answer.

(B) the guiding ideology. Thoroughly implement the party’s 18 and eighteenth session of the Third, Fourth, Fifth Plenum, Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of “Three Represents”, the scientific concept of development as guidance, thoroughly implement the learning Chairman of the series especially important speech of defense and army building important expositions, in accordance with the “four comprehensive” strategic layout requirements in order to target the party strong army under the new situation for the lead, must implement the military strategic principle in the new situation, the full implementation of a strong army reform strategy, efforts to address the constraints of national defense and military development of institutional barriers and structural problems, policy issues, and promote the modernization of the military organizational form, further emancipate and develop combat effectiveness, further emancipate and enhance the vitality of the armed forces, building commensurate with China’s international status, with national security and development interests compatible consolidate national defense and powerful armed forces, to achieve “two hundred years” goal to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese dream to provide a strong guarantee power.

(C) the fundamental principles

– Adhere to the correct political orientation. Consolidate and improve the party’s absolute leadership over the army’s fundamental principle and system, keeping the nature and purpose of the people’s army, and carry forward the glorious tradition and fine style of our military, the full implementation of the CMC chairman has overall responsibility to ensure that the military command of the supreme leadership of the Party Central Committee to focus on, CMC.

– To insist on focusing war. To adapt the form of war and the world development trend of the evolution of the military, fighting the only firmly established the fundamental standards, and effectively solve the preparations for military struggle to overcome difficult problems and combat heavy construction weaknesses, build integrated joint operations system, to enhance the army can fight, the ability to win the war.

– Adhere to innovation-driven. Implement through science and technology strategy, give full play to innovation in military theory, military technological innovation, military organizational innovation, management innovation traction and military role in promoting efforts to achieve military modernization construction by leaps and bounds, to seek greater military competitive advantage.

– Adhere to the system design. Grasping the reform initiatives of relevance, coupling, correctly handle the top-level design and stratification docking, long-term layout and transitional arrangements, supporting policy reform and relations, so that the reform and promote each other, complement each other to form the overall effect, best effect.

– Uphold the rule of law thinking. Give full play the leading role of the rule of law and norms of the reform, so that major reforms in the legal basis, reform and harmonize legislation, focusing on the use of curing the results of reform laws and regulations, to promote the rule of law reform on track.

– Actively and steadily adhere. Both our minds, trying to make this reform a breakthrough in the reform, and based on reality, steady hoof walked quickly grasp the rhythm of reform, the reform of control risk, take progressive, open the path of reform, to ensure high degree of stability and centralized.

Second, the overall objectives of the reform and main tasks

(1) the overall goal. Firmly grasp the principle of “total JMC tube, main battle theater, built in the main military services” to the leadership of the management system, joint operational command system reform, focusing on promoting the coordination of the scale structure, policies and systems and the development of military and civilian integration depth reform. 2020, a breakthrough in the leadership and management system, joint operational command system, optimizing the size of the structure, improve the policy system to promote achieved important results on the integration of military and civilian aspects of the depth development of reform, efforts to build able to win the information war effectively fulfill its mission mandate Chinese characteristics of modern military system, and further improve the military system of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Accordance with the overall objectives and requirements, in 2015, focused on the implementation of organizational leadership and management system, joint operational command system reform; in 2016, organizing the implementation of the military structure and the size of a combat force structure, institutions, armed forces reform, basically completed the task of reforming stage; 2017 2020, for further adjustments related areas of reform, optimize and improve, continue to promote the reform in various fields. Policy regimes and civilian integration depth development and reform, promoting a mature one.

(2) leadership and administration system. Focus on strengthening the Central Military Commission centralized and unified leadership, strengthen strategic planning JMC authorities, strategic command, strategic management functions, optimizing the CMC Organs configuration and institutional settings, improve military services and new combat forces leadership and management system, the formation of decision-making, enforcement and oversight powers both check each other and coordinate the operation of the system.

Starting from the positioning functions, according to prominent core functions, integrate similar functions and strengthen oversight functions, fulfilling the coordination function of thinking, adjustment and reform of the Central Military Commission of Organization, headquarters for the system to adjust the multi-sectoral system. JMC delegated authority to act in the military services building functions, stripped specific management functions, merge similar adjustment similar functions, reducing the level of leadership, streamlining staffing and units directly under the command make, construction, management and supervision of four link more clear, decision-making, planning, implementation , the evaluation function configuration is more reasonable.

Sound armed services leadership and management system, optimize the configuration and functions of the organs of the military services institutional settings play an important role in the construction and management of the armed services and Security. Logistical support adjustment and reform leading management system, based on the existing joint logistics system, adjust and optimize the configuration and security forces leadership and command relationships and build joint operational command system to adapt, sub-system integration, through logistical support system designed two lines. Reform equipment development leadership and management system, build centralized system managed by the Central Military equipment department, armed services concrete construction and management, theater joint use of the institutional framework, the development of equipment construction to the Central Military equipment sector – the military services and equipment sector institutions, equipment management to ensure the implementation of the Central Military equipment sector – the military services and equipment sector – force security sector institutions. Strengthen the unified leadership of the national defense mobilization system.

(3) the joint operational command system. Adaptation Integrated Joint Operational Command requirements, establish and improve the Central Military Commission, the theater two joint operational command system, build peacetime one, normal operation, specially the main, capable and efficient, strategic and operational command system. Readjust the designation of the theater.

According to joint operations, joint command of the requirements, adjust the specification refers to linking the Central Military Commission, the military services, operational command functions of the Union refers to the theater and theater military services. And joint operational command system to adapt, and improve joint training system.

(4) the size of the military structure. Adhere to the road of fewer but better troops with Chinese characteristics and speeding up the army from quantity to quality and efficiency changes. Active duty military posts cut 300,000 troops gradually reduced the size of the 2.3 million 2 million. Optimize the proportion of military services, reduce non-combat institutions and personnel. Yajian officer positions.Optimization of weaponry scale structure, reduce equipment types of models, elimination of old equipment, the development of new equipment.

(5) Force compiled. Depending on the strategic direction of the security requirements and operational tasks, adjusting the structure, enhanced functions, optimize the layout, promote the composition of forces to the full, synthesis, and more energy, flexible direction. Optimize the structure of reserve forces, militia Yajian quantity, adjust the layout and strength marshalling mode.

(6) New Military Talents. Training of military personnel to follow the law, to build military educational institutions, military training practice, military personnel training system trinity of professional military education. Sound Central Military Commission, the leadership of the armed services two institutions management system, improve the early, middle and high three training system, adjust and optimize the structure of the scale institutions. Sound professional military education system, building full gamut of full-time professional military education platform. Creative Talents institutional mechanisms to strengthen the institutions and armed forces personnel were sterile.

(7) policy regimes. Military mission requirements and adapt the functions of national policy institutional innovation, further improve the military human resource policies and systems and logistics policies and systems, building reflects the characteristics of military occupation, and enhance the military sense of honor pride policy institutional system. Adjustment of military personnel classification, and gradually establish the rank-dominated hierarchy, to promote the professional military officers, military service system reform, non-commissioned officers system, civilian system. Veterans resettlement policies and improve the management mechanism.Deepening the management of funds, material procurement reform, construction and military wages, housing, health care, insurance and other systems. Full cessation of the armed forces to carry out foreign paid services.

(8) development of military and civilian integration. Full focus on the formation of elements, multi-field, high-effective civil-military integration depth development pattern, building a unified leadership, military coordination, smooth and efficient organization and management system, state-led, demand traction, market unity of the work of running the system, the system is complete, Joining a complete, effective incentive policies institutional system. Categories related fields to promote the reform and improve the regulatory system and the development of military and civilian integration of innovation and development mechanisms.

(9) Wuzhuangjingcha Forces Command management system and force structure. Strengthening the Central Military Commission of the centralized and unified leadership of the armed forces, the armed forces command to adjust the management system, optimize the structure and troop strength compiled.

(10) the system of military rule. Fully implement the Law forces strictly policy, improved army, to achieve fundamental to the administration by law fundamental shift from the way of simply relying on experience working habits and working practices from relying solely on executive order to rely on rules and regulations of the transition from assault-style, campaign-style grab a fundamental change to the way work according to rules and regulations act. Improve the legal system for the military and military Falvguwen system, reform the military justice system and mechanism innovation discipline inspection and supervision system and inspection system, improve the audit system mechanisms to improve the military legal talent management system, establish the rule of law and procedural rules improve the organization, improve national defense and army the level of the rule of law.

Third, the reform of organizational leadership

Deepen defense and military reform is a holistic, revolutionary change, big efforts to promote the wide, deep touch interests, of unprecedented scope, must always be under the unified leadership of the Central Military Commission and Chairman of the study, thoroughly implement the Central Military Commission the spirit of reform work conference, adhere to strengthen education and unity of thought throughout to strengthen the responsibility falls fine implementation throughout to promote the law, moving steadily through to the end, the bottom line thinking, risk control throughout, with strong organizational leadership to ensure that all reforms task is satisfactorily completed.

(A) strengthen the responsibility at all levels of play. Party committees at all levels should focus on reform initiatives landing capability as an important political responsibility, improve the leadership of reform, give full play to the core leadership role, mainly to be a good leader first responsibility. Investigation should run through the whole process of reform, deepen the major theoretical and practical issues research, to discover and solve new problems. To establish and improve the supervision and assessment mechanism reform, strengthen supervision and inspection of the implementation of the reform. Each institutional reform departments at all levels must closely cooperate to create synergy, the Central Military Commission to guide the working group set up to further adjust the unit to strengthen tracking guidance, specific guidance, full guidance, the Central Military Commission inspection teams launched simultaneously inspections. Reform of the Central Military Commission and the Office to improve the preparation of the relevant mechanisms play a good co-ordination, supervision, role. Four general headquarters is necessary to do their own adjustment and reform, reform of the army but also a good guide. The new Central Military Commission after the establishment of organs and departments should pay close attention to improve the operational mechanism, into the role as soon as possible, to perform their duties. Newly formed units to adjust and improve the timely establishment of Party organizations, to strengthen the organization and leadership of the reform implementation. Each institution should take responsibility for the aftermath, and properly handle all kinds of problems left.

(B) to strengthen ideological and political work. Organization officers and soldiers in-depth study President Xi series of important expositions on deepening defense and military reform, special education organizations do a good job, deepening ideological mobilization, the army unity of thought and action to the Central Military Commission and President Xi decision-making arrangements . Senior leading organs and Gaojiganbu first common understanding, lead politics, the overall situation, discipline, promoting reform, diligence, under the above rate, the army looks good.The ideological and political work throughout the entire process of reform, the ideological trend of concern at all levels, targeted to do the work, and guide all levels to strengthen political awareness, overall awareness, sense of command and guide the officers and men turn their concepts, new ideas, and consciously from the overall high level of awareness reform unified in emancipating the mind and thought, the correct treatment adjustment of interests, and actively support, support and participate in the reform. Attaches great importance to public opinion to guide online public opinion in particular, to work, take the initiative battle, spread positive energy, to promote the reform to create a good atmosphere for public opinion.

