Wars in different eras have different characteristics, and the “fog of war” that accompanies them is constantly changing. Often when people feel that they have basically seen the way to win through multi-faceted exploration, the next war presents new uncertainties. Local wars such as the Syrian War and the India-Azerbaijan conflict have demonstrated the multifaceted and complex nature of modern warfare from different perspectives. It can be seen that although traditional firepower warfare is still on the stage, the characteristics of intelligence have already emerged; although the combat type is still an offensive and defensive struggle, the combat guidance, environmental conditions, and specific methods of play have undergone profound changes. Wars are accelerating their evolution towards intelligence. The battlefield space has expanded from land, sea, air, space, electricity, and the Internet to space, polar regions, deep sea, and cognitive confrontations. The game competition has changed from military confrontation to multi-dimensional competitions such as politics, economy, science and technology, and public opinion. The participating forces have developed from the two warring parties to global attention and multi-dimensional intervention. Information intelligence has moved from auxiliary support to comprehensive dominance, full penetration, and full coverage. The combat unit has evolved from scale optimization to small, micro, and sophisticated, and the form is scattered and capable. Intelligence and hybrid have become basic trends. In the face of evolving wars and new uncertainties, we need to be sensitive to change and respond proactively, accumulate momentum and forge ahead in the midst of change, so as to achieve leadership and surpass others and seize the opportunity to win.
Enhance the hybrid nature of war based on the “pan-variability”. War is the continuation of politics and has never been a simple military confrontation. In the era of intelligence, visible struggles and invisible struggles coexist, battlefields with gunpowder smoke and silent battles coexist, and gray areas, hybrid warfare, and marginal conflicts coexist. In the face of fierce and complex competitive game situations, it is necessary to accelerate the construction of a hybrid warfare system with military as the cornerstone. First, enrich strategic options. Closely follow the characteristics of the times, strengthen the exploration of the characteristics and laws of non-military confrontation and the construction of power means, implement relevant preparations, and form comprehensive advantages. Secondly, enhance invisible strength. Attach importance to geopolitical, cultural, psychological and other aspects of research, and form an effective discourse system through think tank exchanges, academic promotion, cultural integration, legal construction, media propaganda and other means to influence the other party’s cognition in a silent way. Thirdly, unite the forces of peace. Take the construction of a united front in the new era as an important means of hybrid confrontation, unite all forces that can be united, and enhance international influence and appeal.
Enhance the flexibility of tactics based on the “smart change” of the battlefield. Looking at recent local wars and conflicts, due to factors such as the regional dimension and the strength of both sides, the traces of traditional warfare are still relatively obvious, but intelligent and unmanned warfare has irreversibly come to the fore. It can be foreseen that comprehensive intelligent warfare is not far away, the extension range of weapons and equipment will be farther and wider, the combat perspectives of the opposing sides will be larger and wider, and the degree of hinge fusion between the physical domain, network domain, and cognitive domain will be deeper. The battlefield with deep “smart change” calls for concepts and tactics that are adapted to it. We should accelerate the promotion of intelligent thinking, intelligent technology, and intelligent network aggregation and empowerment to form a flexible closed link with fast perception, fast decision-making, fast judgment, fast action, and fast feedback, based on “OODA” and the kill chain to beat the slow with the fast and change with change. Relying on intelligent computing power and intelligent algorithms, we design wars in advance, build various models, and innovate tactics and training methods in peacetime. In wartime, we analyze the battle situation in real time, keenly seize opportunities, and make precise decisions and actions. We use “military + technology”, “theory + experiment”, and “algorithm + tactics” to integrate the art of strategy with intelligent technology to achieve a combination of the strange and the orthodox, take the lead in rapid changes, and win by intelligence.
Enhance the plasticity of forces based on the “micro-change” of units. One of the important characteristics of modern warfare is that large systems support elite combat, and combat units are becoming increasingly miniaturized, integrated, and modular. We must focus on the combat unit, the end of combat effectiveness, and forge a “sharp knife” and “sharp blade” that is small, fine, micro, and strong to adapt to intelligent warfare. On the one hand, strengthen its ability to integrate into the system and connect all parties, rely on ubiquitous access to information networks, and achieve decentralized combat and energy concentration through flexible matching and rapid reorganization; on the other hand, strengthen its independent decision-making and improvisation capabilities, improve robustness and self-recovery, and be able to survive, respond to emergencies, and fight in extreme situations. It is possible to explore the formation of a “micro-unit” concept force, implement a flexible organization, do not fix the number of personnel, and do not restrict the field. Advanced combat theories, new combat formations, and new weapons and equipment can be tested and verified in advance, so as to explore ways to achieve cloud combat, cloud joint, cloud energy gathering, and self-combination at the end of the strike chain.
Enhance strategic bottom line based on deterrence “evolution”. Deterrence has a long history like war. With the in-depth application of intelligent technology and weapons and equipment, the connotation and extension, force means, form and effect of deterrence are changing. Although traditional nuclear deterrence is still the cornerstone of bottom line, new deterrence capabilities have been quietly formed, requiring higher determination, strength, wisdom, and strategy. Focusing on the role of deterrence in blocking the enemy invisibly in peacetime, controlling the situation at the key in times of crisis, and winning the final victory in wartime, we should focus on strengthening the strong and making up for the weak, opening up new areas, and long-term strategy to maximize the strategic value of deterrence. First, we should give equal importance to conventional and unconventional, accelerate the development of new weapons and new forces, and achieve the predetermined deterrence intention through actual combat training and actual combat deployment, supplemented by the expression and transmission of strategic will. Secondly, we should continue to study new combat concepts and new combat theories, and promote the transformation of theories from “soft” to “hard” through academic exchanges, think tank collisions, and multi-track and multi-layer confrontations, and transform them into real deterrence. Thirdly, accelerate the transformation of science and technology into the military field, increase research efforts in cloud computing, blockchain, quantum technology, etc., and strive to form a potential deterrent to opponents.
●The application of artificial intelligence in the military field is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it greatly improves combat effectiveness, but on the other hand, it also requires great attention to the potential weaknesses and loopholes of artificial intelligence.
●The use of intelligent weapons does not mean that the role of humans has declined, but rather that some of the functions of humans have been transferred and materialized into weapons. Weapons extend the human body and brain, and stimulate human creativity and initiative.
Accelerating the development of military intelligence is a strategic task proposed in the report of the 19th CPC National Congress. It is a powerful tool to promote the modernization of national defense and the army and realize the party’s goal of strengthening the army in the new era. It is also a major measure to aim at the future war situation and seize strategic opportunities. When conducting research on intelligent warfare, we should adhere to dialectical thinking, prevent research from “deviating from reality to virtuality”, “generalizing from a single case”, and “focusing on technology rather than theory”. Only by scientifically analyzing the characteristics and laws of intelligent warfare can we truly promote in-depth and practical research.
To prevent “decoupling from reality and turning to virtuality”, we need to use scientific methodology and epistemology to analyze the problem
Intelligent warfare is a highly informationized war conducted in the physical and cognitive domains through the extensive use of intelligent weapons and equipment and the corresponding combat styles and methods. It is essentially not out of the scope of informationized warfare. The trend of unmanned warfare in recent local wars only has some characteristics of intelligent warfare, and is far from being an intelligent war in the true sense. At present, there is a wave of research on artificial intelligence in all walks of life, but to some extent, there is also a phenomenon of exaggeration and exaggeration. Some people also believe that intelligent warfare will give rise to geopolitical changes, and the traditional physical space control will be replaced by “intelligence control” with artificial intelligence as the core. This view inevitably has a tendency to virtualize cognition. To this end, intelligent warfare should be rationally studied and understood using scientific methodology and epistemology.
System theory perspective. Intelligent warfare is an advanced stage of information warfare, and is essentially still a system confrontation based on information systems. Whether it is human-machine collaborative operations, real-time perception of the entire battlefield, or brain-machine integrated decision-making, the characteristics it exhibits are all conscious behaviors of the various elements of the military system with “winning the war” as the ultimate goal. The understanding of military intelligence cannot stop at “technology-only theory” and “weapon-only theory”, but should focus on the mutual connection and action characteristics between the various elements of the military system, and explore its triggering mechanism, internal laws and implementation path.
Global thinking. Qian Xuesen believes that war is an organic whole composed of many parts and cannot be separated. In all human social practices, there is no activity that emphasizes the global concept and the overall concept more than directing war, and emphasizes starting from the overall situation, using all forces rationally, and ultimately achieving the overall final effect. This is true for directing war and studying war. Intelligent warfare not only refers to the intelligence of weapons and equipment, but also includes a series of intelligence such as intelligence analysis, command and control, military training, and logistics support. Only by conducting all-round research and thinking on the relevant elements can we have a global understanding of intelligent warfare. Global thinking also requires us to consider military intelligence in the context of achieving the Party’s goal of strengthening the military in the new era and the overall national strategy, and to grasp the dialectical relationship between short-term and long-term, key and urgent needs, and actual military needs and overall military modernization.
Engineering design. To win future wars, we must have the ability to design future wars. We should use engineering thinking to classify and plan the operational concepts, operational styles, and force use of future intelligent warfare, and put forward practical military needs, phased development goals, and methods based on the current development stage of our army and targeting powerful enemies. We can follow the idea of ”proposing theories – developing concepts – experimental simulations – actual military exercises” to promote innovative breakthroughs in military theories based on intelligent warfare, incorporate them into operational regulations, and integrate them into actual combat training.
Avoid generalizing from a single example, and grasp the opposites of contradictions with the unity of opposites thinking
The ancients said: “The way to win or lose, to be safe or dangerous, is the way.” The “way” here includes not only the fundamental view of war, but also the speculative understanding of the laws of winning war. Intelligent warfare research should go beyond the limitations of one-sided descriptions such as “algorithmic warfare”, “unmanned warfare” and “self-adaptation”, and use dialectical thinking to fully understand and grasp the relationship between the various elements of future wars.
The relationship between people and weapons. With the widespread use of drones, unmanned combat vehicles, unmanned submarines, etc. in the military, “war between people” will be largely replaced by “war between machines”. The realization of combat means such as autonomous coordination and autonomous decision-making has reshaped the combat process, and the combat style with unmanned operations as a prominent feature has rewritten the rules of the battlefield. Despite this, the decisive role of people in war has not changed, but the way they act is significantly different from before. As Engels said, “It is people, not guns, who win the battle… Guns will not move by themselves, and they need a brave heart and a strong hand to use them.” Intelligent weapons undoubtedly play an important role in war, but the subject of war is still people, and people are always the most active factor in war. The use of intelligent weapons does not mean that the role of humans has declined, but rather that some of the functions of humans have been transferred and materialized into weapons. Weapons extend the human body and brain, and stimulate human creativity and initiative. Intelligent weapons cannot replace the important role of fighting spirit. The superposition of indestructible political beliefs, overwhelming heroism, the bloody spirit of daring to fight and win, as well as superb strategies and flexible strategies and tactics, these dynamic factors make it possible to win when the enemy and our strength are equal, and to have the possibility of defeating the strong with the weak when we are at a disadvantage.
The relationship between offense and defense. The application of artificial intelligence in the military field is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it greatly improves combat effectiveness, but on the other hand, it is also necessary to pay great attention to the potential weaknesses and loopholes of artificial intelligence. Intelligent warfare mainly relies on powerful algorithms and interconnected networks. Once they are attacked, fatal errors occur, or they are reversely controlled, the advantage may turn into a disadvantage. The U.S. Department of Defense has now established a special agency to assess the potential risks of military intelligence and countermeasures. While promoting military intelligence, we should pay special attention to strengthening information protection and risk management, and simultaneously develop “anti-artificial intelligence technology” to establish a two-way advantage of both offense and defense.
The relationship between inheritance and innovation. Artificial intelligence has promoted major changes in the war situation, but it has not changed the general sense of the war guidance rules and war winning mechanism. No matter how the future war is fought, we must not abandon or deviate from the precious war experience and theoretical guidance accumulated by our army in long-term practice. We must still adhere to the principle of “you fight yours, I fight mine”, uphold the principle of asymmetric strategic checks and balances, and attach importance to giving full play to people’s subjective initiative. On the other hand, we must follow the general trend of military reform, keep a close eye on the forefront of war development, promote military innovation with a sense of urgency and accelerate the application and transformation of results.
To prevent “focusing on technology and neglecting science”, it is necessary to promote technological and theoretical innovation by integrating science and technology.