(C) improve solid adjustment of cadres placement. The reform process as a process of strengthening the construction of the contingent of cadres, cadres carry out military standards, establish the correct employment-oriented, adhere to all over the world, merit, ability and political integrity adhere to Germany first, do a good job with leadership adjustment, selecting the right with a good cadres to firmly implement strong military goals, and actively reform plan, strongly supported the reform, the courage to join in the reform of the cadres to use. The proper placement of the backbone with retention, improve the structure together, the scientific development of cadres and resettlement plan for the adjustment, reasonably determine the fate of the advance and retreat of cadres, cadres of concern and resolve practical difficulties. Cadres should promote the reform as a showcase for the best stage talent, tempered and tested in the reform, to become promoters of reform and doers. Veteran is a valuable asset of the party and the army, security services need to carefully prepare cadres continue to work.

(D) the transfer of well-organized transfer scribe. Do a good job of personnel, materials, and funds transfer work to ensure that the old system is not out of control during the transition staff, assets are not lost, all work seamlessly. Strict military land, barracks management and ensure the transfer of the camp barracks facilities to adjust and do remedial work in construction. Comprehensive verification, financial and material base. Follow organizational security of supply in a timely manner to resolve various contradictions and problems encountered in the supply, to ensure continuous supply, not for the leak. A solid job in the transfer of weapons and equipment inventory, well-organized deployment of security equipment, equipment management and strictly implement the provisions.

(E) the strict implementation of disciplinary regulations. The more critical time of reform, the more discipline and rules put in front of the very strict political discipline, organizational discipline, and personnel discipline, financial discipline, discipline, and discipline of secrecy. Strictly political discipline and political rules, resolutely oppose Ziyouzhuyi action on organizational politics. Serious organizational and personnel discipline, adhere to the principle of press policy outlaw follow procedures. Properly handle the reality of military conflicts and problems left by history. Discipline, inspection and auditing departments should strengthen supervision and discipline, and severely punish all kinds of violation of discipline problems during the adjustment and reform.

(F) do a good job overall troop readiness training management. Pay close attention to national security and social stability during the reform period, the development of a major emergency situations response plans to improve and strictly implement the provisions of Gongzuozhidu combat readiness, combat readiness duty to maintain efficient operation of the system at all levels, to ensure that if something happens to timely and effective response. Careful planning organization’s annual military training mission. Strengthen military management, the implementation of security responsibility, to discover and solve trends and tendencies problem, prevent the occurrence of major accidents and cases, maintaining stability and security forces centralized.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

戰略火箭軍

新華社北京1月1日電　經中央軍委主席習近平批准，中央軍委近日印發了《關於深化國防和軍隊改革的意見》。

《意見》強調，黨的十八大以來，黨中央、中央軍委和習主席圍繞實現強軍目標，統籌軍隊革命化、現代化、正規化建設，統籌軍事力量建設和運用，統籌經濟建設和國防建設，制定新形勢下軍事戰略方針，提出一系列重大方針原則，作出一系列重大決策部署。貫​​徹落實黨中央、中央軍委和習主席的重大戰略謀劃和戰略設計， 必須深化國防和軍隊改革，全面實施改革強軍戰略，堅定不移走中國特色強軍之路。

《意見》指出，深化國防和軍隊改革的指導思想是，深入貫徹黨的十八大和十八屆三中、四中、五中全會精神，以馬克思列寧主義、毛澤東思想、鄧小平理論、“三個代表”重要思想、科學發展觀為指導，深入貫徹習主席系列重要講話精神特別是國防和軍隊建設重要論述，按照“四個全面”戰略佈局要求，以黨在新形勢下的強軍目標為引領，貫徹新形勢下軍事戰略方針，全面實施改革強軍戰略，著力解決制約國防和軍隊發展的體制性障礙、結構性矛盾、政策性問題，推進軍隊組織形態現代化，進一步解放和發展戰鬥力，進一步解放和增強軍隊活力，建設同我國國際地位相稱、同國家安全和發展利益相適應的鞏固國防和強大軍隊，為實現“兩個一百年”奮鬥目標、實現中華民族偉大復興的中國夢提供堅強力量保證。

《意見》強調，深化國防和軍隊改革要堅持以下基本原則：堅持正確政治方向，堅持向打仗聚焦，堅持創新驅動，堅持體系設計，堅持法治思維，堅持積極穩妥。

《意見》指出，深化國防和軍隊改革總體目標是，牢牢把握“軍委管總、戰區主戰、軍種主建”的原則，以領導管理體制、聯合作戰指揮體制改革為重點，協調推進規模結構、政策制度和軍民融合深度發展改革。 2020年前，在領導管理體制、聯合作戰指揮體制改革上取得突破性進展，在優化規模結構、完善政策制度、推動軍民融合深度發展等方面改革上取得重要成果，努力構建能夠打贏信息化戰爭、有效履行使命任務的中國特色現代軍事力量體系，進一步完善中國特色社會主義軍事制度。

《意見》明確了領導管理體制、聯合作戰指揮體制、軍隊規模結構、部隊編成、新型軍事人才培養、政策制度、軍民融合發展、武裝警察部隊指揮管理體制和力量結構、軍事法治體係等方面的主要任務。

《意見》強調，深化國防和軍隊改革是一場整體性、革命性變革，必須始終在黨中央、中央軍委和習主席的統一領導下，深入貫徹中央軍委改革工作會議精神，堅持把加強教育、統一思想貫穿始終，把強化責任、落細落實貫穿始終，把依法推進、穩扎穩打貫穿始終，把底線思維、管控風險貫穿始終，以堅強有力的組織領導保證各項改革任務圓滿完成。

中央軍委關於深化國防和軍隊改革的意見（全文）

為貫徹落實黨中央、習主席的戰略部署和決策指示，紮實推進深化國防和軍隊改革，提出如下意見。

一、改革的重大意義、指導思想和基本原則

（一）重大意義。深化國防和軍隊改革，是實現中國夢、強軍夢的時代要求，是強軍興軍的必由之路，也是決定軍隊未來的關鍵一招。黨的十八大以來，黨中央、中央軍委和習主席圍繞實現強軍目標，統籌軍隊革命化、現代化、正規化建設，統籌軍事力量建設和運用，統籌經濟建設和國防建設，制定新形勢下軍事戰略方針，提出一系列重大方針原則，作出一系列重大決策部署。貫​​徹落實黨中央、中央軍委和習主席的重大戰略謀劃和戰略設計，必須深化國防和軍隊改革，全面實施改革強軍 戰略，堅定不移走中國特色強軍之路。這是應對當今世界前所未有之大變局，有效維護國家安全的必然要求；是堅持和發展中國特色社會主義，協調推進“四個全面”戰略佈局的必然要求；是貫徹落實強軍目標和軍事戰略方針，履行好軍隊使命任務的必然要求。全軍要充分認清深化國防和軍隊改革的重要性必要性緊迫性，以 高度的歷史自覺和強烈的使命擔當堅定不移深化國防和軍隊改革，努力交出黨和人民滿意的答卷。

（二）指導思想。深入貫徹黨的十八大和十八屆三中、四中、五中全會精神，以馬克思列寧主義、毛澤東思想、鄧小平理論、“三個代表”重要思想、科學發展觀為指導，深入貫徹習主席系列重要講話精神特別是國防和軍隊建設重要論述，按照“四個全面”戰略佈局要求，以黨在新形勢下的強軍目標為引領，貫徹新形勢下軍事戰略方針，全面實施改革強軍戰略，著力解決制約國防和軍隊發展的體制性障礙、結構性矛盾、政策性問題，推進軍隊組織形態現代化，進一步解放和發展戰鬥力， 進一步解放和增強軍隊活力，建設同我國國際地位相稱、同國家安全和發展利益相適應的鞏固國防和強大軍隊，為實現“兩個一百年”奮鬥目標、實現中華民族偉大復興的中國夢提供堅強力量保證。

（三）基本原則

——堅持正確政治方向。鞏固完善黨對軍隊絶對領導的根本原則和製度，保持人民軍隊的性質和宗旨，發揚我軍的光榮傳統和優良作風，全面落實軍委主席負責制，確保軍隊最高領導權指揮權​​集中於黨中央、中央軍委。

——堅持向打仗聚焦。適應戰爭形態演變和世界軍事發展趨勢，牢固確立戰鬥力這個唯一的根本的標準，切實解決和克服軍事鬥爭準備重難點問題和戰鬥力建設薄弱環節，構建一體化聯合作戰體系，全面提升我軍能打仗、打勝仗能力。

——堅持創新驅動。貫​​徹科技強軍戰略，充分發揮軍事理論創新、軍事技術創新、軍事組織創新、軍事管理創新的牽引和推動作用，努力實現我軍現代化建設跨越式發展，謀取更大軍事競爭優勢。

——堅持體系設計。科學把握改革舉措的關聯性、耦合性，正確處理頂層設計與分層對接、長期佈局與過渡安排、體制改革與政策配套的關係，使各項改革相互促進、相得益彰，形成總體效應、取得最佳效果。

——堅持法治思維。充分發揮法治對改革的引領和規範作用，做到重大改革於法有據、改革與立法相協調，注重運用法規制度固化改革成果，在法治軌道上推進改革。

——堅持積極穩妥。既解放思想、與時俱進，努力使這次改革成為突破性的改革，又立足現實、蹄疾步穩，把握改革節奏，控制改革風險，走漸進式、開放式的改革路子，確保部隊高度穩定和集中統一。

二、改革的總體目標和主要任務

（一）總體目標。牢牢把握“軍委管總、戰區主戰、軍種主建”的原則，以領導管理體制、聯合作戰指揮體制改革為重點，協調推進規模結構、政策制度和軍民融合 深度發展改革。 2020年前，在領導管理體制、聯合作戰指揮體制改革上取得突破性進展，在優化規模結構、完善政策制度、推動軍民融合深度發展等方面改革上取得重要成果，努力構建能夠打贏信息化戰爭、有效履行使命任務的中國特色現代軍事力量體系，進一步完善中國特色社會主義軍事制度。

按照總體目標要求，2015年，重點組織實施領導管理體制、聯合作戰指揮體制改革；2016年，組織實施軍隊規模結構和作戰力量體系、院校、武警部隊改革，基本完成階段性改革任務；2017年至2020年，對相關領域改革作進一步調整、優化和完善，持續推進各領域改革。政策制度和軍民融合深度發展改革， 成熟一項推進一項。

（二）領導管理體制。著眼加強軍委集中統一領導，強化軍委機關的戰略謀劃、戰略指揮、戰略管理職能，優化軍委機關職能配置和機構設置，完善軍種和新型作戰力量領導管理體制，形成決策權、執行權、監督權既相互制約又相互協調的運行體系。

從職能定位入手，按照突出核心職能、整合相近職能、加強監督職能、充實協調職能的思路，調整改革軍委機關設置，由總部製調整為多部門制。軍委機關下放代行的軍種建設職能，剝離具體管理職能，調整歸併同類相近職能，減少領導層級，精簡編製員額和直屬單位，使指揮、建設、管理、監督四條鏈路更加清晰，決策、規劃、執行、評估職能配置更加合理。

健全軍種領導管理體制，優化軍種機關職能配置和機構設置，發揮軍種在建設管理和保障中的重要作用。調整改革後勤保障領導管理體制，以現行聯勤保障體製為基 礎，調整優化保障力量配置和領導指揮關係，構建與聯合作戰指揮體制相適應，統分結合、通專兩綫的後勤保障體制。改革裝備發展領導管理體制，構建由軍委裝備部門集中統管、軍種具體建管、戰區聯合運用的體制架構，裝備發展建設實行軍委裝備部門—軍種裝備部門體制，裝備管理保障實行軍委裝備部門—軍種裝備部門— 部隊保障部門體制。加強國防動員系統的統一領導。

（三）聯合作戰指揮體制。適應一體化聯合作戰指揮要求，建立健全軍委、戰區兩級聯合作戰指揮體制，構建平戰一體、常態運行、專司主營、精幹高效的戰略戰役指揮體系。重新調整劃設戰區。

按照聯合作戰、聯合指揮的要求，調整規範軍委聯指、各軍種、戰區聯指和戰區軍種的作戰指揮職能。與聯合作戰指揮體制相適應，完善聯合訓練體制。

（四）軍隊規模結構。堅持走中國特色精兵之路，加快推進軍隊由數量規模型向質量效能型轉變。裁減軍隊現役員額30萬，軍隊規模由230萬逐步減至200 萬。優化軍種比例，減少非戰鬥機構和人員。壓減軍官崗位。優化武器裝備規模結構，減少裝備型號種類，淘汰老舊裝備，發展新型裝備。

（五）部隊編成。依據不同戰略方向安全需求和作戰任務，調整結構、強化功能、優化佈局，推動部隊編成向充實、合成、多能、靈活方向發展。優化預備役部隊結構，壓減民兵數量，調整力量佈局和編組模式。

（六）新型軍事人才培養。遵循軍事人才培養規律，構建軍隊院校教育、部隊訓練實踐、軍事職業教育三位一體的新型軍事人才培養體系。健全軍委、軍種兩級院校 領導管理體制，完善初、中、高三級培訓體系，調整優化院校規模結構。健全軍事職業教育體系，構建全員全時全域軍事職業教育平台。創新人才培養制度機制，加 強院校與部隊共育人才。

（七）政策制度。適應軍隊職能任務需求和國家政策制度創新，進一步完善軍事人力資源政策制度和後勤政策制度，構建體現軍事職業特點、增強軍人榮譽感自豪感 的政策制度體系。調整軍隊人員分類，逐步建立軍銜主導的等級制度，推進軍官職業化，改革兵役制度、士官制度、文職人員制度。完善退役軍人安置政策和管理機 構。深化經費管理、物資採購、工程建設和軍人工資、住房、醫療、保險等製度改革。全面停止軍隊開展對外有償服務。

（八）軍民融合發展。著眼形成全要素、多領域、高效益的軍民融合深度發展格局，構建統一領導、軍地協調、順暢高效的組織管理體系，國家主導、需求牽引、市場運作相統一的工作運行體系，系統完備、銜接配套、有效激勵的政策制度體系。分類推進相關領域改革，健全軍民融合發展法規制度和創新發展機制。

（九）武裝警察部隊指揮管理體制和力量結構。加強中央軍委對武裝力量的集中統一領導，調整武警部隊指揮管理體制，優化力量結構和部隊編成。

（十）軍事法治體系。全面貫徹依法治軍、從嚴治軍方針，改進治軍方式，實現從單純依靠行政命令的做法向依法行政的根本性轉變，從單純靠習慣和經驗開展工作的方式向依靠法規和製度開展工作的根本性轉變，從突擊式、運動式抓工作的方式向按條令條例辦事的根本性轉變。健全軍事法規制度體系和軍事法律顧問制度，改革軍事司法體制機制，創新紀檢監察體制和巡視制度，完善審計體制機制，改進軍事法律人才管理制度，建立健全組織法制和程序規則，全面提高國防和軍隊建設法治化水平。

三、改革的組織領導

深化國防和軍隊改革是一場整體性、革命性變革，推進力度之大、觸及利益之深、影響範圍之廣前所未有，必須始終在黨中央、中央軍委和習主席的統一領導下，深入貫徹中央軍委改革工作會議精神，堅持把加強教育、統一思想貫穿始終，把強化責任、落細落實貫穿始終，把依法推進、穩扎穩打貫穿始終，把底線思維、管控風險貫穿始終，以堅強有力的組織領導保證各項改革任務圓滿完成。

（一）強化各級責任擔當。各級黨委要把抓改革舉措落地作為重要政治責任，提高領導改革的能力，充分發揮核心領導作用，主要領導要當好第一責任人。要把調查 研究貫穿改革實施全過程，深化對重大理論和實踐問題研究，及時發現和解決新情況新問題。要建立健全改革評估和督查機制，加強對改革落實情況的督導檢查。各 級各部門各改革機構要密切配合、形成合力，軍委指導工作組要深入調整組建單位，加強跟蹤指導、具體指導、全程指導，軍委巡視組同步展開巡視工作。軍委改革 和編製辦公室要完善相關機制，發揮好統籌、協調、督促、推動作用。四總部既要做好自身調整改革，又要指導好全軍改革。新的軍委機關部門成立後，要抓緊完善 運行機制，盡快進入角色、履行職責。新調整組建的單位要及時建立健全黨組織，加強對改革實施工作的組織領導。各善後工作機構要負起責任，妥善處理各類遺留 問題。

（二）加強思想政治工作。組織全軍官兵深入學習習主席關於深化國防和軍隊改革一系列重要論述，組織抓好專題教育，深入進行思想發動，把全軍的思想和行動統一到黨中央、中央軍委和習主席決策部署上來。高層領率機關和高級幹部首先要統一認識，帶頭講政治、顧大局、守紀律、促改革、盡職責，以上率下，為全軍做好 樣子。把思想政治工作貫穿改革全過程，關注各級思想動態，有針對性地做工作，引導各級強化政治意識、大局意識、號令意識，引導官兵轉變理念、更新觀念，自覺站在全局高度認識改革，在解放思想中統一思想，正確對待利益調整，積極擁護、支持、參與改革。高度重視輿論引導特別是網上輿論工作，打好主動仗，傳播正 能量，為推進改革營造良好輿論氛圍。

（三）紮實搞好幹部調整安置。把推進改革的過程作為加強幹部隊伍建設的過程，貫徹軍隊好幹部標準，樹立正確用人導向，堅持五湖四海、任人唯賢，堅持德才兼備、以德為先，搞好領導班子調整配備，選準用好幹部，把堅定貫徹強軍目標、積極謀劃改革、堅決支持改革、勇於投身改​​革的好幹部用起來。把妥善安置同保留骨 幹、改善結構結合起來，科學制定幹部調整安置計劃方案，合理確定幹部進退去留，關心和解決幹部實際困難。廣大幹部要把推進改革作為展示才能的最好舞台，在 改革中經受鍛煉和考驗，爭做改革的促進派和實幹家。老乾部是黨和軍隊的寶貴財富，要精心做好老乾部服務保障接續工作。

（四）嚴密組織轉隸交接。認真搞好人員、物資、經費等交接工作，確保新舊體制轉換期間人員不失控，資産不流失，各項工作無縫銜接。嚴格軍用土地、營房管 理，抓好營區營房設施調整交接，做好在建工程善後工作。全面核實經費物資底數。跟進組織供應保障，及時解決供應中遇到的各種矛盾和問題，確保不斷供、不漏 供。紮實做好武器裝備清點移交，周密組織裝備調配保障，嚴格落實裝備管理各項規定。

（五）嚴格執行各項紀律規定。越是改革的關鍵時刻，越要把紀律和規矩挺在前面，嚴格政治紀律、組織紀律、人事紀律、財經紀律、群眾紀律、保密紀律。嚴守政 治紀律和政治規矩，堅決反對政治上組織上行動上的自由主義。嚴肅組織人事紀律，堅持按原則按政策按規矩按程序辦事。妥善處理軍地現實矛盾和歷史遺留問題。紀檢、巡視、審計部門要加強執紀監督，嚴肅查處調整改革期間各類違規違紀問題。

（六）統籌抓好部隊戰備訓練管理。密切關注改革期間國家安全和社會穩定，制定完善應對重大突發情況預案，嚴格落實戰備工作制度規定，保持各級戰備值班體系 高效運行，確保一旦有事能夠及時有效應對。周密籌劃組織年度軍事訓練任務。加強部隊管理，落實安全責任，及時發現和解決苗頭性、傾向性問題，防止發生重大 事故和案件，保持部隊安全穩定和集中統一。

Original Source: XinHua Military News

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China Internet Soverignty, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Strategic Support Forces

China Military Theater System Reform Era of Information Warfare //中國軍事戰區制改革信息化戰爭時代中國軍隊應對新安全形勢的重大保障

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China Military Theater System Reform Era of Information Warfare 

中國軍事戰區制改革信息化戰爭時代中國軍隊應對新安全形勢的重大保障

習近平中國軍事改革

習近平中國軍事改革

February 1, the PLA theater inaugural meeting held in Beijing. CPC Central Committee General Secretary and State President and CMC Chairman Xi Jinping granted flag to the theater and five issued a bull. Theater set up joint operations command structure, the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission in accordance with domestic major strategic decision, made ​​by the international situation changes, China will further promote the reform process in military forces, and greatly enhance the combat capability of the PLA.