An advanced army needs advanced military theory to guide it. The emergence of intelligent warfare is first of all due to the promotion of the new scientific and technological revolution, but it is inseparable from the scientific guidance of advanced military theory, especially Marxist military theory. The report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed to comprehensively promote the modernization of military theory, which is an inevitable requirement for realizing the party’s goal of strengthening the army in the new era, and is also the meaning of intelligent warfare research. To this end, we must conscientiously implement the development idea of integrating theory and technology, and promote the simultaneous innovation of technology and theory in deepening problem research.
Conceptual integration. Modern military theories are increasingly characterized by actual combat-driven, interdisciplinary, and systemic support. To promote the integration of science and technology, we must first break through the barriers of concepts and ideas. We should adhere to the complex research approach of overall planning, system design, and system integration, based on the evolution of war forms and the actual national and military conditions and development stages, and coordinate the promotion of technological breakthroughs, concept development, tactics innovation, combat power generation and other theoretical innovations to provide scientific guidance and theoretical support for winning future wars. We should strengthen research on the winning mechanism, combat guidance, and combat style of intelligent warfare, and conduct in-depth research on the military organization form caused by intelligent warfare, especially the series of changes in organizational system, scale structure, combat organization, tactical principles, combat support, and force application, so as to make ideological and theoretical preparations for a new round of military reforms.
Integration of disciplines. Intelligent warfare research not only involves the application of artificial intelligence in the military field, but also involves multiple fields such as algorithms and materials, and multiple disciplines such as physics, chemistry, electronics, and biology, and involves a wide range of fields such as war ethics and international law. In order to achieve the integration of science and technology, technical workers are required to break away from the shackles of pure engineering thinking, establish strategic thinking and global awareness, master scientific methodology and epistemology, and use dialectical thinking to lead technology research and development. Theoretical researchers should break the boundaries of disciplines, step out of the small circle of pure academic research, actively promote the interaction between scientific research institutions and colleges, troops, and technology research and development departments, strive to achieve original results in the basic field of artificial intelligence, and enrich the theory of intelligent warfare. Make good use of data, focus on actual combat, adhere to the “three aspects”, and effectively play the leading and guiding role of theory on technology.
It is easy to break the “fog” of the battlefield, but it is difficult to break the “obsession” in your heart——
Since ancient times, achieving surprise through combat deception has been an important way to win on the battlefield. Entering the era of intelligence, the in-depth application of artificial intelligence technology has not only clearly dispelled the original war “fog”, but also created a large amount of new war “fog”. If we only rely on improving deception techniques and means, and simply superimposing and strengthening the traditional deception paradigm, it will become increasingly difficult to achieve the deception goal. From “smart deception” to “smart victory”, there is an urgent need for an overall transformation of the objects of deception, means of deception, methods of deception, and focus of deception, so as to form a new deception paradigm that meets the requirements of the intelligent era.
The target of deception has shifted from humans to human-machine hybrid agents
Clausewitz believed that three-quarters of the factors on which war is based are more or less surrounded by the “fog” of uncertainty. Combat deception is essentially the use of uncertainty in war. The more “fog” there is in war, the more room there is for maneuvering. Traditional combat deception is carried out around the opponent’s decision-making level, and people are the only target of deception. However, with the increasingly prominent role of intelligent intelligence analysis and auxiliary decision-making systems in command activities, the use of deception to achieve strategic, campaign, and tactical surprises faces major challenges. How to deceive human-machine hybrid intelligent entities composed of humans and intelligent systems has become an important factor that needs to be considered when planning and implementing deception in the intelligent era. The competition surrounding intelligent deception and anti-deception is becoming increasingly fierce.
There is a world of difference between deceiving people and deceiving intelligent systems. In the past, the “calculations” that deceived people may be exposed when facing the “calculations” of intelligent systems. Intelligent systems can efficiently integrate and process massive amounts of sensor data and Internet open source information, making a qualitative leap in the speed, depth, breadth and accuracy of battlefield situation perception, realizing a profound transformation from “sensing” to “knowing”, from “state” to “momentum”, and playing an important role in dispelling the “fog” of war. For example, on the battlefield, although both sides try to hide the truth and cover up their intentions in various ways, they still cannot escape the “eyes” of the intelligent system: the tracks left by carefully disguised tanks and armored vehicles, after being detected by the opponent’s satellites, drones, etc., will also reveal their specific locations under the analysis of the intelligent system.
On the contrary, it is very easy to deceive intelligent systems with methods that target them, but it may not be able to deceive people. A foreign research team found that by changing a few key pixels in a picture of a cat, the intelligent system can identify the cat as a dog, while the human eye will not make any recognition errors due to this change. Similar incidents are common. Some studies have pointed out that sticking a piece of paper with a special pattern on a person’s forehead can deceive the strongest facial recognition system, and this method is highly portable and can deceive other facial recognition algorithms with a slight change.
It can be seen that deceiving people and deceiving intelligent systems are two different “deception methods”. After the deep application of artificial intelligence in the field of intelligence analysis and auxiliary decision-making, from the formulation of strategic deception plans to the design of battlefield camouflage patterns, how to deceive both the human brain and the computer and keep the human-machine hybrid intelligent body “in the dark” will be an important issue that needs to be focused on and solved in order to win the initiative in war.
The fraudulent methods have shifted from being mainly human-based to a combination of human and machine.
The organization and implementation of traditional combat deception is mainly manual, especially large-scale strategic deception, which requires a lot of manpower, material and financial resources. For example, in World War II, the Allies formulated a series of deception plans to ensure the success of the Normandy landing: setting up a fake radio network and a simulated landing fleet, and imagining that the US 1st Army Group with 50 divisions and 1 million people was actively preparing to cross the channel and land in the direction of Calais; using the air force to bomb Calais and Normandy, but the former was bombed more than 1 times more than the latter, etc. The application of artificial intelligence in deception can fundamentally change this situation. With humans as the main guide and intelligent means as the auxiliary, it can quickly generate massive amounts of false information, confusing the real with the fake, and create a thicker war “fog” for the opponent.
The use of intelligent means can improve the quality of deception. On the one hand, intelligent decision-making aids can be used to formulate deception plans, optimize the design of deception forces, deception deployment, deception processes, etc., to achieve systematic deception with the best overall effect; on the other hand, intelligent intelligence analysis systems can be used to pre-test the deception effect, “using one’s own spear to attack one’s own shield”, find out the loopholes and contradictions in the plan, and then improve the deception plan to make it logically self-consistent and seamless.
The use of intelligent means can expand the scale of deception. The increasingly mature deep fake technology can synthesize realistic fake pictures, handwriting, audio, video, etc. in large quantities, and has broad application prospects in strategic, campaign, and tactical deception. For example, in strategic campaign deception, corresponding technical means can be used to confuse opponents by forging fake radio stations and fake commanders, and even to fake an active command post in a certain battle direction; in tactical deception, battlefield camouflage can be used to attach special patterns to high-value equipment to make the opponent’s intelligent system recognize it incorrectly.
The use of intelligent means can reduce the cost of deception. With the support of technologies such as virtual reality and deep fakes, unexpected deception effects can often be achieved with the help of synthetic optics, acoustics and other means, and they are low-cost and low-investment, which is more cost-effective than traditional strategic deception methods. For example, setting up false targets such as bait unmanned combat platforms, using electronic feints and electronic camouflage to send false signals can effectively restrain the opponent’s power, produce high returns at low cost, and thus gain the upper hand.
The use of intelligent means can optimize the accuracy of deception. Traditional combat deception is usually stereotyped, with prominent characteristics of broadcast, extensive, and generalized. For this reason, in the era of intelligence, we should focus on collecting data on opponent decision makers in peacetime and use big data for precise analysis to “know the enemy” more deeply and specifically. On this basis, deep fake technology can be used in wartime to customize the content of deception, realizing precise deception from targeting groups to targeting individuals.
The method of deception has shifted from mainly deceiving to mainly confusing and seducing.
“Playing cards” and “playing chess” are two game modes with completely different battlefield transparency. In the “playing cards” mode, both sides only know the cards that the opponent has played, but do not know the cards in the opponent’s hand, let alone what cards the opponent will play next; while in the “playing chess” mode, the deployment of both sides’ forces on the chessboard is completely transparent, but the opponent’s intentions and the next move are unknown. It is not difficult to see that from cold weapon wars, hot weapon wars, mechanized wars, informationized wars, and then to intelligent wars, the form of war confrontation is increasingly changing from the “playing cards” mode to the “playing chess” mode.
In a war of “playing cards”, blind deception is very useful. Through strict disguise and strict confidentiality, the opponent’s channels of information can be blocked as much as possible, making it impossible for the opponent to detect one’s own intentions and actions, thereby achieving surprise. In the past, when the means of obtaining information were limited and information on the battlefield situation was scarce, there were many examples of wars that used “hiding the truth” and “showing falsehood” to achieve surprise. However, at present, with the help of advanced reconnaissance technology, full-dimensional and full-spectrum reconnaissance has been realized, and the battlefield is becoming more and more transparent. Complete concealment without any revealing features is difficult to achieve. Once the concealment state is switched to the action state, the probability of being discovered by the opponent will be greatly increased. Blind deception can only become an auxiliary deception method.
In the war of “chess”, the following two deception methods are usually used: one is confusing deception, that is, using intelligent means to send a large amount of true and false mixed and difficult to identify information, increasing the ambiguity of information and the difficulty of analysis, making it difficult for the opponent to judge or misjudge. The second is inducement deception, that is, by sending high-definition misleading information, the opponent is led into a preset trap. The combination of these two methods and the cooperation of blinding deception together constitute a hybrid deception that is difficult for the opponent to guard against.
The focus of deception shifts from human perception to human cognition
As the main subject of war, people are important variables that influence the war situation, which implies uncertainty and uncontrollability. From the perspective of psychology, cognitive neurology and other aspects, the “black box” of the mind still cannot be revealed. Deception by deception targets people’s eyes and ears, taking advantage of human sensory weaknesses, while deception by deception and temptation directly targets people’s minds, taking advantage of human weaknesses.
From past cases, even with the most advanced intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance technology and the most intelligent analysis methods, it is impossible to make up for and overcome human weaknesses. In many cases, it is not that the intelligence department failed to recognize the opponent’s deception, but that the decision-makers are unwilling to believe the facts. On the eve of the Soviet-German War in World War II, although more and more evidence showed that Germany was planning to invade the Soviet Union, the Soviet decision-makers believed that the war would not come for the time being. Therefore, when the war broke out, the Soviet army was not well prepared for the response, and the initial defensive actions were very passive.
War practice shows that in the era of intelligence, even if the opponent has obvious military technology advantages and can achieve one-way transparency on the battlefield through advanced intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance technology, the enemy can still take advantage of the cognitive weaknesses of the opponent’s decision-making layer to implement counter-intuitive deception and cover up the true intentions and actions. This also shows that the focus and center of deception in the era of intelligence should not be entirely on how to deliberately cover up the traces of military actions, but should focus more on targeting the opponent’s decision-making layer and inducing it to make decisions and actions that the enemy wants to see.
Yuan Yi Zhao Di
(Author’s unit: Institute of War Studies, Academy of Military Science)
At present, a new round of scientific and technological revolution and military revolution is developing rapidly. Disruptive technologies represented by artificial intelligence are accelerating the evolution of war to intelligent warfare. Winning intelligent warfare has gradually become the focus of military competition among powerful countries. As a pre-practice of war, military training should take a new step towards intelligence in a timely manner, realize the transformation to “intelligence”, train soldiers with “intelligence”, continuously improve the scientific and technological level and “intelligence content” of military training, and help accelerate the generation of intelligent combat capabilities.
Keeping up with the changes in the war situation, upgrading the concept of intelligent training
With the acceleration of the intelligent era, high-tech has been widely used in the military field, which is causing major changes in the concept, elements and methods of winning wars. The size of the army and the number of equipment are no longer the key to winning a war. It is imperative to upgrade the war thinking and training concepts. We should follow the development trend of intelligence with a more proactive attitude and a more open vision, and advocate new thinking in intelligent military training.
Grasp the internal mechanism of intelligent victory. The winning mechanism is the manifestation of the internal laws of war. Driven by the intelligent revolution, driven by strategic competition, and guided by war practice, the advantages of information-generated intelligence and intelligence-enabled capabilities are becoming increasingly apparent, reflected in actuarial science, jointness, systems, and other aspects. To a certain extent, it can be said that the higher the “intelligence”, the higher the quality level of combat and training can be. Therefore, an army whose training thinking remains at the mechanized level will never be able to keep up with the pace of intelligent warfare no matter how it is trained. We should have a “brain storm” with the courage of self-revolution, upgrade the concept of intelligent warfare, strengthen the theoretical research of intelligent training, deal with the problems of mechanized, informationized, and intelligent warfare with the thinking of training troops with “intelligence”, organically connect training and fighting, design wars with advanced technology, and rehearse wars with intelligent means, so as to clear up the fog of intelligent warfare.