Substantive reform: the military establishment system to adapt to new forms of information warfare needs

Military technology, military and military establishment system are the three basic elements of the new military revolution. Mankind has experienced a long weapon cold and hot steel age after the war and military technical thinking in the era of rapid development of mechanized warfare. The late 1970s, the Soviet Chief of Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Ogarkov Given the rapid development of military technology, forward-looking put forward the idea of ​​military technological revolution, which started a new military revolution sweeping the globe; 1997 , the US military put forward the “network-centric warfare” concepts, theories began to appear new military revolution prototype – each a full revolution in military affairs, the military establishment were to promote institutional change by a large development of military technology and weaponry – it by military personnel and weaponry so that the army can be effectively combined to form an overall combat power key.

In 1998, China put forward the “information warfare” concept, explicitly stated that mankind is the fourth military revolution of information technology revolution in military affairs, marking the technical form of human warfare into the information age warfare from mechanized war era. Against this background, the PLA is to follow the above rules, after weapons and equipment technology has made rapid progress, the military regime began vigorously to prepare a series of reforms: December 31, 2015, the armed services mechanism reform is completed, set up a new army, rocket forces, strategic support of three services – army, navy and air force combined with the previous, form a pattern of five armed services; January 11, 2016, to complete the formation of organs of the Central military Commission departments, from the previous four general headquarters, JMC became 15 functional departments; February 1, 2016, five theater adjustment is completed, the previous seven military regions, adjusted to five theater.

The main reason: “military” system become shackles China Military Revolution and the development of military

Original seven military system schematic

Original seven military system schematic

From the founding of the early century, by the comprehensive national strength and defense spending restrictions, military equipment levels remained low, failed to achieve the goal of complete mechanization construction; and, when low domestic railway, highway construction level, under difficult conditions in a nuclear war support large formation in the territory of strategic mobility. By the above two limitations, only the army at the time of partition of defense, so that each major military all have independent ability to respond to a threat of strategic direction.

Nearly 15 years, accumulated through investment in national defense and army reform, China’s transport network has been done, “accessible”, the level of military equipment have been greatly improved – Preliminary mechanization and mobility of fighting units sharply higher, with the from “area defensive shift basis “to” trans-regional mobility. “After greatly improved mobility, combat troops in wartime may implement in different zones under the command of, and therefore no longer need to implement the military management by a specific military.

Also, in the “military” system, military and navy and air force the same level, but also under the jurisdiction of the military air force, and even the fleet, in fact, is the embodiment of “Continental Army” thought, there are some drawbacks: military orders, regardless of military inefficient. This system has become the shackles of China Military Revolution and the development of the armed forces, can not effectively respond to security threats or China is likely to face.

Perimeter security situation and the international situation changes, “theater” made a timely decision.

Theater, from a geographic dimension in terms of a multi-dimensional space, including a broad front, greater depth and possible operational target, it is mainly based on strategic and operational tasks delineated strategic and operational activities of the regional corps with the leadership and command bodies, forces have on the area command, the command level is between the high command and strategic battle between the Legion.The main basis for division of the theater, including changes in the international pattern of perimeter security situation, military strategy, political, economic, military status and geographical characteristics of the country, and many other aspects.

Since the reform and opening up, China’s economic construction has made remarkable achievements in comprehensive national strength rising rapidly driven by changes in national strategy occurred; the Soviet Union, China land border security threat disappeared, and security threats from maritime direction is upward trend, originally established military regime on the basis of the Continental Army can not adapt to the new international situation and the security situation in neighboring China, thereby theater system came into being. In the People’s Liberation Army is divided into five theater, theater should correspond to the east of Japan and the East China Sea direction, corresponding to the western Central Asia and India theater direction, mainly the southern theater direction corresponding to the South China Sea, the northern war zone corresponds to the direction of Russia and Mongolia, as the central theater centered coordinate strategic reserve corps.

Officers appointed theater: Theater five display a mission and future trends

Five theater and officers appointed

Five theater and officers appointed

Officers from the theater can be seen in the appointment of some common: theater five ten military officers are “50,” so relatively young; most of them have experience working at the grassroots level, the so-called “starting in Reggie died five”, which two military officers have battlefield experience; most have received training integrated joint operations command. This shows the five main tasks entrusted to the theater and future trends:

First, combat and theater become the main task is to deter. Eastern theater commanderLiu PLA and western theater commander Zhao Zongqi are returning heroes from the battlefield, with actual combat experience, which is a valuable asset, but also the implementation of the “Military Commission to total, theater battle, armed services main building” in the implementation of the “theater of battle “organizational guarantee.

Second, the integrated joint operations will be the main model for future combat theater. The so-called “integrated joint operations” around unified combat purposes to the combat units, combat elements of highly integrated combat system as the main body, give full play to the overall combat effectiveness, in a multidimensional space combat or fight against the enemy’s fighting style. And the appointment of military officers have a theater at the National Defense University and other institutions of military education integrated joint operations experience.

Third, the theater system will be in constant development and improvement. The theater is a relatively young officers will and individual will, visionary, to accept new things, strong ability; In addition, the relatively young military officers also means working for a long time, can ensure coherence of policy implementation.

With the deepening of Chinese People’s Liberation Army to change the implementation of the system, this massive military force after the founding of foreign unbeaten mighty will rapidly improve combat effectiveness. This not only has a positive significance for peace and stability in the region and the world, but also for the new military revolution on a global scale provides a theoretical and practical aspects of the double “template.”

Original Mandarin Chinese:

习近平向五大战区授予军旗

习近平向五大战区授予军旗

2月1日，中国人民解放军战区成立大会在北京举行。中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席习近平向五大战区授予军旗并发布训令。组建战区联合作战指挥机构，是党中央和中央军委根据国内、国际形势变化做出的重大战略决策，将进一步推动中国部队军事改革进程，并大大提升中国人民解放军的作战能力。

改革实质：使军队编制体制适应信息化战争形态新需要

军事技术、军事力量和军队编制体制是新军事革命的三个基本要素。人类经历了漫长的冷兵器和热兵器时代之后，战争技术与军事思想在机械化战争时代迅猛发展。20世纪70年代末，苏军总参谋长、苏联元帅奥加尔科夫鉴于军事技术的飞速发展，富有前瞻性的提出了军事技术革命的设想，由此展开一场席卷全球的新军事革命；1997年，美军提出“网络中心战”概念，新军事革命的理论开始出现雏形——在每一场全面的军事革命中，均是由军事技术和武器装备的大发展推动军队编制体制变革——它是通过保证军队人员和武器装备有效结合从而使军队能够形成整体作战力量的关键。

1998年，中国提出“信息战”概念，直接指出人类第四次军事革命就是信息化的军事革命，标志着人类战争的技术形态从机械化战争时代迈向信息化战争时代。在此种背景下，中国人民解放军正是遵循着上述规律，在武器装备技术水平得到长足发展后，开始着手大力对军事体制编制进行一系列改革：2015年12月31日，军种改革机制完成，新组建了陆军、火箭军、战略支援部队三个军种，加上此前的海军和空军，形成5个军种的格局；2016年1月11日，军委机关各部门组建完成，从以前的四总部，变成了15个军委职能部门；2016年2月1日，五大战区调整完毕，以前的七大军区，调整为五大战区。

主要原因：“军区”制成为中国军事革命与军队发展的桎梏

原有七大军区制示意图

原有七大军区制示意图

从建国初到上世纪末，受综合国力和国防投入限制，我军装备水平始终较低，未能实现完成机械化建设的目标；并且，当时国内铁路、公路建设水平较低，难以在核战争条件下支持大兵团在境内实施战略机动。受以上两点限制，我军在当时只能进行分区防御，使每个大军区都具备独立应对一个战略方向威胁的能力。

近15年以来，通过国防投入积累和军队体制改革，我国交通网络已经做到“四通八达”，我军装备水平已经得到大幅改善——初步实现机械化，部队机动作战能力大幅高，具备了从“区域防卫型”向“全域机动型”转变的基础。在机动性大大提高之后，部队在战时可能在不同区指挥下实施作战，因此就不再需要由特定的军区实施军政管理。

并且，在“军区”制度下，军区与海空军平级，又下辖军区空军，甚至是舰队，实际上是“大陆军”思想的体现，存在一定弊端：军政军令不分导致效率低下。这种体制已经成为中国军事革命与军队发展的桎梏，不能有效应对中国正在或可能面临的安全威胁。

国际格局和周边安全形势发生变化，“战区”制应时而生

战区，从地理层面来讲是一个多维空间，包括宽阔的正面、较大的纵深和可能的作战对象，它主要是根据战略战役任务而划定的战略战役军团活动区域，设有领导指挥机构，拥有对辖区部队的指挥权，是介于统帅部与战略战役军团之间的指挥层次。划分战区的主要依据包括国际格局的变化，周边安全形势，国家的军事战略，政治、经济、军事力量状况和地理环境特征等诸多方面。

改革开放以来，我国经济建设取得了举世瞩目的成就，综合国力迅速攀升带动国家战略发生变化；苏联解体后，中国陆地边境安全威胁基本消失，而来自海洋方向的安全威胁则呈上升趋势，原先建立在大陆军基础上的军区制度已经不能适应新的国际格局和中国周边安全形势，由此，战区制度应运而生。在此次解放军划分的五大战区之中，东部战区应该对应日本和东海方向，西部战区对应中亚和印度方向，南部战区则主要对应南海方向，北部战区则对应俄罗斯和蒙古方向，中部战区则作为战略预备总队居中策应。

战区主官任命：显示五大战区肩负使命与未来发展趋势

五大战区及主官任命

五大战区及主官任命

从此次任命的各战区主官中可以看到一些共性：五大战区的十位军政主官都是“50后”，相对年轻；大多有在基层任职经历，所谓“猛将起于卒伍”，其中有两位军事主官具有战场经历；大多接受过一体化联合作战的指挥训练。由此可见五大战区肩负的主要任务与未来发展趋势：

第一，作战和是威慑成为战区主要任务。东部战区司令员刘粤军和西部战区司令员赵宗岐都是从战场凯旋的英雄，具有实战经验，这是宝贵的财富，也是落实“军委管总、战区主战、军种主建”中落实“战区主战”的组织保证。

第二，一体化联合作战将成为未来战区的主要作战模式。所谓“一体化联合作战“，是围绕统一的作战目的，以各作战单元、作战要素高度融合的作战体系为主体，充分发挥整体作战效能，在多维作战空间打击或抗击敌方的作战样式。而此次任命的战区军事主官都有在国防大学等军事院校进修一体化联合作战的经历。

第三，战区制度还将处于不断的发展和完善中。此次战区主官都是相对年轻的上将和个别中将，思维开阔、接受新事物能力强；另外，军政主官相对年轻也意味着任职时间长，可以保证政策实施的连贯性。

随着中国人民解放军军改制度的不断深入实施，这支建国后对外大规模用兵保持全胜的威武之师将会快速提高战斗力。这不仅对于地区及世界的和平与稳定具有积极意义，也为全球范围内的新军事革命提供了理论与实践方面的双重“范本”。

Original Source: China MOD

China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Strategic Support Forces

Chinese Military Informatization Construction & Development Process // 中國軍隊信息化建設和發展的過程

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Chinese Military Informatization Construction & Development Process 

中國軍隊信息化建設和發展的過程

部队信息化系统-国德建设

中國軍隊信息化建設和發展的過程

For Chinese military informatization construction and development process, these unusual phenomena:

The convening of the National Science and Technology Awards Conference, the General Staff was not always an information technology research institute mountain dew, surprising to get a national scientific and technological progress, become the focus of the conference ……

Since last year, the army accelerate the transformation of combat effectiveness model to improve the combat capability based information systems, has taken unprecedented steps ──

Northwest desert, the Air Force Military Air Force organize multiple consecutive number-field conditions at the combat maneuvers in high-performance logistics information system, the formation of a powerful strike capability.

Yellow Sea, the North Sea Fleet led joint exercises Army, Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force participation, navy and air-ground early warning radar network integration, surface ships and anti-air fighter pilot together, missiles and submarines Phangan firearms against contract .

At the same time, the military regions, the Second Artillery Force have also organized to improve the combat capability based information system for the goal of joint combat exercises ……

Some may be difficult to link these phenomena together, but military experts familiar with the matter knows: It is a breakthrough in the matter of the army information construction of some key global challenges, open up to accelerate the transformation of the mode of generating combat army ” Renduermo. ” This historic turning point, that is, information from the General Staff of the Institute for a joint military and civilian units of hundreds of thousands of scientists face the challenge, hard research made numerous fruits. Since only “fifteen”, the Institute will include a complete integrated command information system, tactical

200 number of important results such as the Internet, access to a national scientific and technological progress awards, three first prize, second prize 8, 54 military scientific and technological progress award for accelerating the transformation of the army burgeoning mode of generating combat upsurge It provides a strong boost. Heads of the Central Military Commission praised them as the vanguard of the army research front, information technology pioneer!

In the army information construction most need someone to stand up when it is equal to hesitate hesitate cold feet. Face the challenges of future wars, we have no right to say not ready —

“Goad” shock out a piece of paper “military order”

This is an important meeting on army construction and development of information technology, which is a certain integrated command information system project chief engineer, former director Wang Jianxin most unforgettable scene.

Beijing spring of that year, the sun was shining. Just defeated “SARS” Chinese people smile stretch to live in peace, and the Chinese military’s heart, but he is not easy ──

Just a year ago, the Iraq war started, the US military whistling “Tomahawk” missiles pierced the sky in the new century of peace and tranquility. Based on high-performance network-centric warfare command information systems, showing new information warfare style ── information war from the laboratory onto the stage of human warfare.

Before being able to fight the war ended. The rapid development of military reform, a strong impact on the survival and to bring peace and challenges, but also to our military struggle preparation task even more urgent.

By this time, our military information construction has suffered difficulties: the army’s troops, although a lot of built command and information systems, but the larger institutional differences between these systems, interoperability is difficult, restricting the ability to improve our military information warfare.

To achieve “building computerized armed forces and winning the information war,” the strategic goal to come up with effective measures to solve practical problems of our military presence in information technology, according to the head of the Central Military Commission instructions, held at the headquarters of the combat troops comprehensive integration of information technology seminar.

部队信息化系统-国德建设

People are anxious: the meeting has been open for two days, appeared to be the end of Understanding more, talk less approach, and sometimes into the tangle. Chair of the headquarters-led sit still, convened an emergency officer: “so many problems, but we could not get a way, there would not care either weight, simply tell our enemies that we are not ready, a war? Wait?”

“In the military information technology is most needed someone to stand up when it is equal to hesitate hesitate chickened face challenges of information war, we have no right to say not ready!” After listening to headquarters-led criticism Zhefan half and half “dare”, then when Wang Jianxin, director-blood straight forehead: “heads, I recommend a project to develop an integrated command information system as soon as possible.”

Wang Jianxin proposal is certainly not a passing fad. When the world changes in the surging tide of the military, he led the researchers to track real-time, in-depth research to find countermeasures, see the scenes deeply hurt him ──

Participate in exercises of the army, the head of the field in front of the headquarters of the command of all military branches placed a dozen different command terminal system. Force exercises, field command post two command vehicles but not close Unicom, staff officers can only braved the pouring rain to stand outside the car, umbrella propaganda to pass information to each other.

Information technology is the soul of “Fabric capability.” “Village ignition, household smoke,” How can mean clenched into a fist?

As a research institute, to courageously pioneer information technology.Facing the challenges of the times, Wang Jianxin and his research team has already launched a pre-integrated command information system, the development of related software, and even tried in individual exercises.

From that day, leaving them for only 40 days.

Military no joke. Wang Jianxin and lead the struggle of the people day and night, relying on the existing common software, load the temporary transformation of Arms Command messaging software, the fastest to build a simple simulation system, scheduled for the Central Military Commission, the headquarters of the army leadership and senior commanders were three games in a row demo.

First end of the presentation, the scene silence. Shortly after, the head of the headquarters slowly stood up: “This is the prototype of the future integrated command information system in the right direction, ideas and feasible!”

In this regard, the development of an integrated command information system officially approved. Wang Jianxin, representing the whole of the researchers set a “military order”: time node, the timely completion of development tasks!

Thus, only the beginning of the scene: the National Science and Technology Awards Conference, Wang Jianxin as a chief engineer and project representatives, by the party and state leaders cordially received.

Lessons “bombs and one satellite” successful experience, to carry out military and civilian research collaboration to fully mobilize all forces and resources on doing big things, play a game of information construction congress battle —

Take the road with Chinese characteristics and create a miracle latecomer

An order!

That year, the institute researchers to fully weigh the crushing weight of these four words.

New Year’s bell had just struck, two official documents issued at the same time it posthaste: one was hosted by the Institute developed an integrated command information system; another is also an important research project hosted by their research.

Two projects, each of which is winning the information war relations overall are major innovation projects. Complete a separate no easy task, not to mention two projects rolled into one. This allows both up and down the whole feel honored, but also feel unprecedented pressure.

However, duty-bound. You can only forge ahead, no turning back. The Party scientific deployment forces, forces were divided into mouth. When Wang Jianxin as a director-integrated command information system chief engineer, deputy director Yin Hao as the other information systems chief engineer.

Determination difficult, the more difficult road to go. When the research really opened the curtain, threw himself into research, they found the complex and difficult challenge, unspeakable. To develop an integrated command information system, for example, when all military branches have been built all kinds of command information systems have hundreds, thousands more related software.

In the past, they have tried to help an army division engaged in comprehensive integration of information systems, centralized crack hard work half a year before shaping. At this rate, integrated command information system to drag these years to build?

Foreign experience shows that the development of large-scale information systems with high investment, high risk and low success rate characteristics, and construction costs are often substantial period than expected.

How to get rid of this curse? How this mess in the group clarify ideas, scientific and efficient way to find innovation? Party decisions in-depth research, listen to opinions from all parties based on the completion of this major information technology projects, can not copy foreign experience, you must break a large-scale information system with Chinese characteristics developed road.

── Information Integration. Make full use of information technology has been the outcome of troops, not to engage reinvent the wheel, reinvent the wheel, through a unified technical standards and the development of a common software for comprehensive integration. Their army has a variety of command and information systems technology research, software model to build thousands of repeated technical tests, more than 8.5 million words written out feasibility reports, thousands of software will integrate the army into three categories 1700 More than a software component, integrated command post transformed into a typical information system, cross military services, cross-business, cross the comprehensive integration.

── integration of military and civilian research. Lessons “bombs and one satellite” successful experience, to carry out a large collaborative research outside the military, concentrating power. In the headquarters of a unified leadership and strong support, their combined more than 300 military and civilian research institutes, more than 8,000 scientific research personnel integrated command information system research team to carry out joint research.In order to fully mobilize the enthusiasm of scientific research play parties, they proposed “system we build, to build a unified basis, their application to build” collaborative research ideas, pay attention to the wisdom of relying on the team to crack research problems.

── innovative research model. Innovative research and development group model, organizational group of military experts, technical experts, test force three teams simultaneously entering participate in research. Military experts mention needs technical experts engaged in research, test force to verify, identify problems and make improvements, while research and reform in scientific research like the beginning, being kind, setting three stages alike.

Thinking of a change world wide. An outcomes come out on schedule, took home one award after another. Practice has fully proved, based on the actual break our military information construction of this unique research and development path to shorten the maximum period of scientific research, improve research efficiency, to create a miracle after the hair plays an important role.

Like war, like the need to engage in scientific research is not afraid of difficulties and obstacles, indomitable commandos, we are to use this information for the military spirit blaze a new trail construction —

Adhere to the spirit of the Highlands to climb the peak technology

Full year convened That people passionate research mobilization meeting, many speakers we all remember, only when the founding director Wang Jianxin, said the sentence still echo in everyone ear: “engage in scientific research as war need not afraid difficulties and obstacles, indomitable commandos, we need this spirit is for the military information technology to blaze a new trail! ”

You can never erase the memory, because it is deep in the heart ──

That year, an integrated command information system complete prototype development, ushered in the first big test: the headquarters of the organization associated test drills. Early all goes well, it’s when we secretly delight in the core database server system suddenly can not start.

Lunch in the cold days, drill off frosty, indoor tension has reached boiling point. Some commanders and staff officers participating are red eyes, researchers responsible for troubleshooting is sweating, anxiety.

Although failure ruled out, but the exercise was interrupted for half an hour.

“If this scene took place in wartime, will have what dire consequences!” Although the head of the General Staff encourage everyone to put down the burden of traveling light, but Wang Jianxin and researchers know that such systems must not be on the battlefield!

To this end, they began their own “hard hand”: all systems must meet the reliability, all data must be stored on backup, all aspects need to develop contingency plans for the whole process and all elements of the system test.

In those days, each test is full full participation of thousands of software each test cycle, we must work day and night 7 days and 7 nights. Everyone eating instant noodles hungry, thirsty to drink mineral water, sleepy lying in a chair.

There are memorable old expert Dr. Luo Jiangyi starry night for risk. It was a time when information systems joint trial is about to begin, suddenly found an army command information system failure. If not timely troubleshooting, joint trial would be postponed, security testing and commissioning of ten thousand soldiers and equipment will regroup numerous deployments, military leaders and related personnel recite.