Establish the goal of “strengthening the strong”. At present, the military of developed countries is implementing a training transformation with an emphasis on intelligence, trying to further widen the gap in combat power with the military of other countries. Once the military gap is widened, it will be difficult to make up. If you can’t keep up, you may be completely controlled by others. Only by keeping a close eye on the opponent can you surpass the opponent. We must highlight the goal of “strengthening the strong” in military training, and improve the level of military intelligence and asymmetric combat capabilities in training.
Strengthen the goal positioning of science and technology empowerment. Science and technology are the core combat power. Driven by science and technology, the combat power form has leaped from mechanical energy type and information energy type to intelligent type. Traditional siege-style large-scale troop operations are gradually withdrawing from the historical stage, and cutting-edge competition in high-tech and emerging fields is becoming increasingly fierce. If military training does not improve its scientific and technological content, it will only be able to linger at a low level and it will be difficult to open the door to intelligent warfare. To this end, we should firmly establish the concept of winning through science and technology, firmly grasp scientific and technological innovation, the “life gate” and “key point” to winning future wars, greatly improve the scientific and technological content of military training, and increase the practical application of new technologies and new means such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and big data, so as to unveil the mystery of intelligent warfare and control the initiative in future wars.
Keep up with the changes in technological development and strengthen intelligent training conditions
Intelligent training conditions are the basic support for organizing and implementing intelligent military training, and are directly related to the quality and effectiveness of intelligent training. To build an intelligent training environment, we need to keep a close eye on the development of intelligent concepts, intelligent technology, and intelligent warfare, and continue to work hard in building a training environment, innovating training methods, and cultivating new talents.
Construct a realistic battlefield environment. Intelligent warfare has a wider space, a wider range of fields, and more diverse methods. The battlefield environment construction under the conditions of simple mechanization and informatization can no longer support the needs of intelligent training. We should highlight the elite confrontation, rapid confrontation, and joint confrontation under the support of intelligent conditions, fully tap the potential of existing training methods and training venues, strengthen the application of technologies such as big data analysis, smart wearable devices, and machine “deep learning”, and effectively integrate various fields such as land, sea, air, space, electricity, and the Internet. For example, use digital maps, virtual reality and other technologies to simulate and display intuitive three-dimensional terrain, weather and complex combat situations, and construct vivid and realistic intelligent actual combat scenes.
Develop advanced training methods. Advanced training methods are helpful to improve training effectiveness. Intelligent military training should grasp the key factor of intelligent “data-centricity” and transform the latest scientific and technological achievements into training conditions. We should focus on strengthening data linkage and integration, creating a “data pool” covering strategy, campaign, and tactics, and connecting command organizations to end-users; developing data intelligent analysis tools, integrating and mining combat data with the help of advanced technologies such as cloud computing and artificial intelligence; developing intelligent training systems, increasing the construction of simulation training methods such as simulation, war game confrontation, network confrontation, and intelligent decision-making, and overall promoting the transformation and upgrading of military training methods to “technology +” and “intelligence +”.
Cultivate new military talents. No matter how the war situation evolves, people are always the real controllers and final decision-makers of war. The quality of military personnel’s intelligence level determines the quality and effect of intelligent training to a certain extent. To win the information-based local war with intelligent characteristics, we should accurately match future military needs, strengthen the intelligent training of traditional combat force talents, make good use of “technology +”, “maker +”, “think tank +” power resources, promote the integrated development of “commanders”, “combatants” and “scientists” and “technicians”, and forge a new type of professional and intelligent military talent group to achieve intelligent interaction between people and equipment, deep integration between people and systems, and extensive adaptation between people and the environment.
Strengthen support for intelligent equipment. At present, the world’s major military powers attach great importance to the development of intelligent equipment. New equipment such as unmanned “swarms” and unmanned submarines are emerging in an endless stream, supporting intelligent military training while constantly testing and improving them in training practice. To this end, we should make full use of the overall coordination mechanism of war construction, vigorously promote the “+ intelligence” of existing equipment and the “intelligent +” construction of a new generation of equipment, insist on researching, building, using and improving, and improve the intelligence level of weapons and equipment through breakthroughs in training practice. We should work on both ends to achieve a multiplier effect, shorten the timeline of weapons and equipment from “weak intelligence” to “strong intelligence” and then to “super intelligence”, and better support intelligent military training.
Keeping up with the changes in war practices, innovating intelligent training models
The combat style determines the training mode. After years of development, military intelligence has moved from theoretical exploration to battlefield practice. In recent local wars, intelligent warfare has begun to show its edge and has shown the potential to change the “rules of the game” of war. As the combat style changes, the training mode must also change and change proactively. We must keep a close eye on the characteristics of intelligent warfare, innovate intelligent military training models, and fully rehearse the next war in military training.
Highlight high-end warfare research and training. We should focus on cracking the essence of high-end warfare by strengthening the enemy, continue to deepen research on strengthening the enemy, and use the development of new combat concepts and training theories as a starting point to understand the development laws and winning mechanisms of high-end warfare. We should predict future wars and design combat styles from a high-end perspective, and pool wisdom and innovation to research unique, clever, and high-level strategies to defeat the enemy. We must emphasize key actions such as joint missile defense, target strategic campaign and tactical training to force strong organizations to defeat the strong with the weak, target practical training for asymmetric checks and balances to win decisive battles in high-end organizations, target extended training in new domains such as the far sea and far domain for all-domain confrontation organizations, seize high positions in future wars through innovative training, and develop combat capabilities that are “one step ahead in intelligence” and “one step ahead in skills” against powerful enemies.
Emphasize the training of new-type forces. The transformation of war from winning by force and equipment to winning by wisdom has made new-type combat forces a new growth pole of combat power. According to information, the US military plans to achieve intelligentization of 60% of ground combat platforms by 2030, and the Russian military expects that the proportion of intelligent weapons and equipment will exceed 30% by 2025. As the army has more and more new equipment with intelligent attributes, it should move away from the actual combat training path with new-type combat forces as the dominant element, highlight the formation and combat use of new-type combat forces, carry out training methods and tactics that are compatible with the new domain combat concept and winning mechanism, increase new types of training such as unmanned combat, promote the integration of new-type forces into the combat system, and make new-type combat power resources move and come alive.
Emphasize intelligent command training. No matter how the war situation evolves, command capability is always the key to winning the war. As the intelligence level of war continues to increase, planning and command based solely on experience and personal wisdom can no longer adapt to the ever-changing battlefield situation. Artificial intelligence decision-making training has become an inevitable trend to improve the efficiency of combat mission planning, combat planning, and command and control. We should focus on commanders and command organizations, which are the key to the system’s operations, seek breakthroughs in the scientific nature, accuracy, and timeliness of command planning, and rely on new technologies such as “big data” and “AI algorithms” and new methods such as “engineering” and “one network” to promote the upgrading of command planning from “human intelligence” training to “human intelligence + intelligence” training. We should judge the enemy’s situation, formulate plans, and determine actions through actuarial and detailed calculations, so as to achieve the goal of defeating the slow with the fast and getting the upper hand over the enemy.
● Modern artificial intelligence is essentially like a “brain in a vat”. If it is allowed to carry out combat command, it will always face the problem of subjectivity loss, that is, “self” loss. This makes artificial intelligence have natural and fundamental defects. It must be based on human subjectivity and improve the effectiveness and level of combat command through human-machine hybrid.
● In intelligent combat command, the commander is mainly responsible for planning what to do and how to do it, while the intelligent model is responsible for planning how to do it specifically.
“Brain in a vat” is a famous scientific hypothesis. It means that if a person’s brain is taken out and placed in a nutrient solution, the nerve endings are connected to a computer, and the computer simulates various sensory signals. At this time, can the “brain in a vat” realize that “I am a brain in a vat”? The answer is no, because as a closed system, when a person lacks real interactive experience with the outside world, he cannot jump out of himself, observe himself from outside himself, and form self-awareness. Modern artificial intelligence is essentially like a “brain in a vat”. If it is allowed to implement combat command, it will always face the problem of subject loss, that is, “self” loss. This makes artificial intelligence have natural and fundamental defects, and it must be based on human subjectivity and improve the effectiveness and level of combat command through human-machine hybrid.
Based on “free choice”, build a “man-planned” command model
On the battlefield, the commander can choose which target to attack, and can choose to attack from the front, from the flank, from the back, or from the air; he can isolate but not attack, surround but not attack, talk but not attack… This is human autonomy, and he can freely choose what to do and how to do it. But machines can’t do that. The combat plans they give can only be the plans implied in the intelligent model. As far as the specific plan given each time is concerned, it is also the most likely plan in the sense of probability statistics. This makes the plans generated by artificial intelligence tend to be “templated”, which is equivalent to a “replica machine”. It gives similar answers to the same questions and similar combat plans for the same combat scenarios.
Compared with artificial intelligence, different commanders design completely different combat plans for the same combat scenario; the same commander designs different combat plans when facing similar combat scenarios at different times. “Attack when the enemy is unprepared and take them by surprise”, the most effective plan may seem to be the most dangerous and impossible plan. For commanders, facing combat scenarios, there are infinite possibilities in an instant, while for artificial intelligence, there is only the best-looking certainty in an instant, lacking creativity and strategy, and it is easy for the opponent to predict it. Therefore, in intelligent combat command, based on human autonomy, the commander is responsible for planning and calculation, innovating tactics and tactics, and designing basic strategies, and the machine is responsible for converting basic strategies into executable and operational combat plans, forming a “man-planned” command mode. More importantly, autonomy is the unique mark of human existence as human being. This power of free decision-making cannot and is not allowed to be transferred to machines, making people become vassals of machines.
Based on “self-criticism”, build a command model of “people against machine”
Human growth and progress are usually based on the real self, focus on the ideal self, and criticize the historical self in a negation-negation style. Artificial intelligence has no “self” and has lost its self-critical ability. This makes it only able to solve problems within the original cognitive framework. The combat ideas, combat principles, and tactics of the model are given when the training is completed. If you want to update and improve your knowledge and ideas, you must continuously train the model from the outside. Mapped to a specific combat scenario, the intelligent model can only provide the commander with a pre-given problem solution. It is impossible to dynamically adjust and update it continuously during a battle.
People with a self-critical spirit can jump out of the command decision-making thinking process and review, evaluate, and criticize the command decision. In the continuous self-criticism, the combat plan is constantly adjusted, and even the original plan is overturned to form a new plan. In the command organization group, other commanders may also express different opinions on the combat plan. The commander adjusts and improves the original plan on the basis of fully absorbing these opinions, and realizes the dynamic evolution of the combat plan. Therefore, combat command is essentially a dynamic process of continuous forward exploration, not a static process given in advance by the combat plan. When the machine generates a combat plan, the commander cannot accept it blindly without thinking, but should act as an “opponent” or “fault finder”, reflect on and criticize the combat plan, and raise objections. Based on the human’s objections, the machine assists the commander to continuously adjust and optimize the combat plan, forming a command mode of “human opposing and machine correcting”.
Based on “self-awareness and initiative”, we build a command model of “people lead and machines follow”
Comrade Mao Zedong once said that what we call “conscious initiative” is the characteristic that distinguishes humans from objects. Any complex practical activity to transform the world starts with a rough and abstract idea. To transform abstract concepts into concrete actions, it is necessary to overcome various risks and challenges, give full play to conscious initiative, and take the initiative to set goals, make suggestions, and think of ways. Artificial intelligence without conscious initiative, when people ask it questions, it only gives the answers implied in the model, without caring whether the answer can be used, targeted, or practical. In other words, when an abstract and empty question is raised, it gives an abstract and empty answer. This is also why the current popular large model unified operation mode is “people ask questions and machines answer”, rather than “machines ask questions”.
Relying on conscious initiative, even the most abstract and empty problems can be transformed step by step into specific action plans and specific action practices. Therefore, in intelligent combat command, the commander is mainly responsible for planning what to do and what ideas to follow, while the intelligent model is responsible for planning how to do it specifically. If the combat mission is too abstract and general, the commander should first break down the problem into details, and then the intelligent model should solve the detailed problem. Under the guidance of the commander, the problem is gradually solved in stages and fields, and the combat goal is finally achieved, forming a command mode of “people lead and machines follow”. It’s like writing a paper. First you make an outline and then you start writing. People are responsible for making the outline, and the specific writing is done by the machine. If the first-level outline is not specific enough, people can break it down into a second-level or even a third-level outline.