3:00, is the director of the Department of Luo Qiang after a busy that situation, the director refused to apply to the Ministry of the vehicle, rushed stopped a taxi on the dark streets, straight over 200 kilometers outside the command post, has been working to 9:00, solve problems and then non-stop back to directing department, continue to participate in joint trial exercise.

Afterwards, a leading training ground said with deep feeling: “This Institute researchers has been able to research a critical moment on the dash, hold up, was under attack, the key is promising army information construction indomitable, selfless dedication pillar. ”

Adhere to the spirit of the Highlands, in order to climb the heights of science. Wang Jianxin father was the army’s telecommunications industry pioneer ── Wang Zheng. War years by his father inherited that spirit, huh research to life, is commonly known as “Tie person.”

Tactical Internet division of the total in the whole, an information systems division vice president Luo Qiang many first-class research backbone, have experience studying abroad, but they are not favorable for foreign material temptations treatment, insist on returning to their careers.

It is this spirit inspired everyone, so, sacrifice commando war years, fear of fatigue, courageously break ──

An integrated command information systems division vice president Cao Jiang for several days and nights of continuous fighting to overcome the difficulties without a break, actually tired late at night on his way home against a tree and fell asleep, woke up until the big rain-fed.

It Zhidong young scientists, for the command and information systems need to adapt to high altitude operations, seven on the snow-covered plateau, overcome severe altitude sickness, collect relevant data, commissioning and installation systems, quality engineering system acceptance by the parent organizations.

Tang Hong, director of a center for the early completion of border command and information system development, and his comrades lianzhouzhuan day and night, working is more than 40 days, collapsed of a heart attack in the field of research. The doctor asked him to be hospitalized, but he took the oral drug in the back, and continue to work overtime until the task is completed.

An information systems division vice president Chen Qiang, the child was born 10 days, he rushed to the field to participate in scientific research work.Years, he rarely home conquests war, like the system from the beginning, being kind to stereotypes, to achieve results, the children have grown up ……

Core technology can not be bought, bought there are risks; mere imitation is not far away, Zhaomaohuahu only produce short-term benefits; rely on the introduction unreliable, dependent on people must be controlled by others —

Independent innovation as information technology basis points

A few years ago, when several major information technology research progressed, one must answer the question put in the front: point where scientific work?

A debate about how to build information systems around the first core part ── “software component” broke out. To reduce the development difficulty, to avoid the risk of the development, it was a standard move member countries, and called for the preparation as such.

Liu Hong, director of a center firmly opposed: “The core software technology, information related to the construction of the foundation of our military problem, we must now independent innovation ‘Zhaomaohuahu’ petty advantages, the future will suffer a great deal on the battlefield..”

Debate the truth. Liu Hung finally persuaded related cooperative units using innovation program, although several times to spend the effort, but it is essential for safe and reliable battlefield.

Debate, has aroused great concern of the Party: In recent years, around the major research projects, the researchers collected a lot of foreign technical information, how to use? It is not copy, or selective absorption?

Security is an integrated command information system “lifeline”, it is also the highest part of the innovation requirements. Young chief engineer Yang led his research team to develop inventive security system. Unexpectedly, a drill, a new virus has led to the chain of command all but paralyzed.

Since that safe, reliable, foolproof protection system was breached. Face the harsh reality, Yanglin they realize there is no innovation in scientific research, once on the battlefield, it is likely to occur “as also Xiao Xiao loser”!

By “stimulus” Yang Lin they followed through completely independent innovation, to create a “safe line of defense in depth”, and the headquarters of the organization in network of high-intensity offensive and defensive drills, and withstood the test.

Profound lesson, so that the party committee set determined: the core technology can not be bought, bought there are risks; simple imitation go far produced only short-term benefits rather than beyond capacity; rely on the introduction unreliable, dependent on people must be controlled by others.Guarantee winning strategic basis must be placed on innovation!

Vision to reach places, the pace to reach. This year, the early development of an information system, due to the electromagnetic information computational complexity, resulting in the battlefield situation map with the actual situation is not synchronized. If this difficulty is not a breakthrough, it may lead to wartime command to make wrong judgments and decisions. To break through this difficulty, a total of 17 members crowded group division in the lab for three days and three nights of research, testing hundreds of times, but never resolved.

Just when everyone was unable to do anything, has been meditating division vice president Cao Jiang suddenly stood up and asked:. “We change in thinking, not the traditional method, use the new algorithm,” everyone shines. Along the way, they not only look to solve the problem, but also to create new ideas developed by our military information systems.

It is even more gratifying that, by insisting on the scientific point of independent innovation, the past few years, this institute by the completion of major scientific research projects, gave birth to a large number of technological achievements with independent intellectual property rights. Only certain innovations integrated command information system generated by the project, it obtained a national scientific and technological progress awards, 22 military scientific and technological progress award, for winning future wars cast a sword.

Information system development is not a “turnkey” project, not once and for all, must follow the military change as demand increases, to achieve “one-year version of a three-year upgrade” —

Fighting services for the military research is the eternal mission

The research work on this history, this may be a unique exception ──

The end of November last year, Liu Hong, director of a center suddenly apply to the General Staff Operations Leadership: Please let me into combat duty on duty!

It turned out that two days ago, Liu Hung learned combat duty in some applications to operate is not easy, but the problem is they can not tell the user. Thus, the application of the special red Liu on duty. Upon approval, she walked into the duty room, find out the software design problems, led the researchers improved.

Research in respect of military service as a combat! Liu Hong won the headquarters-led approach of praise, but the familiar people know, this kind of thing at the Institute abound.

In recent years, some of the developed information systems, have been identified through the stereotypes, with the troops.

But they did not see this as a “turnkey” project, but keeping up with the changing needs of military struggle and technical progress, in accordance with the “one-year version, an upgrade for three years,” the idea, scroll improve and perfect outcomes, and enable improved information systems to keep up with the pace of military reform.

This year, in the promotion of an integrated command information system applications, business director Liu Dongbo found on the system of Artillery situation plotting is too simple and can not accurately display the cluster and related impacts range firepower for combat possible bias .

However, Cheng research unit has felt, due to lack of relevant data and model support, and sometimes difficult to improve. “Fighting for the service is the eternal mission of scientific research, but also solve another big problem.” 刘东波 difficulties and his comrades, the front line to collect data, repeated studies calculus, successfully designed three-dimensional, dynamic, multi-cluster artillery fire hit model , the problem is completely resolved.

According to statistics, only one direction of the theater, the researchers in the application, the size of the find and solve 275 problems and ensure an integrated information system for safe operation.

Deputy director of a center to promote the application of forces to the east in the next bud Tactical Internet, found a strange phenomenon: the equipment in good laboratory performance, when the exercise application, performance is often compromised, repeated analysis also found “root cause.”

East Lei went down to the communications company, together with the soldiers live, train together, and finally reveal the answer: some soldiers to improve maintenance of the new equipment, often after Cawan gun, pulled a gun oil to a new type of radio antenna also rub. The gun oil has an insulating effect, oiled antenna resistance increases, performance naturally weakened.

Thereafter, promote the use of Tactical Internet a few years time, east Lei troops under 20 times, the longest up to 3 months, has found nearly 16 aspects of a problem, and through timely improvement, so that research results fast Xian parade ground.

Only research and operational needs docking, vitality. In this institute, each regarded researchers from the voice forces deemed to promote research and development of the power of each of them reflect the views, the small nor ignored.

Once a theater communication department heads to Beijing act casually about some integrated command information system when displaying the battlefield situation, to show both the macro war on the same screen, and show the specific local situation is even more easy to use.

Speaker has no intention, the listener interested. The presence of a central leadership keenly felt this proposal, to enhance the service function of great value. Immediately, they assigned director Ning early-depth special investigations unit found: needs of the troops involved in many complex technical issues.

“As long as the operational command needs, hard to have to change.” First research tasks at hand rather put down, two local organizations Institute research staff, worked for six months in a row, and finally overcome the difficulties.

End of the year, the head of the theater authorities to apply the new situation display system, successfully organized troops cross maneuvers. To this end, they wrote a special letter of thanks to the headquarters.

Who is the first to occupy the commanding heights of the new technology will come in the future a little more chance of winning the war; who can look into the future direction of development, will have more chips in tomorrow’s game —

Change the world to catch up with the forefront of the military, we are still on the road

Solemn National Science and Technology Awards Conference held night, some information in the General Staff of the Institute hospital scene was emerging, a lot of people quite surprised:

Baitian Gang leaders just took over the award certificate hero who, calm face at night, walking hurriedly went into the research building, open the computer to carry out scientific and technological activities.

Although this day, we are very happy, but did not imagine the kind of people celebrating carnival, toast singing ……

In recent years, faced with fruitful results, the institute every soldiers always maintained an unusual calm:. “Our results compared with the development of military changes in the world, still walking on the road to catch up with neither have a shred of satisfaction, but can not have a shred of slack! ”

Words are the voice. After several important research setting, a research center director who was known as “arraigned” activities, then the whole of the expansion: according to the requirements of the Party Committee, director of the Center dozen turns on stage, mutatis mutandis, the world’s military development representation, find the problem allowed, ideas disarray, who can not “step down.”

Tang Hong, director of a center, focusing on the world’s new technological revolution, about 18 research projects presented. Unexpectedly, in its subsequent “arraigned” in no clearance because: some issues too frontier, some topics are too partial, and some issues too, some topics which makes the lack of maneuverability …… Tang Hong difficult “to step down.”

Management ideas, to find the starting point, to seek long-term. He led Tiaofenlvxi help him sort out, he finally put things into focus key issues, the six directions of information technology and other border and coastal defense.Today, there are six major research breakthrough. Wherein the direction of things declared three sub-topics of major national science and technology projects, border and coastal defense information technology has also been research project.

It is a field that special “arraigned” as they stride into the eternal power that often ranging from scientific research tasks at hand the dust settles, some key research direction has been quietly, struggling to seize the new high ground ─ ─

Just as a center took home dozens of major awards, like a “magician” new technology laboratory studio, created the first in the army, it may be applied to an item magical new technology experiment for the future, here quietly expand.