Based on “self-responsibility”, build a command model of “human decision-making and machine calculation”
Modern advanced ship-borne air defense and anti-missile systems usually have four operational modes: manual, semi-automatic, standard automatic, and special automatic. Once the special automatic mode is activated, the system will no longer require human authorization to launch missiles. However, this mode is rarely activated in actual combat or training. The reason is that humans, as the responsible subject, must be responsible for all their actions, while the behavior of machines is the absence of the responsible subject. When it comes to holding people accountable for major mistakes, machines cannot be held accountable. Therefore, life-and-death matters must not be decided by a machine without autonomous responsibility. Moreover, modern artificial intelligence is a “black box”. The intelligent behavior it exhibits is inexplicable, and the reasons for right and wrong are unknown, making it impossible for people to easily hand over important decision-making power to machines.
Because AI lacks “autonomous responsibility”, all problems in its eyes are “domesticated problems”, that is, the consequences of such problems have nothing to do with the respondent, and the success or failure of the problem solving is irrelevant to the respondent. Corresponding to this are “wild problems”, that is, the consequences of such problems are closely related to the respondent, and the respondent must be involved. Therefore, in the eyes of AI without self, there are no “wild problems”, all are “domesticated problems”, and it stays out of any problem. Therefore, in intelligent combat command, machines cannot replace commanders in making judgments and decisions. It can provide commanders with key knowledge, identify battlefield targets, organize battlefield intelligence, analyze battlefield conditions, predict battlefield situations, and even form combat plans, formulate combat plans, and draft combat orders. However, the plans, plans, and orders it gives can only be used as drafts and references. As for whether to adopt them and to what extent, it is up to the commander to decide. In short, both parties make decisions together, with artificial intelligence responsible for prediction and humans responsible for judgment, forming a command mode of “human decision-making and machine calculation”.
Digitalization, networking, and intelligence are the prominent features of the new round of scientific and technological revolution, and are also the core of the new generation of information technology. Digitalization lays the foundation for social informatization, and its development trend is the comprehensive dataization of society. Dataization emphasizes the collection, aggregation, analysis and application of data. Networking provides a physical carrier for information dissemination, and its development trend is the widespread adoption of information-physical systems (CPS). Information-physical systems will not only give birth to new industries, but will even reshape the existing industrial layout. Intelligence reflects the level and level of information application, and its development trend is the new generation of artificial intelligence. At present, the upsurge of the new generation of artificial intelligence has arrived.
In his important speech at the 2018 General Assembly of Academicians of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Engineering, Comrade Xi Jinping pointed out: “The world is entering a period of economic development dominated by the information industry. We must seize the opportunity of the integrated development of digitalization, networking, and intelligence, and use informatization and intelligence as leverage to cultivate new momentum.” This important statement is an accurate grasp of the dominant role and development trend of information technology in today’s world, and an important deployment for using information technology to promote national innovation and development.
Human society, the physical world, and information space constitute the three elements of today’s world. The connection and interaction between these three worlds determine the characteristics and degree of social informatization. The basic way to perceive human society and the physical world is digitization, the basic way to connect human society and the physical world (through information space) is networking, and the way information space acts on the physical world and human society is intelligence. Digitalization, networking, and intelligence are the prominent features of the new round of scientific and technological revolution, and are also the focus of the new generation of information technology. Digitalization lays the foundation for social informatization, and its development trend is the comprehensive dataization of society; networking provides a physical carrier for information dissemination, and its development trend is the widespread adoption of information-physical systems (CPS); intelligence reflects the level and level of information application, and its development trend is the new generation of artificial intelligence.
Digitalization: From computerization to dataization
Digitalization refers to the technical approach of storing, transmitting, processing, handling and applying information carriers (text, pictures, images, signals, etc.) in digital coding form (usually binary). Digitalization itself refers to the way of representing and processing information, but in essence it emphasizes the computerization and automation of information application. In addition to digitalization, dataization (data is an information carrier in coded form, and all data is digital) emphasizes the collection, aggregation, analysis and application of data, and strengthens the production factors and productivity functions of data. Digitalization is developing from computerization to dataization, which is one of the most important trends in the current social informatization.
The core connotation of dataization is the deep understanding and deep use of big data generated by the integration of information technology revolution and economic and social activities. Big data is a fragmentary record of social economy, real world, management decision-making, etc., containing fragmented information. With the breakthrough of analytical technology and computing technology, it is possible to interpret this fragmented information, which makes big data a new high-tech, a new scientific research paradigm, and a new way of decision-making. Big data has profoundly changed the way people think and live and work, bringing unprecedented opportunities to management innovation, industrial development, scientific discovery and other fields.
The value generation of big data has its inherent laws (obeying the big data principle). Only by deeply understanding and mastering these laws can we improve the awareness and ability to consciously and scientifically use big data (big data thinking). The value of big data is mainly realized through big data technology. Big data technology is an extension and development of statistical methods, computer technology, and artificial intelligence technology. It is a developing technology. The current hot directions include: blockchain technology, interoperability technology, storage and management technology of integrated storage and computing, big data operating system, big data programming language and execution environment, big data foundation and core algorithm, big data machine learning technology, big data intelligent technology, visualization and human-computer interaction analysis technology, authenticity judgment and security technology, etc. The development of big data technology depends on the solution of some major basic problems, including: the statistical basis and computational theoretical basis of big data, the hardware and software basis and computational methods of big data computing, and the authenticity judgment of big data inference.
Implementing the national big data strategy is an important way to promote the digital revolution. Since my country proposed the implementation of the national big data strategy in 2015, the pattern of rapid development of big data in my country has been initially formed, but there are also some problems that need to be solved: data openness and sharing are lagging, and the dividends of data resources have not been fully released; the profit model of enterprises is unstable, and the integrity of the industrial chain is insufficient; core technologies have not yet made major breakthroughs, and the technical level of related applications is not high; there are still loopholes in security management and privacy protection, and the construction of relevant systems is still not perfect; etc. At present, effective measures should be taken to solve the bottleneck problems that restrict the development of big data in my country.
Networking: From the Internet to Cyber-Physical Systems
As an information-based public infrastructure, the Internet has become the main way for people to obtain, exchange and consume information. However, the Internet only focuses on the interconnection between people and the resulting interconnection between services.
The Internet of Things is a natural extension and expansion of the Internet. It connects various objects to the Internet through information technology, helping people obtain relevant information about the objects they need. The Internet of Things uses information collection equipment such as radio frequency identification, sensors, infrared sensors, video surveillance, global positioning systems, laser scanners, etc., and connects objects to the Internet through wireless sensor networks and wireless communication networks, so as to achieve real-time information exchange and communication between objects and between people and objects, so as to achieve the purpose of intelligent identification, positioning, tracking, monitoring and management. The Internet realizes the interconnection between people and services, while the Internet of Things realizes the cross-connection between people, objects and services. The core technologies of the Internet of Things include: sensor technology, wireless transmission technology, massive data analysis and processing technology, upper-level business solutions, security technology, etc. The development of the Internet of Things will go through a relatively long period, but it may take the lead in achieving breakthroughs in applications in specific fields. Internet of Vehicles, Industrial Internet, unmanned systems, smart homes, etc. are all areas where the Internet of Things is currently showing its prowess.
The Internet of Things mainly solves the problem of people’s perception of the physical world, while to solve the problem of manipulating physical objects, it is necessary to further develop the cyber-physical system (CPS). The cyber-physical system is a multi-dimensional complex system that integrates computing, networking and physical environment. It realizes real-time perception, dynamic control and information services of large engineering systems through the organic integration and deep collaboration of 3C (Computer, Communication, Control) technologies. Through the human-computer interaction interface, the cyber-physical system realizes the interaction between the computing process and the physical process, and uses the networked space to control a physical entity in a remote, reliable, real-time, secure and collaborative manner. In essence, the cyber-physical system is a network with control attributes.
Unlike public infrastructure that provides information interaction and application, the focus of the development of cyber-physical systems is on the research and development of networked physical equipment systems that deeply integrate perception, computing, communication and control capabilities. From an industrial perspective, cyber-physical systems cover a range of applications from smart home networks to industrial control systems and even intelligent transportation systems, which are national and even world-class applications. More importantly, this coverage is not just about simply connecting existing devices together, but will give rise to a large number of devices with computing, communication, control, collaboration and autonomous capabilities. The next generation of industry will be built on cyber-physical systems. With the development and popularization of cyber-physical system technology, physical devices that use computers and networks to achieve functional expansion will be ubiquitous, and will promote the upgrading of industrial products and technologies, greatly improving the competitiveness of major industrial fields such as automobiles, aerospace, national defense, industrial automation, health and medical equipment, and major infrastructure. Cyber-physical systems will not only give birth to new industries, but will even reshape the existing industrial layout.
Intelligence: From Expert Systems to Meta-Learning
Intelligence reflects the quality attributes of information products. When we say that an information product is intelligent, we usually mean that the product can accomplish things that only intelligent people can accomplish, or has reached a level that only humans can achieve. Intelligence generally includes perception, memory and thinking, learning and adaptive, behavioral decision-making, etc. Therefore, intelligence can also be generally defined as: enabling an object to have sensitive and accurate perception functions, correct thinking and judgment functions, adaptive learning functions, and effective execution functions.
Intelligence is the eternal pursuit of the development of information technology, and the main way to achieve this pursuit is to develop artificial intelligence technology. In the more than 60 years since the birth of artificial intelligence technology, although it has experienced three ups and two downs, it has still made great achievements. From 1959 to 1976, it was a stage based on artificial representation of knowledge and symbol processing, which produced expert systems with important application value in some fields; from 1976 to 2007, it was a stage based on statistical learning and knowledge self-representation, which produced various neural network systems; in recent years, research based on environmental adaptation, self-game, self-evolution, and self-learning is forming a new stage of artificial intelligence development – meta-learning or methodological learning stage, which constitutes a new generation of artificial intelligence. The new generation of artificial intelligence mainly includes big data intelligence, group intelligence, cross-media intelligence, human-machine hybrid enhanced intelligence, and brain-like intelligence.
Deep learning is an outstanding representative of the new generation of artificial intelligence technology. Due to its performance that surpasses that of humans in many fields such as face recognition, machine translation, and chess competitions, deep learning has almost become synonymous with artificial intelligence today. However, deep learning has major challenges in terms of topological design, effect prediction, and mechanism explanation. There is no solid mathematical theory to support the solution of these three major problems. Solving these problems is the main focus of future research on deep learning. In addition, deep learning is a typical big data intelligence, and its applicability is based on the existence of a large number of training samples. Small sample learning will be the development trend of deep learning.
Meta-learning is expected to become the next breakthrough in the development of artificial intelligence. Recently developed meta-learning methods such as learning to learn, learning to teach, learning to optimize, learning to search, and learning to reason, as well as the outstanding performance of “AlphaGo Zero” in Go, have demonstrated the attractive prospects of such new technologies. However, meta-learning research is only just beginning, and its development still faces a series of challenges.
The new generation of artificial intelligence is already here, and the foreseeable development trend is based on big data, centered on model and algorithm innovation, and supported by powerful computing power. The breakthrough of the new generation of artificial intelligence technology depends on the comprehensive development of other types of information technology, as well as the substantial progress and development of brain science and cognitive science. (Xu Zongben, academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and professor of Xi’an Jiaotong University)
● Cognitive domain warfare focuses on full-dimensional attacks, including both cognitive penetration in “peacetime” and cognitive coercion in “wartime”.
● Wartime cognitive domain operations are carried out around the achievement of military objectives, and are implemented in coordination with military operations and support each other.
●In cognitive domain warfare, as the sound of gunfire fades away, the clarion call for a new round of cognitive domain warfare may sound again, and there can be no slackness.
Cognitive domain operations are confrontations conducted at the level of consciousness and thinking. Through selective processing and transmission of information, it influences judgments, changes concepts, and competes for people’s hearts, thereby guiding the reality to develop in a direction that is beneficial to oneself. From the perspective of cognitive shaping, cognitive domain operations focus on full-dimensional attacks, including both cognitive penetration in “peacetime” and cognitive coercion in “wartime”. Therefore, cognitive domain operations do not have a clear boundary between peace and war; at the same time, according to the needs of political or military purposes, its targets can be individuals, organizations, and even countries. Therefore, cognitive domain operations should establish the concept of peacetime and wartime integration, military-civilian integration, cross-domain integration, and joint victory, and sort out basic tasks accordingly.