At the same time, the Institute has 11 research institutions in the United Nations on 34 kinds of products to carry out independent information integration experiment. These budding scientific research, is becoming a new means to meet future challenges.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

對於中國軍隊信息化建設發展進程來說，這些現像不同尋常：
國家召開科學技術獎勵大會，向來不顯山不露水的總參某信息化研究所，出人意料獲得1項國家科技進步特等獎，成為此次大會焦點……
去年以來，我軍加快轉變戰鬥力生成模式、提高基於信息系統的體係作戰能力，邁出前所未有步伐──
西北大漠，空軍組織多個軍區空軍部隊連續進行數場信息化條件下體係作戰對抗演習，在高效能信息系統運籌下，形成強大的打擊能力。
黃海之濱，北海艦隊牽頭，陸軍、海軍、空軍和第二砲兵部隊參加的聯合演練，海軍預警與陸空雷達融合組網，水面艦艇與空中戰機聯手抗導，潛艇導彈與岸島火器合同打擊。
與此同時，各大軍區、第二砲兵也相繼組織了以提高基於信息系統的體係作戰能力為目標的聯合作戰演練……

中國軍隊信息化建設和發展的過程

也許有人很難把這些現象聯繫在一起，但通曉內情的軍事專家深知：正是在事關我軍信息化建設全局的一些關鍵性難題取得突破，打通了加快轉變我軍戰鬥力生成模式的“任督二脈”。這個歷史性的轉折，就是來自總參某信息化研究所聯合軍內外數百家單位、數千科技工作者直面挑戰、刻苦攻關所取得的累累碩果。僅“十五”以來，該所就完成了包括某一體化指揮信息系統、戰術
互聯網等200多項重要成果，獲得1項國家科技進步特等獎、3項一等獎、8項二等獎，54項軍隊科技進步一等獎，為全軍蓬勃興起的加快轉變戰鬥力生成模式熱潮提供了有力助推。軍委首長稱讚他們是我軍科研戰線的排頭兵、信息化建設的先行者！
在軍隊信息化建設最需要有人站出來時，遲疑躊躇就等於臨陣退縮。面對未來戰爭的嚴峻挑戰，我們無權說還沒準備好———
“激將法”激出一紙“軍令狀”
這是有關我軍信息化建設發展的一次重要會議，也是讓某一體化指揮信息系統項目總師、原所長王建新最為刻骨銘心的一幕。
那年北京的初春，陽光明媚。剛剛戰勝“非典”的中國老百姓笑容舒展地享受和平生活，而中國軍人的心頭卻一點也不輕鬆──
就在一年前，伊拉克戰爭打響，美軍呼嘯的“戰斧”導彈劃破新世紀和平寧靜的天空。基於高效能指揮信息系統的網絡中心戰，展現出全新的信息化作戰樣式──信息化戰爭從實驗室走上了人類戰爭的舞台。
能戰方能止戰。快速發展的軍事變革，給生存與和平帶來的強烈衝擊和嚴峻挑戰，也使我軍軍事鬥爭準備任務愈加緊迫。
而此時，我軍信息化建設卻遭遇困難：全軍各部隊雖然建了不少指揮信息系統，但這些系統體制差異較大，難以互聯互通，制約了我軍信息化作戰能力提高。