Focus on the layout tasks of ideology
Ideology is “a system of thought that systematically and consciously reflects the social and economic forms and political systems”. Ideology determines the rational foundation of cognition and has distinct camp characteristics. Although ideology covers all aspects of social life, in the confrontation between countries or political groups, the struggle around belief guidance, attitude acquisition, and concept assimilation is particularly fierce, becoming the focus of cognitive domain operations.
Shaping and guiding political cognition, seizing the initiative to break and establish beliefs. The confrontation between countries or political groups is not only a confrontation of national strength, but also a confrontation of national will, and the confrontation of political beliefs bears the brunt. Shaping and guiding political cognition aims to consolidate or destroy political consensus, strengthen or shake political beliefs, and expand or disintegrate political camps. In cognitive domain operations, through the cognitive guidance of various aspects such as the legitimacy of the ruling party, the rationality of political ideas and systems, and the health of the political ecology, cultivate feelings such as recognition or denial, support or hatred of political positions, beliefs, and practices, and lay a political cognitive layout that is beneficial to oneself and detrimental to the enemy. Political cognition is related to the survival foundation of a country or organization, and is the primary focus of cognitive domain operations.
Shape and guide war cognition, seize the leadership of war attitude. A country can live without war but cannot live without war awareness. War cognition is the basis for the formation and development of will, concept, psychology, and thinking of individuals, organizations, and countries in the war cycle. Through the guidance of cognition of the nature, properties, and legal concepts of war, it is a key issue to build a war cognition thinking system, guide the evaluation trend of the rationality, justice, and legitimacy of war, promote the formation of support or opposition to the possible war, and regulate the fluctuation of the willingness to assume war obligations. War cognition affects war attitude, and the struggle for control over it is a task that must be taken seriously in cognitive domain operations.
Shape and guide value cognition, and seize the control of emotional will. Values affect people’s judgment of beauty, ugliness, right and wrong, and social behavior orientation. In terms of identifying things and judging right and wrong, people’s emotions always tend to support propositions with similar values. Value cognition permeates every corner of life. Through the dissemination of ethical and moral concepts, standards of beauty, ugliness, good and evil, and literary and artistic viewpoints, the competition for the right to guide value concepts, the right to guide life patterns, and the right to judge traditional inheritance is frequent and fierce. In real life, different values often penetrate and entangle with each other. The essence of shaping and guiding value cognition is to strive for the recognition of social emotions, which is a regular task of cognitive domain operations.
Focus on the social psychology of the task of creating momentum
Social psychology provides a perceptual and experiential basis for cognition, and it is formed on the basis of daily life, social activities, practical insights, etc. Social psychological guidance often promotes unpredictable changes in the real situation. It is one of the common modes of confrontation between the two sides, especially in non-military conflict periods, and it is also a task that must be taken seriously in cognitive domain operations.
Guide national psychology and regulate national emotions. National psychology is one of the social psychology that is most likely to cause conflict and confrontation. Attacking national self-esteem can breed national inferiority complex and easily split and disperse. Improving national self-esteem can enhance national cohesion, but the expansion of national self-esteem can easily lead to extreme racism, national chauvinism, etc.; the differences in status, interests, culture, customs, and life among different ethnic groups within the country provide opportunities for people with ulterior motives to stir up national confrontation, while the same living space and cooperation process lay the foundation for eliminating prejudice and even cohesion and tolerance among ethnic groups. The result depends on cognitive guidance. National psychological guidance is sensitive and easy to get out of control, which has a direct impact on social stability. It is a task that needs to be focused on in cognitive domain operations.
Guide group psychology and increase or decrease opposition awareness. Groups generally refer to people of the same kind, such as ethnic groups, regions, classes, professional groups, and even civil groups, non-governmental organizations, etc. If groups are subjectively defined based on the standard of “convergence”, then the “differences” between groups exist objectively. This difference may be political or economic status, or it may be cultural ideas, regional concepts, or other. Guiding the cognition of differences to promote the opposition psychology of different groups such as party opposition, regional opposition, professional opposition, and rich-poor opposition will not only damage the internal unity of the country, but also accumulate and increase the dissatisfaction of all sectors of society with the political authorities, laying the groundwork for instigating social unrest and division. In cognitive domain operations, attention needs to be paid to this kind of social psychology.
Guiding individual psychology and influencing social emotions. In cognitive domain operations, individual psychological guidance is divided into two situations. One is the psychological guidance of important figures, such as sensitive professionals, social intellectuals, academic elites, successful business people, etc. The struggle for their political stance, emotional attitude, etc. is an issue that both sides of the confrontation need to focus on. The other is the use of phenomena that easily trigger individual psychological resonance. For example, in public crises, major accidents, natural disasters, and even some criminal incidents and emergencies in life, intentionally guiding certain emotions may cause group polarization due to the individual’s herd effect, thereby causing changes in public opinion and even social unrest. Both aspects are content that cognitive domain operations need to pay attention to.
Targeting the critical task of wartime cognition
Cognitive domain operations precede military operations and end with them. In wartime, cognitive domain operations are carried out around the achievement of military objectives, coordinated with military operations, and mutually supportive, with the characteristics of violent coercion. In this stage of cognitive domain operations, “offensive” and “defensive” actions are carried out simultaneously, with the combined effects of weapons and propaganda, and the emergence of “enticement”, “attack”, “cheating”, and “control”. This is the key stage of cognitive domain operations.
Attack the enemy’s mind and induce cognition. Cognitive attacks in wartime are mainly carried out to weaken the enemy’s will to resist and induce the enemy to make wrong decisions. Targeted attacks are used to shake the enemy’s will to resist and front-line commanders and fighters, and information deception interference is used to induce decision-making; for armed forces, which are mainly military forces, the use of force to deter and deter is dominant, and the use of public opinion warfare and other style actions and emerging technical means are used to shake their belief in participating in the war, cause panic, undermine their military morale, and dominate their action patterns; for social support forces, strong information is delivered through large-scale military exercises, equipment tests, and propaganda on the lethality of weapons to undermine confidence, induce panic through selective target strikes and the dissemination of battle conditions, and seek understanding through publicity of one’s own humanitarian actions in the war and related international comments.
Build a strong defense line, gather hearts and minds to control the situation. The focus of cognitive defense in wartime is to build a strong defense line of “heart”, “will” and “intelligence” to prevent the loss of fighting spirit under the stimulation of drastic changes in the situation or environment. Education and publicity are the basic ways of cognitive defense in wartime. For the participating forces, stimulate enthusiasm for participation through mobilization and incentives, clarify the truth by refuting rumors, establish the belief in victory by publicizing the results of the war, mobilize morale by setting up models, etc.; for the supporting forces, establish a sense of mission, responsibility and obligation for the whole people through education and publicity on the justice, rationality and legality of the war, stimulate the psychology of common hatred of the enemy by exposing the enemy’s brutal behavior, and stimulate enthusiasm for supporting operations by publicizing the deeds of local participation in the war and supporting the front, etc.
Expand the camp and eliminate hidden dangers. Creating a favorable cognitive atmosphere and providing support for the expansion of one’s own camp is an important aspect of cognitive domain operations during wartime that must be done. In particular, although the pursuit of international support forces is mainly based on political and diplomatic activities, the widespread spread of one’s own positions, ideas, attitudes, etc. often leads to changes in international civil attitudes, which in turn affects decision-making at the political level and provides support for the expansion of one’s own camp. In addition, cognitive domain operations during wartime have an important task that runs through the entire war, that is, to eliminate the adverse hidden dangers caused by various accidents in the war. Especially in the later stages of the war, as the destructive effects of the war appear and spread, people’s cognitive systems will inevitably be repeatedly impacted by different information. During this period, ideological guidance, social psychological shaping, and individual psychological counseling are needed to ensure the consolidation of the results of the war. In cognitive domain operations, as the sound of gunfire dissipates, the horn of a new round of cognitive domain operations may sound again, and there must be no slackness.
美军网络作战武器装备研发始终按照军商民结合、兼收并蓄的方法进行。网络空间作战装备与常规作战装备不同，其主要是以代码为基础、以设计为核心的研制生产形式，供应链的层级关系并不明晰。如今，美国具有以美国国防部高级研究计划局（Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency，DARPA）为核心的军方研究力量，以诺斯罗普·格鲁曼、雷声、洛克希德·马丁等传统防务公司为主，互联网、电子、软件、信息安全等领域公司兼收并蓄的研制力量。
From the perspective of the construction of cyberspace combat forces in major countries in the world, the U.S. military, as the first army to publicly announce the construction of cyberspace combat forces, has relatively strong strength and has carried out cyberspace combat operations many times in war practice. Organizations and countries such as the European Union and Russia have also launched cyberspace combat force building and carried out some actual combat operations. The study and analysis of the successful experience and practices of the major countries and regions in the world in the construction of military cyberspace combat forces has important reference and enlightenment significance for the development of cyberspace in my country.
With the rapid development of network information technology and its wide application in the military, cyberspace has become an emerging combat domain following the four domains of land, sea, air, and space, and cyberspace operations have also become an inseparable and important component of all-domain joint operations part, and become the key to gaining and maintaining the operational initiative, control and victory. The United States, Russia, Japan and other major countries in the world have formulated cyberspace security and development strategies, established cyberspace combat forces, and developed advanced network technologies and weapons and equipment, stepping up to seize this new strategic commanding height.
The United States leads the construction of cyberspace
Whether it is cyberspace concept and theoretical research, or other related technology research and application practice, the United States is the source and leader of cyberspace development, driving the development of cyberspace in various countries and regions. The U.S. military’s cyber force is the earliest “established” cyber combat force in the world. It has gone through stages such as the establishment of defense during the Clinton era, cyber counter-terrorism during the Bush era, simultaneous deterrence and war during the Obama era, and “forward defense” during the Trump administration. It has developed into a network combat force with 133 network task teams and tens of thousands of people in various services.
1.1 Strengthening the strategic deterrent position
In order to compete for the control and development of cyberspace, the United States actively responds to the new requirements of changes in the shape of future wars, and establishes cyberspace as an emerging combat domain alongside land, sea, air, and space, and places it as a strategic deterrent. Strategic Position.
The important strategic documents related to cyberspace promulgated by the United States are shown in Table 1. In 2011, the United States successively issued three major strategic documents, the “International Strategy for Cyberspace”, the “National Strategy for Trusted Identity in Cyberspace” and the “Strategy for Cyberspace Operations of the Department of Defense”. The use and control of cyberspace has been elevated to a basic national policy.
In recent years, based on competition among major powers, the U.S. military has further enhanced its strategic position in cyberspace, and a combat system structure for cyberspace operations has basically taken shape. In 2018, the U.S. military successively released the new version of the “DoD Cyber Strategy” [1] and the “Cyberspace Operations” joint doctrine, clarifying that cyberspace operations themselves can be used as an independent combat style to achieve tactical, operational or strategic effects, and can also be integrated with other fields. The integration of combat styles improves the effectiveness of joint operations through coordinated operations; in 2020, the U.S. Cyberspace Sunbathing Committee released the “Warning from the Future” report, proposing the “defense forward” strategy, and recommending that the U.S. Department of Defense expand it to the national level , the strategy is a national cyberspace layered deterrence strategy based on continuous confrontation as the main mode of action, and behavior shaping, benefit denial, and cost imposition as the fundamental approaches.
1.2 The leadership system has a clear division of labor
The United States divides its national cyber security business into four parts: homeland security business, national defense business, intelligence business, and law enforcement business, as shown in Figure 1. Among them, the homeland security business is dominated by the Department of Homeland Security, which is mainly responsible for coordinating the cyberspace security of important infrastructure and protecting government and commercial networks and systems; the national defense business is dominated by the Department of Defense, led by the US Cyber Command, and various military services provide troops It has three major functions of attack, defense, and military information infrastructure operation and maintenance management. It is the core of the US cyber security force; the intelligence business is dominated by the National Security Agency, which is mainly responsible for detecting malicious activities in foreign cyberspace. The Ministry of Defense provides capability support; criminal law enforcement involves multiple departments including the Department of Justice and its subordinate agencies.
Table 1. Important strategic documents related to cyberspace promulgated by the United States
Figure 1. Management and coordination framework of cyberspace organizations in the United States
The U.S. Cyber Command was established in 2009 and was originally affiliated to the U.S. Strategic Command. In August 2017, the U.S. Cyber Command was upgraded to the 10th independent U.S. Joint Operations Command, and the responsibility for combat command was assigned to the Cyber Command. And the director of the National Security Agency also serves as the commander. For the U.S. military’s network operations, especially operations with high real-time requirements, this move straightens out the command and control relationship. The organizational relationship between the upgraded U.S. Cyber Command and other agencies is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. The organizational relationship between the upgraded US Cyber Command and other agencies
The U.S. Cyber Command is under the command of the President and Secretary of Defense of the United States, and has operational control over the headquarters of the National Cyber Mission Force, the Headquarters of the Joint Cyberspace Forces, the Headquarters of the Cyberspace Forces of the Services, and the Headquarters of the Joint Forces of the Department of Defense Information Network; Mission detachments, combat detachments, protection detachments and support detachments have operational control.
During the operation, the U.S. Cyber Command conducts cyber operations in accordance with the instructions of the U.S. President and Secretary of Defense, implements operational control over its subordinate forces, and provides customized force packages to the Joint Operations Command for support. The force package is composed of cyber combat forces, combat support personnel and other cyberspace forces under the Cyber Command. Cyber Command maintains operational control of force packages and delegates operational control to subordinate commands as appropriate. The commander receiving the force package has tactical control over the timing and tempo of cyberspace operations.
1.3 Large scale of organizational strength
The U.S. military’s cyber force is the first established “organized” cyber combat force in the world. It has long recruited cyber talents, formed a cyber force, and held secret exercises. At present, the U.S. military has basically formed a general pattern in which the Cyber Command is responsible for operations, and the military services and the Defense Information Systems Agency and other Ministry of Defense business bureaus are responsible for the construction. Different from the land, sea, and air combat domains, the particularity of the cyberspace combat domain requires that the two chains of management (military administration) and operations (military orders) must cooperate more closely.
The U.S. military’s cyberspace strategic combat force is mainly composed of 133 cyber mission teams under the Cyber Command, with about 6,200 active duty and civilian personnel. According to the instructions of the Ministry of National Defense in 2013, the force was formed by drawing forces from various services (41 from the Army, 40 from the Navy, 39 from the Air Force, and 13 from the Marine Corps). It mainly performs tasks such as the operation and maintenance protection operations of the Ministry of National Defense information network, offensive cyberspace operations, and defensive cyberspace operations. The 133 cyber mission teams are organized into three types of troops: national cyber mission troops, combat mission troops, and network protection troops, according to the different types of tasks they undertake. Currently, the U.S. Cyber Task Force is expanding its scale. By 2024, 21 cyber protection teams will be formed, increasing the number of cyber task teams to 154.
The cyberspace tactical combat force of the U.S. military is mainly composed of the cyberspace forces of the four major cybercommands of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps under the U.S. Cyber Command (the total number is about 80,000 people), and they are responsible for network protection and combat support of various services. The mission provides support for the offensive, defensive, and operation and maintenance operations of the cyber mission force in joint operations. The network commands of various services are also stepping up the expansion and integration of network combat forces to provide support for the operations of network mission forces and the network protection of various services.
1.4 Comprehensive combat capability system
In terms of equipment research and development, the U.S. military adheres to the principle of “building while using, and integrating construction and use”, continuously intensifies the research and development of cyber warfare weapon systems and equipment, and conducts research on key technologies for cyber warfare. A number of research programs have been carried out in early warning, command and control, and training and evaluation, and tens of billions of dollars have been invested in the research and development of various cyberspace combat equipment, thereby promoting and improving the level of network combat technology, enhancing service support capabilities and operational capabilities. efficiency.
The most representative equipment for network defense includes “network deception” system, “cyber wolf” software system, network attack alarm system and network vulnerability scanner. At the same time, the US military also attaches great importance to the application of the concept of “active network defense”. It has promoted the rapid development of network attack traceability technology. Cyber attacks include a variety of powerful computer viruses such as “Stuxnet” and “Flame”; battlefield cyber attacks are more representative of the Air Force’s “Shuter” system and the Navy’s EA-18G “Growler” aircraft. Reconnaissance perception has the ability to obtain information such as enemy communications, content, network protocols, hardware addresses, passwords, identity authentication processes, and network vulnerabilities. Programs such as “Einstein” and “Prometheus” have formed large-scale intelligence production capabilities and are trying to build a global cyberspace situational awareness system.
1.5 Equipment research and development forces are all-inclusive
The research and development of the U.S. military’s network combat weapons and equipment has always been carried out in accordance with the method of combining military, commercial and civilian, and inclusive. Cyberspace combat equipment is different from conventional combat equipment. It is mainly a code-based, design-centric development and production form, and the hierarchical relationship of the supply chain is not clear. Today, the United States has a military research force with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) as the core, and traditional defense forces such as Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and Lockheed Martin. The company is the mainstay, and the company has an eclectic research and development force in the fields of Internet, electronics, software, and information security.
The cyberspace research directions of the U.S. military, government scientific research institutions, and traditional defense companies usually cover one or more aspects of cyberspace reconnaissance (situational awareness), surveillance, attack, defense, test verification, and comprehensive integration; while the Internet, electronics, Companies in the fields of software and information security carry out cyberspace technology research and equipment development and production in their respective fields. In addition, since the research and development products of cyberspace combat equipment are mainly software, which is a logical layer product, this has led to a blurred boundary between basic research in cyberspace and equipment development and production. Teams and individuals are also an important part of the US cyberspace industry. Figure 3 shows the main power structure of cyberspace R&D and production capabilities.
Figure 3 The main force structure of US cyberspace R&D and production capabilities
Among them, large and medium-sized military enterprises are the backbone of the research and development of the US cyberspace equipment subsystem/subsystem/technical field. In recent years, the traditional large and medium-sized military enterprises in the United States have rapidly entered the field of network security through “mergers and reorganizations” as the main means, and formed several companies such as Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin. Comprehensive companies are the leading network security defense industry. In the bidding of DARPA and various military cyberspace projects, these large and medium-sized military enterprises usually occupy the position of main contractors.
2 Europe follows closely behind
The European cyberspace industry started later than the United States, mainly focusing on research on cyberspace defense and cyberspace security issues. In recent years, European governments and national defense/electronic companies have also invested in the field of cyberspace security. Through the gradual improvement of strategic policies, public-private alliances, and guidance of cyberspace technology research and development, a network that spans the entire Europe and other countries and regions has been initially formed. Cyberspace defense system. Specifically, it is manifested in the following levels.
At the level of research and development, European countries not only follow the lead of the United States, but also rely on NATO, the European Union and other transnational platforms to achieve integration and complementarity within Europe and between Europe and the United States, and finally formed a cyberspace security capability with both commonality and characteristics, second only to the United States .
At the level of organization and management, since most European countries are small in scale and easy to manage, they have achieved a relatively efficient, integrated, and powerful cyberspace management mechanism. At the same time, due to the large number of European countries and the existence of competition, there are sometimes obstacles to the implementation of national-level cooperation on cyberspace security.
At the level of system research and development, due to the very high level of digitalization, softwareization, and networking in many European countries (even higher than the United States), they are facing great pressure in cyberspace defense just like the United States. Therefore, their cyberspace development is to ensure cyberspace Safety first. In recent years, under the guidance of cyberspace thinking that focuses on defense, the research and development of cyberspace technology, especially cyberspace security technology, has been gradually strengthened. Expand investment and deployment in the field. When countries are investing in the cyberspace security market one after another, the cyberspace security products of some major European countries have already occupied a relatively large market share and opened up a certain scale of global market.
Russia’s cyberspace development ideas are unique
Compared with Western countries, Russia has always paid attention to comprehensive and large-scale information space, and has not conducted in-depth and systematic research on cyberspace as a subdomain of information space like the United States. However, due to Russia’s long-term attention to the field of information security and industrial accumulation, it has a good foundation in the field of cyberspace. Specifically, it is manifested in the following levels.
At the level of strategic planning, Russia has issued a series of legal documents aimed at protecting information security in all aspects of the country, such as the “Russian Federation Information Security Doctrine”, “Russian Social Information Development Strategy”, etc., but in the existing legal documents, it does not cover The relational system between information space and cyberspace, the term “cyber security” is not separated from the concept of “information security”. With the continuous increase of network security risks, Russia has focused on the protection of cyberspace security on key information infrastructure since 2010, and successively promulgated “Conceptual Viewpoints of Russian Federation Armed Forces in Information Space Activities” and “2020 Legal documents such as the National Policy Framework in the Field of International Information Security of the Russian Federation, the Strategic Conception of the Russian Federation Network Security (Draft), the Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation (Second Edition) and the Law on the Security of Key Information Infrastructures of the Russian Federation It expounds Russia’s strategic goals to promote the development of cyberspace at multiple levels, as well as the important measures implemented to protect key information infrastructure and guide the development of cyberspace. At the organizational level, in August 2013, the Russian government announced the formation of a specialized information warfare agency under the Russian Armed Forces, and decided to form a cyber security command and a new agency of the armed forces, with the aim of improving the country’s cyber combat capabilities.
At the level of application practice, the “Network Commander’s Handbook” published by the United States in 2010 shows that the only example of global network operations is the information network attacks that occurred in Estonia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan from 2007 to 2009. These three small-scale attacks They are all done by Russia. It can be considered that Russia has unique practical experience in the field of network security.
In terms of research and development capabilities, Russia has a network security defense company with outstanding strength. For example, Kaspersky Lab is an important company in the field of global information security, and the “Russian Technological Information” company under the Rostec Group is also a core network security company in Russia. because
Transparency is limited, and it is difficult to find Russian companies capable of researching and developing cyber attack equipment from public channels, but this does not mean that Russia does not have such capabilities. In addition, Russian hacker organizations enjoy a “famous reputation” around the world. Research, production and trade of equipment.
4 Japan set off a wave of cyberspace development
Japan is one of the countries with the most advanced information technology in the world. At the same time, it is also subject to more and more cyberspace threats ranging from targeting individuals to public sectors and infrastructure. Therefore, Japan has long paid attention to cyberspace security issues. Japan classifies these threats under the umbrella of “information security” and established the National Information Security Center in 2005 to address the threat. As the concept of “cyberspace” proposed by the United States has been widely accepted, Japan also began to emphasize “cyberspace” at the national level around 2010, and regarded cybersecurity as an important issue affecting national security. Specifically, it is manifested in the following levels.
At the level of strategic planning, in 2013, the Japanese government issued the first “Network Security Strategy”, which promotes the construction and development of network security at the national level, and clearly proposes to build Japan into a powerful country in network security. In August 2015 and July 2018, the Japanese government successively issued two upgraded versions of the “Cyber Security Strategy”, mainly to prepare for the network security protection of the 2020 Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games.
At the organizational level, in 2010, the Japanese Defense Agency established a “cyber warfare force” of about 5,000 people composed of computer experts from the land, sea, and air self-defense forces to specialize in the attack and defense of network systems. The main task of Japan’s “cyber warfare forces” is to develop transnational “cyber weapons” that can destroy the network systems of other countries, and undertake tasks such as self-defense force computer network system protection, virus removal, and program repair; develop tactical “cyber weapons” “, and study the relevant tactics of cyber warfare; support the anti-hacking organization and anti-virus intrusion tasks of the “Network Special Attack Team”. International researchers pointed out that from the Japanese “cyber warfare forces”, we can see the shadow of the US military’s “super hacker force”.
At the level of application practice, Japan pays more attention to the actual combat background in network offensive and defensive exercises, so as to improve the practicality and pertinence of the exercises. In the “March 18” exercise in 2014, the preset scenario was that Japan’s key infrastructure encountered cyber attacks during the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. In the “Yamazakura” joint exercise held by Japan and the United States in 2019, the preset scenario was that Tokyo and the southwest region of Japan were attacked by missiles and other events concurrently. The exercise aimed to test the operation of the command and control system under cyber and electromagnetic attacks situation and study countermeasures.
At the level of system research and development, Japan emphasizes “both offense and defense” in building a network combat system, allocates a large amount of funds to invest in network hardware and “network warfare troops”, and establishes a “defense information communication platform” and a “common computer system platform” respectively. It facilitates the mutual communication and resource sharing of various organs and military network systems of the Self-Defense Force.
5 Apocalyptic Suggestions
From the perspective of the construction of cyberspace combat forces in major countries in the world, major countries and organizations in the world, such as the United States, Russia, Japan, and the European Union, have continuously strengthened military cyberspace operations through strategic planning guidance, organizational structure construction, combat force formation, and system equipment research and development. This has certain reference significance for the development of my country’s cyberspace.
5.1 Deepen the top-level design and enhance the strategic position of cyberspace
Cyberspace has greatly extended and expanded the boundaries of national interests. The Internet has increasingly become the basic platform for national political, economic, cultural and social activities, the lifeblood of the real economy and the nervous system on which the entire society depends. It can be seen that network security is not only a security issue of the network itself, but its impact has radiated to all aspects of national security and national interests. Therefore, it is necessary to plan and deploy the country’s network security issues from the national strategic level. my country should learn from the experience of foreign cyberspace strategies, formulate cyberspace strategies at the national level, strengthen cybersecurity legislation, build an international cooperation system, and plan and deploy national cybersecurity development as a whole at the national level.