部队信息化系统-国德建设
為實現“建設信息化軍隊、打贏信息化戰爭”的戰略目標，拿出有效措施解決我軍信息化建設存在的現實問題，根據軍委首長指示，總部召開了作戰部隊信息化綜合集成研討會。
讓人心急如焚的是：會議已經開了兩天，眼看就要結束，談認識的多，講辦法的少，一時陷入糾結。主持會議的總部領導坐不住了，緊急召集有關人員：“這麼多問題，我們卻拿不出辦法，豈不有負重托？要不，乾脆告訴敵人，我們還沒準備好，請戰爭等一等？”
“在軍隊信息化建設最需要有人站出來時，遲疑躊躇就等於臨陣退縮。面對信息化戰爭的嚴峻挑戰，我們無權說還沒準備好！”聽了總部領導這番半是批評半是“激將”的話，時任所長王建新熱血直衝腦門：“首長，我建議盡快立項研製某一體化指揮信息系統。”
王建新的建議當然不是一時心血來潮。當世界軍事變革大潮湧動之時，他就帶領科研人員實時跟踪，深入研究，尋找對策，看到的一幕幕場景深深刺痛了他──
參加全軍性的演習，現場指揮的總部首長面前擺放著各軍兵種不同體制的十幾種指揮終端。部隊演習，野戰指揮所兩台指揮車近在咫尺卻不能聯通，參謀人員只能冒著瓢潑大雨站在車門外，打著雨傘互相喊話傳遞信息。
信息化的魂是“網聚能力”。 “村村點火、戶戶冒煙”，又怎能攥指成拳？
作為研究所，要勇當信息化建設的開路先鋒。迎著時代挑戰，王建新和他的團隊早已展開了某一體化指揮信息系統的預研，開發了相關軟件，甚至在個別演習中試用過。
從那天起，留給他們的時間只有40天。
軍中無戲言。王建新帶領全所人員不分晝夜拼搏，依托已有的共用軟件，加載臨時改造的軍兵種指揮信息軟件，以最快的速度搭建一個簡易的模擬系統，如期為軍委、總部領導和全軍高級指揮員連續作了3場演示。
首場演示結束，現場沉寂了。片刻之後，總部首長緩緩站起來：“這正是未來一體化指揮信息系統的雛形，方向正確，思路可行！”
就此，研製某一體化指揮信息系統正式立項。王建新代表全所科研人員立下“軍令狀”：按時間節點，如期完成研製任務！
如此，才有了開頭的一幕：國家科學技術獎勵大會上，王建新作為項目總師和代表，受到黨和國家領導人親切接見。
吸取“兩彈一星”成功經驗，開展軍內外科研協作，充分調動各方力量和資源辦大事，打一場信息化建設大會戰———
走中國特色之路創造後發奇蹟
軍令如山！
那年，該研究所科研人員充分掂量到這4個字的千鈞分​​量。
新年鐘聲剛剛敲過，兩份紅頭文件便急如星火同時下達：一項是由該研究所主持研製某一體化指揮信息系統；另一項同樣是由他們主持某重要科研項目攻關。
兩大工程，每一項都關係打贏信息化戰爭大局，都是重大創新工程。單獨完成一項決非易事，何況兩大工程集於一身。這讓全所上下既感到光榮，又感到前所未有的壓力。
然而，義不容辭，責無旁貸。只能奮勇前行，沒有後路可退。所黨委科學調配力量，分兵把口。時任所長王建新擔任某一體化指揮信息系統總師，副所長尹浩擔任另一個信息系統總師。
決心難下，路更難走。當科研大幕真正拉開，全身心投入攻關時，他們才發現面臨挑戰之複雜艱鉅，難以言表。以研製某一體化指揮信息系統為例，當時全軍各軍兵種已經建成各類指揮信息系統有數百種，相關軟件更是成千上萬。
過去，他們曾嘗試幫一個陸軍師搞信息系統綜合集成，集中精兵強將苦乾了半年時間才成形。照此速度，一體化指揮信息系統要拖到猴年馬月才能建成？
國外經驗表明，研製大型信息系統具有高投入、高風險和低成功率的特點，建設成本和周期往往會大幅度超出預計。
如何擺脫這一魔咒？如何從這團亂麻中理清思路，找到科學高效的創新之路？所黨委在深入調研、廣泛聽取各方意見的基礎上決定，完成這項重大信息化工程，不能照搬國外經驗，必須闖出一條中國特色大型信息系統研製開發之路。
──綜合信息集成。充分利用部隊信息化建設已有成果，不搞另起爐灶、推倒重來，通過統一技術標準和研製共用軟件進行綜合集成。他們對全軍已有的各種指揮信息系統進行技術調研，構建數千種軟件模型反復進行技術測試，撰寫出850多萬字論證報告，將全軍成千上萬種軟件整合成3大類1700餘個軟件構件，集成改造成一個個典型指揮所信息系統，實現跨軍種、跨業務、跨領域的綜合集成。
──軍民科研融合。吸取“兩彈一星”成功經驗，開展軍內外科研大協作，集中力量辦大事。在總部統一領導和大力支持下，他們聯合軍內外300多家科研單位、8000多名科研人員組成一體化指揮信息系統攻關團隊開展聯合攻關。為充分調動發揮各方科研積極性，他們提出“系統大家建、基礎統一建、應用各自建”科研協作思路，注重依靠團隊智慧破解科研難題。
──創新攻關模式。創新科研編組和研發模式，組織軍事專家組、技術專家組、試驗部隊3支隊伍同時進場參與科研。軍事專家提需求，技術專家搞攻關，試驗部隊來驗證，發現問題隨時改進，邊研邊改，在科研成果的初樣、正樣、定型3個階段都是如此。
思路一變天地寬。一項項成果如期問世，一個個大獎相繼捧回。實踐充分證明，立足我軍信息化建設實際闖出的這一獨特研發之路，對於最大限度縮短科研週期、提高科研效益，創造後發奇蹟發揮了重要作用。
搞科研像打仗一樣需要不怕艱難險阻、一往無前的突擊隊，我們就是要用這種精神為部隊信息化建設殺出一條血路———
堅守精神高地才能攀登科技高峰
當年全所召開的那場讓人熱血沸騰的科研動員大會，許多發言大家都記不得了，唯有時任所長王建新說的一句話至今還迴響在大家耳旁：“搞科研像打仗一樣需要不怕艱難險阻、一往無前的突擊隊，我們就是要用這種精神為部隊信息化建設殺出一條血路來！”
永遠磨滅不了的記憶，是因為它深深扎在心田──
那一年，某一體化指揮信息系統完成初樣研製，迎來第一次大考：總部組織聯試演練。前期一切順利，就在大家暗自歡欣之時，核心服務器數據庫系統突然無法啟動。
數九寒天，演練場外滴水成冰，室內緊張程度卻達到沸點。參演的一些指揮員和參謀人員都急紅了眼，負責故障排查的科研人員更是滿頭大汗，焦急萬分。
故障雖然排除了，但演練卻中斷了半小時。
“如果這一幕發生在戰時，將產生怎樣可怕的後果！”儘管總參首長鼓勵大家放下包袱、輕裝上陣，但王建新和科研人員都知道，這樣的系統決不能上戰場！
為此，他們對自己下起了“狠手”：所有系統必須達到可靠性指標、所有數據必須存有備份、所有環節必須制訂應急預案，對系統進行全過程全要素檢驗。
那段日子，每次測試都是全員全程參與，數以千計的軟件每測試一個週期，就要連軸轉上7天7夜。大家餓了啃方便麵，渴了喝礦泉水，困了就在椅子上躺一會。
讓人難忘的還有老專家羅強一博士星夜排險。那是一次某信息系統聯試即將開始時，突然發現某集團軍指揮信息系統有故障。如不及時排除故障，聯試就要延期，保障聯試的近萬名官兵和眾多裝備就要重新集結部署，部隊領導和相關人員急得團團轉。
凌晨3時，正在導演部忙碌的羅強一得知情況後，顧不得嚮導演部申請車輛，衝到漆黑的街道上攔了一輛出租車，直奔200多公里外的指揮所，一直工作到上午9時，解決問題後又馬不停蹄地趕回導演部，繼續參加聯試演練。
事後，演練場一位領導深有感觸地說：“這個研究所科研人員之所以能在科研關鍵時刻沖得上、頂得住、攻得下，關鍵是有為我軍信息化建設一往無前、無私奉獻的精神支柱。”
堅守精神高地，方能攀登科學高峰。王建新的父親是我軍通信事業的開創者──王諍。他把父親戰爭年代那種精神繼承下來，搞起科研不要命，被大家稱為“王鐵人”。
戰術互聯網總師於全，某信息系統副總師羅強一等所裡眾多科研骨幹，都有國外留學經歷，但他們不為國外優厚物質待遇誘惑，堅持回國干事業。
正是這種精神激勵大家，像戰爭年代的突擊隊那樣，不怕犧牲，不怕疲勞，奮勇突破──
某一體化指揮信息系統副總師曹江，為攻克難點連續奮戰幾晝夜不休息，竟累得深夜回家途中靠著大樹睡著了，直到被大雨澆醒。
青年科技工作者何志東，為使指揮信息系統適應高原作戰需要，七上雪域高原，克服嚴重高原反應，採集有關數據，調試安裝系統，以優質工程通過上級組織的系統驗收。
某中心主任唐宏，為儘早完成邊防指揮信息系統研製，和戰友們白天黑夜連軸轉，一干就是40多天，心髒病發作暈倒在攻關現場。醫生要求他住院治療，他卻拿著口服藥回到所裡，又繼續加班，直到任務完成。
某信息系統副總師陳強，孩子出生10天，就趕赴外地參加科研工作。幾年間，他東征西戰極少回家，系統從初樣、正樣到定型，取得成果了，孩子也長大了……
核心技術買不來，買來也存在隱患；單純模仿走不遠，照貓畫虎只能產生短期效益；依靠引進靠不住，依賴於人必然受制於人———
把自主創新作為信息化建設基點
幾年前，當幾大信息化科研項目陸續展開時，一個必須回答的問題擺在了眼前：科研工作的基點在哪兒？
一場爭論，首先圍繞如何構建信息系統核心部分──“軟件構件”爆發了。為減少研發難度，避免研發風險，有人搬出某發達國家構件標準，並主張照此編寫。
某中心主任劉東紅堅決反對：“核心軟件技術，事關我軍信息化建設根基問題，必須自主創新。現在‘照貓畫虎’佔點小便宜，將來在戰場上就會吃大虧。”
爭論出真知。劉東紅終於說服相關協作單位採用自主創新方案，雖然要多花出幾倍的力氣，但它的安全可靠對戰場至關重要。
這場爭論，引起了所黨委的高度關注：近些年，圍繞重大科研課題，科研人員收集整理了不少國外技術資料，怎樣使用？是照搬照抄，還是有選擇地消化吸收？
安全防護系統是某一體化指揮信息系統的“生命線”，也是對自主創新要求最高的部分。年輕的總師楊林帶領他的科研團隊，獨闢蹊徑研製安全防護系統。沒想到，一次演練，一種新型病毒就導致指揮系統全線癱瘓。
自認為安全可靠、萬無一失的防護體系卻被攻破了。面對殘酷的現實，楊林他們認識到，沒有自主創新的科研成果，一旦走上戰場，很有可能出現“成也蕭何敗也蕭何”！
受到“刺激”的楊林他們，隨後通過完全的自主創新，打造出“縱深安全防線”，並在總部組織的高強度網絡攻防演練中，經受住了考驗。
深刻的教訓，讓所黨委定下決心：核心技術買不來，買來也存在隱患；單純模仿走不遠，產生的也只是短期效益而不是超越能力；依靠引進靠不住，依賴於人必然受制於人。必須把保障打贏的戰略基點放在自主創新上！
眼光到達的地方，腳步才能到達。這一年，某信息系統研製初期，由於電磁信息運算複雜，造成態勢圖與戰場實際狀況不同步。如果這個難點不突破，可能導致戰時指揮做出錯誤判斷和決策。為突破這個難點，總師組17名成員擠在實驗室，連續3天3夜攻關，試驗數百次，但始終沒有解決。
就在大家一籌莫展的時候，一直在沉思的副總師曹江突然站起來提出：“我們換個思路，不用傳統算法，改用新的算法。”大家眼前一亮。沿著這個思路，他們不僅一下解決了難題，還開創我軍信息系統研發的新思路。
令人更加欣喜的是，由於堅持把科研基點放在自主創新上，幾年來，這個研究所通過完成重大科研項目，催生出一大批具有自主知識產權的技術成果。僅某一體化指揮信息系統一個項目產生的創新成果，就獲得1項國家科技進步特等獎，22項軍隊科技進步一等獎，為打贏未來戰爭鑄就一把把利劍。
信息系統研製不是“交鑰匙”工程，不能一勞永逸，必須緊跟軍事需求變化不斷提高，實現“一年一版本、三年一升級”———
為戰鬥力服務是軍事科研永恆使命
在這個所科研工作歷史上，這或許是一個絕無僅有的特例──
去年11月底，某中心主任劉東紅突然向總參作戰部領導提出申請：請讓我到戰備值班室值班！
原來，兩天前劉東紅獲悉，戰備值班某些應用程序操作起來不太方便，但問題用戶又說不清。因此，劉東紅申請了這次特殊值班。經批准，她走進了值班室，弄清了軟件設計的問題，帶領科研人員進行了改進。
軍事科研就該為戰鬥力服務！劉東紅的做法贏得了總部領導的讚許，但熟悉這個所的人都知道，這種事在該研究所比比皆是。
近年來，這個所研製的一些信息系統，相繼通過定型鑑定，配發部隊。
但他們並沒有把這當成“交鑰匙”工程，而是緊跟軍事鬥爭需求變化和技術進步，按照“一年一版本、三年一升級”的思路，滾動改進完善成果，使信息系統的改進跟上了軍事變革的步伐。
這一年，在推廣某一體化指揮信息系統應用中，業務室主任劉東波發現，系統關於砲兵火力打擊情況的標繪過於簡單，不能精確顯示集群火力打擊範圍及相關影響，用於實戰可能產生偏差。
然而，承研單位卻感到，因缺乏相關數據和模型支持，一時很難改進。 “為戰鬥力服務是科研的永恆使命，困難再大也要解決。”劉東波和戰友們迎難而上，深入一線採集數據，反复研究演算，成功設計出立體、動態、多層砲兵集群火力打擊模型，將問題徹底解決。
據統計，僅某戰區一個方向，這個所的科研人員就在推廣應用中，發現並解決275個大小問題，確保某一體化信息指揮系統安全運行。
某中心副主任向東蕾在下部隊推廣應用戰術互聯網時，發現一個奇怪現象：裝備在實驗室性能良好，可在演練應用時，性能卻時常打折扣，反複分析也找不到“病根”。
向東蕾就下到通信連隊，與戰士一起生活、一起訓練，終於將謎底揭開：有的戰士為了搞好新裝備維護保養，經常在擦完槍之後，順手用槍油把某新型電台天線也擦一擦。而槍油具有絕緣作用，塗油的天線電阻增大，性能自然減弱。
此後，在推廣應用戰術互聯網的幾年時間裡，向東蕾下部隊20多次，最長時間達到3個月，先後發現16個方面近百個問題，並通過及時改進，使這一科研成果快速顯威練兵場。
科研工作只有與作戰需求對接，才有生命力。在這個研究所，每名科研人員都把來自部隊的呼聲，視為推動科研發展的動力，對他們反映的每一條意見，再小也不忽略。
一次，某戰區通信部門領導來京辦事，隨口談起某一體化指揮信息系統在顯示戰場態勢時，要在同一屏幕既能顯示宏觀戰局，又能顯示局部具體情況就更好用了。
說者無意，聽者有心。在場的某中心領導敏銳地感到，這個建議，對提升系統服務功能很有價值。隨即，他們指派室主任初寧深入部隊專題調研，結果發現：部隊的需求涉及眾多複雜技術問題。
“只要作戰指揮需要，再難也要改。”初寧放下手頭科研任務，組織地方兩個研究所科研人員，連續乾了大半年，終於攻克難關。
年終，這個戰區首長機關應用新的態勢顯示系統，成功組織部隊跨區機動演習。為此，他們專門給總部寫來感謝信。
誰搶先佔領新的科技制高點，誰就在未來戰爭中多一分勝算；誰能夠洞察未來發展方向，誰就在明天的博弈中擁有更多籌碼———
追趕世界軍事變革潮頭，我們依然在路上
莊嚴隆重的國家科學技術獎勵大會召開當晚，在總參某信息化研究所院內出現的一幕情景，讓很多人頗為詫異：
白天剛剛從國家領導人手中接過獲獎證書的功臣們，晚上又面容平靜、步履匆匆地走進科研大樓，打開微機，開展科技攻關活動。
儘管這一天，大家都很高興，但卻沒有人們想像的那種狂歡慶祝、舉杯高歌……
幾年來，面對累累碩果，該研究所每名官兵始終保持著一種異乎尋常的冷靜：“我們的成果與世界軍事變革發展相比，依然行走在追趕的路上。既不能有一絲一毫的滿足，更不能有一絲一毫的懈怠！”
言為心聲。幾項重要科研成果定型之後，一項被科研中心主任們稱為“過堂”的活動，隨即在全所展開：根據黨委要求，十幾個中心主任輪流上台，比照世界軍事發展進行陳述，問題找不准、思路理不清，誰也不能“下台”。
某中心主任唐宏，著眼世界新技術革命，一下提出18個研究課題。沒想到，在隨後幾次“過堂”中都沒過關，原因是：有的課題太過前沿，有的課題太偏，有的課題太大，有的課題缺乏可操作性……這讓唐宏難以“下台”。
理思路，找抓手，謀長遠。所領導幫他條分縷析梳理，他最後把攻關課題聚焦到物聯網、邊海防信息化建設等6個方向上。如今，這6個研究方向都有重大突破。其中，物聯網方向申報3個國家重大科技專項子課題，邊海防信息化建設也已經立項研究。
正是這一場場特殊的“過堂”，為他們大步前進注入了永恆的動力，以至於往往不等手頭的科研任務塵埃落定，一些重點科研方向已悄然展開，奮力搶占新的製高點─ ─
就在某中心捧回幾十個重大獎項時，一個猶如“魔術師”工作室的新技術實驗室，率先在全軍創建，可能應用於未來的一項項神奇的新技術實驗，在這裡悄然展開。
與此同時，該所還聯合國內11家科研機構，對34種自主信息產品開展集成實驗。這些含苞待放的科研成果，正在成為迎接未來挑戰的新型手段。

Original Source: X