5.2 Consolidate the foundation of capabilities and develop cyberspace countermeasures
In recent years, with the advancement of my country’s informatization construction and the comprehensive popularization of national network infrastructure equipment, network security threats from home and abroad have shown a trend of diversification, complexity, and frequent occurrence, posing a major threat to China’s cyberspace security, leading to my country’s Important information systems of government agencies and critical infrastructure may face security risks such as large-scale leakage of sensitive information and paralysis of information systems. In order to ensure the integrity and availability of cyberspace information infrastructure, it is necessary to improve its survivability, respond quickly to cyber threats, and initiate attacks at the right time. Based on this, our country must proceed from the aspects of theory, technology, and talents to consolidate the foundation of cyberspace capabilities and provide guarantees for possible cyberspace confrontation and defense in the future.
5.3 Strengthen strength building and build a cyberspace support system
Today, cyberspace has become an emerging combat domain. It is necessary to build a powerful cyberspace combat force and seize control of this emerging combat domain in order to effectively maintain national security and development interests in cyberspace. Since the establishment of the U.S. Cyber Command in June 2009, the U.S. military has made great achievements in the construction of cyber military power, forming a strong military guarantee for U.S. cyber security, and at the same time posing a huge threat to the cyberspace of other countries. We must speed up the construction of cyberspace forces, continuously improve the cybersecurity awareness and information protection capabilities of the whole people, strengthen national defense mobilization, cultivate reserve forces, and build a network combat force system with sufficient combat capabilities, so as to effectively contain and counter the opponent’s attack on our country. cyber threat.
6 Conclusion
Cyberspace has become an important combat force for the military to seek development because of its characteristics such as not being restricted by time and space, not being constrained by combat objectives, having a wide range of sources of support for combat forces, and strong mutations in the combat process. In recent years, major countries and organizations in the world, such as the United States, Russia, Japan, and the European Union, have been committed to promoting the construction of cyberspace combat capabilities in order to seize the dominant position in this field. my country should accelerate the construction of military cyberspace forces and enhance our country’s cyberspace combat capabilities in order to seek the right to win future information warfare.
Citation format: Li Shuo, Li Zhenjing, Wang Shizhong, et al. Analysis and Enlightenment of the Development Situation of Foreign Military Cyberspace Combat Forces [J]. Information Security and Communication Secrecy, 2022(5):90-99.
US Army issued the “cyberspace and electronic warfare operations” doctrine// 中國軍事評論美國陸軍頒布《網絡空間與電子戰行動》條令
The field command FM3-12 provides instructions and guidance for the Army to implement cyberspace and electronic warfare operations using cyberspace electromagnetic activity in joint ground operations. The Fields Act FM3-12 defines the Army’s cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, roles, relationships, responsibilities, and capabilities, and provides an understanding of this to support Army and joint operations. It details how Army forces protect Army networks and data, and explains when commanders must integrate custom cyberspace and electronic warfare capabilities within military operations.
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On the basis of the 2006 National Cyberspace Operations Military Strategy (NMS-CO), the US Joint Chiefs of Staff announced the joint publication JP 3-12 in February 2013 as an internal document. October 21, 2014 The published document for public release is Joint Publication JP 3-12(R). The order states that “the global reliance on cyberspace is increasing, and careful control of offensive cyberspace operations is required, requiring national-level approval.” This requires commanders to recognize changes in national network policies that are mandated by operations. Potential impact. On April 11, 2017, the US Army issued the field command FM3-12 “Network Space and Electronic Warfare Action” on this basis. The field war said that in the past decade of conflict, the US Army has deployed the most powerful communication system in its history. In Afghanistan and Iraq, enemies lacking technological capabilities challenge the US military’s advantages in cyberspace, and the US military has taken the lead in cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) operations. However, regional rivals have demonstrated impressive capabilities in a mixed-operational environment that threatens the US Army’s dominance in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. Therefore, the Order states that the integration of cyberspace electromagnetic activity at all stages of combat operations is the key to acquiring and maintaining freedom of maneuver in the cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, while preventing the enemy from doing so. Cyberspace electromagnetic activity can synchronize capabilities across a variety of domains and operational functions, and maximize synergies within and through the cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Intelligence, signal, information operations (IO), cyberspace, space and firepower operations are critical to planning, synchronizing, and implementing cyberspace and electronic warfare operations.
The Fields Order FM3-12 supports the Joint Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Act and the Army Doctrine Reference Publication ADRP3-0, Combat, and provides a background to define the Army’s doctrine reference publication ADRP5-0 “Operational Process” and Cyberspace and The relationship between electronic warfare operations. In order to understand the basic principles of integration and synchronization of cyberspace and electronic warfare operations, you must first read the Army’s doctrine publication ADP2-0, the Army’s doctrine reference publication ADRP2-0, the Army doctrine publication ADP3-0, and the Army doctrine reference publication ADRP3. -0, Army doctrine publication ADP5-0, Army doctrine reference publication ADRP5-0, Army doctrine publication ADP6-0, Army doctrine reference publication ADRP6-0, Army technical publication ATP2-01.3, field bar FM3-13 And FM6-0. By planning, integrating, and synchronizing cyberspace and electronic warfare operations, cyberspace electromagnetic activities can integrate functions and capabilities across operational functions, defend networks, and provide critical capabilities to commanders at all levels during joint ground operations. Cyberspace and electronic warfare operations affect all combat functions and are also affected by them.
Network space visualization operating environment of electromagnetic spectrum
The field battles present detailed tactics and procedures for Army cyberspace and electronic warfare operations. The field command replaced the field title FM3-38 dated February 2014. The Fields Order FM3-12 is an Army cyberspace and electronic warfare campaign advocacy publication. The field battles contain the basic principles and guiding principles of cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and cyberspace electromagnetic activities in a single publication. It provides a comprehensive account of how they support and achieve action, and how to support the missions and functions of the various levels of force. The field battles laid the foundation for subordinate Army technical publications.
Cyberspace and e-war operations incorporate established joint and Army processes into operations such as intelligence processes, targeting processes, and military decision-making processes (MDMPs). The field battles explain the basic ideas of the Army’s cyberspace and electronic warfare operations. Content includes staff responsibilities, contributions to military decision-making processes, cyberspace and target work in the electromagnetic spectrum, and reliance on intelligence and operational environment readiness (OPE) in cyberspace.
The field battles describe the relationship between cyberspace operations, missions, operations, electronic warfare, electromagnetic spectrum, and each other’s actions. This elaboration also includes cyberspace electromagnetic activity, providing compliance for military forces and the following combat forces planning, integration, and simultaneous electromagnetic activities.
Schematic diagram of electromagnetic spectrum
The first chapter provides an understanding of cyberspace, cyberspace operations, missions, actions, and effects. It describes cyberspace and situational understanding, situational awareness, threats, risks, vulnerabilities, and their relationship to information and operational environments. The level and characteristics of cyberspace confirm the legal authorization applicable to cyberspace and cyberspace operations, and discuss the basic information and spectrum management functions of electronic warfare related to cyberspace and electronic warfare operations.
Chapter 2 provides information on the use of cyberspace operations and tasks, rather than day-to-day operations, pointing out that information operations, intelligence, space operations, and targeted work can affect cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, cyberspace operations, and electronic warfare operations. Commanders and staff officers have integrated and synchronized all of these aspects of cyberspace and electronic warfare operations.
The third chapter expounds the Army’s cyberspace electromagnetic activity and mission-style command, the role of the commander, the cyberspace with combat functions and the electronic warfare action, and discusses how to incorporate the planning elements of cyberspace and electronic warfare operations into the operational process. This includes planning, preparation, implementation, evaluation, and targeting. The discussion of the operational environment is combined with the military decision-making process, followed by an overview of the preparation requirements, implementation tactics, and how to assess cyberspace and electronic warfare operations.
Appendix A discusses cyberspace operations and various joint operations partners.
Appendix B highlights the location of cyberspace operational information in the Combat Command and Appendix 12 to Annex C. This appendix includes an example of Appendix 12 to Annex C, which describes the types of information contained in this appendix and sections.
Appendix C contains the procedures for handling cyberspace operations requests from military, military, and military units, as well as fields and information for the Cyber Operations Application Form (CERF). Blank copies of the cyber operations application form and field explanations are all part of the process.
Appendix D includes fields and information for the Electronic Attack Request Form (EARF). A blank copy of the electronic attack application form and a five-line brief with field interpretation are part of the program.
Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Actions Directory
Preface
preface
Chapter 1 Network Space and the Basic Principles of Electronic Warfare Action
Section 1 Overview of Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Spectrum
First, the network space domain
Second, combat operations and cyberspace domain
Third, cyberspace tasks and actions
Section 2 Understanding Network Space and Environment
1. Network space and electromagnetic spectrum
Second, cyberspace and information environment
Third, the network space level
Fourth, the characteristics of cyberspace
5. Cyberspace as part of the operational environment
Sixth, risk in cyberspace
Seven, authorization
Section III Electronic Warfare Action
First, the electromagnetic spectrum action
Second, electronic warfare
Third, the application of matters needing attention
Fourth, spectrum management
Chapter 2 Relationship with Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Spectrum
I. Interdependence
Second, information operations
Third, intelligence
Fourth, space operations
V. Target determination
Chapter III Electromagnetic Activities in Cyberspace in Operation
First, the basic principle
Second, matters needing attention
Third, the role of the commander
Fourth, empower resources
V. Planning work and cyberspace electromagnetic activities
Sixth, network effect application form and target determination activities
Appendix A Integration with Unified Action Partners
Appendix B Cyberspace in Combat Commands
Appendix C Network Effect Application Form
Appendix D Electronic Attack Application Form
Thanks for compiling/reviewing: Shen Song
Article source: Zhiyuan Strategy and Defense Research Institute
Chinese Analysis of Cyber Space Deterrence – Important Strategic Points
淺析網絡空間威懾的特徵、類型和運用要點
Chinese People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Sciences Yuan Yi
January 04, 2016
Editor’s note: When both opposing parties have the ability to ensure intrusion and damage to the other party’s network, they can bring about two-way network containment, making the two parties obliged to comply with the game rules that do not attack each other’s network under certain conditions, forming an invisible safety valve. Even international conventions or conventions that do not attack each other’s networks will be formed. The cyberspace has thus become a strategic area that can produce a huge deterrent effect. After the deterrence of cyberspace followed by nuclear deterrence, it began to enter the strategic vision of big country politicians and military strategists. Studying the characteristics, types, and points of use of cyberspace deterrence must be taken into consideration and necessary action by the Internet powers and the cyber force.
With the increasing dependence of human society on cyberspace, cyberspace has become the “second type of living space” for human production and life and the “fifth-dimensional combat space” for military confrontation. Countries around the world have fiercely competed for the dominant rights, control rights, and discourse power of cyberspace. The competition in the cyberspace has reached the level of human survival, national destiny, and success or failure of military struggles. Thinking about cyberspace deterrence capacity building has great practical and theoretical value.
First, analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of cyberspace deterrence
Cyberspace deterrence refers to the actions and actions taken in the cyberspace to demonstrate and control enemy cyberspace, and to control the enemy’s physical space through cross-domain cyberspace, so as to achieve the goal of destroying enemy forces, stopping the enemy, blocking the enemy, and preventing deterrence. A form of strategic deterrence for the enemy’s purpose. Compared with the physical space, the “virtual and real duality” of network space and the uniqueness of network warfare compared with traditional combat styles have determined that the advantages and disadvantages of cyberspace deterrence are very obvious.
(A) The advantages of cyberspace deterrence
The advantages of cyberspace deterrence are mainly reflected in the following: First, the deterrence approach has become more civilized and humane. Compared with nuclear, chemical, and chemical weapons based on physical, biological, and chemical killing mechanisms, the direct killing and destructive effects of cyber warfare weapons are much smaller than the former. Normally, they will not cause permanent damage and pollution to the natural environment, nor will they cause large numbers of people. Casualties and humanitarian disasters. Second, deterrence costs are inefficient. The network warfare weapons are dominated by viruses, Trojans and other software. The costs are relatively low, and the technical threshold is low. The destructive effects are rather alarming. The network defense points are multi-faceted, and they are hard to prevent. To increase the level of network security by one level, the input cost will increase exponentially. The contrast between the low cost of cyber offense and the high cost of cyber defense makes the offensive and defensive performance of the network a feature of “spirit shield”, and the cyber warfare weapon is thus called “the atomic bomb of the poor country”. The third is that deterrence methods are diverse and practical. The variety of cyber warfare weapons and the multiple goals of cyber attacks have determined that there are diversified cyberspace deterrent methods to choose from. The effects of cyberattacks are recoverable to a certain extent. As long as the application is properly implemented, the risk of causing war and escalating the war is relatively small. In a sense, the deterrence value of nuclear weapons is far greater than the value of actual combat, and cyber warfare weapons are both practical values and deterrence values. Fourth, the use of repeatability and deterrence is strong. Once the “nuclear threshold” crosses, a full-scale nuclear war will erupt, and the two sides at the nuclear balance will fall into a state of mutual destruction. The easy implementation of nuclear deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence against non-nuclear countries, will also be condemned by international public opinion. These factors are all The use of nuclear deterrence is greatly limited. The deterrence of software and hardware and the controllable characteristics of cyberspace deter- mine the flexibility and control of deterrence in light of the changes and needs of the military struggle. It can be used in advance, used throughout, and used repeatedly. It has strong flexibility.
(B) Defects in cyberspace deterrence
The deterrence of cyberspace is mainly reflected in: First, the credibility of the deterrence effect has not been fully verified. The credibility of nuclear deterrence has been verified in actual combat. However, as of now, the real network war has not really exploded. People’s astonishing destructive power over cyber warfare is more of a speculation and worry. The real power of cyber warfare can only be convincing after being tested by actual combat. Second, the reliability of deterrence measures is not very high. Network warfare is a dynamic process of continuous offensive and defensive interaction between the two sides of the enemy and me. The characteristics of network confrontation and technicality determine that the network warfare attack has greater uncertainty and may not achieve the desired operational objectives, which will greatly reduce the effectiveness of deterrence. . For example, when the enemy performs cyberspace deterrence, if the enemy takes various effective defense measures in a timely manner, it will increase the difficulty of its own cyber attack and reduce the damage, and even lead to the failure of the attack. Third, the controllability of deterrence scope needs further improvement. As one of the important weapons of cyber warfare, viral weapons have strong dissemination, poor controllability, and a wide range of influence. It is difficult to launch targeted and targeted attacks on enemy computers and networks. If it can’t control its effective scope, it will spread to third-party neutral countries and even make itself a victim. As a result, the use of virus weapons suffers from the use of “imposed rats.” The fourth is the selective limitation of deterrence objects. Nuclear deterrence is clear and effective for any country, and the effectiveness of cyberspace deterrence has a lot to do with the level of informatization of enemy countries. Cyberspace deterrence is extremely effective for countries with a high degree of informatization, and for those underdeveloped countries with weak information infrastructure and weak network dependence, it is difficult for them to exert results, or even completely ineffective. Fifth, the organization of deterrence is relatively complicated. All nuclear powers in the world implement centralized and unified management of strategic nuclear forces. Command and control powers are highly centralized. When organizations implement nuclear deterrence operations, they can accurately control each combat unit, and the organization is well-executed. The implementation of the deterrence of cyberspace involves many forces such as investigation, control, defense, and control. It has many personnel and large scales and is scattered among different departments and units in the military and the military. It is very complicated to organize and it is difficult to form a synergy.
Second, the main types of cyberspace deterrence
The cyberspace deterrence includes four types: cyberspace technology test deterrence, cyberspace equipment demonstration deterrence, cyberspace operational deterrence deterrence, and cyberspace operational deterrence. Among them, the first three are demonstrative deterrence, and the latter is actual deterrence.
(A) Cyberspace Technology Test Deterrence
The cyberspace technology test deterrence is a field in the field of cyber warfare. It constantly conducts preliminary exploratory experiments on new concepts of warfare, new experiments on the effectiveness of attack mechanisms and tactics, and practical experiments on the weaponization of new technologies. The outside world is disclosed to demonstrate its strong strength in the basic research of information technology and its enormous potential for transforming it into a cyber warfare capability to achieve deterrence. At present, network offensive and defensive technology is still developing rapidly. A breakthrough in a key technology will often have a significant impact on cyberspace security and operations, and even lead to revolutionary changes. Whoever preempts the strategic commanding heights of the network offensive and defensive technology, who will be able to achieve a clear advantage in the future of network warfare.
(B) Cyberspace Equipment Demonstration
The demonstration of cyberspace equipment deterrence is the development of network warfare equipment development planning, technology development, target testing, stereotyped production and other development stages. According to the needs of the appropriate disclosure of network warfare equipment models, performance, characteristics, parameters and development schedule, etc. Reach the purpose of deterring opponents. There are two main ways: one is through public disclosure in official media such as national defense white papers, diplomatic bulletins, and newspapers, periodicals, and large-scale websites; and the other is through online social media or other unofficial. The channel has deliberately leaked equipment-related information and implemented hidden deterrence. The cyber space equipment demonstrates deterrence. On the one hand, it can invent new cyber-warfare equipment with new mechanisms and new concepts and render its unique combat capabilities. On the other hand, it can deliberately exaggerate the operational effectiveness of existing cyber warfare equipment. There are facts in the virtual reality, there is something in the real, and the implementation of fuzzy policies, so that the other party can not understand their true situation and strength, resulting in fear and jealousy. For example, the U.S. military’s “Shuute” on-board network power system has been put into practical use several times and poses a serious threat to the air defense systems of its hostile countries. However, its basic principles, working mechanisms, and combat technical indicators have not been publicly disclosed. It has not been completely mastered by other countries and has remained in a state of secrecy. It is difficult to distinguish between reality and reality and has played a very good deterrent effect.
(3) Deterrence in cyberspace operations exercises
The deterrence of cyberspace operations exercises is to conduct drills in cyberspace through virtual or virtual methods, and use various media channels to show potential war opponents their own cyber warfighting capabilities, strengths and determinations in order to achieve deterrence. Cyberspace operations can be divided into two kinds: actual drills and virtual exercises. The former is usually carried out nationwide or in alliance with allies, and is generally based on the joint exercise of military space and space defense operations. In recent years, the United States and its allies have held “Network Storm” series of cyber warfare exercises and “Shriver” series of space-network space exercises, which have demonstrated the mobilization strength, overall defense level, and the implementation of cyber warfare. Determination. The latter is usually held at the national large-scale network integrated shooting range, and is generally based on the offensive actions of the military professional cyber warfare forces.
(D) Deterrence in cyberspace operations
The deterrence of cyberspace operations is the actual deterrence of attacking specific opponents by deterring opponents with certain attacks. There are two opportunities for its use: First, when one’s own side is aware that the enemy is about to wage a war on one’s own side, one’s own choice of the key cyber targets of the enemy’s key defenses will be targeted to combat them, and preventive and deterrent deterrence will be implemented; When the Party initiates a tentative cyber attack on its own side and implements cyberspace deterrence, it must immediately conduct effective retaliatory and disciplinary deterrence. There are many types of cyber warfare operations that have deterrent effects. For example, infiltrate the enemy’s telecommunications network, send a large number of anti-war messages to the enemy’s citizens, and attack the enemy’s power grid, resulting in a short-term blackout of major cities in the enemy’s power; attacking the enemy’s broadcast television networks and inserting their own broadcasts during prime time. Special video programs; etc.
Third, the use of cyberspace deterrence points
The general requirements for the use of cyberspace deterrence are: combination of wartime and warfare, with strength, actual display capability, and determination, strive to demonstrate deterrence with small battles, ensure deterrence with strikes, and achieve deterrence with a small price. Specifically, the following points should be achieved.
(A) Combination of peacetime and long-term preparation
“Frozen feet, not a cold day.” Successful implementation of cyberspace deterrence requires a combination of peacetime and warfare, and we must fully and carefully prepare for peacetime. The first is to conduct comprehensive and thorough network reconnaissance. Requires the combination of spying, reconnaissance and technical reconnaissance, wireless reconnaissance, and cable reconnaissance. Conduct long-term and continuous network reconnaissance of enemy network targets, gradually understand the basic conditions of the enemy’s network, draw a picture of its network topology, and in particular analyze and find all kinds of soft enemies. Hardware system vulnerabilities. The second is to conduct a large number of effective strategic presets. Using hacking methods, secretive infiltrate all types of networks through the use of system vulnerabilities or password cracking, leaving the back door, setting up a springboard machine, and laying down logic bombs and Trojans to set a breakthrough for launching cyber attacks in the future. The third is to conduct pre-prepared cyber defenses. When deterring cyberspace deterrence against the enemy, one must adjust the deployment of network defenses in advance, make the enemy’s pre-designed attack path, anticipate the use of system loopholes, and plan to implement an attack plan that is difficult to implement, or the effect of implementation is greatly reduced to minimize the enemy’s Losses caused by cyber retaliation.
(B) careful decision-making, control strength
Sun Tzu said: “The Lord must not anger and raise a teacher. Cyberspace deterrence is a strategic game behavior between countries, especially with deterrence and sensitivity. It must be rational, beneficial, and tangible. It must not be abused because of the low threshold of deterrence. Otherwise, its effect may be counter-productive. . Cyberspace deterrence has a high requirement for combat intensity control. On the one hand, if the intensity is too small, the enemy’s government and people will not have fear and will not achieve the deterrent effect they deserve. The other party may also use the same methods to implement anti-deterrence, eventually leading to confrontational escalation and deterring one’s own deterrence. On the other hand, if it is too strong, it will cause huge economic losses and casualties to the enemy countries. This will cause the condemnation of the international community and the hatred of the enemy governments and people. It may trigger the enemy’s use of conventional forces to carry out large-scale revenge. Nuclear countries may even Nuclear power may be used. This will not only stop the war but will also play a role in warfare.
(III) Unified command and careful organization
The implementation of the deterrence of cyberspace requires centralized command, unified planning, and good coordination. The first is meticulous organization of strength. Uniformly organize the four forces of military investigation, attack, defense, and control, and actively coordinate the strength of the cyber warfare forces of all parties to form a joint force. In particular, it is necessary to organize and coordinate the strength of civil non-professional cyber warfare, especially patriotic hacking, so that there can be no phenomenon of “blindness” so as to avoid triggering friction, escalating fire, causing an escalation of cyber warfare, or prematurely exposing attack intentions and giving people a handle. , leading to uncontrollable situations or failure of operations. The second is to select the target. Should choose a wide range of influence, easy to produce a clear deterrent effect of the goal. For example, broadcast television channels with the highest ratings, portals with a large number of visitors, and wireless communication networks with numerous users. It is not possible to choose attacks that are irrelevant, insignificant, and indifferent to the target. They can easily be mistaken for cybersecurity incidents created by ordinary hackers and do not achieve the desired deterrent effect. In addition, we must also consider the constraints of international law and war laws. We must not choose targets that are easy to cause humanitarian disasters. We should try our best not to select the network goals of railways, aviation, finance, and medical departments so as not to arouse condemnation and resentment from the international community and the people of the other side. The third is the precise control of the process. Prior to the deterrent strikes in cyberspace, it is necessary to publicize the momentum through extensive public opinion, issue warnings to the enemy countries, and declare the justice of their actions to the world in order to gain the understanding and support of international public opinion. In order to highlight the deterrent effect, one can highly announce the target of the enemy’s network to be attacked, break through the enemy’s layered network defenses, and implement a resolute and effective cyber attack. If necessary, the network attack effect can be resumed regularly to show its superiority. The cyber attack technology and means make the enemy’s decision makers and the public have a sense of frustration that is hard to defend and difficult to parry, thus forming a strong shock effect.
(4) Combining actual situation with actual situation, focusing on strategy
The grandson said that “it is not possible to show and not to use it,” and it is used to deter online space. Its main points are summarized as “showing without propaganda, advocating without showing.” “Indicating nothing” means that it is difficult to track and locate using cyber attacks and conduct cyber attacks on specific targets. However, it is not done for others to announce that they are doing their own thing. It not only demonstrates their own capabilities, but also makes the enemy’s suspicion of doing their own thing. However, there is no evidence and it cannot be pursued. “Proclaiming but not showing” is the publicity or inadvertent disclosure of the type, performance, and characteristics of the advanced cyber warfare equipment developed or fabricated by the company, deliberately exaggerating its combat effectiveness, falsifying facts, and integrating facts and facts, so that the enemy can’t understand its true strength. , resulting in a deterrent effect. The cyber warfare operations have the characteristics of difficulty in tracking and traceability and complexity in forensics. The initiating party can either admit or deny it, or push the responsibility to civil hacker organizations. (Source: China Information Security).
